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Foreign Relations of the United States 1951

Volume III

European Security and the German Question

(in two parts)

Part 1

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PREFACE

Fredrick Aandahl supervised the planning and compilation of this volume. William Z. Slany succeeded him as editor in 1975 and directed the process of review, declassification, and final editing.

David H. Stauffer and John A. Bernbaum prepared the sections on development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and financial assistance for defense of Western Europe. Mr. Stauffer and Mr. Slany prepared the section on the tour of capitals by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Lisle A. Rose compiled the documents on development of the NATO command structure, and Mr. Bernbaum those on the seventh and eighth meetings of the North Atlantic Council. Mr. Slany edited the materials on the attitude of the United States toward the conference for the organization of a European defense community. Charles S. Sampson prepared the sections on meetings at Bonn, discussions concerning a possible convening of the Council of Foreign Ministers, meetings of the American, French, and British foreign ministers at Washington, Paris, and Rome, and the entire compilation on the German question. The technical editing of the volume was done by the Publishing and Reproduction Division under the direction of Paul M. Washington and the immediate supervision of Anne K. Pond. Francis C. Prescott prepared the index.

The editors acknowledge with appreciation the assistance provided them by the historians of the Department of Defense, including those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are also grateful for the cooperation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency, all of which facilitated declassification of papers for release in this volume. Thanks are also due to those foreign governments that kindly granted permission for publication of certain of their documents.

DAVID F. TRASK
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPILATION AND EDITING OF "FOREIGN RELATIONS"

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 2 FAM 1350

of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the regulation, as further amended, is printed below:

1350 Documentary Record of American Diplomacy

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record is guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the Historical Office:

a. Refers to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
b. Refers to the appropriate foreign governments' requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS, AND CODE NAMES

EDITOR'S NOTE.—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

ACA, Allied Control Authority for Germany

ACC, Allied Control Council for Germany

Actel, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Acheson while away from Washington

AEC, Atomic Energy Commission

AF, Air Force

AFHQ, Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater (1943–1945)

AFN, Armed Forces Network

AG, *Aktiengesellschaft* (Joint Stock Company)

AGCC, All-German Constituent Council

AGSec, Allied General Secretariat, Allied High Commission for Germany

AHC, Allied High Commission for Germany

AIOC, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company

AK, Allied *Kommandatura* for Berlin

ALO, series indicator for military telegrams

Amb, Ambassador

AP, Associated Press

A.P., Atlantic Pact (an informal reference to the North Atlantic Treaty)

APO, Army Post Office

ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

ARBIE, United States radio broadcast operations at Munich

B/P, balance of payments

BDL, *Bank Deutscher Länder*, West German financial institution

BGA, an informal abbreviation for Bureau of German Affairs; *see* GER

BHE, *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* (League of Expellees and Disfranchised)

BIS, Bank of International Settlements

BK, Berlin *Kommandatura*

BL, Basic Law

BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State

C of E, Council of Europe

C of S, Chief of Staff

CCS, Combined Chiefs of Staff

CD, North Atlantic Council Deputies

CDT (CMDT), Commandant

CDU, *Christlich-Demokratische Union* (Christian Democratic Union)

CET, Central European Time

CFM, Council of Foreign Ministers

CG, Commanding General

CHU, Christian Historical Union, Netherlands political party

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CIC, Counter Intelligence Corps

CINC, Commander in Chief

CINCAFE, Commander in Chief, United States Air Force, Europe

CINCNELM, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean

circtel (cirtel), circular telegram

CMC, Collective Measures Committee, United Nations

CoCom, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group of nations working to control export of strategic goods to Communist countries

Cominform, Communist Information Bureau

CTB, Combined Travel Board

DC, Defense Committee, NATO; *also* series designation for documents of that committee

DDR, *Deutsche Demokratische Republik* (German Democratic Republic)

DEF, Department of Defense

DefMin, Defense Minister

DefRep, Defense Representative

DefSec, Secretary of Defense

Deleg, Delegate; Delegation

Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly

Dep, North Atlantic Treaty Council Deputy

Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram

Depreftel, Department of State reference telegram

Deptcir (Deptcirc), Department of State circular telegram

Deptel, Department of State telegram

Depto, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Deputy Representative to the North Atlantic Council

DFEC, Defense Financial and Economic Committee, NATO

DirGen, Director General

DKV, *Deutsche Kohleverein* (German Central Coal Sales Agency)

DOT, dependent overseas territory

DP, *Deutsche Partei* (German Party)

DP, displaced person

DPA, *Deutsche Presse Agentur* (German Press Agency)

DPB, Defense Production Board, NATO

E, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

E/W, East–West

EB, Executive Bureau, Temporary Council Committee, NATO

ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration

ECA/W, headquarters of the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington

Ecato, series indicator for telegrams from the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington to its missions abroad

ECC, European Coordinating Committee

ECE, Economic Commission for Europe

ED, European Defense

EDC, European Defense Community

EDF, European Defense Force

EDT, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State

EE, Eastern Element, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Berlin; *also,* Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State; Eastern Europe

Embdesp, Embassy despatch

Emboff, Embassy officer

Embtel, Embassy telegram

EPU, European Payments Union

ERP, European Recovery Program

ETS, exploratory talks with the Soviet Union; also series designation for United States position papers prepared for the exploratory talks with the Soviet Union

EuCom, European Command, United States Army

EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; Europe; European

FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization

FDGB, *Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (Free German Trade Union League)

FDJ, *Freie Demokratische Jugend* (Free Democratic Youth)

FDP, *Freie Demokratische Partei* (Free Democratic Party)

FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Far East

FEB, Financial and Economic Board, NATO

FedRep, Federal Republic of Germany

FEG, Finance and Economic Group, NATO

FinCom, Finance Committee

FinMin, Finance Minister

FM, Foreign Minister

FonAffs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives

FonMin, Foreign Minister

FonOff, Foreign Office

FonRels, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate
FonSec, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
ForMin, Foreign Minister
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State
GA, General Assembly of the United Nations
GADel, United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly; *also* Gadel, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GEA, Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State
GER, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State
GFR, German Federal Republic
GNP, gross national product
GOI, Government of India
GOP, Government of Pakistan
GPA, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State
GTI, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State
H, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
HAR, series indicator for telegrams to Washington from Harriman as Chairman of the Temporary Council Committee, NATO
HICOG, United States High Commissioner for Germany
HICOM, High Commission(er) for Germany
HMG, His Majesty's Government
HPPP, High Priority Production Program
IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee
IAR, International Authority for the Ruhr
IARA, Inter-Allied Reparation Agency
IBD, Division of International Broadcasting, Department of State
IC, Indochina
ILO, International Labor Organization
IMF, International Monetary Fund
Indo, Indonesia
infotel, information telegram
INS, International News Service
intel, circular information telegram
IRO, International Refugee Organization
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State
ISAC, International Security Affairs Committee
ISG(G), Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany
IZT, Interzonal trade agreement (Germany)
JAMAG, Joint American Military Advisory Group
JAMMAT, Joint American military Mission for Aid to Turkey
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JEIA, Joint Export–Import Agency
JP, *Jung Pionier* (Young Pioneer)
KDP, *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* (Communist Party of Germany)
L/EUR, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State
LA, Latin America
LDP, *Liberal-Demokratische Partei* (Liberal Democratic Party)
LOC, line of communication
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP, Military Assistance Program
MB, Munitions Board
MC, Military Committee, NATO
MDAA, Mutual Defense Assistance Act
MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
ME, Middle East
MEC, Middle East Command
MEDB, Middle East Defense Board
MEDLO, Middle East Defense Liaison Organization
MG, Military Government
MilCom, Military Committee, NATO
MPSB, Military Production and Supply Board, NATO
MRC, Military Representatives Committee, NATO
MRP, *Mouvement Républicain Populaire*, French political party
MSA, Mutual Security Agency
MSB, Military Security Board
MSP, Mutual Security Program
MT (MTP, MTDP), Medium Term Defense Plan, NATO

MTB, motor torpedo boat
mytel, my telegram
NA, North Atlantic
NAC, North Atlantic Council
NACD (NACDep), North Atlantic Council Deputies
NAO, North Atlantic Ocean
NAORPG, North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group
NAT(O), North Atlantic Treaty (Organization)
NATFEB, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Financial and Economic Board
NATIS, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Information Service
NATP, North Atlantic Treaty Pact
NCA, National Constituent Assembly
NE, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Near East
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
NECDB, Near East Cooperative Defense Board
niact, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NIOC, National Iranian Oil Company
NKVD, Soviet secret police
NRW, Nordrhein–Westfalen
NSC, National Security Council
ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization
OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OLC, Office of the *Land* Commissioner
OMP, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State
OOF, Office of Operating Facilities, Department of State
OSP, off-shore procurement
OSR, Office of the United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948
ourtel, our telegram
PanAm, Pan American World Airways
PAO, Public Affairs Officer
PBOS, Planning Board for Ocean Shipping, NATO
PC, participating country
PCC, Palestine Conciliation Commission (United Nations)
PED, Petroleum Policy Staff, Department of State
PEPCO, Political and Economic Projects Committee, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany
PLI, prohibited and limited industries
PM, Prime Minister
PolAd, Political Adviser
PolCom, Political Committee
PriMin, Prime Minister
PW, Prisoner of War
PWS, Permanent Working Staff
RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State
RCT, Regimental Combat Team
reDeptel, regarding Department of State telegram
reEmbtel, regarding Embassy telegram
refcirtel, reference circular telegram
reftel, reference telegram
RelCom, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate
remytel, regarding my telegram
Repna series indicator for telegrams on matters dealing with NATO from the United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948
Repsec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State from the United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948
Repto, series indicator for messages to the Economic Cooperation Administration headquarters in Washington from the United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948; also series indicator for messages from the United States Delegation at the Temporary Council Committee, NATO, to the Department of State
reurtel, regarding your telegram
RFE, Radio Free Europe
RGR, *Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines,* French political party

RIAS, *Rundfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor* (United States Radio in the American Sector of Berlin)
RM, raw materials
ROK, Republic of Korea
R-P, Rhineland-Palatinate
RPF, *Rassemblement du Peuple Français,* French political party
RPTS, series designation for reports prepared in the Department of State for use in possible talks with the Soviet Union n the spring of 1951
S/A, Ambassador at Large, Department of State
S/Def, Office of the Secretary of Defense
S/ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State
S/MDA, Office of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SAC, Supreme Allied Commander
SACA, *see* SACLANT
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SACLANT, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
SACME, Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East
SAG, Saudi Arabian Government
SC, Security Council of the United Nations
SCC, Screening and Costing Committee of the Temporary Council Committee, NATO
SCC, Soviet Control Commission (in Germany)
SCS, Screening and Costing Staff of the Temporary Council Committee, NATO
SEA, Southeast Asia
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
SecGen, Secretary-General of the United Nations
Secrep, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State to the United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948
Secto, series indicator for telegrams to the Department of State from the Secretary of State or his Delegation in connection with conferences of Foreign Ministers
SED, *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (Socialist Unity Party), the Communist Party in East Germany
SG, Standing Group of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Council
SHAEF, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (1944–1945)
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
Shapeto, series indicator for telegrams from the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
Sigto, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany
SOA, Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State
SovDel, Soviet Delegation
SPD, *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (German Social Democratic Party)
SRP, *Sozialistische Reichspartei* (Socialist Reich Party)
SUSRep, Senior United States Representative, North Atlantic Treaty Military Production Supply Board
SYG, Secretary-General of the United Nations
TA, technical assistance
TAFCE, Tactical Air Force, Central Europe
TCC, Temporary Council Committee, NATO
Telac, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Acheson while away from Washington
telcon (telcom), telecommunication conference
TGS, Turkish General Staff
TIAS, Treaties and Other International Acts Series
Todep, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Deputy Representative to the North Atlantic Council

Toeca, series indicator for telegrams to the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington from its missions abroad

Toisa, designation for telegrams dealing with matters within the responsibility of the Director, International Security Affairs, Department of State

Topent, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation on the Screening and Costing Committee of the Temporary Council Committee, NATO, to the Secretary of Defense

TopSec, Top Secret

Torep, series indicator for messages from the Economic Cooperation Administration headquarters in Washington to the United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948

Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State or his delegation in connection with conferences of Foreign Ministers

Tosig, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation at the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany

TRC, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State

T.S., Top Secret

TWA, Trans-World Airlines, Inc.

TWP, Three Western Powers

UKDel, United Kingdom Delegation

UNA, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State

UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State

UNRRA, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

uragram, your airgram

urinfo, your information

urtel, your telegram

USA, United States Army

USAF, United States Air Force

USAFE, United States Air Force, Europe

USCOB, United States Command (Commander, Commandant), Berlin

USDel, United States Delegation

USDep, United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council

USG, United States Government

USN, United States Navy

UST, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*

VOA, Voice of America

VVN, *Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes* (Association of Victims of the Nazi Regime)

WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State; Western Europe

WERPG, Western European Regional Planning Group

WFM, Washington Foreign Ministers' Meeting

WFTU, World Federation of Trade Unions

WG, Working Group

WU, Western Union (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), signatories of the Treaty of Brussels, March 17, 1948

WYF, World Youth Festival

ZVD, *Zentralverband der Vertriebenen Deutschen* (Central League of German Expellees)

LIST OF PERSONS

EDITOR'S NOTE:—The identification of the persons in this list is limited to circumstances and positions under reference in this volume. Historical personages alluded to in the volume and certain minor officials are not identified. All titles and positions are American unless there is an indication to the contrary.

ABBOTT, Douglas C., Canadian Minister of Finance.
ABS, Hermann J., Chairman, German Federal Republic Delegation for Settlement of German External Debts.
ACHESON, Dean G., Secretary of State.
ACHILLES, Theodore C., United States Vice Deputy on the North Atlantic Council.
ADENAUER, Konrad, Chancellor; Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany from March 1951.
ALLEN, William Denis, Head of the German Political Department, British Foreign Office.
ALPHAND, Hervé, French Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council; President of the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community from February 1951.
ANDERSEN, Hans G., Legal Adviser, Icelandic Foreign Ministry.
ANDERSON, Eugenie, Ambassador in Denmark.
ANGELO, H. G., Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State.
ANSCHUETZ, Norbert L., Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs, Department of State, until September 1951; First Secretary of Embassy in Greece from October 1951.
ARNDT, Adolf, a leader of the German Social Democratic Party and member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.
ASHER, Robert E., Adviser to the Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, until October 1951; thereafter, Special Assistant, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
ASHWORTH, Colonel Edward T., USA, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
ATTLEE, Clement R., British Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, July 1945–October 1951.
AUCHINCLOSS, John Winthrop, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State.
AURIOL, Vincent, President of the French Republic.
AVEROFF, Evangelos, Acting Foreigh Minister of Greece.
AXEN, Hermann, member of the Central Committee of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED); Chief, Propaganda Section of the SED at the end of 1951.

BAEYENS, Jacques, Director, Asia-Oceania Division, French Foreign Ministry.
BAKKER, A. R. Tammenoms, Netherlands Vice Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
BALDWIN, Charles F., Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom until October 4, 1951, Head of the United States Delegation to the Tripartite Conference on Aid to Yugoslavia, London, April–June 1951; Consul General at Singapore from October 4, 1951.
BALDWIN, Hanson W., military correspondent for the *New York Times*.
BANCROFT, Harding F., Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State; Deputy United States Representative on the UN Collective Measures Committee.
BARBOUR, Walworth, Counselor of Embassy, with rank of Minister, in the Soviet Union, until July 1951; Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from July 1951; Acting Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs, from October 1951.
BARCLAY, Roderick E., Private Secretary of Foreign Secretary Bevin, until October 1951; thereafter, Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.

BARKLEY, Alben W., Vice President of the United States.
BARNARD, John L., Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State.
BARNES Robert G., Chief, Policy Reports Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State; Acting Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, from May 21, 1951; Deputy Director, from September 2, 1951.
BARRINGER, Philip E., Office of the Secretary of Defense.
BASHKIN, L. A., Political Adviser to the Soviet Commandant for Berlin, October-November 1951.
BASTIN, A. J., Belgian member of the Permanent Working Staff, Defense, Financial and Economic Board, NATO.
BATT, William S., Chief, ECA Mission in the United Kingdom; United States Representative, Defense Production Board, NATO.
BATTLE, Lucius D., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
BAUDOUIN, Prince Royal of Belgium, August 1950–July 1951; King of the Belgians from July 17, 1951.
BAYAR, Celâl, President of the Turkish Republic.
BAYDUR, Hüseyin Ragip, Turkish Ambassador in Italy.
BEAULIEU. *See* Leroy-Beaulieu, Paul.
BEAUMARCHAIS. *See* Delarüe Caron de Beaumarchais.
BECH, Joseph, Luxembourg Foreign Minister and Minister of Defense.
BEEBE, Colonel Rayden E., Jr., USAF, Director, Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs in the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).
BEGOÜGNE DE JUNIAC, Gontran, French First Counselor of Embassy in the United States; Head of the French Delegation to the Tripartite Committee on Military Assistance to Yugoslavia, meeting in Washington after April 9, 1951.
BELL, John O., Assistant Director, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State, until October 1951; Counselor of Embassy in Denmark, from December 1951.
BELLOWS, Everett H., Special Assistant in the Office of the Administrator, ECA.
BENDETSEN, Karl R., Assistant Secretary of the Army (General Management).
BENEDIKTSSON, Bjarni, Icelandic Foreign Minister.
BÉRARD, Armand, French Deputy High Commissioner for Germany.
BERRY, Burton Y., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State.
BEUGEL, Ernst Hans van der, Chief, Division of Western European Affairs, Netherlands Foreign Ministry.
BEVIN, Ernest, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until March 1951.
BIDAULT, Georges, French Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State, March-August, 1951; thereafter, Minister of National Defense; member of the Chamber of Deputies; President of the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire.*
BISHOP, Max W., Department of State member on the National Security Council Staff until July 1951; Consul at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, from July 1951; Consul General from September 1951.
BISSELL, Richard M., Jr., Deputy Administrator for Economic Cooperation until September 1951; Acting Administrator from September 1951; Deputy Director for Mutual Security from December 1951.
BJÖRNSSON, Sveinn, President of Iceland.
BLAISSE, P., Member of the Netherlands Parliament.
BLANK, Theodor, Delegate of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (Adenauer) for Problems Relating to the Increase of Allied Troops; Christian Democratic Union member of the Bundestag; Chief, German Federal Republic Delegation to the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community from July 1951.
BLANKENHORN, Herbert, Minister-Director and Chief of Staff for Foreign Affairs in the Federal Chancellery until March 1951; thereafter, Head of the Department II, Political Affairs, German Federal Republic Foreign Office.
BLISS, Don Carroll, Minister in Canada.
BLUECHER, Franz, Vice Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Minister for Relations with the Marshall Plan; Chairman, Free Democratic Party.
BOETZELAER VAN OOSTERHOUT, Carel Baron van, Netherlands Ambassador in France; Netherlands observer at the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community.
BOHLEN, Charles E., Minister in France until March 1951; Counselor of the Department of State from March 13, 1951; member of the Senior Staff, National Security Council from July 1951.

BOLTÉ, Lieutenant General Charles L., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army.

BOLTZ, Lothar, First Chairman, Free Democratic Party in East Germany; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Reconstruction, German Democratic Republic.

BONBRIGHT, James C. H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

BONESTEEL, Colonel Charles H., 3d, USA, Attaché (MDAP) in the United Kingdom; Executive Director, European Coordinating Committee, MDAP.

BONNET, Henri, French Ambassador in the United States.

BONSAL, Philip W., Counselor of Embassy in France.

BOON, Hendrik N., Secretary-General, Netherlands Foreign Ministry.

BOURBON-BUSSET, Jacques de, *Directeur du Cabinet*, French Foreign Ministry.

BOURNE, Major General G. K., General Officer Commanding, Berlin (British Sector), until October 1951.

BOWIE, Robert R., Chief, Office of the General Counsel, HICOG.

BOWKER, Sir Reginald James, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.

BRADLEY, General of the Army Omar N., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

BRANDT, Willy, nonvoting Social Democratic member for West Berlin of the Bundestag of the German Federal Republic; editor-in-chief of the *Berliner Stadblatt*.

BRANNAN, Charles F., Secretary of Agriculture.

BRAY, William H., Jr., Chief of Program Staff, MDAP, until early 1951; thereafter, in the Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State.

BRENTANO, Heinrich von, Chairman, Christian Democratic Union Party; Chairman, German Federal Republic Delegation to the Council of Europe.

BROFOSS, Erik, Norwegian Minister of Trade.

BRONZ, George, Special Assistant to the General Counsel, Department of the Treasury.

BROOK, Sir Norman C., Secretary of the British Cabinet until November 1951; Chief Planning Officer and Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Treasury from November 1951.

BROUSTRA, Vincent, Head of the Conference Secretariat of the French Foreign Ministry.

BRUCE, David K. E., Ambassador in France; observer at the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community from February 1951.

BRYN, Dag, Norwegian Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

BURIN DES ROZIERS, Étienne, member of the French Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Deputies.

BURNS, Major General James H., USA (Ret.), Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until July 1951.

BURROWS, Bernard A. B., Counselor, British Embassy in the United States.

BUSH, Vannevar, President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington; Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, 1941–1946; Chairman, Research and Development Board, National Military Establishment, 1947–1948.

BUTLER, Richard A., British Chancellor of the Exchequer from October 1951.

BUTTENWIESER, Benjamin J., United States Assistant High Commissioner for Germany.

BYINGTON, Homer M., Jr., Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State.

BYROADE, Henry A., Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State.

CABOT, Thomas D., Director, International Security Affairs, Department of State, February–October 1951.

CAFFERY, Jefferson, Ambassador in Egypt.

CALHOUN, John A., Deputy Director, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State.

CARMONA, General Antonio Oscar de Fragoso, President of Portugal, 1928–1951; died April 18, 1951.

CARNEY, Admiral Robert B., USN, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, 1950–1952; Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe and Commander in Chief, Allied Naval Forces, Southern Europe, from June 18, 1951.

CARNS, Colonel Edwin H. J., USA, Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
CAROLET, Major General (*Général de Brigade*) Pierre Louis, French Commandant for Berlin.
CARPENTIER, Lieutenant General (*Général de Corps*) Marcel Maurice, French Deputy Chief of Staff at SHAPE.
CATTIER, Jean, Chief, ECA Special Mission in the Federal Republic of Germany; Director, Office of Economic Affairs, HICOG, until July 1951.
CHAPIN, Selden, Ambassador in the Netherlands.
CHAUVEL, Jean, French Permanent Representative at the United Nations.
CHUIKOV, General of the Army Vasiliy Ivanovich, Commander in Chief, Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany; Chief, Soviet Military Administration in Germany; Chairman, Soviet Control Commission for Germany.
CHURCHILL, Sir Winston S., leader of the Conservative Party in the British House of Commons until October 1951; Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury from October 26, 1951.
CLASEN, André, Luxembourg Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
CLAXTON, Brooke, Canadian Minister of National Defense.
CLAY, General Lucius D., USA (Ret.), United States Military Governor for Germany, 1945–1949.
CLEVELAND, Harlan, Deputy to the Assistant Administrator for Program, ECA; Chairman, Finance and Economic Group, ISAC.
CLEVELAND, Stanley M., Second Secretary of Embassy in France.
COHEN, Benjamin V., Alternate Representative at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
COLLINS, General J. Lawton, Chief of Staff, United States Army.
CONANT, James B., President of Harvard University.
CONNALLY, Tom, Senator from Texas; Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
CONOLLY, Admiral Richard L., USN, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, November 1, 1947–October 31, 1950.
COSTA LEITE, Joao Pinto da, Portuguese Minister of the Presidency.
COX, Henry B., Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State.
CRAWFORD, Lieutenant General Sir Kenneth, Controller of Munitions in the British Ministry of Supply.
CUNHA, Paulo A. V., Portuguese Foreign Minister.

DARIDAN, Jean, French Minister Counselor of Embassy in the United States.
DAVIES, Ernest A. J., British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until October 1951.
DAVIS, Vice Admiral Arthur C., USN, Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
DAVIS, Richard H., Officer in Charge of U.S.S.R. Affairs, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State.
DAYTON, Kenneth, Chief, Internal Political Affairs Division, Office of Political Affairs, HICOG, until the summer of 1951; subsequently, Deputy Director, Office of Political Affairs, HICOG.
DE GANEVAL, Lieutenant General Jean, French Military Representative at the Bonn talks concerning a German military contribution to Western Defense; Chief of Staff for French Minister of National Defense.
DE GASPERI, Alcide, Italian Prime Minister; Foreign Minister from July 26, 1951.
DE GAULLE, General Charles, former President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic; Leader of the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*.
DE GREEF, Colonel Édouard, Belgian Minister of Defense.
DEHLER, Thomas, German Federal Republic Minister of Justice; member of the Executive Committee of the Free German Party and member of the Bundestag.
DE JUNIAC. *See* Begouëgne de Juniac.
DELARÜE CARON DE BEAUMARCHAIS, Jacques, Officer in Charge of Saar Political Affairs, French Foreign Ministry.
DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY, General of the Army Jean, French High Commissioner in Indochina; Commander in Chief, French Union Forces in Indochina.
DE L'ISLE AND DUDLEY, Baron (William Philip Sidney), British Secretary of State for Air from October 1951.
DE MAIZIÈRE, Lieutenant General Ulrich, former German General Staff officer; Military Adviser to the German Federal Republic Delegation to the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community from February 1951.

DE MARGERIE. *See* Jacquin de Margerie.
DENGIN, Major General Sergey Alexeyevich, Soviet Commandant for Berlin.
DERTINGER, Georg, Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Germany.
DE STAERCKE, André, Belgian Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council; Head of the Belgian Delegation to the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community from December 1951.
DIBELIUS, Otto Friedrich Karl, Bishop of the Evangelical Church, Berlin-Brandenburg Diocese, and Chairman of the Evangelical Church of Germany.
DICKINSON, Edward T., Assistant to the Joint Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
DITTMANN, Herbert, Acting Chief of the German Federal Republic Liaison Group to the Allied High Commission for Germany, until July 1951; thereafter, Head of the Personnel and Organization Department, German Federal Republic Foreign Office.
DIXON, Ben Franklin, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State.
DIXON, Sir Pierson J., British Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Superintending Under-Secretary of the Western Organization Department (NATO), British Foreign Office.
DORSZ, Edmund J., Deputy Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State.
DREES, Willem, Netherlands Prime Minister and Minister for General Affairs.
DULLES, John Foster, Consultant to the Secretary of State.
DUNCAN, Vice Admiral Donald B., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
DUNN, James C., Ambassador in Italy.

EBERT, Friedrich, Mayor of East Berlin.
EDEN, Anthony, a leader of the Conservative Party in the British House of Commons; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from October 27, 1951.
EICH, Wilhelm K., West Berlin Senator for Economics and Food from February 1951.
EISENHOWER, General of the Army Dwight David, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
ELBRICK, Charles Burke, Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom; member of the Mission to NATO from July 1951.
ELLIOT, Air Chief Marshal Sir William, Chairman, British Joint Services Mission in the United States, and British Permanent Representative, NATO Standing Group, after April 1951.
ÉLY, Lieutenant General Paul, Chief, French Military Mission in the United States; French Permanent Representative, NATO Standing Group.
ERHARD, Ludwig, German Federal Republic Minister of Economic Affairs.
ERIKSEN, Erik, Danish Prime Minister.
ERKIN, Feridun C., Turkish Ambassador in the United States.
ERLANDER, Tage, Swedish Prime Minister.
ERNST, Roger, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
ESENBEL, Melih, Turkish Counselor of Embassy in the United States.

FECHTELER, Admiral William M., USN, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, until July 1951; Chief of Naval Operations from August 1951.
FERGUSON, John Haven, member, and Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from April 1951.
FESSENDEN, Russell, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State.
FINLETTER, Thomas K., Secretary of the Air Force.
FISHER, Adrian S., Legal Adviser, Department of State.
FOLEY, Edward H., Under Secretary of the Treasury.
FOREST, Alexander R., Policy Reports Secretary, Office of the Executive Secretary, HICOG.
FOSTER, William C., Administrator for Economic Cooperation until September 1951; Deputy Secretary of Defense from September 1951.
FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE, General Francisco, Spanish Chief of State and Prime Minister.
FRANÇOIS-PONCET, André, French High Commissioner for Germany.
FRANKS, Sir Oliver S., British Ambassador in the United States.
FRASER OF NORTH CAPE, Baron (Bruce A. Fraser), Admiral of the Fleet, R.N., British First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

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FREUND, Richard B., Attaché in the United Kingdom and member of the mission to NATO.

GAINER, Sir Donald St. Clair, Joint Permanent Under-Secretary of State (German Section), British Foreign Office.
GAITSKELL, Hugh, British Chancellor of the Exchequer until October 1951.
GANEVAL. *See* De Ganeval.
GEBER, Anthony, Chief of the Economic Division of the Eastern Element of HICOG, at Berlin.
GERHARDSEN, Einar, Norwegian Prime Minister until November 1951.
GERHARDT, Lieutenant Colonel Harrison A., USA, Special Assistant to the United States High Commissioner for Germany.
GIFFORD, Walter S., Ambassador in the United Kingdom.
GILLET, Robert, Deputy Director, Division of Economic and Financial Affairs, French Foreign Ministry.
GLEASON, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council.
GODLEY, G. McMurtrie, 2d, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State.
GOLAY, John F., Deputy United States Secretary on the Allied General Secretariat, Allied High Commission for Germany.
GORDON, Lincoln, Economic Adviser of the Special Assistant to the President (Harriman); Assistant to the Deputy Administrator for Economic Cooperation.
GRANDVAL, Gilbert, French High Commissioner for the Saar.
GRANDVILLE. *See* La Chevardière de la Grandville.
GREEN, Theodore Francis, Senator from Rhode Island.
GREENE, Joseph N., Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State.
GREWE, Wilhelm, Head of the Office for Changing the Occupation Statute Through Contractual Relations, German Federal Republic Foreign Office from March 1951.
GRIGOROPOLOUS, Lieutenant General Theodore, Chief of Staff, Greek Army.
GROMYKO, Andrey Andreyevich, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister.
GROTEWOHL, Otto, Cochairman of the Socialist Unity Party and Minister-President of the German Democratic Republic.
GRUBER, Karl, Austrian Foreign Minister.
GRUENTHER, Lieutenant General Alfred M., USA, Chief of Staff, SHAPE; General from August 1, 1951.
GUILLAUME, Baron (Jules Guillaume), Belgian Ambassador in France.
GUIRINGAUD, Louis de, Political Adviser to the French High Commissioner for Germany.
GUNDERSEN, O. C., Norwegian Minister of Justice.

HAAKON VII, King of Norway.
HAAS, Friedrich, West Berlin Senator for Finance.
HAKKI, Abdul Rahman, Egyptian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
HALABY, Najeeb E., Jr., Special Assistant to the Administrator, Office of the Assistant for International Security Affairs, ECA.
HALL-PATCH, Sir Edmund Leo, Permanent British Representative at the Organization for European Economic Cooperation; Chairman, Executive Committee of the OEEC Council.
HALLSTEIN, Walter, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the German Federal Chancellery from August 1950; State Secretary and Head of the Office for the Schuman Plan in the German Federal Republic Foreign Office from March 13, 1951.
HANDY, General Thomas T., USA, Commander in Chief, European Command.
HANNAY, Evan B., Financial Policy and Trade Development Division, ECA.
HARRIMAN, W. Averell, Special Assistant to the President until October 1951; Chairman, Temporary Council Committee (North Atlantic Council), from September 1951; Director for Mutual Security from October 1951.
HARRIS, Michael S., Chief, ECA Special Mission in the Federal Republic of Germany; Director, Office of Economic Affairs, HICOG from July 1951.
HARRISON, Geoffrey W., Head of the Northern Department, British Foreign Office until October 1951; thereafter, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
HARVEY, Sir Oliver Charles, British Ambassador in France.

HASELTON, Norris S., Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, until April 1951; thereafter, Acting Officer in charge of Dominion Affairs.
HASSELMAN, Lieutenant General B.R.P.F., Chief of General Staff, Royal Netherlands Army.
HAUGE, Jens Christian, Norwegian Minister of Defense.
HAY, John, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State.
HAYS, Major General George P., USA, United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany.
HAYTER, William Goodenough, British Minister in France.
HEBBARD, William L., Assistant Director, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury.
HEINEMANN, Gustav, German Federal Republic Minister of the Interior in 1950.
HEROD, William R., Coodinator of North Atlantic Defense Production; ex officio member of the Defense Production Board, NATO.
HERZ, Martin F., Second Secretary of Embassy in France.
HESSELUND-JENSEN, Aage, Danish Counselor of Embassy in the United States.
HEUSINGER, Alfred, former German General.
HEUSS, Theodor, President of the Federal Republic of Germany.
HICKERSON, John D., Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.
HILLENBRAND, Martin J., Officer in Charge of Government and Administration, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State.
HIRSCH, Étienne, Deputy Commissioner General of the Plan for Modernization and Reequipment of the French Economy; French Deputy Commissioner of the Preparatory Conference on the Schuman Plan.
HOFFMANN, Johannes, Minister-President of the Saar.
HOLMES, Julius C., Minister in the United Kingdom.
HOLT, John B., Soviet Sector Branch, Political Affairs Division, Berlin Element, HICOG, until February 1951; Acting Director, Eastern Element, HICOG, from February to July.
HONECKER, Erich, First Chairman of the Free German Youth and candidate-member of the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party.
HOOD, Viscount (Samuel Hood), British Counselor of Embassy in France until October 1951; Head of Western Organizations Department, British Foreign Office, from October 1, 1951.
HOOVER, Herbert, former President of the United States, member of the Advisory Board of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
HOPKINSON, Daniel K., Director, European Program Division, ECA.
HOYER-MILLAR. *See* Millar.
HUGHLIN, Colonel Henry C., USAF, staff member of the United States representation on the NATO Standing Group, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
HULL, Major General John E., USA, Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
HUMELSINE, Carlisle H., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.

S'JACOB, Hendrik L., Netherlands Minister for War, until March 1951.
JACOBS, George R., Assistant Chief, Division of Industry and Development, Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State, until February 1951; thereafter, International Relations Officer in the same Office.
JACQUIN DE MARGERIE, Christian, French Counselor of Embassy in the United States, until July 1951; thereafter, Counselor of Embassy in Vatican City.
JACQUIN DE MARGERIE, Roland, Assistant Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Foreign Ministry.
JANNE, Henri, Chairman and Belgian Representative, NATO Defense Production Board.
JEBB, Gladwyn, British Permanent Representative at the United Nations.
JESSUP, Philip C., Ambassador at Large; member of the National Security Council Senior Staff until July 1951.
JUIN, General of the Army Alphonse P., French Resident General in Morocco until January 1951; thereafter, Inspector General, French Armed Forces; Commander in Chief, Allied Army Forces, Central Europe, from April 1951; redesignated Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe, on August 2, 1951.
JUNIAC. *See* Begoügne de Juniac.

KAISER, Jakob, German Federal Republic Minister for All-German Questions.
KAPLAN, Jacob J., European Program Division, ECA.

KATZ, Milton, United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 until September 1951.
KAUFFMANN, Henrik L. H. de, Danish Ambassador in the United States.
KAUMANN, Gottfried, German Federal Republic representative at the interzonal trade agreement negotiations.
KEARNEY, Richard D., Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State.
KELLERMANN, Henry J., Office of German Public Affairs, Department of State.
KENNAN, George F., Career Minister in the Foreign Service, on leave during 1951; proposed as Ambassador to the Soviet Union in November 1951.
KENNEDY, Joseph P., Ambassador in the United Kingdom, 1937–1941; author of articles on international and economic questions.
KERR, Robert Samuel, Senator from Oklahoma.
KERR, Walter B., Jr., diplomatic correspondent and Chief, Paris Bureau, New York *Herald Tribune*.
KIELINGER, Valentin Anton, West Berlin Senator for Justice.
KIELMANNSEGG, Johann, Office of the Commissioner for Questions Arising in Connection With an Increase of Allied Troops, German Federal Republic.
KING, James E., Jr., Executive Secretary, HICOG.
KING, W. L. MacKenzie, Canadian Prime Minister, 1921–1930, 1935–1948.
KIRK, Alan G., Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
KIRKPATRICK, Sir Ivone A., British High Commissioner for Germany.
KNAPP, J. Burke, Attaché in the United Kingdom; assigned to NATO affairs after January 8, 1951.
KNIGHT, Ridgway B., Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, until February 1951; thereafter, Acting Deputy Director, and from July 1951, Adviser on NATO Affairs.
KOHNSTAMM, Max, Director, German Bureau, Netherlands Foreign Ministry.
KÖPRÜLÜ, Fuat, Turkish Foreign Minister.
KRAFT, Ole Bjørn, Danish Foreign Minister.
KRISTENSEN, Thorkil, Danish Minister of Finance.
KRONACKER, Baron (Paul Kronacker), a leader of the Belgian Liberal Party.

LA CHEVARDIÈRE DE LA GRANDVILLE, Jean de, Assistant Chief, Office of Economic Cooperation, Bureau of Economic and Financial Affairs, French Foreign Ministry; Secretary General of the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community from February 1951.
LACOSTE, Francis, French Deputy Representative to the United Nations Security Council.
LALOR, Rear Admiral William G., USN, Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
LALOY, Jean, Officer in Charge of U.S.S.R. Affairs, French Foreign Ministry.
LANGE, Halvard M., Norwegian Foreign Minister.
LANGHELLE, Nils, Norwegian Minister of Communications; occasionally Acting Deputy Foreign Minister.
LATTRE DE TASSIGNY. *See* De Lattre de Tassigny.
LAUKHUFF, Perry, Director, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State.
LAWTON, Frederick J., Director, Bureau of the Budget.
LAY, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council.
LECHERES, General Charles F., Chief of Staff, French Air Force; member of the Superior War Council; Acting Chairman, French Chiefs of Staff Committee; French Representative, Military Committee, North Atlantic Council.
LEFORT, G., Economic Adviser to the French Commandant for Berlin.
LEHR, Dr. Robert, German Federal Republic Minister of the Interior.
LEMMER, Ernst, Editor of the Berlin newspaper *Der Kurier*.
LE ROY, Jean, French Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom.
LEROY-BEAULIEU, Michel, Economic Adviser to the French High Commissioner for Germany.
LEROY-BEAULIEU, Paul, Chairman, Financial and Economic Board, NATO.
LE ROY DE LA TOURNELLE, Guy, Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Foreign Ministry.
LEVY-HAWES, Maurice, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State.
LEWIS, Geoffrey W., Deputy Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State.
LIE, Haakon, Secretary General, Norwegian Labor Party, since 1944.
LIE, Trygve H., Secretary-General of the United Nations.
LIEFTINCK, P., Netherlands Minister of Finance.

LINCOLN, Anthony Handley, Head of the German Economic Department, British Foreign Office.
LINCOLN, Colonel George A., USA, Office of the Secretary of Defense; assigned to SHAPE, Paris from October 1951.
LIND, Lewis M., Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State.
LINDER, Harold, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
LINDSAY, Major General Richard C., USAF, Liaison Officer between NATO Standing Group and Council Deputies.
LLOYD, Selwyn, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs from October 30, 1951.
LÖBE, Paul Gustav Emil, West Berlin nonvoting Social Democratic Party member of the Bundestag of the German Federal Republic.
LOCKER, Melville, E., Deputy Director, Financial Policy and Trade Development Division, ECA.
LODGE, Henry Cabot, Jr., Senator from Massachusetts.
LOEBE. *See* Löbe.
LOJENDIO, Miguel Maria de Legendio Irure, Spanish Counselor of Embassy in France.
LOMBARDO, Ivan Matteo, Chairman, Italian Delegation to the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community.
LOVETT, Robert A., Deputy Secretary of Defense until September 1951; thereafter, Secretary of Defense.
LUCIOLLI, Mario, Italian Counselor of Embassy in the United States.
LUETKENS, Gerhard, leader of the German Social Democratic Party and member of the Bundestag of the German Federal Republic.
LYON, Cecil B., Special Assistant to the United States Commander, Berlin, from August 1951; Director, Berlin Element, HICOG, from October 1951.

MACARTHUR, Douglas, II, Deputy Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, until February 1951; thereafter, Counselor of Embassy in France, and Adviser on International Affairs to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
MACLEAN, Lieutenant General Sir Kenneth, Chief Staff Officer in the British Ministry of Defense.
MACVEAGH, Lincoln, Ambassador in Portugal.
MAGRUDER, Major General Carter B., USA, Defense Department representative at the London Tripartite talks on German Security Controls.
MAIZIÈRE. *See* De Maizière.
MAKINS, Sir Roger, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
MALIK, Yakov Aleksandrovich, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister; Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
MALLET, Sir William I., Deputy Under Secretary of State (for the Austrian Treaty), British Foreign Office; Ambassador in Yugoslavia, from October 1951.
MARGERIE. *See* Jacquin de Margerie.
MARGOLIES, Daniel F., Deputy Director, Office of German Economic Affairs Department of State, from January 1951; Director from July 1951.
MARJOLIN, Robert E., Secretary General, Organization for European Economic Cooperation.
MARRAS, Lieutenant General Efisio L., Chairman, Italian Joint Chiefs of Staff; Italian Representative, Military Committee, North Atlantic Council.
MARSHALL, George C., Secretary of Defense until September 1951.
MARTEN, F. W., First Secretary, British Embassy in the United States.
MARTIN, Edwin M., Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State.
MASSIGLI, René, French Ambassador in the United Kingdom.
MATERN, Hermann, Chairman, Control Commission, East German Socialist Unity Party; Vice President of the East German *Volkskammer*.
MATHEWSON, Major General Lemuel O., USA, United States Commander, Berlin, from February 1951.
MATTHEWS, H. Freeman, Deputy Under Secretary of State.
MAUTZ, William H., Director, Economic and International Security Estimates Division, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
MAYER, René, French Minister of Justice until August 1951; thereafter Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, Minister of Economic Affairs.
MCBRIDE, Major General Horace L., USA, Chief, Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey.
MCBRIDE, Robert H., Consul in Rabat, Morocco.
MCCLELLAN, John L., Senator from Arkansas.

McCLOY, John J., United States High Commissioner for Germany.
McCORMICK, Admiral Lynde D., USN, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, from August 1951.
McCULLOUGH, James A., Director, Financial Policy and Trade Development Division, ECA.
McDERMOTT, Michael J., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (for Press Relations).
McFALL, Jack K., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.
McFARLAND, Ernest W., Senator from Arizona.
McGHEE, George C., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.
McMAHON, Brien, Senator from Connecticut.
McNARNEY, General Joseph T., USAF, Chairman, Screening and Costing Committee, NATO.
McWILLIAMS, William J., Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State.
MELVILLE, Eugene, Financial Adviser to the British High Commissioner for Germany.
MERCHANT, Livingston T., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs until November 1951; thereafter, Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs.
MERKATZ, Hans-Joachim von, German Party member of the Bundestag of the German Federal Republic.
MESTA, Perle, Minister in Luxembourg.
MIDDLETON, George H., Counselor, British Embassy in Iran.
MILLAR, Sir Frederick Robert Hoyer, British Deputy Representative, North Atlantic Council.
MILLER, Frank J., Chief, Property Division, Office of Economic Affairs, HICOG.
MILLER, William K., Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State.
MOCH, Jules, French Minister of National Defense, July 1950–August 1951.
MOLLET, Guy, Secretary General, French Socialist Party; Minister of State in charge of Council of Europe Affairs, July 1950–March 1951; Deputy Prime Minister, March–August 1951.
MONNET, Jean, Commissioner General of the Plan for Modernization and Re-equipment of the French Economy; President of the Preparatory Conference on the Schuman Plan.
MONTENEGRO, Daniel W., Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State.
MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN, Field Marshal Viscount (Bernard L. Montgomery), Chairman, Commanders in Chief Committee, Western Union Defense Organization, from March 1951; Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
MOORE, C. Robert, Acting Officer in Charge of Turkish Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State.
MORGAN, George A., Director, Eastern Element, HICOG, until November 1951.
MORRISON, Herbert S., British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, March–October 1951.
MORSE, Huntington T., Special Assistant to the Administrator, Maritime Administration, Department of Commerce; Alternate United States member of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board—United States and Great Britain.
MORSE, Wayne L., Senator from Oregon.
MOTZ, Roger, President of the Belgian Liberal Party.
MURPHY, Robert D., Ambassador in Belgium.
MURRAY, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C., USA, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

NASH, Frank C., Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense until July 1951; thereafter, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
NIELSEN, Sigurd (Sivert), Secretary, NATO Temporary Council Committee (TCC).
NIEMÖLLER, Martin, President of the Evangelical Church in Hesse and Nassau; President of the Ecclesiastical External Relations Office of the Evangelical Church in Germany.
NITZE, Paul H., Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.
NORSTAD, Lieutenant General Lauris, USAF, Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe; Commander in Chief, Allied Air Forces in Central Europe, from March 1951.
NUNLEY, William T., Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State.

NUSCHKE, Otto, Chairman, Christian Democratic Union in East Germany; Deputy Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic.

OFSTHUN, Colonel Sidney A., USAF, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

OHLY, John H., Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance until January 8, 1951; thereafter, in the Office of International Security Affairs (ISA), Department of State; Assistant Director for Policy and Program Development (ISA) from October 1951.

OLAFSSON, Björn, Icelandic Minister of Commerce and Education.

OLAV, Crown Prince of Norway.

OLLENHAUER, Erich, a leading Social Democratic Party member of the Bundestag of the German Federal Republic.

OLMSTED, Brigadier General George H., USA, Director, Office of Military Assistance, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Head of United States Delegation to the Tripartite Committee on Military Assistance to Yugoslavia, April 9, 1951; Chief, Joint MDAP mission to Yugoslavia from August 1951.

O'NEILL, Con Douglas Walter, First Secretary and Political Director to the British High Commissioner for Germany.

ORLOPP, Josef, Ministry for Foreign and German Trade, German Democratic Republic.

O'SHAUGHNESSY, Elim, Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State.

OSHINS, Robert L., Deputy Director, Organization and Planning Division, ECA.

PABSCH, Anton F., Political Affairs Officer in the Internal Political and Governmental Affairs Division (Liaison and Political Reporting Division, after May 1951), Office of Political Affairs, HICOG.

PACCIARDI, Randolfo, Italian Minister of Defense.

PACE, Frank, Jr., Secretary of the Army.

PAGE, Edward, Jr., Director, Berlin Element, HICOG, until July 1951.

PARKMAN, Henry, Chief, ECA Mission in France until August 1951.

PARODI, Alexandre, Secretary General, French Foreign Ministry.

PARROTT, Cecil Cuthbert, Head of the United Nations (Political) Department, British Foreign Office.

PARSONS, J. Graham, Deputy Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, from July 1951.

PAUL, Norman S., Deputy Assistant in the Office of the Assistant for International Security Affairs, ECA.

PEARSON, Lester B., Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs; Chairman Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Rome, November 1951.

PELLA, Giuseppe, Italian Minister of the Budget and Treasury until July 1951; thereafter, Minister of the Budget.

PERKINS, George W., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

PETERSEN, Harald, Danish Defense Minister.

PETSCHE, Maurice, French Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs until August 1951; Minister of State, August–September 1951.

PÉTURSSON, Gunnlaugur, Icelandic Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

PEURIFOY, John E., Ambassador in Greece.

PFERDMENGES, Robert, Christian Democratic Union member of the Bundestag of the German Federal Republic.

PHILLIPS, Joseph B., Information and Editorial Specialist, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

PHOLIEN, Joseph, Belgian Prime Minister.

PITTMAN, Steuart L., Office of the General Counsel, ECA.

PLEVEN, René, French Prime Minister, July 1950–March 1951; Deputy Prime Minister, March–August 1951; Prime Minister, August 1951–January 1952.

PLOWDEN, Sir Edwin, Chief Planning Officer and Chairman of the British Economic Planning Board; Vice Chairman, Temporary Council Committee, North Atlantic Council, from September 1951.

PORTER, Ivor F., First Secretary, British Embassy in the United States.

PORTER, Paul R., Assistant Administrator for Program, ECA; Acting United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 from September 1951.

PRUD'HOMME, Hector C., Director, Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State.

QUARONI, Pietro, Italian Ambassador in France.
QUEUILLE, Henri, French Minister of the Interior until March 1951; Prime Minister, March–August 1951; thereafter, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State.

RAU, Heinrich, Deputy Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic and Chairman, State Planning Commission; member of the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party.
RAYBURN, Sam, Speaker of the House of Representatives.
RAYNOR, G. Hayden, Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, from March 1951.
REBER, Samuel, Jr., Director of Political Affairs and Counselor, HICOG; United States Deputy for Austria, Council of Foreign Ministers.
REIFMAN, Alfred, Division of Research for Western Europe, Department of State.
REIMANN, Max, Chairman of the German Communist Party; member of the Bundestag of the German Federal Republic.
REINSTEIN, Jacques, J., Director, Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State, until December 1950; thereafter, on duty at Frankfort on the Main; Special Assistant to the Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, from August 1951.
REUTER, Ernst, Governing Mayor of West Berlin.
RICHARDSON, Commander David C., USN, Joint Strategic Plans Group, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
RICHEY, Earle J., Office of African Affairs, Department of State.
RIDDLEBERGER, James W., United States Political Observer at the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community; attached to the ECA Mission in France; Acting Deputy United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 from September 1951.
RIDGWAY, General Matthew B., USA, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Korea); Commander in Chief, Far East.
RIDSDALE, William, Head of the News Department, British Foreign Office.
RILEY, Roderick H., Officer in Charge of Industry and Development, Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State, from spring 1951; Officer in Charge of Trade and Resources from fall 1951.
ROBERTS, Frank K., Deputy Under-Secretary of State (German Section), British Foreign Office, from October 1951.
ROBERTSON, General Sir Brian H., British Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces.
ROEDIGER, Professor Conrad, Deputy Head of the German Federal Republic Delegation to the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community.
ROGERS, Jordan T., Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State.
ROIJEN, Jan Herman van, Netherlands Ambassador in the United States.
ROLL, Eric, British Representative on the NATO Financial and Economic Board; Chairman of the Economic and Financial Working Group, OEEC.
ROOSEVELT, Anna Eleanor (Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt), Chairman, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, until April 1951.
ROSE, Edward M., Assistant to the Head of the Western Organizations Department, British Foreign Office.
ROSEMAN, Alvin, United States Representative for Specialized Agency Affairs at Geneva, ECA, until June 1951; Director, Organization and Planning Division, ECA, from July 1951.
ROSSI LONGHI, Alberto, Italian Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
ROUNTREE, William M., Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State.
ROWAN, Sir Leslie, British Minister (Economic) in the United States until July 1951; Second Secretary in the British Treasury from September 1951.
RUEFF, Jacques, French economist.

SALAZAR, Antonio de Oliveira, Portuguese Prime Minister.
SANTOS COSTA, Lieutenant Colonel Fernando dos, Portuguese Minister of National Defense.
SATTERTHWAITE, Livingston L., Deputy Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, until August 1951; thereafter, on detail to the National War College.
SAUVAGNARGUES, Jean, Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs, French Foreign Ministry; Acting Deputy Director from May 1951, Deputy Director from August 1951, Office of Central European Affairs, French Foreign Ministry.

SCHACHT, Hjalmar, German economist.
SCHÄFFER, Fritz, German Federal Republic Minister of Finance.
SCHELLING, Thomas C., Economic Cooperation Administration until July 1951; thereafter, in the Executive Office of the President.
SCHMID, Carlo, Deputy Chairman, Social Democratic Party of Germany.
SCHREIBER, Walter Carl Rudolf, Deputy Mayor of West Berlin.
SCHUMACHER, Kurt, Chairman, Executive Committee, Social Democratic Party of West Germany; member of the Bundestag of the German Federal Republic.
SCHUMAN, Robert, French Foreign Minister, leader of the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire.*
SCHUMANN, Maurice, French Deputy Foreign Minister from August 1951.
SCHUYLER, Major General Cortlandt V. R., USA, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, SHAPE.
SCOTT, Joseph W., Officer in Charge of Swiss and Benelux Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State.
SCOTT, Robert Heatlie, Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.
SEMYONOV, Vladimir Semyonovich, Political Adviser to the Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany.
SEYDOUX FORNIER DE CLAUSSONNE, François, Head of the European Affairs Section, French Foreign Ministry.
SFORZA, Count Carlo, Italian Foreign Minister.
SHEPPARD, William J., Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until August 5, 1951; then, Executive Assistant to the Director for International Security Affairs, until November 25, 1951; thereafter, Executive Assistant to the Director for Mutual Security.
SHINWELL, Emanuel, British Minister of Defense until October 1951.
SHUCKBURGH, Charles A. E., Head of the Western Organizations Department, British Foreign Office, until October 1951; thereafter, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden).
SIDI MOHAMMAD, Sultan of Morocco.
S'JACOB. *See* s'Jacob under J.
SKAUG, K., Norwegian Representative on the NATO Financial and Economic Board.
SLATER, Joseph E., United States Secretary on the Allied General Secretariat, Allied High Commission for Germany.
SLEEMAN, Lieutenant Colonel R. C., Chairman Secretary, Allied Kommandatura, Berlin.
SLESSOR, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John C., Chief, British Air Staff.
SLIM, Field Marshal Sir William J., Chief, British Imperial General Staff.
SMIRNOV, Major General I. V., Administrative Officer, Soviet Control Commission in Germany.
SMITH, Joseph Kingsbury, European General Manager, International News Service, Paris.
SNOW, Conrad E., Acting Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.
SNOW, William P., Deputy Chief of Mission and Counselor of Embassy in Norway.
SNOY ET D' OPPUERS, Baron Jean-Charles, Belgian economist, former Chairman of the Council of the OEEC.
SNYDER, John W., Secretary of the Treasury.
SPAAK, Paul-Henri, former Belgian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister; President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe until December 1951; leader of the Belgian Socialist Party.
SPEIDEL, Hans, former German General and military representative of the Federal Republic of Germany at the Bonn talks concerning a German contribution to Western defense and to the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community.
SPENNRATH, Friedrich, President of the West Berlin Chamber of Commerce.
SPIERENBURG, Dirk P., Chairman of the OEEC Council at the Official Level.
SPOFFORD, Charles M., United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council; Chairman, North Atlantic Council Deputies and European Coordinating Committee.
STABLER, Wells, Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, Department of State.
STAERCKE, André de, Belgian Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
STAF, Cornelis, Netherlands Minister for War and the Navy from March 1951.
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STEEL, Sir Christopher E., British Minister in the United States.
STEENSEN-LETH, Vincens de, Danish Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
STEVENS, Roger B., Assistant Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office; Alternate Representative at the Intergovernmental Study Group for Germany; Representative to the Tripartite Talks on a German Financial Contribution to Western Defense from October 1951.
STIKKER, Dirk U., Netherlands Foreign Minister; Chairman, OEEC Council.
STONE, Shepard, Director, Office of Public Affairs, HICOG.
STRANG, Sir William, British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
STRAUS, Richard, Information and Education Specialist, Office of German Public Affairs, Department of State.
STUYT, Giacomo Constantyn, Chief, Western Cooperation Section, Netherlands Foreign Ministry.
SUHR, Otto, President of the West Berlin House of Representatives.
SULTAN, Herbert L., Legislation Division, Office of the General Counsel, HICOG.
SULZBERGER, C. L., chief foreign correspondent for the *New York Times*.
SUSIN, A. F., Deputy Berlin Representative of the Soviet Control Commission for Germany.

TAFT, Robert A., Senator from Ohio.
TASSIGNY. *See* De Lattre de Tassigny.
TAVIANI, Paolo Emilio, Under Secretary to the Italian Foreign Minister.
TEDDER, Baron (Arthur William Tedder), Marshal of the Royal Air Force; British Permanent Representative, NATO Standing Group, until April 1951.
THEDIECK, Franz, State Secretary in the German Federal Republic Ministry for All-German Questions.
THOMPSON, Llewellyn E., Jr., Counselor of Embassy in Italy.
THORP, Willard L., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
TJARDA VAN STARKENBORGH STACHOUWER, Jonkheer Alidius W. L., Netherlands Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
TRIMBLE, William C., First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom until September 1951; then, Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom, until October 1951; thereafter, Counselor of Embassy in the Netherlands.
TRIVERS, Howard, First Secretary of Embassy in Denmark.
TRUMAN, Harry S., President of the United States.
TUFTS, Robert W., Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.
TWINING, General Nathan F., Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

ULBRICHT, Walter, Deputy Minister President of the German Democratic Republic; member of the Politburo and Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party.
ULRICH, Ruy Ennes, Portuguese Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
UNDÉN, Östen, Swedish Foreign Minister.

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VAN ROIJEN. *See* Roijen.
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VASS, Laurence C., Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State.
VERNON, Raymond, Commercial Policy Staff, Office of Transport and Communications, Department of State, from November 1951; thereafter, Deputy Director, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Department of State.
VILLARD, Henry S., Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.
VINOGRADOV, Major General Ilya Vasilyevich, Deputy Chief of Staff to the Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (Chuikov).
VITETTI, Leonardo, Director General of General Affairs, Italian Foreign Ministry.
VOCKE, Wilhelm, President of the *Bank Deutscher Länder;* member of the Board, Bank for International Settlements.

VOCKEL, Heinrich, Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany in West Berlin.
VREDENBURCH, Jonkheer Hendrik F. L. K. van, Administrator of the Free Territory of Tangier, 1948–1951; from October 1951, Head of the Netherlands Delegation to the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community.
VYSHINSKY, Andrey Yanuaryevich, Soviet Foreign Minister.

WADSWORTH, George, Ambassador in Turkey.
WAINHOUSE, David W., Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, until April 1951; thereafter, Director.
WANSBROUGH-JONES, Major General Llewelyn, Chief of Staff, British Western Command.
WAPLER, Arnauld, Chief, Atlantic Pact Division, French Foreign Ministry.
WARD, John G., British Deputy High Commissioner for Germany.
WEBB, James E., Under Secretary of State.
WEHNER, Herbert, Chairman of the Committee for All-German Questions in the Bundestag of the German Federal Republic.
WELLINGTON, Rebecca G., Political Officer; Chief, Political Affairs Division, Berlin Element, HICOG, from May 1951.
WERKMEISTER, Karl, Chief, Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the OEEC.
WESKAM, Wilhelm, Roman Catholic Bishop of Berlin, from June 1951.
WESTRICK, Ludger, State Secretary, Ministry of Economics, Federal Republic of Germany.
WHERRY, Kenneth S., Senator from Nebraska.
WHITE, Major General Thomas D., USAF, Director of Plans, Department of the Air Force.
WHITELEY, Lieutenant General Sir John, F. M., Deputy Chief, British Imperial General Staff.
WHITMAN, Roswell H., Officer in Charge of Economic Organization Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State.
WIESNER, Louis Arnold, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State.
WILGRESS, L. Dana, Canadian Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.
WILLIAMSON, Francis T., Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State.
WILLIS, Frances E., First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom; Counselor of Legation in Finland from February 1951.
WILSON, Charles E., Director of Defense Mobilization.
WOLF, Joseph J., Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State.
WOOD, C. Tyler, Deputy United States Special Representative in Europe Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 until late December 1951; United States Representative, NATO Financial and Economic Board, after September 1951.
WOOD, Sir Ernest, British Foreign Office, after April 7, 1951.
WOODWARD, Stanley, Ambassador in Canada.
WOOLDRIDGE, Rear Admiral Edmund T., USN, Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Representative on the Senior Staff of the National Security Council.
WRIGHT, Vice Admiral Jerauld, USN, Deputy to the United States Representative, NATO Standing Group.
WYMAN, Parker D., Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State.

YINGLING, Raymond T., Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State.

ZEELAND, Paul van, Belgian Foreign Minister; Chairman, Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa.
ZOPPI, Vittorio, Secretary General, Italian Foreign Ministry.

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Bonn Mission Files, McCloy Project, Lot 311

Comprises a chronological record on all phases of the work of the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany including a "Diary" which indicates McCloy's daily appointments and conversations. Especially useful for documentation on the Allied High Commission for Germany.

CFM Files, Lot M–88

Consolidated master collection of the records of conferences of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers and ancillary bodies, North Atlantic Council, other meetings of the Secretary of State with the Foreign Ministers of European powers, and materials on the Austrian and German peace settlements for the years 1943–1955 prepared by the Department of State Records Service Center.

Conference Files, Lot 59 D 95

Collection of documentation on certain official visits of European heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences (including North Atlantic Council sessions) attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1949–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

ECA Message Files, FRC 53 A 278

Master set of telegrams and airgrams to and from all overseas missions for the years 1948–1951 as maintained by ECA Washington headquarters.

EDC Files, Lot 57 M 44

Comprehensive collection of official documentation of the Paris Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community and related reports, memoranda, and correspondence for the years 1951–1952, as maintained in the Embassy in Paris (by Second Secretary Stanley Cleveland).

EUR Files, Lot 59 D 233

Subject files maintained in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs for the years 1945–1957.

Frankfurt Consulate General Files, Lot 58 F 97

Central classified correspondence of the Consulate General in Frankfurt for the years 1950–1952. (Retained as a portion of FRC Accession no. 59 A 543.)

ISAC Files, Lot 53 D 443

Top Secret records relating to the activities of the International Security Affairs Committee for the period February–October 1951, including action summaries, committee summaries, memoranda of meetings, minutes, and other papers, as maintained in the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

London Embassy Files, Lot 59 F 59

Classified files of the Embassy in the United Kingdom for 1951 containing important comprehensive collections of documentation (principally exchanges of telegrams but also memoranda and other papers) on Germany and Western European politico-military matters.

Military Cable Files, Lot 52–246

Important Top Secret Army and Air Force telegrams furnished to the Department of State by the Department of Defense Liaison Officer during 1950–1951, dealing mostly with Korea but also with Germany and other European areas, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

News Division Files

The principal repository for complete sets of the press and radio news conferences of the Secretary of State and press releases of the Department of State maintained by the News Division and successor units. Bound volumes of the press releases are also maintained in the Library of the Department of State.

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563

Master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda and related correspondence for the years 1947–1953 of the Policy Planning Staff.

Secretary's Daily Meetings, Lot 58 D 609

Chronological collection of the records of the Secretary of State's daily meetings with top Department of State officials for the years 1949–1952, as maintained by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

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Comprehensive chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda, memoranda of conversation, and memoranda of conversation with the President for the years 1947–1953, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 65 D 238

Chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation with the President for the years 1949–1952, memoranda of the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State for the years 1951–1952, and the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation with Senator Tom Connally of Texas for the years 1950–1951, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Shulman Files, Lot 53 D 403

Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, containing materials used in the preparation of speeches by President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson for the years 1950–1953, as maintained by the Office of the Secretary of State.

State–JCS Meetings, Lot 61 D 417

Records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the period 1951–1959 and selected problem files on the Middle East for the period 1954–1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

S/ISA Files: Lot 52–19
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Lot 52–51

Files of the Office of the Director, International Security Affairs, Department of State, containing material for the years 1949–1951. These lot files, all of which are included in FRC Acc. No. 62 A 613, include documentation on the operations of the Special Assistant for International Security Affairs (S/ISA) and the interdepartmental International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC) during 1950–1951; material on program development and implementation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program for 1949–1951; and documentation on planning directed toward the establishment of the Mutual Security Program for 1951. The material includes subject and chronological files, and records of various departmental and interdepartmental committees concerned with military assistance and foreign aid during the 1949–1951 period.

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Much authoritative information is to be found in unofficial publications written by those who participated in the events documented in this volume or by authors who compiled documentary histories based on already published official and unofficial materials. The editors have made use of such unofficial publications for factual information or have cited them as a source for documentation referred to in the documentation printed here. The Department of State assumes no responsibility for the accuracy of fact or interpretation in these unofficial publications. The publications of this type which have been most consulted in the preparation of this volume are set forth in the list that follows. Other works also consulted on particular points are identified in annotations at the appropriate places.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY

PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND UNITED STATES FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE[1]

740.5/1–351

Extracts From a Briefing Book Prepared in the Department of State for the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Eisenhower)[2]

TOP SECRET U.S. EYES ONLY [WASHINGTON, undated.]

PART B: STATUS NATO FINANCIAL AND PRODUCTION PLANNING TO IMPLEMENT MTDP,[3] INCLUDING U.S. AID

1. GENERAL

The NATO has sought

(1) to determine requirements for an adequate defensive strength;
(2) to plan production to meet the equipment requirements, including allocation of tasks to countries; and
(3) to determine how the economic and financial burdens of the defense effort should be shared.

Production planning has not made very much progress, although expert task forces under MPSB auspices have recently concluded surveys of production capacities and potentials in the most important

[1] For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

[2] General Eisenhower was about to begin a tour of the capitals of the NATO countries. (See pp. 460 ff.) The briefing book, prepared for him in the Office of European Regional Affairs, consisted of two major divisions: I. General Comments and II. Country Briefing. The latter is not printed. Part A of the General Comments, military in nature, is printed *ibid.* A copy of the General Comments was transmitted to Lucius Battle by George Perkins with a memorandum dated January 3 (740.5/1–251) suggesting that Acheson might wish to glance through its contents before his talk with Eisenhower on January 4 described in circular telegram 354, January 5, p. 395.

[3] Medium Term Defense Plan. It was set up on April 1, 1950, at a meeting of the NAT Defense Committee at The Hague. At that meeting, the Defense Committee approved the first draft of a detailed 4-year defense plan prepared by the NATO Standing Group, Military Committee, and Regional Planning Groups. This plan, in revised form, was approved by the Defense Committee and forwarded to the North Atlantic Council Deputies on October 28, 1950. This document is presumably the one generally referred to as DC 28.

categories of military equipment. These surveys are under study in the MPSB and the results of these studies should be useful to the newly created DPB in moving forward to achieve an adequate production program.

In the interim, each country has been urged to undertake production in those categories of equipment most urgently needed and for which the most serious deficiencies exist. Progress in this direction is uneven although some improvement recently has been noted. The U.S. is seeking both through the NATO and bilaterally to get each country to increase and expedite its production of military equipment as much as its financial and economic situation will permit.

Efforts to work out an equitable distribution of defense burdens are necessarily proceeding slowly. The difficulties include the necessity for first determining the cost of the effort required and at least tentative decisions as to the assignments to countries of tasks both in terms of forces and production. The U.S. seeks to avoid permitting this determination becoming a condition precedent to an all-out effort by all countries.

In planning U.S. assistance to NAT countries, the U.S. has necessarily had to make some broad estimates of the costs of the MTDP, some assumptions as to the extent of the production task which should be undertaken by the U.S. and by the other NAT members, and some assumptions as to the capability of the European nations to increase defense expenditures, with a resultant estimate of economic aid from the U.S. which would be required to assure continued economic stability.

Two billion dollars were appropriated in 1950 and 1951 under the MDAA for aid to our NAT partners. A supplemental appropriation of $3.5 billion was made in 1951 to be devoted primarily to production of long lead items in the U.S. which would ultimately be delivered to European nations. The regular appropriations were designed to provide part of the deficiencies in capital equipment of the forces expected to be in being. The supplemental appropriation is only now being programmed but will also be related to increased forces.

There is attached a table[4] which reflects current U.S. estimates of the costs of mounting the Medium Term Defense Plan in Europe showing the amounts of aid required in the form of equipment and economic support and the extent of European effort assumed. These figures are phased over a four year period. It must be borne in mind that if it is decided to accelerate the MTDP, these estimates would have to be sharply adjusted. They are also rough judgments based on

[4] Not printed.

incomplete and inadequate data. They assume the U.S. bearing the cost of 60% of capital equipment deficiencies with the European nations bearing the remaining 40% and all of the maintenance and support of forces costs.

PART B

2. DEFENSE PRODUCTION

1. *NAT Organization for Production.* The past organization has consisted of the NAT Military Production and Supply Board (MPSB), composed of representatives of all NAT governments except Iceland. The MPSB is a subordinate body under the NAT Defense Committee, and has met infrequently. Its continuing work has been performed by a Committee called the "Permanent Working Staff (PWS) of the MPSB", composed of full time representatives in London. Progress by the MPSB in getting increased military production under way has been very slow. Among reasons advanced for this slow progress are: (*a*) Inability to get from the Standing Group statements of deficiencies in equipment and decisions as to specific types to be produced, (*b*) lack of adequate funds in defense budgets of countries concerned to permit necessary expansion of production, and (*c*) the necessity to work in committee or subcommittees of national representatives rather than through an integrated staff capable of continuing forward planning.

2. *New Organization.* Reorganization of the MPSB into a "Defense Production Board" (DPB) of country representatives permanently available in London, plus an international staff under a Director or Coordinator of Defense Production has just been approved by NAT governments. The DPB will meet in early January to appoint a Coordinator and to initiate the establishment of an international staff. When the DPB is a going concern, it should be more effective than the MPSB, but the necessary urgent action will remain dependent in the final analysis on adequate increased defense budgets.

3. *Progress.* Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, defense production in the European NAT countries has increased from about $700 million yearly to something under $1,500 million. However, if equipment requirements for NAT defense forces are to be met by 1954, it will be necessary, as a minimum, to more than double this rate of production, even assuming that U.S. production for Europe under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) is continued at present or even higher levels. A most useful step taken by the MPSB has been the organization of "task forces" of competent people

in specialized fields of production of high priority equipment, which have visited all important potential producer countries and have made reports which will be used to establish sensible production programs in the various fields covered.

4. *Problems.* In addition to the necessity of getting clear cut decisions from the Standing Group or other military sources as to requirements and types to be produced, and the necessity for governments to increase defense budgets to finance military production, there are other major problems involved in obtaining adequate and urgent production increases in Europe.

(*a*) First is the problem of coordinating U.S. "end-item" programs (equipment produced in the U.S. for Europe) with European production programs. Countries hesitate to increase their own production if they think there is any hope that they can get the same items free from the U.S.

(*b*) Second is the problem of "integrating production". To get the requisite amount of production performed urgently and at reasonable costs, it is necessary that large scale and economical projects be carried out, utilizing the countries best able to produce certain items, to meet not only national but total NAT requirements. However, production of items in one European country for transfer to other countries would involve payments back and forth, contracts, etc., which have so far prevented initiation of any large-scale production for transfer.

(*c*) Other complications in the production field arise from selfish commercial motivations, failure of certain countries to provide the MPSB with full production data necessary for planning, difficulties involved in trying to do production planning through the "committee system", etc.

5. *Adequacy of Effort.* Although no authoritative figures for the total cost of needed new equipment for European NAT countries have been produced, various rough estimates indicate such cost will run from $20.0 billion to $25.0 billion or even more. Assuming the U.S. might provide 50% or somewhat more of the equipment free from the U.S., there remains the necessity for Europe to produce over $10.0 billion worth of new equipment in the next three years. Unless greatly increased emphasis and accent is put on military production in Europe, there is grave danger that the forces desired by 1954 under the Medium Term Defense Plan will not be properly equipped by that time.

6. *Comments.* The unavoidable time-lag between the beginning of production planning and the delivery of finished items is such that all countries should be urged:

(*a*) To back up the newly approved Defense Production Board, make available to it the best possible personnel, and accept and implement its recommendations.

(*b*) To initiate maximum production that is known to be economical and needed without awaiting full commitment of U.S. aid, the completion of agreement on "sharing the defense burden", etc.

(*c*) Most importantly, to take the urgent and courageous action necessary to obtain increased defense budgets from their Parliaments.

PART B

3. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC

1. European NAT members have not yet faced up to the full need for increased defense budgets. Some of the basic difficulties have been:

a. Lack of the same sense of urgency that has impelled post-Korea U.S. increases.

b. Political shakiness of European governments, which has made them reluctant to take unpopular decisions and disappoint hopes for higher living standards.

c. Postponement of decisions until U.S. aid has been committed.

2. Financial planning within NATO is still in an elementary stage. Such planning has been based on the general perfectionist assumption that the costs of the MTDP must first be estimated and then the burden of sharing such costs should be shared equitably, having regard to the capabilities of each participant. Attempts to cost the MTDP have not yet resulted in any NAT-wide accepted estimate of what the cost of an adequate defense plan would be. Meanwhile, NATO has agreed on procedures to analyze the economic capabilities of member countries with a view to helping the Council Deputies agree on an equitable sharing of the burden, but conclusions are not now expected for some months.

3. The defense budgets of European NAT countries in 1950 have not increased substantially above the pre-Korea rate. For 1951, their budgets based on announced plans may total $6.6 billion for defense, compared with the pre-Korea rate of $5 billion. Increases in addition to announced plans, however, are now being actively considered. U.S. appraisals show need for increasing European budgets for next year to at least $10 billion, exclusive of about $6 billion of U.S. aid if minimal defense needs are to be met. Some U.S. estimates suggest much larger budgets are necessary.

4. The following pages discuss present prospects and economic potentialities for increasing defense expenditures of the various countries. Their present and pre-Korea rates of defense expenditures are given in the accompanying table, which also compares expenditures with each country's Gross National Product.

NAT European Defense Budgets

	FY beginning: (in million $)			*Percent of GNP*		
	1950		*1951*	*1950*		*1951*
	*Pre-Korea rate**	*Post-Korea rate*		*Pre-Korea rate*	*Post-Korea rate*	
Belgium	187	187	250	2.9	2.9	3.8
Luxembourg	4	6	N.A.	3.5	4.5	N.A.
Denmark	53	75	75	1.8	2.6	2.5
France	1,640	1,640	2,451†	7.3	7.3	9.7
Italy	515	595	915‡	4.0	4.5	6.4
Netherlands	307	307	263	6.2	6.2	5.0
Norway	48	63	80	2.7	3.6	4.5
Portugal	41	44	N.A.	1.8	1.9	N.A.
U.K.	2,237	2,380	3,108§	6.0	6.4	8.0
Canada and U.S. Defense Budgets						
Canada	493	950	950	3.3	6.3	6.3
U.S.	15,124	{47,689 (a) / 25–30,000 (b)}	N.A.	5.5	{16.7 / 8.7–10.5}	N.A.

(a) Appropriations.
(b) Estimated expenditures.

*Based on country submissions to the PWS–DFEC. [Footnote in the source text.]

†Assumes $400 U.S. special aid. [Footnote in the source text.]

‡This is projection based on the assumption that very substantial U.S. dollar assistance will be available. [Footnote in the source text.]

§Assumes U.S. special aid of approximately 100 million. Program is now being reviewed by Cabinet and further increases likely. [Footnote in the source text.]

740.5/1–351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, January 3, 1951—6 p. m.

Depto 382. Perkins from Spofford. Canadian memorandum [1] "revised in light of conclusions reached by military committee [2] and by groups of experts in London" has just been received and is being circulated among deputies.[3] All pertinent parts text reads as follows:

"4. Canadian approach to problem is based on two assumptions:

"(*a*) That there is general recognition by member governments that increased responsibilities of NATO now makes necessary

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[1] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 461 ff.

[2] NATO Military Committee, composed of one military representative of each member country, preferably a Chief of Staff.

[3] North Atlantic Council Deputies, in continuous session in London under the permanent chairmanship of Charles M. Spofford. The 12 regular members of the Council Deputies in 1951 were: André de Staercke for Belgium, L. Dana Wilgress for Canada, V. de Steensen-Leth for Denmark, Hervé Alphand for France, Gunnlaugur Pétursson for Iceland, Alberto Rossi Longhi for Italy, André Clasen for Luxembourg, Jonkheer Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer for the Netherlands, Dag Bryn for Norway, Ruy Ennes Ulrich for Portugal, Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar for the United Kingdom, and Charles M. Spofford for the United States.

some degree of reorganization, and that it is timely to examine problem as whole;

"(*b*) That any changes in organization that may be necessary or advisable should be made without alteration of treaty, that is by appropriate revision of 'by-laws' of NATO rather than by amendment to its 'constitution'. (In Canadian view, this can be accomplished by revising previous decisions of Council and Defense Committee.[4])

"5. Under present structure, with three separate Committees of Ministers,[5] problem of coordination arises and this problem is difficult to resolve simply through Council Deputies. Moreover, quick action is often impeded because if meeting of a Ministerial Committee is pending governments may tend to defer approval proposals under consideration in Council Deputies. With accelerated transformation from period of planning to period of action, it is desirable to limit number treaty bodies which meet periodically. Changed circumstances dictate that all subsidiary bodies of organization should be on continuing basis, with only NAC meeting periodically to review progress and work of subsidiary bodies and make decisions on higher and general policy.

"*Council of Governments:*

"6. Canadian Government is, therefore, of view that considerations in preceding paragraph emphasize necessity for combining all activities of NATO under single council which would represent governments. At such council, governments might according to their own domestic requirements and nature of agenda, be represented by one or more ministers. (Occasional representation by Prime Ministers should not be excluded.)

"7. It is recognized that such solution might increase number of persons attending meetings of Council. Nevertheless, advantages to be gained by introducing into highest body of NATO where policy is formulated, Ministers directly responsible in their own governments for defense, finance and supply seem sufficient to outweigh disadvantages of numbers. Council sessions could be made less cumbersome by setting up ministerial subcommittees on functional basis.

"8. March of events has made it essential there should be immediately available (and consequently in continuous session) a body of representatives of all governments. Such body would be Council Deputies. This body should be representative of governments. Under proposed reorganization Council Deputies would no longer be merely deputies of Foreign Ministers, as they are now at least in form, but would also represent all their Ministers concerned with North Atlantic matters. In fact, between Council sessions, Council Deputies would represent governments and be in position to speak for NATO. It would not seem that any new directive would be required for this development, since it would follow directly from transformation of present council into 'council of governments'.

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[4] NAT Defense Committee, composed ordinarily of the Defense Ministers of the member countries.

[5] The Defense Committee, the Defense Financial and Economic Committee composed of the Finance Ministers, and the North Atlantic Council.

"*Military side:*

"9. On military side, reorganization we have in mind would be to redesignate military representatives committee [6] (referred to in document MC 22/5) the 'defense committee' in order comply with requirements of Article 9 of treaty. This defense committee would be permanent body responsible to Council, meeting in same place as SG.[7] Defense committee would meet as often as necessary, but at least once fortnight. Governments would be represented on defense committee either by chiefs of staff or their representatives. Chiefs of staff would attend whenever they considered it advisable, or at request of chairman.

"10. Under this arrangement there would be no need for separate military committee, since all NATO governments would be represented continuously on defense committee at level of chiefs of staff (or representatives). SG would act as steering and executive agency of defense committee and would provide its chairman. SG would be required consult at early stage with defense committee or military representatives of individual nations when their interests were involved in formulation or implementation of plans. Defense committee would be guided on political matters by Council, and when Council not in session by Council Deputies. SG would be channel through which this political guidance would be passed to supreme commander. Council Deputies would obtain military guidance from defense committee.

"11. At New York meeting,[8] Council requested defense committee examine problem of establishment of closer relationship between SG and accredited representatives. Military committee has now approved certain recommendations to this end, set forth in document MC–22/5. It is felt that proposed redefinition of functions of defense committee and SG, as outlined in paragraphs 9 and 10 above, would further strengthen effectiveness of measures already proposed by military committee. It is suggested that proposals in these two paragraphs should be considered by appropriate NATO military agency.

"*Production side:*

"12. To ensure efficiency and prompt attainment NATO objectives in production field, proposals for establishment of Defense Production Board and Director of Production have been approved. While advice on military aspects production would be provided by defense committee or SG, it is essential that DPB should be responsible to and operate under general direction of Council Deputies.

"*Financial and economic side:*

"13. Similar considerations apply to machinery best suited for efficient and prompt attainment of NATO objectives in finance and economic field. We agree in principle with approach to problem now being worked out by Council Deputies and consider that advisory groups and working group to be constituted in this field should be responsible

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[6] The NATO Military Representatives Committee, a permanent committee meeting in Washington, composed of representatives of the Military Committee.

[7] The Standing Group, the executive agency of the Military Committee, was composed of the Chiefs of Staff of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, or their representatives, functioning continuously in Washington.

[8] North Atlantic Council meeting, September 1950. For documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

to and obtain general guidance from Council Deputies. Under Canadian proposals, present responsibilities of DFEC would be exercised through reorganized NAC.

"*Secretariat:*

"14. It is also felt it will be necessary to strengthen to some extent secretariats both in London and Washington, and develop ways of integrating secretariat services of various NATO agencies as closely as possible."

Believe effort will be made to put Canadian paper on agenda promptly. Therefore request Washington's reaction soonest.

Todep 189 [8] just received. Will cable views shortly.

[SPOFFORD]

[8] January 2, not printed. This message stated that the Departments of State and Defense were still considering the subject of NATO reorganization and that, in this interim period, Spofford should continue to obtain the views of the other NATO nations while seeking to postpone crystallization of debate until the U.S. position could be firmed up. (740.5/12–2850)

740.5/1–351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 3, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 193. (1) Knapp is being fully briefed on Washington views re NATO–OEEC consolidation. While this matter becoming increasingly urgent, no further progress toward decision contemplated until your views received, which hope can be soon.

(2) Meanwhile, believe mtg Financial Experts [2] scheduled Jan 4 might as well proceed if only to elicit views European members on principle of bringing all NATO economic and financial staff work under direct supervision of Deputies. European experts will presumably have consulted their Finance Ministers on this subject which will remain a problem under any form of NATO–OEEC consolidation.

(3) In view present discussion of more basic reorganization, US rep shld oppose any final decisions or referrals to Depts. US rep shld feel free to express US view that some basic reorganization and consolidation of NATO–OEEC is likely prove necessary in near future. Until time schedule for such consolidation becomes clear, however,

[1] Repeated to Paris with instruction to pass to OSR. J. Burke Knapp of the Office of European Regional Affairs drafted the telegram and Edwin Martin, Director of that Office, cleared the message in substance with ECA.

[2] Presumably the Working Group on Production and Finance (the so-called Working Group of Seven), meeting in London and composed of seven of the Council Deputies.

US rep shld keep door open for possible adoption interim solution along lines Depto 305.[3] Our views on latter question will take into account reaction European reps at Jan 4 mtg.

ACHESON

[3] December 9, 1950, not printed; it presented the texts of a draft resolution and draft report on the proposed reorganization of NATO's financial and economic procedure. These drafts, presumably drawn up by the Working Group of Seven, were intended to stimulate comment from the NATO governments. (740.5/12-950)

740.5/1-451 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, January 4, 1951—4 p. m.

Depto 385. From Spofford and Breithut for Perkins pass to Knapp.

1. Memo "Reflections regarding production military equipment in Europe" received from Van Zeeland. Copy pouched January 3.[2] It is proposal for stimulating NAT arms production of items for transfer by NATO guarantee of compensation to producers. In accordance his request, memo has been circulated to deputies D-D(51)1.[3] As indicated telephone conversation January 1, Spofford-Achilles,[4] it will be on agenda meeting January 4. We plan suggesting deputies referring it to PWS/DFEC for study.

2. Main points memo follow:

(*a*) Cites MTDP as establishing minimum size of required forces and indicates types of needed equipment now also known. Indicates this information provides basis for determining what equipment is needed and how much. Remaining problem is to assure producers of payment.

(*b*) To extent that producing countries procure for their own forces they can themselves give assurance of payment. However, in case of arms provided for other countries, producing countries cannot be expected to assume the risk of production exclusively on own responsibility.

(*c*) Proposes solving latter problem by promise or guarantee of payment by 12 NAT countries collectively, including US.

(*d*) Indicates 2 methods of implementing this proposal: maintenance of book accounts with settlement of net debit and credit balances every 6 or 12 months; or through EPU appropriately amended. No specific amendments or means of using EPU are outlined.

[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR and to Brussels.

[2] Not printed. A copy of the original text and translation were transmitted to Washington in airgram 770 from Brussels, January 4. (740.5/1-451)

[3] Not printed.

[4] No memorandum of this conversation has been found in the Department of State files.

(*e*) Concludes with some suggestions for stimulating internal shift of manpower and resources to defense production in producing countries by paying premiums. Suggests fund created by each country contributing percent excess profits (probably means tax). Suggests as one specific use of fund, financing of migration and housing costs of skilled labor as growth of production makes shortages of technicians acute.

3. Although memo not explicit, fund appears not related to guarantee arrangement.

4. Reports from Embassy Brussels (Embtel 1021 to Department December 21[5]) and discussion here with Bastin (Belgian delegate PWS DFEC) indicated early version Van Zeeland plan unacceptable to FinMin and National Bank. However, inclusion in present proposal of possible use EPU may have made proposal acceptable.

5. As presented proposal might involve open end guarantee of payment for armament production, and in present form is too vague for realistic consideration.

6. We have been thinking about less ambitious scheme for implementing HPPP by establishing 1 to $200 million fund various currencies to provide 90 percent guarantee so that producers while having some assurance of payment will also continue to have incentive to find buyers. Latter considered important as providing motive for maintaining quality of production standards. Some obstacles re:

(*a*) Some NAT participants presently unwilling to let contracts on basis of MTDP's commitments. If financial and economic limitations result in reduction of procurement below requirements, some high priority items might be slashed disproportionately or eliminated entirely.

(*b*) SG determination of acceptable types not construed as meaning that types designated as acceptable to meet needs of producing country would necessarily meet needs of NAT partners for such equipment. For example, international financing of Italian truck production based on overall NAT truck needs and SG designation of Italian trucks as "acceptable" might be rash, if other countries refuse to consider such trucks acceptable to them.

(*c*) MPSB data do not at present provide basis for elimination inefficient high-cost producers. Thus financing of all high priority projects outlined in PWS D-D/175,[5] by international commitment might result in NATO misdirection of resources and in group acquiring high-cost unsaleable equipment.

7. We believe above problems may be solvable, and basic suggestion of international financial commitment as instrument for stimulating armament production for others merits exploration. Believe basic question to be answered soon is whether US opposed in principle to such scheme or willing to consider participating if above problems solved.

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[5] Not printed.

8. Would also welcome OSR's reactions, possibly during Triffin's expected visit here, with whom Breithut had discussion substance paragraph 6 above.

[BREITHUT]
[SPOFFORD]

740.5/1–551 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, January 5, 1951—11 p. m.

Depto 391. Perkins from Spofford.

1. Subject is NATO–OEEC relationship, reference Todep 171.[2]

2. I have not as yet been able to confer with Katz other than by telephone but expect to see him in Paris over weekend, following which joint comments requested will be forthcoming. In meantime these are my tentative views, which I discussed with Knapp before his departure to Washington.

3. I agree time has come to reconsider NATO–OEEC relationship and develop clear-cut US position. I also strongly support Katz approach that we think in terms of functions to be performed by both organizations and assets represented by each and that with rapid shift in emphasis we should not regard either organization or relations between them in static terms.

4. In my view principles which should govern reorganization in order of priority are:

(*a*) Primary consideration should be attaining most effective economic underpinning for NATO defense effort. In economic field emphasis is going to be heavily on defense at least for near future and it should have top priority for expert personnel.

(*b*) In whatever consolidation or regrouping is decided upon there should be minimum of overlap or duplication and most efficient use of personnel. This is particularly important for smaller NAT partners who have limited resources in economic expertise.

(*c*) Any such consolidation or regrouping should be done so as to preserve, so far as possible, asset now represented by OEEC delegates and secretariat. With Katz I would place less emphasis than Washington on morale of OEEC staff.

5. While present arrangement with twelve man group [3] has not gone far enough to come to final conclusion on workability, strong

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] Dated December 16, 1950, not printed.

[3] Presumably the so-called Working Group of Twelve which was established in late 1950 to meet in Paris for the study of problems involved in the distribution of the defense financial burden among the NATO participants. It was composed of representatives from each of the NATO member governments.

probability that as temporary [*tempo?*] and activity step up separation of deputies and important element of economic staff will not be satisfied [*satisfactory?*]. Therefore we should plan on assumption that entire NAT economic organization responsible for defense matters should be located in same city as deputies and DPB.

6. Some consolidation of NAT economic agencies and OEEC therefore seems necessary. Alternatives are (*a*) consolidation of entire OEEC organization and NAT agencies or (*b*) regrouping and transfer to NAT of those OEEC functions relating directly to defense, presumably those set out in Katz analysis in Paris Repto 6905[4] subparagraphs (*c*), (*d*) and (*e*) of paragraph 2. Functions performed by OEEC not directly related to defense, e.g. EPU, trade liberalization and integration, et cetera not to be consolidated.

7. From NATO standpoint and aside from political and security problems arising from different membership, I see following disadvantages in over-all consolidation:

(*a*) Assimilation of large organization dealing with functions not relating to defense effort would be time consuming organizational job which would most certainly slow up necessary reorganization in overlapping fields, which will be difficult enough in any event. Sheer numbers of OEEC organization would make total consolidation difficult business.

(*b*) Although I make point with hesitancy because of limited direct contact, I have feeling that "back to normalcy" psychology in OEEC organization would involve psychological disadvantage in over-all consolidation.

8. From OEEC standpoint I think it should be carefully considered whether consolidation into NAT and attempt to streamline organization for essentially defense purposes may not involve loss of OEEC's present and possible future effectiveness in non-defense fields, in which I am sure we all want to see it continued and strengthened.

9. For foregoing reasons I favor alternative (*b*) in paragraph 6.

10. If regrouping is decided upon, question of geography becomes unimportant. NAT economic staff would be based in London; residual OEEC would continue in Paris. In any event geography is not controlling, certainly from US standpoint.

11. To summarize, my tentative views are that:

(*a*) Economic functions of NAT and OEEC related to defense should be consolidated.

(*b*) These should be performed by single staff in same city as deputies.

(*c*) This should not involve over-all consolidation of OEEC and NATO economic agencies to which I see objections from standpoint of NATO and possibly from standpoint of OEEC.

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[4] Not printed.

(*d*) Preferable alternative is regrouping of functions and consolidation only those directly related to defense.

12. Will comment more fully when I have had talk with Katz.

[SPOFFORD]

Editorial Note

Congressional opposition to the stationing of American troops in Europe as part of the NATO defense force grew after President Truman's press release on the subject on September 9, 1950. In that statement he said he approved a substantial increase in the strength of United States forces stationed in Western Europe for the defense of that area on the basis of recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, endorsed by the Secretaries of State and Defense. (Department of State *Bulletin*, September 18, 1950, page 468)

A speech by Herbert Hoover on December 20, 1950, set the stage for the following "Great Debate" on the use of American troops in Europe. Hoover said that the prime obligation to defend Europe rested with the Europeans themselves and that the United States should limit its contributions to air and sea power. In his opinion, committing American ground forces to a land war in Europe would result in "a war without victory . . . would be the graveyard of millions of American boys and would end in the exhaustion of this Gibraltar of Western Civilization." (*New York Times*, December 21, 1950, pages 1, 22)

At a Department of State meeting on January 2, 1951, Under Secretary of State Webb, Legal Adviser Fisher, and Director McWilliams of the Executive Secretariat agreed that someone in the Department should draft a reply to a forthcoming speech by Senator Taft opposing the use of American troops in Europe. They planned to offer it to an administration supporter, probably Senator Connally, for use in the Senate debate. Information on that meeting is in the Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238.

Senator Taft opened the Senate portion of the debate on January 5. He said the President had "no power to agree to send American troops to fight in Europe in a war between the members of the Atlantic Pact and Soviet Russia." Taft considered a powerful air force the best defense for the United States and suggested the country rely on superiority in air and sea forces throughout the world for its own defense and for assistance to its allies. He concluded by saying that any policy adopted "must be approved by Congress and the people after full and free discussion. The commitment of a land army to Europe is a program never approved by Congress, into which we should not drift." (*Congressional Record*, 82d Congress, 1st session, pages 54–61)

Secretary's memoranda, lot 53 D 444

The Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the President [1]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

[WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1951.

Subject: Congressional Debate on Foreign Policy during the Eighty-second Congress

It is clear that your State-of-the-Union message and Senator Taft's announced statement on foreign policy will precipitate the full-scale debate on foreign policy which is brewing.[2] Under the circumstances this is both inevitable and desirable.

Although the Administration policies are sound and are consistent with the natural inclinations of most Americans, dangerous confusion has been created in the public mind by persistent Republican attacks. The Republicans in Congress have been and are well organized to conduct this debate. The Democrats in the Congress have not been well organized to combat these attacks effectively. If they are to make a clear and convincing statement of policy which will be understood and supported despite Republican efforts to create confusion, it is now imperative that they be organized by the leadership. Your meeting with the new leadership on Monday morning is an ideal opportunity to start this organization, and in view of the urgency it should not be delayed beyond that time.[3] Enclosed is a memorandum of suggested points which it is recommended you take up with the leadership at this meeting.

[Enclosure]

NOTES FOR CONFERENCE WITH LEADERSHIP ON FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE [4]

1. Impress on leadership the vital importance to country of creating an understanding of our foreign policy and support for it out of the confusion which the Republicans have created during the last campaign and are still trying to create. Mention the particular importance of public support of the policy of collective security as contrasted with the isolationism being preached by Hoover, Taft, and [Joseph] Kennedy.

2. Point out that there is no common "Republican policy"—their entire effort has been to create confusion by attacking Administration

[1] Drafted by the Legal Adviser, Adrian Fisher.

[2] See editorial note, *supra*.

[3] No record has been found in the Department of State files of discussions between the President and Secretary or Under Secretary of State on this topic, but see editorial note, p. 22.

[4] The source text indicated that this paper was drafted by the Legal Adviser, Adrian Fisher, on January 4, 1951.

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efforts. They have been able to do this with great success because they are very well organized both in the Senate and the House and have an effective speech-writing machine.

3. Democratic foreign policy as carried out by the President and as enacted by the Congress during the last several years is fundamentally sound and is consistent with the natural sympathies of the American people. What we must do is to make it plainly understood despite the organized Republican efforts to spread confusion and doubt.

4. In view of the Republican organization, it is absolutely vital that the Democratic leadership in the Senate and the House create an even better organization to support the Democratic program. To do this it will be necessary to arrange for a group of able speakers to make speeches on the Floor in an organized program which the leaders personally keep on schedule.

5. The President's State-of-the-Union message on Monday will open the debate. It is understood that Senator Taft is planning to make a full statement of his views on foreign policy immediately thereafter. The Democrats in the Senate and the House should therefore be prepared to start their speeches in the next day or so.

6. The President will depend on the leadership to make these arrangements with the Senators and Representatives whom the leadership feels are most appropriate and best qualified.

7. The President has reiterated his standing directions to the State Department to be available to the leadership on a day-and-night basis to help them and any of the members who are joining in this effort to clarify public understanding of the issues through furnishing materials, drafting speeches, and whatever else may be requested. They shall call upon Mr. Webb for this.

740.5/1–551

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Humelsine)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 6, 1951.

Subject: Future Handling of NAT program in Department of State

I understand there are two general schemes in mind concerning the responsibilities of Mr. Cabot here as related to NATO. One is that NAT operations remain the primary responsibility of EUR, with supervision, general policy direction and integration into the world situation by Mr. Cabot and his organization.[1] The second one is that

[1] The reference here is to the International Security Affairs Committee. See footnote 3, p. 21.

Mr. Cabot and his organization take over the full responsibility for operating all matters connected with NAT.

I want to register very strongly that we in EUR believe that the first course is essential. As I understood, and still understand, the regional setup in the State Department it is that the Regional Bureaus were to be responsible for affairs in their areas with, of course, due and proper coordination and supervision from higher echelons. The North Atlantic Treaty is the heart of the policies and operations in EUR. It is the most important single item in our relations with the European countries. It also has an important bearing on our relations with the European countries and other countries under EUR which are not directly associated in NAT. To eliminate EUR from the work on this matter would, I believe, hopelessly compromise the influence and effectiveness of EUR as an operating agency. The NAT is more than a military arrangement. It enters into political and economic questions as well, and it is, therefore, at the very core of all EUR work.

I cannot see that moving the work in connection with the NAT to some new central agency would provide any operating advantages. The NAT problem is big enough and of sufficient importance to justify in itself a component and effective staff. But it is equally true that it cannot be adequately understood and dealt with as a thing apart from other European problems. As part of EUR such a staff has the advantages of being integrated closely with the Office Directors and desk Officers who are working constantly on all problems of the countries affected by the NAT.

I think I should again point out, as I have often before, that EUR needs additional strength in personnel to discharge its functions properly in connection with NAT. This, I think, we have all recognized for some time, and the only reason we have not moved on strengthening and increasing the personnel was the uncertainty as to what the central organization would be and where it would be.

I have, as you know, long favored the establishment of a position such as Mr. Cabot's. I believe there is a very important function to be performed in establishing departmental-wide policies, in correlating the activities of the Regional Bureaus, in establishing priorities in working out inter-departmental relationships, and in carrying an integrated program to the Congress. These functions seem to me to be enough to tax anyone's ability.

Now a word further on inter-departmental organization. It seems to me that the idea which we had sometime ago of a worldwide inter-departmental coordinating committee with subsidiary regional coordinating committees is desirable and efficient. Certainly there should be regional committees for EUR and FE, and probably also for ARA and NEA.

I am attaching hereto a memorandum which Ed Martin has prepared which goes into further detail on some aspects of the situation, and also a list of the personnel in EUR which is now involved in NAT matters.[2]

[2] Neither printed.

740.5/1–751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, January 7, 1951—2 p. m.

3780. For Perkins from Spofford. Reference Todep 189 [1] and Deptel 2864.[2] Following is my view re Canadian proposal: [3]

1. I believe basic structure contemplated by Canadian paper is unquestionably sound, i.e., one policy-making body representing governments and meeting periodically, one "governmental" body sitting permanently to insure that its policies are both effectively implemented and kept up-to-date in light of events, with detailed implementation carried out by permanent integrated staff agencies assisted by technical advisory bodies.

Most NAT governments agree such structure desirable. I believe it would be far more effective than present "proliferation of committees" and provide framework in which US leadership could more effectively be exercised. I nevertheless do not agree with all details of Canadian paper or feel that it satisfactorily disposes of some problems.

2. Concept of Council of Governments is certainly sound. I believe this has always been intention of parties and that what is needed is recognition this fact rather than reorganization on this point. Paragraph 1 of Council document D–1/1 September 17, 1949 [4] makes clear that Council is principal treaty body, that it is charged with responsibility of considering all matters concerning implementation of treaty and that other bodies set up under treaty are subordinate to it. Concur in Department's view, which represents long established international practice, that Foreign Ministers in international relations always speak for their governments rather than their ministries. Since most if not all NAT governments concur that Council should represent governments it should not be difficult to obtain agreement that it now in fact does.

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 9, p. 9.

[2] Not printed. This telegram to London of December 1, 1950, provided Spofford with the first reactions of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the Canadian proposal and stated that the Department of Defense did not believe the time was appropriate for action on top-level NATO reorganization (740.5/11–2950).

[3] See footnote 1, p. 6.

[4] "Report of the Working Group on Organization as Adopted by the Council on September 17, 1949." For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. IV, pp. 330–337.

3. Believe Council should as provided in third paragraph of D–1/1 normally be composed of Foreign Ministers. This does not, of course, preclude governments from being represented by other persons provided they have "plenipotentiary" powers. While delegations might well include delegate of other Ministries depending on agenda, believe each government should have only one representative on Council. Possibility conflicting voices speaking for any one government must be avoided. Canadian suggestion of subcommittees may be found useful.

4. If Council represents governments it follows automatically that Deputies also represent governments (recognized in paragraph 2*a* of my terms of reference [5]). Question is simply one of assuring that person representing his government on Deputy's has confidence of all agencies concerned and that he is advised by those agencies so that he can adequately expound their point of view. I consider deputies regarded as speaking for governments by each other.

5. I see real advantage in retaining Defense Commission [*Committee*] in some form. Reconstitution as outlined in paragraphs 9 and 10 of revised Canadian paper would have advantages of simplified military structure and give non-SG governments feeling of permanent military representation without impairing operational authority of SG. On other hand, we see real advantage in continuing personal meetings of Defense Ministers and are not sure inclusion of them or their representatives in Council delegations would be sufficient. As compromise you might consider reconstitution of Military Representative Committee with Military Committee representative reporting directly to Deputies on usual policy matters requiring government sanction and to Defense Committee specially convened for the purpose to review or consider policy matters in defense field. Such meeting including agenda to be coordinated with NAC meeting possibly to be held jointly with NAC.

6. With respect to relations between Deputies and SG, we believe each should have responsibility for giving other guidance in its own field and calling upon other for advice and assistance in other's field. For example, SG would be subject to continuing over-all political guidance from Deputies as permanent alter ego of Council but not to any authority by Deputies in military field. Deputies would depend on SG for advice on military but not on other matters. Deputies should call upon SG for military advice and assistance and needle them for

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[5] The passage under reference reads "The United States Deputy shall have the following functions: *a.* represent the United States Government in the work of the North Atlantic Council of Deputies: . . .". The text of the terms of reference, approved by President Truman, December 16, 1950, is attached to a memorandum for Acheson from the Executive Clerk in the White House, dated December 16; neither printed. (740.5/12–1650)

it (e.g. acceptability of types, military requirements, costing information et cetera). SG should call upon Deputies and needle them for advice and assistance concerning political, economic and production matters. Deputies could not require SG to take substantive action in military operational matters nor could SG require Deputies to take substantive action in other fields. This concept would continue Council and Deputies as bodies speaking for governments and would provide Deputies with direct line of authority over SG within area of Deputies competence but would make impossible for Deputies (particularly small nations represented therein) to interfere in any substantive way with authority of SG or SHAPE on military operational matters.

7. Believe DFEC should be eliminated and that all agencies engaged in NATO production, raw materials or finance problems such as DPB, RM [*raw materials?*] advisory group and proposed new Finance and Economic Board or elements of OEEC should report to NAT Council and between meetings to its alter ego Council Deputies. DPB would not be responsible to Defense Ministers. Of course, as above stated, SG or SHAPE should guide DPB as to acceptable types, military requirements and other matters. Deputies would be principally responsible in economic, political and production fields.

8. Believe paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 should be modified as indicated above. Items 12 and 13 are generally sound.

9. Re item 14 believe Roseman revised draft[6] embodies sound US position and plan to take this up informally with UK and other interested Deputies. Have altered chart to remove entirely boxes showing position of DC and DFEC.

10. Believe these suggestions preferable to those in paragraph 5 Deptel 2864 of 1 December.

11. I believe that practical answer to relationship between Deputies and SG is something along lines of paragraph 6. However, in view importance most governments attach to continuing political guidance over military, we believe emphasis in negotiations in Deputies should be upon fact that Deputies as continuing body are channel for governments to give higher direction to work of other NATO agencies. It would then be the mission of US representatives on Deputies and SG to achieve day-to-day working solution advanced in paragraph 6.[7]

[SPOFFORD]

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[6] The reference here is to a revision, not found in Department of State files, of a memorandum of December 28, 1950, by Alvin Roseman, U.S. Representative for Specialized Agency Affairs at Geneva, entitled "Suggestions for the Development of an Internationally Financed Staff for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." The memorandum of December 28 is in Department of State file 740.5/12–2850.

[7] In answer to this message, telegram Todep 203 of January 9 informed Spofford that his position on the Canadian proposal was sufficiently at variance with views previously expressed in the Department of State as to require careful study and that he should limit his participation in debate of the subject to expression of his personal views (740.5/1–751).

ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, Paris Torep, telegram

The Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Foster) to the United States Special Representative in Europe (Katz),[1] at Paris

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 8, 1951—6 p. m.

Torep 143. 1. Pres. signed on Dec. 19 memo of understanding [2] between Depts. State, Treas., Defense and ECA on organizational arrangements within US Govt. for policy and implementation re international security arrangements and mil. and econ. assistance for mutual defense.

2. This document provides review and coordination of policy and program among interested agencies shall be through high level Committee on International Security Affairs, consisting State, Def., Treas., ECA and Harriman office reps., with State rep. as chairman. FYI State rep. is Thomas Cabot, ECA rep. is N. E. Halaby, other agency representatives not yet designated.[3] Committee expected to hold first mtg. shortly.

3. Document provides "it is essential that operating responsibility be delegated to greatest possible extent to those agencies which are equipped to handle it", and further that "ECA shall have primary responsibility for developing and implementing plans for economic assistance required to support an adequate defense effort abroad, and for implementing approved programs for addl. mil. product. abroad".

4. Copies this document being airpouched, but above provisions set forth in order guide OSR and Missions in taking immediate steps increase their participation in development plans for economic support European rearmament effort.

5. Specifically, it is view ECA/W that missions backstopped by OSR must play new and important role, in close cooperation Embassy and MAAG, in negots. with NAT countries re increased defense effort (including raising and maintaining troops and mil. production) and should provide initiative in developing econ judgment as to amt. MDAP econ. support funds required accomplish desired results. This connection missions should regard all Tomap cables raising econ. and

[1] Authorized by N. E. Halaby of ECA, drafted by Norman S. Paul of ISA. Cleared in draft by Deputy ECA Administrator Bissell and by Assistant ECA Administrator for Programs Porter. Cleared in substance by Ohly, Bell, and Martin of the Department of State. Repeated to ECA missions in all NATO countries. All telegrams from ECA Washington to the Office of the Special Representative in Europe were addressed to and sent via the Embassy in France. All telegrams from ECA Washington to the various European ECA missions were addressed to and sent via the Embassies in the countries in which the respective missions were located.

[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 484.

[3] Effective January 8, 1951, the position of Director, International Security Affairs, was established in the Department of State and took up the personnel, records, and functions of the Office of the Director, Mutual Defense Assistance. For a description of the duties of ISA, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 22, 1951, p. 155.

financial issues as priority action matters. Recognize that in present atmosphere lack of detailed definition agency responsibilities much of mission work must be on *ad hoc* basis, but strongly urge that missions use own judgment in applying their best talents towards meeting pressing problem of securing maximum defense effort abroad.

6. Econ. support programming now entering stage where different kinds competence required in field than heretofore, particularly in area of mil. product. Urge Chiefs of Missions and OSR give immediate attention possible staffing needs this regard. Production problem relates not only to programming for US financing but to priority assistance as well. Missions and MAAGs must work in closest cooperation this matter.

7. This cable primarily addressed to immediate problem negots. now in progress in connection MDAP financing. Separate instructions forthcoming on relationship ERP allotments to European defense efforts.

8. These bilateral approaches to governments must be geared with US actions in NATO and in coming weeks developments in Deps, WG 12 and DPB will be important matters for Missions to consider.

FOSTER

Editorial Note

In his State of the Union message on January 8, President Truman did not specifically mention sending American troops to Europe, but he did ask the Congress for legislation for "military and economic aid to help build up the strength of the free world." A copy of the State of the Union message is in Department of State *Bulletin*, January 22, 1951, pages 123–127.

On the afternoon of the same day Senator Kenneth Wherry introduced Senate Resolution 8, and the Wherry Resolution came to be the central issue of the "Great Debate." It stated that "no ground forces of the United States should be assigned to duty in the European area for the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty pending formulation of a policy with respect thereto by the Congress." (*Congressional Record*, 82d Congress, 1st session, page 94)

In a press conference on January 11, the President told reporters that his constitutional powers as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces gave him the authority to send troops anywhere in the world. He said he would consult the Congress before sending troops, but did not need congressional permission to do so. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S Truman, 1951* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1965, page 19)

On January 12 Secretary Acheson called Senators Connally and McFarland to thank them for responding to Senator Taft with Senate speeches favorable to the administration's foreign policy. On January 16 he called Senator Lodge to thank him for his speech of January 11, and on January 18 he called Senator Morse about his speech of January 15 and Senator Kerr about his speech of January 16 in support of the administration. Memoranda of those telephone conversations are in the Secretary's Memoranda, lot 53 D 444. The speeches can be found in the *Congressional Record*, 82d Congress 1st session: McFarland, page 139; Connally, page 140; Lodge, page 146; Morse, page 253; Kerr, page 334. All the Senators the Secretary called spoke in favor of stationing American troops in Europe as part of the NATO forces, and opposed Senator Taft's suggestion that the United States rely on air and sea power.

During the month of February the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees held 11 days of joint public hearings on Senate Resolution 8, the Wherry Resolution. Secretary of Defense Marshall gave the opening testimony against it on February 15. He told the committees that the President had authorized him to discuss the specific strength of American ground forces in Europe. He said, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to me and I have so recommended to the President—and the President has approved—a policy with respect to our forces in Europe which looks to the maintenance by us, in Europe, of approximately six divisions of ground forces. We already have there, on occupation duty, about two divisions of ground forces. Our plans, based on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs, therefore contemplate sending four additional divisions to Europe." (Department of State *Bulletin*, February 26, 1951, pages 328–330)

Secretary of State Acheson and General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified against the resolution on February 16. The Secretary answered those who proposed reliance on air and sea power by saying that "however overwhelming our available air striking power is likely to be in the period ahead of us, the presence of defense forces in being in Western Europe is a vital part of the effectiveness of our air power as a deterrent to attack. . . . In the event of an attack the availability of defense forces in Europe would give us time that we would vitally need to bring our other forces into operation." Copies of the administration witnesses' testimony are in Department of State *Bulletin*, February 26, 1951, pages 323–332. Early drafts of Secretary Acheson's testimony are in the Shulman files, lot 53 D 403, "Wherry Resolution Testimony." An account of the public hearings is printed in *Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services on S. Con. Res. 8* (Washington: Government Printing Office,

1951). A short account of the "Great Debate" and excerpts from some of the major speeches can be found in *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1951*, pages 13–25, 225–228.

After the hearings ended, the committees rewrote the Wherry Resolution and reported out Senate Resolution 99, in support of the President's authority to send American troops to Europe. (Senate Report 175, 82d Congress, 1st session.) A copy of Senate Resolution 99 is in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 16, 1951, page 637; *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1951*, page 227; and *Congressional Record*, 82d Congress, 1st session, page 3282.

On April 2 the Senate, by a vote of 49 to 43, with 4 not voting, added the McClellan Amendment to Senate Resolution 99. The amendment stated that "no ground forces in addition to such four divisions should be sent to Western Europe in implementation of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty without further congressional approval." On April 4, by a vote of 69 to 21, with 6 not voting, the Senate passed Senate Resolution 99. (*Ibid.*, pages 3096, 3282)

At a press conference on April 5, in answer to a question about whether the Senate's addition of the McClellan Amendment would alter his policy on sending troops to Europe, the President said that the only matter considered was the sending of four divisions, which the Senate approved. He added that he had always consulted the Congress about major policies and that the situation would develop in the usual manner. (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S Truman, 1951*, page 214)

Documentation in Department of State files on the "Great Debate" is scanty. From time to time Department officials discussed it and reports of their meetings are in the Secretary's Daily Meetings, lot 58 D 609; the Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238; the Secretary's Memoranda, lot 53 D 444; and the Barrett files, lot 52 D 432.

740.5/1–1051 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT LONDON, January 10, 1951—noon.

3817. For Perkins from Spofford and Batt. Re diplomatic status and rank coordination DPB, and Embtel 3681, December 31.[1]

1. Recommend, of course, that Coordinator[2] be given US diplomatic status (passport, et cetera) and high personal US rank. While his position is international, he is, nevertheless, "contributed" by US Government.

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[1] Not printed.

[2] See paragraph 2 of Part B, Section (2) Defense Production, p. 3.

2. As to his status in UK, we have discussed with UK deputy who assures us he will be given same diplomatic status as council deputies.

3. As to his status in other NAT countries, he will be holding a position unique, except for that of General Eisenhower, established by action of all 12 NAT governments, who have recognized the vital importance to North Atlantic defense of finding a dynamic leader for the NAT defense production effort. Consequently, there is no doubt that he will be received in other countries as a person of highest rank and importance. There should be no bar, from this standpoint, to his talking to any and all government ministers as the occasion demands. We would expect to formalize the NAT-wide status of the coordinator as an important element in the formal development of international staff of NATO, but hope you will assure Herod that we anticipate not the slightest formal difficulties or lack of recognition of the importance of the job of any NAT governments. [Batt.]

[SPOFFORD]

740.5/1–1151 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, January 11, 1951—1 p. m.

Depto 401. Pass to Secretary Defense. Please pass to Chairman SG from Chairman NAC.[1] Deputies have asked me to inform you that, as result action of NAC in Brussels, they intend continue discussion of possible reorganization NATO structure and to consider question of relationship between SG and military representatives and SG and Deputies, as directed by Council. Deputies understand that latter aspects of military organization will also be considered by SG and military representatives in Washington, and it is the Deputies' thought that discussions on this question should not be carried on simultaneously in Washington and London. Therefore, they intend proceed with discussions on reorganization top NATO structure and to postpone discussion military aspects of reorganization until hearing from you as to schedule and procedure contemplated by appropriate Washington agencies for consideration these questions. I should therefore appreciate learning as soon as possible intentions of SG in this regard.

Deputies wished me to point out that outcome of their discussions on Canadian memo (D–D(51)4)[2] might well have bearing on con-

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[1] Paul van Zeeland, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[2] Not printed. Presumably the revised memorandum discussed in telegram Depto 382, January 3, p. 6.

sideration by SG and military representatives of military aspects of reorganization.[3]

[SPOFFORD]

[3] The Council Deputies' discussion of the Canadian memorandum, referred to in this telegram, took place in the Deputies' second meeting of the year on January 10. The meeting was reported in telegram 3837 of that date from London, not printed. (704.5/1–1051)

740.5/1–1251 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, January 12, 1951—6 p. m.

Depto 405. For Perkins from Spofford. Embtel 3837.[1] January 10 discussion by deputies of Canadian reorganization proposal resulted in free and frank exchange of views re top NATO structure particularly proposed council of governments. Leading participants were Wilgress, Alphand, Starkenborgh and Hoyer-Millar. Consensus of opinion was expressed by Starkenborgh when he said that Netherlands favored council of governments because it would do away with present multiple committees at ministerial level whose practice had been to refer questions back and forth and each of which could act on only part of questions put before them.

I said very little during discussion except to express personal view that we had always considered represented governments rather than foreign offices and that there might be merit if annual though probably not more frequent meetings were held with wider high level representation. At end when it was asked which deputies could accept Canadian concept of council of governments in principle, I said I was not instructed. Only other deputy unable to accept in principle was Belgian who also uninstructed. I believe that on Monday when question is to be discussed again Belgium will indicate acceptance in principle.

Situation we face therefore is that of US being only government not ready accept principle of Canadian proposal for council of governments. Possible courses of action seem to me to be (1) take position that present top structure satisfactory and no reorganization needed, (2) accept principle of council of governments as basis for discussion without accepting details of Canadian paper, and attempt to fill out picture along lines satisfactory to US, (3) put forward alternative proposal for reorganization of top structure.

First alternative would not solve question but merely have effect of prolonging discussion and consideration of reorganization. We

[1] Not printed, but see footnote 3, *supra*.

would be substantially alone in that position. As to third, we can undoubtedly get sympathetic consideration of constructive new proposals, but I believe that if we are going to advance any we should serve notice at Monday's meeting of our intention to do so.

Believe we should follow second alternative. In any event, we can no longer prevent crystallization of position by 11 other governments without expressing some US position. Appreciate your efforts to get US position formulated and importance of getting one satisfactory to all concerned. At same time I have been stalling since September council meeting and curve of diminishing returns is now falling sharply. In effort to help clarify problem, I submit following further discussion in amplification of thinking in Embtel 3780 [2] and Deptel 2864.[3]

There is general agreement here and I believe in Washington that council members should and do speak for governments. This is principle of council of governments which I recommend we join others in accepting. While other NAT governments have indicated in general terms more or less agreement with details of paragraphs 6 to 8 of revised Canadian paper there has been little specific discussion and I believe we can secure its development along satisfactory lines if we can take active role quickly enough. Am glad to note in Todep 203 [4] statement increasing number US agencies attaching importance to NATO as "operating entity". In this connection wish reiterate views expressed paragraph 1 of Embtel 3780 that forecast as indicated therein would be far more effective and better vehicle for US leadership. Problems with which Canadian paper still seems to deal inadequately and which are apparently bothering Washington may be broken down as follows:

(1) Composition of council to ensure efficiency, responsibilities, and continuity. Believe it should, as indicated paragraph 3 Embtel 3780 and paragraph 3 Deptel 2864, be small and normally composed of FonMins, in any case with only one spokesman for each government.

(2) Making sure views of all agencies concerned are adequately reflected both in policy decisions and operations. This in turn has 3 aspects (*a*) composition of council delegates (*b*) formulation of instructions and (*c*) advisors to deputies. We believe (*a*) could adequately be met by appropriate defense and other interested agency advisors on council delegations. With respect to (*b*) commission on internal security affairs should insure adequate coordination of US policy based on views all concerned. Defense and other advisors to deputies as suggested last sentence paragraph 5(*a*) Deptel 2864 should cover (*c*).

(3) Question of personal contact between top officials other than FonMins. This is clearly desirable provided action not held up pending such meetings. In this connection believe solution should include

[2] January 7, p. 18.
[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *ibid.*
[4] Not printed, but see footnote 7, p. 20.

elements both alternatives suggested paragraph 5 Deptel 2864 perhaps along following lines:

(*a*) SG, with military representative commission [*committee*], whose members presumably reflect their Defense Ministers' views, should be action agency in military field and have final decision on operations within framework overall policy decisions of council and political guidance from departments. Defense Ministers would continue meet periodically primarily in advisory relation to council. (I note present terms of reference of defense commission [*committee*] provide "it shall meet in ordinary session annually and at such other times as it may be requested to meet by the council or as may be deemed desirably by majority of defense commission"). Whether or not SG–military representative commission [*committee*] renamed "defense commission" as Canadians propose seems of little importance but its role is closer to that assigned to defense commission [*committee*] by treaty, i.e., "to recommend measures for implementation of Articles 3 and 5" than is role of Defense Ministers.

(*b*) Council deputies adequately advised by representatives of defense and other ministries would continue as permanent alter ego of council to supervise operating groups as envisaged in 5(*b*) Deptel 2864 (except for military planning). They would in effect be deputies of all agencies concerned. It might, in time, be found desirable to have defense and other advisors to deputies meet in sub-committees which would further this concept.[5]

[SPOFFORD]

[5] In the answering telegram 3391 to London of January 13, not printed, Perkins informed Spofford that he personally favored his second position but felt that no decision could be made until the subject was discussed in the Department at Washington with Spofford and Katz, preferably in the coming week (740.5/1–1251).

740.5/1–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 12, 1951—7 p. m.

3382. Pass to Spofford. Sir Leslie Rowan has reported to Perkins on Bevin–Stikker conversation of Jan 9 re OEEC–NATO relations.

He indicated main Brit purpose was to cool Stikker off and prevent matter being brought to an issue at this time. Brit believe they succeeded.

Brit position was outlined as consisting of following points:

1. Essential to maintain important position for OEEC.
2. Not sufficient personnel to have two major international economic bodies in EUR.

[1] Repeated to Paris for Katz. Drafted by Martin and cleared by Haselton (BNA).

3. Undesirable to undertake any major reorganization until further effort to develop along lines already established and see how it works out.

4. Wld hope that more and more functions can be assigned to WG of 12 in Paris.[2]

A number of questions were raised with Rowan about possibility of proceeding on present basis and having in fact an effective operation.

ACHESON

[2] See footnote 3, p. 12.

740.5/1–1551 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and ECA Missions [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 15, 1951—8 p. m.

Subj: Fol is general framework for Mission Negots

388. Re defense effort and resulting submission info for Congressional Aid Presentation.

This is joint State–Defense–ECA msg.

I. *Purpose*

Purpose this cable is to:

1. Emphasize need for increased defense effort by NATO countries.
2. Indicate why intensive negots are needed in next four weeks to obtain commitment or other evidence of intention to undertake such effort and general character of such negots.
3. Point out info needed for such negots and for Bureau of Budget presentation of Eur aid program.
4. Instruct Missions to take action on getting info.

II. *Need for Increased Effort*

NAT countries have accepted certain mil tasks which, if carried out on sched, will meet (with some gaps) MTDP. NAT countries have not, however, taken steps necessary to carry out this plan on sched. Letting of production contracts is going forward slowly, conscription periods in many countries are inadequate and, on whole, budgets are very inadequate. We estimate that to meet their reasonable share of cost of MTDP as presently dated Eur Govts this year need on average to double their budgets over pre-Korea rate—an increase of about five billion dollars. While a number of countries are taking steps in right direction less than half this increase has been realized in budgets to date.

[1] Sent to all capitals of the NATO countries except Reykjavik. Drafted by R. H. Whitman (RA) and cleared by him with Martin (RA), Byington (WE), Levy-Hawes (BNA), Bray (S/MDA), Colonel Ofsthun (Defense), and Cleveland (ECA).

FYI only, trend of events is such that US Exec Branch considering as matter of urgency extent to which present target date of MTDP shld be made substantially earlier. If at all feasible, time allowed to complete MTDP by all NAT countries shld be shortened. Certainly MTDP as now sched must be met as minimum requirement. Countries shld be prepared to make commitments now on this basis.

US feels NAT countries can meet their fair share costs without endangering their political stability or basic econ strength. Admin is prepared ask Congress for funds needed to assist them in this task provided there is reasonable assurance other countries will do their part. Moreover, as Pres stated in Budget msg US assistance will be geared to actual performance by Eur Govts.

III. *Need for Negots at Present Time*

Since July 22 US Govt has been discussing increased defense effort with NAT countries both bilaterally and multilaterally.[2] On whole results have not been adequate to give any confidence that MTDP will be met on sched. World situation makes renewed vigorous efforts necessary. Efforts are required at this particular time so that goals will be met on sched and in order to permit presentation aid program to Congress. Before Admin can present program must be able to show convincingly that efforts Eurs are in support of an agreed defense plan and that other NAT Govts are taking necessary steps to do their part, so that with requested US aid, defense plan can be met approx on sched.

According present interdepartmental agreement Eur aid program shld be submitted to Bureau of Budget by early Mar.

In general, presentation of program will start with description of MTDP showing mil and in so far as possible, production tasks accepted by each country. Second step will be to indicate gross cost of plan. Finally, in light of cost, of country's econ and financial position, of country's own productive facilities and production program they can do, state what is necessary US aid program both as end-item assistance to supplement production program and as general econ assistance. Thus all econ assistance will be shown in relation to total defense effort. S/M formula [3] will no longer apply to allotment US econ aid. Admin cannot present a program until it is assured that actions taken by country will at least come close to mtg phase require-

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[2] The reference here is presumably to a circular telegram from Washington on the subject of increased defense efforts, addressed to the NATO participants on July 22, 1950. For the text of that circular and subsequent correspondence on the subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 138 ff.

[3] The reference here is to the Snoy-Marjolin formula for allocating economic aid through the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Baron Jean-Charles Snoy et d'Oppuers was formerly Chairman of the Council of the OEEC and Robert E. Marjolin was Secretary-General of the Organization. For documentation on involvement of the United States in decisions of the OEEC, see volume IV.

ment of MTDP for FY 1952. It is recognized that NAT countries are now engaged in costing MTDP and their submittals to NAT are due Feb 8. Moreover, some of Eur NAT countries are now reexamining their mil and budgetary plans for coming months and are or are about to make new decisions concerning them and concerning the complementary econ policies and measures needed to support them. It will not be possible, however, to postpone negots nor delay sched for Congressional presentation to await such info. Therefore, is essential that Missions obtain from their Govts as much as possible of necessary info on a bilateral basis, in advance of its submittal to NAT.

IV. *Role of Missions*

In next 4 weeks Missions will play extremely vital part both in conducting negots to obtain an adequate effort and in reporting info needed for appraising adequacy of countries effort and for Congress. For this purpose Mission is defined as an Emb–ECA–MAAG team under leadership Ambassador. Missions will have primary responsibility for negots along line described VI below but outside participation, particularly Spofford and Katz, will be called upon to join with Ambassador in particular cases where negot situation calls for this type additional effort at head of Govt and key Cabinet Minister level.

This cable sets forth instrs to Mission with respect to obtaining info and will be followed shortly by specific instrs each Mission with respect to character and timing their approach to Govts on negots re level their effort and US aid. Such specific instrs will take account of what is known about adequacy commitments already obtained, status past and current negots, etc.

V. *Relation to Multilateral Negots*

These negots are not intended supplant or affect multilateral negots re burden sharing, assignment tasks, etc. If decisions had been reached in NATO more promptly burden of bilateral negots wld be less.

Missions will make clear to Govts that info and maximum commitments must be obtained at this time on a bilateral basis because (1) Aid will not be asked for by Admin without adequate data and programs covering defense tasks of NAT countries (2) Timetable for Congressional presentation does not permit awaiting the results of NATO burden sharing negots.

National undertakings obtained by action contemplated here can be fitted into subsequent multilateral undertakings and level US aid, where necessary, can be adjusted later in light of burden sharing negots in NATO, Congressional action on funds, and performance of countries. These adjustments can take place through transfer non-dollar resources, through agreed adjustments of US aid program and through apportionment funds to be requested from Congress which

will not be tentatively earmarked for particular countries in prelim bilateral negots.

VI. *General Character of Negots*

Negotiating pattern will differ in each country. General objectives, however, are the same: to ensure that each country contributes to mutual defense program in accordance with its ability and, in particular, that its contribution in 1951 will make possible achieving time phased goals of MTDP. It will be important to emphasize physical tasks which must be accomplished as well as fiscal actions to support such tasks. In each country it will be necessary to compare proposed defense effort of country with both its "potential" contribution and with requirements of MTDP. Prelim estimates country "potential" are set forth in ECA Blue Books. These estimates shld not necessarily be considered maxima; they are being reviewed here and will be revised in light of costs of MTDP, ECA Mission comments and other factors. Specific revisions of or comments on Blue Book country estimates will follow in individual cables to each Mission. Both comparisons will be approx since neither bench mark can be measured accurately. Whenever comparisons show that country's effort is inadequate negots must press for a larger program.

Negots will also involve a discussion of possible level US econ aid in relation to size country's program. It is recognized that, in order obtain a reasonably firm statement of intentions, it will be necessary in many countries to indicate scale of aid which US considers as reasonable and which Admin wld contemplate requesting of Congress. Missions will be instructed as to amount US aid which can be considered.

VII. *Required Info*

1. *General.*

Info is required for two purposes. First is to appraise what a country shld and can do to meet MTDP. This will help set general goals and character of negots. Same info is also required for presentation program to Congress along lines stated in III above. Info shld cover costs of MTDP, specific tasks necessary to achieve MTDP and specific actions to implement MTDP which Eur Govts are planning take within next 12 to 18 months.

As much info as possible shld be obtained on an unclassified basis so that favorable developments can be reported widely (See Depcirtel 351 Jan 5[4]). An understanding shld be reached as to possible use classified material in oral testimony in Exec Session Congressional Commites. You can assure Govts use info will be confined to Exec Agencies US Govt if necessary.

[4] Not printed.

Data shld be developed where feasible to cover period through June 30, 1952. However, emphasis shld be placed on 12-month period for which country data and plans are most firmly developed. Negots can be limited to most convenient 12-month period. Projection through US FY will be made by Washington.

2. *Required Info on Costs of MTDP and Other Defense Programs.*

If possible, cost of entire MTDP shld be obtained. Is essential to obtain country costs for country's next FY. What is needed are countries' prelim estimates their submissions under NATO costing instrs. All detail called for by costing instrs is not required. As minimum, however, summary info Table H of SGM–317–50 is necessary together with data in Attachment Table B1 called for in SGM–602–50 which breaks down material requirements into "Own Production", "US", "Canada", and "Other". Projection of non-NATO production cost sched in Table 4 is also necessary.[5]

3. *Info required or Character Commitments be Obtained Re Govt Intentions and Contemplated Policies and Action.*

In addition to info on costs of MTDP and other mil programs, info or commitments on Govt plans, policies and intentions will be required in connection with negots outlined in VI above and for Washington use in connection with Congressional presentation. Info on these commitments will be in two forms: (1) statistical forecasts; and (2) evidences of Govt pol decisions, establ of new admin arrangements and like. As indicated in VI above, major purpose of negots described in this cable is to obtain such info in form of commitments or statements of intention by Govt concerned. General categories in which such info forecasts or commitments wld be most desirable are:

1. Defense budget indicating part of budget required for non-NATO cost, for maintenance existing forces, for raising and supporting new forces, and for production equipment. Costs of civil defense shld be shown separately.
2. Overall budget.
3. Steps taken or contemplated to meet budgetary requirements, e.g., what funds will be raised in new taxes, what will be nature of required borrowing, etc.
4. Action other than fiscal to produce needed equipment:—contracts let, factories converted to armament production, procurement plans, etc.
5. Action taken or contemplated to raise or support troops. This is problem of sched forces, legis on enlistment, etc., as well as budgets.
6. Supplementary actions contemplated or undertaken re admin transfer econ resources; i.e. direct controls to be put into effect over materials and manpower, etc.

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[5] The schedules and tables of the costing instructions mentioned here are not printed.

7. Whenever available, national accounts and balance of payments forecasts.

VIII. *Summary Instrs*

1. This message has given general background for negots. No negot for greater effort shld take place without specific instructions. The following pertain only to obtaining or imparting info.

2. Missions will immediately approach their Govts to obtain info called for in Sec VII, 2 and where not already obtained that in Sec VII, 3. This info is necessary by Jan 27 in order to set goals for negots. If info cannot be obtained by that time Missions shld inform Wash immediately and indicate alternative ways of appraising adequacy of country programs so that negots can proceed on solid basis. Missions shld forward info on costs as rapidly as available and supplementary reporting to date shld keep Wash currently informed re changes Govt intentions.

3. Mission shld at once inform Govts of general character proposed US aid program emphasizing following points:

a. There will be only single country aid program in FY 1952.

b. Aid will be justified only as support to a program for meeting MTDP rqmts and expenditure made only as program is put into effect. No aid will be allotted by S/M formula in FY 52.

c. In order present any aid program US must have assurance that actions contemplated by NAT countries will be adequate to meet time phased goals of MTDP and that adequate info will be available to present an aid program to Congress.

4. If negots are not already under way, Missions shld also inform respective Govts of US concern with adequacy of NAT defense effort and intent US to start negots shortly with country re character and level of its defense effort and rqmts for US assistance.[6]

ACHESON

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[6] Beneath the Secretary's signature on the source text appear the following directions to the Department of State code room:

Add for Rome: Instructions will follow shortly on US position re Ital proposal. Approve waiting approach to Ital Govt until receipt of same.

Add for London: Instructions are modified as follows: The current review of their rearmament program by Brit Govt will delay any attempt get definitive date on scale of UK effort. Nonetheless, UK Govt shld be warned, at this time, of rqmts imposed by Congressional time-table. They shld also be requested furnish info called for in Sec VII, 2 as soon as possible. Info in Sec VII, 2 shld be obtained and forwarded when no[t] contained in previous messages.

Add for Lisbon: Above FYI Comments of Mission requested as to application of approach this message to Portugal.

Add for Paris: Conversations with Fr in October and current review their program along lines Embtel 3869, Jan 8 shld provide most info called for on relation Fr program to MTDP called for in Sec VII, 2 and 3. This airgram does not alter plans for further negots with Fr, on which instrs will follow.

Editorial Note

In the Council Deputies meeting of January 17, Wilgress introduced a re-draft of the North Atlantic Council terms of reference (D–1/1; see footnote 4, page 18) which he had worked out with Alphand to meet the latter's point that the Foreign Minister was the only official who could engage the French government. Spofford supplied the substance of the re-draft in his telegram Depto 422 of January 18, not printed, and added that the other Deputies showed a preference for the original Canadian proposal. He reported that, when asked for American ideas on the language of the drafts, he had informed the Deputies that he could only reiterate the United States view that the NAC was in fact a council of governments and that foreign ministers represented governments and not merely foreign offices. (740.5/1–1851)

740.5/1–1951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 19, 1951—7 p. m.

NIACT

3463. Spofford eyes only from Perkins. At Interdepartmental mtg this morning it was agreed that Spofford–Katz–Clay [2] discussions shld start Monday afternoon.[3]

FYI there is desire here to see clear-cut centralization of responsibility in order avoid any possibility buck-passing as cause of delays. It is considered important to insure that US does not seek defense programs in Eur for which we are not prepared supply machine tools and raw materials which can only be procured in US. It is desired to insure also that European mobilization measures make most effective possible use of imported short supply goods, including for example restrictions on uses to which materials in short supply may be put.

In this context talks will focus on following major issues:

1. How shld NATO be organized to perform its current job most effectively? In particular, shld DPB be expanded to cover all economic mobilization activities rather than just mil production problems, or shld a separate body be established for non-mil field, with Deps serving as Coordinator of the two? How is mil planning effectively related to production and basic economic planning?

2. A pertinent issue to above is extent to which, as far as US concerned, Office of Def Mobilization looks to NATO and to what extent

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[1] Drafted by Martin (RA) and cleared by John Ohly, Office of International Security Affairs.

[2] Gen. Lucius D. Clay, representing the Office of Defense Mobilization.

[3] January 22.

to individual countries for joint planning with respect to material and eqpt rqmts for European def and essential civilian production programs.

3. A further pertinent issue is development of adequate integration of OEEC and NATO activities in economic, financial and production field.

4. In such a new setup what shld be US organization at regional and country level to insure effective direction of US efforts?

In addition to above central issues, there will be discussion in larger or smaller grps as appropriate of relation of NAT and OEEC to international commodity grps and their relation in turn to US agencies. It is also hoped that we can settle US position on whole of Canadian reorganization proposal and on NAT–OEEC question. We also hope we can give you clearer answers as to Wash backstopping arrangements for various NATO activities.

On basic questions at issue we have no fixed positions here. The job will be to explore problems and reach agreement as to best solutions.

[PERKINS]
ACHESON

Editorial Note

The Council Deputies, in their meeting of January 22, discussed further the future composition of the NAC and, with the exception of the United States representative present, agreed upon a draft statement that would substitute for certain parts of the Council's original terms of reference, D–1/1, and the Wilgress draft introduced at the meeting on the 17th. Ambassador Gifford, quoting the draft and reporting the meeting in telegram Depto 445, January 23, not printed, said that at the close of the discussion the Deputies expressed the hope that the United States would soon remove the last hurdle on reorganization of the top NATO structure by making its position known. (740.5/1–2351)

740.5/1–2451 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, January 24, 1951—11 p. m.

Depto 450. Deputies seventh meeting January 24.

1. Considered Canadian report [2] on progress of preparation *ad hoc* report on status of defense effort. Report indicated information deficient in all phases. Initial financial data expected shortly, production

[1] Repeated to the capitals of the other NATO countries and to Frankfurt, to Heidelberg for Handy, and to Wiesbaden for Norstad.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

information to be largely based on replies to JAMAG questionnaire. Military information lacking owing failure receive information on forces from SG.

SG letter January 17 Tedder to Spofford [3] indicated SG believed it rather than governments should supply information but still debating information to be supplied deputies and SG not in possession sufficient information permit reporting in accordance deputies request. Deputies decided again request SG for report, by February 14 if possible, on simpler basis giving minimum information required for deputies' immediate use and at same time request their governments to provide SG with information required this purpose. Text resolution contained separate telegram to Department, Paris and HICOG.[4]

[Here follows a summary of discussion concerning NATO statistical services, possible recipients of a Canadian offer of armament and ancillary equipment for a second infantry division, and a decision to provide information requested by Yugoslavia and Austria on the NATO decisions of late 1950 regarding German military participation.]

4. Continued discussion NATO reorganization with emphasis on role deputies and relation to SG. Netherlands urged establishment principle that deputies act fully for Council of Governments as highest NATO body when latter not in session. Deputies would furnish direction to NATO military agencies represented by SG "as to political considerations on which strategic positions should be based" (see GG 5–D6, paragraph 7*f* [5]). In absence such permanent political control, governments putting troops under SHAPE would have to admit in their parliaments they had surrendered all control over their forces to SG. Norway strongly endorsed Netherlands position emphasizing importance of deputies day-to-day liaison with SG not only through representatives of latter in London but also through strong deputy representation Washington. UK felt SG might have occasion ask deputies to reconsider political decisions on military grounds and might also insist that final decision on major issues be top-level government decisions in each country. Netherlands replied this assured since deputies represented governments, but agreed that SHAPE could request reconsideration. Essential point was that final decision be by political rather than military authorities.

Norway circulated informal working paper on deputies terms reference [6] based on May Council resolution establishing deputies.[7] It pro-

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[3] Not found in Department of State files.

[4] Telegram Depto 449 from London, January 24, not printed (740.5/1–2451).

[5] Not found in Department of States files.

[6] The verbatim text was transmitted to Washington in telegram Depto 454, January 25, not printed (740.5/1–2551).

[7] For text of resolution, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 29, 1950, p. 831. For documentation on the May 1950 meeting of the North Atlantic Council, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

vided they would constitute permanent working organ Council Governments and represent it in all aspects between sessions. Deputies' general terms of reference would be same as those of Council and they would be responsible for carrying out its policies. Particular terms of reference would be those of May resolution brought up to date (fuller report to Department [8]).

Next meeting January 29.

[SPOFFORD]

[8] Telegram Depto 454.

740.5/1-2651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 26, 1951—5 p. m.

3539. Dept, ECA, Def, Budget and Harriman taking advantage Spofford's and Katz' presence US to discuss advisability of consolidating NATO operations in Paris or London. Gen feeling here that Eisenhower and his staff, Spofford and OEEC shld be in one place and that eventually this will be found to be necessary even if it is not done right away. If SHAPE included this wld of course make it Paris. Before reaching any decision on this and related problems and to help us weigh all factors, wld like your estimate effect move to Paris on Brit Govt, on Brit public opinion and on effectiveness Brit influence, cooperation and leadership in making defense efforts successful. Text of paper covering this and other points on which we want your comments will be available and sent you tomorrow with comments required by Mon.[2]

ACHESON

[1] Drafted by L. Satterthwaite, Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, and cleared in draft with Martin (RA).

[2] The paper referred to here has not been identified in the Department of State files.

740.5/1-3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT LONDON, January 30, 1951—8 p. m.

4190. Deptel 3539 January 27 [*26*] [1] and Embtel 4171 January 29.[2] At informal meeting in FonOff attended by Dixon, Makins, Hoyer-

[1] *Supra.*

[2] Not printed; it provided an Embassy estimate of the probable British attitude regarding the proposed transfer (740.5/1-2951).

Millar, Shuckburgh, Baldwin, Achilles and Willius [*Willis*] British gave us official view opposing transfer NATO organizations to Paris. Dixon presented British position which he said had been agreed upon at Whitehall meeting January 21 attended by Dixon and Makins from FonOff, Hoyer-Millar, NAT deputy, Brook, secretary Cabinet, Sir Harold Parker from Ministry of Defense and Plowden for Treasury among others. Dixon pointed out collective view presented was that of high officials and should not be regarded as final position of HMG. However, if question of moving NAT agencies to Paris were formally raised position opposing could not be changed without submitting to ministers, which would in turn involve submission to Cabinet since position communicated to Perkins by Rowan [3] last week had already been approved by Cabinet.

Dixon outlined two groups of objections to moving NAT organizations to Paris as follows: group one, those with political implications; and group two those which were operational in character.

Group one—objections with political implications:

a. Broad general effect would be to strengthen European concept at expense of Atlantic concept.

b. There would be danger that NATO would be absorbed into OEEC, and economic rather than defense considerations would predominate, whereas it was agreed that defense should be paramount.

c. Close cooperation between the US and the UK would be more difficult in Paris than in London. Close cooperation between these two countries is regarded as the heart and soul of NATO.

d. Commonwealth sympathy which is important can be better attained if organizations are in London and would doubtless be weakened by transfer to Paris. Makins interjected that statement was true in itself and that further link-up of NAT and OEEC would weaken appeal to Commonwealth as large portions of Commonwealth look askance at European organizations such as OEEC.

e. Security. It was generally agreed that the NATO security control as administered by UK is good. In Paris it would be in the hands of international staff and danger of Communist penetration would be greater. In fact penetration of Communists into organization would be almost inevitable. They recognized NATO material already subject to risk of Communist access in France but felt that risks would be far greater if organizations were located in France where, for example, all messengers would be French.

Group two—objections of an operational character:

a. Difficulties would not be solved merely by having NATO and OEEC side by side. It was admitted that there might be some gain from national point of view in merging delegations but that if there

[3] The communication referred to here has not been identified in the Department of State files.

were no fusion of functions of two organizations the problems of differentiation of functions, overlapping and liaison would still remain. Certain advantages of having physical location of two organizations in separate cities were brought out in connection with the participation of those countries which do not belong to NATO and do not wish to be associated with its work such as Sweden and Switzerland.

Dixon stated objections had been listed in order of relative importance. Following presentation of British views above outlined, there was an extremely informal exploration of possibilities other than the moving of NATO operations to Paris. British indicated they had looked at possibility of moving OEEC to London and decided it was politically not practical and would undoubtedly evoke objections from OEEC members not members of NAT. In general British view appeared to be that problem of relationship between OEEC and NATO was one which was not ripe for solution, and that it would be preferable not to try to solve it for a few months but to test out existing working arrangements. Makins expressed personal view that question had been raised prematurely partly because of (*a*) "fuss over raw materials" and (*b*) feeling on the part of OEEC that it was going to lose some of its functions.

In reply to question whether there was any indication from Eisenhower as to whether he desired to have deputies in close proximity to SHAPE it was stated Embassy had no information on subject.[4] British reiterated doubt Eisenhower would wish to be surrounded by NATO agencies since this would tend to involve him in questions from which he would otherwise be screened by standing group. British also inquired whether in the event that NAT organizations were moved from London to Paris US would also be in favor of having SG move to Paris. Embassy officers again indicated they had no information on this point.

Our estimate given in paragraph 6 Embtel 4171 that move would not have adverse effect on British public opinion is unchanged by views expressed at January 30 meeting.

GIFFORD

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[4] General Eisenhower's views on the proposed move of the Council Deputies to Paris were briefly expressed by the Director of the Executive Secretariat, William J. McWilliams, in a memorandum to S/S, drafted by MacArthur and dated February 6. Eisenhower, the memorandum said, had indicated that he did not wish to take a position regarding the matter but thought the decision should be made on the basis of whether organizationally such a move would make sense. (740.5/2–651)

740.5/2-351

Memorandum by the Director for International Security Affairs (Cabot) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 3, 1951.

Subject: U.S. Position on Canadian Proposal to Reorganize NATO.

Mr. Spofford has informed me that you gave your blessing at lunch on Tuesday to the attached short statement of a U.S. counter-proposal to the Canadian reorganization plan. He was unable to see Mr. Lovett [2] prior to departure, but telephoned him from New York and also asked me to send Mr. Lovett copy of the document. This, I did, indicating that I understood you had approved the proposal.

Mr. Lovett referred the document to General Burns [3] and Colonel Beebe.[4]

In the ISAC meeting yesterday,[5] General Burns said he planned to recommend to Mr. Lovett that this State proposal, together with the original Canadian proposal, be referred to the JCS.

This morning, Mr. Lovett phoned me as indicated by attached memo. I have informed Mr. Spofford.[6]

[Enclosure 1]

SUGGESTED REORGANIZATION OF NATO TOP STRUCTURE [7]

The Council is the senior body of the NATO; its members continue to represent governments. Other ministers may be invited to participate as members of national delegations. Once a year, there shall be a plenary meeting of the NATO attended by all the national representatives of Cabinet rank (i.e., members of the Council, Defense Committee and D.F.E.C.).

The Council will be advised by the Defense Committee and by the Defense Finance and Economic Committee.

The Defense Committee consists of the Defense Ministers and shall advise the Council on military matters, including measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5 of the NAT.

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[1] The source text bears the handwritten notation "Sec[retary] saw."
[2] Robert A. Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense.
[3] Maj. Gen. James H. Burns.
[4] Col. Royden E. Beebe, Jr.
[5] The meeting of February 2 was the first meeting of the International Security Affairs Committee. The participants included W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President, and representatives of ECA and the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury.
[6] Telegram Todep 237 to London, February 3, not printed (740.5/2-351). This telegram also briefly summarized the proceedings of the ISAC meeting, most of which were concerned with organizational and procedural matters.
[7] Drafted by Ridgway B. Knight (RA).

The D.F.E.C. shall advise the Council on matters of financial and economic policy. Its members shall be of cabinet rank and each government shall have full discretion in the selection of its representative.

The Council Deputies discharge the Council's responsibilities between Council sessions on a permanent and continuous basis. When the Council is not in session, they shall furnish direction to the Military Committee and Standing Group as to political considerations on which strategic decisions should be based. The Deputies shall be responsible for coordinating the activities of and giving general direction and guidance to all the other permanent organs of the NATO (Defense Production Board, Finance Economic Board, Planning Board for Ocean Shipping). The Deputies shall be assisted by competent advisers who may be either national representatives on the permanent NATO bodies or designated by the interested ministers at the discretion of the individual governments.

The Military Committee shall consist of Chiefs of Staff or their representatives and will be responsible to the Council advised by the Defense Committee. It shall supply day-to-day guidance to the Deputies concerning military considerations entering into the formulation of policy. The Standing Group is the executive organ of the Military Committee. It consists of the U.S., U.K., and France, and will be in permanent session and will maintain close liaison with the Deputies. When the Military Committee is not in session the Standing Group will supply military guidance to the Deputies and will receive political guidance from the Deputies on behalf of the Military Committee.

JANUARY 31, 1951.

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Cabot

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 3, 1951.

Mr. Lovett called and expressed concern that the Spofford suggested reorganization of NATO top structure by subordinating the Defense Ministers might have unfortunate repercussions by weakening the Standing Group. He also said he was not sure that the British Government really supported the Canadian proposal. He thought perhaps that several of the Deputies were agreeing in principle only and that the British in particular had not, as a Government, decided favorably on the Canadian proposal. I surmise he has gained this impression from conversation with Marshal Tedder, OSD.

Mr. Lovett said that he wanted 10 days for the JCS to consider the Spofford paper [8] and asked me to so advise Mr. Spofford.

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[8] Presumably enclosure 1.

Editorial Note

In pursuance of the matter of relocation of NATO bodies and restructuring of the Organization, Thomas Cabot sent a memorandum (drafted by Martin) to Acheson on February 9 enclosing a suggested *aide-mémoire* (also drafted by Martin) proposing the transfer to Paris of the Council Deputies, the newly formed Defense Production Board, and a projected successor to the DFEC, a Financial and Economic Board composed preferably of NATO-country representatives on the OEEC. Cabot recommended that Acheson inform the French and British Ambassadors of this American position and hand them the *aide-mémoire*. He further recommended that several days later the Ambassadors in the other NATO countries be instructed to inform those governments of the American view along the lines of the *aide-mémoire*. He recommended that Spofford, at the same time, be instructed to propose actions in the Council Deputies necessary to implement the decision. Finally he recommended that no publicity be given this position pending a NATO decision.

Action on this recommended procedure was delayed while the Department of State awaited the views of the Department of Defense on the transfer question and made an effort to determine what the British reaction would be to the terms of such a proposal. The memorandum and *aide-mémoire* were later returned to Cabot and are not printed (740.5/2–951). No answer to the memorandum or evidence of action taken on it have been found in the Department of State files.

740.5/2–1551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, February 15, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 253. Eyes only for Spofford. AmEmbassy London, eyes only for Gifford.

1. As you know, problem organization NAT economic work and NATO/OEEC relations, alternative solutions thereto, and especially question geographical location, have been intensively considered by interested Wash agencies over several weeks, especially during recent Spofford–Katz visits. In view political delicacy location question, we

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[1] Repeated to Paris eyes only for Katz. The telegram was drafted by Martin and cleared with the following: Bissell (ECA), Nitze (S/P), Matthews (G), Bonbright (EUR), Cabot (S/ISA), Gordon (White House), Lovett (Defense), and Webb (State).

desire secure expression UK views at highest level before taking firm US position between London and Paris.[2]

2. Amb Gifford is therefore requested to discuss this matter with Attlee, requesting an expression of UK views. It will doubtless expedite Brit consideration and expression of views if Attlee can have appropriate Brit ministers and/or officials participate in discussion. Amb Gifford will doubtless also wish to request Spofford and Katz to take part in view their recent participation Wash discussions this subject. US position shld be presented to Attlee along following lines:

(1) US Govt is impressed with need to take coordinated action along many lines in economic and financial field to maximize defense effort while maintaining sound basic economic structures. Action on many of these matters requires knowledge and understanding NAT military programs. It also requires close coordination with work other NAT bodies, particularly DPB, and shld be given continuous political leadership and guidance by Council Deps.

(2) US Govt has therefore concluded that NAT requires full-time economic organization, dealing with all aspects economic mobilization in support military production, complementing DPB's vital task of stimulating output of military equipment. US intends submit proposal for establishment such body, which might be called NATO Financial and Economic Board (FEB) to Deps at early date.

(3) In considering necessary NAT economic and financial work, US Govt has been impressed by four points:

a. Difficulty of creating a second major and efficient international economic organization in North Atlantic community without stripping OEEC, with respect both to national delegations and most competent members Secretariat.

b. Importance in long run maintaining OEEC with genuine vitality as body promoting economic cooperation North Atlantic community on broader basis including all free nations Europe as well as present NAT members.

c. Value of having many economic mobilization and adjustment measures agreed on among NAT countries accepted by wider membership of OEEC, especially Western Germany, Sweden and Switzerland.

d. Desirability of utilizing for NAT defense effort problems, as well as in continuing work of OEEC, experience and cooperative working traditions developed in almost three years fruitful activity by OEEC national delegations and Secretariat.

(4) As US Govt sees it, there are five possible courses of action:

a. To move present NAT agencies in London to Paris. If this were done, we wld assume that members of proposed FEB wld

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[2] Ambassador Gifford was informed in telegram 3828 of February 16, not printed, of Eisenhower's unofficially expressed fear that a move of NATO agencies to Paris would cause a great increase in the tendency to turn to his staff and to him for answers to all sorts of questions. Gifford was asked to weigh carefully and report back on the extent to which the United States would face a major battle with the United Kingdom if it adhered to its position in favor of the move to Paris. (740.5/2–1651)

also be senior members NATO country delegations to OEEC. This wld permit necessary flexibility between NAT and OEEC in handling the many related and even common problems with which the two bodies will have to deal in coming few years.

b. To move OEEC and national delegations thereto from Paris to London, with same relationship as in (*a*) between FEB and OEEC.

c. To retain present NATO agencies in London but establish FEB in Paris, similarly related to OEEC.

d. To establish FEB in London, and transfer from OEEC such functions and national delegations and Secretariat personnel as are primarily related to defense programs and require consideration within NATO framework.

e. Retain *status quo.*

(5) Intensive consideration has been given within US Govt to these five possibilities. It is present judgment US Govt that either (*a*) or (*b*) wld constitute genuinely satisfactory and effective solutions, that (*c*) and (*d*) raise such serious difficulties as probably to be unworkable, and that (*e*) is unacceptable. On balance, as between (*a*) and (*b*) tentative judgment US Govt favors (*a*). The following considerations are relevant to these judgments:

a. It is not easy to predict now, both from standpoint of way in which problems will arise and from standpoint of attitude of non-NATO members of OEEC, which of the problems which will be arising in general field of economic and financial support of defense effort can best be dealt with in NATO framework and which in OEEC. In fact, it may well be that many of them might best be considered more or less informally in NATO, but formally acted upon in OEEC with its wider membership. Importance maintaining maximum degree of flexibility by using body best equipped to deal with problems constitutes major advantage in choosing either (*a*) or (*b*).

b. Alternative (*a*) to move to Paris differs from all other proposals in bringing Deps into same locality as SHAPE. After careful consideration, US view is that this aspect of alternative (*a*) presents both advantages and disadvantages and shld not be considered as necessarily a controlling factor.

c. US Govt recognizes that political difficulties are posed by both (*a*) and (*b*). For example, if OEEC were to be moved to London, it wld be necessary for us to be able give assurances this step wld not reflect desire reduce prestige and position OEEC and did not indicate psychology of retreat from Continent. We anticipate, moreover, possible objections from Eur neutrals, who have given strong indications willingness cooperate informally with measures supporting NATO defense objectives but wld be fearful overt action which might be construed as subordination OEEC to NATO. On other hand, it is recognized difficulties might be posed to UK by concentration in France of all North Atlantic multilateral activities located in Europe. Move in either direction wld also pose practical problems providing housing and office facilities, although numbers moving wld be appreciably smaller if Paris were selected than if OEEC, together with OSR and other national delegations in Paris were to move to London.

d. Alternative (*c*), which wld establish FEB in Paris while leaving Deps and DPB in London, wld present major difficulties of coordination, since Deps will have major concern with political aspects cooperative economic mobilization measures, FEB work shld be intimately meshed with DPB work on military production, and Deps shld be responsible for insuring close coordination between Dep [*DPB*] and FEB.

e. Alternative (*d*) wld present many difficulties to govts members of both NAT and OEEC in distribution limited personnel experienced in types of international economic work that wld be going forward in both Paris and London. It wld also be difficult to determine concretely and without duplication and friction what shld be done in London and what in Paris. It wld sacrifice advantages fluid line of division between NAT and OEEC economic work, and wld make difficult effective association West Ger, Sweden, Switzerland and other OEEC members not in NATO with measures economic cooperation required to adjust economies to requirements rapidly expanding defense programs. US Govt fears that this alternative wld have most adverse effects on future of OEEC.

f. With respect to (*e*), no change, US Govt is impressed with necessity for reaching prompt decision as to way in which international work on economic problems of defense in North Atlantic–West Eur community is to be organized. It is believed that shape of problems and nature of political possibilities for next year or so are clear enough now to permit making decisions which will be satisfactory for at least that period. It is considered urgent to take advantage of this fact and to reach prompt decisions in order that organizational and administrative problems involved in any rearrangement of present setup can be fully worked out and new setup put in reasonable working order before substantive issues, which will arise inevitably out of rapid expansion in defense activities and increasing scarcities of manpower, materials, and eqpt, grow to such volume as to tax our common ability to deal with them. Difficulties of program on which we are embarked are too great to permit us fail to do what we can to be ready to meet them as effectively as possible. Many of them are already upon us and further delays will be increasingly costly. Therefore US Govt does not believe further continuation of *status quo* is acceptable answer to problems raised above.

(6) From these very summary comments it is believed that Brit Govt will agree with US Govt on difficulty of working out perfect solution. It is partly because of difficulties that US Govt seeks views of Brit Govt before reaching firm position as between alternatives (*a*) and (*b*). Needless to say it is most desirable for our two Govts to have a common position. As already indicated, our tentative judgment favors alternative (*a*). Shld alternative (*b*) be strongly supported by HMG, the US Govt wld expect HMG to take initiative in persuading Continental Govts, including non-members OEEC, to accept transfer OEEC to London. It will be greatly appreciated if in light preceding presentation US Govt can have considered views Brit Govt as to most desirable solution.

3. Action on this matter is considered here to be of great urgency and wld be appreciated if this can be taken up as promptly as possible.

4. For ur info, Canadians have informed us that they wld prefer geographical consolidation in Paris, but we understand they have not so informed HMG. You shld also bear in mind that Brit have never been as enthusiastic as US with regard importance maintaining and strengthening OEEC. You shld therefore emphasize that US regards OEEC as extremely fruitful international institution for long term economic cooperation, not only in Western Europe, but in North Atlantic community as a whole.

5. This is State–Def–ECA message, concurred in by Harriman.

ACHESON

740.5/2-1651

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Departments of State and Defense and the Economic Cooperation Administration [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] February 15, 1951.

RELATIONSHIPS AND ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES AND CERTAIN NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY BODIES IN EUROPEAN PRODUCTION AND ECONOMIC AID PROGRAMS

I. DEFINITION OF PURPOSE

An interagency memorandum of understanding,[2] approved by the President on December 19, 1950, identified as a most urgent organizational problem the establishment of "the proper framework in which the questions relating to North Atlantic Treaty and economic and military assistance programs can properly be coordinated." The memorandum of understanding set forth arrangements for the organization of the U.S. Government in Washington, including the establishment of an interdepartmental International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC). It further agreed that corresponding arrangements should likewise be made as quickly as feasible for both the regional and country levels.

This memorandum of understanding is concerned with the organization of United States representatives in European NAT coun-

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[1] This is a revision of the original memorandum of understanding agreed upon by the agencies involved on February 1. The Director of Defense Mobilization, Charles E. Wilson, transmitted the source text to Acheson as an enclosure to his letter of February 15, not printed, explaining that it took account of General Eisenhower's wish that the geographic location of the NATO agencies be left open for him to discuss with Spofford (740.5/2–1651). The original memorandum of understanding was discussed in telegram 871 to London, February 6, not printed (740.5/2–651).

[2] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 484.

tries and with NATO and OEEC organization as related to the work of such representatives on production and related economic aid programs. The assignments of responsibilities to the various groups of United States representatives in Europe and arrangements for their coordination are without prejudice to such division of functions as may be worked out between international agencies on the one hand and United States national representatives on the other. The references to United States responsibilities therefore apply only to the extent to which such functions are now or may be decided to be handled on a United States national basis.

This agreement shall be used as a basis for developing further refinements of the points covered and additional functions and relations of the U.S. organizations and members of international organizations necessitated by the integration of the MDAP and ECA programs. This refinement shall be initiated by ISAC.

II. UNITED STATES ORGANIZATION AT COUNTRY LEVEL

A. *Functions.* The United States representatives (as subsequently defined in B below) at the Country level shall function as a team and be responsible for:

(1) Monitoring (*a*) the conversion of approved plans into specific production programs, and (*b*) the execution of such programs for defense production and of programs for economic mobilization. They should assist, where appropriate, in the planning process itself, including the initiation of projects and the recommendation of desirable measures, and persuasion of European governments to accept desired plans and measures;

(2) Conducting necessary bilateral negotiations on programs involving reciprocal commitments between the Country and the U.S.;

(3) Implementing the United States assistance programs, both for military end items and general economic assistance;

(4) Providing coordinated recommendations and a flow of information to U.S. regional representatives and Washington on the military production position and possibilities, general economic conditions, economic mobilization plans and projects, requirements for financial aid and for materials and products in short supply, and availabilities of scarce materials and products, in the Country.

(5) Assuring the coordination of United States military end item assistance with military production in the country concerned. This includes screening country proposals for end item assistance to eliminate items which should be produced by the countries themselves. (Screening for production possibilities in other European countries shall be done at the regional level.)

B. *Organization.* To insure the full coordination of the U.S. effort, U.S. representatives at the country level shall constitute a team under the leadership of the Ambassador. They will refer to appropriate

regional or Washington agencies, with a joint recommendation or statement of differences, all matters which they are unable to resolve. The United States representatives at the country level are:

(1) The Ambassador, who is responsible for coordination, general direction, and leadership of the entire effort, for insuring that broad United States foreign policy in relation to the country is reflected in all of the operations, and for providing coordinated recommendations to U.S. regional representatives and Washington;

(2) The Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), who is responsible for

(*a*) Administering the United States military end items assistance for the country and assistance in military training; and

(*b*) Military aspects of production programs in the country.

(3) The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) Mission Chief, who is responsible for

(*a*) Administration of U.S. economic assistance to the country, which should now be channeled toward the rearmament program and toward support of those areas of the general economy which tend to deteriorate because of the rearmament program;

(*b*) Following, influencing and reporting on the country's economic mobilization including defense, defense-supporting and non-military production, economic stabilization, and the maintenance of the basic economy. This function includes primary responsibility in negotiations with the national governments on economic and financial measures relevant to defense efforts.

(*c*) Influencing, expediting and reporting on non-military production, as well as economic aspects of military production. This includes advice on technical aspects of production and guidance as to most economical use of country resources. With respect to military production, there will be a need for close coordination with the MAAG to insure that military and economic aspects of production programs are properly integrated, and that there is proper interrelation between production and end item programming;

(*d*) Reviewing, reporting and making recommendations with respect to country availabilities and deficiencies in scarce materials and products.

(4) The detailed respective responsibilities of the U.S. representatives at the country level and the U.S. element of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Defense Production Board (DPB), as well as the U.S. position on the appropriate responsibilities of the International Staff of the DPB, shall be further clarified by the International Security Affairs Committee.

(5) The Ambassador's responsibility for coordination, general direction, and leadership shall be given renewed emphasis, and all United States elements shall be reindoctrinated with respect to the Ambassador's role as senior representative for the United States in the country.

III. REGIONAL LEVEL

A. *Functions.* The United States regional representatives are responsible for

(1) Guidance from the regional viewpoint of the work of the U.S. representatives at the country level;
(2) Representing the United States in the regional multilateral organizations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC); and
(3) Evaluating country programs and providing coordinated recommendations thereon to Washington.

B. *Organization.* The principal U.S. regional representatives are as follows:

(1) The United States Deputy in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), responsible for general political guidance and for assuring political-economic-military coordination in accordance with his approved terms of reference of December 16, 1950.[3]
(2) The U.S. military representative in Europe (designated by the Secretary of Defense) and his staff responsible for coordination of the United States end item supply and training programs and providing guidance thereon to the MAAGs.
(3) The ECA United States Special Representative in Europe (OSR), responsible for economic mobilization activities and United States economic assistance programs and for coordinating the work of ECA missions; and
(4) The United States member of the Defense Production Board (DPB), responsible for representing the United States position in connection with NAT munitions production programs. He will have appropriate access to and will be served by OSR and ECA Missions and may also have appropriate access to MAAGs, as determined by the United States military representative in Europe.

C. *Coordination.* These U.S. regional representatives shall be formally coordinated through the European Coordinating Committee (ECC), composed of the U.S. Deputy (Chairman), the U.S. military representative in Europe, and the ECA Special Representative in Europe, as identified in III–B. Arrangements shall be made for associating the U.S. members of the DPB and of the FEB with this group. Arrangements shall also be made for effective collaboration between this group and the United States element in Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE).

D. *Geographic Location.* Effective coordination requires easy access between the U.S. representatives identified in III–B above and the United States element in SHAPE. This implies consideration of the transfer of the Council of Deputies, the DPB, the permanent working staff of the Defense Finance Economic Committee, and the Mili-

[3] See footnote 5, p. 19.

tary Standardization Agency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as the United States regional organizations now in London (Joint American Military Advisory Group, and the U.S. Deputy's Staff). The United States should seek the agreement of other interested governments to a location of the agencies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as may be recommended by the U.S. Deputy (Chairman) with the concurrence of SHAPE.

IV. DEFENSE PRODUCTION BOARD RESPONSIBILITIES

A. The DPB should concentrate on problems of NAT munitions production, in accordance with the hitherto accepted London discussions of its scope. This includes planning for NAT production in accordance with military requirements based on approved objectives, and expediting the effective accomplishment of such production plans. It should also include the identification of major bottlenecks in the form of material supplies, production equipment, machine tools, manpower and other resources. and seeking action to remove these bottlenecks by the responsible authorities, national or international.

B. The DPB functions should not be broadened to include economic mobilization, NAT organization for which is discussed in V below. Close working relations between these NAT organizations will be essential.

C. The DPB should maintain close liaison with the Standing Group and its agencies including the Military Standardization Agency.

V. NATO ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION

A. There should be created, in a position parallel with the DPB and similarly subject to coordination by the Deputies, a NATO Finance and Economic Board (FEB) composed of senior economic officials from the member countries. The U.S. member would be designated by OSR. The FEB, and on a broader geographical basis the OEEC, should be responsible for necessary cooperative work in the entire field of economic mobilization and maintenance of the basic economies, including parallel action on materials conservation and limitation, conversion of civilian production, economic stabilization, and stimulation of additional production of scarce materials, power and fuels, and other defense supporting requirements. A great deal of this work will necessarily be performed on a national rather than an international basis, and the degree of NATO-wide coordination will be less than in the case of munitions production.

B. The permanent working staff of the Defense Finance Economic Committee would be absorbed into or be replaced by the FEB. The working Group of Twelve on equitable distribution of the economic burdens of the NATO defense program would also be absorbed into the FEB structure, but for the purpose of the burden-sharing exercise,

the FEB would report recommendations for action by the Deputies rather than merely operating under their general coordination.

C. U.S. representatives shall press vigorously for the expeditious establishment of FEB. Pending its establishment, the U.S. Deputy and the ECA Special Representative in Europe shall act for the fulfillment of the objectives proposed for FEB, in the Council of Deputies and OEEC and in discussions with regional representatives of other NAT nations.

D. The FEB might well be composed of the NAT country members of the official level of OEEC Council. A corresponding relationship should exist with specialized subcommittees wherever action both on a NATO basis and on an OEEC-wide basis is desirable. (For example, an FEB subcommittee concerned with the problem of financing military end item transfers would be the NATO member element of the OEEC Trade and Payments Committee, which is concerned with the general operations of the European Payment Union.)

E. The FEB would require some international staff. Part of the FEB staff might well be recruited from the existing OEEC Secretariat staff.

VI. ADJUSTMENT OF REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITIES FOR SCARCE MATERIALS AND NON-MILITARY PRODUCTS

A. The primary channel for determining deficiencies in scarce materials and non-military products should be the national governments, with review and screening by the ECA Missions as part of the United States country teams outlined in II above. Arrangements should also be made for regional screening to ensure the fullest use of intra-European supply possibilities. These country claims will be affected by action in the FEB (and OEEC), particularly in connection with the development of parallel conservation measures and European supplies. Screened claims for non-European resources will be transmitted through the ECA for appropriate consideration in Washington. This will require coordination with global action on supplies and requirements in the proposed international materials group.

B. European materials programs should be reviewed so far as possible through U.S. machinery, national and regional, in Europe and transmitted to Washington for action only after such screening. Washington Supply Missions of foreign countries shall not become agencies for the submission of programs of requirements to U.S. allocating authorities. They will have to engage in day-to-day negotiations with claimant agencies in connection with final decisions on claims, modifications of programs, and the development of detailed schedules within approved programs. However, decisions in Washington should not be taken without reference to review and recommendations from the country and regional representatives.

740.5/2–1951

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director for International Security Affairs (Cabot)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 16, 1951.

Pursuant to a telephone call from Mr. Spofford yesterday, I called Mr. Lovett regarding delay in getting decision on the Spofford counter-proposal to the Canadian Proposal on top-structure of NATO. Mr. Lovett called back today stating that if I pushed for an immediate decision it would be adverse, but that he hoped to work out a compromise by Wednesday at the latest. I told him we preferred to wait until next week in the hope of a compromise. Thereupon I phoned Mr. Spofford who concurred.

From various sources in the lower echelons of Defense, I gather that the Munitions Board and the JCS don't wholly agree, but generally fear weakening of the authority of the military and particularly of the Standing Group. I am trying to assure those concerned that this is not an attempt of the State Department to gain authority, but only an attempt to improve liaison and provide a better working relationship between the political, economic and military elements of NATO.

[1] Transmitted to Acheson in a memorandum from McWilliams dated February 19, with the comment: "With reference to your phoning Mr. Lovett on the Canadian proposal for the reorganization of NATO, the following are submitted for your information." Also enclosed were copies of the Canadian proposal of November 17, 1950 and the draft counterproposal (memorandum by Cabot, February 3, enclosure 1, p. 41.

740.5/2–1951 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, February 19, 1951—6 p. m.

Depto 517. Reference Todep 244 February 8, repeated Paris Torep 928.[2]

1. Following message summarizes USDep–OSR views on organization of FEB in NATO, based largely on discussion Paris February 10 with Katz, Wood, Bissell, Batt, and my representatives participating. Comments appreciated.

2. Believe US should table FEB proposal in NACDeps simultaneously with or immediately following formal proposal for move to Paris. While some such proposal might be advanced even if geographic separation were to continue, believe at this stage we would avoid un-

[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR and MacArthur.

[2] Not printed; it referred to circular telegram 454, February 3, not printed, concerning relationships between NATO, ECA, and OEEC in the overall defense effort. (740.5/2–851 and 740.5/2–351)

necessary and probably irrelevant discussion by linking FEB proposal directly to that for geographical consolidation. Once latter agreed to in NAT, we would press for immediate implementation of FEB proposal even though actual transfer of other NAT agencies to Paris might be somewhat delayed.

3. US proposal in NACDeps or FEB would consist of brief general statement followed by draft resolution containing terms of reference and establishing organizational relationships. Draft of such paper will be transmitted shortly; upon receipt this proposal, deputies will probably desire (although we should not encourage) referral to expert group; if so, while many if not all of WG of 12 members are likely participate, we believe this should be *ad hoc* 12-nation group meeting in London and with same individuals subsequently participating in deputies discussion.

4. So far as FEB functions concerned, we concur in your preference for broadly-stated terms of reference. Check-list contained in reftel for US guidance seems useful pending experience with FEB operations. Desire call your attention, however, to certain additional organizational problems (see paragraphs 5–9 below) on which US position should be as clearly established as possible for purposes discussion in NATO whether or not incorporated directly in USDep's proposal for creation of FEB.

5. Relationship of FEB to NACDeps. In general deputies should have same authority to coordinate and give guidance to FEB as in case DPB. Would not be necessary in case FEB to provide analogous responsibility to ministerial committee (DFEC) although would be desirable to have FEB, under guidance deputies, undertake service any required DFEC meetings along lines earlier proposal for advisory group on financial and economic problems (See Depto 305, December 9, repeated Paris 1138).[3] DPB formula of appeal to deputies in case of disagreement would seem provide useful safety-valve for FEB, although would not expect such procedure to be followed frequently and when followed, would not expect deputies to be able ordinarily to solve issues which had defied solution at FEB level. Agreed recommendations would be transmitted directly to governments unless FEB or deputies believed subject concerned was of sufficient importance to warrant review and endorsement by deputies or council itself. While we would envisage a great many recommendations being forwarded by FEB directly to governments far-reaching policy or political implications of some of its decisions, e.g., on burden-sharing, would clearly warrant consideration by higher authority.

6. Relationship of FEB to DPB. This relationship would consist largely of DPB, having identified economic or financial problems obstructing the accomplishment of defense production programs, refer-

[3] Not printed.

ring them to FEB for appropriate multilateral action. May also be occasions on which FEB would make recommendations to DPB, for example, on desirability directing assignment of production tasks toward countries with underutilized resources. Obviously essential secure intimate collaboration DPB–FEB on such problems as assuring provision of raw materials, components, and production equipment for purposes defense production.

7. FEB secretariat. FEB should have own international staff, own premises, and own security arrangements separate from OEEC and conforming to general NATO standards. Staff director and few top-level assistants would have to be full-time NATO personnel, as would lower level staff including research assistants, clerical and stenographic personnel. At intermediate levels should be possible for NATO and OEEC to exchange personnel on loan basis as general work load and need for particular expertise might indicate. OEEC personnel borrowed by NATO would have to be thoroughly screened for security purposes. NATO secretariat would continue rely on OEEC secretariat for much straight statistical and research work, so that number could probably be held to around 100 overall. Large percentage of this number could probably be recruited from present OEEC secretariat, with addition of appropriate proportion of US and Canadian personnel. All NATO staff would at present have to be on contributive basis, pending consideration of NATO international budgetary and employment procedures. Foregoing procedures would apply in interim to WG of 12 secretariat.

8. Functional relationship to OEEC. Agree general principle that FEB and OEEC (at all levels of international representation) would constitute inner and outer circles with inner circle delegation personnel normally representing their governments simultaneously in outer circle. Also agree on maximum "transferability" of subjects as between FEB and OEEC with assignment being determined from case to case, mainly on grounds indicated in paragraph 3 reftel. While may be unnecessary define this division of labor much more precisely in FEB terms of reference (which in any case deputies would lack power to do insofar as OEEC is concerned), believe that US deputy should be in position to reflect US view on broad division of labor with at least some specific illustrative examples. In general, we would expect OEEC to retain major interest and activity in such matters as raw materials conservation and allocation (specific defense requirements, however, being assessed in NATO), harmonization of monetary and fiscal policies, and trade and payments relationships (other than military transfers). Even where action assigned OEEC, however, would expect FEB undertake as necessary to concert action by NATO members, and be prepared take over problem if non-NATO members were to obstruct effective action. A further consideration, arising from

fact that US will be a full member of FEB and presumably bound as fully as European members to receive and consider FEB recommendations, is that we may desire steer into OEEC forum questions on which recommendations addressed *inter alia* to US would be embarrassing. Fact that NATO European countries might have opposite interest in steering such matters into FEB emphasizes strategic character FEB chairmanship.

9. Sub-committee structure. Agree that existing functional bodies (burden-sharing group, raw materials group and PWS–DFEC) would become sub-groups of FEB. Question of further sub-groups requires further consideration but does not need to be covered in initial organizational paper.

10. Chairmanship. In view of need for aggressive leadership and in view delicate problems of steering business as between FEB and OEEC (see paragraph 8) chairmanship is likely to prove important and strategic post. While organizational paper need only provide that FEB will elect its own chairman, believe it important for US view on this subject to be developed soon. There would be obvious advantages to US chairmanship, although this must be considered in relation to nationality chairman in other NATO bodies and in light desirability avoiding excessive US responsibility for managing NATO affairs. Your views will be welcomed.

SPOFFORD

740.5/2–2051

Memorandum by the Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 20, 1951.

OUTLINE OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT POSITIONS CONCERNING STATE DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS TO REORGANIZATION OF NATO

Mr. Knight spent the morning discussing the Defense Department's position concerning State's NATO reorganization proposals with the following: (*a*) Admiral Wright and Colonel Hughlin of the U.S. Standing Group team; (*b*) Colonel Beebe and Mr. Ernst of the Office of the Secretary of Defense; (*c*) Commander Richardson and Colonel Ashworth of the JCS; (*d*) Mr. Dickenson, Assistant to the Joint Secretaries. The following were determined to be the main subjects of concern to Defense:

(1) State's proposal concerning the Military Committee was interpreted as an attempt to bring in all twelve nations into the Standing

[1] Drafted by Knight (RA) and sent through the Executive Secretariat.

Group operation through "day-to-day" supervision. This is fundamentally unacceptable to Defense which insists that the present Standing Group membership and method of operation be preserved to insure the necessary speed and efficiency for a command operation.

(2) Defense is concerned over the difference in the words "direction" and "guidance" in describing the special relationship between the Deputies and the Military Committee and Standing Group. On the one hand, State has proposed that the Deputies shall furnish *direction* to the Military Committee and Standing Group as to political considerations on which strategic decisions should be based. On the other hand, we have proposed that the Military Committee, or the Standing Group in its stead, supply day-to-day *guidance* to the Deputies concerning military considerations entering into the formulation of policy. Defense's concern is that "direction" may give the Deputies too much influence in "purely military matters".

(3) Defense is worried about the general reduction in influence of the Defense Ministers by taking the Defense Committee out of the line of command and making it purely advisory.

The Standing Group is primarily worried by (1) and, to a lesser extent, by (2). The Office of the Secretary of Defense is primarily worried by (3). The JCS is worried by (1) and (2). Mr. Dickenson is worried by (1) and (2) and, to a lesser extent, by (3).

State's position was stated as follows:

(1) State considers that the organization from the Military Committee level on down is primarily a Defense matter and would accept any reasonable Defense view, including perpetuation of the present *status quo*. It was explained that our tentative suggestion was based on our belief that Defense might welcome some kind of a military "screen" between the Standing Group and the Deputies.

(2) With reference to political "direction", we referred to the grave concern on the part of the smaller countries that a three-nation purely military body, such as the Standing Group, might free-wheel and take certain measures leading to war without the smaller countries having had the opportunity of stating their views.

(3) The State proposal concerning the Council organization was strongly supported on the grounds of efficiency and of the necessity to establish responsibility clearly. It was pointed out, however, that Government instructions would be fully coordinated with Defense and that there was no intention to try in any way to reduce the stature or influence of the defense establishments of the NATO countries.

It is expected that the JCS position will be completed sometime tomorrow. Likewise, the Joint Secretaries [2] will meet on this question tomorrow.

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[2] The Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

State–JCS meetings, lot 61 D 417, Jan–June 1951

Draft Record of Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon Building, Washington, February 20, 1951, 3 p. m.[1]

TOP SECRET

PRESENT

General Bradley	Ambassador Jessup
General Collins	Mr. Matthews
Admiral Sherman	Mr. Nitze
General Vandenberg	Mr. Mann
Admiral Duncan	Mr. Tufts
General Bolte	Mr. Ferguson
General White	Mr. Bonbright
Admiral Davis	Mr. Lay
Admiral Lalor	Mr. Gleason
Admiral Wooldridge	
Colonel Carns	

. . . . . .

WESTERN EUROPE

MR. NITZE: We might begin our consideration of the problem of the defense of Western Europe by taking up the morale problem and the problems associated with the Medium Term Defense Plan. On the political side, it is clear that the basic problem is the problem of developing confidence in Western Europe that Western Europe can be defended. General Eisenhower's visit was extremely helpful in this respect. I think that the announcement concerning the sending of additional U.S. forces to Europe has also been helpful, and that the steady increase in U.S. production of defense items is also having a helpful effect. We in State believe that it is very important for the U.S. Government to do whatever it can to back up General Eisenhower. His assignment is a particularly difficult one, and his success depends in large part on his ability to exercise personal leadership. That in turn depends to some extent upon the backing he receives from Washington. Such things as flexibility in the MDAP program will be helpful in giving him the support he will need.

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[1] The source text, drafted in the Department of State, recorded the discussion of the defense of Western Europe, here printed, and four other topics not printed: Latin America, Yugoslavia, Korea, and a proposed Conference of Foreign Ministers.

Representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met at varying intervals throughout 1951 to discuss matters of common interest. At one point (March 14–15) they met on successive days. At other times (May–June) nearly a month elapsed between meetings. Usually one or more of the Joint Chiefs was in attendance, while Department of State representation varied according to the topics under discussion. However, Mr. Nitze, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, was almost invariably in attendance.

The recent splits in the Italian Communist Party are also a very promising development. There are a range of problems of a straight political character like this which we have well in mind and to which we are giving full attention.

As regards the MTDP, the problem of particular concern to us is that of the deficiencies. As we understand it, the national submissions leave a considerable gap between the requirements set in the MTDP and the forces which the European countries are actually planning to create. These deficiencies amount, we are told, to about 19 divisions on D plus 30, to 3800 planes, and to about 450 ships. The problem of what to do about these deficiencies has been thrown back to the countries. They have been asked to make additional submissions. This process is very slow and from the returns which have come in, it seems unlikely that these additional submissions will meet the gap. We are quite worried whether we can continue to let this problem drag and at the same time make the necessary presentation of our MDAP program to the Congress.

GENERAL BRADLEY: Those deficiencies do not take into account what forces the Germans may provide. Is that correct?

MR. NITZE: That is correct. We understand that whatever forces Germany supplies are matched in effect by an additional requirement. In other words, as we understand it, the problem of defending Western Europe as far to the east as possible requires forces in addition to those called for in the MTDP. It is hoped that these additional forces will be supplied by Germany.

GENERAL COLLINS: I am not sure that that is right.

GENERAL BRADLEY: I think the problem is rather more complicated than that. For instance, the adoption of a forward strategy will, to some extent, reduce the requirement for forces for the defense of Denmark and Italy, and so forth.

GENERAL COLLINS: But the offset is not complete. It will be harder to defend Western Europe the farther east we attempt to hold.

GENERAL BRADLEY: It seems to me that before we start worrying about meeting the gap, we should obtain more progress toward the accomplishment of the present goals contained in the national submissions. The improved spirit and morale coming from such progress will itself provide a basis for the additional efforts required to fill the gap. General Eisenhower's assignment, the steady increase in military production, and gradual improvement in morale will all help to get the Western European defense effort rolling. Then we can talk to the French about increasing their targets. It would not accomplish much to get the French steamed up at this time about the need to create 35 divisions instead of 28. The biggest problem now is to revive the spirit of the French and Germans and others.

GENERAL COLLINS: Korea can contribute to the improvement of morale. The excellent showing which the French troops have made in Korea ought to be emphasized to the French. If we can get the French as proud of their military prowess as the Turks, we will have a very different situation.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: There are many discouraging factors. I have been talking with General Lechere and Marshal Slessor about the problem of tactical air. I don't know where we are going to get the necessary tactical air forces. General Lechere told me about his plans and about how far short he is going to fall. He asked me what we could contribute, and the answer I had to give him was that we could not contribute a damn thing. Then the question arises of how these people are going to protect their cities and people against air attack. What we have available is a drop in the bucket compared to the size of the problem. We have got to get a realistic allocation of manufacturing capacity and we have got to persuade the Europeans that this problem is a manageable one. But right now a big number is staring everybody in the face and no one is doing anything about it. Even after they get moving, it will be 2½ years until any planes are produced.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: There is another problem which has been giving me some concern. I am frank to admit that I am not sure of my analysis. This is the problem of the attitude of the U.K. The Royal Air Force and the Home Fleet are not allocated to General Eisenhower. They have not been made available for the Western European region or for the North Atlantic region. In effect, the U.K. home islands are an enclave in the NATO area. What bothers me are the implications of this. The British are not prepared to put their homeland into NATO to the extent that the French and Dutch and others have done. It seems to me that the British must have reservations regarding the defense of the U.K., and that they must have some internal political difficulties. I suppose that the British are troubled about the survival of the British people in the event of war. We, of course, are sitting in a more comfortable position. We are not committing our home defense forces and the British are acting as we are, but everything that the French have is at the disposal of NATO. I have the impression that the British are waiting for the establishment of a combined Chiefs of Staff apart from NATO or for some other development of this kind. They appear to be holding back.

GENERAL COLLINS: General Eisenhower is planning to do something about this problem. This was indicated to me recently by General Gruenther. There is a good argument—especially as regards air—for full British participation in the defense of Western Europe. They still remember that they fought the Battle of Britain over the English Channel. Some of them perhaps do not realize that this will not happen

again. It is in the British interest that the Battle of Britain be fought as far to the east in Europe as possible. The Soviet Union will have a large capability in guided missiles and will be able to make it very hot in the U.K. if the U.K. does not succeed in stopping a Soviet advance before it reaches the Channel coast. They should be particularly interested in the security of the North Sea area, the defense of the continental coast and the holding up of a Soviet advance across the North German plain.

MR. MATTHEWS: I am sure that the psychology of 1940 is still an important factor in the U.K.

GENERAL COLLINS: Conditions are different, however.

MR. MATTHEWS: I recognize that, but the same psychology probably still exists.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: The real problem is that the U.K. has nothing to throw into the defense of the continent.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: But the U.K. will not throw in what it does have.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: We can hardly blame them for this attitude. There is this great big hole between what Western Europe has for defense and what it needs for defense. No one can see where this hole is going to be filled. No one but the U.S. is producing any substantial quantities of equipment.

GENERAL COLLINS: There has been too much talk about the shortage of ground forces and not enough talk about the shortages in tactical air. When the DPB was set up, Mr. Pace and I thought that it should be strengthened by the appointment of a good executive who would [be] comparable to General Eisenhower in stature. We could see no other way in which to get production moving in the U.K., France and Belgium.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: There is also a good capacity for production in Italy, but nothing is happening.

MR. NITZE: We have appointed Mr. Herod, former President of the International General Electric Company to head the DPB.

GENERAL BRADLEY: I talked with Mr. Herod and Mr. Batt this morning. They feel that the U.K. is really getting underway on its production program now. Of course, the British are real individualists when it comes to production. Mr. Herod and Mr. Batt have already found that it is necessary to talk to British industrialists one at a time. Apparently it is not possible to call in the representatives of the entire industry and to work out a program with the group.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Basically what is bothering the British—if we get to the real roots of the matter—is the poverty of their resources and the implications of this for the future of the U.K.

GENERAL BRADLEY: None of us will get this problem solved until we get production going.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: The European countries have got to pull themselves up by their bootstraps. The NATO machinery in the production field is bogged down. Once it gets started it will take two years to get much in the way of results.

MR. NITZE: The deficiency of 3,800 aircraft seems to us to be pretty important.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: If we look at that problem coldly the deficiency is really on the order of 8,000 aircraft. Only a coordinated production program will be adequate. For example, we need a program under which air frames can be produced in France, motors in Italy, instruments and special equipment in the U.K. and some special items in the U.S. That is a very difficult kind of program to develop. Yet nothing has been done on the apportionment of production tasks.

GENERAL BRADLEY: As I understand it the U.K. is setting up production lines to produce about 8,400 jet engines per year.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: That will supply only about 1,000 airplanes and, of course, though that program will supply some engines the question remains where are we going to get frames, tires, electronic equipment, and so forth. Nothing we have heard about is more than a drop in the bucket. We have got to get going in France, Italy and some of the other countries. I can't find anyone who is looking at the whole problem—all the way from gasoline to airfields. The whole thing is completely uncoordinated and is stuck at dead center.

GENERAL COLLINS: Mr. Pace and I think that it is necessary to soup up the DPB. We got the impression at Brussels that genuine progress was being made so far as ground forces were concerned. The question of sovereignty did not seem to loom very large in the question of ground forces, but everyone's back hunched up when we talked about the allocation of production tasks. I think we are going to need as much pressure from the U.S. on production as we have on any other problem.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: The only way they are going to get self-confidence is by producing.

MR. NITZE: It is our view that the U.S. has got to make up its mind about what needs to be done before much can be accomplished in Europe.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: That is the point. It seems to me that we should get U.S. teams of aviation engineers, tank engineers, and so forth, to survey the European scene and to tell Mr. Herod and Mr. Batt what countries can produce what equipment.

GENERAL COLLINS: That is the way we look at it also. We must remember that Mr. Herod has just been appointed. He has not even been over there yet. I think he is going to have to make a survey just as General Eisenhower did. We have been agreed that the DPB should do just the job Mr. Nitze spoke of. The DPB has got to approach tasks

by countries on the basis of surveys of each country's production capabilities.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: Do they have the necessary contacts here to enable them to find out what can be obtained from the U.S. in the way of machine tools and other items needed for their production lines.

GENERAL COLLINS: There are plenty of contact points—the NSRB, the Munitions Board, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and so forth.

GENERAL BRADLEY: Mr. Herod has got to find out what is required. When he has determined what the requirements are he can use ECA personnel to find out what the production capabilities are. On this basis he can farm out the production tasks country by country.

MR. NITZE: Our people are not clear what the requirements are.

GENERAL COLLINS: Mr. Herod and General Eisenhower have got to work closely together on that problem.

GENERAL BRADLEY: The Standing Group tried to work on this but it is an impossible job to do from Washington.

MR. NITZE: Should requirements be based on the existing national submissions or should they be based on the requirements for meeting the full MTDP. The second question is whether we should accelerate the completion of the program as suggested in NSC 68/4?[2] In other words, can the European countries complete their part of the job before 1954. We feel strongly that an attempt to urge them to accelerate would create serious political problems.

GENERAL COLLINS: I think the first thing is to get them to work on their present plans.

MR. NITZE: Do you think that we should make an exception for air and that we should expand and accelerate the programs for the air forces.

GENERAL COLLINS: I think we should await Mr. Herod's recommendations.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: We talked to General Eisenhower before he left about the purpose of his trip.[3] I wonder if it would be helpful for us to have a similar conversation with Mr. Herod. We might give him an indication of how the problem looks to us. It worries me somewhat that in these semi-military problems, other agencies take off without much consultation with us. I think it might be wise to talk to Mr. Herod before he leaves.

(It was generally agreed that this would be helpful.)[4]

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[2] For this National Security Council document entitled "U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security," December 14, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 467 ff.

[3] The reference here is presumably to Eisenhower's tour of the North Atlantic Treaty countries in January. For documentation, see pp. 392 ff.

[4] No record of such a meeting has been found in the Department of State files.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: We would like to know his approach to his job.

GENERAL COLLINS: We might be able to assist him to get a clearer conception of what his problems will be.

MR. NITZE: I think it would be helpful if Mr. Cabot could join that discussion.

(It was generally agreed that this would be desirable.)

GENERAL BRADLEY: Of course, Mr. Batt should be present also.

MR. NITZE: We have a number of further questions regarding the Western Europe defense problem but I am not sure there is time to take them up today.

GENERAL COLLINS: I am anxious to get a discussion of Spain.

740.5/2-2351: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, February 23, 1951—7 p. m.

4600. In accordance with telephone instruction received by Holmes I saw the Prime Minister[2] this afternoon and opened discussion with reference to the location of NATO civilian agencies and OEEC. Spofford accompanied me. I outlined the substance of Todep 253, February 16 [*15*],[3] stating that of the alternatives which had occurred to the US only first and second seemed workable and US was inclined to favor first, i.e., concentration of NATO civilian agencies in Paris. I made clear, however, that we wished to exchange views with HMG on whole problem and hoped we might be able to reach common position in the matter.

Prime Minister said that Cabinet had not formally considered question but that he had already asked for views and would be in a position to discuss the matter further with us promptly. I left with him an *aide-mémoire*[4] based on my telegraphic instruction.

To avoid press speculation we agreed that we would state to press that subject to [*of*] our conference had been NATO economic problem.

GIFFORD

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Katz.
[2] Clement Attlee.
[3] *Ante*, p. 43.
[4] Not found in Department of State files.

740.5/2-2651 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, February 26, 1951—7 p. m.

Todep 272. Following letter [2] from Lovett to Secretary just received. State has Def proposal under urgent consideration and anxious give you final instrs earliest possible date. Want your views before making any final decision.

"Dept Def has given careful consideration to suggestion by Can Govt for reorg NATO and Dept State view thereon as given to us by Mr. Cabot. I last furnished you with my views on this matter by letter of 5 Dec 1950,[3] in which I indicated opinion it was advisable to postpone any major adjustment Treaty Org until we had moved into an 'operational' phase of the Treaty. I am still of this opinion. The 'operational' phase has only just begun through appt Gen Eisenhower and Messrs Batt and Herod. If any real results are to be accomplished to increase def capabilities in Eur it will rest largely on results of SHAPE and DPB. Effectiveness their working patterns and organizational relations are therefore essence of any rqmts to reorganize NATO.

"I am well aware US has placed itself in difficult position on Can proposal as such by turn of events in Council Deps. If you therefore feel that US must present a positive proposal in Council Deps, I have two alternative solutions. These are based on opinions of Joint Secretaries and JCS.

"*Solution A:* US shld propose that consideration of any reorg NATO shld await full installation and operating experience SHAPE, operational commands under SHAPE, and DPB. When these organizations have proven their effectiveness, a study of NATO org shld be undertaken with view to determining if additional support can be rendered to mil def preparations by any adjustment of Treaty mechanism. Meanwhile presently constituted organization shld improve its effectiveness through closer liaison and more effective governmental representations. Dept Def will undertake to improve its part in this matter.

"*Solution B:* If above solution not acceptable, I recommend that the US propose a method of reorganization approaching that suggested by Can Govt but differing in several major aspects. One of the most important differences is that for practical political reasons I consider it is in the best interest of the US to reject notion that the Council shld be re-titled or considered as a Council of Govts. Equally important is the point that mil leadership of US shld not be unsettled by any reorganization of NATO mil structure at this time. US position wld therefore be:

"*a.* Reorganize Council by incorporation therein of Def Comite, and by titular change from 'Council' to 'Council of Ministers'. The

[1] Edwin Martin drafted the message and cleared it in substance with Cabot.
[2] Dated February 24, 1951.
[3] For this letter, signed by Secretary of Defense Marshall, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, p. 524.

US reps wld thereby be the Secretaries of State and Def. The terms reference of Council shld be modified to comply with provisions of Article 9 of Treaty.

"*b.* Expand role of Council Deps so that they represent governmental views of Foreign and Def Ministers. When Council of Ministers is not in session, Council Deps shld carry out policies of Council of Ministers, formulate issues requiring decisions by Council of Ministers or by member govts, and otherwise constitute a body which may register approval of their govts as obtained on matters before them for consideration. On US side, US Council Dep wld be assisted by a rep of Dept Def acceptable to Gen Eisenhower, JCS, and SecDef.

"*c.* Eliminate DFEC, including its assigned role and functions and substitute therefor Finance and Economic Board as set forth in principle in *Memorandum of Understanding* between Depts State and Def and ECA, dated 15 Feb 1951.[4]

"*d.* Reject any proposals by Can Govt, or other govts for reorganizing Mil Comite, and insist that at this time no changes be made in present terms of reference, functions, and org of Mil Comite, SG, and Mil Reps Comite.

"*e.* Support Can proposal regarding DPB.

"The inclusion of the Def Ministers in the highest policy making body of NATO, in order to represent their govts in def problems for which they are directly responsible, is especially desirable inasmuch as this shld insure that mil matters are accorded their place in relationship to other matters considered by the Council."

WEBB

[4] *Ante*, p. 47.

740.5/2–2651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, February 26, 1951—midnight.

Depto 560. Deputies 13th meeting February 26.

[Here follows a reference to the adoption with minor revisions of a resolution authorizing the Chairman to set up an international staff for NATO civilian agencies and a summary of preliminary discussion of a proposed "information conference" on the subject of Soviet aggression or imperialism and the defensive nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.]

3. French deputy asked meeting continue past usual hour to hear important statement on behalf his Prime Minister. He cited NATO

[1] Repeated to Paris for the Embassy, Schuyler, MacArthur, and OSR and to the capitals of the other NATO countries; also to Frankfurt, to Heidelberg for Handy, and to Wiesbaden for Norstad.

progress in short period but called attention to repeated warnings of growing economic disequilibrium which French now consider critical. Skyrocketing raw material prices were reducing western standards of living, tending toward new economic and social troubles, causing payments difficulties (Netherlands and Germany) in EPU, interfering with integration and making rearmament more costly and difficult. Continued degeneration might have economic and social consequences which could defeat purposes of defense program.

His Government did not know answer but felt US steps under Wilson directives[2] along right line. Asking who had responsibility for maintenance international equilibrium, he answered individual governments, Washington raw material groups and OEEC each had responsibilities for some aspects but that dangerous gaps remained. Our twelve governments must deal collectively with this problem, to which Article 2 of treaty particularly applicable. Reiterating answer would be difficult to find, he urged deputies seize themselves of problem, keep informed of national and international steps and take initiative in seeking to plug existing gaps.

Italian deputy, obviously forwarned, supported French position fully. Canada and Netherlands deputies also expressed general support.

Résumé French statement to be circulated tomorrow. CD will meet for clarifying discussion tomorrow and for full consideration later this week or beginning next.

SPOFFORD

[2] The reference here is presumably to action taken by the Director of Defense Mobilization, Wilson, which led to the announcement on February 26 in Washington, London, and Paris of the creation in Washington of a new organization for international cooperation in the field of consumption and production of essential materials under the name of the International Materials Conference. The conference was to consist of a series of separate International Commodity Committees, the first of which was concerned with copper, zinc, and lead and was meeting on the same date, February 26.

740.5/2-2751

The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Director of Defense Mobilization (Wilson)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, 27 February 1951.

DEAR MR. WILSON: I refer to your letter to General Marshall of 16 February 1951, enclosing a memorandum of understanding to promote closer inter-agency relations on European production and aid

[1] Copies of this letter were sent to Harriman, Cabot, W. C. Foster, E. T. Dickinson, Admiral Wright, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

programs.[2] The Department of Defense is particularly concerned about paragraph III D of the paper which implies relocating in Paris those North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agencies now in London. The remainder of the document is satisfactory as a statement of objectives to be secured through Departmental action.

We have received the views of both General Eisenhower (on 24 February 1951) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (on 20 February) on this matter. They both are convinced that a move to consolidate NATO in Paris is undesirable at this time.

I wish to summarize the detailed reasons given by General Eisenhower as to why the move should not be undertaken: There is a definite and continuing security risk in the concentration of so much NATO activity in one city; there is already a serious shortage of adequate accommodations in the Paris area; concentration of NATO activities in Paris might lead to the by-passing of the Standing Group or force it to move to Paris; and finally, that retention of certain major NATO agencies in Paris, London and Washington tends to keep alive with national leaders an interest in NATO affairs.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are particularly concerned that the concentration in Paris would subject General Eisenhower to direct political pressure which might well be detrimental to him militarily. Furthermore, the proximity of the Council Deputies to SHAPE would tend to prejudice the military authority of the Standing Group in which the authority of the United States is more predominant.

It is therefore quite clear that from the military point of view the move to Paris would be disadvantageous. The Department of Defense is aware that the primary reason advanced for the move is to achieve a closer NATO relationship with the OEEC. This is not a matter of our direct responsibility. It would seem, however, that this requirement could be achieved by other means, such as moving all or part of OEEC to London.

I believe the Executive Branch is faced with the problem of deciding whether or not the financial and economic aspects of the problem are of over-riding importance and therefore could only be resolved by the move to Paris despite the views of General Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It seems to me that the interested Departments should consider this matter further before introducing any proposal into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I am forwarding a copy of this letter to Messrs. Harriman, Foster and Cabot.

Sincerely yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT

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[2] Dated February 15, p. 47. Wilson's letter to Marshall has not been found in the Department of State files.

740.5/3–151 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, March 1, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 576. Appreciate opportunity given by Todep 272 [2] to comment on Lovett letter [3] before final decision reached and trust you will both weigh following discussion in reaching it.

It is, of course, true that operational phase is just beginning and that much valuable experience will be gained in coming years. However, several considerations militate against solution *a*.

One point I wish to emphasize is that present reorganization proposals do not involve change from one hard and fast arrangement to another which will last indefinitely but represent rather one step in an evolutionary process. Further changes will undoubtedly be necessary in light of further experience. This was recognized in first sentence of second paragraph D–D1/1 [4] "Organization established under NAT should be operated with as much flexibility as possible and be subject to review from time to time."

Original organization was blueprinted without benefit of experience by political WG before first meeting of council. I am advised that Defense and JCS representatives in those preliminary discussions then expressed concern over "can of worms" of twelve-nation committees which were then considered politically necessary if otherwise unfortunate. Experience has subsequently shown need for reduction in number of twelve-nation committees and increasing use of operating staff agencies. This has been reflected in establishment of SHAPE and DPB and in recognized need for a FEB.

In this evolutionary process, in parts of which we have exerted effective leadership, we can accomplish little by attempting to convince others that no improvement is needed at this time. Eleven other governments and substantial part of US officials concerned hold opinion which I share that further improvement can and should be made at this time. Should we follow solution *a*, most we could do would be to frustrate others temporarily by refusing to budge. Aside from abandonment of US leadership in this field, ill will which would be caused would react unfavorably in other fields in which we are seeking to stimulate action.

One of the most important considerations to my mind is that of giving Eisenhower, Herod and Batt most effective political support

[1] Repeated to Paris for MacArthur. Beginning almost immediately after an instruction from Spofford on March 1 (telegram 1610 to Paris, Depto 571 to Washington), all telegrams from his office to Paris were assumed to be made available to MacArthur and were no longer marked for him. (740.5/3–151)

[2] Dated February 26, p. 65.

[3] Quoted in telegram Todep 272, *ibid.*

[4] Council Document D–1/1. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. IV, pp. 330–337.

from outset. Do not consider present structure adequate to obtain for them supporting action by other NAT governments to degree and with speed which will be necessary. Believe we owe it to them to develop most effective possible instrument for obtaining requisite governmental support and that this should be sought now with such further changes in future as experience may indicate.

I accordingly recommend strongly against solution *a*.

Solution *b* seems much more realistically in accord with US interests. If instructed to proceed vigorously along lines *b* believe we can obtain agreement and that end product will be better instrument for US leadership than we now have. I have following specific comments:

What Council is called or whether it is retitled at all seems of minor importance, although my preference would be to retain present title "North Atlantic Council". What is important is concept. I am puzzled by statement it should not be "considered as a council of governments" and assume this not intended to imply members would not speak for their governments (as they always have). Such implication would make Council merely impotent debating society and deprive whole organization of central authority.

Military side of organization is obviously matter for discussions by military authorities and we have accordingly avoided deputies' consideration of Portuguese and similar proposals[5] pending such action if any as SG might wish to take. Our main interest in this field is to ensure governmental action adequate to implement agreed military decisions.

Agree with paragraph *a* except question need for any change in title and believe participation by Finance and other ministers if agenda requires should not be excluded.

Fully agree with paragraph *b* but if MilCom is to be retained would suggest additional provision such as is implied in DC 24/3[6] whereby decisions of SG which require governmental approval could be transmitted direct by SG with agreement of Military Representatives Com-

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[5] The reference here is to a proposal of late 1950 by the Portuguese Representative on the Council Deputies for a wartime NATO Supreme Cabinet of five members and a five-member Standing Group. This suggestion was described and charted in an appendix to Defense Committee Document DC 24/1, October 26, 1950. The Belgian Representative at about the same time proposed a different formula for composition of the Standing Group. For reference to the discussion of such proposals, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

[6] Defense Committee Document DC 24/3, "Report by the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Defense Committee on the Creation of an Integrated European Defense Force, the Establishment of a Supreme Headquarters in Europe, and the Reorganization of the NATO Military Structure," distributed in the Defense Committee with a covering note by its Secretary on December 12, 1950, approved by the North Atlantic Council as Document C 6–D/7 on December 18, 1950. For text of DC 24/3, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 548 ff.

mission to deputies for final governmental action. Would welcome representative of Defense Department on my staff and would be glad to work out with State and Defense arrangement for channels for instructions of such representative, etc.

Re paragraph *d*, we will undoubtedly have difficulty with smaller nations. However, USmil must undoubtedly be best judges as to what best serves US interests in this field both as to substance and timing and we will continue to resist pressure for any changes unless and until US agrees that they are desirable.

Fully agree with paragraphs *c*, *e* and final paragraph. Would appreciate definite instructions soonest.

SPOFFORD

740.5/2–2151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 1, 1951—7 p. m.

Todep 284. For Spofford. Dept interested ur reference in Depto 540 Feb 21[2] to Wilgress' view that key to NATO reorg problem was a better working relationship between Standing Group and Mil Reps. We wld be interested in amplification and comments on Wilgress' statement in view extreme importance placed by Def on preservation present setup from Mil Comite level on down.

Def fundamentally opposed to any reorg proposal which wld place in permanent session the Mil Comite at Dep Chief of Staff level and hence retard Standing Group's day-to-day work by reducing it to small nation level. Def is positive and State generally concurs any such solution wld render impossible the operation of Standing Group as a kind of 3-nation CCS with command responsibilities over SHAPE and other NATO Supreme Hdqs.

Rep Can Emb told us informally and with specific request he not be quoted he was confident his Govt wld be satisfied to forego now reorg of Mil Comite and lower echelons and give fair trial to results Brussels action in setting up Mil Reps Comite and to current attempts to foster closer assoc Mil Reps with Standing Group work.

As Wilgress' viewpoint cld be interpreted as at variance with above informal local Can views, ur further comments wld be of value.

WEBB

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[1] Repeated to Paris for MacArthur. Drafted by Knight and cleared with the Department of Defense by Colonel Beebe.

[2] Not printed.

740.5 MAP/3–151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, March 1, 1951—7 p. m.

4708. From ECC for ISAC.

1. In considering item III of its agenda (coordination European military production with US MDAP end item programs and US offshore procurement) ECC had in mind overall objective of meeting MTDP equipment requirements with maximum speed and economy. ECC recommends that ISAC, in connection with its instructions to the field aimed at achieving this objective, incorporate the following policies as essential planning guides, the first four of which should be made clear to NAT country governments by country MDAP groups. We realize that in some cases this will constitute reiteration, but believe these US policies not yet fully accepted by other governments nor reflected in their planning.

(*a*) MDAP end item programs should not, in general, include items that could reasonably be expected to be produced in Europe and the US will eliminate from end item program requests those items that can reasonably be made in any European NAT country; the US will expect that the countries will take the necessary initiative to produce or procure such equipment.

(*b*) Pricing in the SG costing exercise, of US types on basis US prices carries no implication whatever that equipment so priced will be obtained under MDAP end item programs.

(*c*) Scope of both US economic and end item assistance will be related to and supplement willingness our NAT partners undertake maximum defense efforts within their respective economic and financial capabilities, including in such efforts, steps to meet presently unallocated MTDP gap and, if possible, making of burden-sharing contributions to other European NAT countries.

(*d*) Country end item programs constitute guides to procurement from US productions and will be delivered in accordance with adequacy and efficiency of the countries actual efforts.

(*e*) Any US procurement in Europe will be undertaken in such manner as to minimize conflicts with principles set forth in paragraphs (*a*) and (*c*) above.

2. Joint regional cables expanding on above principles follow.

3. Foregoing message does not cover financial and transfer measures, which are covered in separate ECC cable.[2]

4. Todep 278 February 27 [3] just received and will be studied further before direct regional comment. [ECC]

GIFFORD

[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR, to Frankfurt, and to Heidelberg for Handy.

[2] *Infra.*

[3] Not printed; it provided a detailed presentation of the latest Washington views concerning U.S. procurement directly by military services of military equipment and related end items and components in areas outside the continental United States and its possessions. (740.5/2–2451)

740.5 MAP/3–151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, March 1, 1951—7 p. m.

4709. From ECC for ISAC. Subject is expansion European military production.

1. Believe there is urgent need to dispel uncertainty in European countries re general system for financing intra-European transfers military equipment. These uncertainties are major factor retarding development rationalized European production. Recommend US press for action soonest in NATO to reach multilateral agreement on general system for financing intra-European transfers by ordinary commercial payments through normal EPU payments mechanism rather than by "free transfer" system or (except in special circumstances) US off-shore procurement. Further recommend that any resulting undue strains on European payments relationships be offset later by intra-European burden-sharing transfers in the form of financial contributions among the European NAT countries. US should use its aid programs as a lever to obtain satisfactory pattern of intra-European contributions as US interests require. Use of off-shore procurement to finance intra-European military transfers should be confined to cases where clearly necessary to break particular log-jam, and limited to scale which will not create European expectations that such use will become generalized. Finally US should declare that US-produced end-item program will in general not include items which can be efficiently and timely produced in Europe.

2. We are convinced long step could be taken toward badly needed acceleration intra-European military transfers if these basic policies were adopted. However, assuming that necessary progress will be made on these and other factors retarding European defense production, believe also there is room for use of additional "pump-priming" financial devices to stimulate production for transfer or perhaps production more broadly. We believe any such scheme should involve multilateral sharing of risks involved. However, as soon as reasonably firm agreement in principle is reached on such risk-sharing believe US funds might be put into scheme. Our specific recommendations this subject follow shortly. Meanwhile, we recommend proceeding with case of French mortar ammunition as in Embtel 4710.[2] [ECC.]

GIFFORD

[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR, to Frankfurt, and to Heidelberg for Handy.
[2] Not printed.

740.5/3–351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, March 3, 1951—5 p. m.

Depto 583. Todep 284.[2] Wilgress did not say that he considered key to NATO reorganization problem was better working relationship between SG and military representatives but that key to SG–military representative problem was better working relationship between them (Depto 540).[3] I gathered that he was referring more to day-to-day operational procedures and informal relationships between SG and military representatives than to any formal procedure which may have been in force. I regard Wilgress comment more as expressing hope that military representatives would as practical matter be held less at arms length by SG than as indication of intention to press for formal reorganization SG–military representative arrangement.

As I get background Canadian attitude probably more sensitive on this point than other non-SG nations since former have enjoyed close and intimate working relationship with both US and UK military since last war. Canada undoubtedly would like to forge closer relationship with US military, and as part of this are most desirous being taken into confidence as much as possible by them re SG operations. UK patronizing attitude of speaking for Canada on SG matters obviously irritating for latter who I think regard their military and strategic interests more in consonance with those of US than with UK.

We have consistently taken position with other deputies that question of military reorganization one which military itself should resolve. I propose continue this position and ward off CD discussion military organization unless appropriate military agencies ask for CD help. Furthermore it is obvious that CD must not attempt to intervene in day-to-day operational problems of military. There has so far been no sign of any desire to do so and I am confident it could be quashed if it arose.

Emphasis in all discussions on organization here has been on necessity for "streamlining" and substitution of command for committee structure wherever possible (e.g., DPB, SHAPE) and apart from some small nation pressure there is increasing support for view which I have always had that SG must be equipped to perform CCS functions. In these circumstances, to let organization move back to the committee type operation would to my mind be unfortunate. I therefore fully understand and agree that it would be highly undesirable to create permanent 12-power military body over SG to which mili-

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[1] Repeated to Paris.
[2] March 1, p. 71.
[3] Not printed, but see the reference to telegram Depto 540 in Todep 284, *ibid.*

tary decisions would be referred before issuance and to allow CD get involved in military decisions. However, it seems to me important as practical matter that US military attempt work out arrangements to insure non-SG nations being kept as happy as possible without formal change in organization or jeopardizing authority or efficiency of SG. I believe this is what Wilgress had in mind.

SPOFFORD

740.5/3-451 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, March 4, 1951—10 p. m.

Depto 586. Following joint message from Katz and myself supersedes paragraphs 2 and 3 Depto 517, February 15 [*19*] : [2]

a. In view at best serious delay in resolving problem geographical consolidation, we now consider it essential proceed forthwith on FEB proposal. In view CD discussion on general economic problems scheduled for Tuesday March 6 as result Alphand statement, desire table paper quoted below at that time.

b. Note paper does not pose question geographical location FEB, although this question bound arise early in discussions of proposed *ad hoc* organizing committee. We are engaged in clearing supplementary message [3] on this subject, together with comments on Todep 287, March 2 [4] which hope you will have Monday morning. Regarding FEB chairmanship, will take soundings at appropriate time as suggested Todep 273.[5]

"1. In view of mounting number, complexity and seriousness financial economic problems confronted by members NATO, and in view importance to common defense effort of effective solution these problems, US Government has been giving urgent consideration to question of how, within NATO framework, and in relationship to other agencies such matters might best be handled.

"2. Clearly measures which are necessary in each member country provide financial and economic support for its defense effort and protect civilian economy against undue deterioration are primarily national responsibility that member. However, US Government also impressed with need for taking coordinated action along many lines financial and economic field to maximize defense efforts while maintaining sound basic economic structure. Existing NAT agencies this field (financial and economic WG in Paris, PWS/DFEC, and ad-

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[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR, to Frankfurt, and to Heidelberg for Handy.

[2] *Ante*, p. 53.

[3] Telegram Repto 1007, *infra*.

[4] Not printed; it concerned a request by Alphand for NATO consideration of the inflation problem (740.5/2-2651).

[5] Not printed.

visory group on raw materials problems), as presently organized, not adequate for this purpose. US Government therefore proposes establishment as part of permanent NAT organization under CD, a high-level NATO financial and economic board (FEB), to be concerned with all aspects financial and economic mobilization in support defense effort which require multilateral consideration, and to complement DFB in task stimulating output military equipment. It is recommended that this board be given broad assignment of responsibility within NAT framework for promoting effective cooperative action in such fields as materials conservation and limitation, conversion civilian production, economic and financial stabilization, stimulation additional production of scarce defense-supporting requirements, and financial measures to promote defense programs.

"3. US Government appreciates that one of the major factors which has hitherto delayed effective action within NATO framework to deal with financial and economic problems has been concern lest such action infringe upon responsibilities and effective functioning of OEEC. US Government is keenly aware of long run importance maintaining OEEC with genuine vitality as body promoting economic cooperation among all free nations of Europe, and fully recognizes value having any economic mobilization and adjustment measures which might be agreed upon among NAT countries accepted by wider membership of OEEC. Arrangements should, therefore, be contemplated which would provide maximum degree collaboration between NATO Financial and Economic Board and OEEC, including maximum flexibility and transferability in assignment tasks as between two organizations. To this end, it is recommended that so far as possible FEB should operate as inner circle within outer circle of OEEC, with individuals who serve on FEB or its subcommittees normally representing their governments in corresponding OEEC bodies. Especially in broader, more general fields finance and economic planning, of fundamental importance to, but not directly related to, defense efforts NAT member countries, NATO should rely so far as possible upon activities OEEC.

"4. In general, CD should have same authority to give continuous political leadership and guidance to FEB as in case DPB. Recommendations developed by Board for communication to NAT member countries would be transmitted directly to governments unless board or CD considered subject concerned was of sufficient importance to warrant review and endorsement proposed recommendation by CD. FEB should work in close collaboration with other NATO bodies, particularly with DPB. DPB should identify economic or financial problems obstructing the accomplishment of defense production programs and refer them to FEB for appropriate multilateral action. May also be occasions on which FEB would make recommendations to DPB for example on desirability directing assignment of defense production tasks toward countries with underutilized resources. There is clearly need for close collaboration between the two agencies on such problems as assuring provision raw materials, productive equipment, and finance required for defense production. It is contemplated that existing NATO staff organizations in financial and economic fields would become subcommittees of FEB, which would become responsible for immediate direction their activities. Would also be neces-

sary for board be equipped with secretariat staffed with appropriate technical experts.

"5. It is recommended that CD consider passing resolution along lines of draft attached in order secure expeditious consideration in NATO of above proposal."

Begin resolution: CD, having examined proposal by USDep for creation FEB, invites member governments to designate representatives to constitute *ad hoc* organizing committee which should be convened London at the earliest possible date to prepare proposed terms reference for NAT financial and economic board. These terms reference should be in conformity with general principles expressed in US proposal and should provide general statement functions this body and define its relationships with other NAT agencies. Organizing committee is also requested include in its report to CD general statement of how it would envisage relationship between operations of FEB and those of OEEC. *End resolution.*

[KATZ]
SPOFFORD

740.5/3-551 : Telegram

The United States Special Representative in Europe (Katz) to the Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Foster)[1]

SECRET PARIS, March 5, 1951—7 p. m.

Repto 1007. For Foster and Bissell; pass Department for Perkins and Cabot. Reference Depto 586,[2] repeated Paris 1653, Frankfort 916. This is joint message from Spofford and Katz supplementing reftel.

1. Re geographical location FEB, problem would of course be automatically solved if favorable decision reached on suggestion now under consideration to consolidate NATO activities in Paris. Failing such decision, believe nevertheless essential proceed with FEB arrangement. There might be two geographical possibilities. One would be set up FEB in Paris like Working Group 12. We agree this not satisfactory because of separation from Deputies and DPB. Remaining possibility arrangement under which inner circle would normally meet in London and outer circle in Paris. This would mean FEB secretariat would be established initially in London, and that in general meetings of FEB and its sub-committees would be held in London. To reduce to minimum possible unfavorable impact upon OEEC, we would contemplate informal personal explanation with Marjolin, Hall-Patch, and possibly Stikker, of ways and means to achieve optimum result. Believe Secretariat arrangements along lines

[1] Repeated to London for Spofford, to Frankfurt, and to Heidelberg for Handy.
[2] *Supra*

paragraph 7, Depto 517,[3] repeated Paris 1496 and functional relationships along lines paragraph 8, Depto 517 good starting point which could be maintained despite geographical difficulties. Furthermore, would contemplate many meetings FEB taking place in Paris and in any case, would recommend leaving WG of 12 operation there until it completes report to CD on first round of burden-sharing.

2. Re Todep 287, repeated Paris 4574, March 2,[4] believe our views fully in line with yours. However, "inflationary problem" comprehends great many general and particular economic issues, some of which could appropriately be dealt with in FEB. To take a clear example, FEB advice to DPB on country's economic and financial capacity to undertake additional defense production tasks would involve assessment possible inflationary consequences thereof and on others of which "maximum flexibility and transferability" between FEB and OEEC should be maintained. To extent "inflationary problem" involves review member countries broad economic and financial policies, notably their fiscal and monetary policies (which are highlighted in Marjolin's memorandum), see further advantage of steering problem to OEEC in that this is clearly field in which US might be reluctant offer full participation.

KATZ

[3] February 19, p. 53.
[4] See footnote 4, *supra*.

740.5/3–451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET NIACT PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 5, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 288. Following are State–ECA–Defense comments on Depto 586.[2]

1. Suggest that in para 3 a new sentence be inserted after sentence beginning "To this end". "In order to permit such an arrangement to function smoothly and in view of the importance of close working relations between the FEB and the OEEC, it is believed desirable that the FEB be located in the same city as the OEEC".

2. Suggest that there be added at the end of first sentence of para 4 the following language: "and shall see that the FEB and the DPB take effective coordinated action and establish and maintain close working relations with each other".

[1] E. M. Martin drafted the message and cleared it with Cabot, Halaby (ECA), Colonel Beebe, and Gordon.
[2] March 4, p. 75.

3. After second sentence of para 4 it is suggested there be inserted following sentence: "Issues on which the FEB is unable to reach agreement may also be referred where practical and useful to the CD for resolution".

4. First proposal is all that can be said definitely on location question at this time. Note you hope to avoid this issue in Deps but not sure this feasible or desirable. Feel strongly that without finally committing ourselves as to where NAT–OEEC shld be, it is more important that FEB be located adjacent to OEEC than to Deps or DPB. This wld mean that unless new decisions are taken by NATO and OEEC on location, the FEB wld be located in Paris. If question shld arise as to whether US attaches importance to close working relations between FEB and Deps and DPB, you can of course answer in affirmative. The issue is rather one of relative importance in immediate future.

5. Purpose of last two suggestions is to strengthen position and responsibilities of CD to insure effective working of NATO.

6. What is your intention respect PBOS? Language para 2 broad and cannot clear today any change.

7. This proposal also raises issues with respect to future of DFEC on which we hope to send you instructions in a day or so as part of general NAT reorganization plan.

WEBB

740.5/3–551

Memorandum by Laurence C. Vass of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the Director of that Office (Martin)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 5, 1951.

Mr. Cabot phoned you again [1] and conveyed to me the following message re Depto 586.[2]

He stated that Spofford had called him about 9:15 this morning to emphasize the necessity of a reply before tomorrow. I gathered that he was also putting in a plug for a favorable reply. Mr. Cabot also stated that Harriman had talked to him this morning [3] and expressed his agreement with the proposal.[4] However, he felt that there should be included in paragraph 3 some statement along the line that the seat of FEB should be in the same city as OEEC in order to bring about the maximum flexibility and transferability contemplated.

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[1] No record of the earlier telephone conversation has been found in the Department of State files.

[2] Dated March 4, p. 75.

[3] No record of this conversation has been found in the Department of State files.

[4] The proposal on the FEB, transmitted by Spofford in telegram Depto 586, March 4, p. 75.

He then stated that he had been informed by Mr. Webb that Mr. Harriman raised the question of FEB with Mr. Lovett at lunch, and told him that we would be sending out a reply tonight. Mr. Lovett expressed interest in the subject and stated that Defense would like to consider the reply. Mr. Webb said that Mr. Lovett would have an opportunity to concur in the cable, whereupon Mr. Lovett remarked that they would need a little time to consider it.

Mr. Cabot stated that he took the line with Mr. Webb that he did not really think that Defense was directly involved in the subject of FEB and was not at all sure that such clearance was essential. I pointed out that Defense would have at least a negative interest in the subject, in the sense that they would wish to make sure that we were not pre-judging the decision on geographic location or NATO reorganization by this action. I pointed out also that Mr. Harriman's suggested reference to location was particularly likely to invite close scrutiny by the Pentagon.

Mr. Cabot concluded by remarking that the important thing was to get something out tonight. If it turned out that we could not reach agreement on the proposal, we should at least tell Spofford why not.

My own initial reaction to Spofford's proposal is that, whether intentionally or not, it forces us to attempt a shortcut to a decision on the major issues between State and Defense. I feel certain that the tabling of such a proposal would lead immediately to questions as to our position on the Canadian proposal, the location of NATO and OEEC in the same (and which?) city and the fate of DFEC. I think we should consider our decision on the reply as a part of our general strategy. If we feel that the introduction of this proposal at this time would accelerate favorable decisions, we should attempt clearing an affirmative reply. While I have a number of questions to raise on the text of the proposal, I have no substantive difficulty with it.

However, I am not at all certain that introducing such a limited proposal at this particular time is a particularly helpful move in the direction of obtaining agreement on the move to Paris and the establishment of FEB. I am particularly concerned at Harriman's suggestion since it sounds to me as though this would imply U.S. willingness to split FEB from the Deputies. It is my recollection that our position is that NATO and OEEC must be together and that we take a dim view of FEB in Paris, unless there has been agreement that all of NATO is to move. On balance, I am not inclined to favor approval of the proposal since the inevitable disclosure that Spofford is not prepared to talk about the essential questions will at least create confusion and may well lead to suspicion of our motives in making so limited a proposal.

740.5/3–651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, March 6, 1951—midnight.

Depto 597. Deputies seventeenth meeting March 6.

[Here follow a comment on reports presented by the Working Group of Twelve and a brief account of a report made by William R. Herod, Coordinator of North Atlantic Defense Production, on first steps being taken to build an international staff for the DPB and to set priorities in the planning and speeding of defense production.]

3. French deputy opened discussion on his paper on economic consequences of rearmament (Depto 560)[2] by emphasizing that he had no intention infringing upon responsibilities and functions OEEC, and only desired reinforce its activities. If CD kept properly informed deputies might be able to intervene from time to time with governments to secure implementation of OEEC recommendations affecting successful carrying out defense effort. This position supported in principle by almost all deputies. Netherlands deputy proposed that CD be kept informed of OEEC activities by WG of 12, and requested comments on this proposal from Roll, who stated his belief that such arrangement would be practicable and helpful to CD. This proposal again supported by most deputies, with French deputy suggesting reports also cover developments in Washington raw materials organization, and with UK deputy raising question of whether, when international staff organized, this reporting function might not become a staff job. CD then accepted chairman's proposal that specific arrangements for obtaining such reports be worked out between him and chairman WG of 12, but chairman emphasized interim character such arrangements, expressed his belief these not adequate on permanent basis, and announced his intention present further concrete suggestions soonest possible. At close of discussion Canadian deputy referred to deputies' responsibilities under article 2 but supported OEEC considerations, at least temporarily, of broad economic and financial problems raised in Alphand paper, on grounds avoiding duplication, OEEC technical competence, inclusion non-NATO members, and because international action on such problems more feasible in European context than if short-term attempt made now to secure full participation Canada and US.

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[1] Repeated to Paris for the Embassy, OSR, and MacArthur; to the capitals of the other NATO nations; to Frankfurt; to Heidelberg for Handy; and to Wiesbaden for Norstad.

[2] February 26, p. 66.

[Here follows an account of discussion concerning national military service, mobilization, and training procedures.]

Next meeting March 8.

SPOFFORD

State–JCS meetings, lot 61 D 417, Jan–June 1951

Draft Record of a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon Building, Washington, March 7, 1951, 11 a. m.[1]

TOP SECRET

PRESENT

General Bradley	Mr. Matthews
General Collins	Mr. Nitze
Admiral McCormick	Mr. Perkins
General Twining	Mr. Ferguson
General Bolte	Mr. Marshall
Admiral [Sherman?]	Mr. Tufts
Admiral Davis	Mr. Lay
General White	Mr. Gleason
Admiral Wooldridge	
Admiral [Duncan?]	
Admiral Lalor	
Colonel Carns	

. . . . . .

MEDIUM TERM DEFENSE PLAN

MR. NITZE: Mr. Cabot recently wrote me a letter concerning the deficiencies in the MTDP and the position which the U.S. Government should take regarding the meeting of these deficiencies. I replied to him in a letter giving the views of the Policy Planning Staff.[2] With your permission, I would like to read excerpts from this reply in order to make sure that our views are not in conflict with your own.

(At this point Mr. Nitze read to the group the two questions addressed to him by Mr. Cabot and most of his reply. These documents are on file in Mr. Nitze's office.)

GENERAL BRADLEY: We have at last received the long awaited costing study, and are very disappointed with it. It seems to represent a mere addition of nine sets of national figures. The principal conclusion to be derived from it is that the European countries want us to do most of the job. In fact, it shows that they expect us to foot about 90 percent of the total bill. We simply cannot do that. Mr.

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[1] The source text, drafted in the Department of State, records the substance of discussions of the Medium-Term Defense Plan, here printed, and three other topics not printed: Yugoslavia, Spain, and Austria.

[2] This exchange of letters not found in the Department of State files.

Herod has got to get busy on this problem with General Eisenhower. He can use the personnel of the ECA organizations and other U.S. personnel in Europe to find out what other European countries can produce. With the information thus acquired I think he can develop a production program. The present study is impossible, and, in my opinion, should be burned.

MR. NITZE: It is our view that before a satisfactory European production program can be developed, the U.S. Government will have to give Mr. Herod and Mr. Batt considerable guidance.

GENERAL BRADLEY: I agree with that. We know that the U.S. cannot furnish more than $4 to $5 billion per annum for two or three years. If the forces called for in the MTDP are to be ready by 1954, it follows that the U.S. can furnish, say, $12 billion, and Western Europe has got to do the rest. On the basis of guidance along these lines, Mr. Herod has got to work out a production program for accomplishing this task.

MR. NITZE: There are a number of problems on which it seems necessary to have a U.S. view if our people are to do an effective job. We have to know what the requirements are, what production is possible, and what financial burdens can be carried by the European Governments before a sound program can be worked out. It is for this reason that we made the two points in our reply: (1) it is important to make progress on the present job, and (2) it is important to prepare a coordinated program here of what the European countries must do. Such a coordinated program would have important influence on the work of ECA and State.

GENERAL BRADLEY: I agree that it is necessary for the European countries to make a good start on their present programs before they are confronted with the question of expansion and acceleration. Even on these present programs they are asking that 90 percent of the burden be carried by us and expect to carry only 10 percent of the burden themselves.

MR. NITZE: We realize that that is not possible. Another element of this problem is the length of time during which the defense of Western Europe will be in doubt. What do we do during this period?

GENERAL BRADLEY: We have accelerated our own program with the view of completing it in 1952. It is unrealistic to expect the Europeans to do the same thing. It is not physically possible for them to complete the necessary production in that time. In my view, 1954 is the earliest date at which the Europeans can develop the forces called for by the MTDP. It will take them two or three years in some instances to set up production lines.

GENERAL COLLINS: At a minimum it will take them 18 months to set up a tank line.

General Bradley: There is no doubt that it will take a long time. For one thing, we have got to furnish a lot of machine tools and other equipment required for the production process.

Mr. Nitze: This corresponds to our own point of view. It leads to the question of what we are going to do about our own security in the meantime. I think it has a bearing on the Spanish problem, the Yugoslav problem, the problem of the air defence of the U.K., and the problem of building up stockpiles in the U.K.

General Collins: Moch is a very able man, and has given a real impetus to the French production program. The French have developed a pretty good light tank. Some of its features are better than our own. The French can move along on this fairly rapidly, but they cannot do it within the time limits that we would like.

Mr. Nitze: They should attempt to meet their present programs, and perhaps to give some increased emphasis to the deficiency in the air. In the meantime, perhaps we could do more to assist Spain, Yugoslavia, and the U.K.

General Collins: I hope you will excuse me for a few minutes. I am trying to stop the limitation to 3½ million men. That would have a profound effect on what we are now discussing. All that you in State can do to help Mr. Herod will greatly increase Western European ability to meet its present targets. I have thought for some time that Mr. Herod should have a stature comparable to General Eisenhower's. His task involves very touchy problems. It is very important, in my opinion, to give him all possible political support.

Mr. Perkins: Mr. Herod has got to organize an international staff, and that will take some time. It seems to me that the U.S. should get its ideas straight—on a unilateral basis—so that we can inject our ideas into the process over there as rapidly as possible.

General Collins: The MDAP groups have a great deal of information which Mr. Herod should receive, and which he could use in developing his own program.

Mr. Nitze: It will take a great deal of time to organize a multilateral staff for the production problem, and for this staff to produce results. It seems to us that these results can be accelerated if the U.S. can furnish Mr. Herod a coordinated program representing our own view of what the Europeans must do. For example, someone needs to give Mr. Herod and Mr. Batt a firm view as to what the Belgians should produce.

General Collins: By invitation of Moch, the Army is sending a group over to evaluate certain new French weapons. We have a favorable report on the French light tanks. They also have a new bazooka and a new recoilless rifle which we are going to look at. This group could discuss with French authorities the limitations on French

production. If it were desirable, the group could pass on its views to Mr. Batt and Mr. Herod.

(At this point General Collins left the meeting.)

GENERAL BRADLEY: To sum up, it appears that we should not try at this time to allocate the additional efforts required to fill the gap. We should try to get the present programs well underway. When we have made some progress, we can talk about plans to fill the gap. This should not be postponed until the present program is completed, but only until it is well underway. By this time General Eisenhower will be able to give us a lot of help. He will be able to work with us and with Mr. Herod and others with responsibilities in this field. At the present time we should give whatever guidance to Mr. Batt and to Mr. Herod that we can. We should inform them that Western Europe has got to do most of the production job, and that the U.S. cannot furnish more than $4 to $5 billion a year in assistance.

MR. NITZE: We will quickly run into serious financial problems in Europe.

GENERAL BRADLEY: But we will not get more appropriations than that from the Congress. There has already been a shift in view on the "hill" which may be of serious proportions. Last September the "hill" was asking why we did not mobilize 6 to 7 million men, but now opinions have changed and there is an increased feeling of security. In my view, we are likely to get only $2 to $3 billion dollars next year. If so, it will be very tough for Western Europe to complete its plans in two to three years. I do not see myself how we can give much more guidance than this to Mr. Herod and Mr. Batt.

MR. NITZE: We have been told by a number of Europeans that it is a mistake to deal with them in terms of generalities. I have myself been urged to recognize the importance of being specific about what it is we want them to do. It presents them with a much easier domestic problem if we tell them that we want a certain number of tanks then if we tell them that they must double their production and their appropriations for military purposes.

GENERAL BRADLEY: Isn't that exactly what Mr. Herod was set up to do?

MR. NITZE: Yes, but I think he needs guidance from us.

GENERAL BRADLEY: He needs guidance from the Standing Group also. We here in Washington are not in a position to tell them exactly what to produce. That job has got to be done over there. The ECA missions in Europe are better able to do it than we are.

MR. PERKINS: We do need to work here on the financial requirements.

GENERAL BRADLEY: The program is laid out in general terms in DC–28. General Eisenhower will eventually be able to make this more specific.

MR. NITZE: Would the costing study provide details as to the number of tanks and other items of equipment which the French and others should produce?

GENERAL BRADLEY: To obtain that information all that is necessary is to take the forces they are planning to create and to apply the data from the tables of organization for each country. We are not familiar with the details of this problem. It might be possible to give the costing exercise to Mr. Herod after deleting the price and value computations.

MR. PERKINS: Shouldn't we look at the T.O. to make sure that it is satisfactory to us?

GENERAL BRADLEY: It is hard for us to know what the T.O. should be. We would greatly resent it if they made suggestions to us for the revision of our T.O. I think we will have to take the approved T.O. of each country as the basis for our work. I am not sure that I understand exactly what it is that you think that we should furnish to Mr. Herod. I don't see how we can go beyond DC–28, and what we can attain by multiplying four figures by the T.O.

MR. PERKINS: An example of what I am talking about is that we are now asking the Belgians to increase their defense budget by 500 million francs. They want to know what they should produce.

GENERAL BRADLEY: That is Mr. Herod's job it seems to me.

MR. NITZE: There are also heavy financial problems when we get into this problem of costs. We have got to have some ideas about the division of the financial burden before we can deal successfully with the production problem. I recognize that the present costing exercise is no good, but we might convert these costs into European currencies in order to get a basis for proceeding to a study of the financial problems.

GENERAL BRADLEY: If the present costing figures should leak, they would do far more harm than good. I think, however, that we could give the requirements data from the costing exercises to Mr. Herod. Perhaps this should go from the Standing Group to Mr. Herod.

MR. PERKINS: I am not sure how valid the individual cost estimates are. On many items of equipment U.S. costs were used because the Europeans did not know what their own costs would be.

GENERAL BRADLEY: We will look into this question of supplying lists of equipment to Mr. Herod without the costing data.

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740.5/3–751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, March 7, 1951—8 p. m.

4802. Following is text *aide-mémoire* which Attlee handed me this afternoon (Embtel 4600 February 23 repeated Paris 1566).[2] Report of my conversation with him follows in separate message (Embtel 4803 [3] repeated Paris 1684 March 7).

1. "His Majesty's Government have carefully considered *aide-mémoire* which US Ambassador handed to Prime Minister on 23 February [4] on subject of co-ordination in economic and financial fields, with particular reference to future development of economic work of NATO.

2. HMG agree with US Government on need to ensure coordinated action in the economic and financial fields for increasing the defense efforts of NAT countries while at same time maintaining sound basic economic structures. They also agree that continuous leadership and guidance from North Atlantic Council deputies to the other NATO bodies is necessary for smooth functioning of whole organization and for attainment of broad objectives of NAT. They recognize, as do US Government, difficulty of working out any perfect solution to these problems.

3. HMG have carefully examined five alternative courses of action set out in Ambassador's *aide-mémoire*. The first point on which they wish to make their position clear is that they could not contemplate moving to Paris the NAT agencies now situated in London, as proposed under solution 'A' in *aide-mémoire*. General grounds on which HMG oppose such a move have been explained to US Government in discussions both in London and Washington and do not need to be rehearsed at length in this reply. Broadly speaking, HMG are convinced that a removal of central agencies of NATO from London to Paris would not be in best interests of the organization and would be detrimental to full and effective cooperation which HMG have been able to offer and intend to continue offering both with US Government and with other members through NATO.

4. HMG appreciate that it is desirable to provide machinery which will enable NATO to deal more effectively than it is at present equipped to do with tasks in economic and financial sphere which fall to the organization. NATO has considerable role to play in this sphere, not only on account of bearing of defense programs on economic life of member countries, but in view of undertakings in regard economic collaboration assumed by member governments under Article 2 of NAT. HMG fully share US Government's desire that NATO and Council Deputies should be put in better position to fulfill their responsibilities in economic field.

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Bruce and Katz and passed to MacArthur for Eisenhower.

[2] *Ante*, p. 64.

[3] *Infra*.

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

5. At same time, HMG feel it is important to avoid duplication with work already being done by other bodies, such as OEEC and International Materials Conference. They are not convinced, having regard to work being done by these bodies, that setting up of any elaborate machinery under NATO is necessary at present time. In their view principal need in present circumstances is to ensure that deputies are able:

(*a*) To keep closer contact with group of twelve and to exercise the necessary supervision over its work; and

(*b*) To maintain liaison with other international organizations operating in economic field.

They believe that these requirements can be met by making full use of the integrated international staff, under a special assistant to the chairman of deputies, which it has recently been decided to set up in London.[5] This staff, if enlarged by appointment of one or two persons with economic training, should be able to keep deputies and their chairman regularly informed of proceedings, both within and outside NATO, affecting economic problems of defense and enable them to take whatever action they may consider necessary. In addition, individual deputies could arrange closer contact with corresponding national member of group of twelve.

6. Arrangements of this kind should enable deputies to keep themselves informed of developments in general economic situation and to satisfy themselves that purposes of NATO are properly reflected in economic policies of member governments, while at same time making full use (through group of twelve) of experience and cooperative working traditions of OEEC national delegations and secretariat.

7. Above are present views of HMG. They are, however, prepared to consider and discuss with US Government any proposal for improving effective working of NATO consistent with maintenance of its headquarters in London."

GIFFORD

[5] The proposed creation of a NATO international staff was reviewed by the Council Deputies during January and February, and a resolution (D–D (51) 47 (Final), not printed) establishing the principles for setting up such a staff was adopted by the Deputies on February 26.

740.5/3–751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, March 7, 1951—8 p. m.

4803. Re Embtel 4600 February 23,[2] repeated Paris 1566. At Prime Minister's request I saw him today to receive British reply as to

[1] Repeated to Paris for Bruce and Katz and passed to MacArthur for Eisenhower.

[2] *Ante*, p. 64.

location of NATO civilian agencies and OEEC. Spofford accompanied me; Dixon of Foreign Office present.

Prime Minister stated government had set out their views in *aide-mémoire*, text which is being cabled in Embtel 4802,[3] repeated Paris 1683 March 7.

Prime Minister orally stated that in addition to points made in *aide-mémoire* in favor NATO agencies remaining in London, there was further important question of security on continent. They could not help remembering situation in 1940. As to geographical question, I inquired whether they had considered alternatives in our *aide-mémoire*. He said they had. As to matter of economic organization he said they were as indicated in *aide-mémoire* prepared to discuss this question.

He then referred to several other points related to NATO. He hoped chief of international staff could be appointed soon. He then referred to Canadian proposals, stating he attached great importance to simplification of complicated committee structure. He hoped this matter could be concluded speedily. Spofford stated we were giving careful and urgent consideration to question and he hoped he could be in a position to take it up in the deputies in the near future.

Prime Minister then stated that he had been somewhat disturbed by reports that SHAPE was to have very large information staff stating this was a matter which in his view should be handled primarily by national governments. He said that he felt there was real question as to desirability of SHAPE engaging in psychological warfare activities; that conduct of psychological warfare by army officers might cause resentment among civilian populations in continental countries and might be construed as having too pronounced American flavor. I stated I was not informed as to General Eisenhower's plans in this respect but latest information we had was that General Eisenhower contemplated only small staff for information purposes.

I told Prime Minister I would transmit his views and give them our further speedy consideration.

GIFFORD

[3] *Supra.*

740.5/3–751

The Deputy Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 7, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This letter will confirm our verbal agreements reached on 5 March 1951,[1] as to the United States position on the

[1] No record of this conversation has been found in the Department of State files.

proposed reorganization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is understood that my letter of 24 February 1951,[2] should therefore be modified as follows:

In Solution "B," paragraph "*a*" should be deleted and the following revised paragraph inserted:

"Reorganize the Council by the incorporation therein of the Defense Committee, but without titular change. The North Atlantic Council will represent the respective Governments of the member states. It shall incorporate not only the Council envisaged by Article 9 of the Treaty but also the Defense Committee referred to in the same Article. The Council shall be composed of members of Ministerial rank, although in exceptional circumstances member Governments may be represented by other persons duly designated for the purpose. Heads of Governments may attend meetings of the Council in person. Otherwise, Governments shall be represented by their Minister of Foreign Affairs and/or their Minister of Defense or by other competent Ministers according to the nature of the agenda."

In Solution "B," paragraph "*b*" should be amended by:

a. Adding to the first sentence the phrase: "and other competent Ministers as appropriate."
b. Deleting the phrase "Council of Ministers" where it appears and substituting the word "Council."

The intent of the above change to paragraph "*a*" is that the Council shall be composed basically of Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers. When the nature of the agenda requires the presence of Ministers other than Foreign Affairs and Defense, such Ministers shall enter the discussions of the Council and participate in its decisions. Under these conditions the United States could be represented at the Council by the Secretary of State alone, or the Secretary of Defense alone, or any competent Minister alone when dictated by the agenda, or by any combination thereof. In selecting the membership of the Council for its meetings the wording now before the Council Deputies might well be accepted, which is:

"Member Governments will decide, in the light of their own constitutional and domestic requirements and of the agenda fixed in advance by which Minister or Ministers they shall be represented."

The intent of paragraph "*b*" is that the Deputy United States Representative, North Atlantic Council, shall, in addition to the Secretary of State, advise and assist the Secretary of Defense according to his responsibilities under Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty and other Ministers according to the agenda. I suggest that Ambassador Spofford's terms of reference, as approved by the President on 16 December 1950,[3] should be reviewed and a joint recommendation

[2] Printed in telegram Todep 272 to London, February 26, p. 65.
[3] See footnote 5, p. 19.

between our Departments be made to the Bureau of the Budget for revision in light of these understandings.

With reference to Solution "B," paragraph "*c*," it was further agreed that in the event all or part of OEEC does not move to London the Department of Defense would not object to the location in Paris of the contemplated Financial and Economic Board. The Department of Defense position regarding other major NATO bodies remains that they should not be transferred from Washington or London to Paris.

Regarding the military structure of NATO, it is my understanding you are in agreement that at this time no changes should be made in that structure, as previously stated in paragraph "*d*" of Solution "B." I therefore urge that this point be made explicit in presenting our views on the Canadian proposal to the Council Deputies.

A major consideration in adhering to the present military structure is to insure direct relations between the Council Deputies and the Standing Group. This is particularly important if the Council is to be reorganized to incorporate the Defense Committee. Under no circumstance should the United States accept any proposal to place the Military Representatives Committee in any way between the Standing Group and the Council Deputies. To insure this point the United States should present to the Council Deputies a proposed amendment to the Council Deputies terms of reference [4] recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which I enclose.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

Appendix

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR COUNCIL DEPUTIES AS PROPOSED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Council Deputies shall represent all Ministers concerned with North Atlantic Treaty matters between Council sessions on a permanent and continuous basis. When the Council is not in session, the Council Deputies shall carry out the policies of the Council, formulate issues requiring decisions by the Council or by member Governments, and otherwise constitute a body which may register the approval of their Governments as obtained on matters before them for consideration. The Council Deputies shall deal directly with the Standing Group (Military Committee as presently constituted when that body is in session) on political matters having military implications and shall provide the Standing Group (Military Committee as presently constituted when that body is in session) with the political guidance

[4] See the North Atlantic Council Resolution on Central Machinery, released to the press May 19, 1950, printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 29, 1950, p. 831.

upon which strategic decisions should be based. The Standing Group shall maintain close liaison with the Council Deputies and provide that body advice on military matters. The Deputies shall be responsible for coordinating the activities of and giving guidance to all the other permanent organs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Each Deputy shall be assisted by such advisers as are deemed necessary by his Government.

740.5/3–851 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, March 8, 1951—6 p. m.

Depto 604. For Cabot from Spofford. Re Todep 288 March 5.[2]

1. In view receipt reftel, notably paragraphs 1 and 4 thereof, have not tabled February [3] paper in CD pending clarification final position of FEB geographical location. Understand reftel dispatched before receipt in Washington of Repto 1007 from Paris of March 5,[4] paragraph 1 of which set forth view of Katz and myself that, failing consolidation NATO activities in Paris, FEB should have main headquarters in London. Consider it appropriate therefore to present following further views on this subject. These views concurred in by SUSRep and cleared by JAMAG, but since Katz has informed me he feels unable pursue matter further as result telephone conversations with Washington since receipt thereof Repto 1007, have not requested him concur this message.

2. Fully share your desire for intimate working relationship between FEB and OEEC and would expect achieve same through inner-outer circle arrangements involving maximum personal union in NAT country representation on two bodies and their respective subcommittees. Such arrangements would ensure that national representatives FEB and subcommittees would be fully conversant with OEEC activities, problems, and policies. However, a further major operating problem remains, namely how to develop intimate collaboration among various NATO agencies and in particular, how to secure proper orientation economic and financial personnel and activities toward importance military considerations and problems associated with defense effort (to cite just one example, question financial measures to promote defense production—see ECC message in Embtel

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[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR, to Frankfurt, and to Heidelberg for Handy.
[2] *Ante*, p. 78.
[3] In the source text "FEB" is incorrectly spelled out as "February" instead of as the acronym FEB (Finance and Economic Board).
[4] *Ante*, p. 77.

4709 [5]). See no effective answer to this problem other than locational arrangements proposed in Repto 1007. Note these proposed arrangements fairly flexible on location meetings FEB and subcommittees. However, believe FEB secretariat (which should be small in comparison OEEC, but which we all apparently agree should be separate from OEEC) must be located in immediate proximity to other elements NATO international staff in order ensure day-to-day coordination of NATO work programs and close gearing FEB activities to problems arising out of additional defense and defense production programs.

3. Desire reiterate view that in initial presentation CD, FEB paper should not specifically address itself to locational problem. However, if can secure your reconsideration conclusions in reftel, would contemplate making oral statement to effect secretariat should be located, and in general FEB meetings should be held, at headquarters permanent NAT organization. Would further suggest organizing committee be invited consider this question (with any guidance which may be provided by CD) in connection with its report regarding relationships with OEEC. (See last sentence proposed resolution in Depto 586.[6])

4. Agree paragraphs 2 and 3 of reftel and am making corresponding amendments to FEB paper. Re paragraph 6 reftel, had not intended affect PBO's status, at least for present, but have added to proposed FEB functions advance planning for wartime economic mobilization, which would eventually have to be brought into relationship with PBO's work. Re paragraph 7 reftel, very much hope avoid raising this issue in initial CD meeting, since this might result long delay even in reference problems organizing committee. However, if pressed, would contemplate making oral statement to effect that relationship with DFEC should be studied by organizing committee in light any guidance provided by CD as result their consideration NATO top-level reorganization.

5. Believe necessary proceed as rapidly as possible with FEB paper in view fact British appear opposed developing NATO body with such broad jurisdiction and, if given time, may succeed in developing substantial Continental opposition to whole idea. British view appears based not so much on sensitivity re OEEC as upon feeling that burden-sharing is far most important NATO economic and financial activity, and that extension NAT functions into field economic and financial mobilization in support defense effort might involve UK in undesirable commitment to multilateral review such matters. Note that British at least agree (see paragraph 5 London Embtel 4802 March 7 [7]) that NATO should have a small staff in economic field operating in London

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[5] March 1, p. 73.
[6] March 4, p. 75.
[7] *Ante*, p. 87.

with rest of NATO international staff (cf. last sentence paragraph 2 above), although their "one or two persons" is of course less than we would expect to have in FEB secretariat.

SPOFFORD

740.5/3–1051

Memorandum by the Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1951.

Subject: Location of NATO.

I need your help in resolving the conflict with Defense on the proper location of NATO. The NATO staffs in London (Deputies and DPB) are dealing with economic and production problems as is OEEC in Paris. The proposed Finance and Economic Board (FEB) of NATO must cover the same problems of burden-sharing and economic mobilization for defense that concern OEEC. Division and duplication are costly, will tend to devitalize the splendid OEEC team built up by the ERP, and will slow down rearmament. It is, therefore, important to reach agreement on geographical consolidation.

The United Kingdom has officially advised us they wish to keep NATO in London. Informal advices indicate that other Europeans want it in Paris. Defense does not believe the U.S. should accept a move to Paris of NATO groups now in London. This would leave us with the alternatives of a split organization or a complete move to London, neither of which State or ECA wish us to advocate. Our advocacy of movement to London would give support to the charge that we consider Europe expendable thus discouraging our partners. Such a move might also weaken OEEC. State and ECA are not impressed by the argument that movement to Paris would make less secure the individuals and secrets with which they deal and might embarrass General Eisenhower with added political interference.

State and ECA now recommend that Ambassador Spofford seek, in the Council of Deputies, to get FEB formed immediately, located in Paris for the moment; and further recommend that he ask the other members to decide whether the rest of the NATO organization in London should be moved to Paris (about 500 personnel) or whether OEEC and FEB should be moved to London (about 800 personnel, including Ambassador Katz and his staff).

The NATO alliance is both political and military as are its problems. Unless you can resolve this problem with General Marshall, I feel it must go to the President.

THOMAS D. CABOT

[1] Cleared by Perkins.

740.5/3–1051 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 10, 1951—4 p. m.

Todep 293. 1. Fol is agreed US position on Canadian reorganization proposal, including concurrence Budget Bureau, as it was concluded in ISAC Mar 9. You are requested to seek agreement to these instructions in substance. If unable to do so you are requested to report situation for further consideration by ISAC. In particular, changes in language with respect to Council shld not be accepted without checking here.

2. With respect to Council following language is desired:

"The North Atlantic Council will represent the respective Govts of the member states. It shall incorporate not only the Council envisaged by Article 9 of the Treaty but also the Defense Committee referred to in the same Article. The Council shall be composed of members of Ministerial rank, although in exceptional circumstances member Governments may be represented by other persons duly designated for the purposes. Heads of Govts may attend meetings of the Council in person. Otherwise, Govts shall be represented by their Minister of Foreign Affairs and/or their Minister of Defense or by other competent Ministers according to the nature of the agenda."

The agreed minute as contained in Depto 567 [2] is accepted subject to predeletion of the words "and finance ministers" and of the last sentence.

The language dealing with the Council has been interpreted by Defense Dept [3] as follows:

"The intent of the above change to para '*a*' is that the Council shall be composed basically of Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers. When the nature of the agenda requires the presence of Ministers other than Foreign Affairs and Defense, such Ministers shall enter the discussions of the Council and participate in its decisions. Under these

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[1] Edwin Martin drafted this telegram and cleared it with Colonel Beebe and the Bureau of the Budget.

[2] The minute agreed to by the Council Deputies for incorporation in its records, as transmitted in telegram Depto 567 from London, February 28, not printed, reads as follows:

"Agreed that presence too many Ministers at Council meetings would lead to considerable inconvenience, and governments should, therefore, be urged keep their representation to minimum called for by agenda. Was felt that as general rule it should be possible by careful arrangement of agenda in advance limit occasions on which presence of more than one Minister would be necessary. Deputies would, of course, consult among themselves regard to preparation of agenda, if only insure that as far as possible member governments were represented by similar Ministers at the different meetings. Was recognized, however, that it might be an advantage if from time to time Council meetings were attended jointly by Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Finance. Was suggested that in such cases progress of work would be facilitated if Council resolves itself and sub-committees on which different Ministers would sit these sub-committees reporting back to plenary meeting of Council". (740.5/2–2851)

[3] In the letter from Lovett to the Secretary of State, March 7, p. 89.

conditions the United States could be represented at the Council by the Secretary of State alone, or the Secretary of Defense alone, or any competent Minister alone when dictated by the agenda, or by any combination thereof." This interpretation has been generally agreed to.

3. The following language is proposed with respect to role of Deps:

"The Council Deps shall represent all Ministers concerned with North Atlantic Treaty matters between Council sessions on a permanent and continuous basis. When the Council is not in session, the Council Deps shall carry out the policies of the Council, formulate issues requiring decisions by the Council or by member Govts, and otherwise constitute a body which may register the approval of their Govts as obtained on matters before them for consideration. The Council Deps shall deal directly with the Standing Group (Military Committee as presently constituted when that body is in session) on political matters having military implications and shall provide the Standing Group (Military Committee as presently constituted when that body is in session) with the political guidance upon which strategic decisions should be based. The Standing Group shall maintain close liaison with the Council Deps and provide that body advice on military matters. The Deps shall be responsible for coordinating the activities of and giving guidance to all the other permanent organs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Each Deputy shall be assisted by such advisers as are deemed necessary by his Govt."

In the latest letter from Defense it is indicated that this language may require revision in your terms of reference. No action will be taken until Council reorganization completed, but when completed wld appreciate your comments on changes you think desirable in light of agreed statement on functions of Deps.

4. Although understand Deps have not completed discussion of military parts of Canadian proposal, it is desired that these be disposed of by action of the Deps. The US position is to reject any proposals by the Canadian Govt or other Govts for reorganizing the MilCom and that at this time no changes be made in the present terms of reference, functions and organization of the MilCom, Standing Group and of the Mil Reps Comite.

5. The DFEC shld be abolished and its functions transferred to the Council. The functions of the PWS of DFEC shld be transferred to a new body to be established which, in view of US, wld be the FEB. It is understood here that language with respect to Council does not determine who shall represent US at Council meetings dealing with financial and economic matters but that that will be decided by interested US agencies, in accordance with the particular circumstances as they may develop.

6. Provisions should be made to have Defense Production Board report to Council Deps as suggested in Canadian proposal.

7. As we understand it, these instructions will permit Deps to take action on all parts of Canadian proposal. If this is not the case, please let us know as it is desired to complete action in Deps on entire proposal at this time.

WEBB

740.5/3–1251 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, March 12, 1951—5 p. m.

Depto 619. For Cabot from Spofford. With further reference Todep 288 of March 5,[2] would greatly appreciate earliest confirmation, in response to Depto 604 of March 8,[3] as to position I should take on FEB. Since I have already indicated to CD my intention table paper on general economic and finance work in NATO, and since there has been some comment in London press this subject, believe desirable proceed as soon as possible.

Understand from various telephone conversations that final US position will support location FEB Paris, but that instruction this subject held up pending resolution interdepartmental differences as implications this decision for future policy on overall geographic consolidation. Hope you can resolve or defer latter issue soonest. On foregoing assumption re US position on location FEB, only outstanding question is whether paper should contain explicit reference to location or should be left to possible CD questions on subject. Do not believe this question particularly important and would accordingly propose adopt suggestion paragraph 1 reftel. Believe in addition, paper should be expanded to instruct organizing committee to report on how practical operating relationships can best be worked out between FEB and other NAT bodies in light geographical separation. Would plan review this problem with Katz at earliest opportunity.

SPOFFORD

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[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR, to Frankfurt, and to Heidelberg for Handy.
[2] *Ante*, p. 78.
[3] *Ante*, p. 92.

740.5/3–1451 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, March 14, 1951—8 p. m.

Depto 634. Re Depto 626 and Todep 293 (of which we are pouching copy to MacArthur).[2] At yesterday's mtg I outlined position given in Todep 293. No objection was raised to US language given in first para of numbered para 2 except on deletion reference to Finance Mins. Belg indicated *ad referendum* acceptance in principle of Can proposal. There was some argument over deletion of reference to FinMins from agreed minutes and considerable argument over relations between civ and mil agencies.

On question of FinMins UK felt strongly they shld be mentioned. He stated Chancellor of Exchequer much interested in NATO and Brit Cabinet had accepted abolition DFEC on understanding FinMins as well as DefMins might attend Council mtgs. Hoyer-Millar commented that while US apparently felt Council delegations shld ordinarily be composed of 2 mins, UK felt it shld be either 1 or 3. US expressed view Foreign and DefMins have primary responsibility but that FinMins or others cld clearly be included when govts felt agenda made it desirable. UK generally supported by Dane, Fr, Ital and Neth. Dane suggested as compromise that words "such as FinMins" be inserted after "competent mins" in last sentence of US language. After mtg Starkenborgh suggested it be made clear in some manner that FinMins were not being omitted as such but that specific mention was being made of DefMins since def committee stipulated by treaty was being incorporated into Council.

On civilian-mil relations US strongly urged no changes be made in mil org pending further experience with MRC in present form. Can stated reorganization of Council was basic object of their proposal, that mil aspects were intended primarily as basis discussion by mil side NATO. While his govt wld prefer to see mil side streamlined now to permit decisions be made more quickly than under system requiring mil committee action, Can willing try present arrangements for while in view US opposition to change. If continued existence of mil com were found to delay taking of mil decisions, Can Govt might later reopen matter. Ports referred to his govt's continued insistence that deps and SG communicate through MRC rather than direct.

Neths felt US language in para 3 Todep 293 increased power SG and tended to give it in effect responsibilities of mil com thereby reducing status of MRC. US referred to desirability of periodic per-

[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] Telegram Depto 626, March 13, not printed, summarized the discussion of various subjects considered in the March 13 meeting of the Council Deputies (740.5/3–1351). Telegram Todep 293 is printed, p. 95.

sonal contact between chiefs of staff and felt mil com useful for this purpose. US maintained effectiveness of MRC cld not be judged without further experience and said SG members making definite effort to make present procedure work satisfactory in practice.

Can commented off-the-record that SG had originally been conceived as executive agency and permanent working staff of mil com but that members of SG had tended to take into their hands all of mil com's authority and to use mil com merely as cloak. He nevertheless thought present arrangement cld work provided SG consulted frequently, sufficiently and seriously with members of MRC individually or collectively. Fr agreed important thing was reorganization of Council and that consideration of changes in mil org shld await further experience.

Starkenborgh admitted he had not heard any recent criticism of SG. He nevertheless felt command and SHAPE staff appointments reflected unduly predominant role for SG countries. Belg indicated dissatisfaction, whether founded or unfounded, existed over relations with SG. US commented any scheme for centralizing authority wld have some unsatisfactory aspects but that appropriate means must be found between need for consideration of natl points of view and need for quick and effective collective action. He reiterated SG members making real effort this respect.

Neths inquired as to significance of words "political guidance" in language para 3 of Todep 293 rather than "political direction" (C 5–D/11 final). If it were polite way of saying "direction" he wld be satisfied but language of DC–24/3 [3] made him skeptical. Fr and UK reiterated Council in C 5–D/11 had used words "higher direction of integrated force as regards polit considerations upon which strategic decisions shld be based." US said authoritative clarification on this point wld be necessary and he wld not attempt personal interpretation. Neths stated basic question was whether or not supreme control wld be civilian rather than mil. Chairman requested reactions of govts be given next week after which he hoped drafting committee cld begin revising D–D1/1.[4] UK and Neths stated Cabinet consideration would probably be necessary by their govts.

SPOFFORD

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[3] See footnote 6, p. 70.

[4] The reference here is to Council Document D 1/1, September 17, 1949. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. IV, pp. 330–337.

740.5/3–2051 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, March 20, 1951—noon.

Depto 651. This msg supplements para 2 Depto 650.[2]

1. CD held prelim discussion Mar 19 on US proposal for establishment of FEB (see D–D (51) 72, Mar 15 [3]—in addition to regular distribution, copies pouched all ECA mission chiefs). Most deputies uninstructed but almost all, led by UK deputy, expressed opposition to any resolution which wld endorse in advance gen principles of US proposal. On other hand, appeared be unanimous willingness appoint organizing comite and call into session at early date, as well as willingness pursue discussions in CD of gen principles US paper prior to and during session of organizing comite with view providing comite further guidance. Expect obtain resolution, or more likely agreed [minute on?] FEB along those lines.

2. UK was the most critical of US proposal, expressing fears of duplicating machinery and labeling US proposal as "too elaborate." UK was only deputy who showed resistance to basic conception of central NATO financial and economic agency. Fr deputy supported by several other deputies including UK criticized proposal of FEB making some recommendations direct to govt, calling it "sidetracking" of CD. US deputy defended this arrangement with respect to matters of insufficient importance to justify CD discussion. Canada deputy supported by several other deputies suggested that existing NATO bodies in financial and economic fields shld be abolished rather than transformed in FEB subcomites, leaving FEB organize its work as it saw best. Several deputies, while endorsing location FEB Paris, expressed concern about maintenance liaison with Dep and DPB in London and Nor deputy, refusing to "beat around the bush" said this problem cld only be resolved by transfer of NATO agencies from London to Paris.

3. Fr. Deputy with some support from others proposed WG of 12 act as organizing comite mtg in Paris, but large majority appeared favor mtg in London of *ad hoc* comite consisting of representatives

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Embassy and OSR, to the other NATO capitals, to Frankfurt, to Heidelberg for Handy, and to Wiesbaden for Norstad.

[2] Telegram Depto 650, March 19, not printed, summarized briefly the discussion of several matters covered on March 19 at the 22d meeting of the Council Deputies.

[3] Council Deputies document D–D (51) 72 was Spofford's proposal as described in Depto 586 and modified by Todep 288 and Depto 619, all printed pp. 75, 78, 97. He had distributed the document in the CD meeting of March 15 on authorization contained in telegram Todep 299 of March 13, not printed (740.5/3–451).

(who might in any case be members WG of 12) specially designated for purpose by govts. This issue, like terms of ref of comite, put over until Wed.

SPOFFORD

740.5/3-1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 21, 1951—7 p. m.

Todep 314. We (State and Defense) consider polit "guidance" wld be accepted as "direction" and hence consider them synonymous. We also consider that civilian control of natl policy in peace time is unquestioned. We believe question of guidance versus direction to be essentially one of semantics. You might usefully refer to Para 15 Part one of DC 24/3[2] which states that council Deputies as only higher NATO polit body in continuous session shld be channel through which polit guidance to mil agencies is funnelled, and point out that language used in this doc was approved by both Defense Comite and Council. You cld also refer to Appeal Provisions in Para 16 Part one DC 24/3 which clearly indicate that guidance synonymous with direction, at least for purposes this doc, as otherwise there wld be no need for appeal.

ACHESON

[1] Knight drafted this telegram and cleared it with Colonel Beebe (Defense) and, in substance, with Bonbright.

[2] See footnote 6, p. 70.

740.5/3-2251 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, March 22, 1951—6 p. m.

Depto 662. Dept pass Ottawa. Deputies 23rd meeting March 21.

[Here follow brief references to a summary by Alphand of the latest German position on the composition of a European army, and to the discussion of a report on the financing of the SHAPE budget.]

3. US proposal con [concerning?] FEB. This item deferred for consideration at next meeting in view inability US and UK to agree on terms of agreed minute regarding convening organizing comite to consider terms of ref for central NATO agency in econ and fin field. US Dep presented new draft for such an agreed minute which

[1] Repeated to Paris for the Embassy and OSR, to the other NATO capitals, and to Frankfurt, to Heidelberg for Handy, and to Wiesbaden for Norstad.

was as conciliatory as possible without abandoning idea that basic purpose of org comite was to prepare recommendations for central NATO fin and econ body, leaving all other genl principles expressed in US paper to subsequent discussion by Deps prior to and during session of organizing comite. However, UK insisted on alternative language which wld have directed *ad hoc* comite merely to study ways of improving NATO organization in econ and fin field including "if necessary, creation of a central agency for this purpose." US Dep took position that this basic decision shld be made by CD before it was worthwhile summoning org comite. Believe all Deps other than UK wld have accepted our proposal. Will utilize period during Deps recess to try to persuade Brit to our view.

4. Canada and Belgium announced concurrence in US amendments to Can proposal on NATO reorg. Former stated Ottawa gratified at US acceptance of its basic thesis on council and agreed no action shld be taken now with respect mil com. In regard to constitution of NAT Council, French still instructed to adhere to original Can proposal. UK proposed insertion in US draft after words "competent ministers" of phrase "especially Ministers for Econ Affairs" on grounds they had as much interest in NAT affairs as Fon Mins or Min Def. Was supported by Italy and, subj to instructions, by Neths. All others able to accept either US or UK draft on this point.

Re mil commission [*committee*], UK announced change of view and agreed it shld not be abolished. Port agreed. Italy and Belg agreed but believed mil agencies shld study whether or not mil reorganization necessary. Neths still thought mil commission shld go.

UK believed final paper shld make clear Deps wld not deal with mil matters. Neth again stressed final decisions shld be by civil rather than mil authorities. In conclusive discussion raised question of what matters shld be considered "military" and therefore avoided since mil agencies themselves had asked Deps to take up political aspects of such mil matters as Ger participation and mobilization and training procedures. Deps agreed WG should now begin drafting revision of D–1/1,[2] bracketing alternate texts where necessary.

Port requested consideration at next mtg of Port-Belg proposals for changes in SG. Chair reminded council he had advised SG these would not be considered by Deps until SG consideration completed but agreed as to SG re present status.

5. On shipping priorities in wartime US reiterated two problems involved: (1) How is problem of wartime shipping needs to be studied? and (2) What agency will allot shipping space in war? US considered FEB appropriate agency to consider this question. Genl

[2] See *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. IV, pp. 330–337.

agreement with PBOS view that latter problem not in competence of PBOS. Further consideration deferred.

[Here follow three paragraphs referring to a memorandum from the Standing Group on estimating civil requirements for shipping, deferred action on a matter concerning merchant shipping, and discussion of a draft agenda for a NATO information meeting.]

SPOFFORD

110.12/3–3051

Memorandum by the Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 27, 1951.

Subject: Report on Trip to London and Paris by Under Secretary Webb and Mr. Cabot, March 19 to 26, 1951.[1]

A visit of three days in London and two in Paris is insufficient to justify a general report on NATO progress, but we would like to record a few impressions.

On the whole, the advance toward a proper military posture for the defense of Western Europe has been good. The greatest need is for psychological stimulus. Europe lacks confidence and a sense of urgency. Progress is being made but European political leaders are reluctant to face unpleasant decisions and tend to follow rather than lead public opinion in levying for their country's defense.

Europe's lower living standards make it unfair to expect burden-sharing comparable to our own. From the following tables, showing defense expenditure as percentage of gross national product, it is apparent which countries are the laggards.

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[1] In telegram Todep 304, March 16, not printed, Webb informed Spofford and Gifford that he and Cabot felt the need for discussions with them and their staffs including Batt and Herod and with Generals Handy and Kibler. Webb said that they, accompanied by W. J. Sheppard, planned to arrive on the morning of March 20. The purpose of their visit, he said, was to get better informed on NATO and the MDAP and what the U.S. overseas elements felt were the major problems on which Washington could be helpful. (740.5/3–1651)

In telegram 4849 to Paris, March 16, not printed, Webb called attention to the copy of telegram Todep 304 repeated to Paris and informed Bruce and MacArthur that he, Cabot, and Sheppard would arrive in Paris at noon, March 23, and depart for New York and Washington on Sunday evening, March 25. Webb said he hoped to converse with Bohlen, Bonsal, and Katz (740.5/3–1651). In addition to discussion with those mentioned above, Webb, accompanied usually by Cabot, talked with Morrison, Gaitskell, and Makins in informal meetings at London (740.5/3–3051) and with General Eisenhower (740.5/3–3151), Petsche, and Parodi (740.5/3–2151) in Paris. There may have been others.

On March 28 Webb and Cabot made an oral report to President Truman on their trip to Europe during which they summarized the contents of the source text. The President authorized them to tell the press about their visit and the attitude of the American officials in Europe. (Secretary's memoranda, lot 53 D 444, Secretary's memos, January–March 1951)

	1949 *Percent*	*1950* *Percent*	*1951* *Percent*
Belgium	2.7	3.0	4.3
Canada	2.7	4.0	8.8
Denmark	1.8	1.8	3.0
France	5.7	7.3	9.7
Italy	3.9	5.1	5.7
Luxembourg	1.2	2.3	3.3
Netherlands	4.1	4.9	5.1
			7.6*
Norway	2.9	3.5	5.0
Portugal	2.7	2.5	2.5
United Kingdom	5.9	6.2	8.7
United States	5.1	7.9	15.0

The improvement in periods of compulsory military training are on the whole more satisfactory. Belgium has extended national service from 12 months to 18 months for the class of 1950 and has a bill pending to increase service to 24 months. Denmark's period is 12 months which must be raised to meet announced plans. France has 18 months of national service with exemptions limited to real physical disability. Italy has raised from 12 to 15 months with a legal service of 18 months now authorized. The Dutch national service period of 12 months can be extended to 18 under present law, which Dutch authorities have now announced they intend to do. Service in Norway has been raised from 9 to 12 months and cannot be raised further at this time on account of lack of officers. The United Kingdom has recently increased its service from 18 to 24 months.

Although the proposed forces are deficient for the Medium Term Defense Plan, confidence is increasing that present proposals can be met and that the deficiency in units will be easier to meet as additional arms become available.

The greatest advance in the past six months has undoubtedly been in organization, particularly in supplementing the complicated committee structure with a command structure both in the military and in the production field. The appointment of General Eisenhower and the building up of his staff in SHAPE have had a profound effect in encouraging Europe and are no doubt doing a great deal to accelerate the accomplishment of the plan. Mr. Herod, who has been in Europe only three weeks, has made great progress in building his permanent working staff of the Defense Production Board.

Partly because we have been late in arriving at a proper organization, defense production has lagged in Europe and is still less than satisfactory. The AMP plan of aiding specific production programs by granting the estimated component of the total cost represented by materials and equipment obtainable only in dollar areas has proved

*Includes additional defense expenditure that Dutch Government has announced will be its new program for the year. [Footnote in the source text.]

too complicated to be much of a stimulus. At best the task of augmenting the manufacture in Europe of military end-items will be a difficult one. We have only disincentives to offer. The incentive is for our allies to delay their production programs in hope that the items covered by these programs will be furnished without cost under our MDAP. Our avowed purpose of furnishing under MDAP only end-items which cannot be produced in Europe will be difficult to enforce without endangering the whole Medium Term Defense Plan.

Coordinating our end-item assistance with our European production program will take great effort. We now have careful plans for coordination at the country level, the regional level and the Washington level and have the will to make it work. Success will depend on complete cooperation with Defense and ECA. Visiting back and forth between the staffs in London, Paris and Washington should also help.

THOMAS D. CABOT

740.5/3–2951 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, March 29, 1951—6 p. m.

Depto 687. Re Todep 318 Mar 22 [2] and Ecato circ B–38 Mar 21.

1. Fol views, concurred in by SUSRep, are being forwarded without full OSR coordination in view stringency time schedule. From telephone contact OSR, understand they have similar views and that their comments to you will be forthcoming shortly.

2. Brief review of illustrative aid figures and supporting data leaves us with impression that different criteria were adopted in establishing assumed level of defense efforts and consequent appropriate level of econ aid for different countries. For example, in case of Neth and Ital very high levels defense effort have been postulated, which in case of Belg zero aid is based on assumption no increased effort over present plans. Why shld not Belg aid request be based on Belg defense spending approaching $500 million? On other hand, we share Neth mission view that assumed rate of $525 million for Dutch defense spending is unrealistic, and, assumed Ital defense expenditure similarly appears to us unrealizable.

3. In gen we urge assuming high but realistic rates of defense expenditure in computing need for aid and then insisting with recipients

[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR.

[2] Telegram Todep 318 to London, repeated to Paris, not printed, concerned a balance-of-payments schedule and tentative economic aid figures for principal European countries for fiscal year 1952, prepared by the Economic Cooperation Administration (740.5/3–2251).

that assumed level defense effort is prerequisite for indicated amt of aid. If aid needed to support maximum defense spending is not requested and obtained, we may be unable offer aid in support of increases in defense spending if opportunities for such arrangements arise. If targets set are not reached, we wld not grant total aid voted.

4. We realize that presentation of even illustrative aid figures high enough to support maximum defense programs might create expectation among recipient countries, if figures leak or are made public, that indicated amts will in fact be granted for presently planned programs. It may be awkward to counteract this impression by giving out publicly actual def expenditure figures by countries on which aid estimates based and gen policy statements re relation aid to def effort may not carry sufficient conviction. Wld it be possible go step further by publishing total defense expenditure figure on which total recommended aid promised, with accompanying indication of extent to which aggregate Eur defense effort falls short of this level under plans to date?

SPOFFORD

740.5/3-2951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 29, 1951—7 p. m.

Todep 335. On basis discussions which Webb and Cabot had in Europe[2] and further consideration whole problem here, it is now US Govt view that with agreement to locate FEB in Paris the question of relocation of NAT bodies or OEEC shld be considered as closed, unless and until future operating experience indicates need for further changes.

It is recommended that you inform UK Govt of this position as response to their recent note on this subject.[3] You are also authorized to take this position with other NAT representatives and in Deps if you judge it necessary.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram, repeated to Paris for Katz, was drafted by Martin and cleared by Webb, Cabot, Perkins, Colonel Beebe, Bissell (ECA), and Harriman.

[2] See Cabot's memorandum of March 27 and footnotes thereto, p. 103.

[3] The reference here is to the British *aide-mémoire* quoted in telegram 4802 from London, March 7, p. 87. Gifford informed Attlee of this new position in a letter dated April 4 which he quoted in his telegram 5229 from London, April 4 (740.5/4–451).

740.5/3-3051 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, March 30, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 693. Fol draft working paper on NATO [2] reorg produced by working group and will be before CD on April 2:

Begin verbatim text:

"1. NAC, pursuant to their res on 19 Dec 1950 (Doc C6–D5 (final)[3]), having considered certain proposals for reorg and simplification of structure of NATO put forward by Canadian rep together with other related proposals, have agreed that provisions set out below shall replace:

(*a*) Sections I, II, III, VII and VIII of report of WG on org, as adopted by Council on 17 Sept, 1949; [4]

(*b*) Directive from NAC to DFEC (doc. Council D–1/4, 18 Nov, 1949); [3]

(*c*) Directive from NAC to MPSB (doc. Council D–1/5, 18 Nov, 1949); [3]

(*d*) Council res No. 4/7, 17 May, 1950 [5] setting up NACD.

2. NAC is principal body in NATO. In accordance with treaty, Council is charged with responsibility of considering all matters concerning implementation of provisions of treaty. Such subsidiary bodies as are set up under Art 9 of treaty are subordinate to Council.

3. The org established under NAT shld be operated with as much flexibility as possible and be subj to review from time to time. Estab of this machinery does not preclude use of other means for consultation and cooperation between any or all of the parties on matters relating to treaty.

II. *Council:*

4. (Council shall be Council of Govts and its members shall represent their respective govts as a whole. It shall constitute not only the Council envisaged in Art 9 of treaty by [*but*] also the Def Comite referred to in same article. Council shall be composed of persons of ministerial rank, though in exceptional circumstances member govts may be represented by other persons duly designated for purpose. Heads of govts may attend mtgs of Council in person. Otherwise govts shall be represented by their Mins for Fon Affairs and/or, according to nature of agenda, by their Mins of Def, or Fin, or other competent Mins.)

Proposed US alternative draft text of para 4:

(NAC will represent respective govts of member states. It shall incorporate not only Council envisaged by Art 9 of treaty, but also the

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] This paper was circulated in the Council Deputies as D–D (51) 86.

[3] Not printed.

[4] See *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. IV, pp. 330–337.

[5] For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 29, 1950, p. 831.

Def Comite referred to in same article. Council shall be composed of members of Ministerial rank although in exceptional circumstances member govts may be represented by other persons duly designated for purpose. Heads of govts may attend mtgs of the Council in person. Otherwise, govts shall be represented by their Min for Fon Affairs and/or their Min of Def or by other competent Mins (especially by their Min responsible for fin and econ affairs) according to nature of agenda.)

(For text of agreed minutes to para 4, see annex A (terms of reference).)

5. NAT shall constitute terms of ref of Council.

Times and frequency of sessions:

6. Council shall be convened by chairmen and shall meet in ordinary session annually and at such other times as may be deemed desirable by majority of parties. Extraordinary sessions under Article 4 and 5 of treaty may be called at request of any party invoking one of these articles.

Location:

7. Location of each session of Council shall be determined by chairman after consultation with other parties. For general convenience, ordinary annual session shld normally be held at about same time and in same gen geographical area as annual session of GA of UN. Other ordinary sessions shld whenever practicable be held at some convenient location in Eur.

Chairmanship:

8. Chairmanship shall be held in turn by parties according to alphabetical order in English language. Each party shall hold office from beginning of one ordinary annual session until appointment of new chairman at following ordinary annual session. If any party does not wish to accept chairmanship it shall pass to next party in alphabetical order.

Languages:

9. English and French shall be official languages for entire NATO.

III. *Council deps:*

10. To enable Council effectively to carry out its responsibilities and to exercise them continuously, each govt shall be represented by a Council dep. The CD constitute permanent working organ of NAC. When Council is not in session, CD shall carry out policies of Council, formulate issues requiring decisions by Council or by member govts, and otherwise constitute a body which may register approval their govts on matters before them for consideration. Each dep shall be assisted by such advisers as are deemed necessary by his govt.

11. CD shall have as their gen terms of ref those of Council; in addition to functions set out in para 10 above, they shall also:

(*a*) Be responsible for coordinating activities of and giving guidance to all other permanent organs of NATO;

(*b*) Exchange views on polit matters of common interest within scope of treaty;

(*c*) (Furnish direction to mil agencies of NATO as to polit considerations upon which strategic decision shld be based);

Proposed US alternative draft text: (Deal directly with mil comite as at present constituted, and when that body is not in session with standing group on polit matters having mil implications and provide these bodies with polit guidance upon which strategic decisions shld be based).

Standing group shall maintain close liaison with CD and provide that body with advice on mil matters.

(*d*) Promote and coordinate public info activities in furtherance of objectives of treaty while leaving responsibility for natl programs to each country;

(*e*) Consider what further action shld be taken under Art 2 of treaty, taking into acct work of existing agencies in this field.

Chairmanship:

12. CD shall select a permanent chairman from among their membership. The chairman, in addition to presiding at mtgs CD, shall be responsible for directing org and its work. CD shall also appoint vice chairman who shall act in absence of chairman, office to rotate alphabetically by countries (in English language) at end of each calendar month.

Time and frequency of sessions:

13. CD shall be so organized as to function continuously.

Location:

14. CD shall have their HQ in London.

IV. *Def Prod Board.*

15. Org and terms of ref of DPB shall be set forth in D–D/205, 7 Dec 1950,[6] except that Board shall in future report to CD and not, as provided in section IV, para (1) of that DOC, to Def Comite. Board shall keep CD currently informed of progress its work, and receive guidance from them.

V. *Fin and Econ Board* (to be inserted)."

Annex A.

Text of agreed minutes to be read in conjunction with para 4:

It was agreed that presence too many Mins at Council mtgs wld lead to considerable inconvenience, and that govts shld therefore be urged to keep their representation to minimum called for by agenda. It was felt that as gen rule, it shld be possible by careful arrangement agenda in advance to limit occasions on which presence more than one Min wld [approx 250 characters garbled].

SPOFFORD

[6] Not printed.

740.5/3–3151 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, March 31, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 699. 1. Informal staff discussions with Brit have persuaded them accept our revised FEB resolution (document D(51) 78 revised of Mar 21 [2]), convening *ad hoc* organizing comite in London "to prepare recommendations to CD re establishment machinery which wld bring together in one body under CD responsibility for econ and fin work in NAT". Principal points upon which Brit desired reassurance were:

a. That FEB wld be subordinate to CD; and
b. That level representation on FEB was not prejudiced by our resolution.

2. We judge Brit concern arises mainly out of two points:

a. Fear that unduly autonomous FEB might seek develop recommendations to member govts on their econ policies which wld embarrass UK (although not clear why Brit any better or worse protected against such contingency by their representation [on FEB?]; and
b. Unwillingness have body on which Hall-Patch is Brit rep subordinate to body on which Hoyer-Millar is their rep. Brit desire designate Eric Roll as their rep FEB.

3. Further comment will fol after discussion with OSR. Believe CD action on resolution now assured for Apr 2 and we will propose Apr 10 as date for convening organizing comite. Pls note resolution calls for CD "pursuing discussion of gen principles expressed in US FEB proposal with view giving organizing comite further guidance thereon."

SPOFFORD

[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR, to Frankfurt, and to Heidelberg for Handy.
[2] Not printed, but see telegram Todep 662, March 22, p. 101, for discussion of the revision.

740.5/3–3151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET PRIORITY NIACT WASHINGTON, April 2, 1951–7 p. m.

Todep 342. For Spofford and Katz.

[1] Repeated to Paris and to Frankfurt for Heidelberg. The telegram was drafted by L. C. Vass (RA) and cleared by him with Martin, Raynor (BNA), and, in substance, with Cleveland (ECA).

1. Highly gratified at success your efforts persuade UK accept FEB resolution, Depto 699, Mar 31.[2] This is State ECA message.

2. However, are concerned, as sure you are, at report UK thinking of designating Roll, which clear evidence UK does not share our view that FEB major body warranting reps at sub-ministerial level. US does not see FEB as simply WG 12 under different name but as NATO body with important functions in number other fields calling for reps of stature Hall-Patch and in our case Tyler Wood.

3. In our view relative status of Hall-Patch and Hoyer-Millar in UK shld not be insuperable obstacle in naming former.

4. Leave to your discretion what if any informal approaches to Brits you may wish to make to convey our general reaction. Wld consider most unfortunate firm UK position appoint Roll before organizing comite spells out functions which we convinced will show need for highest level reps.

ACHESON

[2] *Supra.*

740.5 MAP/4–251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 2, 1951—7 p. m.

6625. Frankfurt pass Heildelberg eyes only for Handy and Spofford [2] from Bonesteel as Dept's 218.

1. Regret unable give you full outline proposed FY 52 foreign asst for NATO and OEEC countries in time for discussion this ECC mtg. Task Force I which is charged with drawing up this part program has not yet completed its preparatory work. However fol is status elements of program. MDAP end-item and training NATO countries approximately $4.8 billion. Stockpile to be built for end-items for NATO contingencies German forces, etc. near $1.0 bil. Economic support aid for NATO countries not yet firm but probably something under $2.0 bil including aid for DOTs. Economic assistance for non-NATO countries of OEEC $0.5 bil.

2. ECA programs have not been worked up against careful US estimates of total requirements MTDP. Total sums MDAP end-items based on broad NSC costing exercise last Dec with little relation financial condition recipient countries. ECA programs have

[1] Repeated to London, eyes only for Spofford, and to Paris, eyes only for Katz and MacArthur. Drafted by C. H. Bonesteel, 3d, Executive Director of the European Coordinating Committee, who was apparently on temporary duty in Washington. Cleared with Colonel Lincoln (Defense), Wood (ECA), and Ohly.

[2] Spofford was scheduled to be at Frankfurt for a meeting of the European Coordinating Committee (ECC) of which he was Chairman.

been based generally on B/P approach assuming natl mil budgets of approx size assumed in Blue Books but not closely related requirements of MTDP.

3. Task Force I is proceeding with finalizing first approximations figures per para 2 above. However we have instituted urgent analysis total costs and allocations of tasks to meet reasonably balanced portion MTDP, i.e. a US exercise to meet appropriate amounts of gap between MTDP and DC 28. Simultaneously making urgent study, under Freund, to estimate reasonable production programs all Eur NATO countries related to projected end-item assistance. From these two studies we hope improve justification sums requested and have basis for final adjustments if these essential. Also to get better estimates raw materials required specifically for def efforts.

4. Several basic problems relating organization and admin of aid still unresolved. Hope get Presidential decision some of these 3 Apr and others by end of week. A principal problem is whether there should be one or two appropriations for MDAP–ECA aid and by what procedures such funds would be allocated.

5. There remains question our minds as to whether MDAP–ECA aid for NATO countries shld include specific conditions requiring reciprocal meeting of some sort of targets before increments of aid are disbursed. Wld greatly appreciate ECC views this subject (have seen Depto 687 [3]). Is there any utility in thought aid might be conditioned on appropriate NATO recommendations that efforts are adequate perhaps tied in to US certification totals of intended efforts are adequate.

6. Balance of omnibus Foreign Aid bill contemplates end-item aid certain ME and Far East countries and some to Latin America; economic aid certain countries; widespread TA (Pt IV) with in some cases capital equipment grants to enable short range projects of maximum local public impact get under way. However major problem is question physical availabilities of materials and goods needed as exports from US and possibilities that in nine months or so, priorities will be needed on wide range of exports. Foreign Aid Programs must be closely coordinated with US National Defense Program in this regard.

7. Appears now unlikely Cong hearings can be started much before 1 May. Program papers are being pouched to Spofford for ECC.

[BONESTEEL]
ACHESON

[3] Dated March 29, p. 105.

740.5/4–251 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, April 2, 1951—11 p. m.

Depto 707. Deputies 24th mtg April 2.

[Here follow brief reports on the Deputies' discussion of financing NATO civilian and military agencies, approving financial regulations for an international budget, and agreeing on interim advances to the SHAPE budget.]

2. On FEB, adopted US proposal to convene *ad hoc* committee London April 10 to prepare recommendations on establishment agency under Deputies to coordinate financial and economic work NATO. Netherlands felt FEB shld be empowered to give guidance to DPB.

3. Re diversion of shipping noted report by Belgian deputy on WERPG agreement setting up national organizations in UK, Fr, Belgium, and Netherlands and recommending international coordinating agency. US and UK favored reference to PBO's [*PBOS?*] to follow consideration by WU and other regional planning groups and advise deputies on extension to NATO basis of regionally developed plans but no action taken pending result expected reports by northern and southern planning groups.

4. Progressed toward final agreement on NATO reorganization, D–D(51)86 (separate telegram to Dept).[2] All accepted US language on NAC with verbal change except France who intimated wld be able accept it shortly.

Netherlands agreed to word "guidance" in place of "direction" to describe deputies relation on political matters to SG, in light US statement that two terms synonymous and US willing incorporate each interpretation in minutes. Netherlands and Canada held this interpretation would supersede paragraph 16 of DPB, C–24/3 [*DC–24/3*].[3]

Portugal reiterated insistence that deputies' guidance to SG be channeled through MIL Rep Com. All other favored direct relationship deputies to SG.

Agreed that deputies shld take final action on NATO reorganization and next council mtg shld be under new terms reference.

Deputies will take up again Apr 9. UK said cabinet must consider final draft.

5. Chairman circulated for information NATO govts ISG statement of changes in existing industrial controls affected by new agree-

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[1] Repeated to Paris for the Embassy and OSR, to the other NATO capitals, to Heidelberg for Handy, and to Wiesbaden for Norstad.

[2] The reference here is to telegram Depto 711, *infra*.

[3] See footnote 6, p. 70.

ment which HICOMs Germany authorized to sign to replace present PLI agreement. (Sigto 573.[4])

6. Agreed invite Vice Admiral Wright, new chairman SG, and Mr. Herod meet with deputies Wednesday April 4 to exchange views on SG matters.

SPOFFORD

[4] Not printed; for text of the agreement dated April 3, concerning industrial controls, see p. 1395.

740.5/4–351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, April 3, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 711. Attention Ridgway Knight. In mtg yesterday CD made fol changes working group paper on NATO reorganization D–D (51) 86 (Depto 693).[2]

Deleted para 1(*b*) and agreed that eventual directive establishing FEB shld refer to replacement DFEC.

Recommended first 2 sentences para 4 (US proposal) be changed to read:

"The members of the North Atlantic Council will represent their respective govts. The Council shall incorporate not only the Council envisaged by Article 9 of the treaty but also the Def Comite referred to in the same article."

This is purely verbal change to make clear that Council members, and not Council itself, represent govts. Assume we can accept this. US agreed to inclusion words in internal brackets "especially by their minister responsible for fin and econ affairs." All other dels, except French, agreeable US proposal with above changes. French dep said off record that he expected be in position accept US proposal next day or so.

US dep noted that para 10 did not make explicit CD function of recommending to govts measures for implementation NAT. In order rectify this, he suggested rewording third sentence as fols:

"When Council is not in session, CD shall carry out policies of Council, recommend to govts the measures necessary to this end, formulate issues requiring decisions by the Council or by member govts, and otherwise constitute a body which may register the approval of their govts on matters before them for consideration."

[1] Repeated to Paris.
[2] March 30, p. 107.

Other deps agreed this proposal. UK suggested last sentence para 10 re advisors be deleted as obvious and unnecessary but did not press point. Do you feel strongly it shld be included?

Para 11(*c*)—US dep said US Govt considered pol "guidance" synonymous with "direction." Other deps except Port indicated willingness accept US proposal para 11(*c*) if this interpretation incorporated in CD minutes. Neth stated wld prefer use "direction" but wld not insist. Point was that "guidance" shld be binding. US said SG wld not be free to reject it. Belg commented Fr translation both words was "directive." Neth and Canad felt it shld be made clear in some manner interpretation given by US prevailed over para 16 of DC 24/3.[3]

Port dep continued maintain position that CD shld deal with SG thru either Mil Comite or Mil Rep Com and not direct. All other deps took position that CD shld deal directly with SG when Mil Comite not in session. Port dep said he wld report situation to his govt and ask instructions.

Re last para Todep 339,[4] working group wording CD section text Depto 693 is synthesis US proposal (Todep 293[5] Norwegian proposal and Council resolution May 1950[6] establishing CD. Other members working group objected to first sentence original US proposal on grounds it was too weak, pointing out that deps shld not be considered as reps of ministers, but as reps of govts. With this exception, rest of original US draft is included in D–D (51) 86, assuming that we get satisfactory solution on para 11(*c*).

We are inclined agree with other dels that present wording D–D (51) 86 is stronger than that originally suggested by US. It is in line with what we understood to be original US thinking, i.e. that CD shld not be considered as merely official level group.

You will note above that in para 10 at US suggestion CD agreed addition which wld make explicit CD function of recommending to govts measures for implementation NAT. With this addition, believe CD section satisfactory, expect that CD will have final look at D–D (51) 86 on April 9. Hope that any last minute changes can be cleared up then and that govts can give formal approval shortly thereafter.

Question discussed of whether reorganization paper shld be acted on formally by Council or by CD. Those deps who were instructed envisaged CD taking action. Other deps agreed report this view to their govt and asked instructions. None thought there wld be disagreement with this procedure.

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[3] See footnote 6, p. 70.

[4] The last paragraph of telegram Todep 339 to London, March 31, requested background information on the draft wording of the section on the Council Deputies in D–D (51) 86 as transmitted in telegram Depto 693 (740.5/3-3051).

[5] March 10, p. 95.

[6] See footnote 4, p. 91.

Unless you perceive objection will request secretary incorporate substantially fol statements in minutes yesterday's mtg.

"US dep stated that his govt considered word 'guidance' as used in para 10 synonymous with 'direction' and wld be glad have his statement recorded in record of mtg. Neth dep preferred latter word be used, for which he saw a reason in that 'direction' was also term used in NY basic document C5–D/11 (final). US dep explained that 'guidance' seemed term more usual and appropriate in relationship between bodies of standing of CD and SG and pointed out that document C5–D/11 (final), was principally concerned with SHAPE, while present context was considerably wider. Neths dep replied that, in interest of reaching agreement and in light of US interpretation he cld accept term 'guidance.' His govt's primary concern was that guidance be binding. US dep stated SG wld not be free to reject such guidance. CD accepted interpretation thus agreed upon."

Foregoing para satisfactory to Neth dep who considers it will close matter as far as he is concerned.

Please instruct by tomorrow morning if possible whether statement may be included in record and in due course as to whether changes made by CD in D–D (51) 86 acceptable.

SPOFFORD

740.5/4–351

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1951.

Subject: The McClellan Resolution on Troops to Europe [2]

The Secretary telephoned Mr. Lovett during the 9:30 meeting [3] about what in his opinion should be done on the Senate Resolution on troops to Europe. He said Mr. Harriman, who was at the meeting, would see the President at 10 o'clock. The Secretary said their view was that it would be better to bring the business to a close and we should, therefore, do everything we could to prevent the Resolution being recommitted where it would drag on. We would take the position that this approves what we should do in the near future and let the longer future take care of itself.

Mr. Lovett said their view is somewhat the same and that if it goes back to Committee it will be likely to come out in worse form. He said

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[1] Copies of this memorandum were sent to Fisher and McFall.

[2] The subject heading evidently refers to the McClellan Amendment to S. Res. 99. See editorial note, p. 22.

[3] A record of this meeting is in file lot 58 D 609, the Secretary's Daily Meetings.

their feeling was to let nature take its course on the floor and try to limit the move to recommit.[4]

Mr. Harriman then spoke with Mr. Lovett and inquired if the McClellan Resolution would be a problem as far as sending small units, and Mr. Lovett indicated they were not quite clear on just where it did leave them.

Mr. Lovett called the Secretary again in a few minutes to say that one of his people reported that Senator McMahon believes he might be able to get the language of the Resolution changed a little and get a favorable re-vote on it. He was inquiring for advice from Defense on this. The Secretary and Mr. Lovett agreed that they couldn't tell McMahon not to go ahead if he thought he could get a revision, but they were doubtful that this could be accomplished, and feared something worse might come of it.

Mr. Harriman telephoned the Secretary about 10:20 to say he had talked briefly with the President about the matter and the President is of the same opinion he was last night. He feels he doesn't want to try to intervene at all, let them go ahead and mess it up good in the Senate (which will prove they are incompetent to deal with the matter) and then if they get a joint resolution, fight it in the House.

The Secretary suggested the President should send word to Senators McFarland and Connally to let them know where he stands, but Mr. Harriman said the President did not want to do that; that he seems to want it to go back to Committee.

The Secretary said people here feel that little can be accomplished so far as the outcome of the Resolution is concerned, but that from the point of view of dealing with the Congress, it would seem wise for the President to let the Senators know what he wants to come out of this. He said if he wants the resolution recommitted, then he should not talk to them.

Mr. Harriman said that seemed to be the course the President wanted to follow, but after the staff meeting was over (about 10:30) he would talk again with him. He said he had given him out arguments in favor of trying to end it where it is, but he was unsuccessful in changing his mind. However, Mr. Harriman will let the Secretary know what comes of their further talk.

Mr. Harriman reported back that he got no further with the President. He said that is where the matter stands unless the Secretary and

[4] The Senate defeated a motion to recommit S. Res. 99 on April 3, by a vote of 49 to 43, with 4 not voting (*Congressional Record*, 82d Cong., 1st sess., p. 3096).

Mr. Lovett feel it is important enough to take up with the President. The Secretary said that time was so short before Congress reconvenes that he did not believe it would be worthwhile.

Mr. Harriman said he raised the question with the President of delay in sending troops and the President said they should not be delayed. Mr. Harriman said that this should be considered. He said one Division was ready, but must be given 30 days notice. It would not be practical to try to keep this troop movement secret because of the 30 days notice, and therefore, making an announcement soon should also be given careful consideration. It was agreed that this should be discussed with Mr. Lovett.

L[UCIUS] D. B[ATTLE]

740.5 MAP/4–451 : Telegram

The Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, April 4, 1951—7 p. m.

5242. From ECC for ISAC. Fol message regarding interim financing devices for purposes stimulating Eur production supplements our recommendations in London Embtel 4709 of Mar 1.[2]

1. We believe main fin obstacle to activation un-utilized Eur mil production facilities is inadequate Eur mil budget appropriations. We must maintain constant pressure for increases such appropriations, and shld take care not to ease this pressure unnecessarily by offering alternative financing opportunities. Nonetheless, we believe that in some circumstances interim financing for critically needed Eur production might be provided through device described below. The principal case in which this device might be employed wld be where one country has productive capacity exceeding its own requirements in items which will reasonably clearly be needed elsewhere in the NATO area, but for which orders have not yet been placed by eventual recipients because of their uncertainty as to their source of supply.

2. The device which we recommend in these circumstances represents an adaptation of the technique which we proposed for handling the French mortar ammunition project. It incorporates the fol basic elements:

a. Earmarking a portion of US aid funds (say $500 million) as a revolving fund to support US procurement and interim financing of selected Eur military production—such procurement to be financed in local currency acquired from producing country for dollars, with

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[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR, Schuyler, and MacArthur; to Frankfurt; and to Heidelberg for Handy.

[2] *Ante*, p. 73.

view to resale of items against same local currency to eventual Eur recipients. It shld be made clear to Eur countries that funds employed for this purpose wld come out of appropriated funds which might otherwise be made available to them as aid.

b. Agrmt of producing country to resell dollars to US in exchange for local currency obtained by US from resale of items.

c. Assignment to DPB (acting on info from Standing Group) of responsibility for determining types and sources of items to be produced.

d. Assignment to appropriate NATO mil authority of function of allocating to Eur countries useable items not sold to Eur recipients at time of delivery.

e. Agrmt by Eur countries that they will purchase items thus allocated to them, paying in currency of producing country.

f. Agrmt by Eur countries that they will share in such losses as may result from unsaleable items not considered by appropriate NATO mil authority suited to mil requirements of any NAT country. We recommend that our Eur partners be asked to bear half of total losses or—if such procedure wld unduly reduce Eur appropriations available for current defense expenditure or make Eur countries inordinately cautious about approving procurement projects—half of losses up to agreed fraction of the total value of procurement. In latter case, US cld protect itself against undue risk by itself limiting amount and character of procurement under scheme through its voice in DPB.

3. Further joint msg from our respective agencies follows with more detailed explanation mechanics this proposal.[3] [ECC.]

BOHLEN

[3] See telegram Depto 779, April 14, p. 137.

740.5/4–551 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, April 5, 1951—5 p. m.

Depto 718. Deputies twenty-fifth mtg Apr 4.

1. Vice Admiral Wright (US) new chairman SG, present and stressed desire for closest working relation with CD. Hoped his visit wld be precedent for future SG chairman to visit all NATO commands and agencies upon taking chair (which rotates every three months).

Replying to US question, Wright said SG gives highest priority to problem of closing gaps between force estimates and requirements (DC/28). By coordination regional plans, particularly taking account of mobility of air and naval forces, some reduction in overall estimates of needs possible. Interim report being submitted to CD summarizes

[1] Repeated to Paris for the Embassy and OSR, to the other NATO capitals, to Frankfurt, to Heidelberg for Handy, and to Wiesbaden for Norstad.

problem and estimates date for definitive report. Fr deputy asked if SG considered DC/28 static or if continuing revision in view changing polit and mil situation contemplated. Wright replied constant amendment necessary and stressed particularly that present paper based on regional plans and that SHAPE currently reviewing it in light overall defense strategy. Alphand suggested that planning beyond MTP, which intended to cover only first 90 days of hostilities, necessary now. Herod (DPB), also present, pointed out that SG estimates of attrition rates extremely important in planning for wartime production. Wright said attrition studies in progress and that defense planning will naturally be extended beyond first 90 days. In reply query when basic data requested of SG in Jan wld be ready, Wright estimated report ready June 30 and reports cld thereafter be made semiannually. This study to be confined to NATO forces and will not consider broader aspects natl mobilization. Chairman stressed value of such reports to CD and Alphand suggested SG, DPB, and possibly FEB each submit reports on same date to give total picture at periodic intervals. Herod said DPB interim report already submitted but that fuller report, covering steps toward mtg deficiencies but not overall production planning, now in preparation and cld be submitted periodically.

Wright said that earlier plans for liaison secretariat now supplemented by SG paper, just submitted to MRC recommending that 2-star officer shuttle between SG and CD and that on suitable occasions reps of SG collaborate with CD in London. Neths asked if similar plans made for liaison between SG and DPB. Wright saw no reason why liaison officer shld not work with all CD agencies. Staff and org to be left to officer after he is named. Deputies gratified by these proposals.

Spofford asked if SG had any views on NATO mil org. Canada asked if Wright considered working relations with MRC satis. Wright said SG has made every effort to make org contemplated in DC 24/3 effective and believes collaboration with MRC (weekly mtgs and continuing consultation) now satis. Canada and Neths joined in asking whether, in view MRC's role continued existence MC now awkward and conducive to delaying decisions. Wright pointed out interim solutions possible and that MC considered useful forum logical channel for studies of subordinate grps, important for policy decisions. He said Port, Belg and Canadian proposals on reorganization NATO mil side under consideration but that SG has given greater emphasis to making existing system work.

Wright made excellent impression. Several deputies later remarked frequent personal contacts with members SG and establishment satis SG–CD liaison wld greatly increase confidence of non-SG govts in SG.

2. Western Union deputies reported transfer of responsibilities personnel, and facilities which SG had requested be transferred from WU agencies to SHAPE had been completed.

3. Le Bigot, head of SHAPE Finance Section, outlined gen pattern of SHAPE budget just submitted to SG (Wright said wld probably be forwarded to CD in few days). UK and Italy announced now agreeable to paying their share interim advance. Canada also agreeable but, since whole question of capital costs now under consideration in Ottawa, with reservation that its contribution only for SHAPE running expenses. Agreed to convene Budget Comite April 11. UK said Parliament, before approving contributions to subordinates, and will insist on some sort of budgetary control. This problem for further discussion but Le Bigot said SHAPE envisages control through SHAPE budget Comite. Iceland maintained that it entered NATO with understanding it wld not share mil burden and asked if deputies cld accept token payment of fixed amt rather than percentage share of indefinite sum. He referred to difficulty of securing parliamentary approval since budget included no defense funds. Lux deputy agreed to advance to SHAPE but raised point that Luxembourg had no air or naval forces and might question contributing to other (North Atlantic) commands. Considerable discussion whether each govt shld contribute to all commands or only those in which it actually represented.

Port deputy said he cld agree to either scheme but felt there shld be gen agreement which course was to be followed (*1b–d* (51) 24). UK, Fr, Neths, Norway, Belg agreed with Eisenhower view, eloquently expressed by Wright, that local interests must not hamper common overall defense effort. Italy, Denmark, and US, though uninstructed, sympathetic this view. Canada uninstructed but saw some advantage in regional weighting in regard to infra-structure and capital costs. Neths, Canada, Ital, Norway, and tentatively US, agreed that these latter costs shld be considered separately from running costs. UK disagreed.

4. Belg announced acceptance pattern for advances on NATO civilian costs (Depto 707)[2] on condition that it does not set precedent or principle.

5. Next mtg Apr 9 unless, in view Commons debate Monday, all deputies have instructions permitting action at short mtg Apr 6 on appointment Fechteler.[3]

SPOFFORD

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[2] *Ante*, p. 113.

[3] For documentation on the consideration of Adm. William M. Fechteler for appointment as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, see pp. 464 ff.

740.5/4–551 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 5, 1951—7 p. m.

590. Dept considering question whether "Buy-at-home" laws, regs, or practices in NATO countries may be significant factor in preventing use by any such country of idle productive facilities or available goods in other countries which might contribute to joint defense. Restrictions of this type may be applicable to (*a*) purchases by Govt bureaus for Govt use; (*b*) purchases by nationalized cos for use or re-sale; (*c*) purchases by private cos working on Govt contracts. Can take any of several forms, ranging from absolute requirement that domestic sources be favored, irrespective of price, other considerations, to gen direction that domestic sources be favored within limits.

From fragmentary data at hand, Dept unable appraise scope of problem and concerned that it may have real importance. Appreciate your prelim appraisal within next two weeks of importance of problem in country you accredited, indicating types of procurement most affected, form which restrictions take. If problem appears significant, appreciate fuller follow up reports as available.

Urinfo. Pres authorized suspend Buy Amer provisions US statutes during present emergency and efforts now being made insure such provisions do not in practice impede US mobilization efforts.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram, sent to the capitals of the other NATO countries, was drafted by Vernon (CP) and Reifman (DRW) and cleared in substance by Asher (RA).

740.5/4–351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 5, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 350. This is State–Defense message. Ref Depto 693 Mar 30; Depto 711 Apr 3.[2] We approve text para 11 of WG draft as quoted Depto 693, with understanding US version Para 11(*c*) prevails. With ref to problem of "guidance" versus "direction" in connection CD–SG relations, we understand per phone call Achilles–Knight April 4 that this problem will now be settled by an agreed minute to be incorporated in document, and not by means of an accepted para in CD record. Agreed minute shld make clear that when we refer to CD

[1] Drafted by Nunley (RA) and cleared by Knight with Beebe (Defense), Perkins, and, in substance, with Cabot.

[2] *Ante*, pp. 107 and 114.

"guidance" vis-à-vis military agencies, we mean "political guidance", and also that such guidance must be interpreted in context of provisions of para 16 of DC 24/3 (final)[3] which permits SG appeal such political guidance.

ACHESON

[3] Not printed.

740.5/4–551

Memorandum by the Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 5, 1951.

Subject: United States Governmental Position on Completion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Medium Term Defense Plan

The member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty are considering what national contributions should be made to close the gap between force requirements and present national contributions under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP). The initial action on these considerations is with the Standing Group based on information from nations and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The United States must appraise the impact on its resources both of what, if any, additional United States forces might be contributed and also what additional military and economic aid we would contribute to other members if the full requirements of the MTDP were to be met on the basis of an equitable distribution of the total burden among all the members.

Developments to date indicate that this problem can be effectively solved only through the exercise of American leadership. It therefore appears necessary that the United States take the initiative in proposing an appropriate level of forces to be achieved by each country and maintained under the MTDP, together with a proposed broad distribution of the production and financial burdens. The problem involves three parts: (*a*) adequacy of present national plans to raise and equip forces, (*b*) advisability of expanding programs of all NATO members to raise and equip additional forces (wholly or partially "closing the gap" between present plans and total MTDP requirements), and (*c*) consideration of increases in or acceleration of the MTDP.

[1] Memorandum for Charles E. Wilson, Office of Defense Mobilization; Frederick J. Lawton, Bureau of the Budget; Lincoln Gordon, Executive Office of the President; Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, Department of Defense; Najeeb E. Halaby, Economic Cooperation Administration; and William L. Hebbard, Department of the Treasury. This memorandum was drafted by Edwin Martin and cleared by Defense, ECA, Treasury, and the Executive Offices through the International Security Affairs Committee.

The Department of Defense is now considering, from the military point of view, the further contribution of forces which could appropriately be made by each country toward closing the gap. The Department of Defense has suggested that, before United States initiative is taken within NATO, there should be a United States recheck from the financial and economic viewpoint. This should take into account: (*a*) United States domestic and foreign military aid programs, (*b*) NATO and non-NATO military requirements of the other NAT member countries, and (*c*) assuming an appropriate German contribution to the total, the ability of the United States and of the other NATO countries to raise and equip for North Atlantic defense the full complement of forces required by the MTDP and to maintain them for an indefinite period of time. This analysis may result in modified recommendations on the total size of desirable forces or on their distribution among individual countries.

Under the NSC 68 directives,[2] United States aid programs to NATO are to be calculated on the completion of the MTDP. However, current aid programs are projected only through Fiscal Year 1952. Moreover, it is not clear that they are on a basis which, with a feasible contribution from other NAT countries, will fully meet the equipment requirements of the MTDP. In considering completion of the plans tentatively set out under the NSC 68 series the International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC) has reached the following conclusions:

a. Although the United States cannot commit aid in advance of fiscal appropriations, a further understanding should be reached with the European nations and Canada on country commitments (if necessary on a contingent basis) which will meet the MTDP by July 1954, based on assumptions with respect to the United States contribution to the other nations as a group.

b. As a condition to United States agreement to a final program the other nations must express general assent to undertake national mobilization programs to raise and equip the forces required as their share of the MTDP.

c. That such a program for completion of forces by 1954 should not prejudice any possible arrangements to be made by the United States or other nations to accelerate completion of military programs.

In anticipation of the necessity of reaching an early decision within NATO, the responsible United States agencies for carrying out aid programs and supporting domestic production should reach joint agreement on the limits of the desirable or feasible levels of the United States contribution to the completion of the MTDP both in forces, equipment and economic aid, taking account of other concurrent claims on United States resources.

[2] For reports in the NSC 68 series (U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security), see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 126 ff.

ISAC recommends that the addressees of this memorandum designate at once a highly qualified representative to serve on an *ad hoc* committee to be responsible for this job.

The main work by the agencies concerned would begin upon receipt of the military recommendation, in suitable form for processing, now estimated to be during the week of April 7, 1951. However, preliminary studies of the adequacy of present plans to meet present commitments and of procedures for measuring the economic load of the gap can be started immediately. The coordinated United States position should be achieved on or before April 20, 1951, since the Standing Group is to complete its recommendations as soon as possible after that date.

It will be appreciated that this review must be initially done on an "order of magnitude" basis. Any detailed programming required after the initial action would proceed according to existing methods.

The nature of this project requires a high degree of security in order not to hazard the position of the United States or unduly complicate future negotiations. It is therefore requested that the distribution of this project be limited to those individuals to whom the information is necessary.

THOMAS D. CABOT

740.5/4–651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, April 6, 1951—1 p. m.

Depto 723. Ref Depto 711 [2] and Knight–Achilles telcons.[3] When Neths deputy was approached with two changes suggested in statement given in Depto 711 for inclusion in minutes of Apr 2 mtg he readily agreed that it be made clear "guidance" meant merely political guidance but he was unwilling to accept ref to appeal procedure. He pointed out correctly that USDep had not mentioned appeal procedure at that point in Mon mtg and that had US done so Neths deputy wld have discussed point at length. In circumstances it was decided that record Apr 2 discussion must be merely record of what was said and that agreed minute wld need to be worked out later. Accordingly Apr 2 minutes will incorporate statement in Depto 711 with fol changes: (1) first sentence reads "USDep stated his govt considered word 'guidance' in phrase 'political guidance upon which strategic decision shld be based' synonymous with 'direction' and that he wld be glad to have

[1] Repeated to Paris.
[2] April 3, p. 114.
[3] No record of these conversations has been found in Department of State files.

his statement recorded in an agreed minute", and (2) last sentence concerning deputy's acceptance of interpretation agreed upon is deleted.

It is clear from importance which both Wash and Hague attach to "appeal" procedure that this matter shld be definitively settled. While DC 24/3 was approved by council Starkenborgh points out that this approval contained reservation that problems raised in part I (including this particular problem) shld be remitted to council deputies for joint study with mil comite (para 25, C 6–R/1). Since part I also covers SG and MRC relationships which some non-SG countries wld still like to be reopened but which US feels strongly shld not be reopened (Todep 293 para 4 [4]), we believe "appeal" procedure problem shld be dealt with as quickly, simply and informally as possible.

On basis discussion with Adm Wright hope this can be done satisfactorily simply by clarification of para 16 of DC 24/3.

Principal Neth preoccupations with para 16 appear to be (1) belief it fails make clear that final power of decision on political matters lies in civilian rather than mil hands, (2) that SG wld be free to accept or reject "political guidance", (3) that para 16 appears to provide for appeal to mil rather than civilian agencies, and (4) that SG members in acute emergency might act in their natl rather than gen NAT interest.

Wright explains re first point SG recognizes seniority and auth of political guidance from council or CD and that first sentence of para 16 intended to make this clear. On second he interprets "militarily unacceptable" as meaning "military impracticable of achievement" and refers to obvious duty of any mil officer natl or intl to advise his superiors if in his honest opinion he considers an order recd to be militarily unsound. On third point he states question is not really one of "appeal" but of SG advising CD who issued guidance that it is militarily unsound and thereafter reporting to mil superiors that it has done so, the latter having no auth to overrule CD in reaching decision. On fourth point he states SG obviously bound to act in best gen NAT interest.

Starkenborgh in Hague today; Wright explained para 16 to Bakker, Neths No. 2, along foregoing lines and latter believed para so interpreted wld be unobjectionable to his govt if interpretation given some formal status in writing. We requested him to ascertain whether interpretation given was satisfactory to his govt and if so how it wished interpretation recorded.

We will seek to work this out in simplest manner possible and believe one satis means, simpler than getting deputies agreement on wording agreed minute, wld be for Wright as Chairman of SG to write

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[4] March 10, p. 96.

Spofford as Chairman of Deputies along these lines in reply to request for interpretation of para 16. Wright has done draft of such ltr which he is bringing to Wash.

SPOFFORD

740.5/4–351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 6, 1951—7 p. m.

Todep 352. Re Depto 693 of Mar 30; Depto 711 of Apr 3.[2] Group paper D–D(51) 86 as cited Depto 693 and amended Depto 711 acceptable with fol changes and reservations:

1. Agree proposed change wording para 4 (US proposal). However, suggest elimination agreed minute in connection para 4, on ground serves little purpose, and interpretations in record shld be kept to absolute minimum. If elimination difficult, we prepared accept present draft text.

2. Believe word "chairmen" in para 6 shld be changed to "chairman". Normally meetings shld be chaired by FM of country holding chairmanship, or in case meetings of Def or Finance Ministers alone, by minister of country holding chairmanship. However, believe unnecessary to attempt spell out all contingencies now.

3. Agree addition US proposed phrase para 10 making explicit CD function recommending measures to govts for implementation NAT. Use own discretion re retention last sentence para 10.

4. In order retain strengthened role Council Deps provided by text para 10 quoted Depto 693 and at same time clarify their responsibilities, suggest substitute first sentence as follows: "To enable Council effectively carry out its responsibilities and exercise them continuously, each govt shall be represented by a Council Dep, who will be responsible to all ministers concerned with NATO matters in his govt."

5. We strongly reaffirm US view para 11(*c*). With regard statement for CD minutes concerning interpretation of "polit guidance", we assume reference in tel to para 10 was in error, and that intended reference was para 11. Also, understand this statement now to be superseded by agreed minute currently under consideration. Our views re this minute already made known in Todep 350;[3] however, wish suggest following text as possible basis agreement:

"For purposes para 11 of D–D (51) 86, term 'guidance' is interpreted to be synonymous with 'direction'. Thus, gen guidance by CD

[1] Drafted by Nunley (RA) and cleared by Knight with Beebe (Defense) and Pittman (S/ISA).

[2] *Ante*, pp. 107 and 114.

[3] April 5, p. 122.

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described para 11(A) has same meaning as gen direction, and polit guidance described para 11(C) has same meaning as polit direction. Term 'guidance' preferred as more useful and appropriate in describing relationship between two bodies of such standing as CD and SG. With reference relationships between CD and SG, latter will not be free reject or alter polit guidance received from CD, but, in event it finds such advice militarily unacceptable, will be subject to procedure set forth in para 16 of DC 24/3 (final)."[4]

6. For security reasons and because of peculiar technical requirements of military, we believe it essential that Council secretariat shld include special provision for segregating military info which may be submitted Council from time to time and that certain military personnel shld be provided to assist secretariat in handling military matters. Uncertain whether this matter need be raised in present discussions, but may be desirable make statement for record now if you foresee any difficulty working out such arrangement later. Use own discretion. Has been suggested present DC secretary confer Council sec to develop recommendation on this problem.

ACHESON

[4] Not printed.

740.5/4–951 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, April 9, 1951—11 p. m.

Depto 740. Dept pass Ottawa. Deputies 26th mtg April 9.

1. Gen Gruenther, SHAPE Chief of Staff, in off-record discussion explained SHAPE command structure and headquarters organization.[2] Emphasized international spirit and policy of keeping down number of Americans. Fundamental problem is judgment of how near operational SHAPE shld be in order effectively to meet possible crisis yet keeping staff to minimum. Emphasized importance early action on infrastructure, particularly airfields for tactical air support, which now almost entirely lacking where most needed. Mentioned disquieting intelligence reports on increasing offensive effectiveness of satellite armies and cited problem whether Korea-type satellite attack or Yugoslavia wld send balloon up or not. Subsequent comments by Deputies indicated Gruenther forthright realism made pronounced impression and increased confidence in present and future of SHAPE. His and Wright's visit indicated clearly importance of frequent personal contact between mil and CD.

[1] Repeated to Paris for the Embassy and OSR, to the other NATO capitals, to Frankfurt, to Heidelberg for Handy, and to Wiesbaden for Norstad.

[2] For further documentation on the NATO command structure, see pp. 460 ff.

2. In discussion Canadian proposal on NATO reorganization (D–D (51) 86) (revised)[3] Portuguese Deputy read long statement Salazarian in tone expressing reluctant concurrence in principle of council of govts but proposing amendments to effect Deputies action on any matter considered "vital" by any three Deputies be considered provisional pending ratification by council and that words "standing group" in 11(*c*) be replaced by "mil agencies of NATO." He argued that Deputies not close enough to home situation to make binding decisions in matters of "vital importance." Also felt Deputies allowed insufficient time for governmental consideration before acting. While believing contact between SG and CD shld not be direct since former not broad enough to represent mil interests of all NAT members, he suggested his amendments wld permit action on Canadian proposals now while deferring decision on mil agencies and relationships.

Canadian pointed out that it was generally agreed to leave mil agencies alone pending further experience and that all actions of CD are reported to council for approval at each of its sessions. French held Portuguese proposal wld paralyze CD. Neth (*a*) felt it most important that matter of "vital importance" not be removed from Deputies competence or doubt cast on definiteness of decisions in such cases, (*b*) pointed out present draft made clear supremacy of council in providing CD is to formulate issues requiring decision by council, (*c*) believed interpretation of "guidance" as synonymous with "direction" made textual change unnecessary although agreed minute still desirable. UK held that whole purpose of CD was to take binding decisions between council sessions. These arguments against Portuguese proposals generally endorsed by Italy, Denmark and US. Portuguese got no support.

France, UK and Netherlands, Belgium and Canada saw great difficulty in accepting US suggestion to describe Deputies as responsible to all ministers concerned with NATO matters in their respective govts (Todep 352[4]). They considered that this is matter of national organization inappropriate for international action and already implicit in text of Canadian proposal.

Belgian Deputy observed that Canadian proposal as revised did not limit scope of council.

French announced concurrence in US text para 4.

CD agreed attempt finalize text April 16 is [*for?*] final consideration by govts and definitive adoption by CD.

3. Discussion of Balkan satellites and NATO civilian budget deferred to next mtg, April 11 when initial consideration will also be

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[3] Not printed; apparently a revision of the draft paper transmitted in telegram Depto 693, March 30, p. 107, as amended by suggestions in telegrams Depto 711, April 3, p. 114, and Todep 352, *supra*.

[4] *Supra*.

given SHAPE budget. French again urged interim action to meet current SHAPE operating costs pending solution more difficult cost-sharing problems.

SPOFFORD

740.5/4–1151 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, April 11, 1951—11 a. m.

Depto 750. Ref Depto 723 and Todep 352.[2] Pls bring this msg to attention Knight and Admiral Wright. Have discussed with Starkenborgh how best to solve question of agreed minute and interpretation of para 16 of DC 24/3 (final).[3] He and we agree most satisfactory and simplest method wld be agreed minute given Todep 352 amplified (1) to take account of incorporation of Def Comite in Council, and (2) to cover points made by Admiral Wright on meaning of terms "militarily unacceptable" and "report". Starkenborgh now agrees to undesirability of specifying guidance shld be "binding" during possible dispute or of attempting to spell out what wld happen shld politically irresistible force meet militarily immovable situation. We have each agreed to recommend to our govts acceptance of fol language: "For purposes of para 11 of D–D (51) 86, term "guidance" is interpreted to be synonymous with term 'direction'. Thus, gen guidance by CD described in para 11(*a*) has same meaning as gen direction, and political guidance described in para 11(*c*) has same meaning as political direction. Term 'guidance' is preferred as being more usual and appropriate in describing relationship between two bodies of such standing as CD and SG. Latter will not be free to reject or to alter political guidance recd from CD. In event it finds such advice militarily unacceptable, it will follow procedure set forth in para 16 DC 24/3 (final)." [4]

With respect to that para, it is observed that (1) words "militarily unacceptable" are interpreted as meaning "militarily impracticable of accomplishment"; (2) new terms of ref of CD preclude possibility of conflicts with strategic conceptions previously approved by higher NATO agencies; (3) word "report" is interpreted literally and not as conferring any new auth upon mil agencies of NATO since we

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[1] Repeated to Paris.
[2] April 6, pp. 125 and 127.
[3] Not printed.
[4] This recommended wording of the proposed minute was accepted by the Department of State in telegram Todep 361 to London, April 13 (740.5/4–1151).

hope to get agreement or text including agreed minute April 16 and since suggested language must be agreed by other ten dels if accepted by US and Dutch, wld appreciate instrs soonest.[5]

Telegraphing separately about port proposal.

SPOFFORD

[5] Telegram Todep 363 to London, April 14, not printed, gave permission to include as part of the agreed minute the wording of this paragraph beginning with "With respect to . . ." and ending with "mil agencies of NATO" (740.5/4–1151).

740.5/4–1151 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, April 11, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 758. ECC for ISAC.

1. At the ECC mtg in Heidelberg on 3 April the comite considered the paper circulated by OSR entitled, *Approach to Administration of US Aid*. ECC endorsed the genl approach of this paper and accepted the conclusion. This action will appear in the minutes of the mtg. Subsequently ECC members have concurred in text of paper and directed that it be forwarded to ISAC.

"*The Approach To The Administration Of US Aid.*

"1. In administering aid programs, it is of course elementary that there is always a difficult line to be drawn between the point at which (*a*) inadequate US aid may discourage constructive Eur action and the point at which (*b*) softness on our part may encourage the postponement of essential and difficult decisions which Eur Govts may inevitably face. There is still a lag between the US sense of urgency and determination to get on with the job and corresponding Eur attitudes. The Eur govts are aware of this, and also know of our concern over the econ stress and psychological and polit difficulties with which they are beset. Consequently, they are understandably tempted by the attractive possibility that, if they hesitate long enough, we may be moved by sympathy and impatience to step in and pick up the check.

"2. To the extent that this were to be done, it wld result in inadequate utilization of Eur resources and an excessive drain on those of the US. This cld have serious polit repercussions at home. But something else is also involved which runs even deeper, namely, the moral and psychological factors growing out of a polit process. Within the Eur countries, the initial burden of decision falls on a particular defense minister or foreign min or finance min. In the present situation

[1] Repeated to Paris for Katz and Schuyler, to Frankfurt, and to Heidelberg for Handy.

he has the choice between (*a*) turning to the US for assistance or (*b*) impressing the needs of the situation upon his colleagues in the govt, with the govt in turn impressing them upon its parliament.

This latter course involves explanation, persuasion, and public discussion which have far-reaching consequences over and above increased appropriations. Within the govt and the parliament it tends to promote resolution thru the exercise of resolution. Among parliament and the people it means a process of education and psychological preparation for possible dangers and difficulties ahead. All this tends to be lost to the extent that mins can avoid efforts of this kind by turning to the US for increased assistance.

"3. There is ground to hope that the situation described in para 1 may be a transitional phase, which may be superseded in time by a situation in which all the countries associated together will proceed on the basis of a common appraisal of the facts and needs, and in full recognition by each that org for self defense is its own primary responsibility. If and when such a new situation is achieved, responsible initiative and voluntary performance by each NATO country cld be expected to be such as to constitute a solid basis for mutual undertakings (including the provision of aid where needed) in a spirit of partnership. We shld seek to establish conditions under which this transition wld be accelerated, we shld avoid actions which might delay it.

"4. Meanwhile, the problem described in para 1 persists. It of course is relevant not only to the admin of econ aid, but also to milit aid, and more broadly to all aspects of our finan relations with Western Eur in the present phase. For example, it emerges clearly in current discussions of (*a*) intra-Eur milit transfers and (*b*) stimulating the use of currently excess capacity in certain NATO countries for production of milit goods. Our approach to the problem involves a delicate matter of balance, and concrete questions must obviously be settled by practical judgments of the specific facts. This is especially true in those cases where the risks of initial delays must be weighed against the benefits of a possibly larger and sounder effort based on a distinct awareness of responsibility and self interest. We are inclined to believe that, as a generalized approach to the question of administering US aid during the present phase in Eur, better results on the whole wld be achieved, in the US interest and in the common interest, by offering US aid more sparingly and expecting larger performance by the Eur countries themselves. We appreciate the risk that such an approach on the US side cld deteriorate into self-righteousness, but believe that this can be avoided. The approach must be managed with the utmost understanding and tact, and with constant awareness that we are dealing with sensitive questions of degree. But, in the actual state of affairs, we feel that this shld be our approach."

SPOFFORD

740.5/4–1251 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, April 12, 1951—2 p. m.

Depto 762. 1. *Ad hoc* organizing comite [for FEB] convened April 10. Riddleberger and Knapp US reps. Skaug (Nor) elected chairman.

2. After 2 days of gen discussion, *ad hoc* organizing comite for FEB has sifted out main issues and made considerable progress in obtaining gen acceptance US views. Three proposals for terms of ref FEB now before comite submitted by US, UK, and Den. Den proposal similar to UK and US. Proposal fols, of course, gen line of US paper submitted to CD. UK proposal wld tie FEB more tightly to CD than we consider desirable, and exclude direct ref issues from FEB to govts.

3. Discussion of issues and possible compromises set forth below:

a. Generally agreed that FEB shld be established immediately responsible to and reporting to [CD?]. Membership wld be at "senior official level" from each signatory country. Brit have taken adamant position against any specific ref to OEEC "official level" council and have made it clear that their FEB rep wld be Roll. Phrase "senior official level" does not of course, exclude heads of OEEC delegations and we will seek to obtain language in report indicating with as few qualifications as possible gen objective of achievement this level. Believe that many smaller countries will probably appoint heads of dels under this formula. Dutch are strongly in favor of level corresponding to OEEC "official council" level.

b. Most difficult issue to date has been relationship of FEB to CD and question of FEB direct contact with govts. Brit position wld mean in effect that all recommendations and reports of FEB wld have to be channelled through CD before ref to govts and no high degree of initiative wld rest with FEB. Our attitude has been that FEB shld prepare reports and recommendations re mobilization of fin and econ resources in member countries in support of def effort with right to submit results to govts unless instructed otherwise by CD. Possible compromise now emerging will assume fol form: CD cld assign tasks to FEB stipulating whether recommendations shld return to it or be submitted direct to govts. Additional safeguard to meet objections to high degree of FEB autonomy wld be provision that in case of disagreement in FEB on submission direct to govts, the question wld automatically be referred first to CD. Not entirely certain yet that UK will accept this proposed compromise but some indication that it may. Apart from US and Nor, no del was prepared to give full support US original proposal that FEB recommendations wld be transmitted directly to govts unless CD or FEB considered subj of sufficient importance to warrant discussion by CD. Fr rep has followed UK line very closely.

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[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR, to Frankfurt, and to Heidelberg for Handy.

c. Gen agreement reached on location in Paris but with proviso that board can also meet in London or elsewhere if appropriate.

d. Gen agreement reached that board shall assume functions and responsibilities of PWS/DFEC, advisory group on raw materials problems, and WG of 12, the functions and responsibilities being transferred in such manner and in such time as the board shall determine. When transferred, the existing groups will be dissolved and board will be free to set up such subordinate bodies as may be required.

e. On question relationship FEB to other organizations under CD particularly DPB, consensus is that close liaison is indispensable and FEB wld provide other bodies under CD with guidance on fin and econ arrangements to meet requirements of def prog. Dutch rep, however, wants DPB directly subordinate to FEB with consequent recasting DPB terms of ref to make this relationship plain. No support from other dels on this proposal but he may raise it in CD arguing that whole point of establishing FEB at proposed level shld be to coordinate and direct all econ activities through FEB.

f. Now appears likely that comite report on relationship of FEB to OEEC will be formulated in generalized terms.

g. UK rep raised vigorously, with support from some other members (notable Nor) question revising para 4 of additional terms of ref for WG of 12 (NATO document D–D 199 annex 1 page 11[2]). Recall that this para while instructing WG to report on equitable distribution of def burden, does not permit it to propose amt or nature of compensatory action in specific cases. UK argues that under US concept of FEB status and functions, this restriction shld be removed, and that otherwise seems no justification for setting up new body at level proposed by US. Canad and US reps with concurrence Fr rep, pointed out that this was very controversial matter, that CD had attached great importance to restriction referred to when considering WG of 12 terms of ref, and that while WG of 12 had wide latitude to offer econ and fin advice to CD, actual recommendations to govts on specific amts of burden-sharing transfers involved political and mil judgements for which only CD competent. We have urged that this matter be treated separately from problem of gen organization and hope to compromise on inclusion in comite report of recommendation that CF [*CD?*] give renewed consideration to WG of 12 terms of ref in light establishment of FEB.

4. Drafting comite scheduled meet this afternoon in attempt reduce various proposals to common draft.

SPOFFORD

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[2] Not printed.

740.5/4–1351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, April 13, 1951—noon.

[1099.] Ref: Deptel 6625 to Frankfort,[2] repeated London 4471, Paris 5182, April 2.

1. Regret reference telegram did not arrive Heidelberg in time for consideration at meeting. In view time factor following joint USDep, JAMAG, SUSRep message is being repeated Washington to give London staff views. Request OSR and military representative comment direct to Washington.

2. Questions asked paragraph 5 reference telegram and comments paragraph two touch on two points that have increasingly disturbed us. One concerns US evaluation of "adequacy" of NATO defense programs. Second concerns best means of approaching NAT countries for further increases in defense efforts, or shifts within currently planned programs, on which US views should be quite clearly formulated before we can appraise usefulness of specific conditions of aid.

3. Re "adequacy" of programs, US has tended use this term in two different senses. One involves US appraisal of what resources each country is capable of devoting to defense, given appropriate economic aid. An effort considered adequate in financial and economic terms may or may not be adequate in physical terms of raising, maintaining, and equipping forces and constructing necessary physical installations to meet requirements of NAT defense.

4. The second sense in which "adequacy" is used involves judgments as to effectiveness of qualitative and quantitative build-up of forces to meet requirements of MTDP. Here we lack authoritative statement of equipment requirements. Time-phasing is another important element. Can we say that a Dutch program designed to build up its forces to meet its DC–28 commitments by mid-1955 is adequate in the same sense as a Nor program to meet its commitments by the end of 1952?

5. ECC discussed in general terms at Heidelberg meeting the problem of evaluating adequacy of country programs in both senses and staffs are now attempting work out necessary procedures to effect a coordinated evaluation of political-military-economic-production aspects of country efforts. We thereby hope to be able to present comprehensive and coordinated regional recommendations as to adequacy of country efforts on a continuing basis. We probably will be unable

[1] Sent also to Paris, eyes only for Katz and MacArthur; repeated to Washington, eyes only for ISAC and Bonesteel, and to Heidelberg, eyes only for Handy. The source text is the repetition to the Department of State, Depto 770.

[2] *Ante*, p. 111.

to contribute much in this direction before the Foreign Aid Bill is presented to Congress, but would hope to have some useful evaluations as a basis (*a*) for congressional testimony in event one of us appears before Congress, and (*b*) for guiding further negotiations re defense efforts with other NAT governments.

6. Believe that, in future negots with NAT governments, US should be prepared with most specific recommendations practicable as to ways they can increase and improve forces and production. By this time most NAT governments have prepared defense programs which, on their own assumptions as to US end-item aid, they think will enable them to meet their DC–28 commitments by at least end of 1954. Approaches for greater increases should therefore be made in light of US positions as to the desirability of a general acceleration of plans to meet DC–28 commitments and on recommendations (preferably from NATO) for filling the gap between DC–28 commitments and MTDP requirements. We understand these questions are under study in ISAC and standing group, respectively. Apart from these two possible general bases for urging increased efforts, US can and should attempt to define specific production tasks (in cooperation with DPB) and to press bilaterally, as well as through the standing group and SHAPE for improvements in the quality of forces.

7. These problems relating to judgments of adequacy of efforts and the bases for urging further defense increases affect the questions mentioned paragraph 5 reference telegram.

(*a*) Agree that US aid for NATO countries should include conditions requiring "reciprocal meeting of some sort of targets" before increments of aid are disbursed provided that targets are stated in general qualitative rather than rigid quantitative terms. Specific application of such conditions, adapted to fit special circumstances in each country, could be worked out as programs develop and aid is disbursed. Recognize that these comments not very helpful in meeting your present problem, which, presumably, is to formulate "conditions" that may satisfy congressional requirements. However, do not believe it possible, certainly at this stage, to reduce to concrete and quantitative terms the level and character of European defense effort which we should seek to obtain during coming fiscal year. Furthermore, believe attempt to formulate specific conditions in terms of performance that would apply across the board to all countries, and to write such condition in law, would dangerously tie our hands in administration, particularly from military point of view. Conditions that could be realistically applied to all countries uniformly would tend to be minimum conditions, reduced to lowest common denominator, and thus tend to encourage minimum, rather than maximum, effort.

(*b*) If it is considered essential for congressional reasons to propose legislative "conditions", suggest consideration following possibilities:

(1) That recipients of US aid undertake sacrifices in support of their defense efforts which bear a reasonable relation, in the

light of their capacities and resources, to those being borne by US;

(2) That recipient countries adopt measures having comparable effect to those established in US for directing scarce resources into military uses;

(3) That JCS endorse reasonableness of country plans for national military service, mobilization and training;

(4) That US administrative authorities be satisfied that recipient country have taken all reasonable steps to carry out NATO commitments and recommendations NATO bodies (but note veto powers of all members such bodies). Even such conditions as these, which allow room for administrative discretion, could clearly embarrass administration of aid programs and even jeopardize attainment of US objectives.

(*c*) Would be greatly preferable (if it would satisfy congressional requirements) to avoid "conditions" as such and substitute notion of qualitative criteria to be taken into account in allocating or administering aid. Such criteria might be drawn along lines suggested (*b*) above, reflecting US judgments, or incorporate NATO evaluations (by SG, WG of 12, and CD on matters within their respective competences), or both.

(*d*) While believe it would be desirable to develop NATO judgments as to adequacy member country efforts wherever this is feasible, and that joint NATO evaluations of country programs would offer opportunity for healthy mutual examination of programs, believe such judgments and evaluations should be thought of as providing guidance to US administrative authorities responsible for aid allocations rather than as anything given binding effect of US by legislation. Especially in view of veto power over own actions of all members in NATO bodies, doubt whether incorporation of provision along these lines in legislation would offer much reassurance to Congress, whether or not legislation contained additional provision regarding US certification that total efforts were "adequate".

SPOFFORD

740.5/4–1451 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, April 14, 1951—11 a. m.

Depto 779. This is joint USDep, OSR, SUSRep, JAMAG msg, supplementing ECC message in Embtel 5242, April 4.[2] Subj is use interim Finance device to activate unutilized European mil production facilities.

1. We believe such device should be very sparingly used where effect might be to ease pressure for higher Eur military budgets. In particular basic solution to problem activating production for country's own use must be increase in country's own defense

[1] Pouched to Paris for OSR, Schuyler, and MacArthur and repeated to Frankfurt and to Heidelberg for Handy.

[2] *Ante*, p. 118.

appropriations. However, in field production for intra-Eur transfer, there may be more excusable reasons why production is held up, even where it is reasonably clear that items concerned will find eventual recipient among NATO countries. Potential producing country, under stress financing requirements its own forces, may be reluctant divert limited public funds to initiation production for others. Potential recipient countries, on other hand, may be delaying placing orders because of hope receiving item free under US end-item program and/or uncertainty as to Eur supply. Former hope shld be dispelled to considerable extent by firm adoption US policies recommended by ECC in Embtels 4708 and 4709 of Mar 1 [3] and concurred in by Todep 303 of March 14,[4] and latter uncertainty shld be progessively diminished by development NATO production planning and allocation. However, determination by prospective purchasers of specific sources supply is likely lag chronically behind availability of Eur productive capacity whose output is reasonably clearly needed to meet aggregate NATO requirements. Our proposal for interim financing is intended primarily to deal with this situation. We recommend, however, that procurement for transfer be undertaken under this scheme only when we are satisfied that producing country is taking all reasonable measures utilize its productive capacity to meet its own needs for item concerned, and is not neglecting its own requirements for sake of developing export earnings.

2. Recommendation in Embtel 5242 represents adaptation technique we recommended for French ammo production, principal drawback of which is that if ammo eventually proves unsaleable (or saleable only at a loss) US will be unable present full amount of francs required under repurchase agreement and hence will lose corresponding dollars. Believe should be multilateral underwriting this risk, even though this will necessitate acceptance multilateral voice (thru DPB) in administration of fund.

3. We therefore propose adapting French ammo procedure to more general purposes as fols:

(A) Earmark portion US aid funds (say $500 million) as revolving fund to support contracts placed in Eur by US procurement agencies as agreed in DPB, and make clear to Eur countries that funds employed for this purpose wld come out of appropriated funds which might otherwise be made available to them as aid. Any actual payments required for such procurement would be made with local currency acquired against dollars under a repurchase agreement (as in French ammo case). Dollar funds committed on one order wld be freed for commitment on next as soon as contract was transferred, or

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[3] *Ante*, pp. 72 and 73.
[4] Not printed (740.5/3–351).

as goods delivered under contract were resold to eventual Eur recipient and local currency proceeds were converted back into dollars. (For impact of possible losses, see (B) below.)

Comment: Note that except for US share in eventual losses, dollars advanced under scheme wld be recovered, and hence wld not be current expenditure from US resources as in case rest of aid program. However, since purpose is to activate Eur end-item production which wld not otherwise come into existence, shld be possible justify diversion US aid funds to this program since cld be corresponding reduction in flow end-items programmed from US sources. Also note that so long as dollar funds available to back up US orders, actual outlays may be held to very moderate amount. This depends upon:

(*a*) Extent to which contractors require progress payments, or alternatively can finance work from own resources or from bank loans issued on strength of orders placed, and

(*b*) Extent to which contracts can be sold out to eventual recipients of equipment prior to its delivery. In any case, such dollar advances as may need to be made under procedure we propose wld be largely if not wholly immobilized in hands Eur control banks during period they were outstanding. Indeed, they wld not amount to much more than bookkeeping transactions.

(B) Seek guarantee by Eur countries (including Canada), in proportions to be agreed among them with such prodding from US as may be needed, to reimburse US for half of any losses in francs (or other local currency concerned) suffered by US from mutually-agreed interim financing operations. However, if it shld be found that this form guarantee wld require unduly large set-asides Eur funds otherwise available for current defense expenditures, or makes Eur countries inordinately cautious about approving proposed procurement operations, we wld recommend limiting losses to be borne by Eur countries to half of total losses incurred up to an agreed limit. Under this arrangement US wld take other half of losses up to agreed limit, plus an "open-end" risk in any losses in excess of that amount; latter risk cld be held in check by US thru its voice in DPB on amount and character of procurement under scheme.

Comment: Note Eur guarantee liability wld be in Eur currency obtainable through EPU: dollar advanced by US wld always be recovered thru exercise repurchase agreement except for agreed US share in losses. If Eur agree to bearing half all losses, procurement by US of $500 million wld involve theoretical Eur risk of $250 million, but obviously in practice losses wld only be fraction that amount. Wld hope Eur share in guarantee cld be implemented by initial appropriation of only fraction theoretical risk assumed, with Eur govts assuring their Parliaments that they wld limit volume and nature procurement under scheme with view to keeping actual losses within this limit while reserving right come back for further appropriations in case losses reached unforeseen size. However, if Eur govts shld feel obliged get appropriations covering full theoretical risk, we fear this might seriously reduce amount of Eur appropriations available to finance current defense expenditures. Another danger is that even

if Eur guarantees can be implemented with only partial appropriations, Eur govts may prove inordinately cautious in approving proposed procurement operations because of fear incurring losses in excess this amount. Hence, we recommend that in either these eventualities (note that second cannot be determined until after scheme is launched) US shld be prepared accept limit on Eur guarantee liability and assume "open-end" risk itself. Thru its DPB rep, US cld itself limit total procurement to amount and character which it considered wld reduce "open-end" risk to negligible proportions. To extent losses were suffered using up Eur guarantee commitments, US might find it prudent to reduce outstanding volume of procurement or seek additional Eur commitments.

(C) In order protect each country's financial commitment, limit US procurement under scheme to projects recommended by DPB on basis military advice as to veto-wide deficiencies in acceptable types; and its own determination appropriate efficient Eur sources supply.

Comment: Note unanimous vote in DPB wld give each country, including US, veto power over any proposed operation.

(D) Require each NAT country (including US, though wld expect this to have no practical significance) to agree in advance to purchase any equipment procured under scheme not disposed of thru normal channels, but declared by appropriate NATO mil authority suited to that country's mil requirements, and in which country has known deficiency.

Comment: Basic purpose such provision wld be to escape losses arising from recognized tendency some Eur countries to ignore other suitable Eur sources supply in favor home production in spite resulting over-all loss efficiency. Essential idea is for all participating countries, each of which is sharing in risk of loss, to delegate proposed allocation authority to impartial arbiter. Obviously twelve-nation body in which each country wld have veto not suitable for this purpose, and although SG might seem logical candidate, nine smaller countries might have obvious reluctance accept this solution. Obligation to accept allocation designated authority cld, of course, be worded in more or less firm terms. Wld envisage allocations being made according to greatest relative need, which might involve distribution among several countries. Wld also envisage no allocation in equipment not well suited to any country's requirements, leaving US to salvage whatever possible thru auction or otherwise with remaining loss to be distributed pursuant to guarantee arrangement. Recognize that even in absence multilateral agreement along these lines US might deliver unsaleable equipment to recalcitrant country as part its end-item program, reducing other end-item aid to country concerned correspondingly and using dollars "saved" to reimburse procurement fund. However, this procedure probably practicable only when unsaleable items reasonably substitutable for items in country end-item program. As even more severe sanction, US might reserve right reimburse fund by corresponding reduction in economic aid to country concerned, although presumably US wld resort to this measure only in extreme circumstances. Believe much better seek agreement along lines we propose, which offers excellent opportunity for practical multilateral cooperation in NATO in mutual interest participating countries.

5.[5] Believe scheme outlined above wld have fol advantages over alternative procedures:

(A) By comparison US off-shore procurement under end-item program, wld avoid rewarding producing country with dollars and making eventual recipient country free gift, with resulting disincentive effects we have all recognized. Our proposal wld conform to general system financing intra-Eur transiers through normal (EPU) payments channels.

(B) By comparison system under which govt of producing country wld initially finance procurement under multilateral guarantee against eventual loss, our proposal wld avoid absorbing appropriate funds in producing country. While existence guarantee make it somewhat easier get appropriated funds, believe net effect guarantee system here referred to bound be reduction funds available in producing country for its current defense expenditures. At same time, our proposal wld leave on producing country "economic impact" of financing procurement. Dollars involved, being subject to repurchase agreement potentially exercisable at any time, wld be effectively immobilized, while any necessary payments on contracts wld in fact be made in local currency provided by producing country's central bank. In fact what our proposal really boils down to is getting producing country to assume real burden of financing procurement by exploiting willingness its central bank provide local currency against dollars. Our proposal also wld avoid cumbersome procurement procedures of many Eur govts, although in appropriate cases US cld employ local govts as its procurement agents. In any case, multilateral agreement instituting this scheme shld include provision granting contractors filling orders under scheme same priorities, privileges, etc. as enjoyed by contractors under local govt procurement.

(C) By comparison system under which each country wld contribute to general procurement fund in proportion to risk it assumed, our proposal wld avoid absorbing appropriated funds in all Eur countries. To finance initial $500 million procurement, these countries wld have to raise $250 million under this proposal—assuming 50–50 risk-sharing—as compared say with fraction that amount under ours. Again, although largely self-liquidating character of operation might make it somewhat easier get appropriated funds, believe net effect this system wld be substantial reduction funds available for current defense expenditures in countries concerned.

6. Question arises whether recipients shld be charged only at cost or (*a*) shld pay flat charge to cover administration costs or (*b*) in cases where current market price of equipment substantially exceeds cost, shld be charged something above cost in order build up reserve to offset losses on unusable items. We believe that prices will continue to rise in immediate future, making profits possible (subject to effect of escalator clauses), and would tend to favor charging prices sufficient to cover administrative costs and establish some reserve for losses especially as such procedure wld give recipients incentive for purchasing contracts promptly before prices rise. However, believe these

[5] Source text contains no paragraph for no. 4.

matters shld be left to determination by DPB in light experience administering fund. Question also arises whether charge to recipients shld include cost raw materials embodied in items concerned and provided by US under aid program. We believe answer depends on what policy US fols in this respect on intra-Eur mil transfers generally, since prices for items procured under these arrangements shld clearly be no higher than those charged if items are bought directly by recipient govts from producers. Incidentally, however, believe wld be desirable review our present general policy in this field, and we are giving matter further study.

7. Numerous other questions of detail have occurred to us, but believe these shld be worked out in course implementation this project after basic decision reached to proceed along general lines proposed.

SPOFFORD

740.5/4–1451 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, April 14, 1951—6 p. m.

Depto 780. 1. Organizing comite for FEB reached agreement today on report to CD and proposed terms of ref for FEB. Difficulties arising from Dutch reservation that DPB shld be subordinated to FEB overcome when Dutch this morning withdrew formal reservation and substituted statement in minutes that Netherlands Govt has not had time study carefully and may raise question later. Last moment Italian reservation that FEB while giving gen guidance DPB cld provide guidance only on request DPB for transactions of specific nature (meaning bilateral agreements) was also avoided by including statement Italian position in minutes. Italian del indicated wld not press viewpoint in CD.

2. While report and resolutions does not meet US proposal in every particular believe they lay base for effective operation FEB and early establishment. Expected that resolution will be considered Apr 23 with adoption indicated.[2] On level membership, UK, France, and Denmark unwilling to stipulate "official level OEEC council" and so compromised on "senior official level" but with indication in report that FEB members shld have sufficient authority and competence make board effective. Several dels indicated informally intention appoint

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[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR, to Frankfurt, and to Heidelberg for Handy.

[2] According to telegram Depto 802 from London, April 19, not printed, discussion of the FEB resolution was postponed to the CD meeting of April 25 in view of the anticipated consideration of the subject by the Netherlands Cabinet on April 23. As a part of that decision, finalization of the revised Canadian proposal was deferred to April 30 in hope of including therein an agreed paragraph on the FEB. (740.5/4–1951)

heads OEEC dels but UK clearly expects appoint Roll. French apparently undecided. On direct contact FEB with govts, see para 5 of resolution which we believe to be workable compromise. Had considerable difficulty on this issue with UK supported by France and in spite of support from several dels cld not get agreement on original US proposal.

3. Msg will fol on issue raised in para 3 of report after consultation with Katz Apr 17.

4. Text report (*verbatim text begins*):

"1. Comite considers desirable there be set up central body to handle econ and fin problems arising out of work of NATO and this shld be fin and econ board, normally mtg in Paris. It shld be composed of one member from each signatory country. In view *ad hoc* comite desirable govts shld appoint to board officials of sufficient authority and knowledge of econ and fin problems to ensure effective discharge of functions assigned to board. Draft resolution containing proposed terms of ref for such board is annexed to this report.

"2. Board shld be responsible to CD and shld as rule submit reports and recommendations to them. It appears, however, necessary provide procedure for speedy transmission to govts of recommendations not involving issues of gen policy. Terms of ref embodied in draft resolution allow for this.

"3. Board shld have general responsibility for dealing with financial and economic problems arising in connection with NATO defense programs. It shld take over functions at present exercised by PWS/DFEC, economic and finance WG[3] and advisory group on raw material problems. Majority of dels felt it wld be appropriate in new circumstances to remove limitations contained in para 4 of additional terms of ref for economic and finance WG (D-D/199 annex I)[4] to enable board make such recommendations as it may find possible taking into acct all economic and finance considerations. This matter submitted to CD for decision.

"4. Board shld maintain close liaison with other NATO bodies under CD and in particular with DPB. Best method maintaining liaison will have to be worked out in practice between bodies concerned. Comite discussed number of suggestions relating particularly to contact between DPB and board. While not possible at this stage make exhaustive proposals comite is of opinion that in order to ensure effective liaison between these two bodies fol arrangements represent minimum:

"*a*. Direct contact between two bodies. Wld include close contact both at membership and staff level; efficient and comprehensive arrangements for exchange of documents; provisions for attendance, in appropriate cases by officers or members of two bodies at each others mtgs.

"*b*. Supervision of liaison arrangements between two bodies thru central staff of chairman of CD. Comite is of opinion it is desirable have one member of staff of chairman of CD specifically charged with responsibility.

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[3] Working Group of Twelve. See footnote 3, p. 12.
[4] Not printed.

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"5. In opinion of *ad hoc* comite, it is necessary that board shld keep itself closely informed of and as appropriate maintain contact with work of other international organizations dealing with finance and economic problem. This particularly important as far as relations with OEEC are concerned. In broader and more gen economic field which is fundamentally important but not directly related to defense efforts of NAT member countries, NATO shld rely as far as possible on activities of OEEC. Maximum degree of coordination of work of board and of OEEC is highly desirable, including flexibility in assignment tasks as between two organizations. It is for these reasons that:

"*a.* It is proposed board shld be located in Paris;

"*b. Ad hoc* comite must view that in making their appointments to board, member countries shld bear in mind need to ensure closest possible contact with OEEC at all official levels; and

"*c.* Board when established will need in its working arrangements (including its staff arrangements) to pay due regard to need to avoid duplication.

"6. Proposals for setting up a finance and economic board now put forward including abolition PWS/DFEC and overlap existing terms of ref and auth DFEC itself. Necessary changes to enable present proposals to be carried thru wld in any case be made if reorganization NAT now in contemplation takes place. Comite hopes, however, that any delay in reorganization will not be allowed stand in way of early implementation present proposals."

5. Text of draft resolution (*verbatim text begins*):

"CD in furtherance objectives NAT and in particular of Art 2, thereof, resolve that:

"1. There shall be established forthwith, responsible and reporting to CD, Finance and Economic Board. It shall be composed of rep at senior official level from each signatory country.

"2. Board shall elect its own chairman and make own rules of procedure. It may establish such subcomites and working parties as it considers necessary for effective discharge of its work. It shall normally meet in Paris, but may also meet in London or elsewhere whenever deemed appropriate. It shall be responsible for formulating proposal to chairman of CD for staff arrangements both at its normal place of mtg and in London. It shall conduct all operations in conformity with NATO security requirements.

"3. Board shall be responsible for considering and making recommendations upon finance and economic problems arising in connection with NATO defense programs and upon best use financial and economic resources in member countries in support common defense effort. It shall provide other NATO bodies under CD with guidance on all relevant economic and financial questions arising out of their work. It shall succeed to functions and responsibilities of PWS/DFEC, advisory group on raw material problem and economic and finance WG, these functions and responsibilities being transferred in such manner and at such time as the board shall itself determine. At that time said PWS, said advisory group and said WG shall be dissolved.

"4. In pursuance of its responsibilities board:

"*a.* Shall carry out such tasks as CD may assign it.

"*b.* May on its own initiative, undertake work in pursuance para 3 above; provided, however, this shall not include advance planning in economic and finance field for possible wartime purposes unless CD shld so direct.

"*c.* Shall maintain close working relations with all other bodies under CD, in particular DPB, and provide them as necessary with guidance on all relevant economic and financial factors, obtain from them info on those aspects of defense programs which are relevant to consideration of economic and financial questions, and provide them as appropriate with guidance on financial and economic arrangements to meet requirements of defense programs. Board shall report as necessary to CD on economic and financial implications of work carried out by other NATO bodies under CD.

"*d.* Shall report to CD on financial and economic aspects of progress of defense programs in member countries.

"*e.* Shall maintain close contact with work of other international organizations dealing with financial and economic problems and in particular with OEEC, having in view need to avoid duplication of effort. It shall advise CD and bodies under CD on financial and economic aspects measures initiated by such other organizations which are relevant to defense effort of NATO countries.

"*f.* Shall keep CD regularly informed of progress of its work.

"5. Reports and recommendations of board shall, except as provided for below, be submitted to CD for consideration and appropriate action. In order make possible speedy transmission to govts of reports and recommendations which do not raise issues of gen policy:

"*a.* CD may, in assigning particular tasks to board, specify matters on which reports or recommendations, when approved by board, may be submitted to govts;

"*b.* Where board undertakes work on its own initiative, it may decide to submit reports and recommendations resulting from such work to govts, unless CD shld desire to review such reports and recommendations." (*End verbatim text.*)

SPOFFORD

740.5/4–1451: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT WASHINGTON, April 16, 1951—7 p. m.

Todep 366. This is a State Defense Message. Re Depto 782 of Apr. 14 [2] Depto 693 Mar 30.[3] Re status of deputies, propose first two sentences of para 10 of draft paper on reorg (as quoted Depto 693) read as follows: "To enable Council effectively to carry out its respon-

[1] Drafted by Nunley (RA) and cleared by him with Ernst (Defense) and Pittman (S/ISA).

[2] Not printed.

[3] *Ante*, p. 107.

sibilities and to exercise them continuously, each govt. shall be represented by a council deputy. Each deputy will represent all ministers concerned with NATO matters in his government, and will be responsible to such minister or ministers as his govt. shall determine." Remainder of para 10, beginning with sentence "The CD constitute permanent working organ of NAC" wld remain as quoted Depto 693.

We believe first sentence establishes status of deputies as govt. representatives. Second sentence serves to clarify this point by explicit statement that deputies representation includes all ministers, and also emphasizes that deputy is not free agent but is responsible to appropriate officials of his govt. Believe this emphasis important. At same time, second sentence permits each govt. to establish whatever line of direction over its deputy it may choose.

ACHESON

740.5/4–1751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT LONDON, April 17, 1951—2 p. m.

Depto 791. Todep 366[2] not recd until after mtg reported in Depto 790.[3] However, on basis previous instrs, we insisted and secured agreement upon inclusion of sentence which we believe same in sense and effect as that given in Todep 366. Sentence agreed yesterday read "Deputy shall represent his Government as a whole, particularly those Mins concerned with NATO matters". Those words make clear each deputy represents all Mins in his Govt concerned with NAT matters and his responsibility to them seems obvious corollary. Agreed sentence spells out first half of sentence in Todep 366 (which is properly matter of international concern) and leaves to national determination (as wld last half of suggested sentence) how each govt establishes its lines of direction.

Strongly hope agreed sentence will be acceptable since final draft incorporating it has been referred to all govts and it wld be highly embarrassing for us to reopen it. Revised agreed minute authorized by Todep 361 and 363[4] adopted with general satisfaction.

SPOFFORD

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Telegram dated April 17, not printed. It reported on the discussion of various matters in the April 16 meeting of the Council Deputies, including (*a*) Portugal's withdrawal of its reservations on the Canadian proposal, (*b*) the Deputies' acceptance of the U.S.-Netherlands agreed minute on interpretation of political "guidance," and (*c*) the Deputies' agreement to transmit the approved text of the Canadian proposal to NATO governments with the hope of final action on April 25, if possible incorporating a paragraph on the FEB which would be discussed by the Deputies on April 23 (740.5/4–1750).

[4] Neither printed.

740.5/4–1751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT WASHINGTON, April 17, 1951—7 p. m.

Todep 369. This is State–Defense message. Re Depto 791 [2] regret any possible embarrassment but unable accept wording proposed reftel.

We prefer you strenuously attempt seek agreement wording given Todep 366 "Each Deputy shall represent all Ministers concerned with NATO matters in his Government and shall be responsible to such Minister or Ministers as his Government may determine". As a less desirable alternative we wld be prepared to accept text given para 4 Todep 352.[3]

If truly impossible reach agreement either two alternatives above we wld accept your wording suggested Depto 791 less "as a whole." This formulation would however require agreed minute as follows: "Council Deputies in the exercise of their functions enumerated in para III 10 shall represent their Governments as they may be instructed and in accordance with normal national constitutional practices." [4]

Reasons for our position are as follows: First, in view of current Executive Branch-Congressional relations exceedingly unwise to indicate that Deputy represents Government "as a whole." Second, in order to avoid possible misunderstanding here or abroad and in view of extensive interchange in Deps that has arisen in connection with this problem, believe it essential to clarify point that Council Deputies, despite expanded powers and functions, is still not supra-national representative body with full freedom to act for member Governments, but, instead that each Deputy's actions shall be subject to regular guidance and direction by appropriate officials of his own government.

ACHESON

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[1] Drafted and cleared with Dickerson (Defense) by Nunley; also cleared by Pittman (S/ISA).

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Dated April 6, p. 127.

[4] In its meeting of April 18, the Council Deputies agreed to this last-mentioned alternative, namely the wording of telegram 791 less the phrase "as a whole." (Telegram Depto 802, April 19, 740.5/4–1951)

740.5/4–1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, April 24, 1951—8 p. m.
PRIORITY

Todep 384. Fol State ECA comments on Depto 780[2] re FEB Terms Reference and report to Council of Deputies.

1. We continue to prefer original language of US proposal and hope that you can substitute it for compromise language of para 5 of committee report. If latter best obtainable, we can accept it providing that you make record clear that US considers FEB to be high level and important NATO body and intends to appoint representative at official level of OEEC Council.

2. Re para 3 of committee report. Removal of para 4 of WG 12 Terms Reference[3] under consideration high level here. Pending decision desire that you have action on this matter deferred. Meanwhile, please forward your current views as to reasons behind proposal.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram, repeated to Paris for OSR, was drafted by Knight who also cleared it with Pittman, Malaby, and, in substance, with Perkins.
[2] April 14, p. 142.
[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 12.

740.5/4–2451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 25, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 389. Personal from Cabot. ISAC discussed policies for increasing Eur defense efforts Apr 13 and directed fin and econ group, among other things, to prepare policy paper on interim fin devices to stimulate Eur production (re Depto 824, Apr 24[2] and Depto 779, Apr 14[3]). Working Group submitted paper (ISAC D–14), summarized below, for ISAC consideration Apr 24.

1. FEG agreed on necessity for scheme for US financing and procurement of matériel within Eur as means of encouraging fullest pos-

[1] This telegram, repeated to Paris for OSR, was drafted by Bray (S/ISA) who also cleared it in substance with Cabot (S/ISA), Cleveland (ECA), and Knight (EUR).
[2] This telegram, not printed, requested information on how the proposal contained in telegram Depto 779, p. 137, had been received, what alternative proposals for activating unutilized European military production facilities were being considered, and how it was planned to treat the subject in congressional presentation (740.5/4–2451).
[3] *Ante*, p. 137.

sible utilization Eur production capacity for mil purposes. Agreed scheme shld be confined to selected projects of very high priority.

2. Considerable sentiment that scheme this sort ran inherent danger its purposes and functions might be misunderstood by Eur NATO countries and might create disincentive to maximum financing of production by Eur NAT Govts themselves. Therefore, agreed any such scheme shld be surrounded by thorough-going safeguards to reduce as much as possible any disincentives to maximum Eur financed defense production.

3. Sub-comite set up to draft terms and conditions under such a scheme shld operate with view to incorporating necessary safeguards.

4. With exception State Dept reps, FEG agreed any such scheme shld be financed within total volume of aid requested for Eur NAT countries. Group did not, of course, address itself to broader question of adequacy of presently planned levels of aid to accomplish our total proposed in NATO rearmament effort.

5. Agreed that, within total aid, funds these purposes shld come largely from programmed econ aid but door shld be left open for use of end-item aid funds. Defense emphasized door cld be left open only re post-1952 end-item program.

6. Opinion of State Dept that scheme shld be financed by an addition to aid funds currently being programmed. State Dept felt scheme shld represent a rephasing of entire US aid program in support of MTDP, with larger sums being applied for FY 1952.

ISAC directed FEG to prepare paper on scheme (para 3 above) prior to taking decision as to whether or not additional funds for its financing wld be required and cld be obtained from the Cong in FY 1952. Prelim report on proposed scheme being prepared.

Freund conversant with Dept thinking re need for additional funds this year.

All members ISAC deeply interested in this problem and careful consideration being given your proposals. Decision on funds question shld be forthcoming early next week. [Cabot.]

ACHESON

740.5/4–2651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, April 26, 1951—noon.

Depto 836. Dept pass Ottawa. Deputies 32nd meeting April 25.

1. General agreement on report and resolution on FEB (D–D (51) 98 [2]) but final adoption deferred due Neth insistence FEB guidance

[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR, to the capitals of the other NATO countries except Canada, and to Frankfurt, Heidelberg, and Wiesbaden.

[2] This Council Deputies document dated April 16 is presumably the *ad hoc* committee's draft resolution as transmitted to Washington in telegram Depto 780, April 14, p. 142.

shld bind DPB. All other deps considered FEB and DPB of equal importance, concerned with different aspects of same problem and both subordinate to overall governmental policy expressed through CD. However, US Dep recognized that, in light of CD interpretation of word "guidance" in context CD–SG relationships, Neth justified in interpreting "guidance" in para 3 and 4 (iii) of draft resolution as meaning binding instructions. Hence proposed substituting "advise" for "provide with guidance" in second sentence para 3 and in para 4 (iii) and adding at end of second sentence para 3 fol words: "and may recommend to CD such directions to these other bodies as may seem necessary from econ and fin view point". With this amendment, draft resolution apparently acceptable to all deps except Neth, who said must consult his govt.[3]

2. Other points of interest in FEB discussion:

a. Several deps expressed hesitation about degree of authority given FEB to make recommendations direct to govts but drew consolation from fact that unanimous decision by FEB necessary for forwarding recommendation direct to govts rather than to CD.

b. Belg and Neth deps envisaged FEB operating at level OEEC official level council but when pressed by Fr and Brit deps agreed that this shld be thought of as a gen principle but not as a rule to be laid down by CD. US dep, who spoke last on this issue, emphasized US interest in top level FEB but in view Brit and Fr sensitiveness to "dictation" as to their FEB representation, did not reopen ques of language in resolution.

c. Discussion of amendment para 4 of WG of 12 terms of ref [4] was deferred at request US rep.

3. In discussion Czech deps views generally in agreement with Dept's A–1767.[5] As in discussion Pol (Depto 822 [6]) nearly all deps took active part but exchange barely touched policy.

4. Next mtg Apr 30.

SPOFFORD

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[3] In its 33d meeting of April 30, the Council Deputies adopted the FEB report and resolution with the amendment contained above and with a substitution in the resolution's preamble of the words "including the purposes outlined in article 2" for the phrase "and in particular of article 2." The Netherlands Deputy withdrew his reservation but said that he would raise the matter again if experience indicated desirable. This information was reported in telegram Depto 862 from London, April 30, not printed (740.5/4–3051).

[4] See previous reference to action on this document in telegram Todep 384, April 24, p. 148 (or Depto 780, April 14, p. 142).

[5] Airgram to London, March 30, not printed, concerning the situation in Czechoslovakia (749.00/3–3051).

[6] Telegram from London, April 24, not printed, reporting on the 31st meeting of the Council Deputies (740.5/4–2451).

740.5/4–2651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 3, 1951—2 p. m.

Todep 404. Ref: Depto 837.[2] Await with interest views Spofford/Katz. To assist in formulation your views, we are sending you a draft cable prepared by ECA which has been discussed and recd favorably working level State, and is now being sent to other ISAC agencies for comment. Wld appreciate your specific comments on this draft. Text also being sent Katz by ECA, for comment.

"1. For reasons that follow, believe you shld seek agreement in Council Deps that NATFEB undertake to recommend as one end-product of burden-sharing exercise, manner in which US econ aid can best be used to enable maximum effective contribution by NATO partners to common defense.

2. Specifically, US position in Deps (and parallel line taken by US Rep at first mtg of FEB) wld be as follows:

a) Original Nitze memo [3] contemplated that members of NATO wld agree on some system of sharing financial burden of rearmament. Raising and maintaining of armed forces, and production of material for their use, shld be done in most efficient locations. Inequities in resulting burdens wld then be shared by financial transfers among NATO countries.

b) US aid is a marginal resource of considerable significance in NATO group as a whole. Decisions about US aid shld not be considered only method of sharing burdens among NATO countries, but it is clearly one important method of doing so.

c) Upper limit on US aid for FY 1952 will shortly be set by Congressional presentation. Executive Branch will shortly present to Congress illustrative estimates of Eur needs for econ assistance. Country breakdowns discussed with Congress will not be binding on Executive Branch. It is desire of US Govt to arrive at ultimate decisions on upper limit of aid to each eligible country on basis of recommendations from whole group of NATO partners.

d) At same time, it wld be desirable to consider other methods of sharing the total burdens such as credit given to Continent by sterling area, Canadian aid, possible adjustments in force, infrastructure, etc. assignments. Whole direction of efforts shld be to increase program and not level down.

e) Decisions on upper limits of country aid shld, of course, be closely linked with determination as to internal measures to be taken by each country to ensure the most effective diversion of resources to rearmament purposes, most equitable internal dis-

[1] Drafted by Cleveland (ECA) and Martin (RA).

[2] This telegram of April 26 (740.5/4–2651) reported on action taken in regard to the last sentence of section 2 of telegram Depto 836, p. 149.

[3] Presumably the so-called "Nitze paper" dated October 17, 1950, sent to Spofford on that date in telegram Todep 63 to London. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, p. 386.

tribution of wealth and income, reasonable assurance that inflationary forces will be kept under control, adequate controls on domestic use of scarce materials, adequate budgetary provision for financing of current and future procurement of military end-items within Eur, etc. Most important contribution of FEB will be to get out onto table, for multilateral review, main elements of each country's programs, plans, and prospects.

f) Within US decisions on total aid (made after recommendation by FEB through Deps), US will discuss with each country specific measures which will be made a condition of aid. In such discussions, US will try insofar as possible to reflect views of NATO and to help solve problems which have been highlighted in FEB and Deps consideration of country burdens and contributions.

3. Main reason for announcing this US position now is to reemphasize US desire that FEB become a body with real power to influence national econ policies along lines consistent with US objectives in NATO. If FEB has some voice from outset on division of US econ aid, it will be in a position to (*a*) secure realistic submissions of econ data and policy forecasts from member govts, (*b*) conduct useful cross examinations (based on submissions) that will highlight main respects in which each country is not pulling its weight, and (*c*) make recommendations re common econ policies that will potentially have weight of US aid behind them. "Teeth" thereby provided shld enable FEB to develop from beginning along lines original US proposal, which proposed FEB as main multilateral agency to promote cooperative action in field of econ and financial mobilization in support of defense effort.

4. Position of US as full member NATO requires some difference in approach from division of aid process in OEEC. Believe US shld be willing and prepared to discuss nature and magnitude of US defense effort in multilateral discussions. However, US naturally cannot be in position binding itself irrevocably to aid decisions one year in advance. Presume, therefore, that US, while active participant in discussions, wld have to place some kind of reservation on recommendations from FEB to Deps, and even on recommendation by Deps, on division of US aid as such. For example, cld make clear that as in case of other NAT actions, they are recommendations to govts only, and govts not bound to conform.

5. OEEC experience indicates that internatl review of econ policies can only be effective if internatl body has some powers to affect policy. In case of FEB, as in that of OEEC, it appears that one element of power which can be accorded to it is that of carrying its analysis of relative burdens so far as to pt clearly to a division of aid based on econ and financial considerations, and recommending a range of figures to Deps. It is clearly understood that Dep[s] are free in light of broader polit-mil considerations to modify such figures as might be necessary to secure maximum defense effort with most equitable sharing of burdens, taking account of such other adjustments in burdens as Deps may agree to in consultation with SG, DPB and SHAPE, for this program.

6. In presenting US position described in para 2, shld be made clear that acceptability of NATO recommendations will depend on ability of NATO to arrive at realistic and hardhitting proposals for total

efforts by NAT countries to meet total burden imposed by need to provide for defense of Western Eur. Realism shld be enhanced by fact that "fair contribution" by US will be a given factor, at least for FY 1952, in view timetable Congressional consideration fon aid bill.

7. Pls comment soonest. If you and Katz agree with proposed US position, you are authorized to present in Council Deps at first available opportunity. It shld also be included in any US statement at initial mtg of FEB."

ACHESON

740.5/5–351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, May 3, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 880. USDep for ISAC. ToISA.

1. We are currently studying how US leadership can best be exerted in CD in coming weeks and months to help secure national action necessary to effective and most expeditious attainment MTDP goals.

2. Action we visualize here initially is presentation by chairman to CD of limited available NATO info and NATO problems in attempting to measure most serious shortfalls as of present time or estimates of future shortfalls, followed by CD consideration as rapidly as practicable of causes of shortfalls and bottlenecks and measures necessary to overcome them. In this process, central element will be presentation facts on specific deficiencies as of now (at any given time) plus concrete present indications of anticipated deficiencies in raising, training, equipping, etc., time-phased DC–28 country commitments, with data on reductions in MTDP requirements and progress of gap-closing commitments naturally having substantial bearing. US info not available for use in CD cld be used as back-up material for use by US in bilateral discussions with countries concerned. Beginning next week, will seek lay groundwork by series presentations indicating deficiencies both in info available and in progress of country defense efforts.

3. Recognize that we will quickly run into areas where info from NATO sources is inadequate and where there will be question as to appropriateness use of US info. Also recognize desirability not cutting across present studies (e.g., WG of 12 burden-sharing review, SG survey of possible recommendations for additional forces to close forces gap, SHAPE evaluation of quality of forces and training programs, and US review of gap disclosed by costing exercise). At same time, feel we shld maintain constant pressure for corrective action even though basic facts not refined and positions not perfected. Accordingly, hope we can be kept currently instructed and informed to maxi-

[1] Repeated to Paris, to Frankfurt, and to Heidelberg for Handy.

mum extent. Will also request your assistance from time to time on specific gaps in background or questions as to use of US eyes only info.

4. In particular, urge that results of revised SG costing exercise be made available soonest to give NATO order of magnitude of the task ahead. Appreciate reasons for delay, and are aware your efforts develop this exercise in form that can be presented other countries, but until this info available it will be very difficult to urge other countries to submit additional info on present performance and prospects on mtg MTDP goals.

5. JAMAG concurs.

SPOFFORD

ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, Paris Repto : Telegram

The United States Special Representative in Europe for the ECA (Katz) to the Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Foster)[1]

SECRET PARIS, May 4, 1951—10 p. m.

Repto 2056. From ECC for ISAC (limit distribution).

1. ECC has considered question of gaps between (*a*) present European plans and US estimates of minimum capabilities for 1951–52 and (*b*) capabilities plus US availabilities for MTDP, and requirements.

2. Believe European govts shld be made aware of these gaps. Believe also highly desirable figures be disseminated before burden sharing exercise, now about to begin, gets underway. Thus because (*a*) European countries may enter burden sharing exercise with conscious or subconscious intention to use their present appropriations as maximum estimates of what their parliaments will provide, and make them conditional on ability to shift part of this burden to US or other European countries (*b*) desirable frame of mind for these negotiations will be one in which Europeans realize that they must be called upon to make larger net effort all around; (*c*) thus we shld at an early stage introduce the notion that MTDP objectives require greater effort, and can be reached equitably by adding in varying degrees to already planned net contributions of each European country.

3. Your attention is called to fact this assessment of situation, while needed immediately, would greatly assist implementation part B of program contemplated in terms of ref of [Working Group of] 12.

4. Therefore recommended that (*a*) Washington provide USDep with authoritative statement of order of magnitude of gaps for 1951–52, together with supporting material relating to force requirements and production deficiencies. (*b*) USDep be authorized to present such material to CD or to FEB, and to request country MDAP groups to follow up appropriately at the country level. [ECC.]

KATZ

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[1] Repeated to London for USDep and SUSRep and to Heidelberg.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

May 25, 1951



Source: House Report No. 872, 82d Cong., 1st sess., p. 11.

Communiqué Issued by the Chairman of the North Atlantic Council Deputies (Spofford)[1]

LONDON, May 5, 1951.

I.

The North Atlantic Council Deputies announce today the adoption by their Governments of new terms of reference for the North Atlantic Council, which will hereafter incorporate the Defense Committee and Defense Finance and Economic Committee and thus become sole ministerial body in organization.[2]

The Council Deputies announce at the same time the creation of a Financial and Economic Board [FEB],[3] located in Paris.

The North Atlantic Council, as originally established, was composed of the Foreign Ministers of the nations party to the North Atlantic Treaty. Two other ministerial committees were organized, a Defense Committee composed of Defense Ministers and a Defense Finance and Economic Committee composed of Finance Ministers. The only full-time agencies functioning during the early months of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) were the standing group (made up of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of France, the United Kingdom and the United States) and the permanent working staffs of the Defense Finance and Economic Committee and of the Military Production and Supply Board, a subordinate organization of Defense Committee.

Experience soon demonstrated the need for a central, continuously functioning body to insure coordination between the work of the various treaty agencies and to facilitate the implementation of agreed plans. The Council in May 1950 therefore established the Council Deputies, who first met in July of that year.

II. THE CANADIAN PROPOSAL

Experience also demonstrated the need, particularly as emphasis shifted from planning to the implementation of plans, for a simpler organization with clear lines of authority, for fewer committees and more full-time operating agencies. In the autumn of 1950 the Canadian Government proposed reorganization of NATO to meet this need, and in December the Council authorized the deputies to study and recommend the necessary changes. The result is the structure announced today.

III. THE REORGANIZED COUNCIL

As before, the Council is the principal body in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and is "charged with the responsibility of con-

[1] Released to the press May 8, and printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 21, 1951, p. 810.

[2] See Chart, *supra*.

[3] Brackets appear in the source text.

sidering all matters concerning the implementation of the provisions of the treaty." The reorganized Council, however, incorporates not only the Council envisaged by article 9 of the treaty but also the Defense Committee referred to in the same article and the Defense Finance and Economic Committee. Both latter cease to exist as separate entities. The Council will continue to be composed of persons of ministerial rank, although in exceptional circumstances member governments may be represented by other persons duly designated for the purpose. Heads of Governments may attend meetings of the Council in person. Otherwise, Governments will be represented by their Minister for Foreign Affairs and/or the Minister of Defense, or by other competent ministers, especially by those responsible for financial and economic affairs, according to the nature of the agenda.

As hitherto, the Council will meet annually in ordinary session and such other times as may be deemed desirable by the majority of the parties.

IV. Location of Sessions

Location of each session will be determined by the chairman after consultation with the other parties. For general convenience, the ordinary annual session will normally be held at about the same time and in the same geographic area as the annual session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Other ordinary sessions will normally be held at some convenient location in Europe.

V. Chairmanship

The chairmanship of the Council will continue to rotate in alphabetical order. Paul van Zeeland, Foreign Minister of Belgium, is the present chairman. In order that the Council may effectively carry out its responsibilities and exercise them continuously, each Government is represented by a council deputy. Each deputy represents all ministers concerned with NATO matters in his Government and is responsible to such minister or ministers as his Government may determine. The Council Deputies, located in London, constitute the permanent working organization of the North Atlantic Council.

VI. The Council Deputies

When the Council is not in session, the Deputies carry out its policies, recommend to Governments the measures necessary to this end, formulate issues requiring decisions by the Council or by member governments and otherwise constitute a body which may register the approval of their Governments on matters before them for consideration.

The deputies will also be responsible for coordinating the activities of and giving guidance to all other permanent organs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, exchange views on political matters of

common interest within the scope of the treaty, promote and coordinate public information activities in furtherance of its objectives.

The chairman of the Council Deputies in addition to presiding at their meetings, is responsible for directing the permanent working staff of the organization.

VII. Military Structure

With the exception of the incorporation of the former defense committee into the Council, the military structure remains unchanged. The Council Deputies will deal directly with the military committee, and, when that body is not in session, with the standing group on political matters having military implications. It will provide those bodies with political guidance upon which strategic decisions should be based. The standing group will maintain close liaison with the Council Deputies and provide that body with advice on military matters.

VIII. Defense Production Board

The Defense Production Board, which was established last December and has its headquarters in London, replaced the military Production and Supply Board and the subsidiary agencies of that committee. It has as its general objectives the achievement of the maximum production of military equipment in the most efficient manner, at the least cost, and in the shortest time to meet the military material requirements of NATO. These objectives will be sought by coordinating national production programmes so that they will together fulfill NATO-wide production objectives. The Board is directed to concentrate its activities on those aspects of military production and procurement which involve major problems of international cooperation among the NAT members. A unified international staff has been organized to serve the Board under a coordinator of North Atlantic Defense Production, who is ex officio a member of the DPD.

IX. Creation of the FEB

The creation of the Financial and Economic Board (FEB) is another step toward simplifying and making more efficient the executive organization of NATO. In this respect it follows the precedent established in the setting up of the Defense Production Board.

According to its terms of reference, the new FEB:

> shall be responsible for considering and making recommendation upon financial and economic problems arising in connection with NATO defense programs and upon the best use of financial and economic resources in member countries in support of the common defense effort. It shall advise the other NATO bodies under the Council Deputies on all relevant economic and financial questions arising out of their work.

The FEB will ordinarily address its recommendations to the Council Deputies, but in specified cases these may be sent direct to member governments.

The FEB will succeed to the functions and responsibilities previously belonging to the permanent working staff of the Defense Financial and Economic Committee, the advisory group on raw material problems, and the economic and financial working group, which was set up some months ago in Paris. Among its other tasks, it has been assigned the duty of reporting to the Council Deputies on the financial and economic aspects of progress of defense programs in member countries. It will also:

maintain close contact with the work of other international organizations dealing with financial and economic problems and in particular with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), having in view the need to avoid duplication of effort.

The FEB will be based in Paris so that it will be able to draw on the experience and skills of the OEEC. It is expected that governments will be represented on FEB by senior members of their delegations to OEEC so that close coordination of activities of these two bodies will be assured.

740.5/5–851 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, May 8, 1951—8 p. m.

Depto 902. Dept pass Ottawa. Deputies 35th mtg May 7.

1. Van Zeeland, attending as chairman NAC, proposed council meeting early July on grounds

(*a*) Not wise to have too long interval between ministers mtgs.
(*b*) About two months preparation needed.
(*c*) Events moving fast, council shld take stock of present status and future plans, review Deputies actions, shld use new procedures created by reorganization,[2] with both FonMins and DefMins attending, and
(*d*) Public opinion, vital to NATO, needs event on which to focus and simple summary of NATO achievements.

Alphand agreed that council as reorganized shld be used but pointed out many major issues may not be resolved by July; e.g., Ger partici-

[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR, to the capitals of the other NATO countries, to Frankfurt, to Heidelberg, and to Wiesbaden.

[2] The reorganization of NATO, as discussed under the many revisions of the Canadian proposal, received the definitive approval of the Council Deputies in its 34th meeting on May 2. (Telegram Depto 879 from London, May 3, 740.5/5–351)

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pation, division of costs, CFM. He felt important to seek most propitious moment which might not necessarily be July. Van Zeeland replied such issues might continue hazy for some time. Suggested it possible to proceed with plans for council discussion of defined problems and concrete achievements.

UK said date not so important as council being able to produce tangible results but thought this probably by mid-summer.

US expressed view that, for public reaction, next mtg of council shld take "important" action. Believed this possible by early July. Joined UK in saying council shld consider state of military plans and preparation, and any recommendations on "gap". Also shld consider status production effort on which DPB wld be able report.

Italy concurred in view that early mtg desirable and extended invitation to meet in Rome if mtg held in Europe.[3]

Canada agreed with UK and US, but felt that govt shld consider carefully if desirable to proceed with council mtg before possible CFM.

Van Zeeland urged Deputies press preparations for council mtg to be held as soon as concrete results possible.

2. Van Zeeland drew attention to need for further measures to exploit defense production potential. Herod said there has been progress in national production for national forces but little success in developing production for transfer. Said question of military acceptability of types sometimes delaying, but not foremost obstruction. (Suggested potential better used if DPB had influence on funds, or better coordination with US end-item, and other MDAP aid and with US or off-shore procurement, or by promoting exchange of raw or non-defense materials for defense products, a system which wld amount to bilateral barter unless made multilateral.)

Janne, chairman DPB, supported Herod. Said root of trouble is national reluctance to budget for expenditures abroad. Urged planning US aid be re-directed, in collaboration with DPB, to give incentive to international approach, and that other incentives (e.g. prefinancing and price concessions) be considered.

UK recognized need for further steps but felt others might follow UK policy of placing maximum possible orders abroad.

Neth said there was also question of ability of foreign firms to fill orders. Suggested govts be more fully informed with view to creating priority system.

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[3] Spofford had reported in his telegram Depto 852 from London, April 30, that he had received a letter from the Italian Deputy stating that the Italian Government would welcome a meeting of the newly reorganized North Atlantic Council in Rome in the near future, with both Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers attending (740.5/4–3051). For further documentation on the scheduling of the NAC eighth session in Rome, November 24–28, following the seventh session held in Ottawa, September 15–20, see pp. 616 ff.

3. Chair announced conclusion of Iceland–US agreement [4] and arrival for first contingents for defense Iceland. To UK question, Iceland Deputy replied believed bases available all NATO states in time emergency.

[Here follows a report on the discussion of infrastructure costs and country contributions towards the cost of SHAPE. The major items included in the category of "infrastructure" were the airfields, communications networks, depots, and other installations essential for military operations.]

7. Next mtg today.

SPOFFORD

[4] See *Foreign Relations*, volume IV.

740.5/5–251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET PRIORITY NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1951—7 p. m.

Todep 427. ToISA for ECC. Pass to Scott, Cabot, and Halaby. Ref Depto 870, May 2.[2] This is State–Defense–ECA message reviewing policies recommended by ECC in London Embtel 4708 and para 1 Embtel 4709 both March 1 [3] and commented on by Todep 303 of March 14.[4] Fol if agreeable ECC are firm policy statements which shld be disseminated all US field reps at regional mtg for use as appropriate with NAT govts.

1. *Relationship Eur production and MDAP End-Item Program*

MDAP program of US produced end-items will not, in general, include items that cld reasonably be expected to be produced in Europe, except insofar as considerations of Eur technical performance, delivery schedules, or strategic implications wld indicate exceptions on a case by case basis. In accordance with this principle and the above criteria for its exception US Government will continuously review current and future programs of end-item requests with a view to eliminating those items which can be produced in Europe.

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[1] Drafted by Kranich (RA) and cleared by him with Thorpe (MB), Murray (S/DEF), Locker and Hannay (ECA), and in substance with Bell (S/ISA).

[2] This telegram from London, not printed, concerned the need anticipated by Spofford for firm financial policy statements available for consideration at regional economic meetings (740.5/5–251).

[3] *Ante*, pp. 72 and 73.

[4] Not printed.

2. *Eur responsibility for Production*

The US will expect that the European NAT nations will take the necessary initiative to produce each for itself and to procure from each other to their maximum financial capacity consistent with NAT and US burden-sharing conclusions. In accordance with this principle US produced end-items will be within amounts of natl deficiencies related to both the recipient country's capacity to produce for itself and to procure elsewhere in Europe.

3. *NATO or US Studies of MTDP Over-all Costs*

Any US or NATO pricing of major matériel for MTDP requirements which involves employment US prices for US types carries no implication whatever that equipment so priced will be obtained under MDAP end-item programs.

4. *Relationships US Aid to European Effort*

US econ and end-item assistance will be related to totality each country's efforts including that of raising and maintaining troops, producing and procuring equipment within its econ and financial capabilities. Such effort shld include steps to meet the MTDP gap and to make burden-sharing contributions to others if the defense role of any individual country does not constitute a strain on its econ and financial resources comparable to the gen level of other countries. US assistance will be conditioned by the adequacy and efficiency of the countries actual efforts, and with respect to end-items in accordance military guidance.

Financing additional Eur mil production will be subject early separate cable.

ACHESON

740.5/5–1751: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, May 17, 1951—2 p. m.

Depto 940. ToISA. ECC to ISAC. At ECC mtg May 4 we considered problem of US allocation system for scarce raw materials and machine tools as relate Eur NAT requirements for mil production and reached fol conclusions:

1. While no evidence yet recd of serious delay in Eur mil production due to inability obtain machine tools from US or raw materials from US of which US buying heavily in world markets, believe importance Eur production programs as now conceived and/or on greater scale for which US continually pressing merit most careful review current US allocation policy with due consideration given MTDP time targets.

[1] Repeated to Paris for Katz, to Frankfurt, and to Heidelberg for Handy.

2. Until consolidated data on mil production and essential civilian requirements of both US and Eur are developed, we do not feel qualified to recommend precise changes in US allocations system or US buying practices. However, we urge prompt review these policies and practices which we understand from FSRC Doc 2 [2] and discussions with Charles Wilson are under way.

3. Of basic importance to such review is, we believe, matter of maintaining consistency between allocations for buying policies on one hand and on the other, US major policy decisions concerning the magnitude of the effort which Eur shld undertake pursuant to the US policy that Eur can, with US help, defend itself but must do so with maximum self-help. We stress importance politically as well as militarily and economically of US pressing Eur for no greater effort than that which US prepared support by making possible adequate flow of essential materials and tools.

4. We believe equally strongly that liberalization allocations procedures shld be made dependent on increased Eur country efforts to increase production of critical materials and tools, to limit civilian consumption and exports to Sov bloc and, for countries controlling major sources, to establish their own allocations systems to assure other NAT countries adequate supplies for mil and other essential uses.

5. In addition to above suggested re-examination US policies, believe it important that operations of IMC be accelerated.

JAMC, SUSRep, Katz and Handy concur.

SPOFFORD

[2] Not identified in Department of State files.

740.5/5–2451 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, May 24, 1951—9 p. m.

Depto 990. Re Todep 437,[1] believe it is neither desirable nor advisable attempt define formally relationship between UN and collective self-def orgs. Understand this question was subj of considerable study during negot, signature and ratification NAT and that US Govt position then was that NAT was fully within framework UN charter and cld be employed by UN in exercise its primary responsibility for maintenance internatl peace and security. This seems to us to be simple expression which makes clear that there is no conflict between NAT and UN charter, but does not establish formal relationship between the two. We can see no reason for any modification this policy and on other hand can see many possible difficulties in attempting further to define formal relationship.

[1] This telegram to London of May 18, not printed, requested comment on an enclosed text entitled "Principles Governing the Relationship between the United Nations and Collective Self-Defense and Regional Organizations" (396.1 ISG/5–1851).

We, therefore, recommend that US Govt not seek internatl acceptance of "principles concerning the relationship between the UN and collective def and regional orgs" embodied in reftel.

SPOFFORD

740.5/5–2551 : Telegram

The United States Special Representative in Europe (Katz) to the Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Foster)[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, May 25, 1951—5 p. m.

Repto 2440. ECA/W for Foster and Bissell; Dept for Webb, Perkins and Cabot. Limit distribution. This joint Spofford–Katz message.

1. FEB convened for organizing meeting afternoon May 22. A snag developed in election chairmanship concerning which a few words of background necessary.

2. Following events described Repto 1840, 1962, 2151, sent London Repto 333, 355, 406,[2] problem chairmanship FEB became involved with problem exec sec NATO. After decision appointment Sutton,[3] French indicated they wished become candidates chairmanship FEB. We indicated we wld be glad support this, if French put forward candidate of suitable rank and standing. While we expressed appreciation Clermont-Tonnerre, we referred to questions which had been previously discussed concerning level of FEB and importance US Govt attached to suitably high level.

3. French Govt thereupon put forward name of Jacques Rueff, well known French economist and financial official, and formerly chairman of the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency, Brussels. In discussions in London, Spofford and Alphand both received impression from Hoyer-Millar that this acceptable to Brit Govt, although Hoyer-Millar did indicate Brit had some questions about individual principally because of lack of previous OEEC experience.

4. However, in Paris, Hall-Patch and Roll showed considerable disturbance. Hall-Patch informed us Chancellor Exchequer had not been adequately consulted, and that when question really brought to his attention, he raised serious question. In private talks, Hall-Patch indicated Brit objections principally (*a*) Rueff old-style classical

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[1] Repeated to London for Spofford, Gifford, and Batt and to Paris for Bruce and Parkman.

[2] These three telegrams are not printed.

[3] Nigel Sutton, an American who had been Secretary-General of the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency in Brussels since 1946, was appointed Executive Secretary of NATO on May 22. His duties in that post were to assist Spofford in his capacity as Chairman of the Council Deputies and to help direct the international staff of the Council Deputies in the coordination of the work of the civilian agencies of NATO.

economist who was alleged at one time to have written a pamphlet arguing that unemployment insurance benefits tended to promote unemployment and (*b*) that Rueff was a candidate for election to the National Assembly, running as member of party almost as far right as De Gaulle.

5. At mtg FEB, Roll, present as UK rep, indicated support for idea of a French chairman but that Rueff not acceptable. Mtg was adjourned to straighten situation out. There were numerous private talks and 3 additional meetings of FEB restricted to heads of dels in course May 22 and 23.

6. At mtgs it was clear that all other dels welcomed French chairmanship and with possible exception Norwegians were glad to accept Rueff. Norwegian rep gave UK mild support but raised question chiefly on ground that dels had not been given sufficient notice. At same time, he also indicated his govt was prepared accept Rueff. UK expressed willingness welcome French chairmanship but persisted in objecting to individual. At same time private talks among delegs indicated support for idea of vice-chairmanship to be offered Roll of UK, who indicated wld be disposed accept. We stated informally our support. Finally, in late evening mtg May 23, FEB agreed (*a*) welcome French chairmanship (*b*) accept Clermont-Tonnerre as temporary chairman. It was understood that delegs wld expect agreement on identity French permanent chairman as soon as possible. Dutch rep specifically stated that if temporary chairmanship shld last more than 2 weeks he wld raise formal objection, and insist on selection permanent chairman. Informally understood "permanent" chairman hold office one year eligible re-election.

7. Spofford saw Gaitskell in London May 24. He gathered Brit position well dug in. Gaitskell seemed base his objection to Rueff on latter's economic philosophy. Spofford also got impression Gaitskell might still have lingering thoughts possibility Roll as chairman. This of course wholly contradictory to explicit and formal statement UK rep at FEB meeting that UK welcomed French chairmanship. Moreover, Hall-Patch in private conversation reporting Gaitskell's attitude had emphasized acceptance idea of French chairmanship. Aside from indirect light which this residual notion about Roll might throw on Brit motives and attitude, it wld be hard to take it seriously under present circumstances.

8. Brit motives far from clear. There is possibility that it represents continuation their effort to play down role FEB and keep it from playing really effective part in NATO, especially if free from any possible Brit control. There is also possibility that purpose is prevent development French continental leadership for so important a NATO body. At same time it is also possible that their attitude represents nothing more than essentially trivial internal differences

and confusion within Brit Govt, especially between Treas and FonOff and between London NATO contingent and Paris contingent. Perhaps principal lesson to be learned is importance special care to avoid confusion in view geographical separation between London and Paris.

9. We propose not take lead in attempting solution, feeling wiser let Brit and French work it out. FEB delegs, including US deleg, put considerable common pressure on Brit to find prompt solution indicating unequivocally, while each member had right consider personal qualification candidate for chairman, no member had right to block selection approved by all others except for clear and compelling reasons. Discussion in FEB further indicated general opinion that objections to Rueff advanced by Brit were not weighty enough to meet this standard. Alphand stated only valid point made against Rueff was his candidacy for election to National Assembly and promised examine possibility Rueff withdraw candidacy if elected chairman FEB. No further information yet this point. Might, of course, constitute face-saving device if deadlock continues and deemed necessary withdraw Rueff in favor of another French candidate.

10. FEB will convene afternoon May 24 [*sic*] under temporary chairmanship Clermont-Tonnerre, to continue its initial business.

KATZ

ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278 : ECA circular telegram

The Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Foster) to all ECA European Missions [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 28, 1951—9 p. m.

Ecato circular E–52. Purpose this circ to seek ur comments on certain assumptions as to manner administering ECA aid in fiscal 1952.

We are faced with situation in which foreign exchange shortage is less and less major limiting factor in ability Eur govts accomplish their economic objectives. Amount of dol aid consequently getting smaller. At same time, importance exercising US leadership and influence in connection economic policies of Eur govts greatly increased by need assure significant contribution from each country toward fulfillment NATO rearmament plans, while maintaining behind growing military shield a cohesive and workable society with highest possible morale.

Full success this undertaking depends upon fundamental decisions which Eur countries have made, and are still making. These decisions so basic that they cannot be "bought" with US aid, but must depend

[1] Authorized by Porter, drafted by Harlan Cleveland and cleared by Bissell. Repeated for information to the Embassy in France for OSR and to the Embassies in Yugoslavia and Switzerland.

on deep realization self-interest, combined with hope, among Eur people. Thus, in determining whether extend US aid to a country, we do not base our decision on expectation such aid will of itself determine or even profoundly affect these basic decisions. Nevertheless, once it has been determined on economic grounds that economic aid in support of country's defense program is justified, administration US aid shld be such as maximize its effectiveness in strengthening those elements in country which contribute most to attainment our common objectives.

Basic objective our aid continues be proper direction of total resources available each of Eur countries and to all of them collectively.

To accomplish specific objectives in particular Eur countries, it is proposed adopt (and so inform Congress), fol modifications in procedures administering aid:

1. As a general rule a country's anticipated B/Ps deficit shld set upper limit to total amount aid a country will receive in any period. We will not, however, fix and agree to this total amount aid for long periods in advance.
2. Within this limit, amounts aid to be considered firm commitments will be agreed from time to time between recipient govt and US, tied to more specific conditions. Agreement on firm commitments aid shld not be confused with formal allotment process; allotments will continue be timed (within agreed aid amounts) to fit in with timing of procurement of commodities involved.
3. Main condition for which we will be bargaining will, of course, be adequate rearmament effort on part aid recipient. Specific objectives in support this main purpose include fiscal measures, materials control arrangements, adequate financing and procurement military end-items in other Eur countries, measures to accomplish redistribution income within country in interest of internal stability, programs for increasing productivity, etc.
4. We generally plan make agreement with govt on use 95% counterpart funds prior to making dol aid available. In past we have often permitted counterpart to accumulate and then have negotiated with govts about its distribution and use. In some countries this has made it impossible use counterpart funds for special incentive purposes or even to direct these funds into meeting most important portions of govt budget. In future it intended that US influence inherent in joint control of portion of recipient govt's revenues will be formalized, and appropriate bargain struck, *prior* to final decision make dol aid available. This shld increase degree to which counterpart can be used as effective bargaining counter in connection specific objectives in each country.

It is intended in this way to use US participation in decisions about disposition local currency counterpart to achieve better direction of total resources in countries receiving aid. This will not in all cases mean use of counterpart for extra-budgetary purposes. Even where our efforts merely mean use of counterpart for items already budgeted, it may be important identify our assistance with these purposes.

5. In order clarify use of counterpart funds for direct military aid purposes, when this seems advisable, changes will be sought in pre-

amble to Mutual Security Act and in counterpart provisions of Economic Cooperation Act, and corresponding changes will be made in bilateral agreements.

Except for item 5, these changes in emphasis can be put into effect without legislative change or negotiations to amend bilateral agreements. It therefore intended that above points, with exception of item 5, become standard practice in the case of all countries as soon as possible with, of course, appropriate variations to fit our objectives and methods of operation in each country. This procedure for administering aid and use of counterpart will have to be directly related to total action program, so that all forces available to US in its negotiations (e.g. allocation scarce materials, technical assistance, end-item assistance, public information, persuasion, leadership, etc., as well as direct country aid) can be focused simultaneously on attainment of major objectives in each country.

To assist in Congressional presentation, request views each mission on implications above principles for its method of doing business with govt to which it accredited, with special reference to method of establishing agreed amounts aid and for administration 95% counterpart funds.

Assumptions in this circular, which represent thinking of ECA/W and OSR, are under discussion with other agencies here. Would appreciate prompt reply as a contribution to finalizing policy on this subject.

FOSTER

740.5 MAP/4–451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 29, 1951—7 p. m.

Todep 468. ToISA. To ECC from ISAC.

Part one of three

We have spent considerable time in deliberation over interim financing scheme suggested in London 5242, April 4,[2] and in attempting to devise other schemes which in our opinion, might deal with problem more expeditiously and with least undesirable effects. We regret delay in passing our views to you but as you realize problem is extremely difficult one, having many implications for total effort which Eur countries will be encouraged to make.

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[1] Also addressed to Batt at London; repeated to Paris for MacArthur and Katz and to Heidelberg for Handy. Martin (RA) drafted the telegram with Schelling and Locker (ECA) and cleared it with ECA and the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense.

[2] *Ante*, p. 118.

Main results that can be achieved through US participation in an interim financing scheme are: (*a*) to expedite mil production and procurement thus minimizing time lag before European-produced material is available to defense forces; (*b*) to expand production base for Eur rearmament; (*c*) to overcome protectionist obstacles now hindering placement of contracts with most efficient Eur producers; (*d*) to introduce US technological skills at early stage in order improve quality and efficiency of European-produced matériel. Principal problem is thus to devise scheme which will promote these objectives, and, at same time minimum disincentive effects on Eur willingness take necessary measures to maximize use their own physical and financial resources. It is recognized that no scheme completely eliminates disincentive effect which necessarily arises once US places contracts in Eur for delivery to NATO countries. However, we feel that perhaps scheme described in Part Two this cable has less built-in disincentives than yours. We wld like to deal briefly in Part One this cable with principal considerations which caused us to suggest an alternative scheme.

1. Estab of fund ("say $500 million" as you suggest), to be allocated for procurement on behalf unknown recipients in undetermined amts, wld in our opinion create a serious disincentive. It seems probable that potential recipient countries will avoid placing contracts in Eur until they are sure what items they will receive from this fund and how much of fund will be used on their behalf. To avoid this we feel recipients shld to maximum extent possible be identified at time of placing contracts and that total amts to be procured on behalf of each recipient country shld also be made known to it. We agree completely with what appears to be implied in your scheme that (*a*) recipient country shld be notified that amount they receive from this scheme will be part of total end-item aid extended to them, and (*b*) producing country shld be notified that dol earnings accruing to them as result of scheme will be taken into account in allotments of aid.

2. It is our feeling that attempt to get multilateral agreement to interim scheme wld necessarily involve delays and therefore not meet immed problem of overcoming delays in contract-lettinb, which delays are one of principal reasons for any scheme. Advantage of proposed scheme in accompanying cable is that it is essentially unilateral in nature and will not involve time-consuming negots with NATO countries. (Believe further, thought shld be given to setting up multilateral arrangement leading to some form of central procurement, at least for some major items of matériel. We will cable you further on this longer-run problem.)

3. The revolving fund idea contained in your scheme makes no special contribution to our objective of securing additional Eur production or procurement. Same effect can be achieved by taking into account in future allocations of aid disbursements under scheme. Problem is to find more Eur financing for mil production, a purpose which is unlikely to be furthered by requiring Eur countries to fin these particular contracts (i.e. those initially placed by U.S.) as

opposed to some other contracts. We are therefore somewhat concerned by prospect that your insistence they pick up particular contracts will require substantial negotiation with Eur countries without any significant contribution to promoting additional Eur efforts. Revolving fund scheme also involves some difficult technical obstacles. In particular, once appropriated dols have been spent in order to procure local currency, dols repurchased must go into miscellaneous receipts and cannot revert to appropriations for reuse.

These in summary are principal considerations which have prompted us to suggest alternative scheme in Part Two of this cable. As already indicated we recognize that there are disincentives in any scheme but believe arrangements we propose are less harmful in this respect, and therefore more likely to be effective in accelerating mil production in Eur.

Part two of three

Fol is ISAC proposal on interim U.S. financing of mil production in Eur:

1. ISAC agreed in principle to U.S. procurement on a limited scale of mil end-items produced in Eur for delivery after fiscal year 1951–52.

2. "Limited scale" implies not only a limit on the total amount ($300 million has been discussed as order of magnitude generally in mind) but limitation to critically important items whose production to meet scheduled requirements (generally to a known recipient) is clearly not forthcoming in absence of U.S. contract placement, and, as far as may be feasible, to certain clearly defined classes of items so that expectations of similar U.S. procurement of other classes of items can be forestalled.

3. Agreement is "in principle" only since there is yet no information available to ISAC on items that might be so procured, either by type, by amount, or by country in which production would take place.

4. Contracts would call for settlement in currency of country where production occurred and shld in gen provide for a minimum of prepayment or progress payment by U.S. in order to postpone as long as possible the settlement payments.

5. Dol earnings accruing to central banks of NATO countries from U.S. settlement of such contracts will, like all dol earnings, be taken into account in allotment of gen econ aid to countries.

6. Local currency for settlement of contracts may be obtained by purchase from central bank of country in which a contract is let, but need not be obtained only by that method. The method employed will be determined by ECA and other interested U.S. agencies, after considering the desirable incidence of dol accruals and all sources of local currency funds available to U.S.

7. Delivery of end-items procured in Eur will be taken into account in determining total U.S. end-item programs of individual recipient countries, and will be governed by principles, conditions, and limitations that apply to all portions of end-item program. In gen, recipient country will be advised in advance of origin of Eur procured end-items in order to permit proper technical consultation and supervision; disposition of such end-items will, however, remain subject to

U.S. discretion just as do any undelivered portions of end-item program.

8. Procurement under this proposal by U.S. of certain end-items in Eur can only be financed out of appropriations resulting from existing Mutual Security Program request. Distribution of Eur produced end-items among countries will be determined in same way as that of U.S. produced end-items. Accordingly, although use of Eur sources of supply may well affect quantities of particular end-items procured and may, therefore, indirectly affect total amount of end-item aid to any particular recipient, this practice cannot give any government reason to count on having more of its needs met by U.S. aid than would otherwise be case. This fact shld be made unmistakably clear to each recipient govt so that U.S. action will not appear to reduce the country's responsibility to procure mil end-items with its own resources.

9. It will often be desirable to assign a contract orginally let by U.S. procurement authorities to procurement authorities of recipient country, because of advantage of technical supervision by that country, continuity with subsequent contracts that wld be let by that country, or budgetary consideration of recipient country, or to facilitate use of recipient country's EPU account for obtaining currency with which to settle contract; but there will be no gen presumption that contracts shld be so assigned and no major negotiating effort will be devoted to such assignment. In event of such assignment negot will, of course, have to make clear relation between any such acceptance of liability for payment and gen econ and end-items aid programs for country concerned.

10. The extent to which contracts may be placed within recipient countries or in countries different from recipient can be determined only after study of what items meet conditions expressed in para 2.

11. Before this program is put into operation, there will be prepared an approximate statement of kinds of items to be procured, the countries in which production will take place, amounts to be procured, and the likely recipients. This statement will be reviewed by ISAC before plans for such procurement are put into operation.

12. The selection of items for such contract placement, and all discussions or negot in connection with such U.S. procurement, must be oriented toward extreme importance of making NATO govts realize that such procurement represents limited interim contract placement; any Eur expectation that U.S. will continue such a practice or extend it outside or beyond limited scope decided unilaterally in advance, must be minimized.

13. In interest of speed, and to minimize danger foreseen in para 12, we shld not attempt to arrange or negotiate multilateral responsibility of any sort in connection with this interim program of U.S. procurement in Eur. However, this program shld be carried out in maximum feasible cooperation with DPB, and full advantage shld be taken of DPB recommendations.

14. These principles have been agreed without prejudice to any more permanent multilateral system involving central procurement of, or financial responsibility for, certain major mil end-items produced in Eur. Consideration of such system will be undertaken promptly.

15. No additional requests for funds are being made for specific purpose of financing this scheme. A determination of source of funds

shld be postponed until such time as reply is obtained to Part III of this cable, providing a more detailed idea of content of contemplated program.

Part three of three

In order to assist in determining appropriate amounts to be set aside for procurement it is essential that we have some idea of amounts and kinds of items for which contracts shld be let in Eur. It wld be appreciated, therefore, if you cld prepare a statement which presents so far as possible a catalogue containing (*a*) specific items that cld be so procured, (*b*) countries in which production is likely to take place, (*c*) the likely recipients, (*d*) amounts to be procured with probable costs expressed in dol equivalents, and (*e*) prospective delivery schedules.

We feel you are in better position to prepare this type of statement but wld like opportunity to review it before plans for interim scheme are put into operation. This is particularly important since essential nature of projects must be demonstrated if funds from existing appropriation requests are to be made available. In this latter connection it is our feeling that projects shld be selected which will result not only in economical and expeditious production of critically needed items, but which will expand the production base to meet continuing needs of Eur rearmament.

ACHESON

740.5/6–151 : Telegram

The Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, June 1, 1951—7 p. m.

7433. From Jessup. If it becomes necessary to make some further statement next week concerning NAT either here or in Wash (ourtel 7411 [2]) I think it might be desirable to develop fact that NATO relationship is broader than its purely military aspects. Hitherto we have, in response to Sov allegations, tended to confine our remarks to pointing out defensive character of NATO, its relation to UN charter, etc. Wld there be disadvantages in pointing out in addition long-range political importance of NAT as a long-range continuing organization of like-minded states bound together by a common civilization, common ideals, etc. Such presentation wld lead up to fact which we have mentioned in meetings here that NATO will continue regardless of discussions or even agreements with Sov.

Advantage I see in such a presentation is getting away from Sov thesis that NATO is purely an offensive military alliance. Believe

[1] Repeated to London for Spofford and Achilles; passed by the Department of State to Moscow.

[2] Not printed.

emphasis on broader aspects of NATO is of general utility aside from question of debate with Sovs. There wld be some difficulties in framing such a statement since Gromyko has been putting increasing emphasis on fact their item includes Amer bases as well as NAT itself. Statement I have in mind, however, wld not ignore defensive measures which we are necessarily taking in implementation of NAT.

I am sending these personal views in hope of receiving comments from Spofford and Achilles as well as from Dept. I have discussed them with MacArthur who agreed with my general thought but who has not seen this telegram.

[JESSUP]

740.5/6–251 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, June 2, 1951—1 p. m.

Depto 1046. Met again with Icelandic legal rep Andersen this morning.[2] He advises that in view of our assurances regarding intended meaning Article IX, section 8 of multilateral, Article 7(*c*) of bilateral and Article XI, section 4 of multilateral he is recommending to his govt that it sign multilateral and expects it will agree. Under circumstances we have given him our interpretations as follows:

a. "It is view of US that first sentence of para 4 of Article 11 of draft agreement on status of NATO mil forces is to be interpreted to mean that reasonable quantities of provisions, supplies, and other goods may be imported free of duty whether they are for exclusive use of a force or its civilian component or of dependents, provided, however, that these duty-free imports shall not be available to civilian components and dependents if laws of receiving state bar their use by them. We believe provisions are complementary to those requiring observance of local laws. Present practice where our troops are in

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[1] Repeated for information to Paris and Reykjavik.

[2] Under consideration in this telegram was the possible Icelandic reservation to the draft agreement between the parties of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their armed forces; see the editorial note, p. 186. In telegram Depto 1033, May 31, Spofford reported that he had met with Icelandic Council Deputy Petursson and Icelandic Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser Hans G. Andersen on May 31 regarding Iceland's reasons for not wanting to sign the NATO status-of-forces agreement. The Icelandic representatives explained that the publicity attending the NATO status-of-forces agreement would cause political problems in Iceland. The Icelandic Parliament's approval of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 was obtained because it was then argued that Icelandic bases would be provided to NATO only during hostilities. The United States–Iceland defense agreement of May 8, 1951, which provided NATO bases in Iceland to the United States prior to hostilities, had neither been published nor formally presented to Parliament. The Icelandic representatives also raised legal questions regarding the relationship between the United States–Iceland agreement of May 8, 1951, on status of personnel and the proposed NATO status-of-forces agreement. (740.5/5–3151) Regarding the United States–Iceland agreements of 1951 under reference here, see volume IV.

foreign countries is that no such restriction is applied to civilians. It is our understanding that this practice will be continued and that language, 'Where such use is permitted', concerns right of receiving state which wld only be applied in cases where privileges are being abused."

b. "There is textual difference between Article VII (*c*) of the Iceland–US agreement and Article IX, para 8, of multilateral agreement. US considers that latter provides that excise taxes, purchase taxes, sales taxes, etc., shall be applicable to local purchases by individuals. This is also implicit in Article VI (*a*) of bilateral agreement. Multilateral languages so far as bulk purchases for forces are concerned shld be read in connection with Article IX, para 2 (Article VI (*b*) of bilateral agreement), which provides for such purchases to be made thru channels of govt of receiving state. Under multilateral agreement such purchases will be made thru authorities which purchase for local armed services. We assume that such govt purchases are not taxed and that practice under multilateral agreement will be that described in Article VII, para 3 of bilateral."

Hope you agree with these interpretations.

Andersen says that if Iceland signs multilateral it will expect exchange of notes to be made with US to effect that bilateral is still controlling between US and Iceland.

Icelandic rep also stated that if there was no objection there will probably be a delay in ratification by Iceland until any storm over signing has died down. Ratification by other signatory nations will probably take some time and therefore there shld be no objection to similar delay in Iceland.[3]

SPOFFORD

[3] Telegram Todep 484, June 5, to London, expressed Department of State concurrence in the interpretations set forth in this telegram and approved the formula for Icelandic signature of the NATO status-of-armed-forces agreement set forth in the penultimate paragraph of this telegram (740.5/6–551). A few days later, Iceland agreed to sign the multilateral agreement in accordance with formula set forth here. Telegram 269, June 16, to Reykjavik, instructed that an appropriate note be addressed to the Icelandic Government before June 19 (740.5/6–1551).

740.5/6–251 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, June 2, 1951—8 p. m.

Depto 1055. From Spofford and Achilles. Re Paris 7433.[2] We fully concur Jessup's belief stress should be placed on fact NATO relationship is long range one basically broader in scope than mere defense alliance and that these aspects of NAT shld receive more emphasis.

[1] Repeated to Paris for Jessup, to Moscow, and to Frankfurt.

[2] June 1, p. 172.

Mere fact it shld seem necessary to assert "NAT will continue regardless of discussions or even agrmt with Soviet," comes as something of shock and proves the point.

During Senate hearings and debate on NAT, Vandenburg repeatedly stressed these aspects [3] and fact treaty's importance transcended any temporary fluctuations in relations with Sov or any other country. Foreign Relations Comite report reflected this in its summary of reasons for recommending ratification of which sixth reads "(6) Treaty is in accordance with basic interests of US which shld be steadfastly served regardless of fluctuations in internatl situation or our relations with any country".[4] In present context we may refer to basic interests of all parties rather than to those of US alone. Foreign relations Comite's fifteenth reason also applicable: "(15) Treaty is not confined to prevention of war but reflects will of participating nations to strengthen moral and material foundations of lasting peace and freedom." Secy's statement at signature NAT [5] and his report to Congress after May 1950 session of NAC [6] also contain useful themes.

These broader aspects seem to us also to be important politically from point of view of public support both in US and in Europe. Their longer range appeal shld help to inspire confidence and hope and to develop willingness to make sacrifices necessary for defense effort. Several deps as well as US mission chiefs here for recent regional mtg [7] stressed importance of this in practical terms of securing both political support and Parliamentary votes for specific def measures.

Stress on these aspects from viewpoints both of talks with Soviets and of public opinion seems particularly desirable at time we are advocating admission of Greece and Turk. We must expect Soviets to distort our advocacy of their admission in support their themes treaty is offensive and designed to secure bases near USSR and that our protestations of treaty's "Atlantic" and defense character are eyewash. While hesitancy of Eurs to have Greece and Turk admitted has various causes, it is unfortunately true that these are sensitive points in minds of some of our allies even in advance of any intensive Commie propaganda drive. Eur willingness to admit Greece and Turk wld certainly be facilitated by clear evidence of continuing and growing US interest in strengthening North Atlantic community.

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[3] For documentation on this debate of July 1949, see *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 8812–9916.

[4] See U.S. Congress Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 1st sess., *North Atlantic Treaty Report, June 6, 1949* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949).

[5] "Report of the Secretary of State to the President on North Atlantic Treaty," made April 7 and released to the press April 12, 1949, printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 24, 1949, p. 532.

[6] Delivered on May 31 and released to the press on the same date, printed *ibid.*, June 12, 1950, p. 931.

[7] Meeting under reference not identified.

Importance which Eurs and we here attach to giving clear indication of intention to work in this direction is given in Depto 1045 May 30 (2567 to Paris) and Depto 887 May 5 (2222 to Paris).[8]

[ACHILLES]
SPOFFORD

[8] Neither printed.

740.5/6-651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, June 6, 1951—6 p. m.

Depto 1075. 1. This preliminary report on consideration of armed forces status agreement in CD today.[2] Date for signing was fixed at 3 p. m. June 19.[3] All deps appeared to have auth to sign except US must await instr due to Newfoundland base problem.

2. The fol points were made:

(*a*) Canada dep said that negotiations were in progress with the US regarding status of troops in Newfoundland. Canada would make reservation unless his agreement was concluded prior to the time of signature.[4] USDep indicated that he hoped that agreement wld be concluded before time of signature. Pls keep us advised of your thinking so that if we can not sign on June 19, we can so advise other deps as soon as possible. Sincerely hope nothing will prevent final execution of agreement on June 19.

(*b*) US made fol statement: US service Attachés and certain senior MAAGs wld not be considered covered by the armed forces status agreement. Other deps made no comment.

(*c*) US made statement on APO's contained in Todep 478.[5] Brit and Fr both indicated that operation of APO's was a privilege and not a right, but both indicated that there had been no difficulty about our operating APO's as in the past.

[1] Repeated for information to Reykjavik and Paris.

[2] Under reference here is the draft agreement between the parties of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their armed forces; see the editorial note, p. 186.

[3] Regarding the signing of the NATO status-of-armed-forces agreement on June 19, see telegram Depto 1152, June 20, from London, p. 187.

[4] In a memorandum of June 5, delivered to the Department of State that same day, the Canadian Government raised the question of the applicability of the proposed NATO status-of-forces agreement to the military bases in Newfoundland leased to the United States under the terms of the United States-Canadian agreement of March 27, 1941, as modified (E.A.S. 235; 55 Stat. 1599). The Canadian Government indicated that it would sign the status-of-forces agreement with reservation unless the appropriate application of its terms to United States forces in Newfoundland were worked out (740.5/6–751). Telegram Todep 484, June 5, to London, informed Spofford of the Canadian request, explained that an interdepartmental decision on the matter was urgently being sought, and instructed that the United States request postponement of the signature of the status-of-forces agreement rather than have a Canadian reservation (740.5/6–551). Regarding the resolution of this problem, see telegram Todep 528, June 18, to London, p. 186.

[5] Not printed.

(*d*) US made point regarding exclusive jurisdiction over its forces during hostilities. UK alone made comment on this indicating that although such rights were granted during the last war with respect to US troops in UK, there cld be no guarantee that Parliament wld do likewise again. He did not indicate that Parliament wld not give the same treatment again, but only that they might not.

(*e*) US made point re security screening of members of fon forces who handle highly classified US material as set forth in Todep 469.[6] There was no comment.

(*f*) Neth again made its statement regarding possibility of national legislation being passed which wld subject other govts to the jurisdiction of its courts. There seemed to be no occasion to comment further on this statement.

(*g*) Informally we advised Fr that US Emb in Paris wld negotiate a bilateral with the Fr extending the multilateral agreement without change to Algeria. Presume that further action on this subj will be taken in Paris.

(*h*) Informally UK chairman of WG stated that his govt expected the existing agreements to continue to cover the Bahamas and Bermuda but that this matter had not been referred to the colonies themselves, and that there was a bare possibility (which he thought was highly unlikely) that they wld prefer the multilateral. The UK is satisfied with the present arrangements.

3. WG report approved. Copy has been pouched.[7]

4. No statement made re protocol between SHAPE and Fr auths which we know is in process of negotiation.[8]

5. Understand that SHAPE expects to issue statement on multilateral the day after it is signed. Wld expect some communiqué on the subject will be issued by deps also.[9]

SPOFFORD

[6] Not printed.

[7] No copy of the working group report under reference here has been found in the files of the Department of State.

[8] The negotiations under reference here continued during the remainder of 1951 and eventuated in the North Atlantic Treaty protocol on the status of international military headquarters, signed at Paris, August 28, 1952.

[9] Regarding the statements issued to the press at the time of the signing of the NATO status-of-forces agreement on June 19, see the editorial note, p. 186.

740.5/6-1151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 11, 1951—7 p. m.

Todep 505. Fol teleg Def 93470, 7 Jun, sent CINCNELM for Bradley by Adm Wright. As Bradley did not see Spofford, we are repeating teleg at Def suggestion to make sure you see it.

[1] Drafted and cleared with Beebe (Defense) by Knight (RA).

"1. I have recd ltr from Gen Baele Chm of Mil Comite proposing that mtgs of Mil Comite be scheduled for immediate future and held independent of mtgs of Council. This same proposal reflected in letter addressed to Amb Spofford from Col De Greef on May 26.

"2. Recommend that you propose to Spofford that he resist this move in Council Deps for fol reasons:

"(A) The Mil Chiefs wld also probably have to attend Council mtg which wld require an addl assembly of Mil Chiefs.

"(B) It is not likely that any papers of sufficient importance to justify an addl mtg of Mil Comite will be ready in near future.

"(C) It wld be undesirable for Mil Comite to set up series of mtgs for purpose of processing papers on projects now pending before SG. I am asking Def to send substance of this msg to Spofford as his guidance in this matter.

"3. This msg concurred in by JCS."

ACHESON

740.5/6–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 12, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 513. For Spofford. 1. ReDepto 990,[2] Dept regrets draft "Principles Governing the Relationship Between the UN and Collective Self-Defense and Regional Orgs" (Todep 437 [3]) did not embody discussion of reasons prompting analysis these relationships at this time. Principles are in no sense rigid. Several changes therein have now been embodied in revised draft, and others may be appropriate.

2. Revised memo containing principles was considered at mtg of Dep Under Secy with S/ISA and Assistant Secretaries June 5, at which it was decided to transmit memo to Dept Def to obtain views JCS on military implications. The covering letter to Dept Def notes that enumeration of principles is still in formative stage in State Dept and expresses intention to discuss matter with other CMC members after clearances within State and Def Depts. It was further decided that each geographic Bureau within Dept shld prepare papers considering how relationships between regional and collective self-defense arrangements coming within their areas of responsibilities can best be developed along with UN security measures.

3. Principles represent concept which we believe is worth further study and development. They are still in exploratory stage. Question

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[1] Repeated to Paris for MacArthur. Drafted by Bancroft (UNA) and Angelo (UNP); cleared with the Deputy Under Secretary of State, in substance with Martin (EUR), and in draft with Bray (S/ISA).

[2] May 24, p. 163.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 163.

of relationships between UN and other security arrangements may arise in UN because of terms ref CMC, although timing and extent of any internatl discussion this problem, on which your views will also be sought, remains to be decided. However, important that US position be formulated. In addition to memo fol may be helpful to you as background info.

a. The basic relationship between UN and NATO has remained unchanged since NAT became effective. See FM D F–6*a*, Apr 28, 1950.[4] Moreover, since Treaty GA has on US initiation adopted Uniting for Peace Res[5] which makes elaboration of relationship important.

Our policy of support for the development of UN collective security system is long-range one which will make it increasingly possible obtain more than theoretical benefits to our own security and that of our closest allies. For this reason we attached great importance Uniting for Peace Res in GA last fall and to res adopted at recent mtg Mins of Am States.[6] With adoption of Uniting for Peace Res there is now real possibility of carrying forward basic Charter purposes. Such progress will be possible, of course, only if various members take steps to maintain units within their armed forces and to make available other resources and facilities for UN use. If Members take such action, UN strength and universal security will be materially increased. This is so because contributions from non-members of such groupings wld be forthcoming more promptly and with broader participation than if we relied solely on our own strength and that of our formal partners in regional and self-defense arrangements.

Foregoing gen considerations raise question of potential relationship between NATO and UN in foreseeable circumstances. It is our assumption that in event of aggression against NAT area we wld seek immed UN support for action taken by NAT. This wld probably mean UN endorsement of action taken pursuant to Treaty, recommendation to all States to make contributions to UN to repel aggression, and appointment of SG or individual members as executive military agency on behalf of UN authorized to negotiate with UN Members for contribution of forces and other assistance. In this way NATO members wld received political, legal and moral approval of world community through UN and cooperation and material support of states outside NAT.

US response to Uniting for Peace Res already reflects a relationship between UN and NAT.

b. Classified elements of foregoing analysis of course will not be discussed in CMC, GA or other UN organs.

c. Principles do not call for estab formal machinery linking UN and NATO prior to any incident calling for armed action in defense of NAT Area. Greatest portion of principles applies to situations arising after aggression under circumstances in which NAT members will want UN help.

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[4] Not printed.

[5] For documentation regarding this UN resolution and other similar items, see vol. II, pp. 455 ff.

[6] For documentation on the action taken at the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American Republics, which opened at Washington March 26, see vol. II, pp. 925 ff.

Finally, as introductory memo shows, draft principles do not contemplate that UN wld enter strategic planning, nor wld they deprive collective self-defense arrangements of capacity for independent action when necessary.

4. FYI Amb Dulles examined revised draft in Dept prior leaving for London. Dulles giving further consideration to insertion in Pacific Treaties of appropriate ref to UN relationships. You may find opportunity discuss with Dulles.

5. Text revised draft memo and principles contained in fol tel.

ACHESON

740.5/5–2451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 12, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 514. For Spofford. Re Depto 990,[2] Todep 437.[3]

1. Text revised draft memorandum and principles concerning relationship between UN and collective self-defense and regional arrangements, which have been submitted to Dept Def for JCS views on military implications, fols:

"*Relationship Between the UN and Collective Self-Defense and Regional Arrangements.* In directing the CMC to study methods which might be used to strengthen internatl peace and security, the GA expressly provided that the Comite shld take account of regional and collective self-defense arrangements.

"The Charter recognized that States might arrange themselves in regional or other less than universal groupings in order to strengthen their own security. Various provisions were inserted in the Charter to insure that any such arrangements shld fit into the collective security system envisaged by the Charter under which the SC has primary responsibility for the maintenance of internatl peace. These provisions are found in Articles 24, 48(2), 51, 52(1), 53(1) and 54.

"Because of world tensions created by the USSR the free nations of the world established collective defense and regional arrangements to an extent which was not envisaged at the time of San Francisco. These arrangements were not expected to be a substitute for the system of the Charter under the direction of the SC. They were expressly tied into the Charter to supplement and strengthen the UN in the security field. Thus they are to be differentiated from mere military alliances.

"In adopting the Uniting for Peace Res the GA sought to ensure that pending the time when there were available to the SC armed forces contributed by Member States pursuant to special agreements under Article 43, the UN wld have at its disposal means for maintaining internatl peace and security. The Res made explicit the procedures

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[1] Drafted and cleared with EUR by Bancroft (UNA).

[2] May 24, p. 163.

[3] Not printed; but see footnote 1, *ibid.*

by which the GA cld make recommendations to Member States for collective measures in cases where the SC failed to exercise its responsibility because of the veto.

"Neither the Charter, however, nor the Uniting for Peace Res expressly provided for relationships between regional and collective self-defense arrangements and the preparation for or the taking of collective measures by Member States pursuant to GA recommendations. An analysis of these relationships is therefore an essential part of the work of the CMC in its task of contributing to the development of an effective collective security system.

"In establishing these relationships both in terms of concept and in terms of operational reality much work needs to be done both by the UN itself and by the existing arrangements for collective self-defense and regional agencies.

"Both arrangements to which the US is a party are by their express provisions closely tied into the Charter of the UN. It is obvious that the policies of the US to strengthen the NAT, to strengthen hemispheric security under the regional arrangement with the LA States, and to develop the UN into an effective collective security system are not inconsistent policies but are mutually dependent. It is therefore to our interest to develop sound relationships between the UN and the arrangements to which we are parties as well as other groupings of states. By so doing we will increase the possibilities of obtaining the political and material cooperation in support of UN action of those states outside the North Atlantic and Rio Treaties.

"The principles which fol if used as a basis for these relationships will represent a further development of the Uniting for Peace Res in furtherance of the policy of the UN to build up an effective collective security system. Furthermore, after consideration of the question by the UN itself and by the appropriate organs of the collective defense and regional arrangements, sound working relationships can be developed which can go far to build an overall system to maintain or restore peace. These working relationships wld not, of course, touch upon the field of strategic planning, nor wld they deprive such arrangements of their capacity for independent action where necessary.

Principles.

"1. There is adequate constitutional authority under the Charter for the utilization of collective defense and regional arrangements in the collective security system of the UN.

"2. By Articles 24 and 51 and under Chapter VIII the Charter expressly recognized the need for coordinating the activities of such arrangements with those taken on a universal basis by the UN for the maintenance of internatl peace and security.

"3. If the SC fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of internatl peace and security and, pursuant to its Charter authority and the Uniting for Peace Res, the GA makes recommendations for collective measures, the need for coordination of the activities of collective defense and regional arrangements and UN action still remains. Accordingly, in such cases the GA shld by its recommendations seek to secure such coordination.

"4. Both the SC and the GA, therefore, in their preparations to strengthen collective security in order to prevent threats to or breaches of the peace and to deter acts of aggression shld take into account

collective defense and regional arrangements and work out techniques concerting the collective measures recommended by the SC or the GA with the measures which might be taken by such collective defense and regional arrangements.

"Similarly the collective defense and regional arrangements themselves shld, in their planning, give consideration to the coordination of their activities with UN preparations to strengthen collective security and with the collective measures which might be recommended by the SC or the GA.

"5. Furthermore, in making such recommendations for collective measures, pursuant to para 1 of the Uniting for Peace Res, the GA can recommend to States that such collective measures be carried out by them directly and through their action in the arrangements or agencies of which they are members.

"6. The machinery of regional or collective defense arrangements cld appropriately be used by states parties to such arrangements to carry out recommendations by the SC or the GA for collective measures to maintain or restore internatl peace and security.

"7. In the event of an armed attack where self-defense measures are being taken, the SC, or the GA, under the circumstances provided for in para 1 of the Uniting for Peace Res, can appropriately make recommendations to States to supplement such measures and to coordinate with them such other or further collective measures as may be decided upon.

"8. Such recommendations cld appropriately include endorsement of such measures of self-defense and they may, if desirable, confer authority on the state or states taking measures to continue the action on behalf of the UN."

ACHESON

740.5/6–1351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET

PARIS, June 13, 1951–8 p. m.

7748. From MacArthur. Re immed preceding tel[2] fol is résumé Eisenhower–Van Zeeland discussion yesterday.

1. Force commitments under MTDP. Van Zeeland brought up methods of force commitments under MTDP. He said force commitments thus far made were nothing more than unilateral declarations of what individual countries willing to contribute without regard to comparability of forces effort of different NAT countries. He personally believed total force requirements should be divided on equitable multilateral basis and that NATO should develop suitable criteria for over-all effort and for allocating force requirements, rather than existing system of individual offers.

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[1] Repeated to Brussels for the Ambassador and to London for Spofford.
[2] Not printed.

Gen Eisenhower agreed in theory with foregoing but pointed out that sharing of burden on basis specific criteria alone was extremely complicated because of many inter-related factors: mil, econ, polit, and psychological. He expressed strong belief that if Eur def is to be organized, each country must make its very best effort. He also emphasized MTDP is useful document in terms target for force requirements; that it is undergoing study; that existing requirements are absolute minimum.

Van Zeeland agreed with "very best effort" concept altho he pointed out strong tendency of nations to consider contribution other members to judge justness of individual loads.

2. Present org of NATO. Van Zeeland asked whether Gen Eisenhower satisfied with present structure NATO and whether it was organized in most effective possible manner. Van Zeeland doubted that it was. Gen Eisenhower agreed with Van Zeeland pointing out that altho deps doing excellent work they appear handicapped by lack of sufficient delegated exec auth. This seemed to be generally true of NATO. For example, when SACEUR has requirements they must pass through series of comites which has become time consuming process and which hampers efforts to build Eur strength as rapidly as desirable. If NAT Govts cld be represented by top level people with considerable greater auth in NATO bodies, more rapid progress might be made.

Van Zeeland believed NAT Council shld meet more often preferably every three months and when Council not in session greater exec auth shld be delegated to deps to carry out policy within Council directives. Gen Eisenhower concurred generally with Van Zeeland's views; Van Zeeland said on basis of his conversation and his own views he intended propose fol for next Council agenda:

(*a*) Council meet regularly every three months,
(*b*) Council review work individual NATO bodies and issue broad policy guidance;
(*c*) In interim period between Council mtgs deps have greater auth to act within agreed policy guidance incl auth to commit certain limited funds for necessary proj such as infra-structure requirements.

3. Belg def effort. Van Zeeland said Belg Govt surprised at US criticism of over-all Belg effort. He felt criticism unjust since Belg doing everything it had agreed to do and appeared to be well ahead other NAT countries this respect. Van Zeeland inquired whether Gen Eisenhower believed Belg effort adequate and if not where it was deficient. General replied that what Van Zeeland seemed to be saying was that Belg was doing everything it said it wld do. Gen Eisenhower asked whether NAT countries shld be asked to do only what they said they wld do or to do their very best. He personally believed strongly

each country shld do its very best and that in final analysis only country itself cld determine whether it was really making all-out effort.

4. Infra-structure. Van Zeeland inquired whether Gen Eisenhower believed infra-structure problem on road to settlement. Gen Eisenhower replied that while problem very complicated, it did not appear to be going well and matter was one of utmost urgency. Gen Gruenther felt NATO was doing badly on infra-structure problems. While recognizing individual govts wished to know to talk cost infra-structure, this would take considerable time. Meanwhile certain infra-structure projs such as airfields were of vital importance if Eur were to be defended. For this interim financing shld be rapidly arranged. He personally surprised Eurs holding back when their very security depended on rapid solution. Van Zeeland said he wished to help in every possible way to get countries to move forward and suggested he have mil info on comparative efforts by different countries on which to base his action.

5. Maximum utilization Eur armament production capacity. Van Zeeland expressed conviction Eur in its own interest shld produce own armaments to maximum extent possible. Unless existing Eur capacity utilized, defense will not be organized as rapidly as necessary. He had made great effort to get Belg industry to expand armament production but Belg industry unwilling unless: (*a*) it recd firm orders, (*b*) it was assured of payment. If these two conditions cld be met problem wld be partially solved. He thought one practical way to make progress this field was to estab list of mil items approved for NAT forces and second by detailed list (with countries' breakdown) of items which different forces [need?] and what different countries can produce. If this were done a bookkeeping arrangement to encourage Eur exchange of armaments might be worked out. For example, Belg has surplus capacity for small arms. It cld ship certain number small arms to Denmark debiting Danish acct to value of shipment. Danes cld ship canned butter to Belg for use Belg Armed Forces. Value Danish shipment wld be credited against Belg shipment. Both shipments wld be duty free since for mil use. At termination certain period books wld be closed and final balances drawn. Creditor country wld extend long term credit of say 10 years which wld be guaranteed by 12 NAT countries. Van Zeeland said he discussed this possibility with Herod who also believed something along foregoing lines possible. Van Zeeland said he heard informally from Murphy US thinking of interim solution envisaging placing by US of limited number of orders with Eur industry. This might be helpful as interim solution but from psychological as well as practical view it wld not be as good as plan which wld require Eur themselves to make maximum use their total productive facilities.

6. Status of Brussels' pact. Gen Gruenther inquired Van Zeeland's views re future of Brussels' pact org incl mil machinery. Van Zeeland replied all Brussels' pact countries felt all machinery of pact incl mil shld be continued because:

(*a*) It provided for social, econ, and cultural coop not envisaged in NAT.
(*b*) Automatic clause bringing all into war if one attacked is very important.
(*c*) It provides possible framework for future Eur org. Van Zeeland said mil machinery Brussels' pact while continuing on paper is virtually replaced by NAT mil machinery and that Brussels machinery shld in no way be permitted interfere with NAT mil machinery which has responsibility for def of Western Europe.

7. Eur army. Van Zeeland said Belg supported Fr proposal for Eur army not on merits but largely as means of finding solution to Franco-Ger differences re Ger rearmament.[3] He was disturbed by newspaper article datelined Bonn in Paris *Herald Tribune* June 11 which talked about 12 Ger divs and other details. He had only vague and conflicting reports re negots in Bonn[4] and asked if details in *Tribune* art were correct. Gen Eisenhower said he had not read art. Gen Gruenther believed art probably based on various rumors and reports re discussion. He pointed out one of main problems in connection with Bonn talks is size Ger units and level of integration (i.e., division or corps). Solution these problems not yet reached. Therefore it premature to become disturbed re newspaper reports. Gen Eisenhower said he had taken no position re Eur Army. He wished maximum number effective units. If Eur Army cld produce such units he wld accept them. On other hand he felt Eur Army as conceived by Fr seemed to require certain unified polit, econ, and fin institutions, which might take considerable time to develop. Ger contribution is most important and shld be arranged at earliest possible moment. In meantime he felt Eur countries shld build up their own strength since this wld attract Gers.

8. Next mtg NAT Council. Van Zeeland reiterated belief Council shld meet regularly four times yearly. He recently contacted all NAT Govts re mtg in July. Consensus opinion was Council shld meet soon as feasible. While Van Zeeland believed it should meet in July he did not believe it shld meet before or during CFM.[5] Agenda shld be carefully prepared by deps and shld include Greek-Turk question. He said he was communicating to Spofford results his soundings other NAT Govts re next mtg. He believed both Fon and Def Mins shld be

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[3] For documentation on international discussion of the French plan for a European army, see pp. 755 ff.
[4] For documentation on the military talks at Bonn, see pp. 990 ff.
[5] The conference referred to here is the Four-Power Exploratory Talks at Paris. For documentation, see pp. 1086 ff.

present and that mtg might be held late July–Aug or Sept depending on CFM and possibility real progress. Place of mtg wld depend on date. [MacArthur.]

BRUCE

740.5/6–1851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT WASHINGTON, June 18, 1951—5 p. m.
PRIORITY

Todep 528. Re Depto sent as 1133, Jun 18.[2] You may sign NATO Forces Agreement without reservation. Dept informed through Canad Emb Washington that Wilgress is being instructed to sign tomorrow also without reservation (Depto 1133). No statement will be made by either country.

FYI only, we informed Canads Sat that we wish, in effect, to exclude US forces on Newfoundland bases from application of NATO Status Agreement under Art I(*a*) pending further discussions.[3] Note has been received from Canad Emb this morning stating that Canad willing sign 19th without reservation and to discuss US request. Note adds that if bilateral agreement not reached by time Canad files ratification, Canad will feel bound to make reservation at that time.[4] Bilateral discussions will take place in Washington or Ottawa in near future.[5]

ACHESON

[1] This telegram, which was repeated to Paris for MacArthur, was drafted by Fessenden of EUR/RA and Haselton of BNA and was cleared by Assistant Secretary of State Perkins, Barringer of Defense, and Yingling of L/EUR.

[2] Not printed. It asked for instructions for the scheduled signing the next day of the NATO status-of-forces agreement in view of the possible Canadian reservation. Regarding the status-of-forces agreement, see the editorial note, *infra*. Regarding the Canadian question on the application of the agreement to the bases in Newfoundland, see footnote 4, p. 176.

[3] Summarized here is a Department of State memorandum handed to the Canadian Ambassador on June 16 (740.5/6–751).

[4] Summarized here is a Canadian Embassy memorandum of June 18 (740.5/6–1851).

[5] United States-Canadian negotiations were carried on throughout the remainder of 1951 and eventuated in an agreement relating to the application of the NATO status-of-forces agreement to U.S. forces in Canada, including those at the leased bases in Labrador and Newfoundland, effected by an exchange of notes of April 28 and 30, 1952. For the texts of the exchange, see TIAS No. 3074, printed in 5 UST (pt. 3) 2139.

Editorial Note

During January and February 1951 a working group of the North Atlantic Council Deputies prepared a draft agreement between the parties of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their

armed forces. Acting Assistant Legal Adviser Conrad E. Snow represented the United States in the working group. The draft agreement was considered by the United States and other NATO governments during March and April after which the draft agreement was revised and perfected in further meetings of the working group as well as in meetings of the Council Deputies. The agreed draft was completed by the working group on May 31, was approved by the Council Deputies on June 6, and was signed at the Council Deputies meeting of June 19. For the text of the agreement as signed in London on June 19, 1951, by the representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States; as ratified by the United States on July 24, 1953; and as entered into force on August 23, 1953, see TIAS No. 2846, printed in 4 UST (part 2) 1792, or Ismay, *NATO*, page 204. At the time of the signing of the agreement, the Portuguese representative entered a reservation to the effect that the agreement was only applicable to the territory of continental Portugal. On the occasion of the signing of the NATO status-of-forces agreement, Ambassador Spofford issued a public statement in London briefly reviewing the content and significance of the agreement. Spofford's statement with a brief accompanying explanation was issued to the press by the Department of State on June 19; for the text, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 2, 1951, page 16. A statement on the agreement was also issued to the press by SHAPE headquarters in Paris on June 19; for text, see telegram 7774, June 14, from Paris (740.5/6–1451). Regarding the approval and signing of the draft agreement on the status of armed forces, see telegrams Depto 1075, June 6, and Depto 1152, June 20, both from London, pages 176 and 187. See also telegram Depto 1046, June 2, from London, page 173, regarding the concern of Iceland over aspects of the agreement. The voluminous documentation on the drafting and signing of the agreement on the status of NATO armed forces, particularly the extensive exchange of messages between Washington and London, is included in file 740.5.

740.5/6–2051 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, June 20, 1951—10 p. m.

Depto 1152. Deputies 48th mtg June 19.

1. At signature agreement on status NAT forces UK FonMin Morrison said NATO is heart of UK foreign policy. Noted achieve-

[1] This telegram was repeated to all NATO capitals and to Frankfurt, Heidelberg, and Wiesbaden.

ments in organizational phase NATO and was confident same cooperative spirit wld prevail in solving major problems of production and sharing burden of financing of defense effort now faced. Expressed hope that NATO, now primarily concerned with defense, wld lead to even closer association within Atlantic community.[2]

2. Resolution on interim application military status agreement adopted.[3] Noted French statement that SHAPE status agreement nearly complete and that similar agreements anticipated for subordinate headquarters.[4]

[Here follows the remainder of the report on the Council Deputies meeting of June 19 which was concerned with a variety of other topics.]

SPOFFORD

[2] Regarding the signing of the agreement between the parties of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of armed forces, see the editorial note, p. 186.

[3] The resolution, designated D–D (51) 140, was originally approved by the Council Deputies working group on May 31, and the text was transmitted in telegram Depto 1028, May 31, from London. It stated that some of the provisions of the status-of-forces agreement could be implemented by administrative action without the necessity for legislation and that such implementation would be useful in the period before the agreement was ratified. (740.5/5–3151)

[4] Regarding the agreements under reference here, see footnote 8, p. 177.

740.5/6–2051

The Counselor of Embassy in France (MacArthur)[1] to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET PARIS, June 20, 1951.

DEAR JAMIE: It seems increasingly clear to me that there are growing pressures both from elements in the US as well as in other NAT countries to revise the NATO structure so that there will be greater executive authority. A case in point from the foreign side is Van Zeeland's conversation with General Eisenhower, which I reported telegraphically.[2] From the US side, I know that Mr. Paul Hoffman and other prominent Americans who have been in Paris and have seen the General have mentioned to him their belief that until there is some form of NATO reorganization, we will not get the best, or in fact even reasonable results from our efforts. General Eisenhower has given some thought to this question, and I know he generally concurs with the idea that something must be done to vest the organization with greater executive authority. Mr. Harriman arrived yesterday, and I believe will be talking about this problem with the General during his visit here.

[1] Attached to the Embassy, on detail to SHAPE.

[2] Telegram 7748, June 13, from Paris, p. 182.

I assume that you are familiar with the thinking described above and the fact that prominent US people, such as Hoffman for example, will probably raise the question in high quarters at home and also possibly with members of Congress. The purpose of this brief note is to give you some idea of the lines along which I believe General Eisenhower is thinking. The General has no pre-conceived ideas, but I have the definite impression that he believes the Council should meet every three months and that in the interim period there should be a considerably stronger NATO executive set-up than now exists to carry out the policy guidance of the Council. Since under such a plan there would only be a lapse of three months between Council sessions, deadlocks or sticky points which might develop would be resolved at the next meeting of the Council, so there would not be the present long periods of months where the Deputies are debating questions with constant reference back to government but no decisions. I would like to make clear that General Eisenhower is not critical of the Deputies, but he just does not feel they have the organization, terms of reference, and level of representation which make for the most effective action.

I also have the opinion that he feels that our own backstopping set-up at home is far from perfect. It is my impression that he believes strongly that the three elements (State–Defense–ECA) should participate together in the formation of policy. But at the same time, I believe, he feels there should be a man of Cabinet stature who rides herd on the operation and who will be in a sense an arbiter who will resolve questions where there is inter-Departmental and agency disagreement. I believe the General tends to think that such a man of Cabinet stature (equivalent in rank to a Cabinet officer) should not be a member of either State, Defense, or ECA, but someone in a role such as Charlie Wilson has in the war mobilization program. If the General's views on this question are sought—and I believe they may well be sooner or later—I think his views generally may run along the foregoing lines.

If such a concept were adopted, our whole foreign aid and NATO defense program would not, I imagine, be under as obvious Department of State administration as now exists under Mr. Cabot's set-up, since any administrator or man of Cabinet stature would most probably be more directly responsible to the White House than to the Secretary of State. I would like to make clear that the General is not "anti-State Department" in any sense whatsoever, but has, I believe, a sincere belief that a separate administrator for foreign aid and security matters is the best way in which to get rapid action and solution to many questions which now are batted about among the different agencies in Washington for protracted periods of time. I might add that by and large, General Eisenhower speaks very favorably of our

Department representation in Europe, and particularly of David Bruce, who did an outstanding job with the Congressional Committee which was just over here. I attended David's briefing of the Committee last Sunday where he made his presentation and then took question after question for a period of almost three hours. When it was all over, he received an ovation from the Committee, which agreed unanimously that it was the finest presentation they had had by any diplomatic mission.

I am passing the foregoing information along to you on a personal basis, since I would not, for obvious reasons, wish to be quoted. However, I do feel that this whole question is rapidly coming to a head, and I wished you and Mr. Perkins to have the benefit of what little background I have been able to pick up here on the general line of thinking, as well as the views of people such as Hoffman who have recently passed through.

Yours ever, DOUG

P.S. There is, of course, another possibility regarding a NATO reorganization, which someone might raise. It would, in effect, be to put General Eisenhower at the head of the whole NATO structure, civilian and military—perhaps giving him some kind of civilian hat and maintaining his international capacity. I have not heard anyone put this forward, but I assume that if the question comes up, someone might well suggest something along these lines. You will understand that this is speculation on my part, but it seems a possibility.

740.5/6–2151 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, June 21, 1951—6 p. m.

6718. Eyes only for the Secretary. (No distribution except as directed.) Joint personal message from Spofford and Holmes. On his recent visit to London Paul Hoffman saw various members of govt and discussed ideas he had formed during his visit to the continent with regard to improvements in the structural organization under the NAT. His ideas in general are embodied in a memo which he submitted unsigned to Morrison at latter's request, text of which is contained in text following eyes only tel.

It was made absolutely clear both by Hoffman and by Emb to Pri-Min and FonSec that Mr. Hoffman was paying a personal visit as private individual, that the ideas he expressed were his own, had no connection with US Govt and had not been discussed in Washington. Morrison's first meeting was luncheon with Hector McNeil, Hugh Gaitskell and Hartley Shawcross. Hoffman reported to us that McNeil

and Gaitskell were noncommittal but that Shawcross exhibited some enthusiasm for Hoffman's suggestion. Hoffman also reported that he found the PriMin interested and polite but entirely noncommittal. He said, however, that he had the impression that Morrison was attracted to this idea for 2 reasons: first, because he felt that the asset represented by General Eisenhower's standing both in America and in Europe should be used to the maximum to speed up rearmament of West and also to insure continued US contribution; second, because he had the impression that Morrison saw an opportunity to do something similar to Bevin's action when he "seized the offer in Marshall's Harvard speech with his two hands". Morrision asked him to put his ideas on paper which Hoffman did as indicated above.

Hoffman discussed the matter in general terms with both of us in advance of his talks and informed us that he had previously discussed the matter with Eisenhower and Katz in Paris.

Hoffman has asked that this and following message be shown to General Marshall.

HOLMES

740.5/6–2151 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, June 21, 1951—6 p. m.

6719. Eyes only for the Secretary (no distribution except as directed). This is message referred to in Embtel 6718.[1] Present conditions clearly indicate that the only practical method available to free nations for deterring aggression on the part of the Kremlin is rearmament. And rearmament must be on a scale to make the Kremlin recognize that any aggressive action can only result in disaster for the Soviet.

The decision to rearm was made by the NATO nations with the greatest reluctance; but having made that decision the speed of rearmament becomes a matter of top priority. Every hour is important, because until a realistic posture of defense is attained, there is always a possibility that the Kremlin, in the rash hope for a quick victory, might start its armies marching toward the Atlantic. With that situation in mind, any avoidable delay is inadmissible.

The speed with which such a realistic posture of defense can be achieved rests on unity of effort among the free nations of Western Europe, and the unity between those nations and the US. Unity of purpose and action between the UK and the US is particularly vital.

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[1] *Supra.*

In the past, the kind of unity needed today has come only after war has forced friendly nations to join in common cause. The free world should not have to suffer again the devastation of a general war; therefore it is imperative that we achieve unity here and now.

Fortunately, through NATO and the OEEC the free nations have acquired valuable new experience in working together in peacetime. Much has been accomplished in the past several months toward building NATO into an effective agency for mutual defense. The foundation has been laid for startlingly rapid progress from now on provided the next logical step is taken:

The establishment in NATO of a unified command.

Such a unified command holds the greatest promise that the necessary combined defense effort will reach maximum effectiveness in the shortest possible time.

Two principal responsibilities would fall to such a command:

1. Overall authority for developing plans for direct submission to the Council of Ministers.
2. Overall authority for executing whatever programs might finally be approved by the member govts.

Clearly the assignment of such responsibility would not call for any additional surrender of sovereignty by any nation.

The man to take such a command is of course General Eisenhower. He is one of the few men living today—and possibly the only man—who is held in great respect and affection by the people in and out of government, both in the US and Europe. His capacity for inspiring leadership can scarcely be challenged.

The essence of this proposal is unified command of all the free nations efforts to maintain peace. This is the one best way of assuring that we will not be forced to join in a unified command for war.

The strengthening and unifying of the defense organization of Western Europe is sure to receive a most favorable response in the US. Should proposals to this come from British quarters the result would seem certain to be a notable bettering of UK–US relationships.

HOLMES

740.5/6–2051

Paper Prepared by the International Security Affairs Committee [1]

[Extract [1]]

TOP SECRET U.S. EYES ONLY [WASHINGTON, undated.]

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY MEDIUM TERM DEFENSE PLAN AND RELATED UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Costing of the Medium Term Defense Plan and estimates of European economic capacity indicate a short-fall between (*a*) total defense of the European NAT countries plus Germany, and (*b*) maximum probable European defense efforts plus United States assistance programmed through FY 1952, amounting to approximately $25 billion. U.S. assistance for FY 1953 and 1954 if projected at the rate requested in the Mutual Security Program for 1952 would amount to $12½ billion for the two years combined. The problem is to find ways and means of bringing the European portion of the North Atlantic defense program within politically and economically tolerable limits of European military efforts and U.S. (plus Canadian) assistance, without sacrificing the essential character of the military objective.

2. It is considered impossible to obtain a sufficiently large European effort to meet the full remaining deficiency, and undesirable to press upon the Europeans a probably unattainable additional defense effort over and above the very large increases already projected. It is considered impracticable and undesirable for the U.S. to cover the full deficiency through increased aid. The costing and capacity estimates now available are not believed to warrant the abandonment of the MTDP as a basic objective or fundamental alterations in strategic plans for European defense. At the same time, it is not feasible, in relation to the requirements either of Congressional presentation or of further negotiation in the NATO, to evade or postpone the problem posed by these estimates.

3. It is recommended that a solution to this problem be composed of the following elements:

a. Continued efforts to induce and enable the Europeans to make the maximum practicable contribution to Western defense, but without

[1] This extract is part of ISAC Document D–4/7*a* whose overall title was "Scope, Duration and Feasibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Medium Term Defense Plan and Related United States Assistance." The extract, plus a section which embodied modifications of the earlier draft, D–4/7 (not printed), was distributed on June 20 to the ISAC member agencies to serve as a basis for Cabinet-level discussion of the problem by the afternoon of June 21 or as soon after that as possible. A copy of D–4/7*a* was pouched to the other NATO capitals on August 13 (740.5/8–1351). For information on the background of this study, see numbered paragraph 9 of telegram Todep 112, August 17, p. 252.

expecting or seeking military efforts so far beyond political and economic capacities as to cause either their discouragement or the acceptance of tasks inconsistent with political and economic stability. Negotiations may be directed toward increased efforts somewhat in excess of those assumed in deriving the figures mentioned above, but planning should not assume the realization of such increases;

b. Seeking adjustments in the timing, quality or quantity of MTDP requirements in such fashion that total expenditures to July 1, 1954, may be reduced by perhaps $8 to $9 billion (1/8 of total cost) without sacrificing the basic military objectives of the Plan;

c. Consideration of the possibility of U.S. assistance during the remainder of MTDP on a scale perhaps 30% greater than the annual rate now programmed for FY 1952, i.e., a sum through FY 1954 totaling $15 to $17 billion beyond the amounts already recommended to the Congress for FY 1952.

4. It is recommended that a position paper for the Congressional presentation be prepared on the size and duration of U.S. assistance to NATO envisaging a possible substantial increase in the level of U.S. assistance in FY 1953 and 1954 and otherwise reflecting the general analysis in the attached paper although not including the specific quantitative estimates.

5. It is recommended that the U.S. members of the Standing Group, the Council Deputies, the Defense Production Board, and the Finance and Economic Board be authorized to initiate negotiations in the NATO, and that the appropriate agencies be authorized to initiate negotiations bilaterally, working toward completion of the Medium Term Defense Plan, if necessary with acceptable modifications which do not jeopardize the central military objectives. In so doing, the U.S. representative should make clear that the preliminary U.S. appraisal of total costs indicates serious economic and production difficulties which will require intensive collective efforts to overcome and which may require adjustments in quality, quantity, or timing, though not basic objectives; and that the U.S. desires to work out with its Allies an effective solution during the summer and early autumn of 1951.

6. It should also be made clear that, in view of the substantially larger probable total costs than previously anticipated, the U.S. Administration would consider recommending to the Congress a significant increase in annual rates of military end-item and economic support assistance for the Fiscal Years 1953 and 1954, provided, and only provided, that the Plan multilaterally worked out and the expanded undertakings of the other members demonstrates the possibility of obtaining the basic military objectives of the MTDP, even if not the full Plan on the target dates in every respect.

7. It is recommended that the appropriate military authorities be requested to intensify and accelerate their efforts to find means of meeting the necessary military objectives of Western European de-

fense but with a significant reduction in the total defense expenditure requirement through mid-1954.

8. It is recommended that the agencies concerned be directed to initiate immediately, making full use of regional and country as well as Washington representatives, a refinement of the costing of the Plan and the estimates of European capacity, together with the development of specific U.S. proposals for expanded production, accelerated force build up, and other steps to effect the maximum practicable realization of the Plan within the limits of realistically appraised political and economic capacity.

SCOPE, DURATION AND FEASIBILITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY MEDIUM TERM DEFENSE PLAN AND RELATED UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE

1. Assuming that the objective of the U.S. program for Europe is to assist in creating military strength in Western Europe which will (*a*) deter Soviet aggression and (*b*) resist invasion if it occurs, an appreciation of the scope, duration and cost of achieving this objective is essential to further planning and action.

2. This paper provides such an appreciation and states certain possible U.S. courses of action. It is designed for use in connection with (*a*) Congressional presentation of the Mutual Security Program, (*b*) NATO planning and negotiation and bilateral negotiation with our European Allies, (*c*) as general background for Cabinet level consideration of the major issues presented. It should also be useful in connection with (*d*) U.S. budget planning for FY 1953, and (*e*) revision of NSC 68/4.[2]

BACKGROUND

3. In late 1950, the governments of the NAT nations agreed on the Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) and accepted certain commitments to raise, maintain and equip combat-ready ground, sea and air forces toward meeting its requirements. That plan was agreed, and those commitments accepted, in the absence of any joint estimate of total costs and, in all likelihood, in the absence of more than a most rudimentary estimate on the part of each country of the cost if its own force contribution, but with the expectation of substantial but unknown amounts of U.S. assistance. The MTDP and the national force commitments have always been assumed to be subject to a feasibility check.

4. The national commitments to raise forces thus far undertaken fall 20 percent (ground forces) to 40 percent (air forces) short of the total forces required in support of the Plan by July 1954, the

[2] See footnote 2, p. 63.

accepted planning date. This difference between commitments and requirements is referred to as the "Gap".

5. The MTDP, which was approved as to military desirability by all the NATO Chiefs of Staffs and Defense Ministers on behalf of all their governments, is of course under continuous review. However, the JCS in May 1951 reaffirmed their view that reduction in the force requirements could not be accepted from a military point of view. SHAPE is now preparing its official comments.

6. Since November 1950, the process of approximating the annual and total costs of meeting the MTDP requirements has been underway in NATO and in this Government. Each NAT nation in response to a Standing Group directive has submitted its estimate of national military costs involved in meeting the MTDP commitments it had undertaken in NATO. The Standing Group has these submissions under study. Simultaneously the Joint American Military Advisory Group and the U.S. Missions in Europe have been evaluating country estimates and the total estimate of cost. This process of successive approximations here and abroad will continue. For the present, it is believed that the costing process reflected herein is reasonably reliable within the limitations of available data.

7. There have been completed within the past three weeks (*a*) a preliminary Joint Chiefs of Staff position on the country-by-country distribution of forces desirable from a military viewpoint to meet the "Gap", this position subject to checking from the economic and political viewpoints; (*b*) a cost estimate of the European portion of the full MTDP (and European non-NATO requirements), based on U.S. screening of country submissions to the Standing Group, with requirements for the "Gap" distributed as in (*a*); and (*c*) a preliminary ECA estimate of European political and economic capacity to carry enlarged military efforts. Each of these studies has assumed full German participation in western defense.

8. The salient results of these studies, which cover total military costs for nine European NATO countries and Germany, are summarized in the table on the following page. Since they show substantially larger costs than the estimates developed last December for NSC–68/3 [3] and since the size and duration of this program have implications of great significance to the security programs and policies of the U.S. and the other NAT nations, it is believed that this estimate should, together with certain conclusions and possible courses of action described below, be presented to the Cabinet level for urgent consideration.

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[3] For portions of report NSC 68/3, "U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security," December 8, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 432 ff. For subsequent material on overall U.S. national security programs, see *ibid.*, 1951, vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

[The remainder of this paper is a detailed presentation of the points covered in the earlier section of "Summary and Recommendations." Omitted too is the above-mentioned table, marked "Tentative—Under Revision" and its accompanying page of explanatory notes.]

740.5/6-2151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Martin)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 21, 1951.

Subject: Meeting the MTDP Gap—ISAC D-4/7*a*[2]

Participants: State—Secretary Acheson
Mr. Battle
E. M. Martin
Defense—General Marshall
General Bradley
Vice Admiral Wright
Colonel Beebe
Office of the Special Assistant to the President—Mr. Lincoln Gordon
Treasury—Under Secy. Foley
Mr. Willis
Mr. Bronz
ECA—Mr. Bissell
Mr. Halaby
Bureau of Budget—Mr. Lawton

The Secretary of State outlined the contents of the ISAC Document. He indicated that it raised major policy issues on which it was desired to secure governmental agreement, including approval of the President as necessary. This was urgent in order that testimony on foreign aid legislation, scheduled to start the following Tuesday, could cover the points at issue, and in order that action could be taken promptly in the Standing Group to secure agreement on meeting the total force requirements of the MTDP.

Secretary Marshall indicated he felt it important that we should now find out what others are prepared to do on forces and that we should tell Congress that we will need at least 17 billion in the next two years. He then asked General Bradley to express his views since he would have to leave shortly.

General Bradley indicated, on the basis of his recent trip abroad, that he was reluctant to press the Europeans for too much now. The present price-wage problem was serious in the European countries and might open the door for Communist sabotage. Six months or a

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[1] This memorandum was prepared on June 23. A handwritten notation on the source text indicated that copies were sent to Cabot, Perkins, and Spofford.

[2] *Supra.*

year from now we might be able to ask for and get a great deal more than we could now. He suggested we might let the situation drag a bit, since in six months or a year we could judge much more accurately what they can really be expected to do.

On the other hand, General Bradley realized that the timing problem was serious. The JCS was not too worried about the rest of 1951, somewhat more, but not too much, worried about 1952, but 1953 and 1954 were dangerous years. Postponement of progress on the MTDP was, therefore, a serious matter both with respect to forces and money. The countries need advance notice for long-range planning. Perhaps we could deal with governments, and not tell the people what is involved since it might be too great a shock to them at this juncture.

Secretary Marshall suggested that perhaps we should proceed with the military planning but on a military basis only and postpone an attempt to resolve the financing and production problem at this point. If the matter were handled this way in the NATO, it might be handled with the Congress on the basis of saying we will need as much in 1953 and 1954 as we asked for in 1952, and maybe more. It is very difficult to calculate just what the cost will be in the future to the U.S.

Under Secretary Foley said he had talked only briefly with Secretary Snyder but that the Treasury was greatly concerned with the problem of the gap. They had the impression that there was a ceiling on what the Europeans could be asked to do but none on what the U.S. tax payer could be asked to do. It was now anticipated that the U.S. would have a 3 billion surplus at the end of this fiscal year. If no tax bill is passed, the deficit which will have to be covered by borrowing in the coming fiscal year will be 10.5 billion. If the bill is passed, it will be only 3 to 3.5 billion, but the prospects for passage now appear precarious. Raising the problem of the gap with Congress at this time may threaten the passage of the tax bill. It would be very helpful if any discussion of the problem could be postponed until after the House has acted on the tax bill, which may be in a day or so, and until after the Senate has acted, which may be some time later.

Mr. Bissell expressed agreement with General Bradley that a three-year forecast is not a precise estimate. The figures given did not represent a physical limit on what could be done, particularly in the field of military production. The limit here is rather raw materials and financing. The latter is important because of the large amounts that must be spent for maintenance and support of troops. The overall limit is the general political, economic and financial situation which determines how much can be made available for defense purposes in national budgets.

From this standpoint, however, the estimates contained in the document are generous. In discussions with U.S. representatives in Europe

there was a general view that the ECA figures were definitely on the optimistic side. Barring another war, there is not much real hope that these figures can be exceeded.

Mr. Bissell expressed, on behalf of the ECA, a desire that there be an opportunity for ISAC to comment on the JCS proposals for distribution of the gap by countries before they are submitted to the Standing Group. He indicated he understood such comment had been requested by the JCS. He proposed that there be a study, country by country, of the political and economic implications of the military proposals, indicating those countries which appeared on the whole over-loaded and perhaps those which might be under-loaded, but leaving it up to the JCS to draw the necessary conclusions about possible shifts in assignments. He thought the ECA views could be ready Friday or Saturday and ISAC action completed by Monday night.

Secretary Acheson asked if this could be done without any delay in the plan of Secretary Marshall to submit the proposal to the Standing Group. Mr. Bissell thought if it were done by the end of the day on Monday, this would not represent any serious delay.

Admiral Wright expressed the view that it was desirable to modify the proposals before presenting them rather than to make general qualifications which would result in proposals for changes later.

Mr. Gordon expressed approval of the proposal of Mr. Bissell, indicating he understood this procedure had been contemplated all along. He also expressed the view that even if we go ahead in the Standing Group on a military basis only, the problem of financing is just as serious as manpower availability and training capacity, and it would be sure to hit us by the time summer is over as countries would be unwilling to make commitments without considering how they can be carried out. The whole approach of attempting to cost the plan, to analyze the economic feasibility of it and of the countries' commitments, was taken because of general agreement that this was the situation.

Mr. Gordon also expressed the view that it was not quite correct to suggest that there was a ceiling on European expenditures and not one on those in the U.S., since no data were available from any source, as far as he knew, on the total U.S. defense load in 1953 and 1954.

Under Secretary Foley agreed that it was only an impression left by the paper.

Mr. Gordon indicated that it was not recommended that the U.S. pick up the total check. Projections in the paper propose a 250% increase in European budgets. This is very much a sloping ceiling, requiring a great increase in effort on their part and on our part to reach.

Mr. Gordon also expressed serious doubts as to the wisdom of delaying until the tax bill was through, in that it was important to face up with our NATO partners to the task of pruning the cost of the MTDP and to tackle the various economic and production problems which would still remain.

Mr. Lawton indicated that in any force plan there were large equipment requirements. These raise problems of timing of production and assignment of production from U.S. sources. It seemed to him it might take more than the 7 percent of the U.S. output, now scheduled, to meet any of these requirements. There is a carry-over into FY 1953 now of 5 billion to be spent out of 1952 funds. 10 to 10.5 billion more will be a heavy load. To get much increase in 1953 will probably require a supplementary appropriation in FY 1952. If we don't give out much to the Congress now about this prospect and then come back in six months, we are apt to be in real trouble on the Hill. He also pointed out that these figures are based on prices lower than present ones and the cost, therefore, may be even greater. On the other hand, it is true that unit costs are falling as rates of output increase. He wondered whether the guiding factor was military requirements, production capacity or the political problem with the Congress in determining how much U.S. assistance should be.

Secretary Acheson said he thought we had considered productive capacity as a possible limiting factor in U.S. assistance.

Mr. Gordon replied that this was in general true, that all the indications received had been that there would be ample capacity in 1953 in the U.S.

Mr. Lawton agreed but expressed the view that this was on the basis of presently planned U.S. forces.

Mr. Bissell pointed out that the proposed 15 to 17 billion aid from the U.S. leaves about 9 billion of the deficit uncovered. It seemed to him that it was optimistic to hope that screening the military requirements could cut them by this amount although he was hopeful and Defense had agreed to the figure. After all there was no specific basis for saying where this amount would come from and one must remember that in view of the price situation the deficit would be more likely to increase rather than decrease. He wondered whether we could postpone discussion of this whole problem in Congress.

Mr. Gordon thought it would probably come up almost immediately, which means that any time after Tuesday Acheson or some other witness is apt to be asked the question.

Secretary Acheson expressed the view that the issue cannot be ducked. Otherwise they will tell you you don't know what you are doing and, in the absence of an intelligent reply, they will be right. He thought that perhaps we could help the Treasury and their people by minimizing the difficulties and by having a well-thought-through

program for meeting them. Frankly he did not think that with the best efforts of our allies, and he thought we could count on that, we can expect much relief in appropriations for foreign aid and they will probably have to be even greater. What we must do with the Congress is tell them what the nature of the gap is, what we are doing about it, and that we have a plan for meeting it. Precisely how much we will have to do cannot be foreseen as there are too many variables affecting the European effort but we can say that there is a plan on which work is proceeding in the U.S. Government and in NATO. We may be able to postpone going into specific figures. By the time this question comes up the tax bill should be through the House, but Senate action is almost surely going to be much too slow to permit waiting before bringing out this issue.

Mr. Bissell suggested we might avoid saying that the bill for U.S. is apt to go up rather than down. Mr. Gordon recalled that Secretary Johnson said our last year's MDAP cost would be going down after 1952. It is essential to correct that misleading guidance.

Secretary Acheson expressed agreement with General Bradley's view that the greatest danger is in 1953 and 1954. He also referred to a statement Secretary Marshall had made, quoting Congressman Wigglesworth, that the European effort is at dead center and a new impulse is needed to get Europe really started and to convince Eisenhower that we have a solution, on the basis of which we can tackle an apparently insoluble problem. If it is not attacked along lines which seem likely to be successful, the effect on the international scene, including the Soviets, would be disastrous. Our own safety requires that we grasp the problem and go forward to solve it. There have been many adverse factors but they may be behind us. The French elections held us up in Germany and on other matters. The very small majority by which the present Government is in power in the UK has been a handicap but Ambassador Gifford now thinks prospects of elections have faded and the present government is ready to be more firm. This has already been reflected in their position in the Paris Deputies' talks. In the U.S. we have had considerable turmoil with respect to international policies in the course of the winter and spring which may now be past. Provided the Kem Amendment [3] does not destroy us, there is a real chance for us to step forward.

Secretary Marshall emphasized that we are buying European manpower in place of U.S. manpower in the interest of the defense of the U.S. The European people have real economic problems resulting from the war. They have lost great numbers of men and they have a difficult Communist vote problem. In helping them solve these prob-

[3] For documentation on this legislation concerned with the limitation on economic assistance to countries trading with the Soviet bloc, see vol. I, pp. 993 ff.

lems and get ahead with the defense effort with U.S. assistance, we are defending the U.S.

It is essential that we not mislead the Congress on possible costs and we must make clear that they will be as heavy or heavier hereafter. Secretary Marshall thought we should restate more positively what our plan is and what commitments we have. The divisions required for 1952 are all committed. We can and should explain to Congress that we have yet to secure commitments, and are now going after them for those required by 1954. We must, by this course, back Eisenhower, or frankly give up supporting him. We already have an investment and it does not seem good policy to abandon it.

Secretary Marshall also laid great stress on the need for making clear that the problem of the Europeans in terms of standard of living is wholly different from the U.S. situation. A five percent cut to the Europeans is the difference between white bread and black bread on the table; for us it is the difference between having radios and televisions, etc. It is also essential to make clear what a great loss to U.S. security the loss of the industrial potential of the Ruhr and of Eastern France would be.

Secretary Acheson outlined what he thought was needed in order to get ahead on this problem. First, the Standing Group should receive the JCS proposed gap distribution after comments of other agencies have been received and considered. These comments should be submitted by the first of the week. There did not seem to be in this operation any decision to be made by the President.

This was agreed by those present.

Second, if they accept these additional commitments, we have obligations to supply the equipment which must come from the United States. But this obligation is inherent in the Medium Term Defense Plan as a whole, which we have accepted as U.S. policy, and therefore no problem for the President arises.

Third, there may be a point for the President to consider if in the course of discussions with other governments it seems proper for the U.S. to assume some additional portion of force requirements under the plan, after all the water has been squeezed out and we have asked them to do everything they can.

Fourth, there is also the question of whether this paper (ISAC D–4/7*a*) should go to the NSC or to the President directly for his approval of the course of action outlined therein and, in particular, the statement proposed to be made about future U.S. economic and military assistance.

Mr. Bissell suggested that the JCS allocation of the gap involves certain additional U.S. force commitments. The wisdom of these proposals are not up for decision here. We are dealing with the other

side of the picture; namely, what additional economic and financial aid is required from the U.S. to implement the gap.

Secretary Marshall queried whether the NSC had not approved the MTDP specifically. Mr. Gordon thought it was approved only in general terms. Mr. Martin suggested that by implication NSC 68 [4] gave approval to it.

Secretary Marshall expressed the view that a question at issue now in connection with the JCS gap allocation is one involving additional commitments of U.S. forces at this time. Secretary Acheson called attention to the fact that the allocation of the previous six divisions had been cleared with the President he thought, but he was not sure in what way. Mr. Martin indicated he thought the joint letter from Acheson and Johnson dealing with the German problem [5] also recommended the allocation of six divisions, and that the proposal was approved by the Presidential approval of this letter. Secretary Acheson then expressed the view that any new allocations should be cleared with the President in a similar way.

Mr. Gordon expressed the view that whether the NSC is used or not depends on timing. Mr. Nitze had estimated once that any new proposals going through the NSC would take three weeks as a minimum. If you can delay that long, that is the proper procedure. Otherwise, if the President can see the whole scheme at once, it might be preferable for Acheson and Marshall to take it up directly. Mr. Bissell expressed the view that there really was not time before we had to speak in Congress and that factor must control our course of action.

Secretary Acheson agreed with this. He felt that with hearings on Tuesday, the President should be approached this week. He suggested that perhaps Mr. Snyder would like to go along. Mr. Foley agreed. Mr. Foley also thought that Mr. Snyder might like to talk directly to Acheson and Marshall in advance.

Secretary Acheson said he thought what was needed now was a paper on what to say in Congress which could be presented to the President for his approval. It would need to be discussed with the President by Marshall, Foster, Snyder and himself before Monday. Perhaps arrangements could be made for Friday afternoon when Mr. Foster might be back. Mr. Bissell thought not but was satisfied with the proposed procedure. Secretary Acheson asked Mr. Lawton whether he would like to be present. Mr. Lawton said he thought he would be out of town. Mr. Foley suggested it might be done after the Cabinet meeting on Friday.

Secretary Acheson asked Mr. Martin if he could, on the basis of the discussion, prepare such a statement, consider it with representatives

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[4] For this paper, entitled "U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security," April 14, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, pp. 234 ff.

[5] The reference here is to a memorandum addressed to President Truman on July 30, 1951. For text, see p. 849.

of the other agencies, and have it in time for the Cabinet meeting. Mr. Martin agreed to try.[6]

The meeting adjourned.

[6] No record of further action on the preparation or use of this proposed statement has been found in the Department of State files.

740.5/6-2251

The Counselor of Embassy in France (MacArthur)[1] to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)

TOP SECRET PERSONAL

PARIS, June 22, 1951.

DEAR JAMIE: On June 20 I dropped you a Personal Top Secret letter[2] which I hope you are holding very close indeed, setting forth my impression of certain of the thinking going on here with respect to NATO reorganization.

This morning several of us in the upper US element of SHAPE had a general go-round on this subject. In the light of this purely informal and private conversation, I believe my letter of June 20 may be a bit misleading. I gathered from this morning's talk that in addition to Mr. Hoffman and other Americans who have raised the question of NATO reorganization, several of the Congressmen who were recently here had fairly strong views that NATO should be made more effective. I also believe I was not correct when I said that General Eisenhower's thinking tends toward the establishment of a high-level man of Cabinet stature who would not be a member of either State, Defense, or ECA. I believe this is one possibility that has been batted at him, but I think he has by no means bought this concept, although I do believe he does think that at home we must have someone of very considerable stature to prevent the inter-Departmental committees from going around and around. I should also like to let you know that at upper working level here there is a definite feeling that pressures to make General Eisenhower some kind of supreme czar of US-European activities should be resisted. Whether or not he should have some kind of deputy in Washington through whom he might channel requests for action is something which may be considered at some later date.

I would like to re-emphasize very strongly that nothing has crystallized at this end, but that some thought is being given to the problem since it seems likely that it will probably be raised in Washington. I would like also to emphasize that at upper working level here (and I include Generals Gruenther, Schuyler, and Leavey of the US element) there is a strong feeling that no precipitous decisions, recommendations, or suggestions should be forthcoming from this end.

[1] Attached to the Embassy, on detail to SHAPE.

[2] *Ante*, p. 188.

I know you will hold this letter and my letter of June 20 to yourself and Mr. Perkins, since I could get in very serious difficulties indeed if the erroneous impression were obtained here that I am in any way cast in the role of informant on matters which are being held very, very tightly here and not being reported to other agencies at home. As I wrote you before, I am passing along this information to you simply because I do feel that you at home may be hit very soon by propositions for NATO reorganization, and you should be thinking about how you may handle any number of suggestions which may come from members of Congress or other prominent Americans.[3]

Sincerely, Doug

[3] On June 26, this letter and the earlier one by MacArthur of June 20, p. 188, were answered by Perkins during Bonbright's absence from Washington. Perkins thanked MacArthur for his thoughts and informed him that the reorganization study was being pushed in the Department of State from several angles; in particular: speeding action by the U.S. Government and the Standing Group in Washington, strengthening the Council Deputies, placing Eisenhower in a position where he could and would communicate directly with NATO governments including the United States, and establishing periodic meetings of the North Atlantic Council. (740.5/6–2251)

740.5 MAP/6–2551

The Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot) to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you know, the various agencies represented on the International Security Affairs Committee have been engaged over the past several weeks in an intensive analysis of the problems of meeting the North Atlantic Treaty Medium Term Defense Plan, estimating its total cost, appraising its economic feasibility, and exploring how the total burden might be divided between the United States and the other member countries.

As agreed at an informal meeting of Generals Marshall and Bradley and Messrs. Foley, Lawton, Bissell and others with Secretary Acheson in his office on June 21,[1] the Economic Cooperation Administration has now prepared an analysis from the economic point of view of the allocation of forces to meet the Medium Term Defense Plan "Gap" as proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum of May 28, 1951, to the Secretary of Defense.[2] The analysis is contained in ISAC

[1] See the memorandum of conversation by Martin, p. 197.

[2] For further information concerning the part played by this JCS document of May 28, not printed, in the development of the overall study of the financing of the defense effort, see numbered paragraph 9 of telegram Todep 112, August 17, p. 252.

D–4/8,[3] which is attached hereto. Time limitations have made it impossible for the body of this paper to be reviewed in detail by all the agencies of the International Security Affairs Committee, but no substantive objections to the summary conclusions having been registered, I transmit this economic analysis to you on behalf of the International Security Affairs Committee for consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This analysis reveals that serious economic problems result from the overall cost of the Plan and the difficulties of meeting it within generous estimates of European capabilities combined with feasible quantities of aid from the United States and Canada. This problem was analyzed in ISAC D–4/7*a*,[4] the paper under discussion at the June 21 meeting referred to above.

In addition to this general problem, the country-by-country review reveals especially great economic difficulties in the cases of particular European countries. I call to your attention in particular the economic limitations suggested in ISAC D–4/8 affecting the possible increases in force for France and Italy. In addition, although data have not been available for a full analysis, such rough figures as are available suggest that the proposed assignment of additional forces to Norway might exceed that country's manpower and other economic capabilities.

It has not been possible in the time available to include an analysis of Canadian capabilities for meeting the requirements of the "GAP".

It is the view of the International Security Affairs Committee that this economic analysis should be carefully reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine what modifications may be desirable in the country-by-country allocation of forces to fill the "Gap" as contained in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of May 28.

In addition, the International Security Affairs Committee considers it extremely desirable, in view both of the country-by-country analysis and of the general analysis contained in ISAC D–4/7*a*, that in presenting a proposal on behalf of the United States to the Standing Group, the United States Representative make it clear that the proposal represents an initial United States position based essentially on military considerations, and in arriving at its final position, the United States will take into account the positions and problems of the other member countries and the analysis through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of the economic and political, as well as the military considerations involved.

Finally, in accordance with ISAC D–4/7*a*, the International Security Affairs Committee recommends that in presenting further pro-

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[3] Not printed. This document dated June 25, 1951, was entitled: "Economic Analysis of the Allocation of the MTDP Gap to European Countries," and was prepared in ECA.

[4] *Ante*, p. 193.

posals on the Medium Term Defense Plan in the various North Atlantic Treaty Organization agencies, including the Standing Group, the United States Representatives should make clear that the preliminary United States appraisal of total costs indicates serious economic and production difficulties which will require intensive collective efforts to overcome; and that the United States desires to work out with its Allies an effective solution during the summer of 1951.

The further development of a firm United States position on the distribution of forces to fill the "Gap", and on the distribution of the production, financial and economic burdens of the entire Medium Term Defense Plan will be the subject of continuing work by the International Security Affairs Committee agencies and by the International Security Affairs Committee itself, in order to provide guidance to United States representatives in all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization agencies based on a consolidated political-military-economic judgment.

Very truly yours, THOMAS D. CABOT

740.5 MAP/6-2651

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of International Security Affairs and the Office of European Regional Affairs [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 26, 1951.

Subject: Policy on U.S. Participation in Financing of NATO Infrastructure.

Recommendation:

That you authorize approval on behalf of the State Department of the attached policy on infrastructure (Tab A).[2]

Discussion:

The Department of Defense has proposed a policy on financing of NATO infrastructure (static capital items required for NATO forces). This policy provides:

A. Infrastructure constitutes one of the several areas of military expenditures which must be covered by the NATO nations if an adequate defense of Europe is to be obtained. Because of its fundamentally local nature, it is one of the most appropriate fields in which

[1] Prepared by Pittman and Knight; addressed to Cabot, Matthews, and Perkins. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that the memorandum was sent to Cabot but not to Matthews or Perkins.

[2] Not printed but discussed in this document. This was a Department of Defense policy paper, agreed upon by the ISAC member agencies at staff level, entitled "United States Participation in Financing of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Infrastructure." A verbatim text was sent to Spofford in telegram 6045 to London, June 21, repeated to Paris as telegram 6989 for MacArthur and Katz, and to Heidelberg and Wiesbaden, not printed. (740.5/6-2151)

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the NATO countries, other than the U.S., can and should find an opportunity to contribute. The concept of the U.S. "paying for the trenches" is, of course, domestically unacceptable. For this reason and notwithstanding the fact that fundamentally there is as much justification for sharing infrastructure as any other part of the military burden, costs of infrastructure should in every case be met in the first instance by NATO nations from their budgets and the U.S. should not contribute to the financing thereof except on specific instruction from Washington, based on the following considerations:

1. There must be immediate military urgency in any such exception.
2. Assuming such military urgency, U.S. participation should ordinarily be limited to a maximum based on the equivalent of the proportionate use of the facilities by the United States armed forces.
3. Any additional emergency participation by the U.S. should only be employed when the interests of the U.S. national security so require.

B. All contributions would be given consideration with respect to sharing the defense burden.

In each particular case application of these considerations will produce differing results, depending upon the location of the facility, the contemplated national use of the facility, and the budgetary capability of the nation concerned.

The foregoing is only a brief excerpt summary of the essence of this paper. It is apparent therefrom that the result will be that the U.S. will attempt to have the other NATO nations assume financial responsibility for infrastructure from their own budgets to the extent possible; that further financing will come in the first instance from Department of Defense funds, not to exceed the equivalent of use by U.S. armed forces; that further financing will come from MSP funds; and that a further financial responsibility will also have to be assumed by ECA and/or MSP to cover other items in national budgets which may be displaced by infrastructure costs, referred to herein, assumed by those nations.

This proposal appears to keep U.S. contributions in the range justifiable for the defense of the U.S., and yet to have such flexibility, if applied, to provide for assisting our NATO partners in the performance of their designated roles, all within the outside limit of military necessity. Its approval, therefore, is recommended.

740.5/6–2651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, June 26, 1951—6 p. m.

8096. From MacArthur. ReDeptel 6045 to London rptd Paris 6989 [2] and Depto 1167 [3] rptd Paris 2795. Fol represents considered view US element SHAPE including C/S re distribution infrastructure costs:

While it is not Gen. Eisenhower's intention to inject himself into resolution of problem of distribution of infrastructure costs, Deptel 6989 has certain implications re successful execution of infrastructure program which seem to require comment.

The principles proposed for governing US participation in financing of NATO infrastructure as set forth Deptel 6989 appear fair and logical from theoretical standpoint. They do not however appear to be in accordance with urgency of situation as we view it here.

It is recognized infrastructure planning shld be consummated far in advance of time approval and financing are required. That is not case in which we find ourselves. Events have caught up with us. Planning data required for application of cited principles is not existent nor can it be produced in time by SHAPE or its subordinate HQ. For execution of infrastructure program in '51 we are generally limited in central Eur to low level of pre-Korean WU planning. For that reason '52 must be year in which infrastructure program is carried on in magnitude far greater than anything envisioned heretofore, both to make up for time already lost in central Eur and to cover requirements of northern and southern regions hitherto provided to an even lesser extent.

For this reason forceful leadership and absence of prolonged negots are required. Principles set forth reftel applied to current and future negots are likely to produce delays which will jeopardize '52 program and will encourage other nations to hold out for precise analytical approach, when boldness and action are required.

US is already committing augmented ground forces to Eur. Infrastructure for them and their air support must be ready in time. In like manner, to be effective, build-up of forces of other nations, much of it accomplished with US aid, must be paralleled by corresponding build-up of common use infrastructure.

Consequences of delayed execution infrastructure are so serious to security this command that it is requested US position as proposed

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[1] Repeated to London, Heidelberg, and Wiesbaden.

[2] June 21, not printed (740.5/6–2151), but summarized in the memorandum by Pittman and Knight, June 26, *supra*.

[3] June 23, not printed; it commented on Tab A of the memorandum printed *supra* with similar reasoning but greater detail than that used by MacArthur in telegram 8096. (740.5/6–2351)

Deptel 6989 be most carefully reviewed in light Depto 1167 and of points set forth above before final decision is reached. [MacArthur.]

BRUCE

740.5/6–2651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 26, 1951—6 p. m.

Todep 551. ToISA.

1. FYI President has approved for guidance to witnesses on MSP fol statement respect to US aid to NATO partners in FY 1953 and FY 1954:

"As you know, together with our allies in NATO, we have drawn up a strategic plan, designed to deter Soviet aggression in Europe and to resist invasion if it shld occur. This plan lists the forces required for this purpose. The NATO countries have undertaken to raise, equip and train a large part of these forces. Additional forces, beyond their present programs, will however be required. A command staff under Gen Eisenhower has been established to supervise preparation for the defense of Western Europe.

"To complete this plan, so important to U.S. security, will, so far as can now be foreseen, require U.S. appropriation in 1953 and 1954 as large as those requested for the current fiscal year, and maybe larger. Thereafter, when the build-up of North Atlantic Treaty forces will have been substantially completed under the present plan, the amount of aid can be substantially reduced. The maintenance of the necessary European forces shld be largely or wholly financed by the Europeans out of their own resources.

"These conclusions are based upon an appraisal which our govt has made, on the one hand, of the forces, equipment, facilities and other mil supplies required to meet the Medium Term Defense Plan and, on the other, of the ability of our European allies to meet these requirements without seriously jeopardizing their polit and econ stability and thus opening the way to Communist subversion.

"This appraisal of requirements and capabilities makes it clear that the task of completing the plan will be a difficult one. It will take the best efforts and ingenuity of all the NATO partners to succeed. Yet there is nothing in the figures to suggest that the plan is beyond our reach. It is an objective vital to our security and to which we have committed ourselves with our allies and accepted the leadership in the person of Gen Eisenhower. We must press forward on all fronts together to overcome the difficulties and create the necessary defenses agreed to.

"Review of the requirements of the plan and their cost is proceeding in this govt and in NATO, with a view to assuring maximum economy in the use of our resources. Under Gen Eisenhower's leader-

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[1] Repeated to Paris for MacArthur, Katz, and Handy. Drafted by Martin (EUR).

ship, SHAPE is now engaged in perfecting the plan and the balance of forces involved.

"At the same time we are seeking the most effective and equitable distribution of costs. The U.S. must now make a greater effort to work out with its partners ways to increase their contribution. This is already going forward both in NATO and directly between this govt and its partners."

2. This conclusion is based on data contained in ISAC Doc 4–7/*a* [2] which has been pouched to you.

ACHESON

[2] *Ante*, p. 193.

740.5/6–2951 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET LONDON, June 29, 1951—6 p. m.

6928. Limit distribution to Dept only; eyes only for Cabot. From Spofford.

1. Wld greatly appreciate your views re impact Def Dept expenditures in Eur countries upon ECA requirements for econ aid funds, and any background info re discussions between Def and ECA on this subject. As we see it, lack firm understanding this matter serious obstacle to some of our current progs.

2. As we understand it, ECA has reckoned its requirements for econ aid funds on basis certain assumptions as to Def Dept expenditures in W Eur countries. Hence to extent mil expenditures exceed amt forecast, and to extent such excess expenditures are reflected in reductions in econ aid; ECA funds are rendered surplus. Why wld it not be reasonable in such circumstances for ECA funds be used reimburse Def? If such solution found, believe wld greatly facilitate more rapid progress on such problems as foll.

3. In case US procurement Eur to stimulate mil prod (see Todep 468 May 29 [1]) one variation your proposal wld involve remittance dols to pay Fr for purchase Fr francs which wld then be used finance US procurement mil equipment in, say, Ital for delivery to Fr under US end-item prog. If—as shld be case—programmed end-item deliveries from US had already taken acct availability Ital prod, this procurement in Ital wld not substitute for procurement in US but wld be net addition to US end-item prog. Hence funds required cld not be made available from end-item appropriations, without eliminating needed deliveries from US. However, this dol remittance to Fr—which we assume not already taken into acct in econ aid calculations—wld

[1] *Ante*, p. 168.

correspondingly reduce Fr requirements for econ aid, thereby rendering surplus equivalent amt ECA funds. In these circumstances, wld it not be reasonable for ECA reimburse Def under transferability clause in aid legislation? If such solution not reached, anticipate great difficulty finding funds finance Ital procurement.

4. More difficult case, in which so far as we know no "transferability" provision exists in legislation, relates to Def Dept expenditures on infrastructure, headquarters costs, etc. Here we are confronted with rigid US positions as to percentages it will contribute, although in fact, to extent higher contributions were offset by adjustments in econ aid, net cost to US wld remain unchanged. When such adjustments are contemplated, wld it not be reasonable for Def Dept to receive reimbursement from ECA out of econ aid funds thereby rendered surplus? Shld think that such arrangement wld make it much easier to obtain some negotiating latitude on such matters as infrastructure and headquarters costs.

5. Realize complications inherent in application foregoing principles, but they nonetheless seem basically sensible. Their adoption wld permit financial issues concerned to be decided on basis US interests as a whole, rather than on basis defending particular agency's appropriations.

[SPOFFORD]

740.5/7–351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, July 3, 1951—8 p. m.

Depto 14. Dept pouch Ottawa. Deputies 52 mtg July 2.

1. General Ely, new chairman SG, emphasized need for close and continued contact between SG and CD. For this reason he was glad to attend CD mtg and to announce appt of Major General Lindsey (USAF) a liaison officer between SG and CD.

Ely on behalf of SG accepted responsibility for preparation milit section of report for NA council mtg. SG draft will be submitted to CD but Ely emphasized that approval of milit comm wld be necessary. Fr dep asked if report wld cover progress made toward mtg DC–28? Ely replied report will cover first question, SHAPE and MRC are working on gap problem, and DC–28 is subj of current review since it is simply combination of regional planning group studies and possibly sets goals too high.

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[1] Repeated to the capitals of the other NATO countries and to Frankfurt, Heidelberg, and Wiesbaden.

2. Referring to questions raised in deps earlier discussions with Adm Wright, Ely pointed out: (*a*) Urgent attention being given to need for combat air-craft but that solution ultimately depends on natl contributions.

(*b*) Coordination of regional planning group work expected to be finally dealt with at July 10 mtg of chiefs of staff.

(*c*) Problem of planning for activities after first 90 days of possible war is in second priority to unsolved problems of first and second phase planning.

To UK question, Ely replied that from SG view most important function of deps in next few months will be to bring about creation of a force and this wld include solution of infrastructure problem.

[Here follows the summary of a discussion on how the proposed membership of Greece and Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty related to military command arrangements in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Middle East areas. For documentation on this subject, see pages 460 ff.]

5. Next council mtg. Fr expressed doubt that there wld be basis for substantial achievement by Sept. Several deps felt that if council met periodically for exchange of views and renewing contacts problem of expecting important public announcement after every mtg wld not arise. Most Depts seemed to agree with UK view that even if final solution not reached in such questions as West German defense role, Gr-Turk, of infrastructure, gap problem, and possibly an interim report on burden sharing, valuable impetus might be given by council discussion. It was suggested that since established procedure requires mtg preceding General Assembly, this cld be brief formal mtg possibly in Rome, but that real working session be held in Sept in Ottawa or Washington. Deps agreed to ask govts their views on date and place of mtg.

6. Next mtg July 5.

SPOFFORD

740.5/7–451 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, July 4, 1951—2 p. m.

Depto 15. From ECC to ISAC and White House for Harriman. Eisenhower has seen and concurred. (Impossible obtain Gen Handy's final concurrence, altho JAMAG has cleared. Handy will cable direct tomorrow.)

Re ISAC D-4/7*a*[1] and Todep 551, June 26.[2] ECC has, after consultation Gen Eisenhower, fol points re timing and manner divulging "gap" study to Congress and NATO countries:

1. Believe doc D-4/7*a* is very useful and generally agree with lines of action indicated therein. However, wld caution against both (*a*) taking the particular figures themselves too seriously in our own circles, and (*b*) giving impression to Congress or to other NATO countries that we fail to recognize numerous variables and likely margin of error. Shld rather consider them merely as giving gen order of magnitude and relationships in order to provide basis for NATO appraisal and Congressional understanding of problem which lies ahead. Concept of "gap" is a tool of analysis. If properly used it can be helpful in continuing reappraisal of requirements, in estimating target dates, and planning an orderly build-up in balanced phases. In this connection it is Gen Eisenhower's belief that altho a sharp tapering off of the program of US aid for Eur can unquestionably be foreseen, it is not now possible to set a definite date for this in terms more exact than "in about three years." Similarly, because of inherent uncertainty in estimates of requirements and of possible errors in estimates of capabilities, the date on which build up of forces can be completed must be expressed in same terms.

2. Believe we shld consider entire study (modified as per para 6 through 9 below) as showing that, in terms of presently projected programs (including appropriations) and presently estimated requirements, a substantial "gap" is indicated for mid 1954, and that three concurrent lines of development are required in order to narrow it as far as possible on that date. These lines are: (*a*) Continuing refinement of estimated mil requirements through successive revisions of plans and estimates and required scales of equipment and readjustment of build-up schedules in light of econ and financial feasibility; (*b*) Development of awareness by US, and particularly in Congress, that aid program must continue at high level for at least two years after FY 1952 (see also para 4 below); (*c*) Development of awareness among Eur NATO countries that their own present plans are not adequate (see paras 6, 7 and 8 below). We shld work out courses of action designed to contribute to these developments.

3. With respect to para 2(*a*) above it seems doubtful that renumerative work can be accomplished until the revision of Gen Eisenhower's def plan now under way has progressed to a point where new estimates of force requirements can be developed. Indications now are that this stage can be reached in approximately two months. Continuing efforts shld be made progressively to scale down equipment to the minimum consistent with the mission the forces are expected to perform. Fol the development of the revised estimates of force requirements, a reassessment of build-up schedules and target dates in light of econ and financial feasibility must be made. It must be made clear, however, that such a reassessment will influence, not the FY 1952 build-up requirements (including mil aid program) which are

[1] *Ante*, p. 193.
[2] *Ante*, p. 210.

already quite firm, but rather programs to be developed for subsequent years.

4. Re para 2(*b*) above, our limited experience with congressional groups here suggests that Congress may be more interested in seeing possibility of program being successfully completed within a stated time limit than in now getting relatively firm estimates of future cost. Consequently, see value in communicating net effect of D–4/7*a* to Congress without disclosing actual figures and saying that we intend to work out solution concurrently along the lines in para 2 above. If it shld become necessary to indicate general orders of magnitude to Congress, we shld stress caution along lines para 1. Reasonable expect this wld create confidence that that administration knows what it is about and it is not relying solely on US appropriations to perpetuate "hand-out" program. At same time it wld not dodge possibility which we must all envisage, namely, that future annual cost to US as well as to Eur NATO countries may exceed any of our current budgetary projections.

5. Balance this msg refers to para 2(c) above, i.e. to developing appropriate awareness among Eur NATO countries.

6. We have long been in favor of providing Eur NATO countries with a serious presentation of the extent to which present efforts fall below our (and their collective) estimate of requirements. However, we have also realized that this must be done most convincingly, and in such a way as not to run substantial risk of discouraging Eur NATO countries by creating impression that goal is not attainable. Suggest we can now do this by giving full D–4/7*a* study with caution along lines para 1 above and with analysis based on the spelling out of para 2 above. Serious Europeans who see D–4/7*a* presented in this way, will, we believe, be convinced of necessity of getting own and other Eur countries contributions up to the point of capability, although action might not fol until after NATO appraisal confirming gen magnitude US estimates.

7. For obvious reasons believe important we release SG costing submissions to all NAT countries (if necessary with appropriate deletions) prior tabling of US study based on those submissions.

8. Believe we shld not at this time push too hard in the direction of Eur commitments to meet cost of full MTDP build-up. Rather shld concentrate, pending full appraisal that will follow SHAPE study in para 3 above, on reaching Eur goals approximately the same as those in congressional presentation for FY 1952. These US unilateral goals are already known individually to most Eur countries. Recommend we be authorized not only to table D–4/7*a* study but to lay before other NATO countries as a group (*a*) comprehensive picture of these goals, together with (*b*) comprehensive picture of country-by-country aid figures, including value end-item aid to date and projected for FY 1952 (even on an illustrative basis) to show clearly where each country stands in our estimates of the job to be done. (This recommendation does not supersede that contained in Depto 1 of July 2 [3] which is for immed action here.) Presentation shld help convince the group as a whole that the goals we have set out for each member are related to our estimate of the requirements of the total program, and are also equitable in relation to the effort by, and aid to, each of the others.

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[3] Not printed.

9. Wish emphasize importance we attach to release end-item program values (para 8(*b*) above). Doubt purposes tabling D–4/7*a* and burden-sharing exercise can be achieved without this release. End-item programs for 1950 and 1951 already tabled in DPB in physical but not value terms and individual countries are aware tentative 52 end-item programs and data on US unit costs of major items. Probably also necessary in order make D–4/7*a* meaningful to other NATO countries that we show some sort of projections US aid for FY '53 and '54. Recommend that when initially tabling this study we make projections at FY '52 level and make clear that further US contribution if any (see first sentence second para statement quoted Todep 551) will still leave substantial deficit requiring increased Canadian and European efforts above their present plans.

10. You will see from above that we conceive presentation of D–4/7*a* as having limited but necessary value on European side now in that it can (*a*) get European govts to think in terms of increasing intensity and size of effort (where now feasible; France is probably the only exception at present), rather than in terms of justifying decisions already made, and (*b*) create pressures within Europe for increasing efforts of laggard countries. We must, however, think and plan beyond this presentation. In particular, believe we must provide the missing component in the whole MTDP as now seen by the Europeans. This component is the prospect of an affirmative and expanding future after some reasonable interval of time during which strains of rearmament are undergone. This prospect wld be based on (*a*) the emergence of a comprehensive, time-phased and well-balanced plan and (*b*) an awareness that mil security is necessary to real econ growth, that econ strength is necessary for mil security, and that the great increase in production and productivity incident to the rearmament program can be turned in time to improving the standard of living. Once this component has been supplied, believe there wld be new limits of econ and polit feasibility higher than our and European present estimates. Under such circumstances, "gap" may be closed in what after all is politically, strategically and morally the soundest way, i.e., through adequate European contributions willingly made. Separate message this points [*point?*] fols.

11. Also believe USDep and other US reps in NATO shld have advance instructs as to what response shld be made to queries resulting from release statement in Todep 551.

12. Wld greatly appreciate being kept currently informed by cable of all developments connected with this matter as it requires further planning here and affects current actions in other areas of NAT activity and preparation for ECC testimony before Congress. [ECC.]

SPOFFORD

740.5/7-651

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Martin) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) and the Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 6, 1951.

Subject: NATO Reorganization

I attach a draft statement of principles to re-invigorate NATO, which the Secretary asked, at our meeting on Tuesday,[1] be drawn up for submittal to the President. This draft reflects that discussion plus subsequent discussions with Mr. Ohly and Mr. Harriman. I should appreciate your comments before giving it to the Secretary, which I hope we might do not later than Monday.[2]

A second paper requested by the Secretary, indicating the precise steps which the adoption of these principles might call for, is in preparation.

[Attachment]

Draft Statement Prepared in the Department of State[3]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1951.

The North Atlantic Treaty Council of Deputies has now been functioning as a full-time body for a year.

General Eisenhower has been in Europe as the Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty forces there for nearly six months.

The United States Government has recently completed a first estimate of the cost, under present plans, of building up a defensive force for Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty.

The size of the job on this basis makes it imperative that extraordinary efforts be made to improve the ability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to cut costs to the bone and to see that the cost is fairly shared.

As the recognized leader in the North Atlantic Treaty operation the policies of the United States toward it are crucial to success. The organization through which the United States exercises its leadership is equally important. But neither the U.S. nor the Europeans can work effectively if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a whole is not set up and does not operate efficiently.

The importance to U.S. security of the success of the NATO effort and the need to follow up on the investment which we have already made in money, equipment, forces, and in the person of General Eisen-

[1] No record of this meeting has been found in the Department of State files.

[2] A handwritten notation on the source text of this covering memorandum, referring to the attached statement, reads "Sec[retary] saw."

[3] Presumably drafted by Martin (RA).

hower, all require a fundamental reexamination of present U.S. policies, of present U.S. organization and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as revealed by experience to date.

It is recommended that the U.S. Government agree to base its action in NATO and in handling U.S. military and economic aid for NAT countries on the following principles:

1. With respect to U.S. policy toward NATO:

a. Having recognized the NATO operation as vital to U.S. security, give it a corresponding priority in all U.S. activities;
b. To recognize that success in NATO is dependent on a spirit of cooperation and sacrifice which can only exist if the U.S. is prepared to act to the fullest extent, consistent with our global responsibilities, as a full partner;
c. To give more weight to NATO recommendations on defense efforts of NAT countries, including U.S. military and economic assistance, and rely less heavily on bilateral planning. Bilateral pressure by U.S. should be used primarily to get these NATO plans carried out.

2. With respect to U.S. organization:

a. To delegate responsibility much more extensively to our regional and country representatives in Europe, including General Eisenhower and U.S. personnel attached to him;
b. To provide for more effective central direction and coordination of the activities of U.S. representatives in Europe;
c. To arrange fuller participation by General Eisenhower and his U.S. staff in all U.S. activities connected with NATO in Europe.

3. With respect to NATO organization:

a. To provide for more active international leadership in NATO matters from the highest political levels;
b. To transfer as rapidly as possible from the area of committee action by unanimous consent to action by international staffs, as for example that headed by General Eisenhower, all NATO work not involving decisions on matters of important national policy.

740.5/7–951

Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1951.

Thank you for letting me see Mr. Martin's memorandum on NATO reorganization.[1] I am not sufficiently abreast of developments on this subject to have any useful ideas, but I miss any statement of ultimate objectives in what apparently is a rather basic paper laying out prin-

[1] *Supra.*

ciples which we should follow in regard to NATO. I wonder if we have a clear idea of the kind of development in and through NATO which we would consider desirable. The impression I get from reading this paper (and it may be a wholly erroneous impression) is that we still regard NATO as an interim mechanism for handling a current defense problem. The feeling I got in Europe was that NATO had the potentiality of being a permanent base on which some kind of more solid political structure could be built in the future. In short, it seems to me before determining U.S. policy toward NATO and organizational aspects, we ought to have a clear idea of what we expect NATO to amount to over the course of a number of years not only from the point of view of basic defense needs but from broader political considerations.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, Paris Repto : Telegram

The United States Special Representative in Europe (Katz) to the Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Foster)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, July 16, 1951—9 p. m.

Repto 3411. For Foster and Bissell; pass Dept for Perkins and Cabot. Limit distribution.

1. Fol recent conversation Stikker with Eisenhower, Stikker and Marjolin with Harriman, Stikker and Marjolin with me, Stikker arranged dinner July 11 taking advantage presence ministers for OEEC meeting July 12. Present were Stikker, Gaitskell, Schuman and Petsche, Pella, Snoy for Van Zeeland who had been delayed, Langhalle Deputy Foreign Minister for Norway representing Lange, Werkmeister of German delegation representing Bluecher, Marjolin, Hall-Patch and I.

2. Stikker opened talk by expressing concern over degree to which apathy and uneasiness seemed to persist in many quarters in Europe. In Netherlands, there were widespread doubts whether things were sufficiently under control and whether country really knew where it was going. He pointed to Commie strength in recent elections in Italy and France and to difficulties raised by Bevan, Wilson, *et al*, in England, as indication that these conditions not confined to Netherlands. This has hampered development unity and has been element of inertia in way of defense program. He called on each of those present to speak in turn about his own country and about conditions generally.

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[1] Repeated to London for Spofford and Batt; to Paris for Bruce, Schuyler, and MacArthur; and to Heidelberg for Handy.

3. With varied degrees of emphasis, there was general concurrence with Stikker's appraisal of existing condition. Conversation then turned to lines of action to deal with it.

4. Although discussion was varied, and much of it rambling and vague, a general trend in thinking seemed gradually to emerge. This shaped itself around ideas which many of us have been examining in recent weeks. It wld be premature to try evaluate practical significance this trend in their thinking, and nothing at all may come of it. At same time, those present spoke with so much feeling, conversation seems worth reporting. Without trying indicate various shades of emphasis of different participants, I will attempt give general summary principal elements in my own words.

5. Apart from varied specific situations requiring specific remedial steps, an underlying moral and psychological source of difficulty was identified. This is fact that European leadership has to unfortunate degree allowed NATO purpose and defense build-up to take on negative character in minds of Europeans. Despite majority support for defense program, there is even among strong supporters excessive tendency to regard it as kind of caster oil which has to be taken. There is uneasy question in people's minds as to how long this will go on, what it will do to economy, and where it is leading them. There has been no adequate attempt on part European leaders to answer this question.

6. Key requirement is to present purposes, policies and action of NATO in positive terms, as realistic program leading Europe to a promising future. Defense build-up must be understood as integral part such program. This must and can be done, and actual facts, if understood, fully warrant it. It is duty European leadership to make this clear to people of Europe, in such way as to give new impetus to defense build-up.

7. Such a positive orientation wld center fol principal elements:

(*a*) Great potential for increasing European production and productivity. After indispensable capital build-up military establishment defense effort can be reduced to maintenance basis, and expanded capacity production developed in course defense build-up can and will be turned to renewed expansion European economic strength and standard of living.

(*b*) Balanced time-phasing. Looking back on period 1947–50, we can now see that, in light of conditions subsequently revealed, free world had neglected its defenses. As compensation, during period 1950–53 or 54, especially intensive attention has to be given to defense build-up. Over total period of, let us say, 1947–57, Europe can and will achieve both necessary defense build-up to establish security against aggression and resumption upward trend in standard of living.

(*c*) Defense build-up and increasing economic strength are not only mutually consistent, they are mutually necessary. For free people, resources devoted to defense build-up to maintain liberty can in no

sense be thought of as marginal, but are fundamental necessity. Beyond this, however, there can be no real and lasting economic recovery and progress in Europe without military security. While fear of war and invasion remains, skillfully exploited by Soviets there can be no real monetary stability, effective investment program, long-term planning, or full-scale effort by management, labor or farmers. At same time, economic strength is equally necessary to real defense of Europe.

8. In concluding meeting Stikker raised question how conclusions cld and shld be followed up. He indicated he wld try to develop a proposed course of action with assistance Marjolin. Gaitskell emphasized his conviction that meeting had been most useful, and called for frequent repetition of such full and candid exchange of views. At least verbally, the need was accepted for European leadership to take responsibility for reorientation thinking people of Europe so as to give fresh impetus and constructive significance to defense program. It remains to be seen whether this acceptance goes deep enough to lead to action.

9. On July 12, Van Zeeland called on me for private talk along same lines; evening July 12, I dined with Gaitskell and covered similar ground. He particularly raised question how follow up the talk in practical way through NATO. He intended discuss this with Schuman.

10. While as indicated it is quite unclear what will come of it, we will endeavor encourage fruitful development in every practicable way.

KATZ

740.5/7–1951

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance (Ohly) to the Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 19, 1951.

As requested by you, I have reviewed the proposed statement of principles[1] prepared for transmittal through Secretary Acheson to the President. Although I realize the inherent difficulty in preparing a statement of this character, particularly when consideration is given to the method in which it will be used, my review nonetheless leads me to make certain general and specific remarks. Some of these remarks would not necessarily lead to changes in the paper but rather represent caveats that we should have in mind.

As to general remarks, I have the following:

[1] Presumably this is a reference to the attachment to the memorandum by Martin, July 6, p. 217.

1. The paper fails to recognize that SHAPE is only one of several commands that have been or will be established under NATO. Therefore, unless it is intended to increase the scope of SHAPE or to give General Eisenhower, either in his international or national capacity, powers other than those which he holds as SACEUR, certain of the conclusions in the statements in the paper do not make complete sense or must be interpreted as indicative of similar unmentioned conclusions with respect to other NATO commands. If the latter interpretation is correct, then doubt is thrown on the value and workability of certain of the proposals which are made, since instead of unity in the performance of certain actions, there will be multiplicity. I also call attention to the fact that substantial quantities of equipment will be going to forces which are not under any NATO command, either because they will be performing national tasks such as in-shore coastal protection or because they are training units.

2. The paper fails to distinguish between the functions of a field or theater command and the functions of a general staff, or else considers such a distinction to be unimportant. This raises the question of the extent to which we wish SHAPE to become a general staff and to assume the innumerable functions inherent in a general staff operation. While this is a perfectly possible proposal, we should consider very thoroughly whether the assumption of such functions by SHAPE will not prove such a huge task that it will prevent Eisenhower from adequately discharging and concentrating upon the principal tasks of a theater commander. It has been my understanding that Eisenhower did not want to take over the problems of national training, the determination of national equipment requirements, the establishment of tables of organization and equipment, the operation of schools, and all the thousand and one other functions that would fall to his organization if we moved too far toward the general staff concept.

3. The statement fails to distinguish between principles that should be ultimate goals and the principles that perhaps should govern our actions as a means toward reaching those goals. For example, paragraph 1*c* states that we should place more weight on NATO recommendations and rely less heavily on bilateral planning. I agree, but the real problem is to force the development of NATO recommendations which can be an appropriate guide to U.S. action in lieu of the bilateral approach.

In the realm of the more specific, I have the following comments:

1. While I believe this would be highly desirable, if these individuals can be persuaded or directed to take the time involved, I have serious doubts as to how, from a practical standpoint, Harriman, Acheson, Marshall and Foster can satisfactorily review the effectiveness with which Washington agencies are coordinated to insure prompt and energetic action. I believe this matter is of such importance that these men, in spite of their other responsibilities, should devote the necessary time, which in my opinion means their acceptance of the fact that it will mean a minimum of 2 or 3 days of continuous joint concentration on this problem. I suggest also that Bradley might be an appropriate addition to this group.

2. I have already commented from a general standpoint under 3

above, on the opening sentence in paragraph 1*c* of the proposed statement of principles. I would like to add one additional point, and that is to caution against the kind of generalization implicit in this sentence. While I agree that we must give more and more weight to NATO recommendations, even to the extent of taking the risk that these recommendations may be less soundly founded than the judgment of our own government, I believe that there are areas in which, because of the nature of the problems involved, we shall always need to rely heavily on bilateral planning. The attempt to concentrate too many decisions of too many different types in international institutions is likely to be followed with the curse that so often characterizes bigness. There should be real power in NATO central institutions and we should be prepared to accept that exercise of power, but we should at the same time recognize that the areas to which such power should extend in practice will for many months, and probably many years, be limited by human incapability of quickly devising the institutions that can handle a large number of the matters now the subject of bilateral dealings.

3. Paragraph 2*a* of the statement of principles strikes me as another dangerous generalization, although I realize that the nature of this statement makes a certain amount of generalization necessary. At the conclusion of this paragraph I am left with a very confused concept. What kind of thing specifically is it intended that one should delegate, and is the delegation a delegation within the U.S. government or a delegation within the NATO organization? What kind of things is it that we have in mind delegating to "General Eisenhower and the U.S. personnel attached to him"?

4. I am somewhat confused by the first sentence in 2*b*. Does it mean that there should be central guidance from Washington to all NATO elements in Europe or that in Europe there should be a focal point, namely Spofford or the ECC, which provides central guidance to all U.S.-NATO elements?

5. With respect to paragraph 2*c*, I comment merely that SHAPE is only one of several NATO commands.

6. With respect to paragraph 3*b*, I again note that SHAPE is only one of several commands and that the MTDP encompasses, I believe, certain tasks which are not under General Eisenhower. I would also, and this goes back to my general comment concerning the dangers of placing too many loads on SHAPE, have serious doubt about fixing responsibility for standardization on a field or theater commander.

740.5/7–2051 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, July 20, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 88. ToISA. For ISAC from ECC.

1. We believe part II Todep 468 May 29 (rptd Paris 6455 and

[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR and MacArthur, to Frankfurt, and to Heidelberg for Handy.

Heidelberg 252)[2] provides workable framework for US action to stimulate level Eur mil prod, and we desire combine this objective with that of promoting sensible long-term Eur mil prod pattern. Specifically, in view increasingly critical time factor in getting available prod capacities under way, we propose substantial proportion of 1952 end-item aid now programmed for ammunition and to extent practicable US spare parts be earmarked for procurement in Eur. Even if and when Eur def budgets for 1952 raised to level US estimated optimum fin capability, there will still be large latent unused physical capacity and large deficiency in ammo and spare parts. To utilize this capacity to meet deficiency will require dol procurement. Furthermore, we believe Eur countries shld be pressed in direction attaining self-sufficiency in these recurrent items at earliest possible date and in any case after 1954. This proposal directed toward achievement all aims set forth in part I Todep 468, and ammo and spare parts represent very critical deficiencies worthy full US support.

2. In order to forestall expectation that US will embark on general program of buying in Eur end-items for Eur forces and consequent disincentives involved, recommend we present this program as one limited strictly to ammo and spare parts for main purpose of stimulating in Eur type of prod which will be necessary to long-term support of rearmament program, and consequent reduction end-item deliveries from US. If ISAC concurs in gen with this proposal, region will submit detailed catalogue of items, quantities, and producing and recipient countries in accordance with para 11 of Todep 468. Quantities, recipients, and delivery schedules will be in consonance with presently proposed FY–1952 end-item prog. Producers will be determined after consultation with coordinator and DP staff.

3. We note that effects these operations upon Eur countries fin and econ position will vary widely, depending upon channels through which procurement dols are remitted and what consequent adjustments are made in US aid progs. Without analyzing these effects in detail, desire urge consideration fol principles to govern admin of prog.

(*a*). Taking due cognizance prod capabilities, selection of producing and recipient countries should be directed to maximum extent toward those countries whose planned def expenditures for FY–1952 most nearly approximate US capability estimates. As soon as legislation permits, believe we should also stimulate mil prod in countries falling short of capabilities by exercising appropriate influence over expenditures from econ aid counterpart funds.

(*b*). If country has reached capability level for FY–1952, we should recognize that additional effort stimulated by US procurement (unless offset by cut-backs elsewhere in country's def prog) will require additional inflow of real resources to meet scarce materials requirements

[2] *Ante*, p. 168.

and to avoid gen inflationary threat. This may mean necessity for increased flow non-mil supplies and materials from dol area, although not on full 1 to 1 basis.

(*c*). Diversion end-item funds to Eur procurement shld permit some net economies in US econ aid progs. Such savings might be transferred to end-item funds to finance additional procurement in Eur or US.

4. In light of foregoing, we no longer press for adoption of particular multilateral interim financing scheme recommended in London Embtel 5242 of Apr 4.[3] We note from para 14 of part II Todep 468 that action along lines your proposal, or variants thereof, would be "without prejudice to some more permanent multilateral system". We plan to continue studying such possibilities, such as Belg proposal recently submitted FEB (see Paris 3393 July 13[4]). [ECC.]

SPOFFORD

[3] *Ante*, p. 118.
[4] Not printed.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, Briefing Materials for Forthcoming NAT Council Meeting

Memorandum of a Joint Meeting of the International Security Affairs Committee (ISAC) With the European Coordinating Committee (ECC) at the Department of State, July 30, 1951, 2:30–5:15 p. m.

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 31, 1951.

ISAC 35

Present:

Department of State
Messrs. Cabot, Chairman
Bell
Bray
Martin
Parsons
Stone
Sheppard

Department of Defense
Mr. Nash
Maj. Gen. Scott
Colonel Beebe
Colonel Van Syckle
Captain Thorp
Mr. Van Atten

Economic Cooperation Administration
Messrs. Halaby
Bissell
Paul

Department of the Treasury
Messrs. Hebbard
Widman

ECC
Ambassador Spofford
Ambassador Katz
Mr. Batt
Maj. General Kibler
Lt. Colonel Powell
Mr. Ketcham, USDEP
Mr. Knapp, USDEP
Mr. Haun, OSR
Mr. Lindeman, OSR
Mr. Ostrander, OSR
Colonel Goodum, JAMAG
Colonel O'Hara, JAMAG
Colonel Pattison, JAMAG

Executive Office of the President
Messrs. Gordon
Schelling

Bureau of the Budget
Messrs. Staats
Lawson
Macy

Secretariat
Messrs. Hickman
Christensen
Denny

MTDP—Meeting the Gap

1. Mr. Cabot referred to the NSC review on the status of programs [1] and indicated that the ECC members would be sent copies of the ISAC review of foreign aid programs.[2]

Improvement in European Production

2. Mr. Cabot noted that the second ECC proposal on increasing production in Europe had been approved by the ISAC agencies, and that they were prepared to go even further than had been proposed by ECC. Mr. Bissell reported on the proposal which he had prepared, and referring to Todep 468 and Depto 88,[3] he said that the steps outlined in these cables have 4 general goals: (1) to expand the total amount of military production; (2) to carry out (1) in a manner which will stimulate the European countries to finance more of the production themselves; (3) to promote a more rational distribution of production; and (4) to give stimulus to making the European countries more self-sufficient. He proposed the following lines of ac-

[1] For documentation on NSC review of national security programs, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.
[2] The ISAC review has not been found in the Department of State files.
[3] Dated May 29 and July 20, p. 168, and *supra*.

tion: (1) to proceed with the approved plans for off-shore procurement as outlined in Todep 468 and modified by Depto 88; (2) while not delaying (1), to induce the Europeans to set aside as large a portion of counterpart funds as possible for procurement under plans developed by the DPB; and (3) to work toward the establishment of a central procurement agency in Europe, a long-range objective relating to the establishment of a European army. He noted that the following rationale should be applied to any plan for off-shore procurement: (1) the U.S. should press the European countries to the feasible limit of their capabilities; (2) off-shore procurement should begin in those countries which come closest to having an adequate defense effort. In countries like France additional economic aid might be given in order that they would be capable of filling off-shore procurement orders. Mr. Bissell said that it should be possible and desirable to carry out these steps in such a way so as not to breach the reserve principle and to still serve the principle of burden sharing. Off-shore procurement when carried out within a country should reduce the amount of economic aid needed. Initially it is contemplated that off-shore procurement will be carried on with end-item funds and then as savings accrue in economic aid, funds for the latter will be transferred to the end-item funds. In conclusion he said that nothing in his paper contradicted the two cables referred to above, and that he attached great importance to proceeding with the counterpart proposal.

3. Mr. Cabot asked if our off-shore procurement would be limited to those items listed in Todep 468. Mr. Bissell said that it probably would be for the time being, but added that at any given time the Europeans should know that the DPB is developing additional programs which may be carried on through this special device. Mr. Gordon suggested that Mr. Bissell's statement on "guidance by the DPB" be amended to read "upon the recommendation of the Coordinator" in order that the difficulties presented by the unanimity rule in DPB be avoided. Mr. Batt pointed out that the DPB has not followed a unanimity rule. Ambassador Katz suggested that since a procedure for coordination on U.S. procurement through SUSRep had been agreed upon only after lengthy negotiations, this system not be changed. Mr. Batt said that it was his understanding that this would not constitute a change in procedure since coordination would still be handled through SUSRep. Mr. Gordon said that his suggestion was designed to strengthen the DPB through acceptance of recommendations of the Coordinator and his staff.

4. Ambassador Spofford suggested that the U.S. utilize existing procedures but that Mr. Batt should consult the Coordinator and give weight to his views in the placing of procurement orders. Mr. Halaby asked if this meant that the Coordinator would recommend programs

and then that our procurement agents would carry them out if possible. MR. BATT said that this was his understanding but in the event that it was not possible to carry out the recommendations that Mr. Herod should be notified as soon as possible and he could submit alternative proposals.

5. MR. GORDON noted that in paragraph 3 A of Depto 88 it is hinted that the U.S. will limit the recipients of off-shore procurement to those who are coming closest to their defense targets and he asked if this was the understanding of the group. MR. BATT said that he did not think that this could be applied. When the goods are produced they will be given to those who need them. MR. GORDON pointed out that the Belgians, for example, are doing less than they are apparently capable of. However, since they are a good source of ammunition production, if orders were placed there it would probably be better to give the ammunition to the French. MR. BATT said that the placing of orders was not a military matter but a production one. MR. MARTIN pointed out that not all orders placed would be "bonuses" in view of shortages in material, the necessity for greater imports, etc. MR. BISSELL said that it would not be feasible to avoid placing orders in countries falling short of the production goals which we feel are possible. He said that if orders were placed in a country like Belgium that it might be possible to subtract the dollars added through this method from their portion of economic aid. However, he suggested that a decision on this portion of the question be delayed until a later date.

6. MR. CABOT asked if it was the view of Defense that off-shore procurement should be limited to ammunition and spare parts. MR. NASH stated that it was the view of Defense that procurement should begin with these two items but that they would like to see the principle extended beyond these two items if possible.

7. MR. BATT referred to contracts being placed by private firms in Western Europe and expressed the view that where private firms develop plans for the production in Europe of spare parts, for example, that it would not be a matter of concern for DPB. MR. BISSELL expressed agreement and said that it should be made clear that a plan being discussed involved off-shore procurement *for* the Europeans and that it should not interfere with the regular procurement by the U.S. Air Force, etc. AMBASSADOR SPOFFORD suggested that since we will gain a considerable amount of experience in the next 60 days that many of these problems be worked out as we go along. MR. CABOT then proposed that Mr. Bissell draft a paper on his proposal for submission to ISAC and it was *agreed* that this paper would be considered at the next joint session with the ECC representatives if possible.

8. With reference to central procurement, MR. BATT proposed that a definite decision on this be delayed, as in the case of distribution of

off-shore procurement items. He suggested, however, that Defense should make certain that the legislation be amended with reference to procurement procedures in order that buying abroad will be made easier. MR. NASH said that the main question was that of how to approach Congress. Although it might be possible to seek an amendment in the MSP for more liberalized provisions, the chances of the bill might be hurt in view of the strength of the "buy American" forces.

9. MR. BISSELL said that the Congressional Committees had already been given testimony on off-shore procurement and that they seemed generally to approve it in principle. MR. GORDON said that this question should be pursued now before Congress if at all. He added that the MSP seemed to be a favorable framework for this device and expressed doubt that the "buy America" group would carry too much weight against a provision for production in Europe for the Europeans. MR. CABOT suggested that Defense investigate whether an amendment was necessary to overcome the obstacles presented by the renegotiation and buy America provisions. If so, he asked that Mr. Nash work out a plan for an approach to Congress and the other agencies will give their support to it.

10. MR. CABOT said that even though Mr. Batt had suggested that we should delay action on the use of counterpart funds as proposed by Mr. Bissell in order to concentrate on off-shore procurement, would it not be possible to take the two steps simultaneously. MR. BISSELL said that the counterpart problem was an urgent one and one which ECA wished to discuss with the European countries under the August allotments. He felt that both off-shore procurement and the counterpart measures could be undertaken concurrently. MR. GORDON asked how much of the counterpart funds would be set aside in view of Mr. Bissell's statement indicating that it should be "as large an amount as can be negotiated." He said that we would have to wait and see what the DPB is capable of doing in order that portions of the Defense budgets not be immobilized through waiting for DPB recommendations. MR. BISSELL said that he agreed, but although negotiations on setting aside counterpart funds for procurement will begin in August, a sizeable sum will probably not be accumulated until mid-autumn.

11. MR. MARTIN suggested that the first step should be to go ahead with the programs recommended by DPB while not immobilizing any of the funds, and secondly, to get as much counterpart as possible set aside in the European budgets as we reach agreement on progams. MR. BISSELL noted that it was Ambassador Katz's view that there should be no U.S. dollars in a central procurement fund and that the Europeans themselves should decide on the disposition of these funds. He added that the Ambassador also felt that U.S. dollars should be used instead for off-shore procurement. MR. GORDON said that this

would mean in fact that we would be urging the Europeans to cooperate in a venture to which we would not contribute. He said that our rationale for using a system of off-shore procurement rather than contributing to a central fund could easily be applied to all other countries.

12. Ambassador Katz, who had just returned to the meeting, said that in considering contributions to the central procurement agency he did not believe that it was possible to separate the method of procurement from the things procured. He pointed out that each European country would receive equipment equivalent to the amount of money contributed while this would not be true for the U.S. should it contribute to a central fund. Actually, he continued, a central fund would be an indirect method of procurement and the central procurement agency would not distribute the items procured.

13. Mr. Cabot asked how orders and items procured would be distributed under the counterpart plan proposed by Mr. Bissell. Mr. Bissell expressed the belief that we should avoid restrictions on the placing of orders. He said that he was not certain that a country contributing $10 million in counterpart funds would necessarily receive $10 million worth of items. Ambassador Katz said that actually the countries would be buying through Mr. Herod rather than directly under a central procurement agency. Mr. Gordon said that Mr. Herod would be providing guidance to the countries rather than acting as a regular procurement officer such as we have for the U.S. He suggested that the U.S. should also be subjected to such "guidance". It was *agreed* that Mr. Martin should draft a cable requesting SUSRep to begin working with Mr. Herod on plans for procurement.

14. Mr. Batt said that both Mr. Herod and SUSRep were very concerned because an enormous amount of unused military production capacity was going to waste each month in Europe. Mr. Gordon pointed out that DPB has not considered all of the "bottlenecks" in production and moreover he felt that it would not be desirable to use, for example, the full munitions capacity in Europe since it would mean that more consumer goods would have to be supplied.

15. General Scott asked whether a determination could be made as to what goods could best be provided to the Europeans by end-item aid and which by off-shore procurement. He expressed the view that off-shore procurement would probably be limited to ammunition and spare parts. Mr. Martin said that the DPB would not be limited to consideration of these two items alone, but that primary emphasis would be placed upon them initially. General Scott also pointed out that there are already a great many demands on counterpart funds and many of the purposes for which these funds are presently used are highly important. It was *agreed* that further consideration would be

given to the question of improving European production at the next joint meeting of ISAC and ECC.[4]

[Here follow discussions of the NATO forces gap, the pattern of aid negotiations for fiscal year 1952, and the extent of German production and troop contributions to the European defense effort.]

[4] The second joint meeting was held on Wednesday, August 1, 3:30–6:20 p. m. at the Department of State. Assistant Secretaries McNeil (Defense), Bendetsen (Army), and McFall (State) were present and participated in a detailed discussion of the infrastructure program. Also under discussion were the U.S. policy toward burden-sharing, a memorandum by Lincoln Gordon on the work of the DPB, the development of the fiscal year 1953 aid program, and the attitude of NATO countries toward rearmament. The memorandum of this meeting, dated August 2, is in the CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, Briefing Materials for Forthcoming NAT Council Meeting.

740.5/7–2051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 1, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 67. Pass to SUSRep. To ISA.

1. At joint ECC–ISAC mtg July 30 agreement reached to proceed immediately on program outlined in Todep 468 [2] as modified by Depto 88.[3] This will be one of several coordinated moves which include negotiating for use of counterpart funds for military procurement and development as soon as possible multilateral arrangements for financing DPB production programs, possibly using US counterpart. Further discussion this subject expected at joint ECC–ISAC mtg Aug. 1.

2. It is therefore requested that SUSRep in cooperation with DPB Coordinator prepare urgently program for US off-shore procurement of ammunition and spare parts as suggested in para 2 of Depto 88. It has been agreed that US will make known to NATO countries that in accordance with presently agreed procedures for consulting SUSRep it will seek recommendations from DPB and Coordinator on its off-shore procurement programs, and will follow them to maximum extent possible. Hence hope will be closest working relations with DPB Coordinator in developing these programs.

3. FYI only this is an initial step. Extension to other fields will depend on experience with these items.

4. This off-shore procurement program will utilize US end item

[1] Repeated to Paris for Katz and MacArthur and to Heidelberg for Handy. Martin (RA) drafted the telegram and cleared it with Halaby (ECA), Colonel Van Syckle (Defense), Bell (S/ISA), Gordon (White House), and Knapp (on temporary duty at Washington). Martin signed for the Secretary.

[2] May 29, p. 168.

[3] July 20, p. 223.

funds, account to be taken of financial effects in line with para 3 *b* and *c* of Depto 88.

5. It was agreed that criteria set forth in para 3–*a* of Depto 88 wld apply primarily in the selection of recipient countries and that selection of producing countries shld be guided largely, though not exclusively, by production and efficiency considerations.

6. It is desired to proceed with this off-shore procurement program urgently. Def representatives are reviewing legal problems, such as those which have arisen in case of French electronics project in attempt to reduce procurement difficulties to minimum.

ACHESON

740.5/8–251

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 2, 1951.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to my letter of 24 February 1951,[1] concerning the North Atlantic Treaty reorganization. Since the reorganization, I have considered what additional action is desirable to give effect to the new status of the North Atlantic Council. I have come to the conclusion that there should be three actions: first, to amend the Terms of Reference for the Deputy United States Representative, North Atlantic Council, as approved by the President on 16 December 1950,[2] to provide for his representation of the Secretary of Defense; second, to proceed with our agreement for the provision to the Deputy United States Representative of a representative of the Department of Defense with a small staff; third, to reach an understanding as to the duties of the Department of Defense representative.

The close relations between our two Departments have been satisfactory to us in dealing with NATO affairs. I believe that the arrangements should continue in their present pattern, but with an even closer tie-in to ensure harmony in United States actions in NATO, particularly between the Standing Group and the Council Deputies. The advent of the International Security Affairs Committee expands and strengthens the inter-departmental relationships in NATO affairs for the review and coordination of policy and programs. I consider that the specific responsibilities of our respective Departments for NATO operational details require continuing efforts to perfect our relationship in addition to the International Security Affairs Committee. I believe that the various directives and charters concerned with these matters should be reviewed from time to time for this purpose.

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[1] The text is printed in telegram Todep 272 to London, February 26, p. 65.

[2] The 1950 terms of reference are printed together with Lovett's proposed changes in them as enclosure "A" of this August 2 memorandum.

I wish to point out that while the Department of Defense representative furnished the United States Deputy, North Atlantic Council, would be a fully assigned member of his personal staff, it is considered that in order for him to be effective in his function of advising and assisting the United States Deputy in politico-military matters, he must be responsible to the Secretary of Defense. I believe this to be consistent with the new responsibilities of the United States Deputy in Defense matters and that harmonious relationship can be developed.

I believe it would be fitting that this individual should be accorded the stature of Vice Deputy United States Representative, North Atlantic Council, for Defense matters, provided a Vice Deputy were appointed also for political affairs. We regard the appointment as a matter of importance and believe it should carry the grade of Major General or the equivalent if the post is filled by a military officer, and the rank of Minister, if filled by a civilian. We do not wish to stipulate whether the person selected be military or civilian, since any selection would be made on a personal basis.

I enclose herewith draft papers dealing in detail with my conclusions in paragraph one, above.[3] If you are in general agreement with them I propose an early meeting in order to conclude the necessary arrangements leading to the appointment.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Very sincerely yours ROBERT A. LOVETT

Enclosure "A"

DRAFT: PROPOSED CHANGES TO TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR DEPUTY UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AS APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT, DECEMBER 16, 1950

Page 1:

Paragraph 2*b*, line 2, insert the word "a" between the words "as" and "United."

Insert a new paragraph 2*c*, as follows:

"Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense in the performance of the latter's duties as a United States member of the North Atlantic Council and as necessary advise and assist such other United States

[3] Enclosures "B" and "C" are not printed. The former consisted of an unsigned and undated draft entitled "Administrative Arrangements for the Department of Defense Representative to the Deputy United States Representative, North Atlantic Council" and a memorandum dated February 8, 1950, on the subject of "Budgeting for North Atlantic Treaty Activities," by W. J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). The memorandum was addressed to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administrative and Public Affairs). Enclosure "C" was an unsigned and undated draft entitled "An Understanding of the Duties of the Department of Defense Representative to the Deputy United States Representative, North Atlantic Council."

representatives as may be attending sessions of the North Atlantic Council."

Renumber the present paragraphs 2*c* and 2*d* to read "2*d*" and "2*e*" respectively.

Paragraph 3, add the following as a continuation of the first sentence and an additional second sentence:

"as pertains to policies and actions which are the responsibilities of the Department of State and/or government as a whole. Those coordinated instructions pertaining to Department of Defense responsibilities shall be transmitted through the Secretary of Defense."

Page 2:

Paragraph 5*a*, line 2, insert the following: ", the Department of Defense" between the words "State" and "or."

Paragraph 8, line 3, insert between the first and second sentences the following sentence:

"He shall also keep the Secretary of Defense informed on those specific activities which are of particular concern to that Department."

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR DEPUTY UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

1. The United States Representative to the North Atlantic Council of Deputies shall have the title "Deputy United States Representative, North Atlantic Council" (hereinafter referred to as United States Deputy). He shall have the personal rank of Ambassador.

2. The United States Deputy shall have the following functions:

a. represent the United States Government in the work of the North Atlantic Council of Deputies;

b. advise and assist the Secretary of State in the performance of the latter's duties as United States member of the North Atlantic Council and senior United States representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

c. serve as the senior United States representative for Mutual Defense Assistance in Europe, and as the State Department member and chairman of the European Coordinating Committee (ECC); and

d. in conformance with Washington policy guidance assure political-economic-military coordination as among U.S. representatives to NATO stationed overseas in NAT planning and negotiations, and provide coordinated advice to Washington on policy matters as directed.

3. The United States Deputy shall receive coordinated instructions from the United States Government through the Secretary of State.

4. The United States Deputy shall normally communicate with the other NATO Governments through their respective Deputies. He may, however, as appropriate, communicate directly with other NAT Governments at the ministerial level provided that in so doing he shall:

a. fully inform the Secretary of State, and other interested agencies through the Secretary of State, of any major policy aspects contained in such direct communications;

b. make such communications with the knowledge of or through the United States Ambassadors to the countries concerned.

5. The headquarters of the United States Deputy shall be in London. The staff of the United States Deputy shall consist of:

a. individuals permanently assigned to the office of the United States Deputy by the Department of State or other United States agencies;

b. individuals assigned at the request of or with the consent of the U.S. Deputy to perform the work for him as long as they are performing such work;

c. individuals assigned by the Secretary of State as advisers or as members of U.S. delegations to NAT bodies meeting in Europe; and

d. the Executive Director of ECC and his staff.

6. *a.* The United States Deputy shall be ex officio an advisory member of United States delegations to all NAT bodies, and he shall receive from such delegations full and current information as to their activities, exclusive of detailed military planning.

b. The advice and assistance of the Office of Special Representative of the Economic Cooperation Administration and other non-military overseas U.S. officers and staffs engaged in NAT planning and operations, and including military production staffs, shall be made available to the United States Deputy.

c. The policies and views of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff on pertinent military matters and also military advice and assistance when requested by the United States Deputy in discharge of his duties, shall be provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representatives in Europe.

7. The United States Deputy shall be a member of the European Representatives Group (EURREG); he shall consult frequently with the United States Ambassadors to the other North Atlantic Treaty countries.

8. The United States Deputy shall report his activities currently to the Secretary of State and through him to such other United States agencies as may be appropriate. In addition he shall take measures to insure the furnishing of such information on activities of the NAT and MDAP, exclusive of war planning, as is in his possession to United States representatives on other NAT bodies and to the United States Ambassadors in NAT countries.

9. The United States Deputy, as Chairman of the Council of Deputies, may contribute the members of his staff or may arrange for the contribution of other available U.S. personnel for service on any international staff created by or authorized to act on behalf of the Council Deputies.

HARRY TRUMAN

Approved: December 16, 1950.

740.5/8–651

Statement Prepared in the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 6, 1951.

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING UNITED STATES RELATIONS TO NATO

The importance to U.S. Security of the success of the North Atlantic Treaty effort and the need to follow up on the investment which we have already made in money, equipment, forces, and in the person of General Eisenhower, all justify a restatement of U.S. policies regarding the North Atlantic Treaty and the organization of U.S. activities in NATO, in the light of experience to date.

The central objective at the present time is to secure promptly the forces, adequately trained and equipped, necessary to the defense of the Atlantic community. The U.S. Government will base its action in NATO and in handling U.S. military and economic aid for NAT countries and U.S. force contributions on the following principles:

A. Having recognized the NATO operation as an integral and vital aspect of U.S. security, give it a corresponding importance in all U.S. activities. Decisions at all levels of the U.S. Government must reflect an understanding of this principle.

B. Recognize that success in NATO is dependent on a spirit of willing cooperation and sacrifice on the part of all members, which can only exist if the U.S. is prepared to act, to the maximum extent consistent with our global responsibilities, as a full partner.

C. Recognizing that the effectiveness of NATO agencies is vital

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[1] This statement was developed from the first draft of July 6, attached to the memorandum by Martin of that date, p. 217, and was transmitted by Cabot to Secretary Acheson on August 6 in a memorandum which read as follows: "The attached statement of Principles Governing U.S. Relations to NATO has been developed in consultation with Messrs. Jessup, Perkins, Ferguson, Martin and Lincoln Gordon. I believe it was your idea to get General Marshall's agreement to these principles and then to submit the paper to the President for his approval. You might wish to cable the contents of the paper to Mr. Harriman before submitting it to General Marshall inasmuch as this statement was developed in large part from ideas which Mr. Harriman expressed to you on his return from Europe. We will of course welcome any suggestions which you may have as to this paper."

In an answering memorandum dated August 8, not printed, Robert Barnes of the Policy Reports Staff informed Cabot (and Jessup, Perkins, and Ferguson by copy) that Acheson had approved the attached statement and wanted it transmitted to Marshall and Harriman simultaneously. A notation on Barnes' memorandum, handwritten and initialed by Martin, reads "I understand Harriman discussed and left with Marshall a copy of his paper. I suggest this might be sent Marshall as a paper which represents a first step toward carrying out views brought back by Harriman and discussion with ECC members Spofford, Katz and Batt while they were here." A copy of the "Principles" was sent to Harriman at Tehran on August 11 in telegram 344 (740.5/8–1151). On August 13, Webb sent a copy to Lovett suggesting that after the Departments of Defense and State had agreed on a draft the matter might be discussed with President Truman (740.5/8–651). On August 30, a memorandum for the files by Battle noted that Acheson had "explained the matter" to General Marshall who then planned to "have a look" at the copy sent by Webb to Lovett on the 13th. (Secretary's memoranda, lot 53 D 444)

to U.S. security, and that they should be strengthened by seeking recommendations from them and according full weight to these recommendations before the U.S. acts on significant determinations with respect to military and economic assistance and U.S. force contributions. NATO plans are developed with full U.S. participation and leadership, and therefore bilateral pressure by the U.S. will be most constructive if employed to assist (*a*) in obtaining agreement to multilateral plans sought by the U.S. and (*b*) in obtaining the implementation of such plans.

D. Recognize the need for more effective integration in U.S. planning of (*a*) military requirements for forces and for equipment, (*b*) the allocation of production tasks among the various member countries, (*c*) U.S. military end-item assistance, (*d*) the economic and financial efforts being sought from each country, and (*e*) U.S. economic assistance to support the common defense effort.

E. Recognize that two important international officials in the NATO organization, General Eisenhower and DPB Coordinator Herod, are Americans whose usefulness can be greatly increased if they are able to bring to bear on NATO problems full information about all parts of the program and the support of all agencies and representatives of the U.S. Government.

F. Assure the full, though largely informal, participation by General Eisenhower and his U.S. Staff in all U.S. activities connected with NATO in Europe, so that such activities support SACEUR. Arrange for active informal liaison by the European Coordinating Committee with Mr. Herod and other Americans in the DPB International Staff so as to obtain close coordination of NATO production planning with related U.S. production and supply actions.

G. Recognize the European Coordinating Committee, under the leadership of the U.S. Deputy, as the central agency to guide, monitor, and give cohesion to U.S. operations in Europe in support of NATO objectives, under broad policy directives from Washington, and assure more effective regional direction of U.S. programs for the European NAT countries through greater delegation of authority to the ECC and its members and through clearer assignment of regional responsibility for control of military and economic assistance activities and for political guidance on NATO matters.

H. Provide firm support in Washington for U.S. regional and country representatives concerned with NAT affairs, including prompt and vigorous action on recommendations from the field.

I. Assure more active leadership in NATO matters on the highest political levels by regular and frequent meetings of the North Atlantic Council, and develop means of improving its effectiveness and capacity to secure more extensive agreement and prompt action by Governments on the widening range of common problems.

740.5/8–851 : Telegram

The Acting United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Achilles) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, August 8, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 171. In recent conversations, Jessup, Lincoln Gordon and others have asked what specific steps we had in mind to give that new impetus to concept of North Atlantic Community.

In strictly mil field, major efforts at developing integrated def already under way appear to require no further initiatives in this field at this time. Assume Wash and SHAPE are giving intensive thought to how Eur def force and its related institutions are to be integrated into NATO. Problem of integrating def prod is separate one which will be developed in relation to DPB report. Problems of coordinating or integrating econ and fin aspects of def effort also require slow dev of steps now under way and we do not recommend any new initiatives in this field at this time aside from current productivity drive (Repto 3411[2]). We do not recommend any present initiatives in econ or fin fields other than those nec for fed effort.

This leaves informational and political fields, and in these we suggest consideration of specific steps along fol lines:

1. Declaration of intention. What we have in mind is declaration by council that, without prejudice to developments in wider frameworks such as UN or OEEC or smaller frameworks such as Eur, parties to NAT expect to work towards progressively closer long-term association "between any or all of them" in all fields by limited and practical steps to extent that experience demonstrates necessity for such action to advance their common interests. Ref to "any or all" would be included in view both of Eur def force and of attitude of some toward Gr Turk membership.

2. In informational (including cultural) field, we would suggest initiation of program based on undertaking in Article 2 to bring about "better understanding of principles upon which their free institutions are founded" designed to stimulate public interest in democracy as, in Mackenzie King's words, "dynamic counter-attraction to Communism". NAT countries naturally have no monopoly on democracy but as has been said, democracy has never worked too well except in Anglo-Saxon and a few other countries, and parties to NATO do represent a nucleus of such countries who are bound by treaty to safeguard and develop these principles. As start, we would suggest council action looking toward establishment of high-level NAT advisory comite, of which US member wld be of stature comparable say to Conant or Bush, and whose members wld concurrently lend national advisory comites, to recommend national and internatl programs designed "to bring about better understanding of principles upon which these institutions are founded". Suggested NAT advisory comite and national comites would be supported by (and former's first mtg pre-

[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] July 16, p. 219.

pared by) NATIS plus small working group selected from Amers and Eurs who have already demonstrated appreciation of and intelligent interest in problems of intellectual and psychological mobilization. Our idea is that this working group could develop concrete projects and suggestions for NAT and national comites. We see this group as small one, Amer-led, which wld call upon such people as Haakon Lie and Jean Paul David, to name 2 rather obvious examples, either as members or as consultants. Even if no decision is taken to estab NAT and national comites, WG along lines outlined above wld be useful to NATIS.

3. Maximum coordination of fon policy. Starkenborgh has several times suggested privately to me that this wld be most practicable and useful step which cld be taken in near future in direction of closer Atlantic association. You recall that we have as result of Lange's proposal in NY last Sept [3] been gradually developing exchanges of views on specific fon policy questions. So far this has been confined to Yugo Berlin satellite countries and USSR but believe it has been of real value both in developing considerable degree of common policy toward Yugo and in increased understanding by smaller govts of conditions coordinated pol guidance through council and deputies. One real advantage for all concerned of procedure as developed here has been its informality and clearly-understood non-binding nature of conclusions reached.

Preponderance of US strength and involvement in world affairs will in practice make this process primarily one of obtaining substantial agrmt by our partners of US policy on specific issues. At same time US will have to pay price of consultation with other govts and take account of considerations important to them in formulation of its policy. This is by no means unmitigated disadvantage (none of us are infallible) and shld be of assistance in reaching soundly based policies which our Allies are prepared to cooperate in carrying out wholeheartedly. We note this aspect of US conduct was very much in mind SecState when he spoke to publishers at White House on June 29. In any event we of course retain final decision as to policy we wish to follow. It shld nevertheless mean in practice that we wld less often formulate a specific policy cleared up through JCS, Cabinet level, and President, announce it publicly without much consultation with our Allies and then expect them to accept it "as is". Examples of US action during past year when use of this procedure has probably made problem more difficult and slower of solution than they otherwise wld have been re Ger contribution and Gr-Turk adherence. Further development of this process of day-to-day consultation on form policy through NATO shld, of course, reinforce rather than interfere with bilateral or multilateral consultation through normal dipl or high level contacts with Brit and other countries as we wish.

Believe that further development this consultation between NAT nations shld be pushed by some of smaller nations in order not give

[3] Proposal under reference here not further identified.

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impression that US seeking means impose its policies on others and to obviate possible difficulties we might encounter with Brit and Fr who might think we attempting get away from close bilateral or tripartite consultation. We shld, of course, make clear to Brit and Fr we have no such intention. Confident that Dutch, Can, and Nor wld welcome opportunity take lead in this field if we give them word.

Would appreciate your reaction to foregoing soonest in order that, if favorable, we may initiate necessary soundings and preparatory work toward council action.

ACHILLES

740.5/8–951

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Parsons) to the Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot) and to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 9, 1951.

Subject: Need for Action to Demonstrate U.S. Interest in North Atlantic Concept

Evidence is piling up that our NATO partners are worried at our seeming preoccupation with the military aspects of NATO and fear that we are losing sight of the wider objectives of defending and improving democratic institutions and economic progress of western civilization, including progressively closer long-range association in North Atlantic and European communities in non-military as well as military fields (Depto 161, August 4).[1]

In mid-September we hope and expect to obtain the admission of Greece and Turkey; the justification for pressing on with this is again primarily military and strategic, specifically the armed strength of Turkey. At this same time we are dispatching a military survey team to Spain and there are negotiations in progress or pending for bases, surveys or other military requirements in Norway, Portugal, France, the North African littoral, etc. Last, but not least, we will have discussed Germany in tripartite meetings just before the Ottawa meeting and here again our goal is to bring German military potential into being. These operations, if not balanced by evidence of our interest in non-military objectives of the Atlantic Treaty, are bound to disturb our NATO partners still further and their concern will be reflected at the September Council meetings. Unless we are prepared to deal with the situation promptly, it is conceivable that it could develop almost critical proportions.

(Evidence of the worries of our allies is most strikingly set forth in

[1] Not printed.

the last paragraph of Depto 157, August 2,[2] in which Mike Pearson is quoted as telling Achilles that he had frequently been asked in the course of his European trip if the U.S. had decided that its objective was not to prevent a war, but rather to win one. Further evidence of concern at the psychological malaise in Europe and some thoughtful exploration of how to counteract it may be seen in Depto 1045, June 1,[2] Mr. Katz' telegram No. Repto 3411, July 16, from Paris,[3] and Depto 161, August 4,[2] paras 7 to 9 inclusive.)

It appears inevitable that there will be a real effort at Ottawa:

1. To seek reassurance from the U.S. as to where we are really trying to go, and
2. To take some action to reaffirm the "North Atlantic concept".

Under these circumstances, instead of waiting for the preoccupations of our allies to deepen and to find expression at Ottawa, it would be to our advantage to take the initiative (*a*) before the September meeting of the Council and (*b*) at the meeting. Our objectives would include the following:

a. An effort to overcome impressions that we value NATO only for such military security as we can develop through it.
b. Further reassurance that the United States is interested in preventing a war and that our strength, when developed, will never be used for aggressive purposes.
c. An attempt to counteract impressions that we seek to dominate partners in NATO by imposing upon them our settled policies and to demonstrate our desire to take account of their views in formative stages of policy making.
d. Development of a more positive attitude on the part of European members towards NATO, which is after all so fundamentally a program of mutual self-help and self-preservation requiring European leadership and drive as well as American.
e. Reaffirmation of our awareness that the defense build-up and increasing economic strength are not only mutually consistent but mutually necessary (Repto 3411), and indication that the present intensive phase of build-up is the investment stage which, once made, will permit a resumption of build-up of civilian well-being.
f. Some expression of our simultaneous interest in *a*) European integration, and *b*) long-range development of NATO (so as to forestall British and Northern European fears of an eventual Berlin–Paris–Rome Axis unbalanced by a broader grouping).

Possibilities for specific action thus far apparent would appear to be:

1) Telegram to inform Stikker that his interest and initiative (Repto 3411 and Depto 1045) is appreciated and we would be interested in hearing any ideas which he had developed. (Such a telegram to The Hague, repeated to NATO capitals is in preparation.)

[2] Not printed.
[3] *Ante*, p. 219.

2) Instruction to Spofford and to NATO capitals to use thinking herein as background in talks with NATO government officials.

3) Consideration here in Washington as to whether Secretary would incorporate some of these thoughts in his general statement to the Council in Ottawa or whether some development of them should be used by him in a special statement introducing this subject as a separate agenda item.

4) Issuance of a Council press release or declaration at end of meeting reaffirming long-range and wider (especially non-military) objectives of NATO. Depto 171, August 8,[4] develops this thought further as follows:

> "Declaration of intention. What we have in mind is declaration by Council that, without prejudice to developments in wider frameworks such as UN or OEEC, or smaller frameworks such as EUR, parties to NAT expect to work towards progressively closer long-term association 'between any or all of them' in all fields by limited and practical steps to extent that experience demonstrates necessity for such action to advance their common interests. Ref to 'any or all' would be included in view both of Eur def force and of attitude of some toward Gr Turk membership."

5) Possibility of creation by the President of a public commission to study the subject of Atlantic cooperation and the progressive development of closer association among nations of the Atlantic Community. (See Appendix.[5])

6) Rapid development of our various ideas as to means of strengthening the NATO organization so that they might be used in September either formally in the Council or informally in private talks where they would at least help to demonstrate the vitality of our interest in and thinking about NATO.

7) Some exploration of the possibility of expanding foreign policy coordination among the NATO nations. The example of the British Commonwealth where coordination is promoted in part by an extensive, continuous interchange of information among the partners, who nevertheless maintain their freedom to differ and to negotiate on their differences, is worthy of study as a possible avenue to greater policy coordination in the Atlantic Community. Depto 171 cites already existing interest in this general approach on the part of Lange and Starkenborgh who has said that, in his opinion, it would be the most practicable and useful step which could be taken in the near future in the direction of closer Atlantic association.

8) Initiation of program based on the undertaking of the NAT nations in Article 2, to strengthen their free institutions and develop better understanding of (democratic) principles. Depto 171 suggests Council action looking toward establishment of a high-level NAT advisory committee, the members of which would head national advisory committees. Aided by the NAT Information Service staff as well as by a working group of persons competent in the field of intellectual and psychological mobilization, projects could be worked out for the NAT advisory and also the national committees to promote.

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[4] *Supra.*

[5] Not printed.

Success would be dependent upon the selection of outstanding personalities and the goal of this idea (which is developed more fully in Depto 171) would be to obtain action in the informational and cultural field to promote in growing association with each other a more "dynamic counter-attraction to Communism" in the NAT countries and beyond.

Action Recommended

1) That a telegram be sent to Ambassador Spofford not later than Monday, August 13 embodying reactions to this memo and to Depto 171.

2) That study be given to the list of objectives herein (which we by no means consider inclusive) and to the list of possible action measures with a view to developing a concrete program as rapidly as possible. Responsibility for working up this study and coordinating with other offices should be centered in RA.

740.5/8–1351 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 13, 1951—7 p. m.

U.S. EYES ONLY

Todep 88. This is State–Defens Msg.

1. Para 1, Annex A, D–D(51)180 (List of Possible Agenda Items for North Atlantic Council Mtg in Sept)[2] indicates the possibility of action by CD to include a formal approval of reorganization of polit structure NATO as an agenda item.

2. In your mtg on 26 July with SG you stated Van Zeeland had once proposed that all reorganization arrangements be reviewed by the Council, but that in your view governmental action had already been taken.[3]

3. We are in complete agreement your view. It is considered that D–D(51)86 has already been approved by govts as a result of the action by CD.[4] Therefore further action by Council is not required. Moreover info has reached us that several nations might wish to reopen this paper, especially in regard to direct channel between Council Deps and SG when Mil Comite is not in session. This we strongly wish to

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[1] E. M. Martin drafted this telegram, together with Colonel Billups of the Department of Defense, and cleared it with Cabot.

[2] Not printed. For early draft of the agenda of the NAC meeting scheduled to open at Ottawa on September 15, see telegram Depto 254 from London, August 23, p. 641.

[3] No record of this meeting was found in the Department of State files.

[4] Council Deputies Document D–D(51)86 on NATO reorganization, as transmitted to Washington in telegram Depto 693, March 30, p. 107, and amended in Council Deputies meetings during April, was approved definitively in the Deputies' 34th meeting on May 2 (Depto 879, May 3, 740.5/5–351).

avoid as D-D(51)86 as approved by CD is completely in accord with US position.

4. Wld like you to make every effort keep this item off agenda for either Sept or Oct mtgs. It is further desired that any reference to this subj which might be made in Deps Report to the Council of action that has been completed, be presented in such manner as to afford the least possibility of a discussion of this subj at any Council mtg.

WEBB

740.5/8–1551 : Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Missions in the Other North Atlantic Treaty Countries [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 15, 1951—6 p. m.

141. A. In Depto 1045 June 1 [2] Spofford reported talk with Stikker on North Atlantic Community in which Stikker urged development Community concept on wider and longer range basis. He felt Atlantic integration desirable and realistic at pace set by US–UK and hoped admission Gr–Turk to NATO wld not weaken concept. He hoped next mtg NAC might spotlight practical development Atlantic Community as major objective of NATO countries, and said he wld be glad to take initiative in this as far as US wld support. He felt there was much support in Eur and Canada for concept, and inquired whether US wld favor his taking initiative this direction.

B. In Paris ECA tel Repto 3411 July 16 [3] Katz reported informal discussion Stikker and representative group Eur Mins. Gen agreement that apathy and uneasiness about future hampering unity and def program. Agreement also that NATO purposes and def build up had acquired negative character in Eur thinking as unpalatable dose which had to be swallowed, but with uneasy qualms as to consequences for future. Need was to present NATO purposes, policies, and actions positively, as realistic way to promising future, around gen pts as fols:

1) Increased productivity after capital investment in def requirements cld be turned in end to renewed expansion Eur econ strength and higher standard of living.

2) Considering period 1947–1957, a balanced time phasing emerges with 1947–50 a period of econ recovery but neglect of def, 1950–54 a consequent intensive def build-up and 1954–57 a period of defensive strength maintained and resumption upward trend in living standards.

3) Def build-up and econ build-up not only mutually consistent but

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[1] Sent to The Hague, repeated to the other Missions. Drafted by Parsons (RA) and cleared by Martin (EUR) and Cabot (S/ISA).

[2] Not printed.

[3] *Ante*, p. 219.

mutual necessity with mil security essential to econ recovery as no effective planning or investment can be carried on under shadow of possible invasion and war.

Since mtg described, Stikker and Marjolin have discussed this subj informally with various Mins at Strasbourg and also with Katz. Draft statement[4] incorporating some of ideas indicated above has been prepared and is now undergoing revision with view to releasing it through some Eur channel such as OEEC, possibly at end Aug. As present draft does not identify danger Sov aggression as cause of fear and need for rearmament, possibility has therefore also been discussed of issuing second statement through NAT Council to (1) endorse previous Eur statement and (2) develop more fully underlying polit facts and implications. Although matter is still in formative stage, Dept impressed with possibilities.

C. You will recognize that (A) and (B) are separate subjs but both are related to basic long-term interest of strengthening NATO. If we encourage development of (A), which is in itself desirable, it serves to demonstrate our interest in wider, long-term objectives of NATO and so may be timely and helpful in counteracting any disadvantageous effects of US pressure regarding Grk and Turk, US interest in Spain, etc. Para B, on other hand, is primarily directed at generating more positive Eur leadership and demonstrating that Eur countries have clear responsibility and interest of their own in providing initiative and drive to accomplish def build-up.

Accordingly, with respect to (A), you may tell Stikker his comments were warmly recd here. If he has any ideas on ways community concept might be developed at NAT mtg, we wld be pleased have him take initiative, though, of course, cannot commit US to support any specific proposals in advance. However, glad to discuss any ideas whenever he so wishes. Re (B), OSR is working closely with Stikker and Marjolin.

D. Similarly, whenever gen subjs these reftels come up in discussions with NATO Govts, our reps shld indicate US definitely interested in Atlantic Community concept as well as need of positive Eur attitude toward NATO and def build-up. They shld assist in generating ideas for consideration and development. We wld appreciate reporting on ideas and your own comments these subjs.

FYI Dept now endeavoring to study and develop specific actions to be taken in connection with Sept Council mtg and after to (1) counteract any incorrect or adverse impressions arising out of our attitude on Grk-Turk, Spain and other questions on which mil necessity has played large role and (2) work toward long-term and wider

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

objectives of NATO for development and well being of cooperative Atlantic Community. Present tel represents step that direction.

WEBB

ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, Paris Torep : Telegram

The Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Foster) to the United States Special Representative in Europe (Katz), at Paris [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 15, 1951—9 p. m.

Torep 5906. ToISA.

1. ISAC–ECC decided last week on US program of offshore military procurement (US procurement with dollars of military end items in Europe for transfer to European forces). Purpose of this program is to activate idle productive resources in Europe and supplement European military production efforts in line with DPB guidance. Offshore procurement also designed to establish broader production base in Europe adequate to meet most equipment needs of European forces after period of initial equipment completed.

2. In order to forestall any expectation that US is embarking on all-inclusive European procurement program with consequent discouragement of or conflict with countries' own procurement plans US orders will be limited to categories approved by ISAC on basis of Defense and DPB recommendations. Programs for ammunition and spare parts will probably be undertaken first. Defense is concurrently requesting DPB to prepare programs in other categories for consideration by ISAC. European governments will be kept advised of categories of US procurement and categories in which they are expected to procure for themselves and US will avoid creating impression that US "in the market" for all types military requirements of Eur forces.

3. US offshore procurement will be financed from MDAP end item funds. All European dollar receipts will of course be taken into account in developing economic aid programs necessary for higher European military efforts.

4. Equipment procured will become property US Government and may be transferred to any NATO country, including producing country.

5. US orders will be coordinated with DPB and local governments. All contracts will be placed in local currency of producing country.

6. ISAC working group under Defense lead will be considering policies and procedures for guidance field on selection producing and

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[1] Drafted by Najeeb E. Halaby, Jr., Assistant to the Administrator for International Security Affairs; repeated to London for SUSRep and USDep, and to Oslo, Copenhagen, Lisbon, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Frankfurt, and Paris.

receiving countries; how much of which items should be purchased overseas; conversion of dollars into local currencies; how and to what extent the contracts entered into by the US under this program can be taken over by the appropriate European governments; relationship between this procurement program and other priority requirements on the budgets of the European NATO countries; and adjustments in MDAP and economic aid, in manner best calculated to obtain highest military effort and desirable impact of dollar receipts and local currency expenditures on external and internal financial position of NATO countries. Issues involved include whether local currency should be purchased from central bank or treasury of producing country, or from recipient country with transfer financed via EPU.

7. ECA/W current thinking: We believe that some objectives of offshore procurement program can also be achieved by earmarking of European counterpart funds for specific military procurement within DPB approved programs. ECA/W is now considering proposal to make provision of some part of future economic aid conditional on prior agreement on uses of counterpart. Uses of counterpart could include end item procurement in specified categories on basis DPB recommendations; uses could also include contributions to a NATO or continental central procurement agency, if established.

8. In general we conceive implementation of this program should take into account need to achieve twin objectives of rearmament and development of economic potential through higher productivity. ECA missions activities in this procurement program should be guided by ISAC D–8/1, especially Attachment 1 ("Detailed Responsibilities of Members of Country Teams").[2] In addition to mission responsibilities that may arise out of further ISAC consideration mentioned para 6, ECA missions should be in a position to advise EuCom procurement officers in placing contracts within producing countries. In particular OSR and missions can help by (*a*) identifying most efficient producers and plant management most interested in improving productivity and sharing benefits of improved methods with workers; (*b*) advising re areas where least additional tools, power, etc. would be required; (*c*) advising re plants with reliable, non-Communist labor situations; and in other ways related to overall objectives aid program in Europe and as requested by Defense.

9. Having decided on offshore procurement as a method of expediting European military production we believe vigorous efforts should be directed to making it as effective as possible, recognizing that in

[2] ISAC D–8/1, "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Departments of State and Defense and the ECA on Relationships and Organization of U.S. Representatives and Certain NAT Bodies in European Production and Economic Aid Programs," March 6, 1951, is not printed; for a copy of this document, see the ISAC files, lot 53 D 443, D–8/1.

light experience we may be able to develop other, better methods to supplement or supplant this method of aid.

10. Defense naturally anxious to proceed with an operation within its primary responsibility and will probably give major consideration to elements of time, quality and cost. We are particularly anxious to have views as to how OSR and missions can advise and assist without hindrance to operations and how program might spur greater productivity.

11. ECA/W views in paras 7 through 9 are provided for information and comment. Substance has been discussed with State and Defense but not cleared with ISAC agencies pending your comments and further consideration here.

12. Please discuss at Mission Chiefs meeting and provide by Aug 23 OSR comments in light of views expressed.

FOSTER

740.5 MAP/8–1751 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, August 17, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 112. ToISA. Fol message contains ISAC agencies' guidance re coordinated CD, FEB, DPB country mission action program to insure positive decisions Oct Council Mtg on increased force contributions, production programs, and financing. Part One outlines gen'l presentation of overall situation based on further consideration D–4/7*a*,[2] exercise. You are authorized introduce to CD soonest after receipt SG costing and SG 20/31,[3] which airpouched to you by courier Aug 17. Part Two outlines coordinated series steps to be taken by US elements NATO prior to Oct Council Mtg to achieve US goal of closing forces gap. Part Three outlines guidance to country missions re their part in coordinated program. Your comments on Parts Two and Three requested before final agreement and transmittal by Wash to Missions.

Part One

1. Question of closing forces gap now being studied by govts from military point view. Govts also have, for first time, estimate of 4-year

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[1] Repeated to Paris for MacArthur and OSR. Drafted and signed for the Acting Secretary by Vass (RA); cleared by Vass with Martin (RA), Kaplan (ECA), Nash (Defense), Bray (S/ISA), and Widmer (Treasury).

[3] *Ante*, p. 193.

[2] Not printed, but see the reference to the genesis and composition of this Standing Group paper at numbered paragraph 9, p. 252.

costs of commitments. Now at half-way point in buildup. With this info and other military recommendations, is appropriate to take decisive action at Oct Council Mtg to meet total requirements MTDP. Essential that we now take a long look at job ahead, evaluate progress and pinpoint problems ahead which we must, by joint efforts, overcome.

2. In connection with preparation '52 Mutual Aid request, US has necessarily made own analysis of costs of mtg requirements for Eur NATO allies, including cost of gap, and evaluated their capabilities for doing job. Have screened SG costing on US experience to make first refinement of this first approximation. While figures subject error, believe best now available and gen'l conclusions US study shld be tabled to aid other countries in reviewing problem in preparation for Oct decision to fill gap.

3. Screened cost of major matériel to meet Eur NATO requirements about $35 billion, of which Eur NATO forces gap accounts for between $3 billion and $4 billion. Non-major matériel costs estimated at $30 billion against which US estimates shld be substantial offset as result Ger occupation costs or mutual aid. Of total, less than $2 billion is add'l cost of mtg full Eur allocation of forces gap. (FYI, present estimate is between $2 and $3 billion Ger offset and $1 billion Canadian aid.) Believe no question each country can and shld find resources cover non-matériel costs. Believe Eur can also provide substantial proportion equipment. Feasibility mtg full MTDP requirements boils down to question whether they willing make sacrifices to raise budgets this year and next 2 fiscal years to level to permit rapid letting production contracts to insure mtg equipment requirements.

4. Given adequate Eur effort, US prepared meet major share initial equipment requirements. However, US aid after capital buildup period must taper off sharply. Unless Eur is in position maintain own defense effort post '54 will not have achieved goal of NAT adequate security, based on economic and political health and independence in Eur.

5. US prepared accept continuation present heavy burden if allies accept commitments meet full MTDP and make realistic plans to raise own level effort to insure achievement MTDP thru joint efforts. US administration prepared to recommend aid for NATO allies of same total amount of appropriations for '53 and '54 as for this year, i.e. roughly add'l $11 billion for '53–54. This means US wld produce and deliver in time meet time-phased requirements about $21 billion equipment in addition to economic aid. Believe other allies, including Canadian friends, can and shld produce balance of essential equipment, if really try and we make sure are wasting nothing on non-essentials. But must plan to meet all essential requirements. SACEUR cannot operate on planned shortfalls.

6. Obviously, cannot do this on present level of Eur efforts or present approach in letting production contracts. Given increase GNP, greater productivity, no question Eur can do more this year and much more in '53–54 than present rate. In fact, our analysis indicates possible for Eur, with moderate US economic aid, raise their expenditures enough to do balance of job. Cannot expect US to make up difference.

7. Best military judgment, recently reaffirmed, calls for fulfillment MTDP. SACEUR has warned that greater efforts in next two years can provide success, whereas longer and drawn out buildup wld be overly dangerous. Our task now is to figure out ways to make sure MTDP will be achieved on time.

8. Critically important to make further increases this FY and start planning now for adequate budgets in coming FY. In this connection, you can state US already working on '53 and plans propose budget in Jan to implement our part if they accept commitments at Oct Mtg.

9. Must prepare for Oct Mtg with fol in mind:

a. No security in inadequate forces too late. MTDP must be achieved, including forces gap.

b. Ways must be found to make it feasible. US judgment is that together we can do job, if accelerate progress towards maximum effort.

c. US will do its part by requesting funds for '53 and '54 at present rate.

10. Propose fol specific course action:

a. Refer SG costing and US presentation to Steering Grp, DPB and FEB. US will make available experts familiar with preparation SG report and US screening to facilitate consideration.

b. Ask Steering Grp to come up with recommendation along line visualized in Depto 202.[4] Shld strive for FEB report for Oct Mtg on steps to be taken to lift financial effort to level needed meet full MTDP requirement on above assumption re US aid and positive DPB program of action which will point way to attaining Eur financed production over next three years sufficient to meet full requirement.

Part Two

Fol is guidance for US elements in NATO bodies:

1. Deps shld set earliest possible deadline for Steering Grp to come up with recommendations re action programs for NATO bodies.

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[4] Not printed; it outlined a plan agreed upon by representatives of the DPB, the FEB, the Council Deputies, and the Standing Group liaison to the CD, in an informal meeting on August 14. The plan called for lower level representatives of the NATO civilian bodies to start accumulating at once data on the total NATO cost picture. This compilation would be presented to the top inter-NATO working group in London about August 29. By that time, the Working Group would have substantially completed preparation of the FEB report to the NATO Council and could then use the compilation of cost data to help develop recommended courses of action to be followed by each NATO body between the projected September and October Council meetings in order to present at the latter meeting a maximum number of specific recommendations. (740.5/8–1551)

2. US elements shld attempt persuade Steering Grp as interim action on revision of SG costing accept promptly US screening of NATO costing. Wash reps will be prepared to explain country differences between NATO and US costing. Immediate object is to make countries look at forces gap on more realistic basis. Equally important, wld hope Steering Grp wld recognize critical importance of eliminating any excessive requirements now in country plans and costing. Might consider specific recommendation in Sept report to Council that appropriate military bodies be urged provide necessary guidance for austerity screening of present plans which cld facilitate decisions close forces gap and pave way for more realistic costing, essential before presentation Congress '53 program.

3. Canada presents special problem. While US presentation necessarily addressed to Eur, because of aid angle, US objective of achieving adequate effort equally applicable to Canada. Wld hope that Steering Grp, FEB and NATO wld highlight possibility higher level effort and Mutual Aid by Canada and make specific recommendations for action to overcome any bottlenecks cited by Canada.

4. FEB shld first complete report re European economic mobilization for FY 51–52. Recommendations this report on country-by-country basis shld provoke sufficient acceleration European military expenditures to implement '52 phase of total MTDP requirements. Both increased rate military expenditures and measures recommended for adoption to support this rate in FY 52 shld provide preliminary for more gen'l report on financial feasibility of total MTDP requirements and recommendations re specific measures which must be taken. These measures shld not include US aid total at rate higher than $5.56 million requested from Congress for NATO countries for FY 52. Recognize initial position European countries may be that MTDP cost feasible only if level US aid much higher, but US shld not consider stating before Oct NAC Mtg that it might consider increasing aid in '53–54.

5. Emphasis in NATO bodies shld be on production and financial implications of filling forces gap, with object of achieving MTDP goal. US position at this stage of negots must be that military have decided MTDP necessary and discussion of lowering requirements or lengthening period must be firmly squelched.

6. It is our firm view that every precaution must be taken to avoid discussion of feasibility closing forces gap at Sept Council Mtg and believe that other govts will agree that issues posed in costing and US presentation are so weighty that national govts shld not contemplate formulating definitive positions on other than procedural matters to be covered in Steering Comite report in short period between date of your presentation and Sept Mtg. It is further noted, FYI, that possible pessimism among Europeans resulting from first

look at US presentation cld, if made public at time of Sept Mtg, be highly embarrassing with regard Congressional action on MSP. It is further pointed out that consideration of entire problem by Council in Oct cannot be undertaken until SACEUR views are available on present MTDP.

7. On these matters, there will be transmitted soonest a phasing of NATO consideration of forces gap problem on which we are operating and on which we believe you shld seek agreement of Steering Comite.

8. US goal in Oct Mtg is to obtain govt commitments on full force requirements, including agreement on necessary production and financial backup, sufficiently firm to convince Congress have reasonable expectation job will be done. This means commitments at least as firm as US offer of aid for '53–54.

9. *Status Action on Gap*

FYI, on 28 May JCS presented proposed allocation of forces by NATO countries to "fill gap" between planned requirements and planned contributions of DC–28.[5] This initial study was used as basis for economic and fin analysis shown in ISAC D–4/7*a*.[6] On basis of D–4/7*a* and 4/8[7] JCS modified their 28 May views, and forwarded listing of these revised forces to US reps in SG on 28 June as initial US mil view. Resulting SG action (SG 20/31) represents limited adjustments to JCS view necessary in order reach agreement. Country allocation of forces to close gap and meet total requirements of DC–28 as shown in SG 20/31 are therefore considered to represent initial US mil position for consideration of this problem. This initial US position is useful for econ planning purposes and is intended to give order of magnitude of effort each nation may have to make, and represents US judgment of what can be done. After comment on SG 20/31 by NATO nations thru Mil Rep Comite, requested by Sept 25, final mil study will be prepared for consideration by MC prior to Oct NAC mtg. At present time, you shld work on pol, econ and fin aspects of SG 20/31 to facilitate mil agreement by NATO nations on this plan for presentation to MC prior to Oct Council mtg, and insofar as possible seek agreement by countries to make this plan a basis for Oct Council decision.

10. Reftel 182.[8] Paris Plan has been included without change in initial SG paper on national contributions to close forces gap as air part of overall plan. Note Encl B to SG 20/31. In overall work on gap Paris Plan shld be considered in above light. However, due long-lead times required to meet requirements of this plan, it warrants

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[5] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1.

[6] *Ante*, p. 193.

[7] ISAC D–4/8 not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 206.

[8] Not printed. This telegram to Paris dated July 9 expressed the ISAC agencies' general agreement with the course of action proposed by the ECC in telegram Depto 15 of July 4, p. 213, and commented on certain matters of detail and timing (740.5/7–451).

special and earliest consideration by all NATO nations. JCS presently have this plan under study and firm US position cannot be developed until their recommendations are completed. It is desired you bring this subject up in CD in conjunction with gen'l gap presentation, pointing out that magnitude and lead-time aspects of air gap require immediate attention by NATO nations. Economic aspects of Paris Plan are, as you know, before DPB and FEB. You shld avoid any CD discussions of mil factors of gap, including Paris Plan.

Part Three Country Mission Guidance

1. US object is to assure that each country receives full picture overall situation as seen by US. This approach is apart from and shld not interfere with 53 programming or current negots re level of effort or economic aid, all of which deal with specific country programs.

2. Mission shld, however, play leading US role in obtaining favorable decision on SG mil judgments re force role which country shld play. Mil reps have been asked give govt views to SG on military grounds by Sept 25. Second role of Missions is to reinforce and supplement US multilateral efforts to accept production and fin consequences of closing forces gap. This latter will enter action phase after Sept NAC mtg. Country guidance re approach will be forthcoming.

3. When Spofford gives green light Amb shld present Part one analysis of problem to FonOff. Use own discretion re method presentation. Convey action schedule as seen by this govt and impress urgency of matter and necessity earliest possible collective decision to meet forces gap. Offer full team assistance in providing info, etc. Indicate matter so important and implications so profound US considers undesirable attempt discuss Sept Council mtg except to blueprint action program leading to decision in Oct.

WEBB

740.5/8–851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, August 17, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 113. Ref Depto 171, Aug 8,[2] and also RA memo, Aug 9,[3] pouched Achilles.

1. Dept greatly interested ideas in ref papers and suggests fol action as possible means of practical development. Wld appreciate your

[1] Repeated to Paris. Drafted by Parsons (RA); cleared by Jessup and Matthews and cleared in substance by Cabot (S/ISA), Martin (EUR), and Ferguson (S/P).

[2] *Ante*, p. 238.

[3] Memorandum by Parsons, p. 240.

comments and leave to your judgment extent to which various ideas in ref papers shld be used for background in informal discussion with other Deps.

2. We consider program of polit and informational action important both from standpoint of (1) short-term objective of counteracting impressions that we regard NATO merely as mil anti-Sov bloc and (2) long-term objective of carrying out non-mil objectives, especially those implicit in Art 2 of NAT. This tel will not deal with related most important consideration that long-term polit development of NATO Community has significant relationship to problem of Eur integration to which EDF, Schuman Plan,[4] etc., seems to be giving genuine impetus. However, this basic problem is in background our thinking as is also need for forestalling and counteracting any impression here or abroad that US interest in Eur extends only to that date in future when Eur can stand on its own feet militarily and that we are now looking forward to not too distant time when we can bring our troops home and return to pre World War II relation to Europe.

3. Ideas set forth in ref tel and memo fall into two categories—those which can be discussed now with view to action during Sept NAC mtg and those which require further study and lead to action over long-term. We believe numbered paras 1, 2, and 3 of Depto 171 can well be fitted into proposed action at NAC which is set forth below; likewise paras 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 of RA memo. Para 5 of latter requires further exploration here. Para 1 relates to circtel 141, Aug 15.[5]

4. As result our consideration these various ideas, our current thinking is that US action shld center around statement by Sec at Sept NAC in which he wld (1) reaffirm US interest in wider and long-term objectives NATO, and (2) propose special agenda item this subj. In this connection wld like your view as to whether Sec's statement cld be made when item 2 "agreement on agenda" (Depto 205, Aug 15[6]) comes up for discussion, or whether it wld be preferable for you to tell Depts that US wishes propose new item and have it included in suggested agenda which CD's will begin to consider Aug 20. Sec cld then make his statement before NAC when this agenda item is reached. We here prefer latter course of action, although former may have some advantages from standpoint maximum impact and publicity.

5. Sec's statement reaffirming our long-term interest in all aspects NATO cld draw on ideas developed in your talks with Cabot and Jessup on genl subj of strengthening NATO. Sec's statement wld also

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[4] For documentation on the plan for a European coal and steel community, see volume IV.

[5] *Ante*, p. 244.

[6] Not printed; it presented and discussed a draft agenda for the North Atlantic Council meeting at Ottawa scheduled for September (740.5/8–1551).

be written with objectives in mind which are listed in sub-paras A through F of RA memo. Possibility of expanding coordination in fon policy matters (para 3, Depto 171, and para 7, RA memo) wld also be referred to. However, key note of Sec's statement wld be proposal that NAC take action at Ottawa create Council "Advisory Subcommittee on non-mil Objectives" composed of small group FonMins (with chairman from one of small Eur countries, possibly Stikker) to promote long-term objectives of NATO, including most especially implementation Art 2 of NAT. Stikker's ideas (Depto 1045 [7] and Dept circtel 141, Aug 15) re Atlantic integration cld be further developed by this group. Finally, as specific tasks, subcomite cld examine immediately after Sept mtg with a view to action at Oct mtg [8] fol measures:

(*a*) Establishment NATO Advisory comite and natl comites to further certain Art 2 objectives (Depto 171, para 2).

(*b*) Measures to expand scope of fon policy questions on which exchanges of views cld become accepted practice and also companion project of expanding inter-change of info on regular basis among member (Depto 171, para 3 and RA memo, para 7).

(*c*) Other measures as developed prior to, or during, Sept NAC mtg.

(*d*) Recommendation as to whether or not Subcomite itself shld be permanent body.

6. As prelim task and achievement to be brought before Council for approval and subsequent publication at close of Ottawa mtg, Subcomite might draft "declaration of intention" somewhat along lines set forth ref docs but which wld also include as evidence of determination to move forward in this field, announcement of its own creation. This statement cld also endorse and develop further report which we understand wld have been by that date issued through OEEC on initiative of Stikker and Marjolin.

7. We shld particularly appreciate your reaction to idea of Council Subcomite to work primarily in Art 2 field. We shld not wish this group to take over any functions of CD or detract from its prestige. On other hand, creation of group such as this in which FonMins of smaller members cld play prominent role seems to us to present many advantages and, as it wld not be mtg constantly, it wld not be likely to interfere in any way with work of CD. It might even be desirable and feasible for you or your Dep to sit in this group as a member, ex officio, by virtue your position as chairman of Deps.

8. While Departmental thinking still tentative in respect much of foregoing, there is clear recognition of need for action because of likelihood that at Ottawa there will be concerted effort (1) to seek

[7] Not found.

[8] The eighth session of the North Atlantic Council tentatively scheduled for October was held in Rome, November 24–28. For documentation, see pp. 693 ff.

reassurance from US as to where we are really trying to go and (2) to take some action to reaffirm the "North Atlantic Concept". In such circumstances it wld be far more effective for us to take initiative ourselves.

WEBB

740.5 MAP/8–2251 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, August 22, 1951—8 p. m.

Depto 243. ToISA. Re Todep 112.[2] Fol are comments each part reftel. ECC joint working staff has collaborated in their formulation.

Part 1. Intend distribute statement presenting part 1 tomorrow (23 Aug) for discussion at next fol mtg. Have discussed figures and other material with Schelling, Mautz, and Rackett who have collaborated in preparing statement. Lindeman will present substance to FEB 22 or 23 Aug. Statement will be essentially paraphrase of part 1 with certain minor changes in tone and presentation designed, from our point of view here, to make statement most effective.

Part 2. Generally agree with indicated guidance in this part. We feel, however, that even with greatest efforts FEB first report will not provoke acceleration expected para 4 (OSR pls comment). Re para 5, agree with emphasis indicated, but we must also not forget gap between present efforts and present DC 28 commitments, i.e., we must aim at achieving full MTDP from present efforts which are below those required even meet DC 28 commitments. Also must take cognizance of increased requirements over SG 20/31 [3] arising from SHAPE recommendation in "SHAPE 1954 force requirements" sent SG 14 Aug. Re para 9, SG has not transmitted SG 20/31 to deps, FEB, and DPB so far as we know. Immediate authority to put SG 20/31 before these bodies and NATO working group seems essential.

Part 3. Fully agree with actions envisioned for country teams. In order that presentation in each country follow same tone used in deps, and FEB and discussions in DPB, will transmit statement on part 1 as presented to deps to each emb and to other regional agencies, for use in preparation presentation to FonOff. Special guidance to elements of country teams shld be transmitted insofar practicable through appropriate regional offices and checked by them with other regional offices so that we all present common party line at all times

[1] Repeated to Paris for Porter and MacArthur and to Heidelberg for Handy.
[2] August 17, p. 248.
[3] Standing Group document SG 20/31, not printed, was later circulated to the Missions in the other NATO capitals as MRC 5/1. See reference in paragraph 9, p. 252.

at both country and regional levels. Suggest Todep 112, taking into account above comments, be repeated immediately to all emb for country teams basic guidance [4] and green light for discussions with govts be 27 Aug, when deps will discuss, unless govts take initiative and query embs earlier. In such case matter shld be discussed then.

SPOFFORD

[4] The message contained in telegram Todep 112, reworded to omit instructions to Spofford and to explain that Part One had been presented to the Council Deputies and the Financial and Economic Board, was transmitted on August 25 to the Missions in the other NATO countries and to Frankfurt and Heidelberg as circular telegram 188, not printed (740.5 MAP/8–2551).

740.5/8–2451 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, August 24, 1951—8 p. m.

Depto 271. Subjects of Depcirctel 141 and Todep 113 [2] discussed more fully with Shuckburgh today, brought out fol concerning UK thinking.

1. UK Govt had for some time been increasingly concerned by:

(*a*) Preoccupation of NATO with mil to exclusion of non-mil aspects of Atlantic cooperation;

(*b*) Thinking primarily in Fr of NAT as short-term enterprise in comparison with longer range "Eur framework" rather than as basis, to which UK attached utmost importance, for permanent US–UK–Eur cooperation;

(*c*) Recent apparent weakening of NA concept due to considerations such as Greece, Turkey, Spain, etc.

2. Because of this FonOff and Morrison had at first felt strongly that Katz–Stikker–Marjolin project shld be brought out through NA Council rather than OEEC but had been convinced by arguments of other Mins at Strasbourg that positive emphasis on practicability and desirability of increased Eur def efforts shld come first from purely Eur group. They nevertheless still believe strongly that Council at Ottawa shld fol it up and more or less "take it over". UK thinking on concrete steps to counteract trends referred to in para (1) had not crystallized but they had been thinking of proposing:

(*a*) More frequent ministerial mtgs not only of Council as whole but perhaps also of different categories of Ministers with view to having some NATO ministerial mtg at least every two months;

(*b*) Coordination of activities of NATO agencies (as is now underway);

[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] August 15 and 17, pp. 244 and 253.

(*c*) Arrangements for Eisenhower to meet more frequently with CD in order to bring his stimulating influence more frequently and directly to bear on govts in other than strictly SHAPE matters.

3. He thought UK wld welcome strong statement by Secy of US interest in non-mil objectives and development of NA concept, as well as declaration of intention but referred to inevitable problem of getting 12-nation agrmt on really strong statement. He thought advisory sub-comite of Council on non mil objectives wld be desirable but was inclined to believe that big three shld be members to insure realism and weight in its recommendations. He said he had all along been seeking personally to assist development of CD exchanges of views on fon policy questions but that there was some opposition in FonOff on grounds of security, difficulty of serious discussion of major matters in such large group, and possibility of crossing wires with discussions of same subjects bilaterally or trilaterally. He personally believed these problems were entirely soluble and felt that we shld continue to stress non-binding nature of exchange of views on policy and avoid trying to reach formally agreed positions on papers.

4. In general he welcomed US line of thinking and expressed desire to explore subj further with us in next few days.

[1]

SPOFFORD

740.5/8–3051 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, August 30, 1951—6 p. m.

Depto 298. Re Depto 297.[2] We assume US Govt, and in particular US Chiefs of Staff, continue to attach same importance as always to authority and position of SG. On this assumption SG refusal to present report or be represented at Ottawa has had repercussions adversely affecting this important US interest.

It would be mistake to underestimate resentment which SG decision has caused in view of (1) sensitivity which non-SG countries have shown about SG since it was first established, (2) various proposals they have presented from time to time on reorganization of milit side, and their reluctant acquiescence in having these proposals put aside pending further experience with existing arrangements.

We believe govts of non-SG countries do recognize both special responsibilities of big three and need for small milit group capable of

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[1] Repeated to Paris for personal attention of MacArthur.

[2] August 30, not printed. This telegram reported on a difference of opinion that arose in the December 29 meeting of the Council Deputies between certain Deputies and the Standing Group representative present at that meeting. The action, concerning the Standing Group decision not to send a representative to the NAC meeting at Ottawa, was summarized in despatch Usdep 17, September 4, from London, p. 643.

reaching decisions quickly and efficiently. At same time their agrmt to yield substantial portion of their sovereignty with respect to defense of their countries to group which may consult them, but which takes by itself decisions vital to them, has throughout been conditioned by (1) their insistence on polit control in which they have some share over SG decisions and (2) their feeling that existing arrangement could be considered satis only if in practice SG would keep them informed, consult adequately with them and take adequate acct of their interests in reaching decisions. Consequently part of price big three must pay for consent of others to SG capable of performing its essential functions of division on vital matters in peace or war is maintenance of relations between SG and govts not represented on it (particularly on day to day basis and in matters where vital decisions are not involved) of nature to maintain their confidence. (See also Kraft statement to Eisenhower (Paris 1292 [3]) recognizing fully need for big three leadership, but that "way in which this was done created real feelings of bitterness".)

We do not believe that smaller govts will seriously question continued existence of SG, but we do believe that its absence from Ottawa will evoke number of proposals for reorganization of milit side designed to exert greater control over SG, that these proposals will be strongly pressed, and that it will be neither possible to brush off nor easy to deal satisfactorily with them.

Believe this sitn merits personal attention of senior US officials in State, Def and SHAPE and of Adm. Wright.

Ernst concurs and is sending Def msg parallel to this and reftel.

SPOFFORD

[3] Not printed.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, documents OTT D–1a–D–10

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) and the Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1951.

COUNCIL OF DEPUTIES RESENTMENT OF STANDING GROUP REFUSAL TO ATTEND OTTAWA MEETING

Depto 298, August 30,[2] commenting on the rather bitter debate (Depto 297, August 30 [3]) which ensued following General Lindsay's statement on behalf of the Standing Group, points out that the situa-

[1] Carbon copies were sent to Jessup, Matthews, and Martin.
[2] *Supra.*
[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra.*

tion which has arisen "merits the personal attention of senior U.S. officials in State, Defense, SHAPE and of Admiral Wright".

The Standing Group position is based upon the view that it would be premature to take up military questions at Ottawa. Even though the Standing Group is in full agreement on it, their position is the position which our own military has held most strongly and which necessitated the understanding between the Secretary and Mr. Lovett before Defense agreement to holding the Ottawa meeting could be obtained. It appears that the Standing Group as well as the Department of Defense hold to the view that military matters should not come up, rather than to our understanding that they should not come up *for action.*

There are at least two serious implications to the current controversy in the Deputies. The first is that added impetus has been given to the desire for more adequate civilian control over the military side of NATO. The second is that impetus has also been given to the desire of the smaller countries to have a greater voice in military decisions affecting their own security, or alternatively to be assured that their interests, sensibilities and own domestic political problems will be taken into consideration and handled on a more understanding basis.

As a further factor related to this matter, word has just reached us by telephone that General Eisenhower has declined to send General Gruenther to Ottawa to make a report on SHAPE progress. Possibly he does not wish to have SHAPE put in the position of bailing out the Standing Group, or it may just be that he does not want General Gruenther to appear when there is no agenda item to which he would speak.

If this matter proceeds much further it will be of very serious concern to the Department of State because it will give rise to a move for reorganization of the military structure of NATO. This, of course, has many implications. In the meantime, however, and particularly because of the Secretary's understanding with Mr. Lovett, it would appear that the next move is up to Defense. The only action which we might take would appear to me to be a telephone call to Defense, presumably Mr. Nash, to say that we look to the Department of Defense for advice as to the reply which should be sent to Mr. Achilles (in Mr. Spofford's absence), in response to Depto 298. I should think that the prestige, authority and position of the Standing Group is of such importance to the Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department as a whole that they will wish to give early and serious attention to this message.

740.5 MAP/9–451 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, September 4, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 323. ToISA. 1. In surveying NATO situation as it will apparently exist at Ottawa, we believe there are three important points, among many others, which US shld take carefully into account in developing our tactics for mtg.

2. First of these points relates to urgency for completing full MTDP and time element therein involved. There have been a number of indications here that there may not yet have been a real "meeting of minds" at highest governmental levels on either (*a*) need for full MTDP or (*b*) necessity for doing total job soonest, preferably before but certainly not later than 1 July 1954. The whole tenor of FEB report which concentrates rather pessimistically on DC 28 country commitments rather than on total job—and UK position that we shld work to meet DC 28 commitments before tackling total job—indicate an acceptance of the proposition that two-thirds of MTDP is sufficient to grapple with for time being. If this approach is followed much longer, it will be physically impossible meet full MTDP on time. On timing, there have been numerous indications by FEB and DPB reps that the way to resolve the total problem is to permit such slippage past target date as will enable build-up be carried out without necessity any strong measures of econ mobilization in Eur countries being applied. Therefore, we suggest consideration be given to thought that, at Ottawa, US opening statement on world situation shld give as much as possible of intelligence info and other arguments to emphasize why we believe piecemeal approach must cease and idea accepted that MTDP shld be fulfilled soonest. It might be possible in fol discussions to try to get nearer to real mtg of minds on full MTDP plus timing than NATO govts seem to have at present. Possible developments San Francisco may make this easier.[2]

3. Next two points derive from para above. First is obvious, but some times underestimated, controlling character of political aspects in reaching agreement on full MTDP forces and intent to fulfill MTDP on time. The mil and production aspects, while difficult, can be resolved if govts take political decision with all its implications to cooperate to do the full job. The politics involved are much less internatl in character than they are internal. There is no easy answer, but fact is symptomatic that UK govt seems desire not to discuss

[1] Repeated to Paris and Heidelberg.

[2] This is a reference to the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan in San Francisco on September 8 and the negotiations preceding it. For documentation on the Japanese Peace Treaty, see vol. VI, pp. 777 ff.

total job at Ottawa, perhaps because of possible gen election near future and "Bevanism". In CD on 29 Aug, Dutch deputy stated his govt fully concurred in program of action implicit in US statement per Todep 112 [3] but added he must make clear that approval of procedural action involved did not include acceptance of statement (para 7, US statement) that Eur cld do more this year and much more in succeeding years. He said for record Neth cld not do more than present program. This emphasizes need, soon as possible, to put total mil-production-fin plan before all NAT govts showing appropriate task of each in relation tasks all others and showing feasibility of overall job.

4. Second point deriving from para 2 above is financial-econ. Discussions in coordinating group and comments by delegations here have emphasized preoccupation in keeping burden-sharing on basis DC–28 commitments. There has also been a great deal of comment to effect that US position, assuming aid figure as firm and Eur effort as variable required to fill gap must be balance against Eur view that its efforts and US aid is item which must fill the gap.[4] There has also been very definite effort to get away from expressing a problem in terms of meeting MTDP requirements. This means that program of action which coordinating group has developed may not be aimed specifically at MTDP. In this regard we shld bear in mind difference in tone between "European manifesto" just issued by OEEC ministers and the FEB report. Perhaps something can be made of former as being views of high level looking at total situation including Sov threat as against narrower viewpoint drafters of FEB report. With regard agreeing at Ottawa on NATO program of action envisaged Todep 112, any suggestion for comprehensive program of work will be vulnerable if it cld be shown that mil side NATO wld not or could not provide, as at least tentative "planning assumptions" for other NATO bodies, certain rough statements on full force requirements, matériel requirements and infrastructure requirements shortly after Ottawa mtg so that DPB and FEB can do their parts in time. Therefore, strong US action may be necessary to get assurance that SG wld provide such info on urgent basis needed.

5. We feel importance Ottawa mtg is likely be very much greater than originally anticipated because debate there will involve FEB report (with its concentration on burden-sharing of only DC 28 commit-

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[3] Dated August 17, p. 248.

[4] In telegram Depto 327 from London, September 5, this sentence was corrected to read as follows:

" 'There has also been great deal of Eur comment to effect that US position, which assumes aid figure as firm and Eur effort as variable required to fill gap, must be balanced against Eur view that its efforts are nearly firm and US aid is item which must fill gap.' " (740.5 MAP/9–551)

ments) and US program envisaged Todep 112. There probably will be collisions between these differing points of view and we shld by no means take it for granted that US proposals will be readily agreed. US shld therefore be prepared for measures which may be required in Ottawa to resolve debate in favor of Todep 112 program. In this connection strong Dept of Def representation wld seem advisable.

SPOFFORD

S/ISA files, lot 52–26, D–4/14

Memorandum by the United States Deputy Representative to the NATO Standing Group (Wright) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] 5 September 1951.

DUSM–467–51

Subject: Information on U.S. Position on Contribution of Forces to Meet 1954 NATO Force Requirements.

1. In accordance with guidance received from the JCS, the U.S. Deputy Representative to the Standing Group introduced into the Standing Group the U.S. position on contribution of forces to meet NATO force requirements of D.C. 28. At that time it was stated that these figures were based essentially on the military considerations involved, with only general economic factors being considered.

2. The U.S. Deputy Representative to the Standing Group has already received several requests for information on those considerations upon which the U.S. based its recommended contributions.

3. It is considered that to present information on factors to the NATO nations at this time might well forestall serious objections to increased contributions before or at the October Council meeting.

4. It is recommended that the U.S. Deputy Representative be provided support including the financial and economic factors of the U.S. position that show the national contributions are feasible.

5. It is understood that, as a basis for the information transmitted on "Closing the Gap", that ISAC and ECA conducted several studies in the field of capabilities of NATO nations to provide military forces, investigating such items as industrial potential to produce equipment, financial stability and capacity to support military forces, economic effects of increased defense expenditures and availability of manpower. By copy of this memorandum it is requested that the Office of the Secretary of Defense provide the JCS with such background information as may be available at this time. It is expected that the information would be in brief general terms as appropriate.

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[1] This memorandum was circulated as International Security Affairs Committee document ISAC D–4/14 of September 12, 1951, along with the covering letter discussed in footnote 2 below.

6. It is requested that this information be provided by 30 September.[2]

JERAULD WRIGHT
Vice Admiral, USN

[2] On September 10, 1951, Frank C. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, forwarded this memorandum to Thomas D. Cabot, Director for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, and requested in his covering letter that this matter be discussed by the ISAC.

740.5/8–2151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 6, 1951—7 p.m.

Todep 180. Re Depto 240 rptd Paris 376.[2] Dept and ECA/W apprec receipt ur joint recommendations re NATO wartime econ planning and are in agrmt with much of ur analysis re both need and difficulties undertaking within NATO such planning at an early future date. In light ur recommendations reftel and our views previously outlined Todep 48 rptd Paris 568,[3] we believe fol shld be US policy at this time.

(*a*) During next three to five months, we shld develop US recommendations re major internatl wartime supply-demand problems and readiness measures to be undertaken to meet wartime ecor. problems. We shld also endeavor to block out framework of wartime orgs.

(*b*) After completion US studies para (*a*), we wld consider practicability engaging in multilateral planning. Shld conclusions of our own studies indicate that NATO planning in this field probably fruitless, we wld examine other possibilities such as extensive exchange views with the UK.

(*c*) Meanwhile, in specific fields where practical wartime planning by NATO appears feasible and where the US has already developed its own views, such as oil, and possibly aviation, we believe it desirable for NATO to undertake planning now. (Further recommendations re these specific fields fol in separate messages.)

[1] Drafted by James W. Swihart of the Office of European Regional Affairs; cleared with Evans of OMP, Barringer of TRC, Moline of EDT, Beale of BNA, McCullough of ECA, and Eakens of PED; repeated to Paris for OSR.

[2] Not printed; it contained the "joint recommendations by USDep–OSR–SUSRep–JAMAG" which were that, unlike the planning for NATO wartime military organization which was considerably advanced, similar planning in the economic field was deficient. Because NATO was the only international body in a position to do such planning, their recommendation was that the United States take the initiative in promoting such planning for wartime economic problems. (740.5/8–2151)

[3] Not printed; it reported that the Department of State held that NATO should not undertake wartime economic planning at that time because this would divert the efforts of the FEB and the CD from more important current problems. (740.5/7–2551)

(*d*) When FEB recommendations (re Repto 4097 rptd London Repto 865)[4] outlined FEB D-D(51)218 are considered by CD, USDep shld take position that in view FEB's conclusion that it wld be extremely difficult estab principles on which wartime imports shld be calculated, it has now been demonstrated that wartime import planning is not feasible and that the FEB's recommendations are not in accordance with the terms of reference contemplated by CD Res D-D (51)135. USDep shld urge that consideration sea-borne wartime import requirements be postponed until countries prepared undertake bona fide wartime import studies. Furthermore, USDep shld stress our view that no useful purpose cld result from undertaking gen wartime organizational planning unless countries prepared to accept realistic assumptions.

(*e*) USRep FEB Working Party (ref Repto 4167 rptd London Repto 16, Repto 4185 rptd London Repna 18)[5] shld indicate US prepared support NATO wartime planning in specific fields such as oil, and possibly aviation, but that such planning shld not at the outset incl wartime organizational planning. In view considerations para (*d*) USRep shld state US not able agree to NATO's undertaking the planning of wartime bodies now to screen sea-borne requirements for the DSA nor to the estab now of stand-by wartime commodity orgs as suggested by UK.

WEBB

[4] Not printed; it reported that the FEB had approved the report of the Working Party on wartime civilian seaborne import requirements with only one drafting change (740.5/8–2051).

[5] Neither printed; both summarized the meeting of the FEB Working Party on August 22 which involved a debate over whether or not the representatives should discuss wartime planning before they talked about peacetime planning (740.5/8–2351).

740.5 MAP/9–651 : Telegram

The Acting United States Special Representative in Europe (Porter) to the Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell) [1]

SECRET PARIS, September 6, 1951—9 p. m.

Repto 4425. ToISA. Fol is our evaluation of present situation of FEB and our notions as to what we can reasonably expect to get out of board in future. It is based on attitudes displayed during work on interim report and on report itself:

1. Although report is less than we would have wanted, final report is much improved from earlier versions.[2] For your info, most of these improvements took place during final week of drafting and prior to receipt by US of detailed London and Wash comments. Most of those comments naturally paralleled our own thinking, which had pre-

[1] Repeated to London for Batt.

[2] This is a reference to the various drafts of Part IV of Council Document C7–D/1 which concerned the activities of the FEB; the entire report, made up of four parts, was designed to inform the North Atlantic Council which was to meet in Ottawa about the status of the various agencies of NATO. For documentation on the Seventh Session of the Council, pp. 616 ff.

viously been made well known to the drafters and to the full board. Improvement during entire course of final week appears to us significant as showing shift in thinking of most Eur countries, this shift being in direction which we want. This undoubtedly due to impact of Spofford paper re gap, as well as to our insistence on lifting sights. Undoubtedly whole report would have been vastly better if gap paper had been presented at earlier date.

2. It would be wrong to suppose, however, that Eur yet see eye-to-eye with US. Attitudes displayed at FEB indicate that Europeans have uneasy feeling, still short of conviction, that our gap analysis may be correct and that requirements of defense program will be such as to make larger effort necessary from them. While they recognize problem, they are apparently reluctant to admit it as yet. Believe this accounts for timid way in which question of possible required increases is handled in FEB report, as well as for unsatisfactory manner in which London combined NATO working group first approached its job.

3. In course of drafting, three distinct attitudes were shown:

(*a*) UK is still insistent upon its own earlier version of "burden sharing" and is trying to lay groundwork for making an econ case that US is better able than other countries to take on financial cost of filling gap. Believe this objective is responsible for UK unwillingness to mention size of US contribution in report in concrete terms (see Repto). Believe we should indicate US is at present dissatisfied with participation of Eur because it does not adequately demonstrate determination to meet Eur responsibilities re defense. We hope that discussions re burden sharing with Gaitskell in Wash will clarify attitudes of two govts. Complete understanding between US and UK re meaning of "equity" as well as size of total job, appears to us to be absolute prerequisite for fruitful work in FEB on problem of econ and financial adjustments needed to meet higher mil goals.

(*b*) Continentals, particularly French and Itals, made strong effort to present econ reconstruction (for which appetite is apparently insatiable) as prerequisite to greater defense effort. This clearly reflection of their preoccupation with internal Communist problem. Believe desirable both French and Itals be made clearly aware of our own concern about this problem, while at same time, we make it clear to them that basic solutions have to be found by Natl Govts and this may or may not result in continuation large amount US econ aid.

(*c*) Smaller countries, without exception, emphasize belief that polit and econ factors make it impossible for them to increase defense budgets further. Believe, however, that Belgs, Norwegians, Danes and Portuguese willing to increase somewhat, if bigger agreed NATO plan is approved by Council. Not sure this applies to Dutch, whose present problems appear to be most serious among smaller countries.

4. Would strongly recommend against US expecting FEB to play aggressive role in getting larger mil appropriations until after there is very authoritative and gen agreed requirements program against which FEB can work. Important to bear in mind that FEB composed

principally of representatives of Finance Mins, (*a*) who traditionally reflect more skepticism re stated requirements of defense departments than other govt officials until they are faced with a firm polit decision to go ahead with the job, and (*b*) who in most cases have recently been through struggle re mil expenditure level within their own govts. Above not to deprecate potential value of FEB in working out specific ways and means to raise required funds, but simply to underline need for US placing major reliance on Council itself or on deputies to determine either at least approximate magnitude of expenditures required or basis upon which they can be calculated and to pass this down to FEB as instructions. We are convinced that only with such authoritative statement of requirements, which each govt recognizes as such, will we be able to get full value out of FEB. This brought out most clearly in attitude of FEB on production problems put to it by DPB, resulting in negative report in D(51)54. (*Note:* US disapproved this document, as reported in Repto 4426.[3]) Main lesson for US is that Eur Govts, or at least their reps in FEB, not prepared to agree with US unilateral gap estimate or mil plus DPB requirements; estimates have at present insufficient authority call for specific recommendations from FEB re increased mil appropriations. Only such recommendation we could now get from FEB would be for increasing US appropriations which, of course, we are not prepared to accept.

PORTER

[3] Not printed; it stated that the United States Special Representative in Europe and the United States Council Deputy agreed that this document was not sufficiently constructive to warrant U.S. agreement, and they requested that it be reconsidered by the FEB. (740.5–MAP/9–651)

ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, Paris Torep : Telegram

The Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell) to the United States Special Representative in Europe (Katz)[1]

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, September 7, 1951—8 p. m.

Torep 6590. Subject: Foreign Aid Legislation.

Following is a circular telegram which we believe it would be useful to get out to all European Missions. We leave it to your judgment whether you should make this a circular to missions, or whether you should use it as text for a talk at next Wednesday's Paris meeting,[2] or both.

[1] Authorized by Cleveland, drafted by Cleveland and C. T. Wood, cleared by Hopkinson and McCullough.

[2] Reference to the Paris meeting of deputy mission chiefs and program officers on September 12.

Begin text.

1. We are now beginning the final month or so of Congressional consideration of foreign aid legislation for FY '52. House–Senate conference to settle difference between the two bills will take place next week and hearings begin in the House Appropriations Committee on September 10. Purpose of this cable is (*a*) to summarize the present picture for your information and that of your staff and (b) to suggest some guide lines in discussing with European representatives the developments so far.

2. This is how it looks as of now:

(*a*) *Administration.* House has voted for a new Mutual Security Administration and Senate for military, economic, and Point IV aid to be administered in separate agencies under a White House coordinator. Position of Executive Branch is that if Senate version preferred, decision should be made forthwith on a new economic aid agency to do job now handled by ECA, rather than waiting until next year to make that decision, as in Senate version of bill. We have of course never had illusions about becoming an old-line agency. But foreign economic functions including aid will continue to be an important concern of U.S. Govt. abroad regardless of administrative formula finally adopted.

(*b*) *Funds.* Economic aid for Europe will be somewhere between *$880,500,000* (Senate) and *$985,000,000* (House). For appropriation justification we are assuming House figure. Record will be made that offshore procurement, procurement of common-use items and possibly some form of AMP may all be employed as devices to relate financial assistance to Europe to the European defense efforts U.S. hopes to achieve. Moreover, five percent of military assistance funds are transferable to economic aid fund if necessary, though of course no decision has been made on this as yet. U.S. is not yet ready to discuss these elements officially with P.C.'s but they are points you should keep in mind in assessing effects of economic aid reduction.

(*c*) *Authority.* Under either bill, use of counterpart for military purposes will be an important feature of our work from now on. Separate circular based on discussion at August Mission Chiefs' meeting [3] will be sent you shortly.

(*d*) Significant changes in form and substance seem to be required in programming for FY '53. For first time effort will be to build a really combined military/economic aid program, tied in with country requirements for military effort under NATO plans. This is a creative planning job right ahead of us. Your responsibilities in this connection, and the importance of getting on with this planning job, are not affected by the current discussions of administrative arrangements for foreign aid.

3. In talking with your European colleagues, it is most important that action of Congress on foreign aid be presented in proper perspective, so that we do not transmit to Europeans an unwarranted sense of discouragement. For example:

[3] Not printed.

(*a*) One fact which stands out clearly as a result of House and Senate action is the overwhelming support for our policy of aiding Western European areas with substantial financial resources in a period in which our own expenditures for defense are of tremendous proportion. The Senate vote of 61 to 5 on final passage of the Bill is eloquent and conclusive proof of this fact. Deep cuts in economic aid represent the workings of many complex cross-currents of opinion and are attributable to failure fully to understand significance of economic aid rather than indication of lack of support for the policy of strong support for our NATO partners. This fact should be stressed on every occasion in discussion with foreign government officials.

(*b*) While it is true that Europe should, in our view, receive more economic aid than either the Senate or House have been willing to authorize, nevertheless the total aid provided in Title I comes to a very substantial figure. The House Bill would provide slightly over 6 Billion and the Senate Bill slightly under 6 Billion. On any basis of comparison, including support forthcoming from the U.S. in past years, amounts European countries are proposing to spend on military buildup, etc., our contribution is something for which no apologies need be made. In particular, there is no reason to assume and less reason for us to show by our attitude that we have given up hope and that we and the Europeans together cannot move vigorously toward our objectives with this massive amount of American aid. *End of proposed circular.*

BISSELL

740.5 MAP/9–1251 : Telegram

The Acting United States Special Representative in Europe (Porter) to the Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell)[1]

SECRET PARIS, September 12, 1951—4 p. m.

Repto 4528. ToISA. Personal for Bissell, pass to Bonesteel and Cabot. Ref: London to Paris 525, sent Dept Depto 354, Heidelberg 94.[2]

1. Re questions raised in reftel, OSR sees no real source divergence. Any mil procurement program out of US funds whether implemented in US or in Eur, must "be related to quality of finished products, realistic delivery schedules, costs, etc.," and must be implemented with the participation of procurement specialists available to Dept of Defense.

2. Our understanding of agreed concepts as fols: US problem and primary objective all agencies administering mutual security program involves determination adequate total NATO effort and country division implementing responsibilities. To solve this problem, US

[1] Repeated to London and Heidelberg.

[2] Not printed; it raised the issue of whether or not the "end-item" program was restricted to only those items of military equipment that were produced in the United States. The Department of Defense and the Economic Cooperation Administration were not in agreement on this question, and it was requested that they settle on a clear policy statement. (740.5 MAP/9–1051)

prepared to give aid to Eur partners in NATO. Need is to select those amounts and forms of aid, and those techniques for administering aid which are most likely to (*a*) gain our primary objective, (*b*) implement multilateral pattern of def production favored by US and start production in desired places as quickly as possible, and (*c*) control econ and social impacts of def expenditure so as to maximize Eur will and ability to defend selves. Nature these objectives emphasizes need for coordinated action by polit, mil, and econ team.

3. Anything that US contributes to other countries beyond its own forces and their equip is aid under present concepts of NAT. Aid can be end-items (from US or from Eur), other physical resources, or cash. Any of these interchangeable forms of aid add to Eur's total available resources and increase her def capabilities. The Europeans understand this perfectly (see para 162 of the "FEB report", FEB D(51)51, and welcome end-item gifts whether from Eur or US production, as additional aid to their hard-pressed econs and budgets.

4. Direct procurement is merely one technique of administering aid which is to be provided initially in the form of end-items. This technique well suited to achievement objectives para 4, only if it is integrated with all forms of aid in one combined technique. Use of direct procurement technique or of other end-item techniques of administering aid in isolation from the negot of amounts of aid and administration of other forms of aid wld frustrate achievement foregoing objectives. Likely result wld be disruption Eur cooperation and efforts self-help, and thus of major Eur defense production effort which direct procurement and other aid techniques intended to stimulate Europeans must be made to realize that all US contributions are subtractions from US resources, and that end-items received via off-shore procurement or from the US are not just gravy, to be added unconditionally to "normal" aid whenever and wherever they can be obtained.

PORTER

ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, box 31

The Acting United States Special Representative in Europe (Porter) to the Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell)[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, September 13, 1951—8 p. m.

Repto 4577. ToISA. Ref: Depto 352, rptd info Paris 536, Heidelberg 99.[2]

(1) OSR concurs in ED ECC proposal for immed issuance cable along lines para 2 reftel for missions to use as appropriate with

[1] Repeated to London and Heidelberg .

[2] Not printed; it requested that a cable be issued giving general guidance regarding the nature and objectives of 1953 programming operations which could be used by U.S. officials abroad (740.5/9–1151).

govts, informing them of general nature and objectives US FY 53 programming operation and relating this operation to multilateral efforts in NATO.

(2) As point info, re para 2(*c*) reftel, are MAAGs developing equipment deficiencies info entirely on unilateral basis?

(3) OSR wishes underline importance of multilateral aspect this operation. We strongly believe that FY 53 programming for purpose Congressional presentation shld be clearly related to work of various NATO bodies and to our objectives for multilateral activity in order avoid developing a dual programming which, we fear, wld plague our efforts for months to come.

(4) What other NATO countries are supposed to do individually—and we with them collectively—is not much different from our own Congressional campaign. Every NATO govt has a Parliament on which it depends for legis and appropriations; every one is developing new parliamentary strategies. One of our fundamental purposes in NATO is to promote a coordination of such strategies, so as to obtain the best total result. It wld, therefore, seem essential to present to NATO, possibly during the Ottawa mtg, but, otherwise, before the Rome mtg, an outline of US admin programming plans for next quarter, along lines properly adapted summary of ECC reg D–7.[3] This wld show that our Congressional schedule parallels program implied in FEB recommendations FEB–D(51)51, and will promote more action in member countries.

(5) If national delegations cld report back from Ottawa that US is initiating with tight timetable, overall and individual estimates of implementation of MTDP, and that opportunity has been given to make this a multilateral project under US leadership, our country teams will have better opportunity of frank exchange of views with country officials. This will also avoid developing again a program in vacuum, which countries are likely later on to reject individually and collectively.

(6) Exchange of views at country level shld be consultation and not negot. Premature piecemeal negots at country level of further increases country defense efforts may prejudice anticipated attempt by US to obtain multilateral NATO decision on division total forces and financing responsibility MTDP.

(7) We are not suggesting, of course, that our final estimate will reflect precisely the countries' own estimates, or the NATO conclusions, but for each case we wld know the extent of the disagreement and we cld continue to work toward minimizing it. In fact, if our targets are higher the countries will have more time to try to come up to them.

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[3] Not found in Department of State files.

(8) Fol cable suggests action schedule for implementing above proposals.[4]

PORTER

[4] The schedule projected by OSR, which is contained in telegram Repto 4581 from Paris, September 13, outlined a series of steps leading to a January 1952 completion date when both NATO and the United States would have developed a program of foreign aid suitable for congressional presentation (ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, box 31).

Editorial Note

The Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States held a series of bipartite and tripartite meetings in Washington on September 10–14, and, among other things, discussed economic problems that hampered their military production programs. For documentation concerning this discussion which included a suggestion that a high-level study be initiated in the near future and that the whole question be discussed at the next North Atlantic Council session in Ottawa, see the "United States Delegation Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and France Held at Washington 9:30 a. m. September 14 (Tripartite MIN–6)," page 1163.

Among the various resolutions adopted during the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council which met in Ottawa from September 15–20, one entitled the "Resolution for Coordinated Analysis of NATO Defense Plans" was approved on September 19 that established a high-level study group called the Temporary Council Committee (TCC), subsequently nicknamed the "Wise Men." The text of this resolution is contained in telegram Secto 23 of September 19 which is included in the documentation on the Seventh Session of the Council on pages 616 ff.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, Ottawa NAC mtg, NATO Council Documents

Report by the Chairman of the North Atlantic Council Deputies (Spofford) to the North Atlantic Council[1]

SECRET OTTAWA, 14 September 1951.

C7–D/3

REPORT BY CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL DEPUTIES

Introduction

1. The Council has received progress reports from the Council Deputies, the Defence Production Board, the Financial and Economic

[1] This report, which was circulated as Council Document C7–D/3, was presented by Spofford during the ninth meeting of the Council on Wednesday, September 19; for a report on the proceedings of that meeting, see telegram Secto 27 from Ottawa, September 20, p. 675.

Board, and the Standing Group, to which is attached a report from General Eisenhower.[2] My purpose in adding a further short report is to set forth certain general comments on the relationships between present planning and proposed action within the various Treaty bodies and to make certain suggestions which may assist the Council and the subordinate Treaty agencies in dealing with the pressing problems faced by the Organization. In making this report as Chairman of the Council Deputies, I am speaking as the individual designated by the Council to be "responsible for directing the Organization and its work", and the comments made below represent my judgment in that capacity. Therefore, my report has been shown to the Council Deputies but their specific approval was not asked, and it does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Deputies.

Major issues now before the Council

2. After an interval of 9 months since the Brussels meeting,[3] the Council will now meet twice within a short time. In terms of major issues, these two meetings can be vitally important in the development of NATO and for the completion of effective arrangements for the defence of the West. Since the Brussels meeting the Treaty Organization has taken more permanent form with the setting up of the DPB, the FEB, and the creation of SHAPE, the principal military command. While these new agencies have been in existence for only a few months, they have nevertheless been able to focus on the major problems facing them. The first reports of the DPB and FEB, now before the Council, present essential factual data which is now, for the first time, available on a multilateral basis for NAT planning and action. While much of the data is tentative and subject to further refinement, the reports contain factual background on various segments of the problems facing the NAT agencies to serve as a basis for the Council to guide its further action.

3. The reports also point up what is to my mind the principal most urgent task facing NATO if planning to date and the future course of its action is to be translated into effective collective defense. Reference to the reports of the Standing Group, the Defense Production Board and the FEB, in so far as they relate to the force problem, the production problem and the resultant financial and economic problems, will serve to illustrate the point.

4. In each of these fields, there are two related but distinct problems: first, the determination of fully agreed overall requirements as to levels

[2] The various progress reports of these NATO agencies as well as the Eisenhower report comprised the four parts of Council Document C7–D/1 which was received for information by the Council during the same meeting that Spofford gave his report cited above.

[3] For documentation concerning the Sixth Session of the North Atlantic Council held at Brussels in December 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 585 ff.

of manpower, material and finance needed; and, second, the allocation among the Treaty members of the tasks of meeting these agreed requirements. While the reports before the Council now show progress on both points. Treaty planning to date has not yet developed a clear definition of the full and coordinate problems, let alone provided a basis for adequate solutions to them.

Force Requirements and Commitments

5. While there will be no recommendations for dealing with the forces problem before the Council at Ottawa, the Standing Group states that it is developing recommendations, to be ready for the Rome meeting, which will set forth the military estimate of the full force requirements, in the light of the revisions of DC 28 suggested by SHAPE. These recommendations, in addition to indicating the general measure of the force requirements, will contain recommended allocations among member governments of the forces "gap". The Standing Group report states that: "The importance of the problem of closing the gap cannot be overemphasized. The provision of the minimum of forces required for the defense of the NAT area, as well as the development of the necessary production and financial programming, depends upon the solution of this problem".

6. Similarly General Eisenhower, in urging an early solution of the force problem, states that he finds the military effort to be "so closely inter-locked with economic, financial and social matters that it is often impracticable and indeed quite unrealistic to consider one of these fields without giving due attention to the others".

7. Without making any assumptions at this time as to the ultimate force levels to be fixed by the Council, or as to the allocation of the forces required to fill the forces gap, it is clear that any disposition of the forces problem will make even more urgent the fixing of matériel requirements; the allocation of production tasks; and agreement upon solutions for the financial problems. It will also make more important the reaching of agreement as to the manner in which a German contribution to the defense of the West is to be made, since any final decisions upon forces or material will be unrealistic without knowledge of the assets and liabilities which the German contribution will introduce into NATO military, production and economic planning no matter at what stage these contributions may come.

Military Production

8. The report of the Defense Production Board deals with only a segment of the production problem, since it is largely based upon a part of the equipment deficiencies of only 7 Continental European countries and their estimated capacities for defense production. In relation to 75 important items of equipment, the Board finds that these countries have a potential capacity for several times the produc-

tion presently planned. However, to realize this production in terms of finished items required by 1954, orders in substantial amounts must be placed now. Shortages of machine tools, raw materials and manpower might impede the full utilization of this capacity. The Board concludes, however, that the primary limiting factor at present is that of finance.

9. The Board has referred various aspects of these financial implications to the FEB. The FEB has the matter under consideration but has not to date made any recommendations.

The Financial and Economic Problem

10. The interim report of the FEB is the first systematic approach by the NATO agencies to the job of evaluating the economic and financial aspects of the NATO defence effort. The FEB has confined its initial considerations to the problem of equitable distribution of the defense burden, based on an analysis of the 1951–52 defense programmes. The report measures the economic impact of present country defense efforts as a basis for considering means of equitably adjusting the present burden, and assesses the economic capacity of each country to contribute to the common defense. The report, therefore, does not make any recommendation as to the means for meeting deficiencies in forces required for full defense or the comparable full production programmes. The Board considers that, in its opinion, the feasibility of undertaking greater economic burdens in the common defense effort "can only be appreciated in the light of the political and military implications of failure to undertake such increased effort.

Suggested NATO action

11. The following facts emerge:

(1) There is a deficiency in forces required by the present plans. The military agencies of the Treaty are pressing for adoption of the measures to make up this deficiency. They will make specific recommendations at Rome.

(2) There is a short-fall in planned production required to equip the forces within the time called for by military plans. Lack of finances is limiting combined NATO action to remedy these deficiencies.

(3) The fact that the limitation is in the last analysis financial and economic is recognized by all the Treaty agencies. But the FEB considers that the feasibility of increased economic burdens must be determined in the light of political and military considerations.

It is apparent that this complex of military-political-economic prolems calls for solution in the broadest terms. This implies action by the Council on the international plane and government action on the national plane so that realistic and effective development of future plans and carrying out of the existing plans can proceed. Obviously, no single decision of the Council can resolve the difficulties inherent in the situation, which go to the heart of the economic life and sta-

bility of many of the member countries, as well as to the collective military security of all. However, the Council should be put in a position at the earliest possible date to assess the overall problem, and to adopt measures which will tend to bring into balance the requirements on the one hand and the resources on the other, in the light of existing political and economic realities.

12. The first step toward this end is the development on a multilateral basis of facts and data which will enable the Council to measure the problem in its various aspects. Until recently information adequate for this purpose has not been available. However, with the completion of the interim reports of the various Treaty agencies with their supporting data, it should be possible to proceed rapidly to develop an overall appreciation of the various orders of magnitude involved. A Joint Working Group, consisting of the senior representatives of the civilian Treaty agencies, has, under the authority of the Council Deputies, considered this problem in a preliminary way. Whether its preliminary suggestions as to a programme of action will be approved by the Council Deputies for submission to the Council is not certain at the date of this writing. Whether or not they are approved, it is clear that closely coordinated action through some inter-agency mechanism is required to develop rapidly the facts bearing on the problem.

13. The appraisal of the facts and formulation of recommendations for Council action is a matter which will require the highest degree of competence and closest coordination by representatives familiar with the political, economic and military factors. It is for the Council to decide what agency or combination of agencies should be entrusted with this task.

14. The development of coordinated action along the lines proposed should, in addition to laying the basis for Council decisions, offer the means of ending the inconclusive reference by one Treaty agency to another of urgent problems, and consequent delay and inaction.

The carrying out of these suggested tasks should of course not in any way delay or defer progress by the DPB and FEB on the matters on which they are now engaged, which should, in accordance with their recommendations, be pressed urgently, particularly the extension by FEB of its current studies on the economic impact of the defence effort to the fiscal years 1952–53 and 1953–54.

Certain financial problems requiring interim solution

15. There are two problems of extremely high priority, which require interim financial solutions in advance of development of the overall position outlined above:

(*a*) One relates to the interim financing of defense production. The report of the Defense Production Board shows that production

capacity exists in Continental European countries which, if activated now, would meet some of the major equipment deficiencies, and that failure to activate it immediately will result in a failure to achieve production from this capacity in 1954. The Financial and Economic Board has considered but has not yet recommended proposals for "pre-financing". Without some such pre-financing scheme or other interim arrangement, valuable months will be lost. It is suggested that the Council instruct the Treaty agencies to develop and adopt solutions on an interim basis which will activate European production to the fullest extent possible, subject to readjustment, if necessary, when final arrangements for financing are made.

(*b*) The other pressing financial problem, that of providing for the costs of infrastructure, is of acute importance to the buildup of forces by SACEUR. The amounts involved are not great in the light of total defense requirements. After lengthy negotiations it appears that the Council Deputies can reach agreement concerning the 1951 program for construction of airfields and signals installations. However, as military plans develop, other similarly urgent requirements will come forward. It is essential that the Treaty agencies be given authority by governments to work out agreed solutions promptly.

Organizational developments

16. As shown by the progress report from the Council Deputies, major steps have been taken in recent months to recast the top structure of NATO in line with the instructions of the Council at Brussels. Since the problems facing the Treaty Organization are without precedent, there are no established guide lines for the development of international machinery to deal with them promptly and effectively. The NATO and member governments should be ready to make improvements in the organizational structure as the Treaty effort moves forward and as the need appears. However in view of the short time available between now and the Rome meeting, and the urgency of the other issues which require decision, it would appear desirable to concentrate on making the existing organization work as effectively as possible and to consider whether changes in the organization may be desirable at or after the Rome meeting. The suggestion has been made that the Council itself should schedule more frequent meetings. I hope this will be adopted. If the Council should decide to meet at intervals of three or four months during the coming year, it would be possible for the agencies of the Treaty Organization to schedule their work in such a way as to obtain prompt ministerial decision on pressing problems as they develop.

The need for increased public understanding of NAT objectives

17. As indicated above, I believe the reports show that the major problem now facing NATO is to provide the resources necessary to accomplish an effective defense structure in time. The next few months are critical. While NATO can develop plans, the resources required can be provided only by political decision and political action. This

in turn requires a fully informed public opinion in each country. If NAT is to succeed, the voter and the taxpayer in each country must understand that in consenting to greater taxes, fewer civilian goods, a longer period of military service, he is contributing in a tangible way to his own security. He must have confidence that he is helping build the most powerful defensive strength that the world has known, strength which can mean the preservation of peace. I believe that too little is known of the growing effectiveness of the common defense forces. This is primarily a matter for national action, but national information services can, through the NATO Information Service, be provided with more effective materials to assist in the problem of developing strong public support. The NAT Information Service has made a good beginning, but its scope and effectiveness must be increased. If this is properly done, increased public understanding should be of the strongest possible support to governments in working toward adequate defense measures.

18. It may be that the presentation of NATO to the public has tended to over-stress the burdens of defense. This may have given the impression that military strength was the end and not the means to an end chosen by the North Atlantic community. Therefore, ways and means should be found to emphasize to public opinion in each country that military strength provides the shield behind which the Atlantic community can continue its progress, with closer cooperation toward peaceful objectives as the basis of the policies of each member and of the common effort. In Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty the parties agree to contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. It has been inevitable that, during the first two years of the development of the Treaty Organization, the primary emphasis has been on the other objectives of the Treaty relating to the defense effort. As progress is made toward realization of the defense goals, it is timely for the Council to consider specific steps to realize the non-military objectives of NATO.

Conclusions

19. The Treaty agencies, in presenting their reports to the Council, necessarily have dwelt on problems unsolved and ground yet to be gained. While it is impossible to overemphasize the importance of the unsolved problems, we should also keep in perspective the tremendous progress toward collective defense over the past four years.

20. Four years ago the only existing defense pact between NAT members was the Treaty of Dunkirk; the Brussels Treaty had not yet been signed; the idea of a pact between the North Atlantic powers

to provide for common defense had not even been conceived. Two years ago the North Atlantic Pact had just come into effect and the Council was meeting for the first time to consider organizational plans. One year ago the strategic concept had been approved, the Council Deputies had been established and had completed their first few weeks of work, and the concept of the integrated force was being presented to the New York meeting.[4]

21. Today the major elements, military and civilian, of the Treaty Organization are organized and operating. Plans have been approved and agreement on a wide range of matters has been reached. The integrated force under General Eisenhower has been established and its strength is growing week by week. The concept of effective common defense in peacetime has become a reality.

22. To carry forward this unparalleled effort it is still necessary to solve a host of major problems. But with the determination evidenced by the progress to date and the gathering momentum of the common defense effort the remarkable progress over the past few years should be capped in November with the decisions which will permit the effective defense of the West to be made a reality.

[4] For documentation on these developments in 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1 ff. The earlier developments are documented in prior volumes of *Foreign Relations*.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 253, miscellaneous memoranda

Memorandum by Lincoln Gordon, Economic Adviser to the Special Assistant to the President, to W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President

CONFIDENTIAL [OTTAWA,] September 19, 1951.

Subject: Initiation of "Operation Wise Men"

In view of the very short time available for the comprehensive review of NATO military programs in relation to political-economic capabilities agreed on in the Council on Wednesday, it would appear desirable for the temporary Council committee ("the Wise Men") to be organized and its plan of action laid out at the earliest possible moment. If the nomination of members and the organization meeting fail to take place within the next few days, there may well be a loss of as much as two weeks, with an even more serious loss of the momentum and sense of urgency generated by the present Council session.

The alternatives appear to be a preliminary meeting in Washington at the beginning of next week (perhaps Monday, September 24) or a meeting in Europe during the first week of October. If the latter course is chosen, a great deal of informal planning would doubtless be done on the assumption that the U.S. member would be elected

Chairman, but this would clearly be a source of some embarrassment which should be avoided if possible.

It is therefore suggested that you mention this problem to the Council Chairman and see if he would be prepared to state the problem at tomorrow morning's Council meeting. He might suggest that, if governments could designate their representatives promptly, or at least representatives who might serve for the purpose of an organization meeting, and considering that many of the persons concerned are now in North America, the U.S. would be glad to serve as host for an organization meeting to be held in Washington at the beginning of next week. If this were done, the persons most actively involved in the work of the NATO Joint Working Group might also wish to be at the new Committee's disposal to help bring them up to date on the work already done and to join with the Executive Bureau, when it is constituted, in planning the general course of action, especially the various tasks sketched in paragraph (4) of the approved Council resolution.

If there is considerable resistance to this proposal, it should not be so vigorously pressed as to create resentment, but a short statement on your part, stressing the urgency of getting on with the job, would be in order. If favorably received, this step might considerably expedite the work to be done.

Editorial Note

During the first seven months of 1951, an expert working group of the North Atlantic Council Deputies worked at the difficult and complex task of preparing a draft agreement on the privileges and immunities of civilian members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This was in effect a companion agreement to the North Atlantic Treaty status-of-armed-forces agreement which was being prepared at the same time. Regarding the status-of-forces agreement, see the editorial note, page 186. After intensive and prolonged negotiations, the draft agreement developed by the working group (document D-D(51)178) was submitted to the Council Deputies on July 25. The Council Deputies transmitted the draft agreement to NATO governments. The draft agreement was further revised and perfected by the working group during August in the light of comments and proposals of the governments. A perfected text was completed at the end of August. The final approved text of the agreement, entitled "Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and International Staff," was signed by the Council Deputies in Ottawa on September 20 at the conclusion of the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council. For the text

of the agreement as ratified by the United States on July 24, 1953, and entered into force in May 1954, together with a corrective agreement signed by the Council Deputies on December 12, 1951, and a corollary agreement between the North Atlantic Council Deputies and the United States signed in London on September 29, 1951, see TIAS No. 2992, printed in 5 UST, p. 1087. The text of the agreement is also included in Ismay, *NATO*, page 224. The extensive documentation on the negotiation of the agreement, particularly the voluminous exchange of telegrams between the Department of State and the United States representatives concerned with the negotiations, is included in file 740.5.

740.5/9–2051 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 20, 1951—11 p. m.

1713. For MacArthur. Fol text agreement concluded Ottawa [2] re sharing second slice infrastructure program.

"1. Arrangement contained this paper has been agreed upon to cover 21 tactical airfields and extensions (not including airfields in Germany) in SACEUR's 1951 airfield program and signals program approved by SG as second slice signals infrastructure program.

2. Estimated figure of gross cost of 84,500,000 pounds is herein assumed be correct for purposes of foregoing formula, such figure however subject to adjustment from time to time as required by actual cost figures as they emerge.

3. From this figure of 84,500,000 pounds further estimated figure of 5,500,000 pounds shld be deducted as estimated cost of land and utilities for airfields portion of program. Actual cost of land and utilities for airfields will be provided by countries in which land located.

4. Arrangement for sharing estimated 79,000,000 pounds agreed upon as follows:—

	pounds
(1) US	38,000,000
(2) France	17,000,000
(3) UK	14,000,000
(4) Canada	3,500,000
(5) Netherlands	2,300,000
(6) Belgium and Luxembourg	4,200,000

[1] Drafted by Frank E. Duvall of the Office of Operating Facilities and Robert G. Barnes, Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, and cleared with MacArthur.

[2] During the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa on September 20, the delegations noted that the Council Deputies had reached agreement on the financing of the infrastructure program as stated in document D–D(51)248. The action of the Council is described in telegram Secto 32 from Ottawa, September 20, p. 683.

Arrangement set forth this para is without prejudice to negotiation of different arrangement with respect any future infrastructure programs.

5. Arrangement agreed upon as set forth in paragraph 4 hereof subject to fol two important conditions:—

a. It is recognized that signals facilities to be erected will make available benefits to civilian economy, and in number of cases requirements of military will coincide with present and future civilian construction plans. It is not possible to estimate at this time exact portion of signal facilities which will be primarily for benefit of civilian econ. Accordingly it is understood and agreed that figures, derived from actual experience, which wld represent additional value to civilian economy of signals program, covered by paragraph 1 hereof, will be paid by host country and will be credited, in lieu of amortization, toward contributions of other member countries under formula for sharing future infrastructure programs.

b. Member countries took note of fact that US here supports principle that it should not be called upon pay amount greater than amount contributed thereto by next two largest contributors, exclusive of amounts included for land and utilities and for civilian economic benefits. Member countries agreed that this principle should apply in future whenever practicable, as basis for negotiation, but taking into account finan and econ situation at time of parties concerned and results of studies now being carried out on equitable sharing of defense responsibilities.

6. It is expressly understood that proportions governing nat contributions agreed upon in pounds in paragraph 4 hereof, on basis of illustrative figure of 79,000,000 pounds will be applied as percentages to sharing of any adjustments in cost which develop in future when estimated cost figures became actual cost figures.

7. It is expressly understood that all construction shall be undertaken and carried out in accordance with standards established and rates of construction approved by govts and acceptable to SHAPE, and that locations and other technical details are to be acceptable to SHAPE and approved by govts.

8. Parties agree that they will negotiate method by which residual value, if any, of facilities referred to in para 1 hereof, will be treated when these facilities or any part thereof are no longer needed by mil forces of NATO."

WEBB

ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278: ECA circular telegram

The Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell) to all ECA European Missions [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 21, 1951—7 p. m.

Ecato circular E–96. Following is proposed new counterpart policy which will serve as guidance at time that economic aid negotiations

[1] Authorized by Cleveland; drafted by Stettner and Gene L. Green, the Special Assistant Administrator for Program; cleared by various divisions in ECA, by Bissell, and, in draft, by Defense.

take place. It modifies Ecato circ E–52 [2] and takes into account Missions' comments, discussions with OSR and provision in pending legislation that $500 million equivalent of ECA counterpart funds shall be used exclusively for military production.

1. Amounts of economic aid will be agreed between recipient government and U.S. within limit set by total economic aid figure envisaged for this country during fiscal year. Latter figure will set upper limit of the aggregate of the firm commitments that may be reached during the year.

2. Amounts agreed on will be conditioned on a satisfactory commitment by the recipient government in relation to overall U.S. objectives. One element of this commitment, in all cases, will be a definite agreement as to the use of counterpart. Agreed aid amounts will be considered firmly committed, subject to satisfactory performance by the recipient PC in fulfilling its commitments to the U.S., including that with respect to counterpart use. Performance by PC's will be jointly reviewed by US and PC periodically.

Negotiation on counterpart will thus take place concurrently with decision on making aid amount available rather than being postponed, as has been the case in some countries, until counterpart has accumulated. This is a double-barrelled approach that envisages firm agreement by U.S. on our aid as well as firm agreement by PC on counterpart use.

3. In order to comply with legislative provision re military production uses, first consideration in such negotiations should be given to uses of counterpart for defense production. Following may be useful guide lines in this connection:

a) Efforts are being made to obtain broadest possible definition of "military production" in authorizing legislation. Senate version broadens provision to read "military production, construction, equipment, and matériel". Expect that this will be version finally agreed upon.

b) Counterpart earmarked for military production purposes should be additive to previously contemplated military procurement in those countries in which US considers additional military effort feasible. Recognize additional military expenditure of this type will not be possible in all cases and that, in order to comply with legislative requirement, counterpart, in some instance, may have to be used at least in part as a substitute for items already budgeted.

c) Decision will have to be reached prior to next general allotments as to amount of counterpart in each country which could be devoted to military purposes in fiscal 1952. This does not apply to emergency allotments made under joint resolution. As part of this process, review should be made currently of amounts of non-committed counterpart funds from previous years' aid which could be devoted to military purposes. Results of this review would supply minimum immediate targets for future negotiations. Please provide ECA/W with results of your review and target figure for our comments.

[2] *Ante*, p. 166.

4. Counterpart can be used also for other than military purposes. In countries where possibilities of military uses of counterpart are small or where it is considered desirable for other reasons to reserve some portion of counterpart funds for other purposes, negotiations should proceed along lines outlined in Torep 5787,[3] i.e., agreement should be reached on counterpart release for a limited number of objectives of special economic and social significance, including control of inflation where appropriate.

5. In most countries it will not be possible to commence useful negotiations concerning counterpart at least until the authorizing legislation has been passed, and in no event can U.S. aid be committed until appropriation is passed. You should, however, inform the Government that this policy with respect to concurrent aid and counterpart negotiation will be put into effect and that we expect negotiations will be commenced soon after appropriation legislation is passed.

6. Before undertaking more than informal preliminary discussions with governments on economic aid, Missions will require further instructions from Washington on the timing of U.S. aid negotiations and duration of aid commitments, on total economic aid potential available to PC; on possible variations as a result of decisions on offshore procurement and infra-structure expenditures; and on the relation of the economic aid-counterpart negotiations to overall U.S. objectives in the PC and to negotiations on other forms of U.S. assistance.

BISSELL

[3] August 11, not printed.

840.00–FA/9–2451

The President to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 24, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: It is of the utmost importance that the limited amount of Title I foreign assistance funds being made available be used most effectively for the building of the military strength of Western Europe. Accordingly, comprehensive and integrated policies must be developed for the utilization of all funds available for foreign aid purposes in Europe. This requires that we at once reexamine the estimated dollar assistance needs of the Western European countries, consider various possible means of providing such assistance, and develop a fully coordinated plan for military and economic aid to Western Europe during fiscal 1952. The results will be useful both in the allocation and apportionment process and in the effective operation of the program during the year.

I therefore request that the International Security Affairs Committee develop and submit to me through the Director of the Bureau of the Budget by October 12, 1951, the following:

1. Estimates of the minimum amount of total United States dollar assistance, exclusive of U.S.-produced end items, which is believed necessary to furnish each Title I country in fiscal 1952, in order to make its maximum realistic contribution to European rearmament. The estimates should include all dollar support felt necessary, regardless of whether in the form of economic assistance, offshore purchase of military equipment, U.S. financing of "common use" items and infrastructure, or other uses of available funds, including the pending MSP appropriations.

2. An evaluation of various possibilities for using military aid funds to supply dollar assistance to European countries. Any recommendations for such use should include an indication of the amount proposed from each source of financing. The recommendations would, of course, be tentative and subject to change as circumstances warrant.

3. A recommendation on the possibility of reducing the need for economic aid to Germany through transferring a portion of the burden of U.S. Armed Forces costs from the German budget to the U.S. Defense Department budget, with an indication of the magnitudes involved.

4. For each country, a summary of any financial commitments for fiscal 1952 which have been made to date on behalf of the U.S. Government by the various agencies, together with the reciprocal undertakings agreed to by the recipient countries.

5. A list of the specific U.S. goals to be sought in pending discussions with the various countries concerning U.S. assistance and European efforts. These lists should indicate relative priority of our various objectives so that adjustments can be made if necessary because of the limited availability of funds or other reasons.

6. A summary table showing the minimum aid needed for each country (1 above) and preliminary estimates as to the financial aid which might be supplied to it from the appropriation for economic aid and the available supplementary sources of dollar assistance mentioned above.

In case the Departments and Agencies in ISAC disagree on any of the above, I desire to receive a summary of the conflicting views and various alternative possibilities in order to make a decision on them quickly so that this key Federal program can go forward without delay.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

740.5/9–2451 : Telegram

The Acting United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Van Dusen) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, September 24, 1951—11 a. m.

Depto 374. 1. To implement Ottawa agreement on sharing cost of second-slice infrastructure (D–D(51)248),[2] USDep urgently requires instrs concerning payments procedures acceptable to US.

2. Procedure which seemed to us simplest and best suited to US objectives was to determine payments due from each participant by applying agreed percentage shares of each participant to appropriately certified bills presented by each host government as work progresses. This procedure could include a stipulation that once the respective payment due from each participant to each host government had been determined in this way, the actual form of compensation shld be agreed bilaterally between the claimant and contributing govts. If necessary, the arrangement might make provision not only for certification of bills by the host govt, but also for gen review of progress and investigation of unduly high costs by SHAPE.

3. Procedure outlined para 2 above wld permit host govts to continue infrastructure work without requiring immed establishment of new fiscal arrangements for SHAPE budgeting, auditing, or disbursement of infrastructure funds or direct supervision of execution of contracts. Para 2 arrangement also adaptable to our instructions that actual form of compensation shld be left open for bilateral agreement between host and contributing govts. Realize latter consideration may not be meaningful in practice, however, since we believe all host govts will insist that payments from US be in dollars.

4. From Washington conversations with Def Dept reps we judge para 2 procedure will not meet US fiscal necessities and that payment into fund to be administered by SHAPE or other NATO agency will be necessary. As a basis for formulating US position for infrastructure committee, we have urgent need of instructions for US proposal. Principal questions relate to SHAPE's or other agency's responsibilities. Shld these include:

(*a*) Direct supervision of execution of contracts;
(*b*) Budgeting of infrastructure funds;
(*c*) Auditing and certification of bills; and
(*d*) Custody of infrastructure funds and disbursement to agencies executing infrastructure work (whether these be contractors or executing govts). In general, we are inclined to favor confining SHAPE (or other agency) functions to (*b*), (*c*), and (*d*) at most. We believe

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[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR, MacArthur, and Schuyler.

[2] The text of this document, which was approved by the Council Deputies at Ottawa, is contained in telegram 1713 to Paris, September 20, p. 281.

even these would probably involve need for immediate substantial increase in SHAPE budget and fiscal staff since even present estimate of second-slice infrastructure program ($224 million ex land and utilities) more than ten times present SHAPE budget.

5. Suggest Defense Dept consider sending here expert versed in fiscal procedures to assist in negotiations.[3]

VAN DUSEN

[3] In telegram Todep 214 to London, October 4, the Department of State advised Spofford that this telegram was receiving urgent consideration and that he would be informed of its position as soon as possible (740.5/10–451).

740.5/9–2551

Memorandum by Ridgway B. Knight of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 25, 1951.

Subject: Possible British Support for a Reorganization of the Standing Group

After the close of the Ottawa session of the North Atlantic Council, I had an hour's conversation with Air Marshal Elliot alone.

In the course of our talk the subject of the Standing Group came up and, in particular, the chronic dissatisfaction of smaller countries not represented thereon.

Marshal Elliot mentioned that he had met privately that morning (September 20) with the Belgians and the Canadians and had obtained that the Belgians agree to withdraw their proposal for reorganization of the Standing Group.

It will be recalled that there are now two current proposals for such reorganization: (*a*) Belgian proposal—the chairman of the Military Representatives Committee to be of the same nationality as the chairman of the Council and to sit with the Standing Group as a full fledged member, thus enlarging the Standard Group to four members; (*b*) Canadian proposal—while the Military Committee is not in session, the Military Representatives Committee would act as the Military Committee. Furthermore, political guidance to the Standing Group from the Deputy would be channeled through the MRC.

According to Air Marshal Elliot, the Belgian proposal is "obviously unthinkable" as the Big Three could not discharge their responsibilities with another and rotating member participating in all Standing Group activities. On the other hand, he thought the Canadian proposal was quite acceptable and said that he himself would

[1] Copies were also sent to Jessup (S/A), Matthews (G), and Martin and Parsons of RA.

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have no doubts as to his ability to handle the MRC when acting as its chairman, and thought that it would give legitimate satisfaction to the aspirations of the non-Standing Group members without unduly complicating the work of the Standing Group.

During the conversation Marshal Elliot expressed himself in very categoric terms about the need for placating the non-Standing Group nations and expressed the feeling that many of us have, that face-saving devices added to a more tactful manner of handling these countries were all that was required.

I was left with the very definite impression that the UK was on the point of assuming the role of "protector of the non-Standing Group nations" and of supporting action on their behalf which in this instance would be support of the Canadian proposal.

Should this be the case, it would be unfortunate if the United States was cast in the opposite role and permitted our British friends to steal a march on us.

RIDGWAY B. KNIGHT

740.5/9–2551

The Secretary of State to the President [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, [September 25, 1951.]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment of Mr. Harriman as Committee Representative [2]

As I reported to you in my summary telegram of September 19 from Ottawa,[3] the North Atlantic Council has agreed to appoint a temporary committee of twelve representatives of Cabinet rank to survey the basic security needs of the NATO countries. The committee will make a synthesis of the pressing military, political, and economic problems now facing the NATO countries and report its findings by December 1, 1951. As you are aware, it is of the utmost importance that a solution be found to the problems assigned to this committee.

In my telegram, I expressed the hope that Mr. Harriman would be designated as United States Representative. I suggested his name because I believe it imperative that the United States be represented

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[1] Drafted by Russell Fessenden of the Office of European Regional Affairs.

[2] In the covering memorandum attached to the source text it was noted that the Secretary of State had already discussed this subject with President Truman on September 24 and that the President had agreed to Harriman's appointment; this memorandum formalized the oral agreement. The statement to the press concerning Harriman's appointment, which was issued on September 26, is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 8, 1951, p. 572.

[3] This is a reference to telegram Secto 23 from Ottawa, September 19, p. 677.

on the committee by an official of wide experience, great ability, and sufficient stature to command the full respect of both the American people and the representatives of other Governments. I, therefore, recommend that you approve the appointment of Mr. Harriman as United States Representative on the committee.

740.5/9–2751 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 27, 1951—6 p. m.

288. ToISA. Fol msg concurred in by State, Def and ECA.

Preparation of material required for development proposed FY 1953 aid program as discussed in recent regional mtg at London obviously necessitates consultation with govts in order obtain or check data. In order avoid misunderstanding as to purpose U.S. unilateral programming and its relation to NATO plans of action, and to elicit full coop from govts you are authorized use such of fol and in such manner as you deem most effective.

U.S. welcomes adoption by NATO at Ottawa of program of action covering comprehensive review of job yet to be done. Prompt completion this NATO work will be essential to U.S. admin if it is to obtain Congressional approval of adequate U.S. aid. It is nec that U.S. admin place proposals for FY 1953 aid before Congress at start of new session in Jan. No decision as to scope and magnitude those proposals has yet been made and no commitments are involved in present initial programming. Admin hopes to place before Cong a program which can be demonstrated to be one which together with U.S. and other NATO countries natl efforts and mutual aid among them, will achieve that level of strength during FY 1953 that is called for to meet agreed NATO def requirements arising out of NATO decisions. Further, program shld be one which includes provision for those actions which must be taken in FY 1953 to assure ability to do those things which will have to be done in FY 1954 (e.g., provision for contracting for long lead time items of equip).

Our desire and intention is to conform these programs with decisions re MTDP which may result from NATO course of action set in motion at Ottawa. If these decisions result in allocation or time phasing of requirements differing from present SG proposals we wld expect to shape our program accordingly. However, in order to meet admin's sched for preparation 1953 program U.S. must proceed in first instance with estimating total residual deficiencies after full

[1] Drafted by Bell of S/ISA and cleared with Hains of Defense, Paul of ECA, Schelling of the Executive Office of the White House, and Vass of RA; repeated to the other NATO capitals.

estimate Eur and Canad efforts on assumption that force allocations proposed by SG will be accepted. Our estimates of Eur efforts in FYs 1953 and 1954 will of necessity have to be based on assumptions of econ and fin capability and consonant polit decisions and will also have to assume certain demands on Eur mil budgets for non-NATO expenditures.

Care shld be exercised to avoid creating impression U.S. aid will be planned meet total residual requirement irrespective of size or Eur effort. As stated above no decisions yet made re amt of aid. But to have basis for decisions must obtain appraisal of requirements and availabilities. Govts coop in furnishing data will enable us make decisions more efficiently and rapidly.

Also shld be clearly understood by govts that U.S. in obtaining these data for purposes program decisions is not undertaking to negotiate re MTDP nor gap allocation which it regards as multilateral task for NATO, nor re 1952 aid. Our use of SG proposals as basis for calculation not intended to prejudice decisions nor signify intransigent position on this problem.

ACHESON

CFM files, lot M–88, box 253, miscellaneous memoranda

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 1, 1951.

Subject: Reorganization of Standing Group

Reference: Mr. Knight's memorandum of September 25 "Possible British Support for a Reorganization of the Standing Group".[2]

In view of the obvious disadvantage to us of allowing the British to pose as the sole champions of a reorganization of the Standing Group, this memorandum attempts to suggest a basis for talks with the Pentagon (probably Admiral Wright and Frank Nash) to obtain a U.S. position on the Standing Group reorganization.

So far as I know, the two reorganization proposals mentioned in Mr. Knight's memorandum, namely (*a*) the Belgian proposal for a fourth, rotating member, and (*b*) the Canadian proposal, are the only two existing proposals for Standing Group reorganization. As the Belgian proposal is quite evidently unacceptable, I should think that our first step should be to determine whether the Canadian proposal is acceptable. The Canadians propose that when the Military Committee is not in session the Military Representatives Committee would

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[1] An action copy was also sent to Cabot of S/ISA; copies were sent to Jessup (S/A), Matthews (G), Knight (S/A), and Martin of RA.

[2] *Ante*, p. 287.

act as the Military Committee and, furthermore, that political guidance to the SG from the Deputies would be channeled through the MRC. Presumably we should check the Canadians' proposal with them before taking it to the Pentagon.

In asking Admiral Wright and Nash to determine the military acceptability of this rather minor reorganization, we should indicate our support therefor along the lines set forth by Air Marshal Elliot in his talk with Mr. Knight.

If the proposal is militarily acceptable, we might suggest that the second step would be for the American member of the Standing Group to place this question on the Standing Group agenda for early consideration. SG approval would then be passed to the Military Representatives Committee and later to the Military Committee for action at its meeting before the Rome Council meeting.

If the Military Committee also approved, the final step would be to have the Canadians introduce the proposal in the Deputies just before Rome or in the Council meeting itself there.

The purpose of handling the matter in this way with U.S. initiative in the Standing Group would be twofold: (*a*) to place the proposed reorganization on a Big Three basis without allowing any one of the three to pose as the protector of the non-Standing Group nations, and (*b*) to enable the Standing Group to take an action which presumably would be popular with those nations and enable it to retrieve some of the ground lost by its initial refusal to attend the Ottawa conference.

740.5/9-2551 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 2, 1951—8 p. m.

1945. From Harriman for MacArthur. Re Embtel 1869, Sept 25.[2]

1. Hope send to all concerned within next few days gen outline our current thinking on conduct NATO Temporary Council Comite (TCC) work now scheduled begin in Paris Oct 9.

2. Among other contributions on mil side, it will certainly be neces for whole TCC generally and Exec Bureau of three in more detail to be thoroughly briefed on basis of stated mil force requirements, factors governing their time-phasing, including target date, gen strategic concepts underlying them, and probable effects of varying degrees of short-fall or deferral in mtg them either qualitatively or quanti-

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[1] Drafted by Gordon of the White House staff and cleared with Harriman, Colonel Beebe of Defense, and Martin and Parsons of RA.

[2] Not printed; it requested that SHAPE be kept informed of Harriman's thinking about how the TCC would conduct its efforts since SHAPE would have to assist in these efforts. (740.5/9–2551)

tatively. In addition, appraisal of mil manpower raising and training bottlenecks will undoubtedly be one of central issues (along with production and gen financial limitations) in determining "realistic politico-economic capabilities" with which TCC is charged.

3. It may well be suggested at TCC first mtg that project shld be initiated through a gen briefing on basis and nature of mil requirements, which shld go as far as security limitations make feasible. Understand Lindsay will be available assist TCC on behalf SG, will be prepared state SG background these matters on NATO-wide basis, and is planning discuss with SACEUR on Oct 6. Wld expect SHAPE deal with problems Eur theatre, which is of course central concern of most TCC members.

4. Cld briefing materials be prepared next few days so that, if desired, gen presentation on lines sketched above cld be made Oct 9 or 10?

5. TCC will also need assistance on possible size Ger force contribution. Assume in addition such SG views as may be available SHAPE's work this field in connection Paris Conference will also be available for TCC.[3]

6. Arriving Paris mid-morning Sun, Oct 7, and hope discuss these and related problems with Eisenhower late Sun or Mon.

7. Have discussed this msg with Adm Wright who is in accord but it has not been discussed with other SG members. Expect informal discussion with them this week. [Harriman.]

WEBB

[3] For documentation on the Paris Conference, see pp. 755 ff.

740.5 MAP/10–351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, October 3, 1951—10 a. m.

Depto 397. Eyes only for Harriman from Spofford. Reftel London 1753, Sept 30.[1]

1. I had long session this p. m. with Hoyer-Millar and Compton of Brit Treas on TCC. They first showed me Brit reply to Alphand memo, text of which has been cabled by Holmes.[2] I gave them substance reftel. We agreed positions were entirely in line. Brit had not gotten impression from Alphand that Monnet conditioned his acceptance of appointment upon acceptance of terms of Alphand memo, as

[1] Not printed.
[2] Not further identified.

indicated in Paris 1896, Sept 27.[3] Plowden is seeing Monnet this afternoon, which may clarify this point.

2. Hoyer-Millar confirmed that while Gaitskell will take part in opening mtgs UK election will require him to leave great deal of work to Plowden. Brit believe it would be desirable to have "unobtrusive" tripartite mtg between Harriman, Monnet and Gaitskell or Plowden on Monday eighth.

Brit team supporting Gaitskell and Plowden will be Roll, Coleridge and Rumbold on econ, mil and polit aspects respectively. Interministerial group has been set up here under chairmanship of Treas, with Compton acting as secty, to back stop operation.

3. Brit concerned about delay in SG allocation of forces gap and were considering requesting deps to obtain govt auth to accept SG recommendations for purposes of prelim costing. I suggested that little time wld be gained by approach to this problem through deps and that TCC might make this one of first orders of business. After discussion Hoyer-Millar and Compton agreed.

Brit have tentatively set up fol timetable for TCC exercise. This working level paper. On basis of this timetable they suggest later date for Rome mtg wld be desirable, although will not press this point. Generally they have considered that Rome mtg shld come after TCC report is finalized. I suggested utility of council mtg during TCC operation, which they will consider. Fol is suggested timetable:

"(*a*) First mtg of the Comite of Twelve and of the Executive Bureau: October 10;

"(*b*) Examination of screened defense costs of current programs and of forces for the full MTDP: October 16 to 18;

"(*c*) Assessment of the military risks involved if defense efforts are not increased: October 20 to 21;

"(*d*) Submission of countries memoranda on the economics consequences of present and required defense programs: October 27;

"(*e*) Examination of the memoranda at (*d*) above: October 29 to 31;

"(*f*) Drafting report: November 1 to 5;

"(*g*) Completion of draft report and submission to Comite of Twelve: November 10;

"(*h*) Examination by Comite of Twelve of the report by the Executive Bureau: 11 to 18."

4. Brit view thus far is that secretariat shld be drawn largely from personnel existing NATO agencies and shld be administrative rather

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[3] Not printed; it transmitted the translation of Alphand's memorandum to the Department of State and added that the memorandum represented an understanding on which Monnet accepted the appointment. This understanding, as outlined in Alphand's memorandum, was that the work of the TCC would be confided to an executive board of three members (representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and France) who would keep the committee of 12 informed of its progress. (740.5/9–2751)

than substantive in character and that first "formative work" wld be done by supporting national staffs of UK, US and Fr.

5. Nominations recd today from Ice, Bjorn Olafsson, Minister of Commerce; and from Neth, Dr. H. M. Hirschfeld.

SPOFFORD

740.5/10–151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 4, 1951—5 : 16 p. m.

Todep 213. ToISA for ECC. Re Depto 389.[2]

1. Off-shore procurement POLs and procedures have been under intensive discussion here between ECA, Def and State. Results so far achieved embodied ISAC D–14/3,[3] gist of which being cabled today. This paper was approved ISAC mtg Oct 3. ECA/W now preparing further proposal on financial procedures. In addition, as you know, off-shore procurement magnitudes, pattern and procedures a vital element in Oct 12 reply to Pres letter [4] on allocation total aid for FY '52, and ISAC agencies now urgently developing positions against tight deadline. ECC will of course be kept currently informed progress this matter, but no decisions likely until middle or end next week.

2. In view above, seriously concerned over plan outlined reftel. Satis progress being made here, and urgently request you do everything possible avoid premature and duplicating staff work. Development of ECC proposals which takes no acct agreements reached here will produce nothing but delay and confusion. Strongly recommend postponement consideration this subj by ECC until Wash decisions and proposals known to all members. Final decisions must of course take into acct ECC recommendations.

WEBB

[1] Drafted by Bissell and cleared with Colonel Van Syckle of Defense; repeated to Paris for Porter and to Heidelberg.

[2] Not printed; it informed the Department of State that the ECC had formed a joint working group to deal with the question of off-shore procurement, and it requested guidelines on the subject. (740.5/10–151)

[3] ISAC D–14/3, "Report of the Working Group on Offshore Procurement," October 1, 1951, is not printed.

[4] Reference is presumably to the letter from the President to the Secretary of State, September 24, p. 284.

740.5/10–451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 4, 1951—6:39 p. m.

Todep 215. Implementation for Rome mtg of Ottawa res on Item IV of agenda (C7–D/21)[2] calls for estimate of rel strength and capabilities NATO and Sov Bloc, among other things with respect to mil forces, indus and econ resources.

After consultation with Spofford, US intell agencies thru the IAC preparing brief estimate on Sov Bloc capabilities and intentions thru 1954 for negot with other members Standing Grp and submission to NATO Rome. This estimate to include mil, polit, and econ sections. (Note "intentions" incl altho not mentioned Ottawa Res.) There then remain (*a*) estimate NATO strength and capabilities (*b*) reports on production programs, finan and econ efforts as called for in paras 3, 4, and 5 ref doc.

Presumably (*b*) above being handled by Def Production Board and Finan and Econ Board as called for in ref doc.

Ans to (*a*) above with respect to NATO force also being prepared by Standing Grp for submittal to Mil Comte. This leaves as remaining item estimate of NATO indus and econ resources for use in comparison with estimate of strength and capability of Sov Bloc. Believe this cld be done by Deputies using internatl staff to compile data submitted by various NATO countries or in conjunction with reports listed (*b*) above. Assume Deputies will arrange.

Also assume this list will be primarily factual in character. Are prepared provide US Reps with eyes only appraisals of situation in the other NATO countries this respect. Will not do so without further word from you.

WEBB

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[1] Drafted by Fisher Howe, Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, and Martin of RA and cleared with the Standing Group and Dulles of CIA; repeated to Paris for MacArthur.

[2] For documentation concerning the approval of this resolution during the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa, see telegram Secto 28 from Ottawa, September 20, p. 686.

740.5/10–651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY LONDON, October 6, 1951—4 p. m.

Depto 426. Personal for Cabot, Nash, Halaby and Gordon (limit distribution). Please refer Todep 213.[2] Since the ECC cable of July 20 (Depto 88)[3] recommending offshore procurement program, which was discussed and agreed upon in the joint ISAC–ECC meeting of July 30 (Todep 67)[4] we have been concerned as to our progress toward getting ahead with this approach to the problem of increasing Eur production, which has been kicked back and forth between here and Washington since February. In the meantime, and particularly in the last few weeks, we have been receiving requests for information, suggestions and prodding from all quarters. As a result, and in line with our earlier action and obvious interest in the matter, we have had some preliminary staff work done and put the item on the agenda for the next ECC meeting to try to pull loose ends together here and to get off some coordinated recommendations. If these were to be of any use it seemed to me that they should be made earlier rather than later and preferably before final decisions are taken.

I am still of this opinion. I am not impressed by the argument that ECC consideration of the matter will "produce nothing but delay and confusion". In the first place I doubt whether anything ECC can do would add to our rapidly growing stockpile of both these items; in the second place, you can always find your way out of the dilemma by disregarding the recommendations, for which precedent can be found.

SPOFFORD

[1] Repeated to Paris personal for Porter and MacArthur and to Heidelberg personal for Handy.
[2] Dated October 14, p. 294.
[3] *Ante*, p. 223.
[4] *Ante*, p. 231.

740.5/10–651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 6, 1951—4 p. m.

Depto 427. 1. Ref Todep 214.[2] At 68th mtg CD on Fr initiative directed WG to implement Ottawa infrastructure agrmt. Expect WG meet Wednesday.

[1] Repeated to Paris for MacArthur and Schuyler.
[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 287.

2. If US does not have position by Tuesday, real danger infrastructure negots may be delayed once again as knowledge of US position wld appear indispensable to any real progress in formulating arrangements for implementing Ottawa agrmt. Delay for any reason wld, of course, prejudice SHAPE mil position, which is primary concern, but delay for such a reason wld also seriously undermine Eur confidence in CD as effective working agency in NATO setup. This consideration particularly valid in view of last summer's long delays and eleventh hour ministerial settlement Ottawa. Nor can entirely discount possibility that Fr may act on Mayer's repeated declarations at Ottawa that Fr wld not continue unilaterally to advance funds for infrastructure after Oct 1. Such action especially unfortunate if US alone of all member nations without instructions on administrative details for implementing substance Ottawa settlement.

SPOFFORD

ISAC files, lot 53 D 443, D–26

Memorandum by Lincoln Gordon, Economic Adviser to the Special Assistant to the President, to W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1951.

Subject: Proposed Outline of Operations for NATO Temporary Council Committee

This memorandum reflects extensive discussions with officials concerned representing the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, the ECA, and the Bureau of the Budget. It is in no sense an officially agreed document, but represents my personal views after taking into account those discussions. This second draft reflects the discussion at a final roundup of interested officials on Friday morning, October 5.

A. *Organization and Procedures.*

The TCC and the Executive Bureau will have headquarters in Paris, with meeting rooms furnished by the FEB Secretariat. Ambassador Spofford will suggest the name of a Secretary for the Committee from the existing NATO Central Secretariat. The probable designee is Sigurd Nielsen of Norway, who is universally highly regarded by persons here who know him.

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[1] This memorandum was circulated as International Security Affairs Committee document ISAC D–26 of October 8, 1951, and in the cover letter attached to the source text it was noted that Gordon wrote this memorandum in consultation with other ISAC agencies although their participation did not necessarily imply their agencies' approval of Gordon's recommendations. The cover letter also pointed out that Section H was prepared by ECA on the basis of discussions with Gordon but that Gordon had not seen this section prior to its inclusion in this memorandum.

As provided in the Council resolutions, the services of the Council Deputies and the NATO *ad hoc* Joint Working Group (which includes officers and international personnel from the Deputies, the Standing Group, the DPB and the FEB) are to be available as desired by the TCC. It is assumed that the TCC Executive Bureau will work out with the appropriate members of the Joint Working Group any specific desired tasks to be performed by existing NATO agencies.

Apart from the work already underway in the Standing Group, the DPB, and the FEB, which may be somewhat modified to meet the requirements of the TCC, I believe that it will not be practicable to make substantial new formal assignments to those agencies. The possible role of the FEB is a particularly difficult aspect of this problem, and is discussed in Section H below.

ECA and Defense representatives have suggested that, in addition to the international Secretary, the TCC (or the Executive Bureau) should seek to appoint an international Executive Director or Chief of Staff to provide executive direction for the whole effort. I consider this proposal impracticable for two reasons:

(*a*) There is no clearly competent eligible individual, who would evoke the necessary confidence, and

(*b*) The member nations, especially the Big Three, are so intensely interested in the TCC operation that they would be unlikely to entrust such responsibility even to a highly qualified international figure.

(The latter reason applies to us no less than the others.)

As an alternative, I believe we should rely upon an Executive Committee of official-level alternates to the members of the Executive Bureau. These three, together with the Secretary, should be in daily contact to ensure that the various phases of the work are moving in step. In addition, for the work on the economic capabilities side, it may be possible to co-opt Marjolin and other key members of the OEEC Secretariat on an international basis. The ECA is supplying a separate memorandum on this point.

B. *Executive Bureau Composition and Relationships to TCC.*

The first action of the TCC must be to elect its Chairman and one or two Vice-Chairmen, and to determine the composition and responsibilities of the Executive Bureau. As reported by Mr. Foster, a clear informal understanding was reached at the private Ottawa meeting of the 12 Ministers that the US member would be Chairman, the British and French members would be Vice-Chairmen, and that the Executive Bureau would be composed only of these three. It will be necessary to confirm this understanding privately in advance of the formal meeting on October 9, especially with the Italians, who have hinted at proposing a six member Executive Bureau. The avoidance

of ill-will on this highly sensitive issue will depend primarily on the degree of delegated authority sought by the Executive Bureau and the proposed relationships with the full TCC.

On this point, I believe we should suggest a full delegation to the Executive Bureau of the TCC's authority under paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Council Resolution to call upon member governments for information, advice and assistance and to require assistance from military and civilian NATO agencies. The Executive Bureau should also be charged with proposing to the TCC a general course of action, preferably at a second meeting to be held Wednesday or Thursday. Thereafter, the Executive Bureau should be charged with carrying out this course of action, including organization of the Screening and Costing Committee (McNarney [2] proposal see Appendix D),[3] a preliminary assessment of "realistic politico-economic capabilities" of member countries (and of Germany), an appraisal of the dimensions of the reconciliation problem and a first formulation of possible courses of action for consideration by the full Committee. In reviewing the politico-economic capabilities of each country outside the Executive Bureau, the Bureau should work with the TCC member from that country.

An interim meeting of the full TCC should be planned between November 5 and 10, when the Executive Bureau could report on the work of the Screening Committee and its own progress on the capabilities side. In addition, if the "Little Nine" representatives strongly desire, the official-level Executive Committee might meet once a week with representatives of the Nine (perhaps their FEB members, who will be in Paris in any event) to keep them informed on current progress.

There is attached as Appendix "A" a draft resolution on the Executive Bureau.[4]

C. *Conduct of the Opening Meeting.*

After the election of officers and establishment of the Executive Bureau, it is suggested that you at once launch the full Committee on consideration of the substance of the problem.

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[2] Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, U.S.A.F.

[3] The words "see Appendix D" were added according to the instructions in the corrigendum to ISAC D–26 of October 10, 1951. Appendix D, "Proposal for NATO–TCC Screening and Costing Committee," was also attached to this memorandum because of the instructions in the corrigendum. Many of the recommendations contained in Appendix D, which is not printed here, were later accepted by the TCC.

[4] Not printed. The draft resolution contained in Appendix A on the organization of the Executive Bureau was approved by the U.S. Delegation on the TCC and subsequently presented to the TCC as a U.S. draft proposal; its text, identical to that in Appendix A, was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Repsec 23 of October 9 (740.5/10–951).

A draft outline of a possible statement, covering the general background and the main lines of attack on the problem, is attached as Appendix "B".[5]

D. *Military Background.*

As indicated in Appendix "B", arrangements would be made for a presentation to the entire TCC of the basis of the military force requirements. It is understood that Major General Lindsay, the Standing Group representative in Europe, is discussing with General Eisenhower on Saturday, October 6, the best way of handling such a presentation. It is probable that General Lindsay would summarize the main states in development of force requirements, both for Western Europe and for other NATO commitments, and that Generals Eisenhower and Gruenther would make a more intensive presentation regarding the European theater.

E. *Revised Military Force Requirements.*

The Standing Group is now planning to have a revised statement of force requirements for the defense of Western Europe some time next week. As presently planned, the force requirements will be referred to National Chiefs of Staff by the Military Representatives Committee next week. The SG paper, revised as a result of national comments, will be forwarded for the use of the TCC about October 15. The Standing Group will also develop next week the new time-phased, country-allocated contributions recommended from a military point of view to meet the new requirements. Since these proposed national contributions will require close study by the National Chiefs of Staff, the Standing Group plans to allow the MRC members until 20 October to submit their comments on contributions. Hence the plan for force contributions will not be issued until a few days after 20 October.

It is essential that timely distribution of Standing Group force papers be made to the appropriate agencies of TCC. Accordingly, I strongly recommend that the Standing Group be requested to adopt the following procedure for these documents:

(*a*) The U.S. element of the Standing Group forward on a U.S. eyes only basis to U.S. Representatives in TCC and SCC planning papers at the time that these papers are forwarded from the planning teams to the U.S. Deputy Representative on the Standing Group.

(*b*) The Standing Group forward documents to the representatives of the Standing Group nations on the TCC Executive Bureau and the SCC as soon as the documents have been approved by the Standing Group.

(*c*) MRC documents to be forwarded to the Executive Bureau for distribution to all TCC Members at the time they are issued to the military representatives.

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[5]Not printed.

F. *Screening and Costing.*

Assuming that agreement can have been reached informally with the French and British prior to the first TCC meeting, you should present to the full Committee the McNarney proposal for the creation of the "Screening and Costing Committee" (SCC). The explanatory memorandum and draft terms of reference, as proposed by General McNarney and slightly amended to reflect the changes agreed in his office last Wednesday, are attached as Appendix "D".[6]

G. *Germany.*

It is understood that the new Standing Group requirements statement will include a specific force allocation for Germany. This figure, however, is based on the JCS view of a desirable German contribution by 1953, and is therefore considered by the U.S. as subject to upward revision to secure a figure on the total German contribution by the middle of '54.

The TCC and the SCC should use the present SG figure as an interim assumption, but seek a final figure from the SG urgently. These figures would be subject to modification when and if the Paris Conference on the European Defense Community reaches agreement on this question.[7]

The SG requirement must be supplemented by estimates of supporting forces for divisions and by time-phasing in some detail of the buildup. These estimates are normally furnished by national governments, but Germany is not in a position to do this. TCC should urgently request SG to have SHAPE prepare estimates on these points.

On the basis of the SC figures, the U.S. Costing Group should estimate German defense costs. Tripartite agreement on them should be sought for use in the forthcoming London negotiations with the French and British on occupation costs.[8] These costs and the requirements they are derived from should be subject to review by the SCC similar to the screening applied to NATO countries.

The London Group will also be seeking for their purposes to develop, in cooperation with HICOM, estimates of German economic capacity. TCC should look to this Group for such estimates on Germany and should be prepared to discuss the estimates with appropriate representatives of the occupying powers on the same basis as with representatives of NATO powers.

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[6] The text was corrected here according to the instructions of the corrigendum discussed in footnote 3 above.

[7] For documentation concerning the attitude of the United States toward the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community, see pp. 755 ff.

[8] For documentation on the work of the Tripartite Group on Germany (TGG), under reference here, see pp. 1647 ff.

While it will probably be impossible for TCC to pass judgment on Germany's capacity figures prior to the time when negotiations will have to be started on this subject with the Germans, the Executive Bureau should give such informal comments as they can on the figures.

Prior to reaching final agreement with the Germans, particularly if the figure proposed differs appreciably from that previously discussed with the Executive Bureau, the occupying powers should secure comments from the Executive Bureau in the light of the TCC exercise as it stands at that time. Any tripartite agreement with the Germans should be subject to renegotiation depending on the final outcome of the TCC exercise as a whole.

It would be desirable if a figure for Germany's defense capacity to which the Germans had themselves agreed could be before the TCC prior to its making it final report.

Recommendations of the London Group with respect to the handling of occupation costs should be communicated to the TCC since they will affect the defense burden of the occupying powers, which must be taken into account in measuring their financial capacity against defense requirements.

H. *Economic Capabilities Aspect of the TCC Operation.*

1. The tactical problem of introducing the economic work under the TCC operation has two principal facets:

(*a*) The first arises from the absence of internationally agreed costing figures now or for several weeks to come. It is obviously necessary and desirable to get some preliminary economic analysis underway to cover the whole period FY 1952 through FY 1954 (which has not been covered in the FEB operation to date) in advance of final international agreement, if any, on costs of military requirements.

(*b*) The second is to devise means of instigating such economic analysis without causing national governments or international bodies to take firm and final positions on economic capabilities prior to confrontation with military costs.

2. Accordingly, it is proposed that:

(*a*) The Executive Bureau of the TCC should request the FEB Secretariat to prepare preliminary analyses of European economic capabilities through FY 1954. Such analyses would be generally prepared in the form of "informal reports" by governments submitted to the FEB Secretariat for technical but not for substantive review, and subsequently submitted by the Secretariat to the TCC Executive Bureau. It should be emphasized that the FEB activity would therefore be a secretariat function rather than a broad function since the work will not involve the conclusion of international agreements on substantive submissions.

(*b*) The Executive Bureau will indicate to the FEB Secretariat the general form of the informal reports on economic capabilities. These

reports would present preliminary governmental views on the economic impact and feasibility of two alternate levels of defense expenditure, assuming economic aid continuing through FY 1953 and 1954 at the level requested of Congress in FY 1952. The two alternate levels of defense effort would be

(i) that level which the national government is internally (i.e., not necessarily with parliamentary approval) planning to undertake on an expenditures basis for FYs 1952, 1953 and 1954, taking into account the known large shortfall in military activities as compared to requirements.

(ii) a level 10 percent higher than the foregoing level in FY 1952 and 20 percent higher than the foregoing levels for FYs 1953 and 1954. (See paragraph 3 below for discussion of possible upper limit of levels of defense expenditure by country.)

(*c*) In its instruction to the FEB Secretariat the Executive Bureau should clearly state that assumption (ii) carries no implication that an equal percentage increase in defense efforts by all countries will be equitable. The purpose of the instruction is rather to select an arbitrary technique for economic analysis designed to minimize preliminary disagreements over assumptions so that a rough basis of economic data will be prepared in time for the confrontation process in November. The Executive Bureau believes that for some countries such a percentage increase will represent an excessive economic burden, whereas it expects that analysis will show for other countries a percentage increase of this or some other magnitude may well be feasible.

(*d*) The Executive Bureau should request the FEB Secretariat, in preparing instructions to countries for the preparation of informal reports, to reduce to a minimum the standardization of detailed submissions. The instructions should request countries to emphasize the principal limiting factor and bottlenecks, such as inflationary limits, industrial bottlenecks, balance of payments difficulties. Some uniform data may be requested such as that shown on the attached short form, but it should be held to a minimum.

(*e*) The FEB Secretariat may at its discretion supplement national informal reports or prepare independent reports on economic capabilities and bottlenecks. In particular it might be useful for the Secretariat to prepare studies on the availability of certain key commodities such as coal and steel for purposes of military production in Western Europe.

(*f*) The national informal reports, having been subjected to technical review, together with any independent Secretariat reports should be submitted to the Executive Bureau as soon as they are prepared and not later than the date which is agreed upon for the submission by SCC of the estimated costs of military requirements.

3. On the question of assumption (ii) described in 2(*b*) above, the question has been raised as to whether some objective formula could be easily devised and agreed to which would make it unnecessary for countries whose defense programs are already relatively high to prepare submissions on the basis of the assumed increment. Experience

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of the past few months suggests that no such objective formula can be devised or agreed. In FEB discussions last spring most countries agreed that any formula for application of specific percentages of estimated GNP to military programs would have to be progressive; thus a proposal to select a figure of 14 percent of GNP as an upper limit to submissions on the basis of assumption (ii) above would be regarded by European countries as a simple technique whereby the U.S. would be able to avoid making a submission on assumption (ii), whereas all other countries would be required to prepare such a submission. As to the development of an objective, progressive formula, several weeks of discussion in FEB failed to elicit agreement on the graduations of progressive percentages of GNP. No other formula has been devised to date. Accordingly, it appears to be necessary to adopt something like assumption (ii) above, supplemented by the statement described in paragraph 2(*c*) above.

ISAC files, lot 53 D 443, D–25

Position Paper Prepared by the Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Martin)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1951.

GENERAL TACTICS IN NEGOTIATING AID TO NATO COUNTRIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1952

1. The negotiations which are expected to commence the latter part of this month, when Congress has passed the aid bill and appropriations therefor, will take place under the following conditions:

(*a*) A substantial proportion of the fiscal year will have elapsed.

(*b*) For the first time, aid will be negotiated in the context of a multilaterally agreed military program which has been reviewed and revised and, in at least preliminary fashion, costed.

(*c*) While the chief variable will be economic aid, the fact that both economic and military aid will, in fact, be portions of a U.S. contribution to the achievement of a multilaterally agreed target, the Medium Term Defense Plan, makes it desirable that both economic and military aid be negotiated as a package which will enable each country to make its largest and most effective defense effort.

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[1] A covering letter, circulated with the source text as ISAC D–25/1 of October 8, 1951, indicated that this position paper was written as a partial response to the President's letter of September 24 inquiring into the use of foreign aid for the purpose of building the military strength of Western Europe. For documentation concerning the letter and the study which resulted from it, see pp. 284 ff. The verbatim text of this position paper was transmitted to Paris for Harriman and to London for Spofford in telegram Secrep 37 to Paris and telegram 1944 to London, October 10, respectively. (740.5/10–1051)

(*d*) Aid negotiations for 1952 are necessarily conducted in the shadow of the Ottawa discussions of the feasibility of the Medium Term Defense Plan and of the TCC project resulting from these discussions designed to draw up for the Council a feasible and adequate defense program.

2. In the light of this situation, it is proposed that negotiations with each country be handled in the following fashion:

(*a*) *Size of Country Effort.*

While it is essential to refer to the need for each country making the greatest effort possible, it is not feasible to condition the availability of aid upon any given level of effort, since the whole question of the size of the country's efforts and the resulting size of required efforts is under review by the TCC. Moreover, the size of the U.S. contribution to the program has been cut back by our Congress and there is good reason to respect the political decisions of other governments as to the size of their effort, just as they must respect our political decisions.

(*b*) *Composition of Military Effort.*

While there is no objection to maintaining in the course of negotiations our views about the desirability of various proposed objects of expenditure, and while we will not give economic or military assistance directly for purposes we consider undesirable, agreement to make, or not to make, certain types of expenditure should not be a condition of aid. Guidance to countries in this field must come from continuous discussion at a technical military level both multilaterally and bilaterally, and particularly in the early planning phases in the development of their defense programs.

(*c*) *Internal Economic Measures.*

In the course of negotiations, we must discuss internal economic measures necessary to minimize the dollar cost of the maximum defense effort, but aid should not be explicitly conditioned upon the undertaking of such measures. There should be an understanding that, as in the past, so in the future, full opportunity will be given for the U.S. and the country in question to work together in discussing internal economic problems and means of dealing with them so that we can pass on the benefit and knowledge of such experience as we may have. Recognition should also be given to the role of NATO bodies in this field. We should not set ourselves up as omniscient with respect to the problems of other countries or their solution.

(*d*) *Amount of Economic Aid.*

The amount of residual economic aid should be negotiated to reach agreement on the minimum level of economic aid required by the effort the country proposes to undertake, recognizing the importance of maintaining political and economic stability, the fact that some differences in our generosity as between countries may be justified by the amount of military effort any given amount of dollar aid will produce in the various countries, and the urgent needs of other countries for such aid. The amount of economic aid, of course, must take account

of total dollars available from other U.S. government sources, estimates of which should be given as programming assumptions prior to negotiations of direct dollar aid.

(*e*) *Amount of Military Aid.*

The amount of military aid should be dictated by the ability of European forces to use the equipment involved, an ability much influenced by the size of their defense expenditures for non-matériel costs. Within the overall amount of military aid available, we should, of course, go as far as possible to put forces on a fighting basis, as required by NATO commands.

(*f*) *Counterpart.*

Because of our legislative requirements, it will be necessary at the time of aid negotiations to reach substantially firm agreements as to the disposition of counterpart, including the portion which should go to meet the legislative requirement for military expenditures and that required for certain other key programs in which we are interested. In line with the principle in *a* above, we cannot expect countries normally to expend counterpart for military production in excess of the military production programs currently contained in country budgets which have included counterpart earnings as an income item.

(*g*) *Loans.*

It is not considered likely that any substantial proportion of the 10% loan provision can be met in Title I. To the extent loans are found to be sound, they should be worked out in the course of the aid negotiations.

(*h*) *Duration of Commitment.*

Since we are requiring our partners to plan their military programs as far ahead as possible and it is, in fact, necessary to do so from a budgetary, a military production and a military training point of view, it is essential that the countries know as far in advance as we can tell them how much military and economic aid they can count on. Therefore, our aid commitments should be firm until the end of the fiscal year. The commitment is, however, to provide the economic and military aid required by the programs they have undertaken to carry out.

(*i*) *Amendments of Aid Figures.*

It follows from this general approach—which may be described as reliance upon conditions subsequent rather than conditions precedent—that our initial aid commitment is subject to reexamination. As in the case of the original figure, modifications should reflect the developed needs of the defense program and within the limits of our financial capacity be modified upward or downward accordingly. Modifications should not be considered as rewards or punishments but simply a recognition that programs have changed, with a resulting change in the need for dollar aid.

740.5/10–951 : Telegram

The United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, October 9, 1951—11 p. m.

Repsec 21. 1. TCC held first mtg today Oct 9. Spofford opened mtg acting at request of Pearson, chairman of council, welcomed creation of TCC; and offered full cooperation permanent NATO bodies.

2. Canadian rep nominated US rep for chairmanship. Election was unanimous. Belgs nominated Fr and Nors nominated British reps for vice chairmen. Also elected unanimously. Ital rep made reservation, however, to apparent effect that his election wld not prejudice question of composition of exec bureau.

3. US rep took chair and made short statement emphasizing seriousness of threat, but conviction that working together countries had resources necessary to create adequate defenses against that threat and thus perhaps lead to easing of present tensions. Pointed out that present level of industrial production in Europe wld have been thought in 1947 wholly impossible of achievement. Must not let ourselves be discouraged by goals now before us. Described nature of TCC problem.

Chairman announced that briefing had been arranged by General Eisenhower and staff and General Lindsay of SG Wednesday Oct 10 at 10:45 at SHAPE headquarters.[2]

4. Plowden as UK rep made brief statement expressing appreciation of all members that US president made Mr. Harriman available and expressing belief that the exercise cld not only be of great value in itself, but also from doing of it wld rise greater sense of common purpose and greater ability to work together among NAT countries.

5. Chairman invited Chairman of Deps to nominate candidate for secy of TCC. Sigurd Nielsen of international staff was proposed and accepted. It was understood that further elaboration of Secy's staff wld only be possible after agreement had been reached on general plan of work to be undertaken. In course of proposal Spofford urged that TCC use NATO coordinating committee as channel for securing assistance from permanent NATO bodies. There was no objection.

6. Chairman circulated proposal (contained in separate msg)[3] for establishment exec bureau. Chairman described purpose of proposal to establish small and efficient group which cld organize and discuss on behalf of larger group work program necessary to permit it to reach sound conclusions on basis of adequate data. Indicated clearly

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[1] Repeated to London for Spofford.

[2] No record of this briefing was found in the Department of State files.

[3] Telegram Repsec 23 from Paris, October 9, is not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 299. For a description of the organization of the TCC, see the editorial note, p. 316.

exec bureau wld be servant of TCC and wld need help and cooperation all TCC members. Pointed out immediate action desirable with particular reference para 3 so that executive bureau cld get started on report on course of action for submittal to TCC Thursday.

Itals, Belgs and Portuguese requested time for study and asked that discussion be postponed until afternoon meeting. This was agreed.

7. At afternoon meeting emphasis was placed on securing approval for chairman and two vice chairmen not acting as executive bureau, to prepare recommendations with respect to courses of action for submittal at Thursday's meetings. This was approved. There was brief discussion of what these courses of action shld cover with emphasis by Dutch representative on development of principles of burden-sharing. Portuguese rep stressed importance of member countries functioning as full members of executive bureau when matters of concern to them were under discussion. No other significant comment.

8. It was agreed that press information wld be confined to procedural matters and that no background discussions wld be held on substantial issues, but that chairman might hold press conference at conclusion this series of meetings.

740.5/10–1151 : Telegram

The United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, October 11, 1951—9 p. m.

Repsec 29. From USDel TCC. Third meeting of TCC October 11.

1. The chairman called attention to TCC D(51)2 [2] which had just been distributed outlining proposed course of action. He indicated that in carrying on temporary council committee work it was fully intended to use other NATO bodies to the maximum although there had not been time to work out specific uses to be made of them and to include in the document such matters. He also called attention to importance of screening and costing committee operation and to high caliber of General McNarney, who had been made available by US to chair group subject to approval of proposal by TCC. Several members suggested that there had not been adequate time to study document and that they would prefer to postpone action until afternoon meeting. This agreed. After brief exchange of questions and answers, meeting adjourned.

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[1] Repeated to all NATO capitals.

[2] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Repsec 27 from Paris, October 10, *infra*.

2. Between morning and afternoon meeting agreement was reached by US, UK and Fr with Itals on amendments to executive bureau paper.

3. Afternoon meeting opened by chairman with further discussion SCC program and organization. Indicated would want recruit staff and secure expert help from all TCC members and McNarney if chairman would serve for TCC as international official. This question returned to at several points during meeting with number of members concerned about proposal confining SCC to three and met by replies that every effort wld be made to use experts from all countries, both civilian and military, and that General McNarney at next meeting of committee would be prepared, after survey of problem, to discuss further nature of work and best method of organization.

4. Canadian rep raised objection to standing group "proposing national contributions" on grounds only countries could deal with questions of contributions and Standing Group should confine itself to total requirements. Persuade accept "suggesting" in place of "proposing". Dutch representative expressed strong endorsement of document; assumed if revisions necessary as result experience of executive bureau TCC would be consulted. Also suggested that as result experience in their work, TCC although temporary might be in position to make suggestions as to permanent improvement NATO organization to deal with similar problems. UK rep called attention to proposals that countries supply certain info and stressed importance such info secured promptly to meet TCC time schedule.

5. Chairman concluded discussion with emphasis on fact not legal document but to be operated in spirit of mutual confidence and cooperation. With minor drafting changes document then approved. (Ten copies text being pouched.) TCC approved in substance telegram for despatch to Standing Group requesting that it be furnished all SG documents bearing on NATO force requirements and forces buildup simultaneously with transmittal to MRC with understanding these will constitute preliminary information for planning purposes and be subject to comments of national staffs through MRC.

6. In course discussion revised terms of reference executive bureau (final text being pouched separate message)[3] chairman again stressed importance of establishing relations on basis mutual confidence. It was made clear that all TCC members would receive copies of country submittals in response to executive bureau request, copies of notes on formal executive bureau meetings and such other material as would assist all twelve in preparing themselves to participate intelligently and actively in the final work of appraising national programs. Chairman proposed as personal suggestion that selection

[3] Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Repsec 30 from Paris, October 12, p. 814.

of representatives, to sit with executive bureau when programs of executive bureau members under discussion, be Italy, a representative to be selected by Benelux countries and a representative from Scandinavian countries. He referred to fact this proposal approved by Canadian rep and hoped acceptable to Portuguese rep who agreed. Document then approved with minor verbal changes.

7. Agreed issue brief procedural communiqué and that chairman might hold press conference on behalf members at which no substantive information would be released. Text communiqué in separate message.[4]

8. Today's discussion characterized by strong concern at degree to which three, through executive bureau and SCC membership, would have complete control of TCC operation. This attitude much softened by revised terms of reference and statements made by three in course afternoon session. Also characterized by strong approval of and minor nature of questions raised about course of action document.

[4] The text of the communiqué was also included in the telegram cited in footnote 3 above.

740.5/10–1051 : Telegram

The United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, October 10, 1951—midnight.

Repsec 27. From USDel TCC. Fol is text of proposed course of action paper which has been agreed by chairman and two vice-chairmen for submittal to TCC Oct 11.[2]

"SECTION I—INTRODUCTION

The Council has stated as the required 'immediate next step' 'An analysis of the issues involved in reconciling on the one hand the requirements of external security, in particular of fulfilling a militarily acceptable NATO plan for the defense of Western Europe with, on the other hand, the realistic political-economic capabilities of member countries.'

The TCC is directed to carry out such an analysis and to submit to the Council its findings including possible courses of action. The committee's analysis is to be completed and its findings reported to the Council by Dec 1, 1951.

To fulfill this task, the comite's plan of work must provide:

(1) Assessment of the dimensions of the problem both on the requirements and the capabilities side, which shld be completed in about one month, and

[1] Repeated to all NATO capitals.

[2] As noted in telegram Repsec 29 from Paris, October 11, *supra*, this paper was approved by the TCC on October 11 with only minor drafting changes.

(2) Exploration of possible courses of action and preparation of the report.

In all aspects of its work, the TCC will assume a German contribution to western defense. It will also assume that the contribution will be made through the European defense community, except for such contributions as may be made to support forces of NATO countries in Germany. The TCC will secure info it needs on Ger requirements and capabilities from the Paris conf and, where necessary, from other appropriate sources, it being understood that the Paris conf will be closely associated with this work.

SECTION II—ASSESSMENT OF THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

This phase is composed of the elements set forth briefly below. Later sections of this paper indicate the proposed method of handling each of the elements. The starting point, namely, the authoritative statement of force requirements from a military viewpoint will be available before the end of this week. In view of the very limited time available, the various other steps in this phase must be carried on concurrently. In summary, the elements of the first phase are as follows:

MILITARY FORCE REQUIREMENTS

A statement from the Standing Group giving their latest estimate, framed in the light of recommendations by SACEUR, of the force requirements for the defense of NATO area in July 1954, with a time-phased build-up, and with their tentatively proposed national allocations of forces to meet those requirements. These must be supplemented by infrastructure requirements.

Thereafter, the proposed line of work involves (1) on the military side an inventory of the current position and the screening and costing of military requirements, and (2) on the political-economic side an inventory of current efforts and an appraisal of capabilities and limitations.

(*a*) *Military stock taking.*

This element involves an analysis of the actual current position with respect to forces and their efficiency, provision of material, and military construction, including not only a record of the present position but also of the results that will follow over the coming months from actions already taken.

(*b*) *Screening and costing of military requirements.*

This element involves an examination of organization and equipment of basic national military units, their training and operating requirements, and the making of recommendations on economy measures to obtain effective mil force requirements at minimum cost. For this purpose, it is proposed to create a screening and costing comite with the functions set forth below.

(*c*) *Econ and financial stocktaking.*

This element involves an inventory of current levels of defense expenditure and production of matériel, including contracts placed for future delivery, the rate of completion of contracts, and the rate

of payments. The position in virtually all respects as it will be at June 30, 1952, and in some respects at later dates, is largely fixed by the actions already taken or in process.

(*d*) *Analysis of capabilities.*

This requires an examination of present and planned levels of defense contributions, and the economic and political problems involved in their implementation and possible expansion to meet the military force requirements estimated by the standing group this to be done for each member country. The analysis must include problems involved in rapidly expanding the levels of munitions production in Europe, and problems involved in raising and training mil manpower in the indicated quantities and by the indicated dates, including possible means of resolving these problems. This work will also include an examination of the possibilities of expanding the capabilities through cooperative measures.

Section III—Courses of Action and Preparation of Report

The ultimate goal is a mil effective and polit and econ feasible program, including the allocation of contributions in men, production, and finances, among the member countries (and Germany). Any such program shld be balanced and time-phased as regards the period up to mid-1954.

The exact method of work appropriate to the second phase can not be determined in advance, since it will be largely controlled by the character and dimensions of the problem as revealed in the first phase.

It is therefore proposed that a more definitive plan of action for this phase be developed by the exec bureau and be presented to the TCC at an appropriate later date.

Section IV—Further Statement on Proposed Action Outlined in Section II

A. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC STOCK-TAKING

In order to undertake a realistic analysis of the current position, the executive bureau will request info from member govts and NATO agencies which will include the size of the forces available to NATO on 31 December 1951 and their state of training and equipment; forecasts of the equipment which will become available in 1952 from European production as a result of firm orders placed, of end-item deliveries to European members from North America against funds already programmed, and of the additional trained manpower which present arrangements will produce by the end of 1952.

B. SCREENING AND COSTING MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

It is proposed that the exec bureau will form a screening and costing comite, which will be an agency of and report to TCC through the exec bureau.

The screening and costing comite wld be empowered to call upon all North Atlantic treaty org agencies, commands and countries to furnish such info as may be necessary in the conduct of its work,

provided its consideration of the info is within its terms of reference as determined by the exec bureau.

The SCC wld make recommendations on economy measures to reduce costs of creating and maintaining recommended mil requirements for an adequate defense of the North Atlantic area. Its work wld be based on revised medium term defense plan force requirements as prepared by the standing group (and subsequent modifications thereof), and wld estimate the minimum cost after taking all possible economies into consideration. The SCC wld review the possibility of affecting all practical economies as for example: equipment both as to resales and unit costs, administrative and supporting units and installations, infrastructure, etc.

C. ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

1. During the initial stage of the work on politico-economic capabilities, it will be necessary to secure an understanding of the character and the seriousness of the politico-economic problems involved in each of the countries in accomplishing present programs and in undertaking the kind and size (in general terms) of military program as estimated by the standing group.

There will also be required an exploration of the steps which might be taken by countries individually or in cooperation to eliminate or reduce the magnitude of these problems. In this latter connection particular attention shld be directed to increases in over-all productivity and output by positive measures.

This phase looks forward to a period when, in the light of the screened requirements resulting from the work of the SCC, TCC will endeavor to develop judgments with respect to overall and country levels of effort and aid.

2. To assist in securing an understanding of the difficulties to be encountered in each country, each member country will be requested to submit within a short period (e.g. two weeks) a statement describing in qualitative terms, supported by approximate data to the extent useful, the problems involved in present and proposed defense programs. These statements shld address themselves to specific difficulties which may be incurred in key areas such as the balance of payments, production, manpower, raw materials. The statements shld also cover the nature of the limitations on additions to present defense efforts and suggestions of a specific nature for overcoming such limitations.

For these purposes countries can not await completion of the detailed costing of the program as estimated by the standing group since only rough general magnitudes will be necessary for the economic analysis.

These statements will provide a basis for and will be followed immediately by full and frank country-by-country discussions among members of the exec bureau of the TCC, including for this purpose a representative of the country concerned, designed to bring out more fully and clearly the politico-economic capabilities and difficulties in each country.

3. To consider positive measures to assist an expansion of total production, and thus permit increased defense efforts without serious

impairment of political and economic stability, it is proposed to recruit key personnel from the OEEC and FEB secretariat.

4. The analysis shld include an examination of the realistic possibilities of expanding the levels of munitions production in Europe, the limiting factors on such expansion, and possible means of overcoming them.

5. In commenting through the mil reps comite on the allocation of forces by country as estimated by the standing group, countries will describe any difficulties from a military point of view in providing the forces required of them. These replies shld be sent simultaneously to the SGG [*SG?*] and the TCC. The TCC will seek advice from the appropriate NATO military authorities on the importance of these obstacles and on measures which might be taken to overcome them."

740.5/10–1251 : Telegram

The United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, October 12, 1951—4 p. m.

Repsec 30. From USDel TCC. Re Repsec 29, rptd London Repna 88 and NATO missions.[2] Fol is final text terms of ref Executive Bureau:

"1. In accordance with Council resolution on C7–D/19, 1951, there shall be an executive bureau of the NATO temporary Council Comite. This bureau is composed of the chairman and the two vice chairmen of the comite. The comite may subsequently appoint any other members of the comite to the Executive Bureau if necessary according to circumstances, with a view to expediting the work of the comite.

"2. The Executive Bureau will in all phases of its work be under the general guidance and direction of the comite.

"3. The Executive Bureau is empowered in the name of the comite to call upon member govts and mil and civilian NATO agencies for info, advice and assistance in accordance with paras 3 and 4 of the Council resolution. It will be the task of the Executive Bureau and the secretariat to keep the members of the comite informed as fully as possible of the requests for info being made to the various agencies of their govts.

"4. The Executive Bureau shall prepare for the consideration of the comite a proposed general course of action. It shall be responsible for all necessary preparatory work to permit final appraisal by the comite: (*a*) of the 'requirements of external security, in particular of fufilling a mil acceptable NATO plan for the defense of Western Eur', and (*b*) of the 'realistic politico-economic capabilities of member countries'.

"5. To this end, in the consideration of the capabilities or programs of any member country not represented in the Executive Bu-

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[1] Repeated to all NATO capitals.

[2] Dated October 11, p. 308.

reau, that country's member of the comite shall for this purpose be a member of the Executive Bureau. In the consideration of the capabilities or programs of each of the countries represented in the Executive Bureau, there shall be appointed as a member of the Executive Bureau for this purpose one other member of the comite.

"6. The Executive Bureau shall be responsible for preparing for the consideration of the comite, draft findings, and the basis therefor, including courses of action.

"7. The Executive Bureau shall meet with the full comite to report progress on its work whenever the comite shall determine or at the call of the chairman.

"8. The Executive Bureau will arrange to keep other member govts fully informed of the progress of the work." (*End Text*)

Fol is text communiqué mentioned reftel:

"The NATO temporary Council Comite, created at the recent Ottawa conference, completed this afternoon its first series of meetings. The comite has started immediately on the task set for it by the North Atlantic Council, which is to analyse the problem of reconciling the requirements of fulfilling a mil acceptable NATO defense plan with the realistic politico-economic capabilities of member countries. After meeting yesterday with Gen Eisenhower at SHAPE for a general review of the mil aspects of the problem, the comite met today to complete its organization and to lay out a general plan of work.

"At its first meeting on Tuesday the comite elected as its chairman Mr. Averell Harriman, of the US, and as its vice-chairmen, Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, of the United Kingdom, and M. Jean Monnet of Fr. The comite designated as its secretary Mr. Sigurd Nielsen of Norway, a member of the international secretariat of NATO previously assigned to the Council deputies.

"As envisaged by the North Atlantic Council at Ottawa, the comite has formed an Executive Bureau composed of its chairman its two vice-chairmen. Acting under the guidance and direction of the comite, the Executive Bureau will organize the necessary preparatory work to permit the comite to make its appraisals of defense requirements and economic capabilities and to develop its recommendations. During the consideration of each country's program, the rep of that country on the comite will also serve as a member of the Executive Bureau. In addition, the comite will add other members to the bureau as needed, in particular when the bureau is considering the programs of the United States, the United Kingdom and Fr.

"Arrangements are being made to keep all members of the comite fully informed at all times of the bureau's work. The comite will be assisted in its work by all the permanent NATO agencies.

"The comite was in unanimous agreement that these arrangements wld provide an efficient working method to carry out in the limited time available the heavy responsibilities laid upon it. The spirit of close solidarity and of complete participation on the part of all the member countries on a footing of equality in the common task of the comite agreed by all to be the basis on which the comite wld carry on its work."

Editorial Note

At the conclusion of their first series of meetings, the 12 members of the Temporary Council Committee had agreed to create an Executive Bureau of three members which would be assisted by a Screening and Costing Committee (SCC), chaired by General Joseph T. McNarney of the United States Air Force. Aided by Sigurd Nielsen, Secretary of the TCC, General McNarney was instructed to appoint a staff and to formulate plans for operating this committee. For the text of General McNarney's speech to the opening session of the SCC, which was held in Paris on October 20, see telegram Har 109, October 21, page 327. On October 26 the SCC was reorganized to include a fourth member representing a nation other than the three on the Executive Bureau; the new group was redesignated the Screening and Costing Staff (SCS).

One week after the decision was made to create the SCC, the Executive Bureau decided to appoint another committee to assist in the compilation and analysis of the economic and financial data gathered on each NATO member country. This working group, the Temporary Economic Analysis Staff, was largely comprised of personnel borrowed from the OEEC and NATO Secretariats and was to assist the Executive Bureau until December 1, 1951. This completed the formal structure of the TCC and its subordinate groups. The majority of the recommendations were to be made by the Executive Bureau, which was aided by its working groups, and these recommendations were then to be reviewed by the full TCC at periodic meetings to be held approximately every two weeks.

According to telegram Repna circular 1 from Paris, October 13, all telegrams sent from the TCC headquarters in Paris were to use the series indicator "Repto," which was normally used for ECA cables, and were to note in the first line of the text that they were from the "USDel TCC"; the series indicator "Repsec" was no longer to be used for TCC telegrams. The distribution in Washington for all TCC communications was to include the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, the Economic Cooperation Administration, and the Office of the Director of the Mutual Security Agency. (740.5/10–1351)

840.00-FA/9-2451

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance (Ohly) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 13, 1951.

Subject: Attached Reply [2] to the President's Letter of September 24, 1951.[3]

Discussion:

In a letter to you dated September 24, 1951, the President requested that the International Security Affairs Committee re-examine the estimated dollar assistance needs of the Western European countries, consider various possible means of providing such assistance, and develop a fully coordinated plan for military and economic aid to Western Europe during fiscal 1952. The President requested a reply by October 12. A copy of the President's letter is attached at Tab A.

The member agencies of ISAC—together with the Bureau of the Budget and other interested agencies—have carefully studied the six specific points to which the President sought answers. However, it has not been possible to respond fully to the President's letter pending the completion of certain studies now under way in the Department of Defense. A further reply will be made when those studies have been completed.

The studies on which the reply is based conclude that with the provision of economic aid to Title I countries of $968,000,000, the Title I countries will be able to support defense expenditures of $11,209,000,000. On the other hand, if U.S. dollar assistance of $1,836,000,000 is provided, the defense effort of Title I countries can be increased to $12,456,000,000. Thus, an increase in European defense effort of $1,247,000,000 can be obtained by an increase in U.S. aid of $868,000,000. Any increase in dollar assistance over the amount appropriated for economic aid would come from such devices as offshore procurement of military end-items, transfer of funds (up to 10 percent) from end-item authorizations to economic aid authorizations, etc.

The reply to the President also recognizes that in view of the trend of the United Kingdom financial situation it might be necessary to finance—in some fashion—United Kingdom imports in an amount estimated at $300,000,000.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to the President at Tab B.

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[1] Drafted by William J. Sheppard of S/ISA. Sent through the Executive Secretariat with concurrences by EUR, E, Treasury, Defense, ECA, and Harriman.

[2] Not printed; it was approved by Secretary Acheson and sent to the White House on October 16.

[3] *Ante*, p. 284.

740.5/9–2451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 15, 1951—8:08 p. m.

Todep 242. Re D–D(51)248 [2] and Depto 374.[3]

1. Our goals are to (*a*) push implementation Ottawa infrastructure agreement with utmost speed (*b*) put NAT countries on notice of necessity in immed future considering ways and means of our complying with policy concerning taxes reflected in Sec 521 MSA Act 1951.[4]

A. Without specifically relating it to Ottawa agreement, you shld make frank presentation of situation which has arisen as result of Sec 521 MSA Act and indicate this is matter of concern to all NAT nations because of its relationship not only to present but also future aid legis.

B. At Ottawa this problem had not emerged in its present form. We are nevertheless faced with present situation and we know other nations will join with us in seeking solution that will not delay implementing infrastructure urgently required. The situation is one which other NAT countries must face realistically as matter of self-interest.

C. You shld state studies are being conducted in US to ascertain types of taxes covered by statutory prohibition and to recommend appropriate procedures to comply with Congressional intent. We hope to have further details on this at very early date. However, as each country has different tax problem, arising from tax structure and tax laws, matter does not appear susceptible of multilateral approach, nor wld multilateral approach provide adequately speedy solution. It is our conviction such details can be developed in due course and must not be allowed delay estab procedure per para E this tel. The accomplishment of second-slice projects, supported by internatl financing, is no more than start of infrastructure program and will overlap further infrastructure projects which will arise in near future. This aspect of problem shld therefore be considered as small aspect of problem of total effort to meet MTDP.

D. As earnest of US desire to minimize difficulties and delays, US is prepared to meet any reasonable calls by SHAPE for financial ad-

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[1] Drafted by Joseph J. Wolf of the Office of European Regional Affairs and cleared with Ernst of Defense, Henning of Treasury, Yingling of L/EUR, Tannenwalt of the Executive Office of the President, and Hefner of EUR; repeated to Paris for MacArthur, Harriman, Schuyler, and Tomlinson, to Wiesbaden for Norstad, and to Heidelberg for Handy.

[2] Transmitted in telegram 1713 to Paris, September 20, p. 281.

[3] Dated September 24, p. 286.

[4] For the text of Public Law 165, see 65 Stat. 373. For documentation concerning the Mutual Security Program, see vol. I, pp. 266 ff.

vances, subj to exception of taxes, under fol procedure, which we believe will be most expedient.

E. To permit speedy application of financing arrangement set forth in D–D(51)248, US believes SHAPE fiscal system shld be utilized and CD participation in these details minimized therefore. Accordingly, SHAPE shld be instructed estab and put into operation procedures as may be advisable subj review by Budget Comite and approval by CD. US believes essential maintain central admin over expenditure subj funds and specifically agrees with functions B, C and D, para 4 reftel. Re function D, shld be clear SHAPE will be no more than paying agent for respective contributing nations. (FYI only rpt only, this is to provide for bilateral arrangements not involving SHAPE re taxes.) As to para 4A, believe this covered by para 7 of D–D(51)248. Procedure shld accord generally with existing fiscal procedures for admin budget insofar as applicable, with adjustments as necessary.

4.[5] FYI only, in interim, until SHAPE has time to estab mechanics, believe Fr Govt will be prepared continue make advances and in contemplation this, US is developing basis for entering into bilateral base right negots with Fr at earliest possible date. This based on statement Mayer to Pace at Ottawa of his pleasure over agreement which obviated need his applying Oct 1 cut off.

5. FYI only, implications Sec 521 are very broad and we feel every caution must be taken so as to abide by and not to commit beyond Congressional intent. We urge you to spare no effort to have other Deps realize seriousness of implications this tax point which wld be aggravated shld they not agree to above proposals.

6. Unless you perceive major objections to foregoing procedure as means obtain goals para 1, you shld pursue soonest.

ACHESON

[5] No paragraphs 2 and 3 in source text.

S/ISA files, lot 52–26, D–4/15

The Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot) to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, October 16, 1951.]

DEAR MR. NASH: I refer to your letter of September 10, 1951,[2] relating to the furnishing of supporting information to the United

[1] This document and a cover sheet were circulated as ISAC D–4/15 of October 16, 1951.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2 to the memorandum of September 5, p. 264.

States Deputy Representative to the Standing Group on the financial and economic factors of the United States position on "Closing the Gap".

The ISAC analysis and conclusions concerning the economic considerations involved in the United States position are contained in ISAC D–4/8, a copy of which is attached for Admiral Wright's information.[3] The conclusions were subject to revision in light of political and military considerations. It is understood that the study was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration in the development of the United States position.

In view of the fact that the study was based on an "initial" United States position on country force contributions to the Medium Term Defense Plan, ISAC recommends that Admiral Wright be advised to reply to inquiries thereto along the following general lines:

a. The initial United States view on increased force contributions was primarily based on military considerations.

b. The military allocations were subjected to a rough United States unilateral economic feasibility analysis which indicates that the program was generally possible under certain assumptions which seemed reasonable at the time.

c. The United States recognized that a detailed feasibility analysis of force contributions should be undertaken in the appropriate NATO bodies. This analysis should be satisfied by the work of the TCC in response to NAC resolution C7–D/9 [*C7–D/19*].[4]

Sincerely yours, THOMAS D. CABOT

[3] ISAC D–4/8, "Economic Analysis of the Allocation of the MTDP 'Gap' to European Countries," June 25, 1951, is not printed. For information concerning this ISAC paper, see the letter from Cabot to Marshall of June 25, p. 205.

[4] For documentation concerning this North Atlantic Council resolution, see telegram Secto 23 from Ottawa, September 19, pp. 677 ff.

740.5/10–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 17, 1951—6 : 36 p. m.

Todep 246. Re Depto 447 rpt Paris 695.[2] In view TCC exercise in which inflation one of many problems being considered, and in view of desirability of affording Eur countries minimum excuses to cloak

[1] Drafted by Robert H. Kranich of the Office of European Regional Affairs and cleared with Ernst of Defense, Paul of ECA, Knight of RA, Schelling of the Executive Office of the President, Camp of RA, Barger of E, and Beale of BNA; repeated to Paris for USDel TCC.

[2] Not printed; it requested the Department of State's position on whether or not the problem of inflation should be discussed at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council which was to be held in Rome in November (740.5/10–1251).

disinclinations toward greater def efforts, we are inclined here to doubt usefulness of discussion problem inflation at ministerial level at Rome mtg. Even if inflation is not agenda item we can expect considerable reference to problem in context country positions re magnitude efforts. As fear inflation already haunts Europeans we believe U.S. need not highlight question and that general discussion in NAC purely on this aspect of defense problem might give undue weight to this limiting factor. We believe TCC appropriate forum where inflation will continue to be considered as one of obvious key elements in arriving at NAT program acceptable from political and economic as well as military view points. Also should be noted U.S. position on inflation being prepared for presentation at Gen Assembly UN. Background material will be available for TCC and at hand for Rome mtg if needed.

ACHESON

740.5/10–1751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, October 17, 1951—8 p. m.

Depto 465. North Atlantic community WG [2] today had free informal discussion of coordination of foreign policy with Bryn leading discussion at Chairman's request. Discussion followed 3 headings: (1) Scope, (2) machinery and (3) Lange's suggestion at Ottawa that Parliaments be associated in some way with NATO.

Bryn felt present pooling of military forces made high degree of political coordination necessary. Interests of most members outside North Atlantic area and preoccupation of all with Soviet policy, intentions, and actions made it difficult to fix geographical limit and primary criteria as to appropriateness of subjects shld be degree of common concern. Fol points were made in ensuing discussion: NATO shld avoid infringement on UN jurisdiction although common policies and action in support of UN purposes and principles cld help UN. Larger powers might feel smaller were seeking to limit their freedom if range of topics too wide. Greater powers had widest range of responsibilities but most members had particular interest in one

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] The Working Group of the Committee on the North Atlantic Community held its organizational meeting on October 16 in London; a record of this meeting is contained in telegram Depto 462 from London, October 16 (740.5/10–1651). The committee was a result of a decision made at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa on September 20 which established a Ministerial Committee to study the future development of the North Atlantic Community. This resolution can be found in telegram Secto 29 from Ottawa, September 20, p. 687.

or another problem. Countries, whether large or small, with most direct interest in particular problem shld take lead in proposing it and in ensuing consideration. Most topics wld probably relate in some way to Soviet threat but development of North Atlantic community in non-military fields might lead to possible discussion of policies within community, not merely negative in sense of seeking to avoid or remove difficulties between members but in positive sense of promoting stability and well-being. It was consensus that Ministers shld not attempt precisely to define scope of matters for coordination but that criteria shld include importance to objectives of NAT, degree of common concern, and likelihood of need for agreed action. It was also recognized that while this subj was included in terms of reference of committee of five, it was also included in Deps terms of reference and already in process of development. Accordingly Deps shld continue to develop it currently and comite of five might be able to report at Rome on concrete action taken as well as proposals for future.

On machinery, it was agreed that the Deps shld be regular primary instrument but that Council shld play important role and diplomatic and other channels shld also be used.

Fol points were made: Maximum objective was such harmonization of policies and such common action as wld best serve common interest. Minimum objective was to assure that action or policy by one did not adversely affect common interest. All available means shld be used to this end, primarily Council and Deps, but members govts shld also make conscious effort to consult other partners through diplomatic channels as appropriate in order to facilitate coordinated policy and action. Since degree of interest of members in particular questions wld vary widely, it might be desirable for those most directly interested to consult among themselves through any channel, at any time in process. At same time undue degree of prior agreement (such as in Big Three mtgs results of which others learned from press) shld be avoided. Objective was solidarity of all twelve and this required that all concerned be at least kept informed. Spirit of teamwork which Deps had developed was valuable, and they and initial staff shld be utilized to present for consideration by govts agreed presentation of particular problems, facts, and issues involved.

Belg raised question of whether comite of five shld not merely be made permanent but given task of substantive preparation for Council mtgs. All others objected on grounds this was Deps task and composition of comite of five unsuitable. It was agreed that while comite report shld include recommendation as to its future existence, terms of ref and composition, possibility of its use in substantive preparation for Council shld be raised only as query.

In introducing question of associating Parliaments with NAT, Bryn stated his govt had nothing specific in mind but felt strongly necessity

for parliamentary and public support for NATO objectives, policies, and decisions, and had noticed in its own Parliament marked difference in attitude between those reps who had been at Strasbourg or otherwise participated in mtgs with foreign reps as compared to those members of Parliament who had not. Two possibilities were: (1) Inclusion of Parliamentarians on Council delegations as was done with UN delegations or (2) something like Council of Eur. On first, he felt present size of Council required streamlining of procedures and enlargement of delegations shld accordingly not present such problem. He believed this question shld be brought before Council at Rome although it might well not be answered there.

Fol points made in discussion: Duplication of, or adverse effects on, Council of Eur shld be avoided. NATO was a governmental rather than parliamentary org. Educational effect on Parliamentarians of travel and discussion with foreigners undeniable as in case of recent Eur visits from US Senate and House. Council of Eur might, following association of US and Canadian Parliaments, become Council of North Atlantic area.

Some form of North Atlantic interparliamentary association or *ad hoc* mtgs of Parliamentarians might be practical. Substantive discussion by Parliamentarians at Council of Eur was irresponsible and often ill informed. NATO's work was diplomatic and technical and Parliamentarians wld make decisions more difficult. Parliamentarians were tending increasingly to infringe on proper functions of executive in foreign policy and this shld be resisted. Ministers shld conduct foreign policy and keep their Parliaments informed. On other hand, NATO ministerial decisions were not enough without parliamentary and public support. Governmental systems varied widely. US and Neth Ministers were not parliamentarians. Most Belg and some Nor Ministers were.

Council of Eur had advantages of educational effect and stimulation of idea of unity but disadvantage of irresponsibility and lack of competence. Problem for NATO was to secure advantages without disadvantages. This in turn created problem of securing parliamentary support without impeding proper ministerial freedom of decision. It was agreed that this was one problem which merited discussion and wld obviously require further careful study by WG, comite of five and Council.

At conclusion Bryn stated that since he wld be away for next week, he wld like to go beyond topic of today's discussion. He said problem was not merely one of coordination of policy but of developing effective common action. In long run this wld require institutional changes. Stikker had spoken at Ottawa of Atlantic federation as something which was obviously not for today but which shld not be excluded as

possible future objective. Nor, from point of view of geography and interests, considered Atlantic framework in which it, UK, US, and Canada all participated on equal footing most suitable framework for development of closer association between it and other countries. This was view of Nor Parliament as well as govt and Nor wld be prepared to go at least as far and as fast as majority of NATO members.

SPOFFORD

740.5 MAP/10–1951 : Telegram

The Acting United States Special Representative in Europe (Porter) to the Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell)[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, October 19, 1951—5 p. m.

Repto 5257. ToISA.

Subj: Division of US aid for 1951–1952 and related "burden-sharing" decisions.

1. We are convinced that total NATO position will be better from US standpoint if 1951–1952 division of US aid can be carried out predominantly in multilateral framework, and in conjunction with other "burden-sharing" decisions, especially re Belg. Main reasons are (*a*) that US has previously invited multilateral recommendations re distribution of aid, especially in its sponsorship of WG–12 and FEB, and in its endorsement of FEB recommendations at Ottawa; (*b*) that US position in TCC will be improved if we now demonstrate clearly our intention to deal multilaterally; and (*c*) most important, our sincere desire to treat common problems on a multilateral basis whenever possible.

2. We realize Wash is proceeding with plans for bilateral discussions. However, believe that with timing appropriate to problems raised by TCC operation, and with careful staff preparation, we can get much better results from US standpoint by combination bilateral and multilateral approaches as developed below.

3. Our main concern about multilateral consideration at this time has been that reopening 1952 aid question in FEB within next few weeks wld have depressing effect on TCC operation. This because under present circumstances each Eur country's presentation to FEB will probably be a recital of weaknesses designed to show need for US aid proportionately greater than that of any other country. For this reason, we have concluded that multilateral discussions shld not now take place. Furthermore, personnel, both Eur and US, for FEB exercise wld be required for next few weeks for TCC operation.

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[1] Repeated to London.

4. There wld be also good reasons for delaying purely bilateral as alternative to multilateral negotiations:

(*a*) Chief one is that US position not yet clear on such crucial questions as amount of economic aid available; substitutability (if any) by countries between economic and end-item aid; criteria for, and amount of, offshore purchases; negotiation objectives re intra-Eur aid; Canadian aid.

(*b*) Of almost equal importance is confusion which wld result from simultaneous discussions in TCC and in country capitals of questions re magnitude of effort and levels of aid. Realize these questions can be logically separate—i.e., TCC applies to long-term whereas country negotiations wld deal with 1952 only—but believe almost inevitably there wld be serious conflicts.

(*c*) TCC decisions will probably have some influence on 1951/1952 "burden-sharing".

(*d*) Data submitted to TCC, especially on rate of actual expenditures, will have important bearing on US 1951/1952 decisions.

5. It appears to us that all above objections wld disappear if we decided to have multilateral consideration by FEB, but postpone this until TCC operation has reached point where there is community of opinion (not necessarily with specific agreement) on (*a*) general magnitude of mil job to be done and (*b*) limited extent to which US itself can be expected to fill financial gap (we assume, of course, that US position can be clarified by then). We now tentatively set such time as Nov 15–19 after TCC has completed country examinations and has SCC report.

6. Believe, therefore, we can safely put 1951–1952 questions to FEB on about Nov 19, setting Dec 2 or 9 as deadline for FEB recommendations to US. If as late as mid-Nov it appears that TCC operations are off schedule, we can move FEB dates forward.

7. Realize that some bilateral approach will serve US interests, not only in helping to meet commitments to some countries (e.g., Fr and Italy) but also in arriving at general areas of agreement. Recommend beginning bilateral discussions in country capitals as soon as we are ready. These discussions wld have limited objective of informing the individual countries:

(*a*) Of our intention to have multilateral negotiations re distribution of US aid and of our hope that multilateral decisions will be reached which we can follow in consistency with our statutory and policy obligations;

(*b*) To make clear to each country the general objectives of the US aid program with respect to that country;

(*c*) Inform each country of our thinking (based on our best current analysis of their presently known programs and those submitted to TCC) re estimated dol receipts from US mil, infrastructure, receipts from off-shore purchases, and our thoughts as to allocation of direct economic aid and general levels of mil expenditures with which they are associated;

All of above to be carefully hedged by repeated refs to point (*a*) above.

(*d*) To get fullest possible understanding of countries' problems and attitudes.

8. Between now and about Nov 15 we shld firm up US positions which now appear to us to be somewhat unclear (see para 3(*a*)). Consider it extremely important from our standpoint that US ente multilateral discussions with very clear notions as to US objectives and limits both in TCC and re 1952 division of aid and burden-sharing.

9. This message not concerned with those continuing bilateral discussions and negotiations which relate to our continuing responsibility to see that US contribution is provided in full accordance with US objectives and policies.

10. US dep, please comment.[2]

PORTER

[2] In telegram Depto 485 from London, October 20, Spofford endorsed the general approach outlined in the source text and agreed that the "firm US drive behind TCC as multilateral method for reconciling mil requirements with politico-econ capabilities wld seem to be somewhat contradicted if we concurrently acted only bilaterally in allocating [19]52 aid." (740.5/10–2051)

Military cable files, lot 52–246, TCC, 1951 : Telegram

The Chairman of the Temporary Council Committee (Harriman) to the Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell)

SECRET PARIS, 20 October 1951—10 p. m.

Repto 5286. Personal from Harriman. Army pass Defense for Lovett. For Acheson, Lovett, Snyder, Wilson, Lawton and Bissell eyes only. I can understand that there are some major questions of principle raised for US by TCC questionnaires.[1] In resolving these questions I am sure you will have in mind that US leadership in NATO is essential for the attainment of security for the North Atlantic Area, so vital to our own, and in fact for the success of General Eisenhower's mission. The possibility of obtaining effective results from TCC will depend directly upon whether we give adequate information, not only because of the value of the information per se, but in order to set a pace for real effort from other countries. I realize that since we are in a different position from other countries, our answers in some cases cannot be as full as we expect and need from others. It is accepted, because of the nature of TCC, that the info submitted consists of

[1] This is a reference to a detailed questionnaire which was sent by the TCC to all member countries in NATO requesting that information about their military and economic capabilities be given to the TCC by October 25. The circular telegram TCC–3 of October 15, not printed, is in the Military cable files, lot 52–246, TCC, 1951.

estimates to which no country can be committed. TCC will in my opinion fail if we adopt the role of Inspector General, rather than one of a participant in a common undertaking.

Military cable files, lot 52–246, TCC, 1951 : Telegram

The Chairman of the Screening and Costing Committee (McNarney) to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)[1]

SECRET PARIS, 21 October 1951.

Har 109. This message is Topent 2 in two parts.

Part 1:

Opening statement by Chairman.[2]

The sense of urgency and willingness to delve into a difficult situation—that is the keynote of the TCC and of the SCC. If a listing were made of the attributes we must possess to accomplish the task before us, I am certain the list would be lengthy. Paramount among our qualifications must be cooperation and understanding. Let me say at the outset that our overall task is a 12 nation task and therefore its accomplishment will require the cooperation and understanding of the 12 nations. I wish to welcome the representatives of the North Atlantic Organization countries on that basis.

Although this is my first opportunity to be a member of the treaty organization it is not my first contact with North Atlantic Treaty Organization affairs. Those of us in Washington who are involved in defense programs are well aware of this important segment in the world wide preparations to resist any aggression. I have watched the steady development of North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense planning and am keenly aware of the importance of achieving its stated objectives. There can be no doubt in our minds of the requirement to complete an effective defense of the North Atlantic community. I mention this lest there be any thought towards representing the temporary costing committee and screening and costing committee endeavors as evidence of hesitancy or indecision to reach our goal. Such is obviously not the case. Our work will center on clarification and discernment of problems so that North Atlantic Treaty Organization can quickly reach decisions that will make present defense efforts even more effective.

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[1] Telegrams from General McNarney and his staff were sent to the Secretary of Defense through the facilities of SACEUR in Paris and bore the series indicator "Har"; copies of some of these cables are in a special lot file in the Department of State entitled the Military cable files, lot 52–246.

[2] This opening statement by General McNarney was presented at the first formal meeting of the Screening and Costing Committee of the TCC which met on October 20. For information concerning the committee's origins, see the editorial note, p. 316.

I have had an advantage over others associated in this present work by being able to meditate on the problems before somewhat in advance. I have also had the opportunity of discussing certain aspects of our problem with the Standing Group in Washington. This has led me to an initial, but still tentative, conclusion as the particular direction this committee should take. Our basic task is to further progress in reaching agreed North Atlantic Organization strategic objectives. A medium term defense plan that is effective and attainable is the specific goal I have in mind. Our task is not to change this plan in its objectives, but to suggest ways and means by which the fundamental military strength inherent in the plan can be secured. This is a very difficult task, but it is an old and familar one. In peacetime military planning, it is usually habitual to absorb within the plan costly projects created through uncertainties and difficulties which in peacetime, seem insurmountable.

We are prone to overestimate, but rarely to underestimate our requirements for one or more of the millions of items or the millions of men that are required for raising, maintaining and fighting a military machine. In addition to our common North Atlantic Treaty Organization problems, each country has its own military establishment problems which in the aggregate may well consume an even greater portion of our total resources than those devoted to purely North Atlantic Treaty Organization problems. The inevitable trend is to produce very large requirements which are difficult, if not impossible to attain short of total mobilization. I believe, frankly, that is our present situation.

The creation of the temporary council committee and the screening and costing committee under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization concept deals with the old problem in a somewhat new and different manner, but that is the end of the novelty. Since it is an old problem, one with which most of us have had previous experience, I am sure that we can agree that the way to a solution is as clear as it has been in the past: In times of scarcity it is necessary to see to it that men, money and materials be put to the most effective use and to resort to priorities and to allocations of our available resources if we are to reach our primary objective.

I have previously cabled my general views to Mr Harriman and I trust that you have had an opportunity to learn of them. I do not foresee any easy road to settling the problem facing the screening and costing committee. As I told Mister Harriman, any routine handling of this situation would end in failure. In fact, if it were routine in nature it would be within the capability of each nation to accomplish its share of the total problem. But, obviously, that has not yet been fully accomplished and each country or the countries collectively, must receive further guidance. It is not our role to be a voice of

authority in making such decisions. It is our role, however, to be a voice of authority in making recommendations. I propose that from the very beginning here, now, at this meeting, each consideration that we make be aimed specifically at practical, professional recommendations which will accomplish some portion of our objective. We must not be led down the side-streets of theoretical discussion, however invaluable or enjoyable that may be. We are not here to promote efficiency alone, or to recommend variations in theoretical patterns. We are here for only one purpose—and that is to make practical, specific recommendations which, if carried out, would in many ways directly contribute to obtaining the primary objectives.

It will be impossible for us to do our work with any degree of popularity. Realizing this, I have disassociated myself from our own military planners. I do not mean that we consider ourselves above our national or North Atlantic Treaty Organizations planners, for our recommendations must finally be acceptable to them, but that we must be without prejudice. We need more than a fresh viewpoint. We need a determination to break through and separate out points of interest. Our mission is a special one. Based upon my own experience, I believe it can best be solved by searching out the major problem areas where economies can be realized without reducing military effectiveness or where military effectiveness can be enhanced without increased cost. We must take into account as best we can our total military. Other matters of the agenda to table the initial thinking of my staff on problem areas I believe we should investigate. I ask that you study these and be prepared to consider at our next meeting a certain number of these objectives to permit this committee to proceed. These papers have been prepared in quick fashion, but I am convinced that, though the working may be rough in these staff papers, the objectives are sound. I therefore ask your very serious consideration so that we may be prepared to outline an immediate work program.

As Chairman, I would like to make a few statements on procedure for meetings of the screening and costing committee. It is obvious that our work be informal and conducted within a limited group—otherwise we shall not get ahead. Until developments indicate otherwise, I suggest daily sessions of the screening and costing committee beginning at 1000 hours. At these first sessions I visualize discussions between the screening and costing committee and the responsible team of the staff on selected problem areas with a view to initiating screening and costing committee action by correspondence to appropriate North Atlantic Treaty Organization agencies and countries. I desire to limit attendance at these working meetings to the minimum. When discussions by the screening and costing committee concern problem areas of particular significance to an individual country, I will specifically request that the country representative to the screening and costing

committee be present. I therefore ask that country representatives be available on reasonably short notice. Under normal procedures screening and costing committee action, in seeking information from individual countries, will be accomplished through the country representatives. I trust that they are prepared to assist us fully and that screening and costing committee may rely on them to take the necessary action involved. From time to time, as sufficient progress is made, I shall call for general meetings in order that the respective views of each nation may be presented and shared by all.

Part 2:

Proposed work program for SCC, statement by the Chairman.

When I was first appointed to this committee I informed Mr Harriman that it was of the utmost importance that the SCC begin its work upon convening and that it was my hope that SCC would get into matters of substance without delay. My understanding of the schedule of the TCC leads the conclusion that within two weeks the SCC must make an initial report, that within a month the SCC must have completed a substantial portion of its task. Let us not be under any illusions that every aspect of our work can meet such a schedule. However, I do believe that important conclusions backed by sound facts can, indeed must, be achieved. With your agreement I propose we set about our business with that objective.

I would like to spend a few minutes on outlining the probable nature of our program, as I see it. I would like to have the benefit of your views either today or at the next meeting.

I have proposed that the SCC staff be composed of 4 basic teams: Force Analysis, Logistics, Budget and Costing. Their titles represent the professional scope of our work. In some fields it will be difficult to distinguish the work to be done by such titles, but I have suggested this division because of the apparent sequence in which our type of analytical task must be approached.

In military planning the basic step is the determination of forces required. The strategic concept which engendered the MTDP forces has been set for us. The tedious process of compiling the essential combat forces required to support the strategic objective has been accomplished and a revised proposal on major units has been issued recently by the Standing Group. The broad operational planning task has been accomplished. But there is yet another task concerning forces that has not been done which I feel is the mission of the first-mentioned team—the Force Analysis Team—this requirement is the technical review of the compilation of force requirements to discover ways and means of reducing the inevitable high cost of major plans and of promoting the most efficient utilization of troops to accomplish the neces-

sary tasks. I propose to touch on this aspect in detail at an early meeting.

After a measure has been secured of the required forces the next step is obviously the requirement to equip and supply them, as well as the ability to do so. I know that each country has planned this in detail. However a cardinal principle in NATO is the promotion of efficiency through more effective use of our overall allied resources. The fact that NATO plans have not yet been refined makes it even more necessary to inspect the possibilities of eliminating duplications, errors and faulty assumptions in logistics planning. There can be little doubt but that in the early phases of our combined operations there is much room for improvement in the logistics field.

Having established force and logistics requirements from the military viewpoint there is the detailed analysis and review of their translation into and procurement of the end items necessary to equip, maintain and operate the forces both in peace and war. I term this the budget review, or the defense ministry type of action. I consider this a most important aspect of the SCC operations.

After the above 3 actions have been accomplished we are ready to proceed with the important task of "costing" the military requirements. This is the work of the Costing Team. They have two principal fields of operations: The costing of the revised MTDP and the analysis of probable savings, if recommendations by the SCC were to be carried out. In the last analysis the SCC mission is intended to provide a measure of economy and we must be able to demonstrate the worth of our recommendations.

The orderly method suggested above cannot be followed very precisely but it appears to be the basic pattern. The TCC requires an early assessment of the financial implications in the revised MTDP. It will be necessary to proceed at once with certain aspects of the costing exercise. I have had my staff draw up certain proposals on this.

The complexity of our task and the need to tie in with the TCC requires a work program of a flexible but yet positive character. At this time I would propose the following tasks as those of first importance:

a. An immediate rough assessment of the cost of the revised MTDP by November 5.

b. A constructive series of questionnaires to NATO agencies and countries designed to provide information in the costing assessment as well as the details of present defense programs. Some of this has already been accomplished.

c. Select certain major fields of investigation wherein substantial savings in material might be effected and reach tentative conclusions by November 5 on what recommendations could be made.

d. Isolate areas where insufficient information is obtainable in order that corrective measures can be initiated.

At the close of this meeting I shall distribute to the SCC the preliminary staff studies that I mentioned earlier. Are there any general comments, suggestions or questions on this aspect of our work?

740.5/10–2251 : Telegram

The United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, October 22, 1951—noon.

Repto 5296. Usdel TCC no. 22. Personal from Harriman for Perkins and Ohly State; Nash Defense; Bissell ECA.

1. This is to comment on certain problems involving the relationship of foreign aid of NATO programs which have arisen during the early stages of TCC activities. I naturally do not intend to take firm positions on these matters without proper consideration of contending factors, but wish to indicate some points which appear to me of great weight.

2. In connection with the decisions on aid, especially economic aid, to the European NATO countries for 1951–52, we have apparently been party to several possibly conflicting understandings.

(*a*) We took the lead in creating the working group of 12 and the FEB, with their specific responsibilities for recommending an equitable distribution of the defense program for this fiscal year;
(*b*) We joined at Ottawa in endorsing the FEB recommending to push ahead rapidly with the "burden sharing" work for FY 1952;
(*c*) We undertook, at least with the French and Italians and possibly other countries, to set up bilateral negotiations in the European capitals late this month and early in November, with a view to determining amounts of aid in relation to their several defense programs, together with any other appropriate specific bilateral understanding;
(*d*) We joined in sponsoring the TCC.

3. I am, of course, aware that certain elements of the aid program require special bilateral negotiation with each recipient, but to determine the amounts and conditions of aid solely through bilateral negotiation seems to me neither likely to produce the best results nor in keeping with our sponsorship of and repeated statements in support first of the FEB and now of the TCC.

4. In my judgment, to launch bilateral negotiations now designed to firm up aid commitments against specific defense program undertakings by the recipients would, even though limited to this fiscal year, seem to many of the Europeans to be pulling the rug out from under the TCC. While the TCC work is not focused on the short-

[1] Repeated to London personal for Spofford.

term period, it must inevitably have a bearing on the character and scale of European defense efforts over the next few months as well as a longer period.

5. It follows that we should devise a means for putting the bilateral and multilateral negotiations in proper relation, using the multilateral forms (TCC and FEB) for the main determinations on size and character of programs and amounts of aid, with bilateral arrangements taking care of supplemental specific points and also filling any necessary requirements. Without specifically endorsing Repto 5257,[2] I request your careful attention to its recommendations as one means of so doing.

6. A somewhat similar issue exists in relation to the DPB, which we sponsored and subsequently appeared to have given far less effective support. Def 84551,[3] is a welcome step in the right direction, but I believe that we must further review our policy on information to the DPB and guidance from the DPB staff regarding offshore procurement, not merely for the sake of doing favors to the DPB, but to make use of the major contribution which its staff will have to offer if such support is forthcoming.

[HARRIMAN]

[2] Dated October 19, p. 324.
[3] Not found in Department of State files.

740.5/10–2651

Memorandum by Ridgway B. Knight of the Office of European Regional Affairs[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1951.

Subject: Defense Reaction to Repto 5360[2]

When I received Repto 5360 I immediately communicated with the office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs in Defense and spoke simultaneously to Capt. Matter and Mr. Ernst. Re submission of the military stock-taking questionnaire I was informed that we could "expect" to have an answer in complete form by the time Mr. Harriman returned on Sunday but that of course the dispatch of this answer would be subject to a policy decision to be reached after Mr. Harriman's return.

[1] Copies of this memorandum, which was written for the files, were sent to Perkins and Martin.
[2] Not printed; it contained recommendations by the U.S. Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee concerning the composition of the U.S. representatives on the Executive Bureau which was to review the defense programs of the various member countries. These representatives would also be responsible for presenting a review of the U.S. defense program. (740.5/10–2451)

Re participation by Defense officially at the secretarial level in the examination of the U.S. submission, it was apparent that the Department of Defense is considerably troubled by the present multilateral orientation of our policy. I was told that Mr. Lovett wants to discuss with Mr. Harriman this entire problem and reference was also made to Repto 5296 [3] and Depto 485 [4] which endorsed the multilateral approach in our 1952 aid negotiations. Furthermore, it appeared that Defense (and Mr. Lovett's name was mentioned somehow in this connection) is concerned that we not give the TCC the impression that it is deciding U.S. affairs for the U.S. It was also said that Defense did not like the implication of "the U.S. defending itself" in front of its NATO allies in view of the size of our contribution, etc., etc.

In order to clear up Defense's position at this level I asked whether or not I could inform Mr. Gordon that (*a*) Mr. Lovett wished to discuss with Mr. Harriman the policy aspects which may be causing him concern, and (*b*) whether I could say that a Defense representative at the appropriate level would participate in the examination of the U.S. military submission.

I received a categoric no to both questions. Thereupon, and after having so informed Messrs. Matter and Ernst, I spoke with Frank Nash who immediately agreed that both Mr. Lovett and Mr. Harriman should have a heart to heart talk and that either Mr. Pace or himself would participate in the examination of the U.S. position. Mr. Pace and Mr. Nash are arriving in London on November 8 and expect to be in Paris on November 10.[5]

Notwithstanding the successful conversation with Frank Nash, I have reasons to believe, based on all my recent experiences with the Pentagon, that the position taken by Messrs. Ernst and Matter is not without foundation and that a talk between Messrs. Harriman and Lovett is much required. The essence of the problem is clear: The Department of Defense refuses to consider that our NATO relationship and commitments could at any time modify U.S. decisions. Defense seems to adhere to the view that U.S. military decisions are exclusively arrived at unilaterally by the U.S. While no one in the U.S. Government would advocate a policy under which U.S. decisions would be subordinate to NATO decisions, it seems imperative there be greater recognition of the direct importance of NATO to U.S. security and therefore greater importance placed on NATO decisions and recommendations.

RIDGWAY B. KNIGHT

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[3] *Supra.*

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 326.

[5] Pace and Nash were designated as members of the U.S. Delegation which was to attend the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly in Paris and then the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Rome.

ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, box 88

The Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell) to the Acting United States Special Representative in Europe (Porter), at Paris [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 26, 1951—8:19 p. m.

Subject: FY 1952 Economic Aid Program

Reference: Repto 5257 [2]
Repto 5277 [3]
Repto 5296 [4]
Repto 5305 [5]
Depto 485 [6]

Torep 8081. To Harriman from Bissell.

1. Concur your view desirability carrying out 51/52 division in multilateral framework so far as feasible and consistent with:

a. Basic objective to achieve maximum defense effort by Eur countries. (We firmly committed as matter Executive Branch policy and Congressional intent to use 52 aid as leverage to this end and have given Congress country target figures which we under obligation to try to attain.)

b. Necessity providing Eur govts with early firm aid assurances essential to enable them finalize budgets and make firmly available funds for expenditure first half calendar 1952 which we consider critical period from danger loss defense momentum.

2. Fully agree importance avoiding any conflict or undermining TCC exercise and would favor making explicit in any discussions that 1952 aid decisions would be modified in light TCC if necessary. Believe real conflict unlikely in practice since TCC conclusions cannot be reached early enough to have major effect on FY 52 expenditures. Suggest may aid TCC discussions, pointed at longer term agreements, to have 52 aid settled soonest possible, rather than remaining one of things each govt considers it is negotiating about in TCC.

3. Believe desirable FEB proceed immediately on burden-sharing exercise, initially stressing analysis of relationship aid to defense pro-

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[1] Drafted by D. Gordon and cleared in draft with Cleveland and Bissell; repeated to London for Spofford.

[2] *Ante*, p. 324.

[3] Not printed; it requested a quick reply to Repto 5257 which would permit U.S. representatives in Europe to state a tenable position on whether 1951/52 aid decisions would be handled on a predominantly multilateral or bilateral basis (ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, box 31).

[4] *Ante*, p. 332.

[5] Not printed; it informed the Department of State that Martin and Vass approved the program outlined in Repto 5257 (ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, box 31).

[6] Not printed; it stated that the U.S. Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Spofford, supported the general approach for allocating aid for 1952 as outlined in Repto 5257 (750.5/10–2051).

grams. Effort would be made to reach general judgments as to relative burdens proposed national defense effort and relation of total burden all countries to such requirements estimates as may be available from TCC interim conclusions or other NATO agencies. Suggest initial objective be early report by FEB along following lines:

(*a*) Ref to analysis contained interim report submitted Council at Ottawa.

(*b*) Comments on magnitude defense efforts by countries relative to one another.

(*c*) Comments on magnitude defense efforts relative to overall military requirements estimates.

(*d*) Agreed estimates B/P positions in 1952 if feasible. (These wld be useful, but not essential.)

(*e*) Comments on aid criteria as recommendations to net donors of aid. For example FEB might recommend aid be tied to magnitude and character defense expenditure undertaken to carry out agreed force commitments.

4. If this initial qualitative review indicates prospect FEB conclusions supporting our basic objective of increased Eur def effort, U.S. would then submit model division 1952 aid related to specific level def expenditures by countries, for comment by other FEB members. Wld appreciate your views re use Models I and II from ISAC D25/3*a*[7] as indicating our view appropriate relation aid and def expenditure. U.S. would make clear willingness receive specific division of aid recommendations multilaterally agreed in FEB provided such agreement could be reached promptly, but also stress absolute necessity, even in absence agreed multilateral recommendation, our being able advise countries promptly at least approximate sums they can count on for FY 52 within limits Model I total.

5. Believe would also be desirable have FEB commentary on economic and financial measures necessary effective carrying out defense programs and minimizing adverse economic effects, which specific countries could take or might be taken jointly. This has been one U.S. objective in FEB from outset, but interim report disappointing this regard.

6. Believe following procedure takes account necessity that final decisions be in multilateral framework, our commitment to Congress to use 1952 economic aid negotiations to attempt secure maximum feasible European defense efforts, and undertakings by U.S. representatives during recent Washington talks (especially to French and Italians) to engage in bilateral discussions soonest possible after appropriation approved, for purpose reaching definitive agreement

[7] Not printed.

levels 1952 aid and def effort. (*Last consideration strongly stressed* Paris Embtel 2357 [8] and Toeca 1323.[9])

a. We ask FEB start work soonest on basis para 3 above and move to para 4 stage soonest possible if progress satisfactory.

b. We start informal discussions with French (and other countries where same considerations apply) along lines suggested Paris Toeca 1323, with view to securing favorable attitude their part toward our position in multilateral FEB discussions and at same time defining shape of interim commitments re aid and def effort.

c. In both bilateral and multilateral contexts we make clear we face question transfer of military to economic assistance, and need demonstrate direct relation between additional aid above "Model I" levels and additional def effort, along lines analyses contained ISAC D–25/3*a*.

7. Country cables summarizing Washington aid and def expenditure estimates, and requesting country team recommendations, dispatched today through ECA channels on basis above framework. If approved by Harriman, we propose establish with each country team range of figures (including best expectation offshore procurement and other dollar earnings from U.S. Govt, as well as economic aid) within which country teams can talk. All messages both ways will be repeated Paris.

BISSELL

[8] Not printed; it requested that talks with the French begin immediately concerning interim aid because of their deteriorating financial situation (751G.00/10–2251).

[9] Not printed; it informed the Department of State that the ECA Mission in Paris concurred in the request made in telegram 2357 from Paris, October 22, (ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, box 33)

740.5/10–2951

Memorandum by Ridgway B. Knight of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 29, 1951.

Subject: Conversation with Mr. Harriman on October 28, and Various Subjects to be Taken up with Mr. Harriman

I spent three hours with Mr. Harriman yesterday. During most of the time Messrs. Ohly, Tannenwald and Schelling were there and we were joined by Dick Bissell about a half hour before I left.

I. *Mr. Harriman seems to have three major purposes during his short stay in Washington:*

A. *Deliveries to NATO Countries.* Mr. Harriman is more concerned with short range problems than with deliveries for the total period.

[1] Copies were also sent to Martin, Tannenwald (on personal basis), and Ohly.

He is primarily interested in making sure that at all times during the build-up period we will have a cohesive adequately equipped battle force. In particular, he mentioned the fact that the real danger at this time comes not from the vast strength in ground forces of the USSR as a whole, but from the twenty-two divisions in Eastern Germany and which could strike at any time. Consequently, his main objective is to see that General Eisenhower by next summer has an adequate force to prevent a lightning attack with immediate catastrophic results. He is ready to urge that we grant the same priority for deliveries to troops on the flanks of our forces as to our forces themselves. General Eisenhower is the person to indicate which forces of what countries are to receive this priority. Mr. Harriman is very intent on this subject and can be expected to push this point with maximum energy with Mr. Lovett. It is recognized that there will be a practical problem, even though Mr. Lovett is convinced, in view of his forthcoming absence and possibility that conversion of Mr. Lovett will not mean conversion of the JCS. Just before leaving Paris Mr. Harriman dispatched a strong telegram to Mr. Lovett on this deliveries question which was concurred in by General McNarney, and which stated that General Olmsted had "helped to prepare it".

B. *Level of U.S. Aid for 1952.* Mr. Harriman stated that this was an essential part of TCC work—necessity to firm up without further delay the level of aid which the Executive Branch would be ready to request from Congress. He was fully informed about Mr. Snyder's position and of the necessity to overcome objections in that quarter.

C. *French Problem.*[2] At last the French financial-military problem should receive the required simple, over-all consideration which has been called for for some time. The figures which for months have been forecast will materialize: the cost of carrying out the military program initiated by Moch and in line with France's contribution under D.C. 28 will, according to Pleven, be in the neighborhood of 1,400 billion francs. According to same source, the French Government can't possibly include in its budget more than 1000 billion francs. The problem is therefore acute. I urged that every possible means be considered in order to make it possible for the French to carry through with their program which is so essential to the MTDP as a whole, particularly from the point of view of ground forces, and that we not, in fact, prejudge the entire question by taking a decision pertaining to only one aspect of the French problem, but which would make it a certainty that the French would have to decrease their military program. In other words, the question before the house is how important is fulfillment of the French military program. Mr. Bissell registered this point. Mr. Harriman was not unsympathetic but obvi-

[2] For documentation concerning U.S. aid to France, see volume IV.

ously has some doubts which are probably fully justified that France could at best implement the program. He was particularly interested in having a good summary of information which we have on the cost of Indochina during French Fiscal 1952 in view of contradictions between information received from Paris and Saigon.

II. *TCC Submission*

A. *TCC Questionnaire as a whole.* Mr. Harriman was warned of the strong opposition on the part of the Council of Economic Advisers, Treasury and Defense to the inclusion in our submission to the TCC of the impact of a defense effort on the hypothesis of 20% of present planned maximum levels. Mr. Harriman felt that we should do so primarily so as to not appear as assuming that we belonged in a separate category unto ourselves. He did not think though that we had to go into details in this submission, that it could be short, qualitative in character and should be "demolished" right away by the use of such arguments as: (*a*) political impossibilities in an election year, (*b*) the effect on raw material availabilities to Europe of a U.S. 20% increase across the board (an argument which he believes would find the Europeans most receptive), and the inflationary effect on the U.S. He stated that all the Europeans whom he had seen were petrified of U.S. inflation. Concerning the draft summary as it now stands, he believes it too rambling and should be less defensive in character, playing up the factors listed above and availing itself more of such things as present extremely high U.S. tax rates.

B. *U.S. Aid.* Must be covered more adequately. In this connection, the question of aid for Germany's military contribution should also be thought out some more.

C. *Off-Shore Procurement.* The submission now mentions the "O'Hara" program of $5 hundred million and refers to the possibility that our 1952 program might even be as high as $750 million. He did not seem too disturbed by the absence of a similar forecast for 1953 and 1954. (At an interagency meeting last Friday, October 26, Frank Nash had indicated that Defense would be willing to think in terms of "twice the O'Hara program for 1953, and twice again for 1954." This view is not reflected in the submission.)

D. *Infrastructure.* There is no forecast in our submission of U.S. disbursements in Europe for infrastructure. This point was made to Mr. Harriman but it was not possible to determine whether he considered this important or not.

III. *Other Questions*

1. *Examination of U.S. Submission.* November 10 is the accepted date by all agencies and was agreed at the October 26 meeting. Dick Bissell will be there for ECA. Mr. Pace and Frank Nash will represent Defense. Mr. Livermore at CEA said that we can virtually count

on Mr. Fleishman being there. The following questions remain to be decided: (*a*) Do we want Mr. Wilson instead of Mr. Fleishman? (*b*) Do we want to try to get Mr. Keyserling? (*c*) Would it be advisable to have the Bureau of the Budget represented by either Mr. Lawton or Elmer Staats?

2. *Defense's Idea that Entire TCC Operation Should be Moved to Rome at Time of NAC.* It was not possible to discuss this subject with Mr. Harriman yesterday. I urge that you seek to convince Mr. Harriman (this may not be necessary!) that such a move would bring unneeded bodies to Rome. Obviously General McNarney and Mr. Harriman's key collaborators in this work should be there as advisers.

3. *Date of Rome Meeting.* In confirming Linc Gordon's telephonic report it was made apparent by a passing reference on the part of Mr. Harriman that he believed November 24 may be premature.

4. *Defense's Attitude in Regard to DPB.* I made point that, notwithstanding Defense's lip service to DPB guidance, it was quite apparent that Defense viewed with genuine fear any NATO interference in its own planning. I do not think you need make this particular point with Mr. Harriman. However, I think it might be advisable to make the general point (which was the subject of my first remark yesterday) that Defense's entire attitude vis-à-vis the importance of NATO requires modification. I sought to point out that this low priority given to the importance of our multilateral defense effort was at the root of all specific difficulties with Defense. This, of course, ties in with our project of last summer which we never completed, i.e., strengthening NATO through achieving greater recognition for it in the U.S. Government and going to the President if necessary on this subject.

RIDGWAY B. KNIGHT

ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, box 32

The Deputy United States Special Representative in Europe (Riddleberger) to the Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell)[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, October 31, 1951—4 p. m.

Repto 5474. Ref: Wash Torep 8081, rptd info London Ecato 1551, Oct 26, 1951.[2]

1. Reftel plus conversation with Stettner just after his arrival, leads us to believe that our previous exchanges have been based on misunderstanding of our original proposal Repto 5257.[3] Following

[1] Repeated to London.
[2] *Ante*, p. 335.
[3] Dated October 19, p. 324.

is restatement our position on which we hope to reach full OSR-ECA/W agreement here in discussions with Harriman, Porter, Bissell, and Cleveland.

2. We are, of course, in agreement with you that US aid shld be used in such a way as to get maximum effective def effort in Europe. This was meaning of para 7(*a*) in Repto 5257. Sorry it was not clear to you, but somewhat surprised you should think we had ignored this basic objection when in fact our msg was directed solely towards attaining it. Pls read balance this msg as representing our considered judgment best way to make progress towards this goal.

3. We want to keep FEB strictly out of business on US aid questions for time being because:

(*a*) We feel strongly that, until there is realization at top level in Europe (where presumably mature polit responsibility rests) of both magnitude of def job needed and on limits to US aid, understandable tendency FEB representation wld be to emphasize European weakness and to lay basis for requesting unrealistic US contribution. Your proposals para 3 reftel wld not stop this. In particular, there is, in European view, no basis for judgment in FEB on questions raised paras 3*b* and 3*c*. Providing necessary basis is purpose of TCC exercise, as we pointed out para 4, Repto 4425.[4]

(*b*) Very minor, but quite practical, reason that FEB Secretariat and better representatives (Roll, Skaug, Malagodi) are properly tied up with TCC.

4. After the appropriate basis is established for FEB negotiations, we believe FEB negotiations will be responsible, technically competent, and complete (including full treatment of problems mentioned para 5 reftel). More important, in a setting where European countries will tend to examine one another instead of ganging up on us, the chances are much better for bringing out ways and means of improving the collective performance. There is, of course, the possibility that we are overly optimistic on this point. Nevertheless, we think we shld recognize its potential merit, while at the same time we reserve to ourselves the well known and well understood right to reject multilateral recommendations which run counter to our statutory responsibilities (see para 2 above).

5. We believe also that any comprehensive negotiations involving both levels of US aid and levels of def expenditures, if conducted during early phases of TCC operation, wld seriously compromise the atmosphere of genuinely mutual confrontation which Harriman wants to create. This is point on which TCC delegation is more competent than OSR to comment, so we will not pursue. However, related and very practical point is that European country plans are not responsive to unilateral pressure, except very superficially, until results of TCC

[4] Dated September 6, p. 265.

operation are known. Exceptions may be that in some countries (e.g., France) minimum aid commitments may now be needed to encourage preliminary budgeting for previously announced plans. This possibility is covered by our proposals para 7, Repto 5257, as further explained by Repto 5425.[5]

6. We now reiterate our recommendations in Repto 5257. We can see no reason for hesitating either to start bilateral talks now with French, for example, or to decide to throw final question of FY 1952 aid into FEB at early date, except for possibility that US position on some very important matters not yet clear (e.g., off-shore procurement policy, EPU settlement, etc.).

RIDDLEBERGER

[5] Not printed; it stated that a judicious combination of bilateral and multilateral negotiations would yield the best results for the United States and suggested that bilateral discussions proceed as long as they did not reach conclusions which might be outside the range of possible conclusions in later multilateral negotiations (ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, box 32).

ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, Paris Torep: Circular telegram

The Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell) to the ECA Missions in Europe[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, November 2, 1951—9:16 p. m.

PRIORITY

Torep 8295. Attention: Chief of Mission

Subject: ECA Defense Production Role, Part I

1. This is Part One of two part cable on Eur defense production problems scheduled discussion Mission Chief's mtg. Part One not designed as directive for action, but only to state highly tentative and preliminary ECA/W views and to get Mission and OSR views. It relates exclusively to ECA/MSA objectives and activities in Eur defense production, and does not attempt discuss other important ECA/MSA tasks in Eur such as productivity drive, etc.

2. Recent events have placed increased emphasis importance of ECA/MSA role in task of stimulating Eur defense production. FEB burden-sharing exercise, DPB reports, current TCC operation, and related work have highlighted inadequacy all sectors current Eur defense programs, including military matériel production. Previous legislative restrictions on uses U.S. economic aid for defense purposes have been removed, reflecting Congressional desire obtain more direct contribution ECA/MSA activities to successful European defense

[1] Authorized by Halaby; drafted by Baum of EPD/ISA; cleared in substance with Bissell; Embassy London was to pass to Spofford. This telegram was also sent to France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and HICOG.

program. At least $500 million counterpart funds must be used for "military production, construction, equipment, and matériel." Finally, new program offshore procurement end-items for Eur use, as well as additional offshore procurement for U.S. needs by U.S. agencies and defense contractors, will serve as direct stimulus to production.

3. A primary general objective of U.S. Gov in Eur is achieve maximum effective military contribution Western Eur consistent with economic and political stability. As part of this overall goal, U.S. Gov has two objectives in fields of Eur military production: first, obtain largest possible use Eur resources for military production consistent with other high priority military requirements and essential civilian needs; and second, to assist in making certain that Eur military production takes place as rapidly and efficiently as possible. These objectives desirable not only to achieve most effective Eur contribution to NATO rearmament, but also to relieve strain on U.S. production and to make Eur self-sustaining in military production in long run.

4. Following paras contain preliminary description principal functions that ECA/MSA may perform in field of Eur defense production.

5. To develop a comprehensive and detailed knowledge of Eur defense production and available production capacity, and to report systematically to interested U.S. agencies on Eur programs of defense production. At the country level, this primarily Mission responsibility, in close collaboration US military, and shld where possible include fol specific points: current status defense production plans within defense ministries; programs of parliamentary action authorization and appropriation funds for defense production; process of contract negotiation and related contract procedures; status defense production under authorized contracts and anticipated delivery schedules; and availability additional production capacity, taking into account requirements for raw materials, technical skills, labor, machine tools, etc. The task will require closest working relationships with MAAGs and defense ministries and procurement services NATO countries.

6. To review and evaluate, in collaboration with MAAGs, Eur defense production efforts, in terms of: overall size and adequacy production program; adequacy Eur procedures for placing contracts and expediting deliveries; feasibility production specific items in time schedules and quantities proposed; identification of bottleneck areas in production process; and possibilities of more efficient production elsewhere in Eur.

7. To evaluate Eur needs U.S. economic assistance and to develop appropriate economic aid programs, designed to: (*a*) support of maximum feasible level of defense expenditures, including optimum allocation Eur defense funds to matériel production; and (*b*) meet essential needs for U.S. imports to sustain necessary levels of civilian and defense production.

8. To participate in U.S. cty level negotiations with NATO countries on overall sizes and composition their defense expenditures, including relative priority assigned to military production and other urgent tasks within defense budgets. In addition, to participate on regular and continuing basis discussions with cty production officials on key phases of agreed Eur defense production programs.

9. To analyze in collaboration with OSR/SUSRep available production capacity in Eur, and participate in programs and policies for maximum utilization Eur productive facilities for defense purposes through Eur financing or through various forms of U.S. assistance (including counterpart funds and offshore procurement). Programming of Eur defense production under ECC Reg D–7 [2] example type functions to be performed this field.

10. To participate in administration counterpart funds used for purpose obtaining increased defense production in Eur. This important new area ECA/MSA responsibility, general character of which outlined ECA Circular E–96.[3] Further programs now being developed and will be cabled shortly on implementation counterpart approach to defense production through country negotiations and agreements of use of counterpart for defense production and other purposes, and follow-up, review, and reporting actual release of funds to expedite specific defense production projects.

11. To advise and assist U.S. and Eur procurement officials concerning placement of U.S. contracts for offshore procurement (both for use by U.S. forces and for NATO countries). This involves: coordination of US contracts with cty-financed production to prevent overlapping production assignments; recommendations suitable plants and industries with available capacity; and advice on local laws and regulations. This assistance will be particularly useful with regard to trade union activity and labor and management relations, which are important elements in obtaining desirable effects U.S. procurement programs.

12. To participate in performance of ECA function as Claimant Agency by reviewing PC statements of material and equipment requirements and furnishing justification of all claims necessary for DPA program determinations and NPA priority actions. It is ECA function and responsibility to assure that materials and equipment are made available to PC's in balanced programs (character, quantities, and time) to achieve maximum military and economic effectiveness.

13. To provide productivity services and technical assistance to manufacturers engaged in defense production, on contracts either for self-financing or for U.S. offshore procurement.

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[2] Not found in Department of State files.
[3] Dated September 21, p. 282.

14. To review policies and procedures of Eur Governments in field of economic controls (price, tax, and wage policies, allocations of manpower and materials, etc.) and to work with govts on modifications in these controls to extent necessary to obtain most effective defense production effort.

BISSELL

ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, ECA circular telegram

The Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell) to all ECA Missions in Europe [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, November 3, 1951—5:44 p. m.

Ecato circular E-111. For Chiefs of Missions. From Bissell and Porter. Limit Distribution. Subject: Re-casting of Technical Assistance Programs.

1. It is essential that ECA technical assistance activities be fundamentally re-examined and recast in the light of the requirements of the new Mutual Security Act and the changing emphasis of ECA/MSA over-all programs. Such recasting should lead to technical assistance program which is in fact a program rather than a shopping list of isolated projects. Projects should be limited to key military or civilian activities and each individual project should arise from a specific need for technical assistance and be geared to produce a specific desired result. General tour-type A projects should be eliminated.

2. Request you undertake quick review of current technical assistance situation in your country and be prepared to present preliminary views during Mission Chiefs meeting starting November 7th,[2] on best methods and timing for conversion present program to standards outlined above. If there are strong reasons why certain types of projects or all projects in some countries should be retained on present basis for further period, please be prepared to explain these. Also would appreciate your having preliminary views on implications proposed change in technical assistance patterns and methods for Mission staffing in this field. Our general impression is that status and quality of technical assistance staff in some Missions may have to be strengthened if quality of program is to be significantly improved.

3. Based on discussions at conference and follow-up visits which senior ECA/W and OSR staff members will make to certain Missions

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[1] Authorized by Everett H. Bellows and drafted by R. L. Oshins of PTAD, cleared by various divisions in ECA and by Bissell.

[2] The results of this meeting are summarized in telegram Torep 9009, November 29, not printed.

following conference, we will develop new technical assistance policy directives and criteria. Meanwhile wish to avoid, insofar as possible, further commitments to technical assistance activities, especially Type A teams, not meeting probable new criteria. All Missions should therefore declare immediate moratorium on formal or informal project approvals or further commitments to groups and individuals in participating countries on Type A projects except where, in judgment of Missions:

a. Commitments have already been made to such an extent that to hold up further action would cause serious embarrassment and raise questions of bad faith on part of ECA or;

b. Project is of such importance that it should go forward regardless of any revision of criteria or;

c. Project is of such a nature that it will clearly be acceptable even under new criteria indicated above.

4. Emphasize that, in our view, relative importance of technical assistance program as whole is increased rather than diminished in present circumstances. In many cases we can contribute more to both immediate and long-term objectives of Mutual Security Program by right kind of transfer of know-how than through much more costly transfer of funds, commodities and weapons.

While redirection TA program along lines indicated above essential all fields, this subject discussed thoroughly June FA meeting Rome and again recent FA meeting Paris. Consequently, reorientation agricultural TA program toward achievement production assistance drive goal may be farther along than in other fields. In any event urge closest coordination TA and FA sections country Missions to insure consistency in policies and development of integrated overall TA program. [Porter.]

BISSELL

Editorial Note

From November 5 through November 16 the Executive Bureau of the Temporary Council Committee scheduled individual reviews of each member country's presentation concerning the military, economic, and political aspects of its defense program, with a full day devoted to each of the eight largest member countries. Each country appointed a delegation to present its report; most delegations were comprised of the Defense Minister and his staff of financial and economic advisers.

No formal minutes were taken of these meetings although Colonel George A. Lincoln of the Department of Defense made personal notes which he later used as the basis for telegrams which he sent to the Secretary of Defense. After hearing eight of the nine presentations of

the European members of NATO, Colonel Lincoln concluded in telegram Har 138 from Paris, November 19, that "without exception these countries have indicated a willingness to undertake their defense programs as now planned. In every case there has been a clear indication, usually in the form of unqualified statements, that US economic aid is expected and is necessary if these programs are to become realities." (Military cable files, lot 52–246, TCC, 1951)

740.5/10–2351 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1951—6:51 p. m.

Todep 313. Re Depto 495[2] and Todep 271[3] para 3 "relations between NATO countries and other free Eur countries".

Re desirability and order discussion, Dept feels countries fall into three groups:

(*a*) *Sweden and Finland:* Best suited for CD discussion at present, along lines noted below.

(*b*) *Spain:* No objection to discussing, but nothing new to be added and UK and Fr sensibilities must be taken into account, as noted para 3 Todep 271.

(*c*) *Ireland, Switz, and Austria:* Prefer no discussion at present for reasons noted below.

Detailed instr on 6 countries follow:

(*a*) *Sweden:* In US view, Swed friendly country, one of nations free world, and shld be treated as such. US recognizes extremely unlikely Swed will abandon within predictable future policy of aloofness from big power alliances (e.g. NATO) and that any direct pressure on Swed to alter policy unwise. In accepting situation and adapting policy accordingly US attempting wherever possible increase Swed cooperation with West in other forms, with some success in

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[1] Drafted by Russell Fessenden of the Office of European Regional Affairs and cleared in draft with Williamson of WE and Bream, Hamilton, and Montgomery of BNA; repeated to Paris for MacArthur.

[2] Not printed; it informed the Department of State that Spofford had proposed to the Council of Deputies that they exchange views on relations between NATO and non-NATO countries in Europe (740.5/10–2351).

[3] Not printed; it instructed Spofford to proceed carefully on this matter since premature efforts might cause the various Foreign Ministries to shy away from making any substantive agreements that would affect such relations. On the other hand, the Department of State encouraged the discussion on this subject since this was in accordance with its desire that the Council of Deputies utilize their meetings as a forum for the exchange of views on important international questions. (740.5/10–2351)

UN, East-West trade. At same time, while Swed's refusal join NATO places certain limitations on our giving or Swed's accepting certain types assistance, it is in US interest Swed's defenses and econ strength be maintained and developed and Swed's contrib West econ and mil strength be increased, e.g., thr manfctr arms for NATO countries and trade in other manfctrs and materials.

(*b*) *Finland:* First obj US pol Fin is maintenance as independent and democratic state. On one hand, we endeavor help Fin in its effort resist encroachments on its sovereignty from without. On other hand, we endeavor avoid endangering these efforts by overt acts which might embroil Fin with Sovs. Other obj is further Fin's progress toward a higher stand liv, and maintain close info and cult exchange between Fin and West.

(*c*) *Spain:* No objection gen discussion Spain in CD, at ur discretion. However, we wld have nothing new to add. US mil Survey Team's report expected next week and will form basis decisions re future negots for US and Span mil facilities. Once course action determined we are committed advise Brit and Fr before opening negots.

(*d*) *Ireland:* As is implicit in NSC 83/1,[4] US believes any manifestation interest in Irish defense position only serves to strengthen Irish hope US in own interest will extend arms assistance on Ir terms of virtually no reciprocal obligation or concession. Dept counters Ir overtures with suggestion US wld welcome her as NATO member but can see no justification for bilateral US-Ir arrangements which wld give Ir status different from that of other US allies, in area of which Ir integral part. If Ir question introduced by other Deps, Dept suggests US position be expressed as readiness to welcome Ir as NATO member but with initiative resting with Ir in view its rejection charter membership.

(*e*) *Austria:* After tripartite agreement reached on Aust Treaty tactics, CD discussion might be useful for purpose explaining Aust position as recipient aid under MSA and relationship West troops in Aust to NATO command. Aust, altho not permitted make direct mil contrib at this time, can furnish considerable indirect aid in form essential material and supplies.

(*f*) *Switz:* Dept feels Swiss can be induced take number practical steps looking to closer coop common defense effort, short of entering formal collective security arrangements, because Swiss neutrality policy has practical purpose preservation natl independence and Swiss attitude not neutral re Communism. Proposed measures to bring Swiss situation of mil, econ, democratic strength into relationship with West def effort currently being submitted to NSC. When NSC decision taken, CD discussion Switz might then be desirable because of importance Switz to security W Eur by virtue its geog position.

WEBB

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[4] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, p. 1477.

740.5 MAP/11–1351 : Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 13, 1951—6 : 17 p. m.

ToISA. This msg concurred State, Def, ECA. Approved Office of Director, Mutual Security. Note this tel for info not for immed action by country teams.

1. Country teams Oslo, Copenhagen, The Hague, Rome will shortly receive instrs for conduct of such prelim bilateral negots as countries may wish engage in for purpose reaching basic understandings far as possible at this time on amts of aid countries can count on during FY 1952 and on firm commitments by PCs to at least minimum levels of def efforts during same period.

2. Relation of such negots to TCC exercise and FEB burden-sharing exercise has received intensive study. During recent visit Harriman to Wash, agreement reached that prelim discussions bilaterally with countries cld not in many cases be held up pending outcome of TCC since many countries now making or about to make fundamental decisions on budgets, import programs, etc. for fiscal years beginning Jan, and that such decisions wld be greatly inhibited unless countries had some assurance soonest about amts of aid they might count on during this FY. Not considered feasible at this time place responsibility on FEB for quick multilateral division of aid since wld be difficult do more than superficial job within necessity for urgency in cases certain countries, and since FEB consideration shld take into acct results of TCC when those available. Idea is not eliminate FEB from consideration US aid in continuation its burden-sharing responsibilities but rather avoid double multilateral negots which wld be implied by FEB FY 1952 deliberations at same time in same place and with some of same people as TCC. When TCC reaches conclusive stages, appropriate for FEB consider whole question including TCC results along with any possibility at that time of additional US aid (which may be available from trans end-item to econ aid funds) that might be associated with enlarged def efforts during latter part this FY.

3. Thus no intention by-pass multilateral responsibilities but only to permit country actions go forward where necessary without waiting for TCC conclusion prior to understandings on US aid.

4. Consequently, intend proceed soonest negotiate bilaterally at least with those PCs which want to know what econ aid they can count

[1] Drafted by T. C. Schelling of the Office of the Director of the Mutual Security Agency, and cleared with Gordon of ECA, Martin of RA, and Colonel Van Syckle of Defense; sent to Brussels, The Hague, Oslo, Copenhagen, Rome, London pass Spofford, and Paris pass OSR. An earlier draft of this same telegram was sent to London as Todep 311 on November 7 and repeated to Paris and Heidelberg. The draft was approved by the ECC, as requested by the Department of State, and then issued as this circular telegram.

on to proceed with def budget, letting of contracts, import programming, etc. Within limits of funds presently available for econ aid, we propose to make firmest assurances re US aid that can be justified on basis country commitments on levels of def effort. These negots wld also pin down gen agreement on use of counterpart, including mil uses. We wld also indicate our best expectations re offshore procurement and other US Govt dol expenditures in Eur.

5. We recognize our bargaining power for securing substantial increase in def plans as condition for FY 1952 aid is limited at present, both because of limited amt of aid available and because of necessity not attempt pre-judge TCC. Consequently, do not intend hold back any substantial part of econ aid funds now available. Believe therefore our aim shld be relatively simple and brief negots at this time principally aimed at basic commitments by countries on FY 1952 def levels. We shall furthermore generally be negotiating for a budget figure estimated on basis of econ analysis (natl accts, balance of payments, budget analysis, etc.) rather than an estimate of costs of present country force commitments or our view of what such country commitments shld be. This not intended preclude discussion composition and quality mil effort, which remains legitimate subj for discussion with PC. Point is that such discussion will not be conclusive prior TCC recommendations, and these aid negots shld consequently not be protracted in attempt reach detailed agreement.

6. Except reach Wash agreement on negotiating positions for most NATO countries within next ten days and communicate to country and region simultaneously, position becoming firm after regional and country comments received and taken into acct. Expect funds available for allotment by or soon after Nov 20.

7. Ideas expressed para 2 being discussed by Harriman with TCC and Bissell with FEB during week ending Nov 9.

WEBB

740.5/11–1551 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 15, 1951—7 : 03 p. m.

Todep 340. Eyes only for Spofford. Limit distribution.

1. Over past year there have been desultory conversations among US officials concerned with NATO matters about problem of securing

[1] Drafted by Martin and cleared with Matthews and Bonbright; repeated to Paris eyes only for Perkins and MacArthur.

political decision by NATO under Article 5 as to action to be taken to meet attack on NATO territory as defined in Article 6. Informal consideration has been given to possibility of reaching agreement in advance as to action to be taken in response to such attack against certain areas and also on action which might be taken under Article 4 in response to attacks on other areas which border upon NATO countries. Attempt to "can" decisions of this character in advance of attack has been found lacking in reality. Future circumstances will never exactly correspond to assumptions laid out in advance. Regardless of future commitments of such specific kinds, countries will have to make new decisions in light of circumstances of each incident and in light of their own position at time of attack. Hence it has become increasingly clear that current actions must be confined to procedure by which political decisions can be reached expeditiously rather than on substance of such decisions.

2. Certain work has been completed on procedures to be followed in transmitting information concerning an attack or threat of an attack. (See NSC 116, Aug 23.[2])

3. Development of procedures for reaching political decisions is made more urgent by current consideration of proposal submitted by SACEUR to SG and contained in SG 129/2 [3] which provide for certain action to be taken in military chain of command but calls for political guidance under certain circumstances as prerequisite to military action.

4. While it is not probable that SG paper will be ready for action at Rome, it may be considered desirable to have preliminary discussion of matter at meeting attended by FonMins and DefMins only. If such meeting held it would seem desirable also to exchange preliminary views as to procedure for securing political guidance.

5. Present State view, which has been discussed only informally with Defense reps at working level, is that agreement should be reached to use Deps for this purpose provided, however, that if for any reason Deps unable assemble and communicate promptly to countries, NATO Council of Ambassadors in Washington should be used. Agreement reached by either body should be communicated simultaneously to all NATO Governments, to SG, and to NATO Supreme Commanders. Believe use of Ambassadors of NATO countries stationed in Washington is matter essentially of practice rather than formal organization, so status of old NAT Council of Ambassadors not particularly relevant. Would appreciate your views above pro-

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[2] NSC 116, "Channels for Transmission of Warning of Attack," August 23, 1951, is not printed.

[3] Standing Group document 129/2 has not been found in the Department of State files.

posal before attempting finalize US position. Suggest you may wish discuss with Nash.

6. In discussing matter here with Matthews, Nitze and Bohlen, principal problem deserving attention seems in State view to arise from nature of Treaty and resulting requirement for unanimous action. In most acute form issue may become one of ability to use NATO machinery, participated in and financed by all NATO members, to carry out course of action not unanimously approved.

We see several types of issues which may raise problems of above character. First type of question might arise over whether or not limited attack should be treated as calling for police action only and attempt made to limit scope, or should be considered to require general response initiating general war. Second might be securing agreement of all NAT countries to use NATO machinery, including their forces, if decision made in favor of limited police action. On both these types of issues we can foresee possibility of fundamental differences of opinion among NATO members.

It has been suggested we might try to reach agreement in advance that countries might have right to abstain from final NATO action and by so doing deny participation of their forces and use of facilities in their jurisdiction without preventing use of NATO, as distinguished from national, organizations and facilities in execution of generally, though not unanimously, agreed NATO decision. Under these circumstances question might arise as to how many NATO countries could abstain and there still be action by NATO, using NATO agencies and facilities.

If the dissent from majority view is confined to smaller countries abstention device described above might be practical, though there is some feeling here that it is unlikely that such countries would be able to hold out against majority, even in situations like those described. If difference in view is among Big Three, abstention would present serious problem in terms of ability of NATO to carry out effectively its decisions. Believe that in practice it is hardly feasible to anticipate course of action being taken by NATO with which one of Big Three is in disagreement.

On balance, our conclusion is that while these problems are real ones and we should continue to seek means for avoiding kinds of difficulties described, it would be unwise to raise in NATO any proposals which would suggest that emergency situation might arise with respect to which NATO countries would not be able to reach agreement on course of action to be followed. We must assume that we will be able to reach agreement and do so promptly when and if an emergency should arise. More importantly we must redouble efforts to exchange

views and coordinate policies so that we are continuously in step on major developments, and action to be taken in event of emergency will become normal next step and not new major decision breaking continuity with what has preceded emergency itself. Would greatly appreciate your thinking this problem.

WEBB

740.5/11–2051 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 20, 1951—8:08 p. m.
PRIORITY

Tosec 51. Limit distribution. Since sending Todep 340, Nov 15, rptd Paris 2936,[2] have had several talks in Pentagon and also rec'd ltr from Acting DefSec re development alert subj for Rome mtg, and enclosing JCS position paper.[3]

Present situation here is that we see little utility in completing final revisions to SG 129/2 prior to further top level talks on political aspects (*a*) within US Govt, and (*b*) at Rome with DefMins and FonMins. Matter is so vitally related to very core of NAT and requires such difficult and important decisions by Govts that seems better approach question at political level rather than carry it further at this stage through medium of precisely worded paper.

Ltr from SecDef raises two basic questions; first, need to fix responsibility in some NATO political agency through which Govts cld indicate implementation of mobilization plans and convey their authorization employment forces in action against aggression, and, second, procedural problem of whether we shld take position within NAT military agencies before substantial agrmt has been reached at political level on measures to be taken on and after warning of attack.

In reply which we wld expect to send by end of week, we wld, subject to your comments on first point, indicate our agrmt with JCS view that CD wld be appropriate NATO agency but add possibility of Council of Ambs as emergency alternate. We wld further agree that nature and extent of guidance to military re measures to be taken

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[1] Drafted by Parsons and cleared with Bonbright; repeated to Rome and London.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] The letter from the Acting Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, to the Secretary of State, November 16, with its enclosure entitled "Modifications to Measures to be Taken on and after Warning of an Attack," is not printed. In addition to suggesting certain changes in SG 129/2, Foster agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they stated that the United States must first make a political decision as to what agency in NATO should have the responsibility for receiving information about mobilization plans in case of aggression. (740.5/11–1651)

will necessarily depend upon existing circumstances and that attempt to define and delimit various contingencies in advance and then provide answers for them might prejudice rather than assist ultimate solution. Re second question, we plan take position further action now at military level through SG might, as DefSec's ltr states, result in unduly restrictive paper precluding assumption of authority by SACEUR in circumstances of near war, that is to say when fighting had broken out but nations involved, or some of them, had not formally declared war. We wld also state further our preference for exploration this gen'l subj at ministerial level at Rome to end that there might be developed a broad political basis for military decisions and actions which might be necessary under a wide variety of contingencies. This is real basis for view that matter shld not go too far in NATO military channels too soon.

JCS some days ago prepared outline of modifications to appendix of SG 129/2 which met most points raised by us including avoidance of any inconsistency with Senate prerogatives or guarantees we gave Senate at time ratification NAT. (This means gen'l alert can in no case be declared without prior Govt'l decision although commanders cld still take actions necessary to assure security of their forces if attacked.) Modifications not yet fully reflected in draft and there will, as we see it, be need for further changes to bring language into line with Art VI of Treaty as amended.

This tel has not been cleared with Def and you may wish to use it in further discussions with DefReps in Eur. Subj was discussed yesterday along these lines with JCS team and Ernst of Nash's office, and believe it is fair reflection their views. We are assuming SG 129/2 is available to you.

Have just read Depto 649, Nov 20, rptd Paris 1102.[4] Believe decision as to whether there shld or shld not be discussion of any kind at Rome shld be made in Eur in view presence there of Sec, SecDef, Bradley and others. If not too urgent from SHAPE viewpoint, believe subj might be postponed until we have studied problem further. In view our constitutional situation, problem probably even more difficult for us than for others.

WEBB

[4] Not printed; it informed the Department of State that Spofford discussed telegram Todep 340 to London, November 15 (*supra*), with Nash, Perkins, and others who were in Paris and they believed the subject should not be discussed formally or informally at the Rome Council meeting (740.5/11–2051).

Military cable files, lot 52–246, TCC, 1951 : Telegram

The United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)[1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, 23 November 1951.

Har 143. TCC meeting Friday[2] discussed oral progress report to be made by Chairman in Rome and date of next meeting. Discussion of progress report, which was outlined to meeting by Chairman, brought out following views held by one or more national representatives:

a. Several wished Rome report to make clear that TCC has not yet reached formal conclusions and recommendations. Meeting appeared agreed that guide lines outlined at October meeting should be presented and that nature of the problems developed should be described. The Dutch particularly stressed that no commitments have yet been made by governments in the TCC.

b. Belgium pointed out need for considering organizational changes consistent with any TCC conclusions, stressed need for TCC to recognize goals and objectives in terms of time intervals, and agreed to stressing general goals in report to Rome. The Belgium representative hoped that no national goals would be mentioned as of this stage in TCC studies.

c. Monnet statement indicated he still places greatest emphasis on programming for 52 and questions importance of planning for time periods thereafter, with perhaps limited exception for 53.

d. Italian representative, acting for TCC member, made statement clarifying the view expressed by his minister to EB regarding setting of priorities by NATO commanders. His statement was that Italy could not give a precise answer to the priority proposal until the results of TCC studies were known. Following this statement Chairman pointed out the danger of holding up actions in NATO on the alleged ground that the TCC report must be available and studied before decisions can be taken. Chairman cited German problem as example of a project which might be delayed, using TCC as an excuse, whereas in fact TCC studies must be based on assumption successful German negotiation. There seemed to be general agreement that the TCC should make clear to Council that it cannot give all answers to current NATO problems. Its reports will, in some cases, not go further than identifying certain issues and suggesting means for solution, including further studies and organizational adjustments.

2. The trend of discussion indicated that agreement on TCC report may be difficult and rather time consuming affair unless some procedural short cuts can be evolved. Chairman made closing statement, stressing that in his view the Council had set up the TCC with individuals selected by their governments to act in their personal ca-

[1] Repeated to Rome for Lovett and Bradley. Both of these men were in Rome as members of the U.S. Delegation to attend the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council, November 24–28.

[2] November 23.

pacities and to make recommendations on this basis. The report would not itself commit governments. He, of course, recognized that there are certain limitations on this approach. He stressed that if each member of the TCC attempts to project his governments point of view on every point, "the job cannot be done". Monnet associated himself forcefully with Chairman's remarks. Plowden not present, but UK representative did not indicate dissent.

3. TCC agreed to meet on 2 December to discuss main issues and problems incident to final drafting of TCC report. It was also indicated that next meeting might discuss aspects of SCS report which is due by that date.

5.[3] French now desire to handle analysis of military budget under TCC rather than through bilateral discussions with US. Thus far no progress has been made on this analysis. Since military program for 52 totals about 1550 billion francs and budget therefore is at present questionable matter somewhere between 1000 and 1550 billion, the TCC program for 1952 is materially affected. US and UK members of EB have appointed representatives and we are pressing French to get on with job.

6. For Rome: First draft of Harriman report carried by Vass and Lindeman. Sense will remain unchanged but there will be changes in wording and in degree of qualification of statements therein.

7. New subject: Harriman accompanied by Plowden scheduled depart Orly 1200 hours Sunday in AF 9146.

8. Delegation requests this message be passed to State, ECA and Office Director of Mutual Security Agency.

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[3] Source text contains no paragraph for no. 4.

Editorial Note

The Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council met in Rome on November 24–28, 1951, and heard numerous reports concerning the status and readiness of NATO defense forces and plans for increasing military production. In addition to the regular reports of both the civilian and military agencies of NATO, Generals Eisenhower and Gruenther spoke at length concerning the Soviet threat to the West. Harriman, Chairman of the Temporary Council Committee, reported during the same meeting concerning the progress of his committee. For the verbatim text of his speech, see *infra*. For documentation concerning the Eighth Session of the Council, see pages 693 ff.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, NATO papers.

Progress Report by the Chairman of the Temporary Council Committee (Harriman)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [ROME,] 26 November 1951.

Mr. President, Members of the Council.

The Council Resolution of September 19th creating the Temporary Committee of the Council called for a progress report at the next meeting, or this meeting, of the Council. The Committee has directed me, as its Chairman, to make to you an informal progress report. It is hoped that both of my colleagues of the Executive Bureau of the TCC could also be present today and that they would supplement my report with statements of the points that they believe should be emphasized. I regret that Monsieur Jean Monnet is not here. He has asked me to express his personal regrets and to explain that his absence is required in Paris in connection with a forward step towards the important Schuman Plan. I am glad to say, however, that Sir Edwin Plowden is here and he will make a statement immediately following this report. Now the Council gave our Temporary Committee the task, as your Chairman, the President has said, of analysing, and I quote "the issues involved in reconciling on the one hand the requirements of external security, in particular of fulfilling a militarily acceptable NATO plan for the defence of Western Europe, with, on the other hand, the realistic political economic capabilities of member countries." It seemed to us, within those words were very deep meaning and that we would have to interpret to considerable extent exactly what your Council had in mind. The Committee has been at work since its first meeting in Paris on October 9th. It has brought together a large volume of information and has begun to identify the key problems involved in the analysis called for by the Council. Today's progress report will indicate some of the major problems emerging from our studies. The Committee has not yet come to considered conclusions on these problems and therefore this progress report does not state conclusions of the Committee. Moreover, in view of the time available our final report itself will not be able to provide precise recommendations on all of the issues within the scope of our survey. It is our intention to identify, however, the issues with the greatest possible precision to make recommendations to resolve certain of them and in other cases to recommend means by which they

[1] This document, circulated at the Council session as Council Document C8–D/8 of November 26, 1951, is a verbatim record of the interim progress report given by Harriman at the third meeting of the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council on November 26, 1951. For a record of the entire meeting, see telegram Secto 88 from Rome, November 27, p. 730. Harriman's remarks were largely based on a preparatory paper, Rome D–24*a* of November 26, 1951 (CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, Rome).

may be resolved through permanent agencies of NATO. When the Committee first assembled in Paris on October 9th we agreed as a basic principle that our task was a collective one in which all members must participate. This principle has been consistently maintained. Now as was envisioned in the Article of Resolution the Committee elected its Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen and created an Executive Bureau. In addition to these three members of the Executive Bureau serving on a full-time basis the Bureau has been expanded to include the TCC member of the country concerned whenever we have reviewed the programmes and capabilities of a particular nation. Also when the programme and capabilities of one of the three full time members has been under review then a fourth country has served as a member of the Bureau. Our Staff has been organised on an international basis. Our Secretary, Mr. Sivert Nielsen of Norway, has been drawn from the Deputies Central Secretariat. Our economic analysis staff consists of professional personnel borrowed from the international staff of the Deputies, the FEB and from the OEEC. The Screening and Costing Staff is headed by a Directorate including General Leboutte of Belgium who is from General Eisenhower's command, General Coudraux of France, Mr. Richard Powell of the United Kingdom and General McNarney of the United States who serves as Director-General. Each nation has staff representatives working as part of the Screening and Costing Staff. The Defence Production Staff is doing valuable work in the appraisal of production and supply problems. This of course is the permanent NATO Defence Production staff. The permanent NATO agencies have been most helpful to the TCC, in fact we could not have undertaken our work without their help. The Standing Group and the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group has assigned liaison officers, full-time SHAPE liaison officers and in addition many members of General Eisenhower's staff are giving us essential assistance in our work. The twelve members of the TCC have been continuously informed between meetings through the distribution of papers and also through informal contacts with their representatives in Paris. We have kept the Council Deputies fully informed of all phases of our work and also of the NATO agencies on matters which relate to their activities. In accordance with established NATO policy, the TCC has assumed that there will be a German contribution to Western defence, to be made through the European defence community in addition to such support as may be made directly to forces in Germany of NATO countries who are not EDC members. The necessary information concerning German contribution has been provided through the Chairman of the Powers' Conference on the European Defence Community, with the assistance of SHAPE, and through tripartite agencies of the Occupying Powers. The TCC adopted, dur-

ing its first session, a plan of work which has been followed throughout by the Committee and the Executive Bureau. At its meeting of October 26 the Committee outlined certain general principles to serve as guide lines in carrying out this plan of work. Both the plan of work and the general principles were drawn with the objective of furthering accepted NATO principles. The guiding principles stem from the conviction that the central objective of the TCC must be the most rapid, practicable build-up of balanced collective combat forces. In order to achieve these objectives it was considered that the guide lines for our work should include, first, appraising the present status of the NATO defence position, both individually and collectively. This includes the developments immediately in prospect resulting from actions already under way. This was what we have called stock-taking and was subject of one of the TCC questionnaires to member countries. Second, defining a politically and economically feasible programme for a progressive build-up towards an acceptable security position for the North Atlantic Community. This should take into account possible economies and requires an outline of contribution in forces, production and finance among member countries and Germany. We should seek to determine a phased, balanced build-up from present levels which will make the most efficient use of the available resources and provide at all times for the most effective possible defence position. Third, reflecting throughout the basic NATO principle adopted at the London Council Meeting in May of 1950, of balanced collective forces in which contributions of members are mutually independent and each country's contribution is most appropriate to its position. Four, outlining the concerted and cooperative actions in both the military and economic fields which are required to achieve NATO objectives. Now our analysis is being conducted on the basis that each country should make the maximum contribution consistent with the country's political and economic capabilities, taking into account the present international tensions, but not going so far as to imply the need for general economic mobilisation.

Since the TCC is a temporary agency, which will cease to exist in early December, we have recognised that our report cannot cover all problems finally and with precision. Much of our work should be carried forward on a permanent basis hence, TCC will have to consider arrangements for carrying on these necessary activities through the strengthening of the NATO as an operational organisation.

We are then much impressed with the loyal and effective work done by the permanent NATO agency so far. The changing situation, however, appears to require organisational tightening and the TCC will be considering this problem.

Now on the basis of the countries' submissions to TCC the executive bureau has had an informal conference of a full day with representatives of each neighbour member country. These conferences have not been hearings but rather have been periods of informal and free discussion. They have started from an analysis of the country's defence effort and military policy and proceeded through considerations of infrastructure and production problems to economic and financial considerations. The Executive Bureau Reviews have been supplemented by staff level conversations on both the economic and military side. I should stress again that there has been a high degree of cooperation and mutuality of approach throughout.

While we have not yet begun the formulation of our conclusions and recommendations certain of the key problems and requirements are already apparent. One field involves the necessary measures to get military resources we now have into the most effective condition, and to press forward with the development of additional military strength. These measures include determination of:

(*a*) The military units that can be brought to a state of combat readiness in 1952; and I may say that process is to attempt to take the brackets out of the chart that General Gruenther showed you a few minutes ago; and those units whose manning, training and equipment in 1952 should be given precedence in order to become effective during the progressive build-up to an acceptable security situation;

(*b*) A realistic build-up by time theories: this includes the phasing of equipment supply and infrastructure in concert with the development of manpower and training;

(*c*) Specific actions to achieve these goals of combat readiness and phase build-up.

One of the most important policy considerations in achieving these objectives is a system of priorities and allocations of equipment related to specific military units. We have discussed this matter with each country. There appears to be general accord that recommendations from General Eisenhower and other NATO Commanders should be given priority consideration in the allocation of equipment as between units within each country in order to attain the maximum defensive strength with the limited resources available. For my own country, I can say, that we have accepted this concept and are reviewing the administration of our end item aid so as to relate priorities and allocations of these items to the developing military capabilities of Western Europe, principally on the basis of recommendations from NATO commanders.

Now speaking for myself, I hope that at the appropriate time, the Council will take definite action on this principle.

The TCC Screening and Costing Staff has already identified some of the general problems. It is apparent to them that NATO military planning ought now to be moving into the operational phase and

this means further organisation development. The SCS has pointed out difficulties from an operational standpoint due to the failure to appoint the commander and establish the command in the North Atlantic and also due to the lack of NATO planning and organisation in the field of logistic support. They have stressed the necessity for more attention to producing currently balanced collective forces and also for some provision in NATO for periodic reviews and re-assessment of defence costs, particularly when there is a significant change in NATO plans or in other circumstances.

The studies and discussions have also brought out problems involving national military policies and these and their possible modifications if we are to attain our objectives of effective combat forces and an ultimate acceptable security situation.

These problems include improved training, length of service, particularly for specialists and officers, improved conditions to attract capable individuals to the regular service, improvements in organisation, and particularly, in combat and logistic support, and the allocation of reserves as between different parts of the country's military programme. There is the problem of keeping related efforts in balance, for example, there may be a shortage in production of aeroplanes in the early stages, but there may be an even greater shortage in training arrangements for pilots and other personnel. Moreover, failure to provide airfields and other necessary installations on time would be a critical defect in planning and programming for NATO defence.

Another problem in the planning and carrying through of infrastructure and the lack of knowledge as the priority of the construction in relation to timing of requirements for the support of specific units on a realistic basis. These are all problems which we see as requiring consideration by the TCC as a whole both in their military, political and economic aspects. And again, I want to make it plain, that I am not speaking of any conclusions of the TCC but only some of the problems that are being placed before us by our Staff.

We recognise that the TCC will not be able to provide a full solution to the difficult problems of producing and supplying of equipment. We are, however, attempting to relate currently programme production to the particular urgent acquirements of a phase build-up. This work must be continued within the NATO and should include consideration of production for the necessary maintenance and replacement, a study of the detail of which is not yet available, and has never yet been analysed. The offshore procurement programme of my own country will be of considerable assistance in the activating capacity on this side of the Atlantic but it alone cannot provide a solution of the production problems of Europe. As indicated earlier, the TCC has taken into account the present international tensions without implying the need for general economic mobilisation. With

this approach the analysis of the political economic capabilities is being carried on, both on a comparable basis as among the member countries and with respect to each country in terms of the realistic, political and economic problems, which the member countries face in expanding defence efforts. Economic analysis has been focused on current action to implement national military programmes presented by each country, the nature of the limiting factors, internal or external, ways and means of overcoming these limitations by national or co-operative action. The lines along which increased effort might most readily be realized and would best contribute to collective defence, the extent to which proposed programmes are comparable in degree of effort and represent the most useful type of contribution to NATO as a whole.

The countries' submissions have revealed in all cases considerable increases, and in some cases large increases, in defence efforts of a pre-Korean level. The countries' submissions have shown both the internal and external economic problems involved in the partial economic mobilisation necessitated by our common programme. On the internal side the problems vary in character and in degree among member countries. They include problems arising from internal inflationary pressures, difficulties in diverting physical resources to defence without undue curtailment of necessary civilian investment or reasonable consumption levels, and financial problems to cover expanded budgets without generating excessive inflationary pressures and with the negligible social distribution of the increased defence burdens.

On the external side the major problems are two-fold in character. First the deterioration of the dollar position in a number of countries due to the worsening terms of trade and to loss, in some cases, of export potential through the diversion to defence, coupled in all cases with continued high import requirements to sustain a high level of production.

The second serious dis-equilibria in the intra-European balance of payments which threaten the effective operation of the EPU and have an important bearing on defence capabilities. On the dollar side, we believe that the United States programme off-shore procurement should make a substantial contribution in providing for an exchange of necessary dollar imports, as well as stimulating the development of European munitions production. Other American military expenditures in Europe for infrastructure and for the direct support of our forces stationed on the Continent should also be of material assistance in relieving the short-term dollar problem. Measures to accelerate infrastructure and off-shore procurement will thus serve the double purpose of speeding the physical defence build-up and assisting the dollar payments balance problem.

The maintenance of a high and expanding general level of production is indispensable for the success of the NATO defence programme. The TCC's economic analysis staff is directing an important part of its work towards the identification of major bottlenecks to overall production and we hope to be able to recommend national and co-operative measures to alleviate these limitations. They involve in part stimulation of production and improved distribution of critical raw materials in the free world as a whole. But one point of paramount importance is the grave shortage of coal in Europe: And coal is one of Europe's greatest natural resources. Every means must be used to increase the output of European coal and to ensure its conservation if Europe is to avoid a waste of its dollar resources or a set-back in both general production and production for defence. Speaking for myself I urge that the highest priority attention be given this problem by each member country and on a co-operative basis among the member countries of NATO and the OEEC.

Another major problem is the effective use of manpower and the related issues of surplus manpower especially in Italy, because I deal with this only in a sentence it is not because the TCC does not understand that it is of major importance in developing the defensive situation which we must in Europe as a whole.

While we cannot now predict the precise scope and detail of our final report as regards political and economic capabilities we hope to point towards both national and co-operative measures in these fields to promote the successful achievement of an adequate defence position and the maintenance of a healthy political and economic foundation both for the period of build-up and for the longer term future. I am sure that our recommendations will reflect the NATO principle that only through economic as well as military cooperation can our common interests, or individual national interests, be effectively realized.

740.5/12–551 : Telegram

The United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 5, 1951—4 p. m.

Repna circular 10. 1. All members TCC except Ital present. Malogodi represented Pella. Deputies standing grp (Wright, etc) present. Short account of EB–SG mtg 29 Nov presented.

2. Discussion of working outline of report opened with gen comments by Belg. Port commented favorably on dominant idea that must not concentrate only on mid '54 but must also be flexible and adaptable

[1] Repeated to Luxembourg, Ottawa, and Heidelberg for Handy.

to requirements of def throughout; mentioned favorable emphasis in econ portion on B/P and entire Eur payments but reminded committee that at first mtg, the TCC accepted that there are internal economic difficulties which must be considered. Ital spoke in support point and chair indicated report certainly intended to take into account any limitation due to maintaining econ stability.

3. Norway and, later, Neths stressed desire have working papers of TCC staffs in order to make preliminary studies prior to gen discussion on draft report. All members acutely conscious each individual country's program wld be dealt with in annexes to report. Chair pointed out that EB need costing estimate divided by countries, years, and categories only today and that wld be several days before final analysis on capabilities wld be available to EB.

4. Canada and Italy thought outline excellent. Abbott considered wld be differences of opinion when draft report is completed and therefore EB shld be allowed proceed with maximum speed to complete draft. He continually stressed this during entire mtg. There was mild suggestion from Belg supported by Portugal that three countries in addition to EB participate in drafting report. Chair stated that drafting by three wld be difficult enough and drafting by six wld mean no report. Dutch and Ital moved that EB shld prepare draft report. This was accepted by TCC.

5. Ital wanted emphasis on internal problems such as level of employment, investment, and surplus manpower. Chair agreed, mentioning that progress in investment shld aim to attain sound social basis as well as to develop raw materials and production needed for def power. Chair made point that problem divided into (*a*) NATO approach and (*b*) problems related to each country. Important that TCC members not become diverted into thinking only of own natl problems. They shld recognize that all these will not be resolved by TCC report and that it may be necessary to make some natl reservations thereon. Objective is to give a draft report within weeks so that members can have overall picture and then look at their natl problems in light of that picture. He recognized it is easier deal with broad NATO problems on basis of personal point of view than to deal with country problems which are matters on which members wld reasonably have to consult govts.

6. Monnet questioned achievement possible in report concerning matters after '52 and stressed that TCC shld answer questions concerning '52 and perhaps only sketch future. This has been Monnet line from beginning, from which he has deviated at times but to which he seems always to return. UK expressed optimism on timing of completion of report and on achievements therein. Ital stressed necessity for report to serve as firm basis for both natl and internatl planning for '52 and necessity for specifics thus tending to support

Monnet with emphasis on '52. Also pointed out need for more info, using example that countries cannot agree to SCS proposed standards without having them to study. This latter statement was revealing since Ital and other mil rep to SCS have been kept continually informed for this very reason.

7. Monnet stressed that if all available forces were gathered together in '52, combat power will be very effective indeed. Chair agreed with direction this thought of Monnet but did not wish to indicate '52 will provide in any way satis situation. It will lay foundation for building further strength.

8. Questions on material to be made available to TCC members and timing thereof were settled by

(*a*) Chairman stated that on 10 Dec, countries wld be provided with (1) the outlook both on econ and mil side with considerable precision for 52 and decreasing precision for 53 and 54, (2) partial rough draft of report, (3) annexes for their country

(*b*) SCS DirGen stated SCS report wld be completed Sat and wld be provided in full to each member if TCC so indicated. He stressed that sections of report are interlaced and report shld be read as a whole. While TCC took no formal action, it appears certain that report will be provided each country.

9. Ital stated certain natl responsibilities which cannot be subordinated to NATO command even as, internally, there are certain responsibilities which a govt can not subordinate to its mil commanders. Ital concern is over trend in report outline toward priorities policy and increased auth for NATO commands. In private conversation, Malogodi indicated Itals fear priorities policy will react to their disadvantage because:

(*a*) Gen Marras believes SG underrates threat to southern flank and

(*b*) Ital troops are unlikely to attain a standard of training of some other nations, thereby perhaps not meriting recommendation from NATO commanders for allocations of equip. Ital pointed out that their low standard of training might have to be accepted because of realities of length of service and training.

10. Canada expressed satis over approach of determining what we are going to do in 52 and rather more flexible approach in 53 and 54. Also stressed Canada's $700 mil balance of payment deficit and stated that Canada does not propose to provide econ aid since such wld mean additional dollar borrowing. (Note that Abbott has been away from Canada for over 10 days.) Port supported Canadian proposal that draft outline of report and expanded outline of introduction be accepted with understanding there wld be TCC discussion of final draft. Sense of mtg indicated agreement.

11. SCS presented report, mentioning that some force proposals are different from country statements due to application of SCS standards of readiness, estimate of training capability, etc. SCS estimated that

major equip difficulties need not necessarily arise, assuming adequate priority system, until 53 and into 54. Raising German forces will then cause added equip problem. Stressed that SCS does not believe their force goal too high. Recognized that finan and econ difficulties might prevent reaching SCS goal by 54 and urged that, in such case, buildups shld be continued beyond 54. Stated SCS view that effective covering force is possible in 52 which shld practically rule out surprise attack. This force wld however, not be adequate. Stressed that to achieve 52 goal and buildup beyond, there must be strict allocation of equip which shld be responsibility of NATO commanders for recommendation. SCS recommended yearly review to continue after buildup.

12. Dutch stressed clarity of SCS documents and definitions in comparison to SHAPE and particularly SG documents. Raised question as to possible differences among standards. SCS noted that SCS standards are materially higher than some smaller country standards but SHAPE standards are D-day standards for units in place for battle and might be called "maximum desirable" whereas SCS are "minimum acceptable". Any differences have to be resolved on basis of econ and polit capability of countries concerned.

13. Chair mentioned TCC might not desire to endorse technical matters such as definitions of readiness but might rather wish to furnish to SG and SHAPE as SCS recommendations. Ital expressed concern over accepting high state of readiness until more is known about finance and equip, raised priority point again. Chair expressed personal view that unless system of priorities adopted NATO will not get much defense.

14. Chair opened organization discussion by mentioning new situation in which NAT organizations have to become more operational. SCS presented mil problem of organization, stressing lack of any priorities system to deal with shortages and stating that SCS wld recommend a system and a change in directive of SACEUR giving additional responsibility and auth. Pointed out that SACEUR now has only operations and training in war, whereas no commander can assure preparations his forces or conduct operations without some degree of influence over deployment, equip, and his logistics. No real progress on logistics plans and arrangement have been made. Prospective changes in terms of reference will provide a basis on which SHAPE can state to each country what wld be prepared in infrastructure. In summary, changes will be concerned with

(*a*) Increased auth for NATO commanders on organization, training, equip and priorities for assigned forces.

(*b*) Logistical organization at both theater and overall levels to determine specific equip and infrastructure needs, and

(*c*) Allocation of material available to NATO in accordance with a basic NATO priorities system.

15. Chair noted that NAT needed an organization which cld define equip requirements and make recommendations on production to countries. Also needed a staff section on financial and econ problems which dealt closely with other staff sections. Furthermore, records must be available and it might be well to have records center which kept up with all aspects of NATO such as coordination of air craft deliveries, air training, and availability of air fields. Chair noted suggestion that there shld be central staff of NATO at a central place headed by a suitable person which could study NATO problems and monitor carrying out of NATO decisions. Mentioned problem of machinery to get prompt reconciliation of views and decisions in govts. Chair suggested that TCC had to determine what they wanted to do and that they might wish to make gen suggestions to council with objective of strengthening NAT organization to get more effective def.

16. Ital asked that oral statements of SCS and chair on organization be distributed at once. Dutch mentioned that we shld have in mind increasing the power of deputies and cited unique opportunity of TCC to solve important matters rather than passing pressing organizational problems to council which wld then have to sit with the difficulties. Port doubted TCC had time for discussion detailed organizational matters and feared delay due to lengthy consultations. Suggested gen agreement if possible and if not that TCC send any EB and SCS recommendation to council. Ital suggested decision be deferred on procedure and that these things too important us forward without comment. Individual members TCC were asked to furnish specific suggestions on organization.

17. Monnet stressed that there is defense for all but no def on a natl basis. TCC has task of reconciliation and also duty of making recommendations to council on organization to assure that TCC proposals can be carried out. If nations are to spend money and give services of their people, they must be sure it will be worthwhile and that the NATO machine can function in case of need. The organization problem can not be disassociated from other problems. Discussion of TCC terms of reference developed point that they covered organization since TCC is charged with the analysis of the issues involved and organization is certainly an issue.

18. Suggestion by Ital that EB might wish to discuss specific country problems with country reps during next few days was accepted. Members TCC insisted on necessity for time to translate draft papers and discuss with their govts before meeting which is hoped to be final. Agreed that presumable final mtg will begin 10:00, Dec 14 to continue until finalization of report.[2]

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[2] For a record of these final meetings of the TCC, see telegram Repto 6248, December 17 and following cables, pp. 379 ff.

19. In delegation opinion, chair achieved our interim objectives of (1) obtaining willing agreement of countries that EB draft the report, (2) informing ministers of major problems in order that they may have preliminary discussions with govts (3) creating feeling of confidence that useful report can be achieved and (4) indicating a pattern of NATO security planning which shld give essential continuing guidance to natl planning agencies.

740.5/12–551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 5, 1951—4 p. m.

3338. For Martin from Vass. No distribution this message outside State Dept. This is background to long report TCC mtg being sent by del.[1]

1. Decision circulate draft report Mon for consideration by govts before final TCC mtg December 14 raises question of extent to which you wish to participate in shaping report. FinMins will, of course, come armed with governmental positions and will naturally assume we have done same.

2. Since report, including controversial country annexes, will be exceedingly bulky and highly classified, hardly practicable cable report, which cld hardly be ungarbled prior to meeting. If you believe State shld see text and offer comments on points where language may be important domestically or in terms foreign relations (assuming we must be prepared for leaks of virtually entire text), suggest you raise this problem. One possibility wld be for me to return with report as soon as available.

3. Postponement mtg to Thurs due largely to Monnet, who must participate in Schuman Plan debate balance this week. He threatened resign as TCC member unless schedule delayed, a move which both US and UK reps described as "blackmail". TCC mtg failed provide either showdown or agreement on issue 1952 versus 1954.

4. Bidault has sent long letter to Harriman, as chairman TCC purporting to prove Fr effort outstanding and winding up with flat demand for 200 million dollars economic aid last half calendar 1951 and 715 million dollars first half 1952, for total of 915 million dollars in US fiscal year 1952. Letter states must be economic aid with counterpart and minimum amount necessary for Fr support 1,512 billion franc defense budget, which he claims is required to meet defense obligations as worked out by TCC. No indication yet whether Harriman will accept this as part TCC operation or turn matter over to bilateral

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[1] *Supra.*

negotiations. Harriman expects deal solely with MSP during Monnet absence.

5. We understand Bidault letter to Harriman was sent by him without prior consultation with his colleagues and does not represent Fr Govt position. [Vass.]

BRUCE

740.5/12–651 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 6, 1951—1 : 31 p. m.

Todep 395. Grk Amb called under instrs his govt state that Grk wished participate in work of TCC. Under assumption Grk and Turk will be full members NATO when NAC meets Lisbon, Feb 2, Grk Govt wished make sure its econ-mil-fin situation will be considered in same manner as that other NAT countries. We sought dispel certain possible false impressions as to nature TCC and its objective, and in particular, that it was primarily an aid allotment device. We highlighted primary purpose TCC to marry max fin and econ capabilities with mil requirements so that best possible def posture on mil and econ fronts will be achieved. We expressed our hope Lisbon wld provide the climax for activities which have been going on in NATO during past two years and that govts will stand up and be counted as to measures which they will take in order achieve our common security in light of TCC recommendations.

We explained to Grk Amb work of TCC was approaching its final stage and that we did not see how it wld be possible, regardless of the fact that Grk is not yet a full member of NATO, to interrupt work of TCC in order fit in the new Grk piece of the puzzle. Furthermore, we pointed out that Grk's econ and fin capabilities represented only one aspect of problem which also required careful study of mil requirements for def of the Grk-Turk bastion of NATO. We expressed the opinion that a TCC type operation for Grk and Turk cld only be satisfactorily accomplished later when Standing Group and MRCs will have had the opportunity in concert with Grk and Turk staffs carefully to work out mil requirements and plans for the area.

Dept has wondered, however, if it might not be useful if Grk and Turk Govts were supplied with TCC Questionnaires which have been

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[1] Drafted by Knight and cleared with Porter of GTI, Martin of EUR, Brown of H, Ernst of Defense, and Parsons of RA ; repeated for action to Paris for USDel TCC and for information to Ankara and Athens.

answered by NAT countries. This might give Grk and Turk Govts familiarity with TCC operation and shld cause them to marshal facts and figures which wld permit speedier "Grk-Turk TCC operation" after admission these two countries and after determination mil requirements and plans Eastern Area NATO.

On balance we are inclined believe that Grk and Turk wrestling with Questionnaires without background and detailed guidance cld be contra-productive. Instead it might be more useful and realistic to have NACDeps invite Grk and Turk Govts to send each a rep to London. The purpose wld be to have these reps work with the Dep's Internatl Staff to acquire NATO background and history and familiarize themselves with NATO procedures and activities. One of these activities wld be the TCC. From security pt of view we have checked with Standing Group and find out that above initiative wld be possible prior to Grk and Turk full membership. According to findings of Standing Group security mission to Grk and Turk, winter 1950–51, reps cld receive Cosmic clearance if they hold T.S. security clearance by their respective natl security auths.

USDep and USDel TCC pls comment.

WEBB

740.5/12–651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 6, 1951—3 p. m.

3371. For Martin from Vass. No distribution outside State.

1. As result of effective work by Lindeman in persuading economic staff to recommend budget increases of $3.8 billion, and SCS screening including departures from MC 26/1 by pruning costs to capabilities, "confrontation" in WG last night was anticlimax, since negligible gap remained between assets available and cost SCS force plan through 1954.

2. Equipment gap for European NATO shown as $22 billion before any allowance for four-year US or Canada MSP. Gap in meeting non-major material costs estimated at $3.5 billion without allowance for German occupation costs as offset to NATO costs, or estimated $500 military mutual aid possible from Belgium and Denmark. Dollar balance payments analysis shows overall four-year need of $7 billion, with assets in sight to cover $5 billion or more without raising aid.

3. Germany just now being added to tables. This will increase equipment gap by that part of $6 billion which Germany cannot or will not be allowed to produce. Line here is to indicate German military aid program will be in addition to $5.8 billion MSP figure projected for NATO in US submission without indicating amount. Gor-

don tentatively thinking of adding total of $3–4 billion for Germany in FY 1953–1954 requests. Would attempt change allocations to enable delivery all programs including FY 1952 by end of calendar 1952.

4. Meeting yesterday on German production studies got nowhere. Hirsch took line could not even consider approaching Germans until FonMins had settled security controls. Failed explain how this position consistent with French agreement to EB D–44, implicitly endorsed by FonMins at Rome. Second meeting planned today but unlikely any clarification issue obtained by then. Byroade briefed before leaving to join Secretary.

5. Now expected TCC meeting will last several days. Feeling is that we must accept national reservations on own programs but must prevent moves to suppress international staff recommendations which serve our immediate purposes of showing concrete ways European effort can be increased and also closing gap. Result, if acceptable US military authorities, promises to provide soundest basis yet for congressional presentation. Big question is whether SCS forces will be acceptable. Clear here that each of services has something to grumble about, and orthodoxy has not yet been preserved. For example, Mantz directed today to cut about $2.5 billion from costs on grounds no indication POL and other items, necessary to support SCS flying hours program, would in fact be available. Real confrontation may be in NSC rather than TCC. [Vass.]

BRUCE

740.5/12–751 : Telegram

The United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 7, 1951—11 a. m.

Repna circ 11. ToISA. 1. Working comite reported to Exec Bureau today, tentative conclusions on reconciliation of econ capabilities with the screening and costing staff's milit program based on manpower, organization and training capabilities.

2. From fin standpoint the working comite concluded that over the three year period FY 1952 to 1954 incl, there is a net fin deficit equal to about 5⅓ billion dollars. This assumes an increase of slightly over 3 billion dollars during the three years above the currently programmed defense expenditures of Eur countries, and about 700 million econ aid from Canada. On a yearly basis there appears to be no fin deficit, assuming countries undertake proposed increases within their estimated capabilities, in fiscal 1952 and only a small estimated

[1] Repeated to Ottawa, Bonn, and Heidelberg for Handy.

fin deficit in fiscal 1953. The great part of the estimated three year deficit wld occur in fiscal 1954.

3. Concerning equip the estimate now is that, taking into account equip for Ger forces, there wld be a deficit of about 6 billion over the three years, assuming adherence to the SCS milit program, incl its austerity standards. Excepting Ger, there wld be an estimated deficit of between 1 and 2 billion as compared to a total estimated capital value of equip of about 33 billion dollars. The judgment as to the time phasing of the impact of these deficits is substantially similar to the judgment in the preceding para on fin deficits, assuming favorable US priorities on deliveries.

4. The dollar balance of payments deficits over the three year period are now estimated at about 7 billion dollars, against which estimates apply assets of estimated US econ aid of about 1 billion per year, a half billion US expenditures in Eur which some experts here consider to be much too low, 700 million of possible Canadian econ assistance which is considered to be within Canadian capability, infrastructure, and off-shore procurement. No firm figures are yet available on the latter two items but it is considered that the dollar deficit in balance of payments wld be approximately closed over the three year period by the measures listed.

5. The TCC estimates are turning to use the three year period of fiscal 1952 to 1954 incl, but the estimates as to fin deficits and equip deficits in the preceding paras can, without adjustment, be compared with prior estimates on the period fiscal 1951 to 1954 incl.

6. Exec Bureau, with France represented by Hirsch, decided (*a*) that the SCS proposed milit program needed no substantial econ reconciliation for fiscal years 1952 and 1953; (*b*) the TCC shld not attempt a detailed reconciliation of the program for 1954 but shld probably handle the matter by submitting suggestions to the council and leaving the precise reconciliation to further study; (*c*) Exec-Bureau will distribute Monday to countries, country annexes which include suggested fin increases in def efforts, as well as the recommended changes and additions to milit program developed by the screening and costing staff. This latter was agreed at TCC mtg on Tuesday. The suggested increases in country program vary from zero for Portugal and UK to over 40 percent increase above that originally submitted to TCC by Belgium.

740.5/12–1051 : Telegram

The United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 10, 1951—11 p. m.

Repto 98. Usdel Tcc no. 70. Subject is EB draft TCC report.

1. Executive Bureau, TCC agreed last night and has today passed to NATO countries EB draft of proposed TCC report. Full TCC meets Friday 14 Dec for consideration of draft. Meeting expected take several days to complete action.

2. Basic concept of proposed report is that NAT activity shld be concentrated on "most rapid practical build-up of balanced effective combat forces." Report endorses for consideration NATO and govts the major recommendations of screening and costing staff (SCS) report including principles and standards of readiness and proposed annual plans for forces build-up on basis indicated para four below. TCC draft report includes sections on: process of reconciliation of mil requirements and politico-econ capabilities; discussion residual financial and equipment gaps; annual programs for NATO build-up; supply, production and maintenance of NATO build-up; econ conditions for fulfillment TCC plan of action; mil conditions for fulfillment of plan; organizational problems of NATO; and country annexes giving proposed TCC conclusions on politico-econ aspects each country's defense effort and suggestions, where appropriate, for increased effort.

3. SCS report in full detail sent countries Dec 7.

4. Draft TCC report, in effect, provides recommended pattern and composition of defense build-up effort as guide to govts in form of clear targets and plan of action for 1952, targets but less precise program for 1953 and targets and indication of program for 1954 and beyond. Recommends there be included in 1952 plan those initial actions on long lead time matters which must be initiated in 1952 to carry out the more flexible planning targets suggested for 1953 and in some cases 1954. Build-up shows possible achieve, by end of 1952, mil forces which, though not adequate will have major capabilities both for combat operations and for deterrent effect. SCS targets for 1954 wld not fully satisfy MC 26/1 estimated requirements although not very far short in orders of magnitude. There remain financial and equipment gaps especially in 1954 but also significant in 1953 even in raising SCS proposed forces, but EB concludes these not of such size to justify reduction in SCS proposed build-up for planning pur-

[1] Repeated to all NATO capitals.

poses. Important fraction equipment gap results from assumed German contribution and necessarily low German mil production starting from scratch; report notes possibility extra US end item assistance this purpose, as indicated in submission. EB proposes adoption SCS 1952 proposals as firm, 1953 as provisional and 1954 as planning guide lines. Proposes overall review by appropriate permanent NATO agencies next summer to adjust programs for 1953 and 1954 and beyond.

5. Draft report indicates suggested plans for action can be met only if countries give serious consideration to and carry out to extent possible conditions for fulfillment. These include, arising from SCS recommendations, the following:

a. Institution effective priority system for assignment of equipment.
b. Establishment approved minimum lists of acceptable types of equipment.
c. Development of adequate plan and program for logistical support.
d. Improvement of command arrangements.
e. Promotion greater standardization.
f. A number of conditions pertaining to creating and maintaining combat readiness, such as larger regular establishments, training of specialists, etc.

6. Report also discusses econ conditions, including general econ expansion, basic materials and manpower, coal, steel, electricity, maintenance internal stability (including restraining demand, reducing rises in costs and prices), dollar balance of payments, OSP, intra-European payments.

7. 1952–54 dollar balance of payments deficit forecast as $7 billion not counting US aid. On basis econ aid consistent US submission proposals, large-scale and promptly implemented OSP, and assumption substantial infrastructure contributions and other direct US mil expenditures, report indicates deficits shld be manageable.

8. Annex on US program recommends stepped up timing of end-item deliveries, administration of programs to maximize effectiveness in helping finance European essential dollar imports. Action recommended to promote most useful internatl distribution scarce materials, avoid unduly high price levels, and assistance in making available increased quantities certain materials, particularly steel, and in facilitating imports to US. Does not comment on question of increase aid program.

740.5/12–1451 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, December 14, 1951—8 p. m.

Delga 664. For the Secretary. Re old Soviet item.[1] As Dept has long anticipated, it seems likely that Soviets in connection their omnibus item will launch major attack on NATO. US and other NATO countries will wish to respond with vigorous offensive showing reasons for creation of NATO and in giving our idea of NATO's proper relationship to UN. USDel here in Paris has been considering how best to conduct this offensive when Soviet item is reached.

One idea that has been put forward is that political comite, in course of debate on Soviet item, might invite or request NATO to send a rep to make a statement before comite. Such statement might be made by General Eisenhower, as the single individual who most genuinely symbolizes and represents NATO as an organization. Such an appearance by General Eisenhower before comite would need to be concurred by appropriate agreement among the 12 govts concerned, after prior consultation with General. Contemplated Eisenhower statement wld be most broadly conceived, to place NATO in true perspective, to state reasons for its existence, and to state its purposes in world situation where San Francisco expectations of great-power cooperation are not a reality today.

Del has discussed above suggestion, and a number of considerations have emerged as favoring suggestion, while at same time certain difficulties have been seen.

Fol are some of difficulties: Appearance of General Eisenhower before UN wld dramatize debate on Soviet item and perhaps lend additional magnitude to Soviet charges directed against NATO. Western Eur countries and certain Asian countries might resent appearance of General Eisenhower as indirect pressure by US to compel greater sacrifices by them for achievement of current NATO goals. There might be unfavorable reaction to appearance of high military figure in UN deliberations. Such appearance by NATO reps in political comite might imply a degree of answerability and even subordination of NATO to UN which countries such as UK and Fr might object to. Some question has been raised as to possible adverse effect on US domestic political situation of appearance by Gen Eisenhower before UN at Paris session.

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[1] Reference here is to item 67 on the agenda of the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly which was meeting in Paris. This agenda item, "Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and freedom among nations," was introduced by the Soviet Delegation on November 8.

On other side of ledger, fol considerations have been advanced: Appearance by General before UN wld actually serve to emphasize bipartisan character of US foreign policy in regard to NATO, and tend to withdraw this issue from 1952 campaign. Magnitude of UN debate on Soviet attack against NATO may in any event be determined by USSR rather than West. Appearance of General Eisenhower in political comite wld serve as dramatic counterweight to role Vyshinsky has played at this session, where for some time he has been single most dominating figure on scene. Positive and broadly philosophical statement by General Eisenhower before UN wld help free world in disposing decisively of Soviet charges. It could show that NATO is not rival or alternative to UN, but that existence of NATO accords with UN and is in support of UN purposes and principles. US statement on behalf of NATO powers would serve as reassurance to Western European countries as well as Middle East countries concerning US intentions in current East-West conflict.

In light of del discussions and above considerations, del believes question of Eisenhower appearance before UN shld be weighted carefully in Wash. In preliminary discussion Dec 13 Congressmen Mansfield and Vorys and Amb Gross expressed strong doubts as to wisdom of suggestion, while Mrs. Roosevelt and Cohen warmly supported it. Cooper, Strauss and Zobias also support. Jessup absent from mtg but opposes.

740.5/12–1451 : Telegram

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen to the President and the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, December 14, 1951—8 p. m.

Delga 665. For President and Secretary of State from Mrs. Roosevelt and Cohen. Limited distribution. We shld like you to have our personal views on the matter covered in Delga 664.[1] This Assembly is probably proceeding as well as might be expected in light of troubled world conditions. If the Assembly did not reflect the strife and malaise existing in the world it wld be remote from realities. But nonetheless if we wish to retain popular faith in UN and prevent disillusionment, it seems to some of us that it is important that we try to find some way of dramatizing the importance of the Assembly in world affairs and at the same time to allay the unreasoning but genuine fears prevalent in Europe and the east as to how US may exercise the military power it is creating—fears which may increasingly handicap

[1] *Supra.*

the operations of NATO as well as other efforts of ours to unify and strengthen free Europe and the free world.

The Sov item attacking NATO as incompatible with UN membership may give us this opportunity if we seize it boldly. We have already met the Sov attack with calm and rational explanations here and elsewhere. But something more is required to allay widespread emotional apprehension, particularly among our friends and allies.

It had seemed to some of us that if a way cld be found to have NATO, either at its own request or on the suggestion of some friendly states, invited by the Assembly's President or the pol comite, to send a representative to explain the purposes of NATO and its relations to UN, and if General Eisenhower cld be chosen to act as NATO rep before the Assembly for this purpose, we cld most dramatically demonstrate to world opinion that NATO exists to uphold the principles of UN and not to undermine them, to preserve the peace and not to threaten it. In such event the General wld of course appear with due humility in civilian garb, and solemnly affirm the devotion of NATO and its members to the principles of the charter, pointing out that under the North Atlantic Treaty the parties have expressly undertaken not to use force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the charter. Such an appearance wld not in our judgment be regarded as an intrusion of a military leader into UN but the recognition by a military leader of the supremacy of the rule of law. It cld have a profound effect upon public opinion throughout the world.

We cannot believe that such an appearance wld have any adverse effect on the political situation at home. It wld, if anything, only emphasize our bipartisan foreign policy and tend to prevent any back-wash from next year's political campaign adversely affecting that policy.[2]

[2] In a memorandum of a meeting between the Secretary of State and the President on December 20, it was noted that President Truman agreed with Acheson's recommendation that it was not a wise idea for General Eisenhower to address the General Assembly. Truman stated that this should be handled by the representatives of the NATO countries and he felt that Mrs. Roosevelt was the ideal person to handle it for the United States. (740.5/12–2051)

740.5/12–1451

The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Eisenhower) to the Chairman of the Temporary Council Committee (Harriman)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [PARIS, December 14(?), 1951.]

I am happy to know that your entire comite is now mtg to put its work into final form. Responding to your request for my personal

[1] The text of Eisenhower's letter was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Repna circular 13 from Paris, December 14; it was repeated to Heidelberg, Luxembourg, London, and Ottawa.

comment on the comite's draft "plan of action", I can offer only broad comments since we here at SHAPE have had no opportunity for exhaustive study.

My first comment is that the results of the work of the Temporary Council Comite and of its Screening and Costing Staff represent a truly monumental piece of work. The participants in that task will certainly deserve a real tribute from the whole NATO community if they are able to complete their difficult work as effectively as they have advanced it thus far. I am impressed not only by the spirit of cooperation that must have animated the members of the comite in achieving the kind of agreement that is represented but also by the objective manner in which they have tackled this most difficult problem.

I have the feeling that we are really seeing for the first time the dimensions, in terms of an integrated mil, econ, and fin effort, of our build-up task. It will be a real milestone in NATO development to have carried out with this degree of success the difficult task of reconciling rapid build-up of security forces with practical limitations in the econ field and to have one [*won?*] this through joint and cooperative action.

The gen approach indicated in the plan of building a balanced combat-effective force at the maximum rate which the availability of resources will permit is clearly one which affords strong support to the fulfillment of the NATO mission entrusted to me and, accordingly, I heartily welcome it. I think your comite has reached something both practical and effective in your handling of the programs proposed for each of the next three years. I assume this same method of operation wld be continued until the full requirements, necessary for the planned strategy, were provided for. In my opinion, the forces envisaged are such as to provide a sound basis for actions utilizing the resources which will become available during the coming year. I am ready to assist in every way I can in the attainment in the greatest possibly measure of the "maximum practicable" goals you have shown.

The standards for manning, training, equipping, and providing cadres are directly related to this build-up of def forces. Those proposed as interim standards for 1952 seem well designed as gen guides which will contribute during the coming year to the maximum practicable build-up of effective forces. In this field also SHAPE will be in a position to advise and assist in making the best practicable application of this guidance to the particular forces and particular circumstances of each country.

From my own standpoint, and in the interest of saving time, I wld welcome the immediate and urgent initiation by the countries of the actions recommended in 1952 for the achievement of the build-up program. It is understood, of course, that Parliaments will have to deter-

mine the eventual levels, but the temporary council comite has already achieved a great deal by cooperative action in preparing a program for the consideration of the NATO nations. If our joint effort follows the broad lines that TCC is suggesting, and if it reaches the levels recommended, it is clear to me that there shld be full value recd in return, in terms of a more rapid development of defensive capability and creation of a real deterrent to aggression in West Eur.

[EISENHOWER]

740.5/12–1751 : Telegram

The United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 17, 1951—1 a. m.

Repto 6248. Usdel Tcc 81. Present session TCC opened 10 a. m., 14 Dec. This cable reports first meeting.

1. Chairman opened meeting by summarizing highlights of draft TCC report. Stated Gen Eisenhower had indicated his general endorsement of plan of action and is prepared to meet with TCC at their convenience. Emphasized that report shld be that of the 12 members with govts not necessarily committed to proposed actions relating to (their) own programs. Suggested start with general discussions of report and talk details later after agreement on principles.

2. Hirschfield praised report as first clear picture of overall problems, but stated did not agree with everything and did not know at moment whether govt wld be able to accept all recommendations. He complained that TCC members have not had sufficient time to study report and suggested delay. Proposed TCC first discuss individual country annexes to find out whether countries able to fill recommendations before discussing principles. Agreed govts not involved in detailed drafting, but TCC members are under general instructions on important issues. When they sign the report they must think of the possibility of obtaining approval of their govts.

3. Chairman read Eisenhower letter, already cabled by Lincoln.[2]

4. Kristiensen agreed with Hirschfield stating TCC members are members of govts and therefore difficult approve report without committing govts. Proposed subsequent meeting TCC just prior to Lisbon to consider comments by govts on report submitted now by TCC. TCC wld make supplemental report to Council on result of governmental considerations.

5. Chairman agreed with suggestions of a later meeting concerned. He pointed out necessity for obtaining comments from NATO bodies

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[1] Repeated to all NATO capitals and Heidelberg for Handy.

[2] *Supra.*

prior to Lisbon, which cld also be considered. In interim there wld be opportunity for further bilateral discussions pertaining to dollar problem, solution of which necessary to obtain imports on which military and econ programs based.

6. Pella agreed with Hirschfield on importance of recommendations by TCC and impossibility for members separate their responsibilities as TCC and as Mins. Suggested members cld facilitate approval by anticipating govt positions but must study report more deeply, implying necessity for adjournment. Strongly favored starting with individual country recommendations.

7. Monnet made strong statement in favor first reaching agreement on general principles. He pointed out TCC cannot itself carry world to point where can make real commitments which are up to govts. He implied agreement on country recommendations wld turn on aid negots which cannot be completed in TCC. He admitted that each country wld probably reserve on own annex, if only for tactical reasons, but urged agreement now on approach, method and basic overall recommendations.

8. Denmark strongly supported Monnet statement. Doubted useful to have detailed country discussions in full comite. Raised question of availability Secretariat of EB during period when govts considering report. Pointed to need for technical clarifications.

9. Chairman re-emphasized Monnet position re importance agreement on principles. Can achieve real defense effort only if accept effective use of resources. Differences over country details relatively unimportant if agree and concentrate on basic implementing principle. Stated Secretariat and SCS available during meeting for technical discussions. After meeting SHAPE cld carry on discussions military aspects. Speaking for himself, Chairman obviously not in position accept every recommendation of report; however, considered report basically sound and while cannot commit govt cld go home and work in best way possible to encourage govt carrying out difficult tasks being put to it. Chairman called attention to German assumption and expressed German problem wld be cleared for council action in February.

10. Belgians strongly urged postponement TCC consideration for week or so, backing Pella line. Mins must be prepared to defend what is agreed and must know what they are defending. Challenged report as being not specific and concrete and requested details on specific 1952 military obligations. Stated had had no real chance to study report.

11. Chairman indicated view TCC shld stay in session until agree on report and recommendations to govts and NATO. Admitted any member cld make reservation if he felt he must regarding his own program. Present is critical moment in NATO and must give it

impetus. If TCC cld not get out its report now, adverse impact on morale wld be great.

12. Brofoss indicated TCC shld come out with concrete results and avoid vague generalities. Agreed to take up general principles first.

13. Pella agreed with Belgium statement and proposed TCC leave afternoon free for careful study of report which might indicate present worries not wellfounded. TCC agreed postpone further meeting until morning, 15 Dec.

14. Monnet urged TCC discuss general principles before hearing Eisenhower. Plowden, Hirschfield and Chairman preferred hear Eisenhower views first, which was agreed.

15. Chairman referred to semi-leaks in press, stating NATO depends on ability hold intimate discussions of highly classified info without arguments reaching press. Unless discussions can be kept out of press, danger that this great cooperative enterprise will break down. Urged that all members must create impression all working together and refrain from discussing differences which are made more sensational in press. Monnet stressed secrecy impossible stating US press best at finding things out. Urged that NATO press officers give guidance to press and members agree refer press to persons of NATIS. Agreed. General agreement to release as much info as possible at conclusion meeting but refrain from disclosing discussions during course of meeting.

740.5/12–1751 : Telegram

The United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 17, 1951—1 a. m.

Repto 6249. UsDel Tcc 82. This cable reports TCC a. m. and p. m. meetings, 15 Dec.

1. Meeting opened with statement by Gen Eisenhower followed by questions and discussion. This covered in cable from Lincoln through Defense channels (not to all addresses).[2]

2. After Eisenhower departure, Chairman gave oral outline in some detail of summary of findings being worked on by EB. Stated summary of findings being incorporated with introduction to form new part 1 of report. (See US TCC tel 79, to Wash only.[3]) At close this statement of findings, Chairman indicated he was encouraged by

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[1] Repeated to all NATO capitals and to Heidelberg for Handy.

[2] The question-and-answer period as well as the statement by General Eisenhower are reported in telegram Har 153 from Paris, December 17 (Military cable files, lot 52–246, TCC, 1951).

[3] This TCC message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Repto 6246 from Paris, December 15 (740.5/12–1551).

prospects. Expressed hope that TCC wld go as far as possible in sharing this view. If TCC report not positive and only points up all difficulties, effect on govts wld be bad. Must express confident tone in report.

3. In afternoon session, meeting began detailed consideration draft report. Part 1 not yet circulated so started on part 2. No comments on section 4. On section 5, discussion centered on references to country efforts with which Belgium, Italy and Canada cld not agree. Belgium desired take out table 1 (financing table). Chairman stated had assumed wld be reservations re recommendations on individual country efforts, but pointed out some countries already implementing and hoped country annexes wld stay in report for govt consideration. Pella suggested TCC discuss general problems and assumptions, considering final handling country's recommendations and annexes in a later meeting prior to the meeting just before Lisbon. Chairman stated wld be disastrous if TCC left this meeting without making report to govts and NATO. Report already overdue. Pella proposed TCC agree on substance of report and leave drafting to EB for future adoption.

3.[4] Plowden recalled timetable established Rome, requiring MC comments before Lisbon. Suggested TCC agree general lines, with final drafting if necessary by EB, and report go to govts with necessary reservations. If necessary there cld be supplemental report as result TCC meeting pre-Lisbon. Chairman agreed. Kristensen agreed, but suggested expand foreword to include statement that individual TCC members not committed recommend to own govts all recommendations of report. Agreed.

4. Chairman commented must bear in mind have made many assumptions, including German participation. If take out assumptions, wld have no report. Assumption US will appropriate aid funds over next two years same amount as this year, one of biggest variables. On country budget recommendations, understand can not be precise now.

5. Hirschfield agreed govts must have report as soon as possible in order have time to discuss in govts before Lisbon. Will never be ready if discuss all national difficulties, but must be sure do not attempt prejudge govt decisions. Shld consider now on basis will finish in three or four days, and decide later in meeting exact formula for handling country commitment problem.

6. Brofoss strongly urged we go ahead with report for govts consideration. Pointed out must keep uppermost basis need for defense and not overemphasize budgetary aspects. Stated was personally prepared advocate report.

7. Portugal agreed shld complete report and transmit on basis amended foreword. TCC agreed proceed in this manner.

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[4] In the source text this paragraph was also no. 3.

8. Pella raised question of inconsistency between tables 1 and 2 in section 5. Marjolin admitted apparent discrepancy, which superficially suggested financial surplus. However, four billion consisted of assumed German surplus. Table 1 assumed this surplus shared only by European occupying powers, a questionable assumption. Ger contribution of assumed sum doubtful. Also assumed all SCS recommendations carried out, with no waste resources and no use defense budgets except for essential requirement costed. Stated additional production certainly underestimated, consideration given only 45 of 75 items covered by DPB, no consideration additional production in UK or plant conversion from non-defense production. Under circumstances actual financial deficit will certainly be higher, but can only say between 6 and 11 billion.

9. McNarney commented that shld go ahead with plans for next two or three years even with financial and equipment gaps. Will provide effective fighting forces which is object of the exercise. To allow to be perturbed by possible residual gap and not go forward wld be grave mistake.

10. Agreed annex to part 2, "summary force build-up" classified Cosmic Top Secret and will be circulated as separate part report.

11.[6] Gen Marras (Italy) raised number of technical questions which agreed should be raised in MC meeting. Also raised Ital peace treaty question proposing inclusion statement recommendations Ital forces cannot be carried out unless restrictions not existent. McNarney pointed out was statement on this matter in SCS report.

12. Wilgress stated Canada considers SCS conclusions as most valuable. Approach entirely correct, and first realistic approach. Expressed hope MC will bear this in mind, stating would be wrong to consider SCS apart from TCC report as whole.

13. No comments on sections 9 thru 11.

14. On section 12, Kristiensen agreed supply survey vital and urgently needed. Wanted know who would do it. Chairman stated first step would be for military to determine detailed requirements, then civilian side NATO survey production financial aspects.

15. Discussion part III. Kristiensen attacked conclusions of economic expansion section as being too optimistic, arguing impossible hold down civilian consumption and investment to indicated levels of 7 or 8 billion out of total production increase of 18 without severe inflation. Supported by Hirschfield, who suggested that precise figures be deleted. Monnet vigorously supported estimates, as being both feasible and essential precondition for achieving defense build-up planned in report. Hirschfield stated that preferable have courage

[6] Paragraphs 11 through 15, which were omitted from the original source text, were subsequently sent to the same recipients in telegram Repna unnumbered from Paris, December 17 (740.5/12–1651).

tell peoples consumption cannot be raised, rather than accept optimistic figures and that, if necessary, consumption could be cut as alternative to cutting defense expenditures. Monnet stated that public opinion would be against program if in fact substantial increase in production permitting increase in consumption not realized.

16. Marjolin explained estimates of increase GNP based on country figures with some staff estimates. Requires effort, but is feasible. Pointed out that means standard of living wld show some increase, but incomes wld increase more, which is measure of problem which Finan Mins must face.

17. Chairman recalled that the Council at Ottawa had endorsed OEEC manifesto and remarked that he had assumed that TCC members wld not wish to do less. Expressed confidence TCC wld get behind concept that production must be increased. Meeting adjourned to resume 10 a. m., 16 Dec.

740.5/12–1751 : Telegram

The United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 17, 1951—1 a. m.

Repto 6250. Usdel Tcc 83. This cable reports TCC meeting 10:00 a. m., Dec 16.

1. Chairman reported general agreement reached previous night to go forward with discussion body of report during morning, with 12 Ministers meeting alone in afternoon to discuss question of method for forwarding report, especially country annexes, and future course of work.

2. Discussion proceeded on Part III of report. Kristensen repeated his previous argument will be difficult hold down consumption to levels assumed and indicated might be necessary revise statement in pre-Lisbon meeting after receiving govt comments. He suggested section on economic expansion shld contain reference to liberalization of trade as aid to increased production. Agreed that Marjolin shld redraft along lines of discussion, indicating figures on increases GNP and percentage available defense not precise, but indicate order of magnitude.

3. In discussion of coal section, Chairman brought out this is most important single econ problem in Europe, but stated that OEEC appeared most suitable body to study problem. TCC agreed to suggestion that report shld urge govts to seek solution to problem in OEEC.

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[1] Repeated to all NATO capitals and Heidelberg for Handy.

4. Agreed amend Part III, para 10, subpara IV, to cover all steels not just special steels, and agreed report shld suggest that NAT "comite of five" shld study problems in section on social policy.

5. Van Houtte proposed addition to section re increased social security, wording of which led to exchange with Monnet, who stated problem as one of bringing Belgium up to standards of others. Chairman suggested wording be "an adequate and broadly based system of social security fosters social stability and increased production," which was agreed.

6. Postponed consideration sections on internal security and EPU until agreed working group draft cld be circulated. (Working group agreed draft at 4 : 00 a. m. this morning.)

7. Chairman mentioned that section on balance payments called for wise and timely action by US. Mentioned that question of Canadian deficit with US cld be discussed bilaterally outside comite. Wilgress proposed mention in para 30 of expenditures of Canadian forces in Eur, which was agreed. Also agreed between Chairman and Wilgress that Canadian and US military shld be urged to seek all feasible ways of purchasing needed supplies for forces in Eur from Eur sources.

8. Re offshore procurement, Kristensen asked whether adequate machinery existed to see that prompt action was taken. Stated Denmark had attempted discuss with DPB after Danish review by TCC, but was told was too early to discuss details. Chairman expressed hope military and civilian supply and production side of NATO cld be so strengthened matter cld be facilitated there. Until organization strengthened, best way to make progress is for US to deal bilaterally with others. Upon return to States wld do everything possible to see that civilian and military missions work together to get on as fast as possible with program, pending putting in more multilateral setting.

9. Agreed on Monnet suggestion that govts especially US, be requested report on specific steps taken to speed up offshore procurement action when commenting on TCC report. Agreed request such reports by govts on actions taken pursuant para 20 of "summary of findings" (Part I) to be made to TCC at pre-Lisbon meeting.

10. No discussion "longer term implications," except observation by Bonnet that he may later offer elaboration last para dealing with maintenance problem.

11. Re para 1, Part IV, Belgium strongly argued for omitting "generally" in TCC recommendation that SCS standards and recommendations be generally followed. Chairman, supported by Neths and France, stated understood cld not be accepted by some countries on that basis and favored retention, on grounds not unduly weakening and realistic. Agreed. Substitute for last eight lines, commenting on SCS standards for combat units and level of equipment prepared in collaboration with SHAPE staff, agreed.

12. Portugal, in commenting on proposal change terms reference NATO commands to estab equipment priorities, hoped there wld be some priorities for Portugal and offered to place Port ground forces under SACEUR for training purposes. Discussion indicated that question shld be handled in MC.

13. Re Part V, Hirschfield indicated great sympathy with general discussion NATO reorganization, but requested fuller statement views of EB re top civilian organization. Pointed out were proposing strengthening military commands and appointing director general, thus requiring clarification top civil continuing body. He favored strengthening Deps by creating Council of Ministers which cld meet frequently and deal with entire range of NATO problems.

14. Kristensen backed a Council of Ministers replacing Deps. Proposed TCC request govts for comments to be discussed in TCC meeting pre-Lisbon so TCC cld provide specific recommendations for action by Council then.

15. Chairman stated had had opportunity discuss problem several times with reps of number of govts. Sensed a general recognition of govts of need to strengthen NATO and its work. However, if TCC tries to be too precise in its recommendations now, wld find it difficult to agree, since there are several different approaches under consideration. Doubted that TCC was best body to work this out and believed TCC shld leave open to govts to refer to TCC if they wish. Agreed action shld, if possible, be taken at Lisbon. Preferred say nothing specific in TCC report about Deps, pointing out they will be hard at work before Lisbon in reconciling govt positions on wide range of problems. Wilgress cited action Council at Rome, asking Deps to report at Lisbon on NATO reorganization.

16. Chairman believed preferable for Pearson as Chairman Council to take leadership on method of considering reorganization. Since need govt agreements he wld be in better position to arrange. TCC not in best position to assume responsibility, but agreed shld be some action before Lisbon or nothing will be done there. Monnet stated that all TCC work wld be wasted if no reorganization. Suggested matter be kept open for discussion in closed meeting of 12 Ministers alone this afternoon. Agreed.

17. Closed meeting now in progress.

740.5/12–1751 : Telegram

The United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, December 17, 1951—4 p. m.

Repna circular 14. Usdel Tcc 84. This cable reports TCC mtg 11 a. m., December 17.

1. TCC approved summary of findings revised to eliminate ref to country recommendations. Number of minor changes agreed in session. EB authorized to draft final wording on several points.

2. TCC approved revised foreword, with fol text:

"In accordance with the directive of the North Atlantic Council at its mtg on the 19th September last, the temporary comite of the council transmits the fol report.

"In their consideration of the problems remitted to the comite the twelve national reps have regarded themselves as members of a team working towards a solution of the over-all military, polit and econ problems of NATO as a whole, rather than as dels acting on detailed instructions from their govts. It fols from this that the recommendations made in this report cannot be regarded as constituting governmental commitments. It also fols that effective action on the lines proposed by the comite will depend on acceptance and implementation by individual govts.

"The report has been approved by the TCC on the fol understanding:

"(*a*) The body of the report contained in parts 1 thru 5 is recommended for acceptance by the North Atlantic Treaty org and member governments. The principles and method of approach of the recommended plan of action and the major findings of the comite are summarized in part 1. The quantitative estimates in parts 2 and 3 rest on a series of assumptions as regards the actions of individual member govts which do not constitute commitments of govts or necessarily of individual members of the comite.

"(*b*) The annexes relating to def efforts of individual member countries in relation to their politico-econ capabilities which are contained in part 6, are submitted to member govts for their consideration.

"(*c*) The report of the screening and costing staff of the TCC is a Cosmic TopSec annex to this report; as indicated in para 1 of part 4, the SCS report is recommended for the urgent attention of member countries and NAT agencies.

"(*d*) The special attention of member govts and NAT agencies is directed to para 20, part 1, setting forth recommendations for immediate action.

"The comite proposes to prepare a supplementary report for consideration by the North Atlantic Council at its meeting in Lisbon on

[1] Repeated to Ottawa, Heidelberg for Handy, and London for Gifford, Spofford, Kibler, and Batt.

2nd February, 1952. The comite accordingly requests each member govt to forward its comments on the present report, including in particular the annex in part 6 concerning action by it. These comments shld be sent as soon as possible, and in any case not later than 15th January, 1952 to the Secretary of the Temporary Council Comite, 2 Rue de la Faisanderie, Paris 16th.

"This report is also being referred to the Mil Comite in accordance with the decision of the North Atlantic Council at its Rome meeting."

3. TCC meets again at 3, which cld be final session.

740.5/12–1751 : Telegram

The United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, December 17, 1951—8 p. m.

Repna circ 15. From Harriman Usdel Tcc No. 85. This cable reports TCC mtg 3 p. m. Dec 17.

1. TCC concluded this series of mtgs by agreeing to report with minor changes. As Belgs suggestion replaced clause in foreword "report has been approved by TCC on the fol understanding" with "TCC has agreed to report on the fol basis".

Foreword otherwise unchanged.

2. Chairman will give out communiqué at his press conf tomorrow.[2]

3. TCC agreed that working group of EB wld meet in Paris to prepare material for EB mtg prior to TCC mtg. Mtg will be called by chairman, who will decide time and place. Indicated Paris preferable any TCC mtg. Mtg will be time not later than Jan 29.[3]

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[1] Repeated to Ottawa and to Heidelberg for Handy.

[2] Harriman's press statement was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Repto 6294 from Paris, December 18 (740.5/12–1851).

[3] In a personal report for Nash, Lovett, and Bradley, Colonel Lincoln concluded that the "closing sessions of TCC have been a success entirely due to chairman whose personal efforts have forced agreement on draft report in EB and whose suggestions and leadership during four-day final session have overcome antagonisms and misunderstandings, turning the twelve ministers into a very effective working team on the final draft." (Department of Defense telegram DA IN 10964 from Paris, December 18; Military cable files, lot 52–246, TCC, 1951)

740.5/12–1751

Briefing Memorandum Prepared for the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, December 17, 1951.]

SUMMARY OF THE TEMPORARY COUNCIL COMMITTEE REPORT

The Temporary Council Committee was created to reconcile NATO military requirements with national politico-economic capabilities. The Committee worked in two directions: screening down requirements and building up country contributions where possible. The Executive Bureau of TCC submitted a draft report on December 9 for consideration by TCC beginning December 14. A U.S. position is required on various recommendations, including expression by JCS on revised force requirements. Early U.S. action is essential to tie in recommendations with 1953 aid program estimates.

Force Requirements

Screening and Costing Staff of TCC has developed revised program of forces build-up, based on country submissions, reviews of country efforts, MC 26/1, and consultation with SHAPE. Proposes force standards and targets for end of 1952, 1953 and 1954. Recommends that 1952 targets be accepted as firm for planning purposes—those for 1953 and 1954 be regarded as provisional.

One major aim of SCS recommendations (in accordance with Eisenhower desire for maximum effective force at earliest possible date) is to provide force by end of 1952 which, while inadequate, will be combat-worthy and will have considerable deterrent effect. To this end, proposes increase in effective divisions available M plus 30 from 34 at present to 54 and ⅔ at end 1952. Increase in aircraft from 2907 to 4230 during same period. Believes these goals can be met if other recommendations in report are adopted.

SCS schedule contemplates continued build-up to 69⅓ divisions, 7005 aircraft by end 1953 and to 86⅔ divisions, and 9965 aircraft by end 1954. These final 1954 figures compare with MC 26–1 recommendations of 98 divisions and 9285 aircraft. Naval build-up (virtually non-existent for 1952) would increase from present M-Day strength of 361 major and 359 small vessels to 402 large and 447 small by end 1954. This compares with MC 26/1 requirements of 642 large and 752 small vessels by 1954. Thus the SCS exercise resulted in general reduction of requirements.

[1] As noted on the cover sheet which was attached to the source text, this memorandum was prepared by the staff of the Office of European Regional Affairs. During the Secretary of State's daily meeting of December 17, he mentioned that he did not fully understand the summary of the "Harriman report" (presumably the source text). During the regular staff meeting on the following day, the Secretary again expressed his desire for some clarification on the TCC report and plans were made for a briefing to be given by Martin that afternoon. No record of this briefing has been found in the Department of State files.

Divisions visualized by SCS will be equipped and maintained on "austerity" basis but with assumption of full combat-readiness at times indicated. Total four-year European costs of build-up estimated at 73.9 billion dollars, as compared 92.7 billion costs estimated prior SCS screening.

Expenditures and Financial Shortfall

The report recommends that European (including Germany) defense expenditures through the FY's 52–54 be raised $2.8 billions, along with a Canadian increase of $.7 billions. The total proposed increase would provide $41.8 billions of NATO financing, exclusive of U.S., to meet the revised European requirements costed at $66.5 billions. This three-year program of military expenditure would require $7 billions to meet dollar balance of payments needs, and is considered the maximum feasible political economic effort without semi- or full emergency mobilization.

European expenditures of $41.8 billions plus U.S. end item assistance of $18.6 leaves a financial shortfall of $6.1 to be met. However, programmed European production of $7.6 plus U.S. end-items leaves an equipment gap of $11.6. The report indicates that the European overfinancing of costs other than major equipment could go in part to support additional production, but intimates that the major portion would be needed to finance qualitative improvement in troop programs. A residual equipment gap of around $10 billion can be expected which can only be met by increased U.S. military assistance. This gap would be negligible in FY '52, but around $5 billion each in FY '53 and FY '54.

Production and Supply

The Defense Production Staff estimates that the annual maintenance and replacement cost of major equipment for the five years after 1954 may well exceed $4 billions. Since programmed European production of major items will only reach $3.4 billion in FY 1954 there is urgent need to immediately expand the European productions base. The report recommends extensive use of U.S. off-shore procurement. It also underlines the need for NATO logistical plans which will ensure the allocation of produced equipment to meet on a priority basis the most urgent troop needs. And further, the fulfillment of the equipment plan would require a favorable priority for NATO in distribution of U.S. production.

Economic Conditions

The Executive Bureau report assumes that the European NATO countries have the economic capabilities to meet the revised military

targets on schedule. However, this assumption is predicated upon the following conditions:

1. An over-all increase of GNP of about 14%, providing a basis for a 5.7 billion increase in defense expenditures over 4 year period, and leaving a balance allowing for a 7–8% increase in consumption over same period. (The Executive Bureau considers this possible on basis of present facts.)
2. The provisions of an adequate supply of raw materials and sources of energy. Report urges special attention to critical coal problem, and also emphasizes to lesser degree the current steel and electricity shortages.
3. Solution of the manpower problem. Report recommends special attention to migration of labor, especially from Italy.
4. Equitable allocation of basic raw materials at stable prices.
5. Internal measures to halt inflation.
6. Achievement of dollar balance of payments. Report concludes continuation present level of economic aid, plus expanded off-shore procurement, plus U.S. expenditures in Europe for infra structure, bases and military supplies can solve this problem.
7. Continued effective functioning of EPU.

The Report notes that, even after defense build-up, continuing cost of maintenance will be heavy burden for Europeans, and urges decisions now which will enable them to meet burden at later date. Believes expansion of off-shore procurement will assist in building long-term armament industry capable of sustaining forces in future, and regards general GNP expansion as essential condition of future maintenance.

Military Conditions

TCC recommends two types of measures as essential military conditions for fulfillment revised program. First aims at achieving maximum immediate standards of readiness through such means as increasing personnel on active duty, improving training of specialists, improvement of training techniques, allocation of equipment in terms of potential combat-readiness, etc. Second aims at maximum economy in use of resources, with countries using SCS screening criteria as guidance, setting military priorities in terms recommendations NATO commanders, keeping forces in balance, and avoiding expenditures not essential to NATO plans.

NATO Organization

TCC draft report indicates improvement of NATO operation is essential to fulfillment of its other recommendations. Believes inadequacies in organization have delayed government decisions both on policies and technical matters and have been important factor in limiting progress toward defense goals. Also points out that shift in emphasis toward "most rapid practical build-up of effective combat

forces" makes it necessary that NATO organization structure be modified to provide more emphasis on operations rather than planning.

Report makes two specific recommendations re organization: (1) appointment of a Director-General of NATO to head an international planning and coordinating staff and execute decisions reached by governments through Council and Council Deputies; (2) The institution of an annual re-analysis of defense plans and capabilities along lines of TCC procedure, in order to provide periodic readjustments. In addition, report suggests that many other readjustments may be necessary in NATO structure, including improved machinery for prompt reconciliation of government differences, which might involve improvement of Council Deputies set-up as well as DPB and FEB. At same time, report recognizes sudden, wholesale reorganization would interrupt progress and recommends appropriate time-phasing.

B. TOUR OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION CAPITALS AND GERMANY BY THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE[1]

740.5/12-2950 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices[2]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 29, 1950—8 p. m.

325. Genl Gruenther today conveyed fol info to Standing Grp [3] and Accredited Reps of NAT countries (Iceland had no rep present at Gruenther mtgs today) concerning Genl Eisenhower's trip to Europe and estab of SHAPE. You may wish to make this info available orally to govt to which you accredited.

1. Genl Eisenhower plans leave US Jan 5 or 6 for quick survey trip to Eur. Purpose of trip is to orient himself with problems facing Supreme Commander and raise with countries any matters which

[1] At its Sixth Session at Brussels, December 18–19, 1950, the North Atlantic Council completed arrangements for the establishment of an integrated European defense force under a Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). At the request of the Council, President Truman made available General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower to serve as SACEUR while at the same time assuming operational command of all U.S. forces in the European area. On December 19 General Eisenhower named Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther as his Chief of Staff and announced his intention of making a preliminary trip to France in January 1951 and of establishing his headquarters (SHAPE) somewhere near Paris soon thereafter. For documentation on the designation of General Eisenhower as SACEUR, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

[2] This telegram was sent to Brussels, Ottawa, Copenhagen, Paris, The Hague, Oslo, Rome, Lisbon, and London and was repeated to Reykjavik and Luxembourg. This telegram was drafted by European Regional Affairs Deputy Director MacArthur. The numbered paragraphs of this telegram are virtually identical with paragraphs 2–13 of a memorandum of December 29, 1950, from SHAPE Chief of Staff Designate Lieutenant General Gruenther to Assistant Secretary of State Perkins. (740.5/12-2950)

[3] The executive agency of the North Atlantic Council Military Committee, located in Washington, composed of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, United Kingdom, and France.

appear appropriate at time. He will proceed directly to Paris where SHAPE Advance Planning Grp has been estab in Hotel Astoria. It is Genl Eisenhower's hope to be able to visit all NATO countries this trip but schedule will not be completed until late Jan. 2.[4]

2. Genl Eisenhower is studying structure of command which he shld have in SHAPE org. One proposed plan contemplates a CINC North, CINC Central, and CINC South. A second plan proposes there be a CINC North and CINC South with the Central sector directly under SHAPE's command. A third solution wld place all major units initially under SHAPE, deferring until later date ques of estab of CINC's. Genl Eisenhower has formed no tentative views as to which of these solutions is preferable or even whether there may be better solution not yet being considered. One of purposes his visit to Eur will be to secure any suggestions various Chiefs of Staff might care to offer on this matter.

3. Genl Eisenhower is also studying the org of HQ but no decision on that matter will be made until command structure is determined.

4. There have been speculations in press as to designation of subordinate commanders and of senior staff officers in SHAPE. All these are without foundation. Genl Eisenhower has all these matters under consideration but will retain an open mind on them until he has made his trip.

5. Genl Eisenhower has a small grp of Amer officers in Hotel Astoria headed by Col Thurston, studying problems outlined above. This in no sense a staff altho it is probable some of the officers in this small grp will become part of staff when organized.

6. In DC 24/3[5] provision was made that when SHAPE HQ is organized liaison officers shld be accredited to SHAPE by those nations which will have forces earmarked for or allocated to SHAPE

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[4] Circular telegram 330, January 2, to all NATO capitals except Reykjavik, reported the tentatively approved itinerary for General Eisenhower's forthcoming trip to Europe. The telegram observed that Eisenhower's very tight time schedule would not permit a series of meetings with individual officials in each capital and expressed the hope that arrangements could be made for him to call on the Chief of State and to limit himself to another single meeting at which appropriate defense and cabinet officials would be present. Although Eisenhower had expressed a willingness to hold press conferences in each capital if so requested, he did not wish to give the impression that he was seeking publicity. (740.5/1–251) Circular telegram 356, January 6, to all NATO capitals, drafted by MacArthur, stated that, while General Eisenhower would of course wish to consult with the Chiefs of Mission and to keep them informed of what transpired at his meetings with NATO Chiefs of State and appropriate foreign officials, it would be an error to have the Chiefs of Mission accompany Eisenhower when he made his calls. It was felt that such a procedure would negate Eisenhower's international stature as Supreme Allied Commander and could be exploited by Communist propaganda. Eisenhower concurred in that view. (740.5/1–651)

[5] The reference here is to a NATO Defense Committee paper (DC 24/3), December 12, 1950, dealing with NATO command structure, which was approved by the North Atlantic Council on December 18, 1950, as document C 6–D/7 at the Council's Fifth Session in Brussels. Regarding DC 24/3, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, p. 548; see also footnote 6, p. 70.

(this probably does not apply to Portugal since they are earmarking no forces for SHAPE). Altho space in Astoria Paris is limited, arrangements can be made to accommodate liaison reps any time after Jan 4. It is suggested that initially these officers be grade of col, or not to exceed brigadier, altho it is recognized that liaison officers who are finally designated will probably be of higher rank. Col Anthony J Drexel Biddle has been designated to work with these liaison officers and will be in Paris by 5 Jan or shortly thereafter. It is anticipated arrangements for securing officers who will be on SHAPE internatl staff when organized will be made thru liaison officers.

(*Note:* In SG mtg Tedder brought out that under terms of para 40*c*, Port and Ice wld not be entitled to send natl liaison officers to SHAPE since they will have no forces allocated to SHAPE. MacVeagh shld therefore not discuss or make any commitment re Por liaison officer.)

7. Genl Eisenhower's sched for NATO trip will be tight. He is most eager to avoid ceremonies and social affairs but give impression he is on a business trip. Within few days small public relations grp headed by Col Frank Dorn will proceed to Eur to work out public relations details. It is hoped Col Dorn will be assisted by NATO Info Service headed by Newton. It is anticipated that details of press conferences and similar matters will be responsibility of host govt in each capital and that Col Dorn and Newton will assist in every practicable manner.

8. Genl Eisenhower coming to Wash on 2 Jan for conferences. It is his plan that as soon as trip completed he will return to US to wind up his affairs at Columbia after which he will return to Eur.

9. Genl Eisenhower has not selected any site for SHAPE HQ. Col Brown who was his HQ Commandant at SHAEF in World War II is now in Astoria studying various areas from tech standpoint to ascertain which are suitable. Among sites being considered are Fontainebleau, Versailles, Rheims, Compiegne, Orleans, Lond, and others. Not even tentative decision has been reached on this point and none will be made by Genl Eisenhower until he has had opportunity to study problem more thoroughly.

10. It is important that psych impact of Genl Eisenhower's arrival in Eur be correct one and his assts here are giving much thought to that problem.

11. Date of assumption of command by Genl Eisenhower was raised in a ques. Reply given was that Genl Eisenhower has no staff yet and that he therefore does not have means to exercise command and that some interim command arrangement will be made.

13.[6] SG and Mil Reps were asked to submit any suggestions they might have in connection with proposed trip, command structure, and

[6] There was no paragraph 12 in the source text.

org of HQ. All indicated agreement with arrangements in progress and expressed high hopes for new command.

ACHESON

740.5/1–551 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 5, 1951—6 p. m.

354. Personal for Chief of Mission, from the Secretary. Gen Eisenhower and I had a long and very satisfactory discussion yesterday on where we stand with respect to the NAT and how best we shld proceed to implement it.[2] We are in full agreement on objectives and how best to go about the task. We have now reached the stage where we must translate plans into action if our whole effort to develop adequate defensive strength in Eur, which is the foundation of free world strength, is not to bog down. The principal task of the US is to give the necessary leadership, assistance, and direction, and to galvanize the Eur countries into action so that they will press forward and make the necessary effort and sacrifices essential if we are to deter aggression or contain it shld it occur. The Eur countries must be convinced that the task is within their capacities and their enthusiasm must be aroused for getting the job done.

We are in full agreement that our tactics in bringing other countries along with us must not consist simply in constant pressure and warnings that others must do more. We must, if we are to succeed, not only exert continuing influence on the Europeans to do what is necessary, but we must also by encouragement and by the example of our actions, establish firmly in their minds that the task is manageable and that the US is determined to press forward and do its utmost if the Europeans make a full and equal effort.

The US is most fortunate in obtaining the services of Gen Eisenhower for this great mission. His task however is formidable and he can only succeed if we all give him whole-hearted and all-out support. This I know you will do and have so informed him.

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram was personally drafted and signed by Secretary Acheson. It was sent to the Missions in the capitals of the other NATO nations and to Frankfurt for HICOG.

[2] According to the Secretary's calendar of appointments, General Eisenhower was scheduled to call on the Secretary on the morning of January 4. No formal memorandum of this conversation has been found in the files of the Department of State. The brief account of this meeting in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 493, indicates that General Gruenther accompanied General Eisenhower. The Secretary's "presentation" summarized in that account appears to be a summary of the substance of the memorandum printed *infra*.

740.5/1–551

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State for the President [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 5, 1951.

Subject: Outline of Secretary Acheson's Presentation of North Atlantic Treaty Problems to General Eisenhower on January 4, 1951.

A. *Background of the Development of the North Atlantic Treaty.*

At the conclusion of World War II, despite the major social, political, and economic dislocations which had occurred, it was hoped that the unity of purpose and of effort which the allies had shown in working together during the war would result in a peaceful era of reconstructions, and particularly that the Soviet Union would cooperate to this end and with the democratic powers.

This hope, which was shared by all democratic powers, was illusory because of the attitude and policy of the Soviet Union, which soon made it clear through its overt actions, and indirectly through the acts of various Communist Parties that it was bent upon a policy of ruthless expansion aimed at world domination.

Furthermore, the possibility of such expansion was made easier because the social, political, and economic dislocations in Western European countries, which have a highly developed and complex structure, were much greater than the dislocations within the more primitive and totalitarian organism of the Soviet Union, and the elimination of two great powers—Germany and Japan—had greatly increased the relative world strength of the Soviets.

It became apparent that to resist these Soviet efforts to cause the disintegration of the Western European countries, economic stability must be reestablished. This was a prerequisite of social and political

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[1] This memorandum, which was drafted by Douglas MacArthur II, was transmitted to President Truman under cover of the following brief communication of January 5 from Secretary of State Acheson:

"As you requested when I saw you yesterday at 12:30, I attach an outline of my presentation to General Eisenhower on the problem of how we must proceed in implementing the North Atlantic Treaty so that we can develop the necessary defensive strength to deter aggression or to contain it should it occur.

"You might find this of some value in your meeting with the General tomorrow."

Secretary Acheson attended a Cabinet meeting at the White House at 12:30 p. m., January 4. Earlier that day, the Secretary had conferred with General Eisenhower; see telegram 354, January 5, *supra*. Regarding Eisenhower's meeting with President Truman on January 6, see the editorial note, p. 400.

The memorandum printed here follows the lines of a January 3, 1951, "Outline for General Briefing of General Eisenhower," prepared by MacArthur, which Assistant Secretary Perkins transmitted to Lucius D. Battle on January 3 together with a copy of a briefing book prepared in the Department of State for the Eisenhower party on NATO military, production, and financial planning and an undated memorandum by MacArthur on the possible designation of a political adviser for General Eisenhower. The entire dossier, less the briefing book, which is not printed, bears the marginal notation "Sec saw." (740.5/1–251) For portions of the briefing book, see pp. 1 and 460.

stability and hence of the maintenance of democracy in these countries.

When it became clear that our immediate post-war relief measures were not sufficient, the Marshall Plan was adopted to build the necessary economic strength to insure the preservation of democratic systems.

While the Marshall Plan resulted in great strides toward economic stability in Western Europe, it was not in itself sufficient to create the necessary defensive strength or to allay the paralyzing fear psychosis which prevailed as a result of the complete defenselessness of the area.

In the face of this situation, the United States took leadership in formulating the North Atlantic Treaty. This Treaty is not simply a military treaty, but is a vehicle for closer political, economic, and security cooperation in the North Atlantic community. *It is a most fundamental part of our foreign policy*, and with the Inter-American Treaty it is the foundation of our security system. The North Atlantic Treaty is of the utmost importance because while it is technically limited to the North Atlantic area, the Treaty countries actually exercise some control over a vast bulk of the strength of the free world. What happens in Western Europe has direct political and economic repercussions in Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, and Latin America.

For these reasons, the North Atlantic Treaty, if effectively implemented, would strengthen the ability of the entire free world to resist Soviet aggression.

B. *Where the North Atlantic Treaty Stands Today.*

The first fifteen months of the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty have been spent largely in creating the necessary organizational structure and developing plans. The time has now come, however, when plans must be translated into action. While all the other Treaty countries sincerely believe in the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty, they have not shown the same sense of urgency as has the United States since Korea.

The principal task of the United States is to give the necessary leadership, assistance, and direction to this great collective effort and to galvanize the European countries into action so that they will press forward and, without undermining their basic economic stability, which is essential, will nonetheless make the necessary effort and sacrifices which are important if we are to develop adequate strength to deter aggression or successfully to contain it should it occur.

This is a most difficult but fundamental task, for we cannot be successful in our effort to redress the balance of military strength unless the other North Atlantic Treaty members are willing to make effort and sacrifice comparable to ours.

Our tactics in bringing the other countries along with us must not consist simply in constant pressure and warnings that others must do

more. We must—if we are to succeed—set the example by our actions and establish firmly in the minds of the Europeans our determination to proceed to the building of adequate strength, which is the best hope for peace.

C. *Views of the North Atlantic Treaty Countries Toward the United States.*

The North Atlantic Treaty countries fully recognize that United States leadership is essential. They believe that the necessary defensive strength, however, can only be attained if the United States makes full and active contribution.

At the same time, they fear the inconstancy of United States purpose in Europe. They believe that we are prone to arrive at sudden conclusions, that we try to push too rapidly ahead without fully thinking through our policy, and that we are inclined to abandon projects which do not show immediate signs of succeeding. These European fears and apprehensions can only be overcome if we move forward with determination and if we make the necessary full and active contribution both in terms of military forces and economic aid.

If we pursue this course, we will be in a much better position to exercise pressure on the Europeans to do what is necessary. In other words, it is our example, rather than threats and warnings, which will induce them to move ahead at the same pace with us.

There is also a belief that the United States is more prone to adopt an aggressive attitude toward the Soviet Union than is wise. They are very apprehensive about the situation in the Far East and are inclined to doubt that there is the necessary coordination between our military in Korea and the policy of the United States Government.

D. *Differences between Northern and Southern European Treaty Countries.*

The Northern European countries consisting of the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands, have only small Communist Parties, and therefore have to deal with a relatively minor internal Communist threat. These countries are law-abiding and have sound governmental structures, with the result that they are in a better position to establish the controls necessary for an all-out defense effort. In general, their public credit and internal financing is good, or at least sufficient to permit sound financing of a considerable part of their defense effort. They have been reluctant to make an all-out effort because their policies have heretofore placed greater emphasis on social advancement rather than on security. While it has thus far been difficult to get them to undertake as effective programs, it is believed that they are now prepared to face up to reality.

The Southern European North Atlantic Treaty countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, and Portugal), by very reason of their

latin nature, suffer from emotional, political, and social instability. They are prone to swing from over-optimism to deep pessimism, depending on how they view the situation of the immediate present. They have strong Communist Parties which exercise a corrosive influence on national morale. They are more subject to the desire to be "neutral". Despite this, their governments have a real desire to move ahead in the building up of the necessary strength.

If the proper leadership is exercised by the United States, it should be possible to get them to take the steps which are necessary. The general public in these countries is inclined to be apathetic now because of their defenseless condition and because of doubts that adequate strength can ever be achieved. If they see real progress and if the plans of the Soviet Union, which are an unknown quantity, give time, it is believed that as North Atlantic Treaty strength starts building up there will be real public support of our common effort with the attendant willingness to make sacrifices which at present they are reluctant to do because they are not convinced that the sacrifices will result in the attainment of the goal.

E. *Germany.*

It is of the greatest importance that we adopt a policy which will tie Germany in solidly with the West. It is also most important that Germany contribute to the collective defense of the West. However, the great publicity over the question of German participation in Western defense has had an adverse effect within Germany, and has perhaps tended to exaggerate in the eyes of the Germans the importance of the immediate German contribution. This places the Germans in a bargaining position where they can attempt to fix maximum and even unreasonable conditions. We should proceed with our plans to integrate Germany solidly with the West so that it can be a fellow-member of the democratic community, and let the rearmament of Germany follow as a normal part of this process.

This procedure, coupled with the build-up of real North Atlantic Treaty defensive strength in Europe, will provide a much greater inducement than efforts first to have Germany make a military contribution.

F. *Conclusions.*

General Eisenhower is in a unique position to galvanize all of Western Europe into action. The Europeans have no confidence in the ability of international committees or councils to take effective action, and they subconsciously wish to give their support to an outstanding individual in whom they have trust and confidence. Despite this, General Eisenhower faces a most difficult and formidable task, and his mission can only succeed if the United States is willing to make the necessary effort and sacrifices and to give him full support.

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At the present time, in terms of the security and indeed the survival of the United States, there is no alternative but to press ahead with our program of building adequate collective defensive strength. We must proceed on this course, for if we do not, Western Europe, with its tremendous manpower and industrial potential, will disintegrate and rapidly fall within the Soviet orbit. This in turn will result in Africa and the Middle East rapidly following, with obvious implications in terms of the American Republics. In other words, if we do not press ahead, we risk standing alone in a world whose manpower and resources are dominated by the Soviet Union and aimed at our destruction.

Editorial Note

On January 6 President Truman and General Eisenhower conferred at the White House. Following the conference, for which no formal record has been found, the President's Press Secretary issued the following statement:

"The President discussed the whole world situation this morning with General Eisenhower. In this conversation the President made it plain to General Eisenhower that he had the wholehearted backing of the United States and the President also expressed himself as being certain that General Eisenhower had the same sort of backing from the other 11 [NATO] nations.

It was stressed in the talk between the President and General Eisenhower that this is an organization for the peace, security and tranquility of the world." (Department of State Wireless Bulletin, No. 6, January 6, 1951)

Following his meeting with President Truman, General Eisenhower conferred with W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President. Later in the day on January 6, President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Marshall, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other top officials of the State and Defense Departments, and diplomatic representatives from the other 11 North Atlantic Treaty nations participated in a ceremony of full military honors for General Eisenhower at the airport prior to his departure by plane for Europe.

General Eisenhower, accompanied by his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Gruenther, European Regional Affairs Deputy Director Douglas MacArthur II, and a small staff, carried out his planned 3-week tour of capitals of NATO nations and Germany during the period January 7–26. The General's itinerary was as follows: Paris, January 7–8; Brussels, January 9–10; The Hague, January 10; Copenhagen, January 11; Oslo, January 12; London, January 13–16; Lisbon, January 16–17; Rome, January 18; Luxembourg, January 19; Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Darmstadt, and Bad Homburg, January 20–22;

Paris, January 23; Reykjavik, January 24–25; Ottawa, January 26; New York, January 27. The documentation that follows includes the principal reports about the General's tour as transmitted through Department of State channels and certain related reports and exchanges. Regarding General Eisenhower's reports to the President, the Congress, and the American people upon his return to the United States, see the editorial notes, pages 449 and 458.

740.5/1–951 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Embassy in Belgium[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY FRANKFURT, January 9, 1951—11 a. m

95. Urgent for General Eisenhower, Hotel Astoria, Paris. Feel strongly that failure to visit Germany would seriously and adversely affect developments here.[2] Not to do so would (1) depress spirits here where they most need strengthening due to weight and imminence of Soviet pressure, (2) prejudice an idea that Western European force was designed to defend Germany as well as areas west of Rhine, (3) accent Communist propaganda now at full blast here to effect that you have refused to shake hands with Germans and are disdainful of them.[3] Besides, this is where the bulk of your command is and it seems rather artificial to me for you to call commanders out of Germany and away from their commands when you are making such extensive visits elsewhere. If you had stayed in one place and called upon others to visit you there, it would have been a different story but to blank out Germany now would be too pointed. We can emphasize the character of your visit as one to your command; stay away from Bonn and political comments; have in a few Germans at informal gathering at my home, together with others, and I believe there will be no unfortunate repercussions anywhere and substantial help will be given here. Have talked this over with Handy who fully agrees and points out

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, to Heidelberg for General Handy, and to the Department of State, the source text printed here.

[2] General Eisenhower's tentatively approved itinerary of January 2 provided for a visit to Frankfurt, January 21–23. In a personal message to Secretary Acheson (Army message DTG 082345Z, January 8, from Paris), which was repeated to High Commissioner McCloy at Frankfurt, General Eisenhower stated the following:

"I am becoming increasingly doubtful of the advisability of visiting Germany at this time. My doubts are based on the adverse propaganda surrounding the question of German rearmament. As alternative would plan on meeting the three Allied commanders at some designated point outside Germany, probably Paris."

In his brief message, the General went on to acknowledge that there might be other considerations, and he asked for an expression of Secretary Acheson's views and those as well of McCloy. (740.5/1–951)

[3] For information on Eisenhower's attitude toward the German officer corps, see Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, pp. 156–157.

that announcement has already appeared in *Stars and Stripes* [4] and German papers that you are to visit Germany.

McCloy

[4] Unofficial newspaper of the U.S. Army, published daily in Germany for American occupation forces.

740.5/1–951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY Washington, January 9, 1951—8 p. m.

3620. Personal for Eisenhower from Acheson. Have considered question of advisability of visit by you to Germany at this time with benefit McCloy's views [2] which you will have received. I agree in general with McCloy that there is no need to avoid visit with HICOM and troop commanders in Germany and that benefit may result from trip. On the other hand failure to make such a visit might be interpreted as indication we view German participation problem with greater delicacy than it now warrants, especially now that the Allies have agreed that Germany may participate in Western defense.[3]

Assume, in taking above position, that McCloy has concurrence his French and British colleagues on desirability your visit. Request he confirm this fact direct to you with copy here.[4]

Acheson

[1] This telegram, drafted by German Affairs Director Byroade, was cleared with Secretary Acheson and repeated to Frankfurt for High Commissioner McCloy and to Brussels for Ambassador Murphy.

[2] See telegram 95, *supra*.

[3] Telegram 3900, January 14, from London, for Secretary Acheson from Lieutenant General Gruenther, repeated to McCloy at Frankfurt and Handy at Heidelberg, began as follows:

"After receipt of McCloy's 5542 January 9 to Department [same as Frankfurt telegram 95, *supra*] and your subsequent message about visiting Germany [printed here] General Eisenhower said 'okay, okay, okay'."

The balance of the message dealt with travel arrangements for the visit to Germany and the remainder of the General's European tour. (740.5/1–1451)

[4] In his telegram 5752, January 13, from Frankfurt, McCloy stated that the Eisenhower visit to Germany had been discussed with both French and British High Commissioners who expressed agreement (740.5/1–1351).

740.5/1–1051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Murphy) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY Brussels, January 10, 1951—10 a. m.

1129. From MacArthur. General Eisenhower called on Pleven, Schuman and Moch January 8 and subsequently met with French

[1] This telegram was repeated to London for Ambassador Spofford and to Paris for Ambassador Bruce. The Department of State was asked to pass this message to the Secretary of Defense.

defense officials. January 9 he called on Auriol and later visited Fontainebleau before taking off for Brussels. Following is résumé of his conversations:

1. *Pleven visit.*

Eisenhower expressed belief that his mission could succeed if each country made maximum contribution to collective effort. Pleven expressed gratitude to Eisenhower for accepting supreme command. He said General enjoys profound affection and respect in hearts of French and is considered as "a general of peace". Pleven then described problem of Communists and neutralists. He felt neutralists were perhaps even more dangerous since they were people of education and means and were type who collaborated during occupation. Communists also dangerous but there is difference between Communist leaders and Communist voters. Last group can be reduced very substantially if we are skillful in use of propaganda. We must convince them that our purpose is to establish a solid and efficient defense against aggression. Pleven said General Eisenhower's statement [2] had hit exactly right note and made excellent impression.

Pleven said present government or any other coalition which might succeed it prior to elections is assured of majority for all defense measures. Recent votes on rearmament justified this view. While vote on new taxes less satisfactory, success of government's plans is assured. In fact, large majority of French people approve measures taken by government for defense and situation in this respect is better than a year ago.[3]

General Eisenhower expressed confidence that if France and other countries willing make necessary effort, Europe can be defended.

Pleven agreed but pointed out difficulties which French Government faces. Indochina represents very heavy burden.[4] Pleven suggested to Attlee prior to Washington visit [5] that there be discreet high-level meetings concerning southeast Asia. He felt this idea should be reexamined and such discussions held. In connection with French defense effort Indochina has created serious personnel situation with respect to officers and non-commissioned officers. If it were not for Indochina France could move faster in creating divisions in Europe. Further-

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[2] At a press conference upon his arrival in Paris on January 7, General Eisenhower made a statement which included the well-publicized words:

" . . . there is power in our union—and resourcefulness on sea, land and air. Aroused and united, there is nothing which the nations of the Atlantic Community cannot achieve. Let those who might be tempted to put this power to the test ponder well the lessons of history. The cause of freedom can never be defeated." (Department of State *Wireless Bulletin*, No. 7, January 7, 1951)

[3] For documentation on the political situation in France, see volume IV.

[4] For detailed documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the situation in Indochina, see vol. VI, pp. 332 ff.

[5] British Prime Minister Attlee visited Washington in December 1950.

more, French financial problem complicated by Indochina. Despite this, France will do everything rapidly to build strength in Europe.

Another French difficulty is in military production field. France has qualified workmen and designers and hopes to obtain British and US support for French production but there have been delays for standardization and other reasons. General Eisenhower said he understood importance this problem. He did feel, however, that we should all make every effort to commence production of a maximum amount of good military equipment.

Eisenhower stated he had come to Europe to listen, learn and understand problems of different countries. Together, we must build necessary strength. We can achieve peace by fully developing strength that will engender confidence. While some believe that this may invite an attack before we are ready, there does not seem to be any other alternative if we are ever to attain security.

Pleven mentioned that many people feel German rearmament might be considered a provocation. Eisenhower replied he did not propose to discuss Germany now and that great harm had been done by too much talk on this subject.

Regarding SHAPE, General Eisenhower felt it essential that there be representation from all countries so that all would have feeling of common participation. Pleven agreed. He then said he was much disturbed by highly critical article in last issue of *Time*. He suggested that SHAPE might create some sort of information service to enlighten public opinion on effort and progress that would be made. Meeting concluded with usual exchange of amenities.

2. *Schuman.*

Schuman visit was brief with Schuman assuring General of his pleasure at Eisenhower appointment and his desire to support him in every way possible. There was no detailed discussion. Eisenhower reiterated view that problem of developing adequate collective strength for defense of Europe is manageable if each nation translates plans into effective action and demonstrates its tenacity of purpose.

3. *Moch.*

The preliminary meeting with Moch was very brief. Amenities were exchanged, during which Moch also mentioned his concern over *Time* article. Moch and Eisenhower then joined French defense officials.

4. *Meeting with defense officials.*

Detailed and highly classified aspects of French military plans were discussed. During discussion Eisenhower stressed necessity of getting on with job and translating plans into action.

5. *Auriol visit.*

After usual exchange amenities President Auriol expressed gratitude which France felt to Eisenhower for accepting command of forces of freedom. General Eisenhower had special place in hearts of French people who saw in him not only man of liberation of past but also man who would safeguard future. He then stated he would ask General Eisenhower to disregard comments which might appear concerning him in Communist press. They did not represent feelings of immense majority of Frenchmen. Also General Eisenhower would probably hear of the neutralists but neither they nor the Communists truly represented France. Immense majority of French people wished France firmly attached to United States, Great Britain and entire free world.

General Eisenhower then stated that in US we had isolationists who were kindred to neutralists in Europe. They, like neutralists, did not give us good press in some sectors. General Eisenhower was certain that the job could be done if all would put themselves to the task with firm resolution. It largely matter of heart, and if all put heart in it no doubt that success can be achieved.

Auriol then stated French people firmly determined to rearm. Recent votes which government had obtained indicated this was wish of 90 percent of the people. Only people who voted against were Communists on left and few De Gaullists on right who, while agreeing with program, voted against for political reasons. France had suffered much and twice in last half century had been battlefield of world. France must rebuild ruins of war: two million houses, industrial equipment which was looted by Germans, and overall economy. In doing this Marshall Plan had been of primary aid to France which would always be grateful to US. French were holding Indochina not for themselves but for free world. If this barrier fell Mao and Ho Chi-Minh would engulf Siam, Burma, Malaya and Indonesia. France would leave Indochina when there was peace. Auriol reiterated France's will to rearm and spoke of necessity of moving quickly but at same time using prudence to avoid a showdown before there was sufficient strength in the west. General Eisenhower stated when he returned to US to speak with members of government, Congress, and other bodies he would like to have concrete evidence of the French will to rearm.

Auriol said there were three important factors in France—the will to rearm, the will to unite, demonstration of which France had given in the Schuman Plan [6] and in the leadership of the movement for

[6] For documentation on the efforts of the United States to assure the successful negotiation of the Schuman Plan for a European Coal and Steel Community, see volume IV.

European unity. At same time France must be careful not push too hard and compromise her economy which would provide a fertile ground for the growth of Communist propaganda. Auriol added he knew General Eisenhower had technical conversations with French military and he would not touch on this. He stated that when General Eisenhower returns definitely he would like to have him to lunch and have a long talk with him at that time.

He concluded: "General Eisenhower, I give you my pledge as chief of the Republic that I will do everything in my power to mobilize the French Government and people behind you in what you are doing."

[MacArthur]
Murphy

740.5/1–1051: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Embassy in the Netherlands [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, January 10, 1951—2 p. m.

115. Eyes only for MacArthur. Suggest you pass following to Generals Eisenhower and Gruenther:

Following Generals' departure Paris yesterday French Government found to its consternation that neither Pleven nor Moch had discussed question French representation in NATO command structure. Apparently each expected the other to handle this matter, or that General Eisenhower might bring it up himself with them.

As you know, French had hoped one deputy might be their nationality as well as their supplying commander-in-chief troops of the western European regional group.[2] Of the two, they attach greater importance to the latter, asserting in view of fact they will furnish about one-half of presently proposed continental ground forces their

[1] This telegram was repeated to the Department of State, eyes only for Assistant Secretary of State Perkins. General Eisenhower and his party arrived in The Hague from Brussels on January 10.

[2] French Ambassador Bonnet called on Secretary of State Acheson on December 29, 1950, on instructions from his government to emphasize the importance which the French Government and people attached to adequate French participation in the command structure of the NATO integrated forces. Bonnet said that in view of the very substantial contributions which the French Government planned to make available to the NATO integrated force, the French Government believed that a French General should command the planned NATO European Central Theater. Bonnet also noted that the French attached importance to the projected position of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Ground Forces and felt that it would be logical for a French General to fill that post. Acheson explained that he had not yet had an opportunity to talk to General Eisenhower, but he knew that the General had made no decisions about NATO command structure and had a completely open mind on these questions. (Memorandum of conversation by MacArthur, December 29, 1950, 740.5/12–2950)

public opinion would never accept appointment to this command of other than French general and would overthrow any cabinet that was not persuasive enough to secure such appointment.

Perhaps only in France could it happen that certain local journalists and some politicians immediately assumed because General Eisenhower saw Marshal Montgomery twice during his French visit [3] General must therefore have offered Marshal two positions, namely, one as deputy and the other as commander western European regional group.

In any event, French have asked me to say that they hope that General will not make any commitment on second position before they present their point of view to him on this subject. When and where they would do so would depend on his wishes.

General Gruenther is familiar, I know, with General Juin's feelings about the necessity of his remaining in Morocco for some time.[4] The problem there is complex and potentially dangerous. Juin is undoubtedly the best man to try to resolve it. If he does so, he should be available to General Eisenhower if his services are desired in a few months. The French Government is fully aware that Juin is their best if not only satisfactory possibility for the new post under consideration and as I understand it would immediately release him from his Moroccan duties. Juin, however, feels an obligation to continue their exercise for the present.

If you can send me any advice in this regard, I would much appreciate it.[5]

BRUCE

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[3] No reports have been found regarding Eisenhower's conversations with Montgomery in Paris at this time.

[4] General Juin had apparently invited General Eisenhower to visit him in Rabat, Morocco. Regarding this possible visit, see the editorial note, *infra*.

[5] In telegram 162, January 11, from The Hague, repeated to the Department of State, General Gruenther advised the Embassy at Paris that it could inform the French verbally that Eisenhower had high regard for French military talent and that he intended to make the greatest possible use of it in filling positions in the integrated force command structure. Thus far, however, no commitments had been made. (740.5/1–1151)

Editorial Note

Telegram 59, January 8, from Rabat to Paris, repeated to the Department of State as 76, reported that an emissary from Sultan Sidi Mohammed of Morocco had requested Consul Robert H. McBride to ask the American Embassy in Paris to arrange with the French Foreign Ministry a call on the Sultan by General Eisenhower, in the event that the General visited Morocco as reported in the local press (740.5/1–851). Telegram 36, January 9, from Paris to Rabat, repeated to the

Department of State as 3904, stated that plans for General Eisenhower's trip to Europe were still fluid and no definite answer on a visit to Morocco was possible. Any decision on such a visit to Morocco would probably only be made within 48 hours of the visit, and the General would most likely communicate directly with General Juin who had extended an invitation (740.5/1–951). Telegram 3640, January 10, to Paris, repeated to Rabat as 44 (drafted by Earle J. Richey of the Office of African Affairs and cleared in WE and RA) observed that the Department of State believed it important that General Eisenhower call upon the Sultan should the General decide to visit Morocco (740.5/1–951). However, telegram 371, January 10, to Copenhagen (where General Eisenhower and his party arrived the following day), from Assistant Secretary of State Perkins to MacArthur, commented as follows on Eisenhower's possible acceptance of Juin's invitation to visit Rabat: "While I hesitate make any comment possible changes General's itinerary I question advisability his visiting any non-NATO countries" (740.5/1–1051). General Eisenhower and his party did not in fact visit Morocco.

740.5/1–1051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Murphy) to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL BRUSSELS, January 10, 1951—5 p. m.

1131. General Eisenhower departed for Hague at 1600 local today. We understand from MacArthur that he is reporting political aspects of visit and that defense considerations are being handled by Eisenhower's military staff. Belgian visit served useful purpose. General Eisenhower's personal prestige and popularity extraordinary. This was evidenced both by crowds greeting him in streets, as well as in attitude Belgian military and civilian leaders whom he met.[2]

It is our opinion that visit has provided urgently necessary stimulus and encouragement to Belgian defense effort. It has sharpened Belgian understanding of urgency of what is required of them and aroused their determination to meet requirements. We feel visit unqualified success.

MURPHY

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[1] Repeated to The Hague for MacArthur.

[2] Regarding General Eisenhower's meetings with Belgian leaders on January 9 and 10, see telegrams 1006, *infra*; 603, January 11, from Copenhagen, p. 410; and 1152, January 12, from Brussels, p. 415.

740.5/1–1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET THE HAGUE, January 11, 1951—3 p. m.

1006. From MacArthur. Following résumé Spaak's conversation General Eisenhower: [2]

Spaak began by saying Eisenhower statement Paris [3] hit exactly right note and produced excellent effect Belgium. He agreed with Eisenhower NAT countries had capability building adequate defense strength but stressed to galvanize them into necessary action and obtain wide popular support, task must be presented in light new approach to problem.[4] Explained with exception UK, all countries West Europe have in recent years seen their armies quickly crushed in war. Their armies have never been victorious although their countries have sided with victors. Actually Europeans have no confidence their national military establishments and hence our present effort should present objective not as rebuilding individual French, Belgian, German or Italian defense establishments but as new concept of united and fully integrated defense force for preservation West community. It important Europeans look forward and not backward at distant memories of glorious military past. Then stressed US participation essential as is US military leadership. Only US General could hold Europeans together and be accepted as acting with reasonable impartiality because of traditional and long-standing rivalries, prejudices, et cetera. He reiterated belief problem building adequate defense strength is manageable and that General Eisenhower would succeed. Said Europeans have no confidence in committee or subcommittees such as exist NAT and Brussels Pact being able take any effective action. This great effort must be centered in great leader. European will look to and follow leader who personifies task but will not do this for a committee. Spaak concluded that General Eisenhower such a leader and he would give him his wholehearted support.

[1] This telegram was repeated to Brussels for Murphy.

[2] A somewhat briefer report on Eisenhower's conversation with Spaak was reported in telegram 1153, January 12, from Brussels, which indicated that Spaak called at the American Embassy residence in Brussels on January 9 and had an informal conversation with Eisenhower for about 1 hour (740.5/1–1251).

[3] Regarding the statement under reference here, see footnote 2, p. 403.

[4] Telegram 1153, January 12, from Brussels (see footnote 2, above), reported that Spaak assured Eisenhower that Belgium would cheerfully bear its share of the European defense burden once it was galvanized into action and clearly understood what was expected of it. Spaak criticized the current Belgian Government as being weak and ineffective with special reference to the current Defense Minister. Spaak explained for that reason and because of defects in the proposed Belgian military legislation, the Belgian Socialist Party had been unwilling to vote in favor of the defense program. That did not mean that the Socialists did not support the defense effort. The telegram concluded: "General Eisenhower made some tactful and pointed references to attitude of Belgian Socialists regarding defense measures with apparently good effect."

General Eisenhower expressed thought human spirit also very important and that appropriate and timely references great past achievements could serve to assist restoring morale and desire and courage to face up to the job. Spaak agreed but said something new and additional must be offered as concept for reasons set forth above.

Turning to Korea, Spaak said he understood Americans were worried over Europeans' attitude. Europe, he said, felt same sort isolationism towards Korea that US felt towards Europe 1914. Korea remote to Europeans. They could not understand getting involved Far East or being asked assist there when Europe totally undefended. They felt they and US should concentrate on building up European defense strength and not pour our limited military resources into bottomless pit Far East.[5]

Spaak disturbed by effect Hoover and Taft speeches [6] on US public. Said Hoover implied US aid Europe been failure. This totally untrue. Marshall Plan succeeded beyond imagination and had in fact made possible our new effort build up defense strength. [MacArthur.]

CHAPIN

[5] For documentation on the diplomacy of the war in Korea, see volume VII.

[6] The reference here is to the speeches on December 20, 1950, by former President Hoover and on January 5, 1951, by Senator Taft opposing American troop commitments to Europe. Regarding these speeches, see the editorial note, p. 14.

740.5/1–1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Denmark (Anderson) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY COPENHAGEN, January 11, 1951—8 p. m.

603. Pass Defense. For Perkins from MacArthur. Following are résumés of yesterday's conversation with Belgium PM Pholien and FonMin Van Zeeland:

1. Pholien expressed his happiness at seeing General Eisenhower. He said his appointment as Supreme Allied Commander had filled Europe with confidence. He wished to assure General that Belgium had the will to resist and was anxious to do her part.

General Eisenhower stated that American people were making extraordinary effort and sacrifice to build up military strength, and that when he returned to the US from this trip, he would have to report on what evidence he found to indicate Europe's understanding of the need for urgency. He would have to appear before the American Congress and talk to members of the government and other influen-

[1] This telegram was repeated to Brussels for Murphy and to London for Spofford. General Eisenhower and his party flew from The Hague to Copenhagen on the afternoon of January 11.

tial people, and it would require concrete evidence that Europe is making a genuine effort if the American people were to be expected to shoulder this burden. Pholien replied Belgium was anxious to do its bit and that Belgian Government proposed to present to the Belgian Parliament this Monday a law to extend period of military service to 24 months. He stated chief difficulty in passage of this law would be Socialists. Liberals were opposed, but for political reasons only. Nevertheless, he felt confident that law would pass.

Eisenhower expressed satisfaction at hearing this and said that we in US were aiming towards a 27 months' period and he felt that it would require at least 24 months' service to build up the kind of strength we were trying to attain. Pholien said recent speeches of Mr. Hoover and Mr. Taft had caused uneasiness.

General Eisenhower said this was additional reason why it was necessary for him to be able to point out that Europe was not waiting to see what the US would do, but was moving forward rapidly to build up its own strength.

Pholien assured General that Belgium was ready and willing make this effort.

He then expressed regret Prince Royal [2] was indisposed and unable to receive General Eisenhower. He added that Prince Royal had just signed decree placing Belgian units under Eisenhower's command.

2. Van Zeeland said he delighted personally, as were all Belgians, at Eisenhower's appointment as Supreme Commander. He said Belgian people conscious of danger which threatened them. This particularly brought home by developments in Far East. He felt that in this respect state of public morale much better than a year ago. He felt very great effort was necessary if West were to be able to defend itself. But he was confident this could and would be done. He felt, in this respect, that Eisenhower's trip through NAT countries would be most helpful. Belgian Government was presenting to Parliament a law extending military service to 24 months. He could not guarantee, but felt reasonably certain this law would pass. Socialists were opposed to it on political grounds, rather than because they did not recognize the need for it.

General Eisenhower said that in US we likewise had our political problems. We are planning for the largest fleet any nation has ever had in peacetime, and a very large air force of some 90 groups. We expect, under present plans, to have some 3,500,000 men in uniform. We are paying extremely high taxes, and if he were not able honestly to point out that European nations were likewise making a great

[2] Baudouin, who was created Prince Royal on August 11, 1950, succeeded his father, Leopold III, as King on July 17, 1951.

effort, Europe could hardly expect Americans undertake additional burden of European rearmament. He felt confident that, if each of 12 nations ready to make sacrifices and to stand together, success was assured. It was principally a matter of heart, and if all put their hearts into it, Western civilization could not be overcome by 190,000,000 backward people.

Van Zeeland said he convinced that job could be done. There had been some fatalistic feeling that, no matter how great the effort, an effective defense could not be built up. This was what had to be overcome. He felt that the fact that Eisenhower had accepted this appointment would greatly aid in combating this idea. He agreed with Eisenhower that it necessary that there be a greater sense of urgency.

General Eisenhower said that, as chairman of the Atlantic Council, Van Zeeland was in position to do something about this; Van Zeeland laughingly agreed, and repeated his conviction that this could be done.

[MacArthur]
Anderson

740.5/1–1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET The Hague, January 11, 1951—6 p. m.

1009. General Eisenhower and party arrived Hague 4:45 p. m. January 10 and departed today 3 p. m. Copenhagen. Met on arrival by Chiefs Staff 3 services, no special honors rendered but security looked after. Reception in stolid Dutch fashion reasonably warm one which would have been even more demonstrative had it not been for bad weather.

I gave stag dinner last night for General and Service Attachés and MAAG officers during course which opportunity was had bring him and Gruenther up to date local situation and defense effort.

This morning General Eisenhower had talks Dutch Chiefs of Staff DefMin PriMin FonMin[2] and was tendered unofficial luncheon by DefMin at which high-ranking Netherlands defense officers present and during which he had opportunity further talks with PriMin and FonMin.

There no opportunity discuss any length with Generals Eisenhower or Gruenther results their visit but my first impression they somewhat disappointed, actually as we previously pointed out and repeated

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Copenhagen, London, and Paris.

[2] The references here are to Minister of Defense Hendrik L. s'Jacob, Prime Minister Willem Drees, and Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker.

today to Jacob the Dutch invariably put worst foot forward. Jacob told me at lunch that within next 3 weeks will ask for 150 million guilder increased defense budget and he proposed within next 3 months ask for 2 additional sums in amounts not stated. However did not mention this fact we gather to Eisenhower.

Dutch service chiefs united feeling that visit great success and most helpful but Aler Chief Air Force said it should be repeated soonest possible. They agreed feeling urgency here or rather Europe not great as US but appreciation this growing and that peoples of countries well as staff chiefs themselves more aware defense necessities than governments.

Press reports there some minor Communist demonstrations Hague and Amsterdam but no disturbances resulted. We feel visit most helpful and should give stimulus Dutch defense efforts. In this regard Embassy will now pursue talks Dutch along lines A–200 December 21.[3]

Embassy understands that MacArthur will report directly Department on other political aspects visit.[4]

CHAPIN

[3] For MacArthur's report on the conversations with Stikker and Drees, see telegram 604, *infra*. See also telegram 1057, January 19, from The Hague, p. 436.
[4] Not printed.

740.5/1–1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Denmark (Anderson) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY COPENHAGEN, January 11, 1951—10 p. m.

604. Pass Defense. For Perkins from MacArthur. Following is résumé of General Eisenhower's conversations with Stikker and Drees: [2]

1. *Stikker.*

General Eisenhower opened by stressing to Stikker view that problem of holding adequate strength manageable but only if all put their hearts into job and each country begins at once take necessary steps to translate plans into action et cetera. Stikker agreed and said Dutch had real desire to take necessary steps.

He then brought up question of Big Four CFM.[3] He believed CFM was most dangerous and feared Soviets would not only exploit it but might well propose the nonmilitarization of Germany. This would appeal not only to very substantial elements in France who oppose German rearmament but also to elements in Germany who wish to

[1] Repeated to The Hague for Chapin and to London for Spofford.
[2] Regarding Eisenhower's visit to The Hague, January 10–11, see telegram 1009, *supra*.
[3] For documentation on exploratory talks in Paris regarding a proposed Council of Foreign Ministers meeting involving France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union, see pp. 1086 ff.

lie neutral or who might see in such a proposal a hope for reuniting of Germany. Stikker believes rearmament Western Germany and closely tieing it in with West essential. He would even be willing for them to join NATO but realizes this premature and French would oppose. He said German rearmament essential to "forward strategy" and defense as far to east in Germany as possible. Without rearmament German defense line would be on Rhine-Issel which is "totally unacceptable to Netherlands".

2. *European Army.*

He is opposed to concept of European army and also thinks it an error for French to call conference [4] at this time since it will not succeed and will aggravate existing disagreements and divisions of opinion not only over Germany but also over French concept of European Federation which UK, Scandinavians and Dutch oppose. He believes that Pleven, FonOff and Monnet are behind French plan[s] which are characterized as unrealistic and impractical. His greatest concern about a meeting at this time is that it will involve disagreements in front of the Germans.

3. *Raw materials.*[5]

Stikker emphasized again importance of satisfactory solution which took into account not only interests but psychology of smaller countries. He recognized that US, UK and France should have decisive voice in raw material control arrangements but said that whatever system is set up, should provide for smaller countries to voice their views and have them receive adequate consideration prior to Big Three decisions. This was at the heart of the problem and the form observed was almost as important to small countries as the arrangements themselves if there were to be the necessary mutual trust. He also stressed need for a satisfactory arrangement between NATO and OEEC.[6] He said he was leaving for Paris to meet with the 18 OEEC Ministers tomorrow. He would try to pour cooling water on fire generated by smaller countries but to succeed, Big Three would have to also give outward signs of understanding.

4. *Drees meeting.*

General Eisenhower gave Drees an excellent talk on the need for translating plans into action et cetera. Drees listened but did not

[4] For documentation on the conference convened in Paris on February 15 by the French Government to discuss the creation of a European army and the development of a European Defense Community, see pp. 755 ff.

[5] For previous documentation on measures to control the supply of strategic raw materials among the NATO participants, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 508 ff, and 1698 ff.

[6] Stikker was referring here to the current debate over the need to merge certain economic and financial responsibilities of these two organizations, involving perhaps the moving of the economic functions of NATO to Paris. For documentation, see pp. 1 ff.

react with enthusiasm as have the other NAT Cabinet members with whom the General has talked. He referred to German problem and expressed view that Allied policy towards Germany had placed Germans in a position where they could blackmail us. He was strongly opposed to French plan for European army. Drees stolid complacency contrasted unfavorably with attitude of other officers.

Mr. Drees gave the impression of an exceedingly amiable individual who is unwilling to grapple with the urgent problems of this era with determination and energy. [MacArthur.] [7]

ANDERSON

[7] Telegram 1023, January 13, from The Hague, informed General Eisenhower that the impression of inertia and weak support of the NATO program which the General had probably felt in his meetings at The Hague ought not to be considered the true attitude of the Dutch people (740.5/1–1351). Eisenhower's views on his visit were the subject of a letter of January 13 to Chapin; see footnote 1, p. 416.

740.5/1–1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Murphy) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BRUSSELS, January 12, 1951—3 p. m.

1152. For Perkins. Your 5 from Copenhagen. As Belgian Liberal Party has during recent months adopted policy refusing support for present Catholic Government's military program because (1) it disapproves government and (2) it considers some features of proposed legislation defective, it was arranged for Dr. R. Motz, President Belgian Liberal Party and Baron Kronacker, prominent party member, to be received by General Eisenhower in Brussels.

General Eisenhower outlined to his visitors general purpose of his voyage to Europe, stressing urgency of our defense requirements and necessity that several member countries of NATO rise above local political considerations in all-out drive to accomplish their common objectives. He recognized difficulties of local politics everywhere, saying that we had our own difficulties in US which our European friends undoubtedly understand. However, if he could return to US and report that in countries like Belgium a proportionate and united effort to provide for Western defense is being made, it would facilitate American share of undertaking to important degree. His remarks were enthusiastically received by his visitors who were visibly impressed.

Doctor Motz said that he fully agreed with General Eisenhower but he thought that we all have indulged too much in talk of dangers of situation. He believed that population needed encouragement and belief in victory and in their own capacity to defend themselves as result, too many are defeatists feeling that it would be hopeless to

[1] Sent to Oslo for MacArthur, repeated to Department of State for information.

resist. Baron Kronacker stated disagreement with this view, asserting that there is far too much complacency and inclination to believe that US will carry load. General Eisenhower emphasized our interest in military service requirements of all NAT countries stressing, of course, that he would not venture to say what Belgium should do but pointing to program of military service in US. If Belgium would vote a period of 24 months military service, he would find that gratifying and encouraging and it would help him when he returns to face congressional committees in Washington as evidence of determination of Belgium to bear its share of burden.

Dr. Motz explained that his party's position in abstaining from vote yesterday in Chamber committee, which is considering militia bill, was not due to opposition to purposes of measure but because of Liberal belief that law is defective and also because of lack of confidence in present weak government. However, Dr. Motz said that Liberals knew that bill would be enacted and merely wanted to use vote as demonstration of their dissatisfaction with what they consider defects in text as well as of their general dissent with present government. Government has failed constantly to tell people what is necessary and Minister of Defense according to Doctor Motz is utterly incompetent.

(During subsequent meeting, Defense Minister de Greef told us that he had used meeting with Chamber committee to read riot act to committee, pointing out to them that attitude of Socialists and Liberals in opposing and abstaining created misunderstanding in US and made it much more difficult to persuade US Congress to vote funds in support of Western European military effort.)

MURPHY

740.5/1–1951

The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Eisenhower) to the Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin)[1]

[OSLO?, January 13, 1951.]

On personal side, our visit to Hague was completely enjoyable. Members my party were without exception impressed by abilities, friendly attitude, breadth comprehension of government officials with

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[1] The source text printed here was transmitted in telegram 1052, January 19, from The Hague, with the following explanatory statement:

"Text Eisenhower letter January 13 addressed Chapin quoted below. Accompanying letter was cover note stating: 'I have no objections whatsoever your showing this letter to anyone in the government whenever you think such action would be desirable'."

Regarding this letter, see also telegrams 9, January 16, from The Hague; Depto 420, January 17, from London; and 1057, January 19, from The Hague, pp. 425, 430, and 436.

whom we came in contact. It was instructive, of course, to learn about disruptive effects and internal difficulties caused by Indonesian war. This we fully understood.

On purely official side, our impression was one of disappointment. Strictly speaking, Dutch Government does not seem to have clearly defined goal commensurate with obvious needs, to be rapidly attained. Consequently, no description of current program would convince American Government that Hague was showing sense of urgency, readiness to sacrifice, and determination to pull its full share of load.

General Gruenther and I did not, by any means, have feeling that any Dutch official was being deliberately blind to existing threat. But we did feel that struggle for efficiency, both in training and production, was over-emphasized to point that it seemed to become predominating influence rather than secondary to over-riding importance of providing maximum of security for country at earliest possible date. Frankly, we can see no reason for rather restricted target that Dutch set for themselves. We do not understand why country of 10 million people should not plan on regular training and organizational framework something on order of four or five divisions, framework which would, over years, produce additional group of reserve divisions and necessary auxiliary troops.

We believe that 12-month period of service is not satisfactory, either from standpoint of training or real strength, unless accompanied by frequent and thorough periods refresher training. We do recognize that, as of this moment, the Dutch could not instantly undertake a 2-year program. But we feel that if this longer period of service became the accepted doctrine of country, and that even if for moment, full term had to be restricted of officers, noncommissioned officers and specialists, yet, under this kind of program, there would not only be speedier progress in the country, but there would most certainly be a great increase in the confidence that other nations feel with respect to Dutch effort. There would also be greater readiness on their part to provide help where help is needed.

You understand, of course, that it is not our function to attempt interference with internal workings of any country to advise, directly, any North Atlantic Treaty nation on methods to be used in its military program. However, questions discussed this letter are of tremendous importance, particularly at this time when picture presented by each nation to all others should, if possible, be one showing a "higher than average" performance. This applies to speed with which plan is executed and, within reason, to ultimate size of force. Consistent with these considerations, utmost in efficiency and economy should prevail, but both General Gruenther and I sincerely hope that Dutch Government will arrange these considerations in an order of priority that does not put efficiency at top.

740.5/1–1351 : Telegram

The Chargé in Norway (Snow) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET Oslo, January 13, 1951—11 a. m.

722. From MacArthur for Perkins. Following is résumé of General Eisenhower's joint meeting January 12 [2] with Prime Minister Eriksen, Foreign Minister Kraft and Defense Minister Petersen. Kraft acted as spokesman for Danes and extended warm welcome to Eisenhower. He then said he had several matters to bring up.

(1) Danish constitution requires Parliamentary action and King's signature on decree necessary to give Denmark acceptance of Eisenhower as Supreme Commander. He said Foreign Affairs committee of Parliament has already approved Eisenhower and that very early parliamentary approval is assured following which King will sign decree.

(2) Medium term defense plan (MTDP).

Kraft reviewed problem Danes faced in building up Danish Force. At time of liberation Denmark had no organized military forces and no equipment. Progress had been slow since arrival first of British and then US equipment had been slow. Denmark Defense Committee working on a plan to satisfy provisions of MTDP. Among projects to increase effectiveness is one to increase period of military service in Denmark from 10 to 12 months.

(3) Contribution of Danish Forces to integrated force.

At present Danish Forces in Germany are under UK command and were scheduled to remain so until May 15. Danish Government will, however, inform UK it proposes to place these troops under Eisenhower command as soon as royal decree signed. It will do so on "assumption" that Danish Forces will be used to defend Denmark's southern frontier.

(4) Internal security.

Kraft said Danes also planning internal defense by improving organization of "home guards" composed of men whose reliability has been "individually checked". This force consists about 30,000 (mostly former resistance men) and its mission is to prevent sabotage, et cetera. Its members are lightly armed with rifles, some light automatic weapons and explosives which members keep in their homes.

(5) General Eisenhower explained purpose of his trip and strongly stated the need for everyone to get on with job. He pointed out that Europe is behind time. Each nation must find way to increase its efforts and that what US will be able to do depends in large measure

[1] This telegram was repeated to Copenhagen. The Department of State was asked to pass this message to the Department of Defense.

[2] General Eisenhower visited Copenhagen on January 11–12 before departing for Oslo.

on what Europeans themselves do. He outlined great US effort to increase US and European defense strength and said they must show by their acts that US aid is justified. In final analysis this project is matter of the heart and small country like Denmark can take lead as well as larger countries.

Kraft said he appreciated frankness of Eisenhower. He explained Danish difficulties in doing more but said they willing to make an additional effort. In this connection he agreed spirit and morale of great importance and said small countries which believe they stand alone cannot believe it worthwhile to make real effort. Danish Government is determined to defend its freedom and while admittedly behind in its preparation as a result of circumstances would try to move ahead.

General Eisenhower stressed importance of adequate training period for conscripts—mentioning 2 years as a desirable goal—in order have effective forces in being and build up well trained reserves. He pointed out that inadequate forces in being were in final analysis a poor investment which offered neither security nor a good return on investment. With this in mind Cabinet Ministers should obtain the judgment of their professional military people on adequacy of military effort.

(6) Kraft then said Danes attached greatest importance to defense as far to east as possible in Germany. This not possible without German participation. He hoped present talks with Germans would result in positive solution.

(7) Participants in foregoing meeting then joined Danish Military Staff for detailed exposition of Danish plans and future program. During course of this meeting General Eisenhower again stressed importance of having each country impress NATO partners with magnitude of own defense efforts. Also reiterated necessity for adequate length of military service. This meeting followed by luncheon during course of which ranking Danish military figures made occasion to tell us privately their strong belief that Eisenhower presentation would do much in obtaining greater effort on part of Danish Government. [MacArthur.]

SNOW

740.5/1–1451 : Telegram

The Chargé in Norway (Snow) to the Secretary of State

SECRET OSLO, January 14, 1951—7 p. m.

725. Eisenhower's short visit here January 12–13 was successful beyond our high expectations, due in great measure to his unique combination of forcefulness and tact, intense concentration on objectives and yet obvious breadth of knowledge and understanding. His personality radiated confidence and had instant effect on press

and on crowds thronging hotel lobby and sidewalks outside, as well as on officials in conference and elsewhere.

High point was 2 hour conference Saturday morning January 13 with cabinet members and top military officials. First hour consisted Norwegian presentation of defense program. Then Eisenhower and Gruenther led discussion with comments and questions. Eisenhower put his finger on sore and weak points and commented with complete frankness but so constructively and with such manifest good will that it was perfect performance. Good results are bound to follow.

Prime Minister [1] told Foreign Minister [2] he agreed with everything he heard Eisenhower say. Justice Minister [3] remarked on vitality and drive of Eisenhower but also especially on insight and sensitivity shown in his comments. He had somehow expected a blunt forceful duty bound soldier without the intellectual grasp and balanced perception exhibited by the General. Many other comments all similar to these. Defense Minister [4] had been prepared for tart criticisms of Montgomery variety and was almost pathetically relieved and grateful because of Eisenhower's method of approach.

Eisenhower said Norwegian concept of citizen army resting mainly on conscription and on refresher training for reserves was probably a good one for Norway provided the reserve training was concentrated enough and included sufficient staff training as well as field exercises.

As for marked shortage of commissioned officers and NCO's the problem would need to be faced of providing an adequate pay scale so that the military profession would offer suitable attractions to the right kind and number of men. If the reserve call up began to impinge upon productivity, thought might be given to substituting women as far as possible in productive jobs.

He directed their attention to the size of the military force they should expect to put under arms in case of war saying that rule of thumb was about 10 percent of total population.

He explained necessity of being able to convince US Congress and public that NATO partners were doing their share. Almost impossible to measure comparative national efforts fairly. Only way to proceed was for each to strive to outdo the others rather than to hold back on assumption it was doing more than its share.

Ended on note of reassurance that European defense was clearly manageable if each country did its utmost to prepare. He was certain US would do its part.[5]

SNOW

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[1] Einar Gerhardsen.
[2] Halvard M. Lange.
[3] O. C. Gundersen.
[4] Jens Christian Hauge.
[5] For a more detailed résumé of General Eisenhower's conversations with Norwegian Government and military officials as well as summaries of his conversations with King Haakon and Crown Prince Olav, see telegram 3902, *infra*.

740.5/1-1451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, January 14, 1951—11 p. m.

3902. Pass Defense. From MacArthur for Perkins. January 13 General Eisenhower called on King Haakon, then Crown Prince and then met jointly with Norwegian Prime Minister Gerhardsen, Foreign Minister Lange, Defense Minister Hauge and top Norwegian military staff.[2] Following is résumé of conversations:

1. Haakon after warmly welcoming Eisenhower said he wished to express personal views. Norway must have help and agreements should be made to supply Norway with necessary forces. He is convinced Norway has will to fight but this not enough since it does not have means to defend itself having a population of only three million and a vast area to defend. Norwegian constitution a factor in what can be done since it prohibits stationing of foreign troops in Norway in peace time. He expressed personal view that NAT Air Forces that are to come to defense of Norway in event of war should be stationed in UK in peace time. He also said that because of small size of Norwegian defense force is not possible employ Norwegian troops outside Norway. General Eisenhower replied he felt it most important Norway constitute a hedgehog defense of such strength that no one would attack it. Eisenhower described opinion current in certain US circles that it inadvisable to commit further US forces for defense of Western Europe because of the belief Europeans do not have will to defend themselves and said it of utmost importance that he be able to point to concrete actions taken by Europeans indicating their determination to defend themselves. King replied he agreed with Eisenhower and assured him that people of Norway can be counted on to make required effort.

2. Crown Prince Olav. Following usual opening amenities during which Olav expressed great pleasure at Eisenhower appointment, General Eisenhower mentioned one problem he would have to consider very carefully in drawing conclusions from his trip was length of national military service. He pointed out US Defense Department now asking Congress for 27-month conscription period and short period of some European nations would be subject of adverse comment. Olav replied Norway has tradition of short conscription period and which would be difficult to change. He added, however, that he was

[1] This telegram was repeated to Oslo.

[2] Regarding Eisenhower's visit to Oslo, January 12–13, see also telegram 725, *supra*.

sure Eisenhower could count on Norwegian people to make great sacrifices in common defense effort.

3. Meeting with Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and military staff.

Prime Minister Gerhardsen opened with welcoming speech in which he pointed out Norway took serious step of joining NAT largely because Norway afraid of being attacked and oppressed if they stood alone. Norway was afraid of war but even more afraid of losing its independence and freedom because it knows from its own painful experience what this means. Norway joined NAT because it believed NAT could secure peace and freedom and Norway fully prepared to take her share of common defense burden by making maximum contribution. Norway wanted Eisenhower to get favorable impression but above all leave with correct impression of Norwegian weaknesses and strengths. All Norway happy Eisenhower selected for great task of Supreme Commander because they recognize he not only outstanding military man but a man gifted in every respect who desires peace, justice and freedom.

Hauge then gave over-all résumé beginning with summary of size of population, area, industries, gross national income, et cetera. He pointed out productivity low but increasing thanks to Marshall Plan. Norwegian youth courageous and forward looking; Norwegians are individualists yet all but Commies solidly support foreign and defense policy. Hard core of Norwegian Commie Party consists of 10,000 dues-paying members. Commies hold no seats in Parliament and strength is on decline. However Commie possibilities should not be under or over-rated. Since liberation in 1945 main task in defense field is to build up strength from little or nothing. Norway has had conscription and national military service system for 80 years. It originally based on the 19th Century Norwegian belief that professional standing army is barrier both to social progress and closer Scandinavian association and also on desire for a really democratic people's army. Norway's quick defeat by Germany stemmed partly from paucity of competent officers and non-coms, short term of military service and fact that only 1% (as compared with 5% in 1951) of national income devoted to defense. Norway trying to rectify by building up cadres, establishing effective national guard; obtaining equipment for training and for reserves; participating in German occupation forces, et cetera. Hauge summed up Norwegian efforts as "brave beginning but no more and no less". Norwegian will to resist has grown in past six months. Chief deficiencies were weakness of cadres and small size of covering forces. He outlined plans to increase defense expenditures from about 350 million kroner in 1950 to between 500 and 550 million in 1951; to

increase cadres by 1500; to increase military service to 12 months (instead of 9 to 11 months); to expand scope of 2 to 3 months refresher courses; to increase the present effectiveness of air and navy. Also desired to improve airfields and warning system but this would depend on receiving equipment.

Touching on Norwegian contribution to defense of Europe he said Norwegian troops necessary for defense of Norway but Norway al had brigade group in Germany. (He stressed German participation essential for "forward strategy".) Assignment of brigade group in Germany to integrated force required Norwegian constitutional action which seemed assured.

Hauge severely criticized failure of efforts of Finance Ministers (through DFEC) to develop formula for equitable distribution of burden of defense effort. National income not in itself fair gauge since it does not take into account what part of per capita national income needed for bare subsistence. Also leaves out productivity. Furthermore ratio of defense budget to national income is not reliable because each country includes different items in budgets. Hauge believes just formula for equitable distribution of burden essential. He concluded that Norway would not shirk its duty and had a good conscience given its resources and capabilities.

Chiefs of Staff then gave detailed outline of programs and problems of three services. Following gives highlights:

(*a*) Principal deficiencies of army were lack of trained officers and non-coms; lack of equipment (being remedied by US aid); lack of adequate staff training in unit organizations of all sizes. Present efforts were therefore to improve quality and also increase effectiveness of reserves.

(*b*) Navy deficiencies listed were serious gap between capabilities and requirements in coastal escort vessels. Also too few minesweepers and MTB. Recently Norwegian Government had started to activate certain laid-up ships. This experience showed Norwegian naval mobilization plan for activating ships was faulty and reexamination is required. Navy also suffered from lack of trained officers and petty officers. Exercises with Royal Navy showed peacetime effectiveness only 50% of Royal Navy performance. Efficiency would improve if there were longer period of conscription. Also it difficult to attract officers and petty officers in regular navy because of higher wage scales in merchant marine.

(*c*) Air deficiencies are in aircraft, spares and equipment; insufficient land communications and radar; housing, et cetera, interceptor performance not too bad but air-ground teamwork not properly developed.

General Eisenhower then asked a number of questions re length of service, stressing importance of building soonest adequate well-trained forces in being. He suggested training techniques to improve efficiency in proper staff team-work; stressed necessity for increasing number

of NCO's and paying salaries sufficient to attract, et cetera. General Eisenhower then summed up his views of over-all situation as follows:

At the bottom of military success are the fundamentals of morale, determined purpose, and burning ambition to succeed. This is hard to achieve in the Allied Command because of national aspirations of individual members. The NATO nations must work together. This is a question of having the right spirit. Each nation must strive to out-do others "if only by one man".

While no one is trying to compare the size of the Norwegian effort with that of US, it must be pointed out there is a real problem in the US. US Congress and people must be honestly convinced that European nations are making comparable effort and sacrifices. Question of effort is really question of heart. There must be no unreadiness to make sacrifices. No one is trying to be arbitrary in this matter but Norway must realize and be sympathetic with what Eisenhower has to do. Eisenhower not pleading US cause but common NAT cause since he considers himself 1/12 Norwegian. Amalgamation of combined power can only be achieved if every nation is convinced that the others are making a comparable sacrifice. Each nation must struggle to be a little ahead of the other. Success is assured if we put our shoulders to job because the free world has the brains, strength and genius to succeed. Problem in the next few weeks is arriving at a decision that will determine course for many months to come. We can meander or go forward, lift up our hearts and heads, and find we have arrived.

[MacArthur]

Gifford

740.5/1–1451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET London, January 14, 1951—2 p. m.

3901. From MacArthur for Perkins. Remytel 1001, January 11 from The Hague, repeated Madrid 4.[1] Joe Kingsbury Smith asked to see me privately and unofficially this morning. He referred to the message which he had sent to Franco and said that on January 11 Lojendio (counselor of Spanish Embassy Paris) called on him in The Hague. Lojendio asked whether General Eisenhower or US Government had knowledge of and approved Smith's message to Franco. Smith said he replied that the initiative came solely from INS.

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[1] Not printed. In it MacArthur reported that he had heard that Joseph Kingsbury Smith, a correspondent for International News Service, who was in Europe reporting on the Eisenhower tour, had sent a message to General Franco asking him if he would invite Eisenhower to visit Madrid. (740.5/1–1151)

Lojendio allegedly told him that while Franco would be glad to see Eisenhower and would even be willing to travel to the Spanish-Portuguese frontier or Lisbon to meet with him, Franco would only give Smith a reply for publication after he was certain that Eisenhower would agree to such a meeting. Smith said he told Lojendio that in his own (Smith's) judgment there was no possibility of Eisenhower seeing Franco on his trip to the NAT capitals and Lojendio allegedly replied that in this event matter should be dropped.[2]

I told Smith that in my personal opinion his initiative in this matter seemed designed to create publicity and confusion and did not serve the best interests of the US, the other NAT countries, General Eisenhower and for that matter Franco himself. I also told him that he should not consider his private meeting with me as constituting any form of channel to General Eisenhower. He said he understood this and added that I was free to deny we had even talked about this matter. [MacArthur.]

GIFFORD

[2] In telegram 3923, January 16, from London, MacArthur reported that Smith had phoned him that afternoon stating that he, Smith, had received a telephone invitation from Lojendio to proceed to Madrid for an interview with Franco. Smith was disinclined to accept the invitation, but he asked MacArthur to authorize him, in a confidential message to INS headquarters in New York, to state that General Eisenhower preferred that Smith not hold the interview. MacArthur replied that he had no such authority, that his conversations with Smith had been strictly personal, and Smith would have to be guided by his own conscience in the matter. (740.5/1–1651)

756.00/1–1651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Embassy in Portugal[1]

SECRET PRIORITY THE HAGUE, January 16, 1951—6 p. m.

9. Personal for General Eisenhower[2] from Ambassador. Because of all-day Cabinet meeting and domestic political crisis it was only this morning I could show Stikker your letter of January 13,[3] leaving copy with him. Copy will also be furnished confidentially to S. Jacob.

Stikker much impressed with letter which he felt although blunt, to point and fair. Said copies would be furnished only to members military sub-committee of Cabinet but letter would probably create something of sensation. Stikker added, "personally and very confidentially, I will be indiscreet enough to say that I like the letter".

[1] This telegram was repeated to Rome, Paris, London, and the Department of State, the source text printed here.

[2] General Eisenhower and his party flew from London to Lisbon on the afternoon of January 16.

[3] Regarding this letter, see footnote 1, p. 416.

Stikker referred to Kerr's article in *New York Herald Tribune* eleventh presumably written before your visit Hague criticizing Drees as "doctrinaire socialist" who not prepared take effective action on rearmament. Said Drees had been deeply hurt over this and had remarked it would be far easier for Socialists leave government and go into Opposition as in that way they could be sure of much better showing next election.

Stikker asked me if I could give him any further reactions from you and General Gruenther as result your visit and I told him that, unfortunately, I had had no detailed discussion with you subsequent your morning discussions January 11. I did, however, in response specific question, say that I felt you had been disappointed with your visit with Prime Minister who, either because of his views or because he "tired", gave no impression he aware urgency for immediate action.

Although Stikker quite obviously worried over domestic political situation since his own position very much in danger through lack support his party on NG issue which to be debated end this week, he recognized problem raised by you as over-riding and stated he wished me assure you he personally would do everything possible obtain pledge from Dutch Government, effective action before you appear before Congress. Specifically, he mentioned proposed first additional Defense budget increase 150 million guilders and proposal build 60 mine sweepers of which 12 would be built on contingent gamble to be disposed of to other NATO nations and 36 in hope to sell to US.

CHAPIN

740.5/1–1651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, January 16, 1951—6 p. m.

Depto 417. Pass Defense. Deputies' [2] fourth meeting, January 16.

1. Deputies met this morning with General Eisenhower who made profound impression.

2. Chairman opened with brief review of deputies' work, with stress on matters of particular interest to SHAPE, and asked Eisenhower to give impressions gained during his trip.

3. Eisenhower began by stressing importance he attached to deputies' work. No matter how NATO might be reorganized, deputies

[1] Repeated to Paris for OSR and General Schuyler, to Lisbon for MacArthur, to the other NATO capitals, to Frankfurt, to Heidelberg for Handy, and to Wiesbaden for Cannon.

[2] North Atlantic Council Deputies.

would be indispensable as central democratic representative body. He would look to them for much assistance.

4. He had been encouraged by spirit of growing confidence he had found but disturbed by vagueness of objectives and plans, especially as to size of planned military formations and time of their creation. Time factor was overriding. Tree could not grow in a day, but if NATO countries were convinced they should create adequate force as shield for peaceful existence, time for initiating action was now. More complicated war became more time required to equip and train forces. He had found too much talk of 1954 and not enough action in progress. Existing schedules not good enough to meet needs of present crisis. Orderliness important but speed essential. Sooner peace could be made secure through strength cheaper it would be though early costs would be high.

5. There was division of opinion in US on how its military strength should be distributed. In next two years we would produce more than anything hitherto dreamed of in peacetime, including resources for foreign aid. Only question was how they should be used. He was convinced US debate would be resolved in favor of defending entire free world if US were convinced all participating countries behind defense effort heart and soul. On his return he must report honestly and accurately to President, administration, and others. He hoped he would be able to say he had no doubts. Speaking as NATO official representing all twelve countries he would say two conditions must obtain. First, twelve equal nations of NATO must act as unit. Second, security must in each country have priority over everything else.

6. He regarded organization of his command as of secondary importance, and nothing he had yet said or done about it implied commitment or obligation of any kind.

7. Europe, which was unquestionably key strategic point, was long, narrow peninsula between seas. NAT nations were sea powers with strong air power. We must hold in center while sea and air power brought to bear. Sea power could reach any NAT nation. None were isolated but each should make itself a hedgehog.

8. In closing his remarks he reiterated importance he attached to working with deputies. He had no particular ideas about liaison but in words of Mae West "come up and see me some time". He ended that in ten days he would be reporting to Washington and he must then have every possible bit of concrete evidence everyone was heart and soul in common effort. Only yardstick was who could do even one manhour more than others.

9. Hoyer-Millar asked how deputies could help most in next few months. Eisenhower replied he had heard number of complaints to effect that defense production capacity was going begging because of

red tape or other delays. Deputies could act as trouble shooters and assist in breaking bottlenecks.

10. Alphand referred to Eisenhower's remark that existing time schedules were not rapid enough, asked whether he had something different in mind from MTDP. Eisenhower replied he was not suggesting different plan but stressing extreme importance of telescoping fulfillment of existing plans into shortest possible time irrespective of formal schedules. Time of even greater value in this effort to preserve peace than in war. More quickly each nation could do its job, more it would stimulate others and more aid it would be apt to get from US.

11. Starkenborgh observed one of greatest hindrances to progress in production had been inability to obtain timely data from military on such matters as acceptability of types. Perhaps Eisenhower could help. Eisenhower said he would try to light fire, and urged deputies to bring pressure wherever and whenever necessary to obtain required action. Concentrated effort saved lives whether in preparation or on battlefield.

12. Comments after meeting revealed depth of impression Eisenhower made on deputies. One said his talk inspired more confidence than 10 new divisions. General feeling Eisenhower's advent marked emergence NATO as going concern and that neither defeatism nor petty bickering could survive under his leadership. We are getting inquiries from individual deputies as to shortcomings he found in their countries and how they might help get them remedied. Will follow up.

[SPOFFORD]

740.5/1–1651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LISBON, January 16, 1951—9 p. m.

263. Pass Defense. From MacArthur for Perkins. General Eisenhower saw Shinwell yesterday and Bevin and Attlee today and impressed eloquently on all of them necessity for translating plans into action now.[2] Following is résumé of views expressed by these 3 Cabinet Ministers who spent considerable time in reminiscing:

1. Shinwell who was energetic in setting forth his ideas expressed view that staffs engaged in plans for building up defensive strength of west are too slow and cautious. Shinwell has been pressing UK Government to move faster and said he had taken lead in getting UK Government to up its sights in terms of a greater defense effort.

[1] This telegram was repeated to London for Gifford and Spofford and to Paris for Schuyler.

[2] General Eisenhower and his party visited London, January 14–16; on the afternoon of January 16 he flew to Lisbon.

He favors and will continue to urge larger military budget. He alluded to the political difficulties of NAT countries in making greater defense effort and said "it is not important whether governments stand or fall but whether nations stand or fall". He believes it most important that British have four divisions in West or in the integrated force as soon as possible this year. He expressed great admiration for Field Marshal Montgomery and expressed hope that appropriate place be found for him in military structure.

2. Bevin who had barely recovered from flu looked very badly. He and General Eisenhower are old friends and Bevin spent much time in personal reminiscences. He was quite insistent that if he could be of help at any time General Eisenhower should come directly to him. Speaking of German rearmament, he said the Big Three should let this question simmer for awhile and avoid talking about it or pressing this particular issue since in his opinion a firm political basis is the prerequisite for German rearmament. (Both Shinwell and Attlee expressed similar view.)

3. Attlee also reminisced at length. He seemed quite optimistic about making progress in the defense field and determined to move ahead.

4. General Eisenhower lunched today with these three Cabinet Ministers and with exception of Shinwell's apparent greater sense of urgency he detected no differences in their position. [MacArthur.]

MACVEAGH

765A.11/1-1651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Embassy in Portugal[1]

TOP SECRET ROME, January 16, 1951—9 p. m.

13. For MacArthur. Not having heard further from you re audience we assume it is agreeable to General Eisenhower that no further steps be taken. In explaining Pope's reluctance grant audience Vatican source said decision based on previous schedule for annual retreat and announcement January 10 that all audiences would be suspended during period January 13 to 20 inclusive. Source also implied some concern that Commie inspired demonstrations might occur and be associated with audiences. Source inquired whether audience planned from beginning of trip and whether we believed it essential to accomplishment of mission. After consulting Colonel Usera we said question of audience had arisen after press speculation based on Vatican AP story when General Eisenhower had expressed desire to pay his re-

[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris for General Schuyler and to the Department of State, the source text printed here.

spects to Pope if possible. (Oslo telegram 721 to Department January 13.[2])

In last night's *Observatore Romano* there appeared prominent notice of commencement of Pope's retreat which concluded with statement "during these days as we have already announced all audiences have been suspended".

If General Eisenhower or his staff receive any further press questions suggest that reply be substantially: "General Eisenhower does not expect to have an audience with Pope since he has now learned that Pope has suspended all audiences for this week during which he is making his annual retreat". If further questions should be asked as to whether audience was requested answer could be in negative and exploratory conversations which we have had should be considered merely as sounding out the Vatican rather than as request for audience. This is particularly important because this Embassy has no formal relations with Vatican and no public indication should be given that we made an approach. Naturally moreover, Vatican does not wish to have impression get out that audience was requested and denied since our Vatican source said, Pope did not wish to give impression that he was opposed to General Eisenhower's mission.

DUNN

[2] This telegram, which was sent from Oslo to Rome as 1 and repeated to the Department of State as 721, is not printed. It stated that during his forthcoming visit to Rome, January 17–18, General Eisenhower hoped to be able to have an audience with the Pope. It suggested that Ambassador Dunn approach the Vatican and explain the General's desire to call on the Pope on the morning of January 18 to pay his respects shortly before departing for London. (740.5/1–1351)

740.5/1–1751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, January 17, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 420. From Spofford. Rome for MacArthur.[2] Starkenborgh told us yesterday that although official word he had from Hague concerning Eisenhower's visit [3] gave no particular picture, he had received private report that General was keenly disappointed. He was most anxious ascertain any information we could give concerning Eisenhower's actual impressions of his talks at Hague, particularly specific shortcomings in Netherlands effort which he had found.

[1] This telegram was repeated to The Hague and Rome.

[2] General Eisenhower and his party, including MacArthur, arrived in Rome from Lisbon on the afternoon of January 17.

[3] Regarding Eisenhower's visit to The Hague, see telegram 604, January 11, from Copenhagen, p. 413.

Starkenborgh returning to Hague tomorrow to attend meeting of Council on Defense Friday morning.

We told him immediately General had been disappointed and also that American correspondents had received unfavorable impression. (We had been told this privately by both AP and US representatives.) Today after consulting MacArthur and documentation, we went over situation with him fully and frankly. Since yesterday he had received from Stikker copy of Eisenhower's letter to Chapin [4] and accordingly knew in general what Eisenhower felt was wrong and should be done. We referred to feeling of complacency and apparent unwillingness to deal with present problem with sufficient determination and energy, stressing need for immediate action on length of service and development of cadres.

Starkenborgh said Eisenhower's visit had been most timely and he hoped effective. He fully agreed as to public and official complacency. He felt there had been too great a desire to relax and lick Indonesian wounds and to hide behind view that France and Belgium would not really do what they said they would and that US exaggerated what it was doing. Nevertheless there were forces in Holland with which he was working to develop sense of urgency in government and he believed that they had been making progress. They were now arguing that France and Belgium had awakened to necessity for large scale urgent action and were taking it, that magnitude of US effort was obvious and that Holland was lagging badly behind. He hoped meeting of Defense Council would produce concrete results. He said S. Jacob felt that taking into forces more men from each class called up would have more immediate effect than lengthening period of service but that Starkenborgh himself felt both were essential and that Holland must very greatly increase its contribution in manpower.

[SPOFFORD]

[4] Regarding Eisenhower's letter of January 13 to Chapin, see footnote 1, p. 416.

740.5/1–1751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LISBON, January 17, 1951—10 p. m.

269. Mytel 266, January 17.[2] General Eisenhower left Lisbon airport 3:40 p. m. today after completing prearranged schedule down to last detail.[3] Public impression notably favorable. Press coverage

[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris and Rome.

[2] Not printed.

[3] General Eisenhower and his party arrived in Lisbon from London on afternoon of January 16 and left for Rome on January 17. The schedule for the visit was set forth in some detail in despatch 472, January 18, from Lisbon (740.5/1–1851). For a résumé of the General's conversations with Portuguese officials, see telegram 3105, *infra*.

extensive and large applauding crowds, spontaneously gathered before Prime Minister's Palace and at airport, clearly delighted with General's hat-raising acknowledgments. Special security arrangements perfectly carried out. Beyond circulation few hand bills, no signs Communist activity observed.

First reactions Portuguese officials also favorable. According Foreign Minister, all pleased with General's easy frankness and grateful for opportunity afforded explain Portuguese attitude. As regards feasibility of further increasing defense establishment without US help, and reluctance to furnish expeditionary forces for European defense in absence Spanish integration, this attitude appears remain as stated mytel 236, December 30.[4] However, new and warmer atmosphere of international trust as well as of confidence in US leadership clearly created, with possibility of favorable repercussions on other aspects of desired Portuguese collaboration such as those now being considered under NAP [*MAP?*] organization.

MacVeagh

[4] Not printed.

740.5/1-1851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET ROME, January 18, 1951—5 p. m.

3105. From MacArthur for Perkins. January 17 General Eisenhower met separately with Prime Minister Salazar, then Dr. Cunha, then with Defense Minister Santos Costa and Portuguese chiefs and finally with President Carmona.[2] Following is résumé of conversations:

1. Salazar. After the usual exchange of amenities, General Eisenhower said the purpose of his trip was exploratory to see if there existed in Europe the same sense of urgency and desire for unity and common action to preserve peace as existed in the US. He was convinced that if all of the nations acted together war could be avoided and peace obtained. Salazar fully agreed with this and said he was certain war was not inevitable. General Eisenhower said to succeed in building adequate strength each country would have to strive to do a little more than the other and everyone should put in their brains, their heart, and their hands. Dr. Salazar said that he understood and agreed with what the General had said but that the General would not find this spirit in all European countries. In

[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris for General Schuyler and to Lisbon.

[2] Regarding General Eisenhower's visit to Lisbon, January 16–17, see telegram 269, *supra*.

America, although there might be differences of a tactical and strategic nature among groups in the population, all were basically agreed on the broad outlines of NAT policy. In some other European countries this was not true and large sections of the population had lost confidence in the future of their country. Furthermore, there was a fundamental difference between the Latin countries of Europe on the one one hand and the so-called European Nordic countries and the US on the other. The population of the latter group had an innate sense of civic and moral discipline which permitted democracy to function well whereas there was no such restraint in the Latin countries of Europe where, in the absence of a government having real authority, it was difficult to draw a line between democracy and license.

Dr. Salazar then said every effort should be made to avoid war which if it occurred would leave neither victor nor vanquished, but would be universal catastrophe in which there would be little difference between victory and defeat. This could only be done by strength. General Eisenhower agreed and said there was only one thing worse than war and that would be to have a war and lose it. Salazar said this was true as it would mean living forever in a yoke of slavery. General Eisenhower said that he expressed this even better than he could himself.

Eisenhower then said that in his trip through Europe he was seeking concrete evidence to take back to the American people that the European countries were giving their defense effort first priority and that they understood the need for speedy action and sacrifices to achieve the collective security. This was particularly important as there were elements in the US which believed Europe was not making a real effort and therefore they favored keeping the great strength we are now developing in the US. He as a soldier could not agree with this latter viewpoint and felt the majority of the American people might not agree with it either. Nonetheless it pointed to the necessity for the Europeans making a maximum effort.

The discussion then turned to US efforts to assist in stabilizing European economies through the Marshall Plan as a means of creating economic stability which is a prerequisite for social and political stability and reduction of Communist influence. While paying tribute to success of Marshall Plan in economic stabilization field, Salazar said he believed we had oversimplified the problem since Americans appeared to believe Communism developed only in an atmosphere of great hardship. This was an illusion. While Communism thrived on misery it also developed where there were no great physical hardships and in classes where there was no economic cause for it. This accounts in part for the disappointment Americans seemed to feel in noting a relatively small decrease of Communists strength in some

European countries, despite the success of the Marshall Plan in restoring economies of the European countries and bringing about a better living standard.

This led to a discussion on Portugal's low cost workers housing projects which are springing up all about Lisbon. Salazar explained that the object is to have workers own their dwellings and that they are so financed that at the conclusion of 20 years of small monthly payments the worker becomes the owner. Funds from the social security fund are used to finance these projects so the money works twice for the workers. The meeting concluded with Salazar again wishing Eisenhower success.

2. Cunha: Expressed his pleasure at seeing General Eisenhower in Portugal both as commander of integrated NAT force and as great victor of World War II he felt sure the General would find, in Portugal, an understanding of the situation and a willingness to make every effort to achieve common defense. The situation in Portugal is different from that in other European NAT countries because the internal situation is one of stability. General Eisenhower then spoke of the purpose of his trip, as an exploratory one in which he was seeking concrete evidence to take back to the US that there was, in Europe, an understanding of the gravity of the dangers and willingness to give security first priority. General Eisenhower explained nature of his trip and explained US is taking unprecedented steps in peacetime to build up defensive strength. US is fully determined to achieve strength but there is a question of where this strength should be deployed. He said there existed in US certain opinion which favored making North America a citadel where we would keep military strength now developing. The common task of all is to convince American people by acts that European nations are making every effort to take measures required by situation. In few minutes, when we would see the Defense Minister, he was going to ask for concrete fact, that would make this task easier for him. Cunha said he was sure General Eisenhower would obtain this evidence from his subsequent talking with the Defense Minister and urged him to speak to him with complete frankness.

Cunha then said that for some strange reason the North Atlantic Treaty Organization regarded Portugal as an island and Spain an ocean which separated Portugal from Europe. Portugal was not an island and Spain was not an ocean; both were directly attached to Europe. He felt it urgent that some solution be arrived at for the common defense of the Iberian Peninsula within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. General Eisenhower said that he recognized there was a problem. Question however seemed a political problem which he hoped the statesmen would be able to work out. As far as

he was concerned, he would like to see all free nations throughout the world line up in defense of Christian civilization. If this could be done, he was sure the Soviets would start no war. The Foreign Minister agreed with this feeling and said last September he had mentioned to Secretary Acheson in New York that even if the present time were not propitious for the inclusion of Spain on the Atlantic Treaty perhaps some preliminary conversation could be undertaken with the Spaniards regarding defense of Iberian Peninsula for such conversations would be useful since if a suitable moment arrived when Spain could be included in NAT, this could then be done speedily without lengthy preliminary conversations. General Eisenhower replied he was not familiar with Cunha's conversations with Secretary Acheson and that this seemed to be a matter which had been pursued through diplomatic channels.[3]

3. Santos Costa and Portuguese Chiefs of Staff: This conversation consisted of an outline of Portuguese military program by Santos Costa with discussion of certain specific points. General Eisenhower explained purpose his trip and problems he faces and urged maximum effort in building up effective forces in being et cetera. (Details of this talk being prepared by military side of Eisenhower staff.) Santos Costa did stress importance of receiving military assistance and military end items from US. General Eisenhower subsequently lunched with Cunha and Santos Costa and it was obvious he had made deep impression on latter.

4. Carmona: After the usual exchange of amenities, President Carmona said how happy he was to receive General Eisenhower in Portugal. He himself, as an old military man, who never lost contact with the military, could assure General Eisenhower he could count on the Portuguese soldier who, during the peninsula wars, under guidance of a foreign general, the Duke of Wellington, had proved his worth. Wellington, he said, had counted on the Portuguese to degree on which he could not count on the Spaniards. Marshal Carmona wished General Eisenhower every success in his mission and was sure that he could bring it to successful conclusion. General Eisenhower said that he knew that Wellington in his subsequent campaign in Belgium had often wished to have with him some of his old Portuguese comrades-in-arms. General expressed appreciation for the very warm welcome he had been given in Portugal, and was

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[3] Telegram 580, January 19, from Madrid, reported that Army, Navy, and Air Attachés in Madrid had received instructions to proceed to Paris to confer with General Eisenhower on January 22 to discuss the possibility of Spanish membership in NATO and to brief the General on the "Spanish situation." The Attachés were to avoid any discussion of political considerations. (740.5/1–1951) No record of that discussion has been found in the files of the Department of State. For additional documentation on the attitude of the United States regarding the participation by Spain in NATO, see volume IV.

impressed by what he had heard from the Minister of Defense, the Foreign Minister, and the chiefs of the Portuguese military establishment. The President concluded by repeating his warm wishes for General Eisenhower's complete success. [MacArthur.]

DUNN

740.5/1–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET THE HAGUE, January 19, 1951—6 p. m.

1057. Fuss and furor created by General Eisenhower's visit,[2] subsequent leak re his letter to me, Kerr *Herald Tribune* article referring to Drees as "doctrinaire socialist" and *New York Times* story January 14 continues only slightly abated. There seems be only little doubt that letter leak was through Catholic member of Cabinet Defense Council . . . to embarrass Drees and likewise we believe General Staff collaborated in *Times* article. While in some ways regrettable and definitely coming at unfortunate time for Prime Minister Drees and his coalition cabinet, I believe entire affair will have positive and beneficial effect on Cabinet thinking re Netherlands national and NATO defense efforts. Practically all papers have devoted columns to defense question—in general there seems be unanimity that Netherlands not doing enough. Parenthetically, I have seen nothing in press and heard nothing from our contacts with Dutch officials and diplomats which would indicate any criticism General Eisenhower or this Embassy.

Foreign Minister Stikker in Second Chamber debate yesterday said priority must be given defense matters since "safeguarding national existence at stake," adding new plans being worked out as to Netherlands' contribution NATO including size of army and such decisions "will have far-reaching social consequences". Also said in his opinion Netherlands "utmost not yet being done".

In same debate Prime Minister Drees referred to US reports and stated "absurd" unwilling support Atlantic defense, adding entire Cabinet supported pact and Netherlands responsibilities thereunder.

Netherlands Defense Council meeting today which time new plan drawn up by General Kruls will be discussed.

Also I have appointment with Stikker tomorrow at ten when propose inform him first immediate step Netherlands must take in meeting agreed commitments under MTDP is an increase in defense expenditures 1951 of $170 million dollar equivalent, including 60 mil-

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London, Paris, and Frankfurt.

[2] Regarding General Eisenhower's visit to The Hague, see telegram 604, January, 11, from Copenhagen, p. 413.

lion training. We propose follow this up with joint discussions on working level to get Netherlands over hump.

CHAPIN

740.5/1–1951 : Circular telegram

The Minister in Luxembourg (Mesta) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LUXEMBOURG, January 19, 1951—6 p. m.

[Unnumbered.] For Perkins from MacArthur. General Eisenhower has now visited all European NAT countries. In his talks with top political and military leaders, he has attempted to set forth clearly and forcefully the situation with which we are faced. He has expressed the conviction that the problem of developing adequate defense for the free world is manageable only if all NAT members make maximum effort. He has also stressed the fact that immediately upon his return to US he must report to the President and Congress on the degree of determination he found in Europe and whether, in his opinion, the other NAT members are prepared now to make effort and sacrifices comparable to those of US. His presentations on this point must be persuasive if US forces in Europe are to be increased and extensive financial and end-item aid assured to other NAT members.

While General Eisenhower has received governmental assurances in every capital that maximum effort would be made, such general assurances will not be convincing with the Congress or American people unless they are backed up with concrete evidence that the European NAT members are now initiating the necessary action.

With the foregoing in mind, it is suggested that you may desire to raise the subject again with political leaders.

If it is not possible, because of parliamentary complications to take positive action before General Eisenhower leaves Paris on 25 January, perhaps the government may be in a position to announce its intention to go before parliament soonest to secure passage of necessary measures. Any other type of specific evidence would likewise be acceptable, because it must be emphasized that much as he believes in the basic capabilities and intentions of free Europe yet success in the immediate problem requires evidence of prompt and maximum programming.

The purpose is not to needle NAT governments again, but to impress upon them the importance of giving General Eisenhower every

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[1] This telegram was sent to Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, London, Lisbon, and Rome and was repeated to Reykjavik, Ottawa, and the Department of State, the source text printed here. General Eisenhower and his party were in Luxembourg January 19–20 before departing for West Germany. On January 19, General Eisenhower called on Grand Duchess Charlotte and her consort Prince Felix and also conferred with Prime Minister Dupong and Foreign Minister Bech.

possible bit of evidence which he can use in his Washington conferences. Action by NAT governments now will be worth much more than action a few weeks from now. Indeed, it may have decisive influence on what US Congress will be willing to do to aid Europe. Please make it clear that General Eisenhower is not trying to interfere in European business beyond scope of his responsibilities. He is only trying to be helpful and therefore repeats these ideas informally through properly accredited US representatives. General Eisenhower will depart from Paris on morning of 25 January for Iceland and Canada and will reach Washington about noon on 27 January.

[MacArthur]
Mesta

740.5/1–1951 : Telegram

The Minister in Luxembourg (Mesta) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY Luxembourg, January 19, 1951—8 p. m.

72. For Perkins from MacArthur. January 18 General Eisenhower and General Gruenther met alone with De Gasperi and then were joined by Foreign Minister Sforza, Defense Minister Pacciardi and Finance Minister Pella. This was followed by meeting with Pacciardi and Italian military chiefs.[2] Following résumé of talks:

1. De Gasperi met [*meeting?*]. De Gasperi opened by congratulating General Eisenhower on statement he made upon arrival Ciampino. He said General stressed exactly right points, and he was confident it would make most favorable impression on Italian people. He made it clear Italian Government and people grateful to Eisenhower for accepting arduous task of supreme commander and they determined give him every assistance in tremendous task which lies ahead. He then said he would like outline some of factors in present situation as he understands them.

In first place, Italy is poor country. Income per individual one-half that of France, one-fourth of UK, about one-seventh of US. In other words there is annual gross income of approximately $260 per individual. With such low standard living, problem of Italy is especially difficult because there is so little margin with which to work. Italy devoid of almost all raw materials. Specter of inflation hangs over everybody's head especially because this evil has befallen Italy three times in past generation.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris for General Schuyler, to London for Spofford, and to Rome for Dunn. Department of State was asked to pass this message to the Defense Department.

[2] General Eisenhower and his party arrived in Rome from Lisbon on the afternoon of January 17 and departed from Rome for Luxembourg on the morning of January 19.

The Italians spending now approximately 32 percent of entire budget for defense and intend to spend more. They will need help and have been assured they will get help from US, but are resolved to go ahead with defense expenditures without waiting.

De Gasperi said generally speaking Italian Communists are in hand.[3] Italians are naturally undisciplined people. Moreover, they taught to flaunt authority of Facist Government during war, and developed habit flaunting authority. With low standard living and disturbed conditions in Italy, Communism has had certain success, but De Gasperi stated its influence is on wane and he certain that effort to reduce it will be successful. He cautioned this not an accomplishment which will come to pass in matter of weeks.

He then said it planned to have conference between French and Italy fairly soon.[4] There considerable speculation in press about this meeting being one between two "neutralist" governments. He wanted make it clear that neutralism will have no place in discussions. Among problems which might be on agenda (although none yet agreed) are immigration, customs union, and Schuman Plan. It possible French will also care discuss European army. Italians favor in principle organization such an army, but believe it should *follow* rather than precede integration on political level. They believe main emphasis in defense field now should be confined to NATO effort, and that organ of Europe army now would probably complicate rather than simplify SHAPE problem.

Prime Minister next invited attention to psychological factor in international relations. He stated he believed announcements by international bodies should be thoroughly coordinated with member governments with respect to time and he said, "you may rely on our loyalty to acquiesce to international decision, but we do request that we be consulted re form in which such announcements should be made in our own country". He believed other countries have same problem. He made vague reference to Council Deputies but it not clear what he had in mind. When pressed this point for illustration he said he had no specific case in mind. General Eisenhower told him he agreed with principle enunciated by De Gasperi and said he would keep it in mind in SHAPE organization.

Prime Minister expressed some concern over German problem and provocation it might cause USSR. He said it important that NATO

[3] Telegram 3131, January 19, from Rome, reported on the general ineffectiveness of Communist-sponsored demonstrations against General Eisenhower during his visit. Judging by the mildness of the Communist protests, the Embassy thought it might be said that the Italian Communist Party continued to act primarily as a party devoted to promoting military defeatism by propaganda rather than a party of action aimed at creating serious civil disturbances. (740.5/1–1951)

[4] French and Italian leaders met at Santa Margherita, Italy, February 12–14, for general political conversations. For documentation regarding this conference, see volume IV.

powers gain time develop their defenses. He favors negotiations with Soviets on various subjects of importance but made it clear that he is not in favor any appeasement measures.

Prime Minister said one of main problems facing west, as he saw it, is question acquiring moral conviction as to righteousness of our cause and determination to make it succeed.

General Eisenhower explained the object of his visit in very much same terms that he has used previously.

De Gasperi spoke of land reform problems in Italy. He told General Eisenhower it began three months ago and will continue for next ten years. It most important project and Italian Government would be reluctant abandon it.

He also outlined some problems in economic field, and said government must move carefully in adopting controls because they tend to alarm Italian people.

DeGasperi gave impression of being sincere individual of ability and character; and of being firmly convinced that increased tempo in defense measures is necessary.

2. Meeting with De Gasperi and three other Ministers.

De Gasperi opened by saying he already expressed General Eisenhower thanks of Italian people for taking up heavy burden. Meeting should be general policy rather than details and Italian views would be expressed and Eisenhower could ask any questions he wished. He asked Sforza to speak first. Sforza said one most precious things Eisenhower had done, and would continue to do, was creation of proper atmosphere. He wanted General go back to US with impression that immense majority of Italians will support Italian Government. If Italians can so convince Eisenhower it will be great accomplishment.

There was one little point he would like to draw Eisenhower's attention and in which his Treasury colleague was most interested. It was awkward to make definite commitments but General Eisenhower would be absolutely certain that Italians will fully meet all their engagements without direct commitments. Italy could be strong only if there is moral unanimity. Use of Italian industry would alleviate unemployment and increase Italy's capability to produce both for herself and her allies. Use this industry would give better life to hundreds of thousands and this type of economic stability was a necessity for military force.

Eisenhower explained purpose of his trip along same lines as set forth previous meetings. He hoped Italians would take up question their capacity to produce, and unemployment, with Spofford Committee and also with Defense Production Board. He said he would also talk to Spofford concerning this and that speedy action in production field would be of profit to all. We in US might have our hands full and if certain equipment could be effectively produced here so

much the better. He said that in course of his trip he was seeking in all countries evidence of Europe's will to unite in achieving solution for problem of building adequate defenses. We not only desired solution of this problem but also wished to see some new evidence indicating Europe's understanding of the urgency of situation. He realized Italy could not be expected to produce like US because it lacked raw materials and great productive capacity of US. Nevertheless each NAT countries could strive to be out in front in its contribution to over-all morale.

Pella then said that in last few weeks Italian Treasury had sought pursue its efforts in three directions:

1. Direct rearmament effort;
2. Defense internal front by development of civil investments;
3. Need to go ahead within over-all scope European cooperation and NATO.

Additional rearmament program of 250 billion lire (400 million dollars) has been undertaken by Italy. This was in addition to regular budget 323 billion lire so that in 12 months the Italians will spend 573 billion lire (950 million dollars). This would be done even though internal procedural requirements might make them spread the formal coverage this over a three year period. This amount represented 8 percent of Italian national income and 32 percent Italian Government expenditures. This in country where individual income after payment taxes amounted to $180 year ($160 before taxes). He asked that when Italians effort be compared, the 8 percent be borne in mind like individual income of $180.

Pella continued that Italians were ready implement this plan without waiting for definite US aid. US help is badly needed but Italians fell compulsion go ahead without awaiting formal assurances. Conversations now in progress and some figures have been established. Italians not entirely happy about financial stability of lire but have had assurance from ECA Mission that help to brake inflation will be given if stability of currency is in danger. Along with this rearmament program Italians will go ahead with their civil investments. They will do this for technical and also for social and political reasons. They feel Communism will be defeated if unemployment defeated. ECA Mission has promised help and Italian Government is asking Italian people for special sacrifices. It has asked Parliament for full powers in economic field. This is political act of first importance and prelude to many things such as restriction on consumption, further taxed [*taxes?*] and mobilization of Italians of all classes to support his [*this?*] effort in civil and military field.[5]

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[5] For additional documentation regarding the interest of the United States in the rearmament of Italy, see volume IV.

Pacciardi then said General Eisenhower had asked if will existed in Italy and Europe. For Italy answer was yes. In struggle against Communism considerable has already been done within Italy. Italy has some factors of safety, not present in other countries, such as stability of government which has large parliamentary majority made of up men ready and willing to fight communism. In addition to defense budget, there other expenses which went towards national security. Expenses for public security and civil defense which were charged to Interior Ministry, stockpiling for defense which charged to Ministry of Industry. All these things put him in continuous struggle with Treasury. Defense expenditures actually much greater than appeared at first glance. Rebirth of Italian armed forces was little short miraculous. Italy had emerged from civil war with new regime burdened by peace treaty which gave no comfort to armed forces. A great effort had been made in Army, Navy and was being made in Air Force to put armed forces in shape to defend themselves. As to morale, he would be happy when Eisenhower takes over command Italian troops in integrated forces so he could see for himself this no longer army of threat but small army ready to fight. He then touched quickly on fact that one-third Italian Army consisted of regular army officers, NCO's and 30,000 specialists. They were aiming for 60,000 specialists. Italy was ready to offer General Eisenhower three divisions and by 30 June of this year five divisions. These were minimum figures. Much remained to be done and there were many shortages but no shortage of good will or will to rebuild armed forces from zero.

There was one set figure he would like give Eisenhower before going to military meeting since if these figures became known to Italian officers they would be extremely discouraged. He had obtained from General Scott following official figures on US military aid to Europe: 478,000 tons of MDAP aid had been delivered to Europe of which Italy got 17,870. 1,600 tanks, of which Italy got 79. 750 pieces heavy artillery, of which Italy got 87. 6,000 vehicles, of which Italy got 13. 600 aircraft, of which Italy got 159. 50 ships, of which Italy got 3.

Deliveries which had been received were not in proportion to Italian effort. He was glad General Eisenhower would soon take command as General would realize true value of Italian Army when he did so. Italians felt worthy to be entrusted with more equipment and hoped direct aid would be increased proportionately as they proved themselves.

Eisenhower replied this was first he heard these figures and he would take matter up. He then said there was very large Mediterranean population all hostile to Stalin and mentioned Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia even though its morals may be repugnant and also Spain. From purely military view all this could have great influence on

defense of Mediterranean where allied naval and air force could assist in defense. He wondered if it possible for Italians to think in friendly terms about Yugoslavia and whether some aid might be given Yugoslavs to help protect southern flank. This could not be done if there were great political influences to work against it. He would like snap judgment from Italian Ministers whether they thought this could be worked out by diplomats.

De Gasperi asked Sforza to reply. Sforza said he would like give General Eisenhower a few facts. Italy always friendly with Turkey and supported latter's request for inclusion in NAT. In [case of?] Greece, despite stupid and criminal Fascist invasion [by] Italy, had succeeded in creating warm feeling between Greece and Italy required to deliver cruiser to Greeks and Sforza had received personal letter from Greek Premier [6] saying he would like make delivery of cruiser occasion for friendly Italo-Greek celebration. Italians are in basic agreement with Yugoslavs although no love is lost on them. Trieste has left additional scars.[7] In 1944 Yugoslavs unfortunately given authority to garrison Italian towns and killed everyone stating they were Fascists. This left bitter memories but unfortunately [*fortunately?*] bitter memories do not last long. At present, only choice if Tito falls is communism and Italy would rather have Tito as neighbor than Kremlin. It was sad fact that in Europe nations were usually friendly with other nations which were not their neighbors. Italy had been very friendly with Great Britain because France was in between. France had been friendly with Poland because Germany was in between, and so forth. A few days ago Italians signed economic treaties solving all problems left over from war, including reparations with Yugoslavs. There had been some fear in Trieste that Italians might be renouncing some territory but Sforza had explained this matter to the Triestinos in private and they satisfied. Yugoslavs had told him they understood need for an agreement but time not yet ripe. In addition there are psychological problems. He would like support what Pacciardi said re importance assisting Italian Army to fight well if that day ever came. Speaking among friends he said there is additional advantage in insuring that Italians fight well. There was sort of secret competition between French and Italians to match what other does. If Italians fought well French would likewise do so because it unbearable for them to have Italians fight better than they. He then said he disappointed in NAT Council Deputies. Italians hoped that Deputies would become alter ego of Foreign Ministers. Instead Deputies had become involved in red tape and not producing

[6] Sophocles Venizelos, Greek Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.

[7] For documentation on the interest of the United States in the dispute regarding the Free Territory of Trieste, see volume IV.

as he had hoped. Sforza said Spofford fully understood situation and doing best to rectify.[8]

General Eisenhower replied in his talk to Deputies in London [9] he spoke of great opportunity they had to bring us all together and to eliminate red tape in passing matters from committee to committee. They were representative leaders and had authority deal with some matters that Defense Minister brought up. Count Sforza said: "Yes, but not the responsibility."

3. Meeting with Pacciardi and Italian military consisted of detailed presentation Italian military program during which General Eisenhower again stressed urgency of taking effective steps now.

[MacArthur]
Mesta

[8] Telegram 3223, January 26, from Rome, reported that Sforza told Dunn on January 21 that the question of Spain had come up during the Eisenhower visit. Sforza said he expressed the view that he was in favor of including Spain in NATO on some basis if the Western Allies were convinced that some real military advantage would be gained thereby. Sforza cautioned, however, that Spain's acceptance ought first to be made certain, because he suspected that Franco was seeking an invitation in order to turn it down. Sforza felt that Spain's decision would be based on a hard-boiled calculation of Spanish interests taking into account the exigencies of maintaining a dictatorship. (740.5/1–2651)

[9] For a report of Eisenhower's statement before the Council Deputies in its meeting of January 16, see telegram Depto 417, from London, p. 426.

740.5/1–2051 : Telegram

The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Eisenhower) to the NATO Standing Group, at Washington [1]

CONFIDENTIAL Luxembourg, January 20, 1951—2 a. m.

75. Department pass Army for Standing Group repeated information for Secretary Defense. From General Eisenhower. My conferences with NATO authorities in several the countries thus far visited, have revealed considerable confusion and frustration resulting from failure to reach decisions on production questions such as types weapons to be manufactured and degree to which standardization should be applied in certain military procurement fields. In some instances, I am informed that such matters have been under discussion for some two years, with no concrete results yet apparent.

Some expeditious solution in a number of specific instances is essential if we are to recreate national enthusiasm for intensified defense effort. I strongly urge immediate action to establish a high level group of about three members composed such men as General Whitely from UK, with representatives of comparable stature and experience from

[1] This telegram was repeated to London for General Kibler and to Paris for General Schuyler.

the US and France, to meet as soon as practicable and come to some reasonable agreement on items particularly where answers appear obvious. There are other important cases where delays are even now resulting in idle production capacity in Europe and perhaps critical loss of time in delivery of end items.

I realize that a NATO standardization committee is in process of organization but I am convinced that great impetus to solution this complicated problem can be given by such a group. I am firmly of opinion that representatives should not be merely technicians but should be officers of broad experience who should be empowered to make decisions.

740.5/1–2451 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY FRANKFURT, January 24, 1951—noon.

6080. For Acheson and Byroade. Eisenhower visit seems to have been real success.[1] His press conference on arrival[2] struck the right note and was very widely and favorably commented upon by German newspapers. At the reception which embraced leading German figures including Bonn Ministers, President, as well as French, British and American officials, there was a brief opportunity for Eisenhower to talk with Adenauer, Ollenhauer, who appeared as Schumacher's representative (the latter being ill), Herr Blank, Heusinger and Speidel.[3]

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[1] General Eisenhower and his party arrived at Frankfurt from Luxembourg on January 20. The General visited the headquarters of the U.S. Army's European Command at Heidelberg, where he reviewed Allied units and conferred with Allied military commanders and officials. Eisenhower also visited First Division headquarters at Darmstadt. On the afternoon of January 22, Eisenhower conferred informally with U.S. High Commissioner McCloy, British High Commissioner Kirkpatrick, and French High Commissioner François Poncet at McCloy's residence at Bad Homburg. No formal record of that meeting has been found. Later that day, high-ranking German leaders joined American, British, and French officials at a reception in honor of General Eisenhower at McCloy's residence. Principal conversations with German leaders at that reception are described in the message printed here. Eisenhower and his party flew from Frankfurt to Paris on the morning of January 23.

[2] In comments made at Rhine-Main Air Base on his arrival on January 20, General Eisenhower stated that he wished to see the German people join with other European peoples in a unified defense of the West. He sought to make clear he came to Germany as a friend with no feeling of resentment against Germany as a nation or against the German people.

[3] The summary that follows here appears to be based upon a memorandum of January 24 prepared in the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner. That memorandum indicates that at the meetings described here took place in a room separated from the general reception and that High Commissioner McCloy was present. The memorandum also indicates that Eisenhower spoke very briefly with Vice Chancellor Blüecher who indicated the West could count on Germany if equality were accorded to the Germans. (Frankfurt Mission files, lot 311, D (51) papers)

Eisenhower stressed to them that he was not there to urge them or press them for military contributions, that he was an officer of NATO and Germany was not in NATO, but he was clear about two points. The first was that whatever German contribution was made it had to be made on a free will basis without any pressures from the outside; and secondly, that in any army that he commanded all soldiers would have to be on an equal basis. He would not tolerate second class membership in the army.

Adenauer referred to the necessity for a change in the political status and Eisenhower said he recognized that this was probably a concomitant of a contribution. Adenauer said that he was thinking of going to the Bundestag within a few weeks for a declaration in favor of the principle of a contribution and indicated that things might develop much more rapidly than was generally expected.

Ollenhauer stressed the Schumacher position of the concern which they had that there should be sufficient allied strength in Germany to serve as a protection to Germany until Germany was able to build up strength of her own; that he wished that the SPD position should not be misunderstood; that they had already chosen to go with the West but they could not run the risk of the loss of the first battle. He also stressed the necessity for equality and I think by this he had in mind political equality as well as soldier equality. Eisenhower assured him on the latter point but did not comment on the first.

Conversations with the Generals took primarily the form of Eisenhower explaining his lack of animus against German soldiers or officers as such, and his willingness to accept the principle of the distinction between Wehrmacht as a whole and the Nazi groups. This seemed to please the professional officers very much and to completely satisfy them.[4] When leaving Eisenhower made a statement to this general

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[4] The memorandum cited in the previous footnote begins the account of Eisenhower's conversations with Blank, Speidel, and Heusinger as follows:

"The General stated that he was gratified to meet with these gentlemen and turning to the Generals he said that he felt he owed them an apology. In 1945 in his aim to carry the war to a successful end he had been under the impression that the Wehrmacht and the Hitler gang were all the same. Recently he had read Brig. Young's book about Rommel. He wanted to ask the Generals and Mr. Blank whether they agreed with Brig. Young that one ought to draw a line between the army and the Nazis. Gen. Speidel said definitely yes and that he had pointed this out in his book 'Invasion 1944'. Heusinger also confirmed this, saying that in his command he had had many opportunities to notice that difference. Mr. Blank added that originally he had been a miner, that he had come up through the trade unions, and that during the war he'd been a lieutenant of the reserve. Nobody could accuse him of being a militarist but he also felt that there had been a great difference between the army and the Nazi organization. The General said he was glad to hear this, that he had been quoted as challenging the honor of the German soldier, that this was completely wrong, that he'd never intended to challenge the honor of the German soldier and officer, even though some members of the German armed forces had committed misdeeds. The Generals and Mr. Blank were obviously pleased to hear this statement from the General."

effect.[5] Every indication that all Germans present at reception, which was quite informal and harmonious, were deeply impressed by his personality and force.[6]

McCloy

[5] Before his departure for Paris on the morning of January 23, General Eisenhower made the following public comments regarding the German Army:

"I have come to know that there is a real difference between the regular German soldier and officer and Hitler and his criminal group. For my part, I do not believe that the German soldier as such has lost his honor. The fact that certain individuals committed in war dishonorable and despicable acts reflects on the individuals concerned and not on the great majority of German soldiers and officers." (*Information Bulletin:* Monthly Magazine of the Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, February 1951, p. 37)

[6] In his telegram 6190, January 26, from Frankfurt, for Secretary Acheson, Byroade, and General Gruenther, McCloy made the following additional observations:

"Indications are that Eisenhower visit had more than a superficially good result. SPD circles as well as Adenauer seem to have been deeply impressed. Latter reports there are some real indications that more constructive attitudes toward German defense contribution will be taken all along line." (740.5/1-2651)

740.5/1-2451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, January 24, 1951—5 p. m.

4321. Please pass Finletter. At luncheon today General Eisenhower [1] in characteristically tactful and skillful manner outlined generally the increased demands for stationing of American personnel and for affording facilities for installations in France. He pointed to necessity of making advance preparations of a public relations nature for such steps. Moch responded that he realized necessity; that he had no funds whatever available in French budget for such contributions, but that he realized long-developing situation greatly expanded ideas far beyond those already brought to French Government would be presented. He said that he would meet them sympathetically and would support them actively from a military standpoint but that he would have to take into consideration certain local political necessities.

I regard his reaction as having been highly favorable, especially as it was expressed before leading military figures French Chiefs of Staff. Afterwards I talked in some detail about this subject to General Vernoux and some of Moch's immediate Cabinet. They all recognize the importance and necessity of what we propose to do but would like, as I have previously suggested by cable, to have such projects initiated,

[1] General Eisenhower and his party arrived in Paris from Frankfurt on January 23 and departed for Iceland on the morning of January 25. While in Paris, the General apparently met with Pleven, Moch, General Koenig, and Field Marshal Montgomery. The message printed here appears to be the only report on his meetings in Paris at this time in the files of the Department of State.

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if possible, under cover of NATO determinations. Meanwhile, I suggest that we proceed with those of immediate urgency on service-to-service basis, keeping the French Foreign Office fully informed on fundamentals therewith connected.

BRUCE

740B.5/1–2951 : Telegram

The Minister in Iceland (Lawson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL REYKJAVIK, January 29, 1951—7 p. m.

130. Public reaction Eisenhower's visit [1] almost universally favorable among non-Communists. Regarded as tangible evidence seriousness efforts NATO create defenses as well as recognition Iceland full partnership. Foreign Ministry confirms wide public favorable reaction and expressed very great pleasure and appreciation of opportunity government confer with Eisenhower. Termed it "extraordinarily beneficial" to the government, every member which highly pleased his full appreciation Iceland's position and problems as well as his open intelligent discussion his mission and general problems NATO defense program. Thought more favorable atmosphere created.

Leaders Social Democrat Party also very favorably impressed. Rumored Communist demonstration did not materialize, due, it believed, split opinion in CP re wisdom; fear unfavorable public reaction; and difficulty ascertaining exact schedule Ike's short schedule. Non-Communist press favorable.

LAWSON

[1] Eisenhower arrived at Reykjavik airport at about 12 : 30 p. m. on January 25. He was received by the Foreign Minister, Benediktsson, and held a press conference at the airport terminal before meeting the Cabinet at Government House. After lunching with President Björnsson and other guests at Bessastadir, he conferred again with Government officials and then left for Keflavik. There he viewed the U.S. airfield facilities and spent the night. He departed for Ottawa the next morning at 7 a. m.

742.5/1–2951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Canada (Woodward) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED OTTAWA, January 29, 1951—3 p. m.

212. Eisenhower's Canadian visit [1] eminently successful in eyes Canadian political, military leaders. Defence Minister Claxton described as "masterful" the General's outline before Cabinet Defence Committee of basic principles and findings European tour. Presence at committee meeting of 11 additional Cabinet Ministers considered

[1] General Eisenhower and his party visited Ottawa on January 26 and departed for New York the following day.

by Canadian defence officials particularly valuable in that insight into defence problems was thus given Ministers not usually directly concerned but whose parliamentary support is essential. Meeting with Joint Chiefs Staff [2] characterized as "valuable exchange of views" in which, although Canadian NATO contributions not directly discussed, Canadians "learned all they want to know" as result questions directed Eisenhower. External "extremely pleased" with visit. All sources comment magnetic, inspiring personality Eisenhower.

WOODWARD

[2] Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Editorial Note

Following his 3-week tour of Western Europe (see the editorial note, page 400), General Eisenhower spent a weekend at West Point, New York, before returning to Washington on January 31 where he was greeted at National Airport by President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Marshall, high-ranking government and military officials, and members of the diplomatic corps. At luncheon with President Truman and at a meeting of the Cabinet immediately thereafter, General Eisenhower reported upon the results of his tour. No official reports of these meetings have been found in the files of the Department of State, but according to the accounts in Truman, *Memoirs*, page 258, Eisenhower reported that he had found general agreement on the principles of a unified defense for Western Europe but found great difficulty in reaching an understanding with each NATO country as to its contribution—a difficulty resulting from the general poverty of Western Europe.

Harry S. Truman Library : Papers of George M. Elsey

Notes on a Meeting at the White House, January 31, 1951 [1]

TOP SECRET

The following persons were present:

The President
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower
The Vice President [2]
The Speaker of the House [3]
Dean G. Acheson, The Secretary of State

[1] The source text indicates that these notes were dictated by Presidential Administrative Assistant Elsey on January 31, 1951. These notes are briefly summarized and quoted in Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 258.
[2] Alben W. Barkley.
[3] Sam Rayburn.

John W. Snyder, The Secretary of the Treasury
General George C. Marshall, The Secretary of Defense
J. Howard McGrath, The Attorney General
Jesse M. Donaldson, The Postmaster General
Oscar L. Chapman, The Secretary of the Interior
Charles F. Brannan, The Secretary of Agriculture
Charles Sawyer, The Secretary of Commerce
Maurice J. Tobin, The Secretary of Labor
W. Stuart Symington, Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Charles E. Wilson, Director of Defense Mobilization
W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President
John R. Steelman, The Assistant to the President
George M. Elsey, Administrative Assistant to the President

The President and General Eisenhower entered the Cabinet Room at 2:35 P.M. After General Eisenhower had greeted those present, the President invited him to take a seat at the end of the table so that he could be seen by all those present.

The President said that he had asked "Ike" to tell the Cabinet what he had seen in Europe and to repeat some of the things he had told the President at lunch.[4]

General Eisenhower began by reminding everyone that he had been asked to be Supreme Allied Commander of the military forces of 12 governments. The purpose of his command was to defend Western Europe. It was, he said, a sad commentary on the state of the world that we had to spend so much of our energy at this time on building up defenses of Europe. Western Europe is the seat of our culture and our civilization. Our literature, our art, our religions, our system of government and our ideas of justice and democracy all come from Western Europe. In Western Europe there are about 350 million people, tremendous industrial capacity, and a highly skilled and educated population. Why, General Eisenhower asked, since Europe has all of these resources, is there so great a fear of Russia? Why should Europe be afraid of 190 million backward people?

General Eisenhower said the answer was simple; there is unity on the part of the Russians and disunity on the part of the West. Russian unity is forced unity, it is unity at the point of a bayonet, but it is still unity. General Eisenhower said he conceives his job as being in large part an effort to bring about a unity in the defense of Western Europe and, he said, if he could succeed in doing that, most of the danger would end.

"My first job" General Eisenhower said, "was to go around these countries and find out what they had in their hearts. I wanted to see how they feel about these questions." His itinerary had included (in

[4] No record has been found of the President's luncheon conversation with General Eisenhower.

this order) Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, London, Lisbon, Rome, Luxembourg, Germany, Paris, Iceland and, finally Ottawa.

Every place he went, Eisenhower said, he recited to officials the advantages which the West possesses. He got everybody to agree that the Western nations could tell Russia to go to hell if they only would get together, raise enough men, and produce enough equipment. There was agreement on this, because everywhere he went he found that there was confidence that the communists in Western Europe presented no grave menace and the opposition could be overcome.

General Eisenhower spoke at some length on the nature of communism in Western Europe, as it appeared to him on this visit. He felt that there is only a small hard-core of communists in each country, even in France and Italy, where supposedly the communists are fairly strong. He admitted that there was a fanatic, highly organized core which is very skillful in getting a fairly sizeable number of people to vote communistic in elections, but he thinks that most of the people who vote the communistic ticket really don't care very much about it and would drop away in time of trouble. The real communist danger at the moment is in its latest manifestation, that of "neutralism." The communists are busy fostering the idea of a "third force." They are trying very hard to persuade large numbers of people that Western European countries ought to be neutral. This appeals to the timid folks, and, the indecisive ones who don't want to have to make up their minds. Neutralism is only a wishful hope, Eisenhower said, but we have to recognize that it has a fairly wide appeal. Neutralism has a number of Western European leaders worried, especially Pleven, and neutralism is definitely a drag on French efforts and probably will be until after the General Elections are held about six months from now.

General Eisenhower said that, while he had found general agreement on the principles of a unified defense for Europe and general agreement that such defense could be successfully organized, he found it much tougher in trying to reach an understanding with each country as to its contribution. At each stop he would ask the question "What are you going to do? You have to tell me exactly what you are going to do so that I can report back to the United States Government."

The answers to this question, Eisenhower said, all tripped on one hard tough fact. That fact is the poverty, the extreme poverty of Western Europe. General Eisenhower said he had found that this poverty meant that no one yardstick could be used to measure the contributions of the various countries. We couldn't, for example, expect the Western Europeans to spend the same percentage of their budget on defense that we are going to spend. They are so desperately poor that some of them just can't spend any more than they are already doing. In Nor-

way, for example, the people live on fish and potatoes and many of them are just scratching out an existence. Despite their poverty, the Norwegian Cabinet has just voted an increase in their defense budget. It doesn't look like much of an increase to us, but it will mean a lot on their standard of living. Incidentally, General Eisenhower remarked, we certainly don't need to have any doubts about Norway. The Norwegians went through one occupation and they aren't going through another one. He is convinced that they will resist to destruction rather than give in to the Russians.

Another country that is trying hard is France. France has just increased her military service to 18 months. That may not look like much to some people over here, since we already require 21 months and are trying to raise it, but the French don't permit any exemptions—no deferments at all. General Eisenhower spoke of a specific case of a widow who had lost four sons in World War II, and her fifth and last son was about to go into the army. People accepted things like that in France and nobody got deferred.

Every country, Eisenhower said, seemed to him to be trying hard except Holland. He can't understand Holland or the attitude of the Dutch. All they seem interested in is a navy, which doesn't make any sense to him, when they ought to be worrying about the land defenses of Holland.

Britain has stepped up her military program tremendously, and General Eisenhower expressed his conviction that the British were pushing hard. He was especially impressed with Shinwell's efforts. Shinwell was running the British Chiefs of Staff as they have never been run before. A short time ago they recommended against sending more divisions to Europe and Shinwell had told them to get the divisions over there, or he would get some new Chiefs.

General Eisenhower said he didn't have much to say about Portugal. Portugal can't reach Europe except by going through Spain. What they seem most interested in at the time is getting Spain into Western European defense in some manner or other. The Portugal Dictator Salazar impressed General Eisenhower especially.

Rome had worried him some, before he got there, because he had heard what the Italian communists were going to try to do. However, once he arrived, he was impressed by two facts. De Gasperi's government is really tough with the communists and really on top of the situation. He did not see a single communist demonstrator while he was in Rome. A second fact that impressed him was the conviction of the Italian leaders that their men could and would put up a good fight if they had to. Eisenhower himself was beginning to believe this. The Italians told him, he said, that their own men were very much underrated because of their record in World Wars I and II, but they explain this by saying they have not had, in modern times, a cause they

could put their hearts in. In World War I, the leaders had sat on the fence and held out for the highest price, while in World War II Mussolini had done the same thing. Eisenhower said he was convinced that if Italy had the cause and had the leaders, she could fight. He thought the present Italian Government was doing a pretty good job of providing both.

Luxembourg also presented an optimistic picture. Of course, Luxembourg is tiny and doesn't count for much in terms of men. There are only 300,000 in the whole country. But Luxembourg has just put in universal military service and they seem eager to do all they can. What they need right now is equipment for their men going into the service and General Eisenhower said he had succeeded in getting a promise of enough equipment for Luxembourg when he was in Canada. He said the Luxembourgers had the finest kind of spirit, and he had told them they were leading everyone in morale.

As for Germany, General Eisenhower said, he thought that too many Americans talked too much out loud about Germany. He, personally, would like to have German troops under his command. He had good reason to know what kind of fighters they made. But he did not want Germans in his command unless they came in without conditions and without strings attached. He had made this very clear to all the German leaders he had spoken to and he had made it equally clear that he didn't give a damn about their quarrels with France. They could settle that themselves, but they certainly weren't going to use his command as a place or as a means to bargain for improving their condition. He wants their men but he doesn't want them if it means coming to some kind of terms. Eisenhower said that he had given his opinions very frankly and very bluntly to German leaders, and they seemed to understand.

To conclude the report of his trip, Eisenhower said that he found a "growing confidence" everywhere and that it was evident things were progressing.

As for the matter of military equipment, we have a lot to do here at home. "What we need is a rapid conversion of our economy so that we can get the equipment to those people. We've got to get them the equipment to end this idea of neutralism. I don't know how fast Charlie Wilson is producing tanks, but I know it's not fast enough. What we need is speed, more speed, and more speed in production. They're being told by the communist press in every country that it's no use, that we can't get the stuff there in time." Let's go ahead and give them the stuff, Eisenhower said, and not be slow about it or decide to do it just if they make the right kind of speeches or spend a particular percentage of their budget. After all, we must remember that some of their leaders are in grave danger all of the time. So are their families and all of

their relatives. Europeans can't always talk the way we would like to hear them talk, Eisenhower said, and we ought to realize that. "They can't talk like I'm doing now, I'm not close to the Kremlin, they are; they're right under the walls."

"Gentlemen," Eisenhower said, "there is only one thing for us to do and that is get this combined spiral of strength going up. These people believe in the cause. Now, they have got to believe in themselves. They have got to have confidence that they can do the job. The way we can give them that confidence is by sending equipment and by sending some American units over there to help morale."

General Eisenhower then turned to his strategic conception of the defense of Europe. Europe appears to him to be shaped like a long bottleneck. The wide part of the bottle is Russia, the neck is Western Europe, stretching down to the end of the bottle, Spain. On either side of this neck are bodies of water that we control, with land on the far side of the water which is good for air bases. The North Sea with England behind it, is on one side and the Mediterranean with the Near East and North Africa is on the other. We must apply great air and sea power on both these sides and we must rely on land forces in the center. "I want to build a great combination of sea and air strength in the North Sea," Eisenhower said. "I'd make Denmark and Holland a great 'hedgehog' and I'd put 500 or 600 fighters behind them and heavy naval support in the North Sea. I'd do the same sort of thing in the Mediterranean, I'd put a great fleet of air and sea power in the Mediterranean and I'd give arms to Turkey and the 'Jugs'." "Then," Eisenhower went on, "if the Russians tried to move ahead in the center, I'd hit them awfully hard from both flanks. I think if we built up the kind of force I want, the center will hold and they'll have to pull back."

That concluded his remarks, General Eisenhower said, but he wanted to make the point again that we ought to mobilize just as speedily in the matériel field as if we were actually at war.

The President asked if there were any questions.

Secretary Sawyer asked about Spain.

General Eisenhower said Spain had 20 divisions and she hated Stalin. "I feel about the question of keeping Spain out the same as I feel about keeping a sinner out of church," Eisenhower said. "You can't convert the sinner unless you let him get inside the front door. I realize there are a lot of political problems on Spain but I am a professional soldier and when I have the problem of hitting an enemy I pick up everything I can reach and hit the enemy with it." He hesitated to speak further on Spain but he wondered if that answered Mr. Sawyer's question.

Secretary Sawyer said it certainly did.

Mr. Harriman asked what the European countries think about Spain.

Eisenhower replied that he thought European opposition to letting Spain in was dropping.

Secretary Snyder wondered if the various European countries each wanted its own complete military force, that is, balanced air, naval and land units.

General Eisenhower replied that Holland seemed to be the only country that hadn't fallen into line. Holland still wants a navy, which doesn't make any sense at all. The other countries were coming along and weren't causing any trouble.

The Vice President asked General Eisenhower, in view of the threat which the Soviet Union presents, how big he thought his combined army ought to be at the end of, say, six months.

Eisenhower replied that there ought to be 50 to 60 divisions in Western Europe, not including Germany, and he didn't know how long this would take. We ought to have them as fast as possible. Of course, we couldn't begin to have this in six months. He didn't really know what we should have in six months, except that we should be building as rapidly as possible until we get up to 50 to 60 divisions.

General Eisenhower said that he wanted to comment at this point about a speech he had read some place, by some prominent American—he couldn't remember who—who had said that, if we build 50 to 60 divisions, this would pose a serious threat to Russia and Russia would be forced to attack. The argument, insofar as he could understand it, Eisenhower said, seemed to be that we oughtn't to try to build up a defense force because it would be a threat to Russia. This was nonsense. A 50 division force on the Rhine posed no threat to Russia at all and Russia knew it. Fifty divisions couldn't possibly attack Russia. Fifty divisions on the Rhine is a lot different from 50 divisions on the Vistula. When an army moves forward, it has to leave all kinds of troops on its flanks, and in the zone of the interior. A 50 division army would be too feeble, by the time it got to the borders of Russia, to do anything at all. On the other hand, he thought that a 50 or 60 division force was quite capable of *defending* Western Europe under the general strategic concept he had outlined above. He thinks that the Russians would believe the same thing.

The Vice President asked again if 60 divisions were adequate if Russia should want to start trouble.

General Eisenhower thought they would, provided, of course, that there were appropriate air and naval supporting forces.

General Eisenhower explained why he wanted American divisions sent to Europe as soon as we could do so. He wants them there to encourage the Europeans and to boost their morale. Nothing would convince the Europeans more than the sight of 10 or 12 United States

divisions that we mean business. Of course, we should not plan on keeping our divisions there forever. Once the Europeans build up an adequate force, and get some reserves trained, the Americans can come home.

As for the question he had heard asked a few times about the fate of the Americans if Russia attacked, he thought that could be answered easily too. We only have two divisions there now. If Russia attacked now, we'd probably lose nearly everybody. But, if we have 10 or 12 divisions there, and the Europeans have their forces up to strength, and if Russia attacks, there is no reason for us to lose any sizeable number of men unless somebody makes a terrible blunder. Even if Western Europe could not hold out—and he thinks it can—we would have enough there to be able to make an orderly withdrawal to some place like the Brittany Peninsula or the Cotentin Peninsula. We could hold out long enough for a good evacuation but, Eisenhower said, he wanted to repeat that he didn't think we would have to pull out.

The Vice President asked if General Eisenhower had been in Europe long enough to form any impression of Russia's plans and intentions.

General Eisenhower said that he did not know what the Russians might do. He doubts very much that the Russians want to fight now. "I personally think those guys in the Kremlin like their jobs. They can't see their way through to winning a war now and I don't think they'll start one. They know they'll lose their jobs, or their necks, if they start something they can't win." Eisenhower said he did not believe all the Russian propaganda about how the war would start if we armed Germany, or armed Western Europe. Of course, "matches can always be thrown in an open powder key [*keg*]," and there was always a possibility that something could happen, but he doubted it. "If the Russians really think that 60 or 70 divisions in Western Europe are a threat to them, they are crazy. They have no business going to war over that and I don't think they'll do it."

Secretary Tobin asked about the attitude of the German socialistics [*sic*].

General Eisenhower replied that Schumacher had been very ill and he had not been able to see him but Schumacher sent word that he was all for European unity and would support General Eisenhower.

The conversation then turned to the arrangements for General Eisenhower's appearance the following morning at an informal joint session of the Congress in the auditorium of the Library of Congress. The Vice President and the Speaker outlined the arrangements and it was agreed that General Eisenhower would speak for an hour or so. No questions should be asked from the floor, and anybody who wished to have the General answer a question could get his answer by submitting

it to one of the four committees before which Eisenhower would appear.

General Eisenhower then returned to some broad observations. "I believe," he said, "that our civilization is in one hell of a hole. I believe we have to work and work like hell. I believe that we have to go all out and produce just as though we were in a war and that we have to get this spiral of strength going up in Europe. Right now, it is going down. We have got to stop it, turn it around, and make it go up. I have been reading about 'Gibraltar' and people who say that we ought to build up our own strength here at home and let Europe go. That's nonsense. Any isolated fort would fall in a week. How long do you think Gibraltar could hold out if Spain attacked her?" General Eisenhower then turned to the President and apologized, saying that he knew, of course, that neither the President nor any of the others present held those views but that he felt so deeply about this question of standing together that he couldn't resist expressing himself. "I'm a soldier and I have to do whatever job is given to me. I'm doing this job because it was given to me but I'm also doing it because I believe in it. I believe very deeply in it."

Mr. Charles Wilson said that he would like to talk with General Eisenhower just as soon as he could and find out what timetable Eisenhower had in mind for the shipment of equipment to Europe. He had been hard at work on production for the United States, and he wanted to know how these European requirements were going to fit into our own schedules. We were already taking on a lot, and he wanted to know how much more we would have to steam up.

General Eisenhower replied that he wanted to stay in the United States long enough to work out questions like that, so that when he went back he could give definite facts to the European governments.

"As far as equipment goes," General Eisenhower went on, "as far as tanks and planes go, we have got to turn to a full war basis of production. We must get this curve, this damned curve, up quick. We have got to get the stuff into the hands of the Europeans. The difference here is whether our civilization goes up or goes down, and so I am ready for a tremendous sacrifice."

Mr. Symington asked if that meant that General Eisenhower did not think that we could have both guns and butter.

Eisenhower replied that answering that question would lead him into too deep water, that he would prefer not to try to answer that question now. What he was sure of was that we would have to produce exactly as if we were going to war. "We have got to 'convert' ", he said, "we can't just pile these new requirements on top of what we are doing—at least I don't think we can."

General Eisenhower, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Symington agreed to talk further on this subject.

Since there were no other questions, the President thanked General Eisenhower for his report and the meeting adjourned at 3:30 P.M.

Editorial Note

Following his meeting with the Cabinet at the White House, General Eisenhower went to the Pentagon where he reported to the Standing Group of NATO on the results of his tour. No official report of this meeting has been found. On February 1, General Eisenhower addressed an informal meeting of Congress held at the Library of Congress and reviewed the problems confronting North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations in establishing an integrated defense. For the text of the address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 12, 1951, page 245. The afternoon of that same day, General Eisenhower appeared before a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. On the morning of February 2, he appeared before a closed session of the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees. On the evening of February 2, General Eisenhower delivered a radio address to the American people reporting on his tour of European capitals and the problems of establishing an integrated defense of Western Europe. For the text of the address, see *ibid.*, February 19, 1951, page 285.

Editorial Note

The charts below present the early 1951 organization and system of command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They are derived from *The System of Command Established Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (London, April 1951).

The Higher Military Organisation of N.A.T.O.


Defence Committee
(The Defence Ministers of the Twelve Powers)
Military Committee
(The Chiefs of Staff of the Twelve Powers)
Standing Group
(The Chiefs of Staff of France, United Kingdom and United States normally working through their Permanent Representatives)
Military Representatives Committee
(The Chiefs of Staff of all the North Atlantic Treaty Powers normally working through their Permanent Representatives)
International Working Teams
Permanent Representatives' Staffs

The System of Command in N.A.T.O.


Standing Group
(The Chiefs of Staff of France, United Kingdom and United States working through their Permanent Representatives)
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Supreme Allied Commander Europe
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
(Other Command Organisation not yet decided)
Deputy (Navy)
Deputy (Air)
Northern Sector
Central Sector
Southern Sector (not yet decided)
Area Commanders-in-Chief
Commander-in-Chief
C.-in-C. Allied Land Forces
C.-in-C. Allied Air Forces
Flag Officer Central Europe
Commander, Land Forces, Norway
Commander, Land Forces, Denmark
Commander, Allied Air Forces

C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMAND STRUCTURE AND RELATED PROBLEMS INVOLVING THE ADMISSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY[1]

EUR files, lot 59 D 233

Briefing Book Prepared in the Department of State for the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Eisenhower)[2]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

I. GENERAL COMMENTS

A—MILITARY

1. The three European Regional Planning Groups have each prepared short and medium term plans. The former are capabilities plans, based on forces available as of 1 September 1950; the latter are requirements plans based on a planning date of 1 July 1954. The short term plans have been accepted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a basis for initiating operations in the event of an emergency, but are subject to review at an early date as additional forces become available. The medium term plans have been integrated into an approved NATO Medium Term Defense Plan.

2. WESTERN EUROPEAN REGION

a. Short Term Plan.

(1) The regional aim is to hold the enemy as far to the East as possible. . . . It is also intended to defend the home territories against air attack, airborne and parachute attack and sabotage; and to defend coastal waters and ports against seaborne attack.

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[1] Throughout 1951, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was much concerned with the interrelated problems of creating a command structure for the Atlantic and European areas under its responsibility and the geographic expansion of the Organization to the fringes of the Middle East to include Greece and Turkey. The documentation in the following pages focuses upon the diplomatic and politico-military aspects of these problems. In the preparation of this compilation the editors have felt it necessary and appropriate to concentrate their attention upon the files of the Department of State. For papers and exchanges on earlier considerations of Greek and Turkish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

[2] For documentation regarding the discussions and considerations leading to the decision in December of 1950 to designate General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), see *ibid.*

(2) It should be noted that this plan contains no provision for successive delaying actions west of the Rhine. Although Field Marshal Montgomery, as Chairman of the Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee,[3] had proposed a broad strategy which contemplated plans for the possibility of such a line of action, this proposal was disapproved by the Western Union Chiefs of Staff for political and psychological reasons. . . .

(3) Other major deficiencies evidenced by this plan are: inadequacy of available combat forces; maldeployment of peacetime land and air forces; inadequate provision for psychological warfare, operational and logistics plans, warning of aggression, support of the strategic air offensive, stockpiles (strategic and tactical), lack of mutual aid among member nations and of measures for remedying equipment and training deficiencies.

b. Medium Term Plan.

(1) The strategic concept is to hold the enemy as far to the East in Germany as possible, and by using all offensive and defensive means available to deny him freedom of action, in order to cover the mobilization and concentration of regional and allied military potential required to reinforce the defense forces and assume the offensive. The objectives envisaged in pushing the line of defense as far to the east as possible are: to cover the whole of the Netherlands, Italy, and Denmark and assist the demands of the other regions; to retain Western Germany; to deny the enemy the use of bases on the North Sea Coast and give the Allies the opportunity to act offensively in the Baltic; to give depth to the ground and air defense of Western Europe.

(2) Principal deficiencies of this plan are: failure to adequately define the area of the land defense; failure to provide for closing the gap between the force requirements contained in the plan and agreed national contributions: specially concerning air and naval forces; lack of any statement of requirements beyond the first phase of operations (stemming the initial enemy assault).

c. Command Structure. There exists at present as a part of the Western Union Defense Organization, the Commanders-in-Chief Committee. This organization, originally conceived to execute com-

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[3] Reference is to the Western European Union, a military alliance established by the Five-Power Treaty of Brussels in 1948 including the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. For documentation on U.S. encouragement of a Western European Union in 1948, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. III, pp. 1–351.

mand in case of war over the forces allocated them by Western Union and the United States, consists of land, sea and air commanders and a skeletonized international staff. Elements of this structure will probably be made available to SHAPE for use either on the SHAPE staff or as part of a subordinate command.

d. Infrastructure. The term infrastructure is used to define the static items of capital expenditure which are required to provide the material backing for operational plans necessary to enable the higher command to function and the various forces to operate with efficiency. An infrastructure program has been evolved by Western Union and recently made a part of the North Atlantic Treaty defense plans. The Brussels Treaty powers [4] have agreed to contribute as a first essential increment, £33,000,000 ($92,500,000) for the construction of a war headquarters, signal communications, airfields, logistical requirements, equipment for airfield construction and GEE coverage. Although some progress has been made in the implementation of this program, a sense of urgency appears lacking.

3. EMMO REGION

a. Short Term Plan.

(1) The aim of the EMMO (Europe Meridonale–Mediterranean Occidentale) Short Term Plan is defined as follows: In cooperation with the bordering NATO groups, to defend as far to the North and East as possible the area under its responsibility, including the vital air and sea lines of communications. Although this plan fulfills the requirements of the Standing Group directive, the deficiencies are the same as listed in para 2*a*(3) above.

b. Medium Term Plan.

(1) The aim of the Medium Term Plan is the same as that set forth in the Short Term Plan. Militarily the plan is sound although a gap exists between the force requirements and the agreed national contributions. It provides as in the other regions only for first phase requirements, with the result that the magnitude of forces and resources necessary for a sustained defense and the offensive required to defeat the enemy are not developed.

c. Command Structure.

The EMMO Region is in the process of approving the establishment of a "Couverture Command in Italy". This command is to be responsible for forces deployed in north Italy during the early stages of a conflict. The headquarters will eventually be located in Northern Italy, however, until such time as the necessary facilities are available in

[4] See footnote 3 above.

Northern Italy, the Command Group will form along side the Italian Staff in Rome. Planning indicates that the ultimate location of this headquarters will be Verona.

d. Infrastructure.

There is no approved infrastructure program in the EMMO Region. This problem is currently under study and is to be incorporated in the Revised Medium Term Plan when the program is approved.

4. NORTHERN EUROPEAN REGION

a. Short Term Plan.

(1) The regional aim is to resist invasion of national territories and, if forced back, to deny to the enemy areas of strategic importance for as long as possible and finally to hold a defensible area. . . .

(2) A major deficiency of the plan is the lack of a detailed demolition policy and plan. Deficiencies evidenced by the plan are the same as those listed in para 2*a*(3) above and additionally the inadequate development of the proper troop basis to insure forces capable of efficient and sustained combat.

b. Medium Term Plan.

(1) The plan is aimed at developing and maintaining a regional defense structure strong enough to deter Soviet and satellite aggression, and, in the event of aggression to defend the region against all forms of attack, and in conjunction with other regions prepare for and initiate offensive actions against the enemy. Lines of action in the Medium Term Plan are essentially the same as those in the Short Term Plan with the exception that retreat is not envisaged as a necessary probability. In addition the plan envisages offensive naval operations in the Baltic.

(2) Principal deficiencies of this plan are:

Failure to provide for closing the gap between the force requirements contained in the plan and agreed national contributions, lack of any statement of requirements and plans beyond the first phase of operations, lack of adequate logistical and infrastructure preparation to support the necessary forces both regional and from other regions.

c. Command Structure.

(1) Although a tentative command structure has been prepared, it has never been formally approved for more than planning. A Commander Designate has been appointed, however, by the Danish Chiefs of Staff for the Jutland Land Forces which forces will include the Danish, Norwegian and British units now stationed in Schleswig-Holstein, these latter units forming the South Jutland Covering Land

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Forces. The Norwegian Commander in this area has been appointed Commander Designate of the South Jutland Covering Land Forces.

d. Infrastructure.

(1) In the Short Term Plan, the guidance for infrastructure requirements is insufficient. In the Medium Term Plan, the plans and guidance for infrastructure are relatively greatly improved but the implementation of this guidance has been slight, due largely to the lack of a definite regional command organization.

5. BASE RIGHTS

An additional important deficiency, common to all three Regions in both Short and Medium Term Plans is the lack of detailed requirements for military bases, rights and facilities, since the implementation of these plans will require, in certain instances, that other than indigenous forces be stationed upon the national territories of certain European NATO nations. On 28 October 1950 the Defense Committee [5] approved a proposed procedure whereby agreements would be undertaken between NAT governments regarding military operating requirements resulting from NAT defense plans. This procedure was approved by the Council Deputies on 8 December 1950. Pending before the Council Deputies is a proposed addendum by the U.S. which would relate the duration of such agreements to a determination by the Council that military requirements continue to exist.

[5] North Atlantic Council Defense Committee. See chart, p. 459.

740.5/2–651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 6, 1951—7 p. m.

Todep 239. This is joint State-Def msg. Pres US has nominated Admiral William M. Fechteler for position Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic accordance with request by NATO doc DC 24/3.[2] It is requested at earliest opportunity you inform Council Deps of

[1] Drafted by Ridgway B. Knight of the Office of European Regional Affairs who also signed for Secretary Acheson. Cleared with Defense and Bonbright.

[2] North Atlantic Council Defense Committee document, December 12, 1950, on the proposed European Defense Force; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, p. 548. According to telegram Todep 209 from Secretary Acheson to Spofford dated January 16, paragraph 27 of DC 24/3 called for the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic in the shortest possible time after the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In this telegram, Acheson had first informed Spofford that the United States was planning to designate Admiral William Fechteler as SACLANT. (740.5/2–751)

nomination and request concurrence NAC Deps, as representing NAC, to fol joint res to which agreement Def Mins is being requested:[3]

"The NAC, having made provision in accordance with the recommendation of the Defense Comite (DC 24/3) for the estab of a Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and having requested the US to designate an officer of the US to fill the position of Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and the President of the US having designated Admiral William M. Fechteler, the Council therefore declares that Admiral William M. Fechteler is appointed the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. His powers and functions over all the forces to be assigned to his command will be in consonance with DC 24/2[4] and DC 24/3 and will be issued separately."

By separate cable action Def requesting M. DeGreef, as Chairman of Def Comite to obtain individual concurrence of Def Mins to this same res.[5] Contact M. DeGreef personally to insure close coordination. Desired effect these two separate actions is to produce doc similar to C6–D/9 of 19 Dec 1950.[5]

Cable to Washington for comment prior release such official NATO communiqué as you may agree upon with M. DeGreef upon assent being given to foregoing action. Contents Pres' ltr designating Admiral Fechteler will be released Washington simultaneously with NATO release and will be cabled to you for info. Until release time set matter shld be held confidential.

ACHESON

[3] In telegram 219 to Brussels of February 7, repeated to the Department of State as telegram Depto 485, Spofford asked that NATO Defense Committee Chairman Edouard De Greef be informed that Spofford proposed to circulate the resolution to the Council Deputies at once, subject to De Greef's concurrence. In a separate paragraph, Spofford informed both Brussels and the Department that he was also seeking the reaction of British Minister of Defense Emanuel Shinwell. (740.5/2–751)

[4] Not printed. According to telegram Todep 209, January 26, from Secretary Acheson to Spofford, paragraph 12 of DC 24/2 approved by the NATO Defense Committee in October 1950 stated that the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic "'shall be a U.S. Officer . . .'". (740.5/1–1651)

[5] Not printed.

740.5/2–951: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY LONDON, February 9, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 494. Reference joint State–Defense message London Todep 239 February 6.[1] Herewith draft communiqué telegraphed to Belgian DefMin De Greef today with suggestion it be released simultaneously next week by NATO London, by De Greef in Brussels if he so desires,

[1] *Supra.*

and in Washington, exact release time to be mutually agreed after approval by individual DefMins and Council Deputies has been given (probably not before Wednesday afternoon and perhaps not till later):

"Admiral William M. Fechteler of the US Navy has been named Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic the North Atlantic Council announced today.

"NAC, acting on recommendations adopted by the Defense Commission at its September meeting in Washington and its meeting in Brussels last December, requested the US to designate an officer to fill the post of Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. The President of the US subsequently designated Admiral Fechteler, whose nomination has now been unanimously approved by the NAT DefMins and the NAC Deputies."

Communiqué kept brief simple to facilitate multilateral clearance; but we would like to release for publication at same time, in addition to full biographical material on Admiral Fechteler (which we have), certain material in DC 24/2 and DC 24/3 as follows:

1. Fechteler's Deputy, as yet unnamed, will be British.
2. Admiral will be supported by integrated international staff drawn from countries belonging to NAORPG.
3. Location of his headquarters.
4. Understood that coordination of SACA with SHAPE to provide naval support for Eisenhower is responsibility of SG.

Believe items 1 and 2 important to release simultaneously possibly in communiqué to emphasize international aspect of command.

Would appreciate any suggested changes text of communiqué and answers on items 1, 2, 3, and 4 plus text President's letter of designation.

SPOFFORD

782.5/2–1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Rountree)

TOP SECRET [ANKARA,] February 12, 1951.

Participants: Celâl Bayar, President of the Turkish Republic
Fuat Köprülü, Minister of Foreign Affairs
George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State
Ambassador George Wadsworth
William M. Rountree, Director of GTI [1]

After a preliminary exchange of courtesies, the President said that he had looked forward to Mr. McGhee's visit to discuss matters of con-

[1] McGhee and Rountree were in Turkey to attend the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission held at Istanbul February 14–21; for documentation, see vol. v, pp. 1 ff.

siderable importance to both countries. The President said that he had talked with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and had been briefed on Mr. McGhee's previous conversations with the Minister and with the Prime Minister.[2] The President had recently talked with Admiral Carney concerning the possibility of a United States security commitment to Turkey, and he hoped that Mr. McGhee was prepared to continue the conversation with the advantage of more current and precise information on the subject.

Mr. McGhee said that he was aware of the President's talks with Admiral Carney [3] but regretted that he was not in a position to give any definitive reply concerning the security arrangement, which has been a Turkish objective for a long time. Although he had previously explained the matter to the Foreign Minister, he would like to highlight some of the comments which he had made.

The United States, Mr. McGhee said, considers Turkey's security to be of very great importance to our own security; the importance which we attach to Turkey's independence has been demonstrated by our policies and programs during the course of the past several years. We have considered that a Soviet attack against Turkey would lead to a general conflict.

Turkey was the first foreign country to which the United States extended military assistance on any scale in the post war period, to build up its own defensive capabilities. Our military aid program in this country was a forerunner to military assistance to Western Europe and to other areas of the free world. Turkey has to date received more of such aid than any other country, and, proportionately, our greatest effort continues to be made here. Our Turkish military aid program has continually increased in size and scope, and we expect it to increase further in the future. The only present limiting factor in our helping Turkey build up the defensive capabilities that Turkey feels it needs is our ability, in light of our own requirements and our commitments elsewhere, to deliver the necessary military supplies and equipment.

We have been aware for some time that Turkey desires a more precise commitment in the event it becomes the victim of aggression, Mr. McGhee continued. The question arose when the North Atlantic Treaty was created, and again last year when Turkey indicated its wish to adhere to the Pact.[4] Our association with the North Atlantic Treaty represented the first commitment of this type which the United States has entered into, and the decision was taken by the Congress only after most careful thought and deliberation.

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[2] McGhee, Rountree, and Wadsworth had held a meeting earlier in the day with Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to discuss Turkish security and military potential along the same lines followed in the conversation with President Bayar and Foreign Affairs Minister Köprülü. A copy of this conversation is in file 782.5.

[3] No record of these conversations has been found in Department of State files.

[4] For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

Continuing, Mr. McGhee said that until the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can be given real strength, the United States does not feel that it can undertake further formal commitments of this nature. We do not consider it wise to undertake obligations beyond our capabilities to fulfill; however, it has always been our hope that when we acquire sufficient strength, we could enter into some form of security arrangement with Turkey. The timing of our acquiring the necessary strength has been affected by events in Korea. Not only have large quantities of American matériel and manpower been diverted to Korea, but new developments in such places as Indo China and Western Europe have created new substantial requirements. Offset against this, however, is a greatly increased build-up in American military strength. Defense expenditures amounting annually to 13 billion dollars have been increased to 50 billion dollars and the months ahead should see a steady rise in the United States military capability.

Mr. McGhee said that the importance of Turkey to the defense of the free world has, if anything, been increased as the result of Korea and other international developments. Turkey has demonstrated support of the principle of collective security through its valuable contribution to the United Nations efforts in Korea, and the fighting qualities of the Turkish soldiers there have won for them the admiration of the whole free world.[5] The importance of a strong Turkey has been highlighted by the revelation of the comparative weakness of the Middle East as a whole.

As a consequence the objective of linking our two countries into a security pact has become even more desirable in our minds, Mr. McGhee, said. While such a step would require Congressional approval, the United States would, when its strength permits it to undertake the commitment, raise the question with Turkey ourselves and discuss the most satisfactory form for the arrangement.

In this connection, Mr. McGhee said that the present basic objective of the North Atlantic Treaty—the land defense of Western Europe—is separate from the problem of land defense of Turkey, and it might therefore be more appropriate at the proper time to consider another arrangement such as an Eastern Mediterranean grouping, centered around Turkey as the strong point in the area. Mr. McGhee regretted that he could not comply with the President's wishes and relate some final word on this point, to which Turkey attaches such great importance, but unfortunately this is not the type of decision that can be made to coincide with official visits.

In reply to the President's question, Mr. McGhee said that he could not give an estimate of the time required for the United States to make its decision. Any conjecture might lead to undue hope and therefore

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[5] For documentation on this subject, see volume VII.

disappointment. He was very glad, however, that his visit and that of Mr. Finletter [6] would be extremely useful in getting the views of the Turkish Government, and would be helpful in consideration of the problem in Washington. Mr. McGhee reiterated in the strongest terms that our failure thus far to adopt the Turkish proposal regarding a pact in no way implied lack of vital interest in Turkish security.

The President expressed his appreciation for Mr. McGhee's full explanation, and said that he likewise would endeavor fully and frankly to set forth his own views. He said that he would like to emphasize Turkey's gratitude, and he knew the gratitude of the entire free world. for the forthright position of leadership and assistance which the United States had taken in the interest of humanity. The position of the United States in Korea has attached Turkey to the policies of the United States and the policy of guaranteeing a free world.

In his opinion, if the United States had not taken the decision to combat the aggression in Korea, the world would be confronted with even larger and more serious conflagrations lit by malicious incendiaries. Turkey would earnestly like to do everything possible to extinguish the fires, and already has done much. The President would like to see at least fifty percent of the burden in Korea assumed by countries other than the United States, but realizes that the burden now lies almost entirely upon America.

Turning to the question of Turkish forces, the President said that when the Democrat Party came to power and he learned of "General McBride's report," [7] he was alarmed, as General McBride reflected considerable doubts concerning the potentialities of the Turkish Army. The President asked the General Staff the reasons for this situation, and the replies were "small and senseless." The President said that, despite laws against revealing military secrets to non-Turks, he had instructed the General Staff to discuss security matters in detail with the United States authorities, and he has taken the legal responsibility for this order. He said that when the Turkish Army is well equipped the men are excellent fighters, and the Government with American assistance is seeing to it that they are well equipped.

The common goal of the free world can be helped by the Turkish Army, the President said. In this common cause, however, military aid is given by the United States, but collaboration is thus far empty in the political field.

In describing the relationship between the United States and Turkey in security matters, the President drew the analogy of a business concern in which some members make profits and some members invest

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[6] Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter visited Turkey during the spring of 1951 to inspect various air facilities for possible use by U.S. forces.

[7] For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1224 ff.

capital but acquire no profit. The concern cannot succeed under these circumstances. Turkey, a partner has received military and economic assistance, but to regularize the legal aspects it has tried to join the Atlantic Pact and was turned down.

Although Turkey recognizes that by joining the Pact it would be giving its support to a number of weak countries, it was willing to make the sacrifice and the refusal of the offer hurt Turkey; the President himself was deeply affected. Turkish action in Korea should, the President thought, rectify the situation. His country is not satisfied with its present position in the partnership with the United States, as Turkey is unwilling not to do its part. *It wants to give a guarantee, and it would like to receive a guarantee.*

Turkey is a poor country, but for six hundred years it has fought and defended itself; it traditionally has made no commitments which it was unwilling to meet. The Turkish people are opposed in principle to receiving assistance without themselves returning something. The President said that if Turkish public opinion were tested on the question of whether Turkey should have a political guarantee with half of the present American military aid, or full military aid with no guarantee, the answer unquestionably would be that Turkey should receive as much military aid as possible but by all means should insist upon the guarantee.

The President said that international events are transpiring very fast, and quick decisions must be taken. The Turkish Government must insist upon this point, as it might soon be in the position of calling upon Turks to give up their lives, and they must know that their Government has done everything possible for Turkish security.

The President said that the General Staff has discussed with the American Military Mission the question of how many divisions, both infantry and motorized, should be maintained under present circumstances. The General Staff says that it could put under arms in short order twenty-five divisions. If this is done, these forces would be an important factor in the interests of the free world. The President concluded by saying that he would appreciate Mr. McGhee's commenting upon these views.

Mr. McGhee, referring to the President's analogy of the business enterprise, said that, as the capitalist in the company, the United States felt that Turkey already is repaying in full its obligation to us; we wish that all countries which we have assisted would prove to be such a good investment.

Referring to the President's comments concerning the McBride report, Mr. McGhee said that he did not know of the report but he could assure the President that General McBride was an extremely good friend of Turkey and was convinced of the potentialities of the Turkish forces, and that he was sure anything the General said was

intended to be constructive. The President said that he was sure of this point; also that the substance of General McBride's report was objective and, in fact, had been very useful in prodding the Turks into action.

Continuing, Mr. McGhee said that the Turkish decision to send troops to Korea was, in his judgment, the wisest that could have been made and will turn out to be of very real benefit to Turkey. Not only has Turkey demonstrated its willingness to participate in collective security, but it also has demonstrated the tremendous fighting qualities of the Turkish troops. For its part, the United States is extremely proud of its association with Turkey in Korea, which is indicative of Turkish-American cooperation in broad world policies.

The application in Korea of the principle of collective security, and the United States action in that country, should be ample evidence that if Turkey is aggressed we will not stand idly by. We have made a great contribution to the principle of collective security and it is indeed good to hear of Turkey's desire to contribute even more to that end.

Within the limitations of the availability of military equipment, Mr. McGhee said, we would like to assist in building up the strength of Turkish forces to any level which Turkey desires, and we are gratified that the Turkish Government already is considering the establishment of twenty-five divisions. We already have discussed in Washington the question of additional United States economic support which would permit the Turkish Government to increase its present forces by some forty thousand men, within the existing divisional organization. We fully understand the budgetary problems created by this increment, and our discussion here with Turkish officials will give impetus to consideration of how we might help.

Mr. McGhee said that he would convey to other appropriate officials in Washington the information concerning the possibility of increasing the Turkish forces to twenty-five divisions, and assumed that the matter also will be discussed at some future date by Ambassador Wadsworth and at the technical level. This is a subject, Mr. McGhee said, which interests us greatly, but it raised the important question of what additional military supplies and equipment will be needed, and how much can we supply.

Ambassador Wadsworth interposed to say that he would welcome highly the President's authorization to have this question discussed carefully between JAMMAT and TGS. The President said that he would instruct the General Staff to discuss the details of the matter with American officials and said that he would himself participate as appropriate. He stated that he was well aware of the military supply problem with which the United States is confronted, and realized that the assistance rendered to Turkey must be within the limitations im-

posed by broad considerations. He wondered, however, whether the question of military aid should not go hand in hand with the question of a security guarantee.

Mr. McGhee said that our problem is not only one of making goods and advice available to other countries, but is the question of our own military forces and capabilities. With the build-up of our strength, our ability to give substance to commitments of the nature which the President desires will be increased. The question of United States friendship for Turkey, Mr. McGhee emphasized, is in no way involved, nor is the importance which we attach to Turkey's security.

Mr. McGhee then promised that he would convey to the President of the United States the Turkish President's deep concern over this problem, and said that he would do everything possible to accelerate consideration in Washington of a security commitment. For this the President said he would be grateful.

Turning now to a different subject, Mr. McGhee said that he would like to tell the President of his great admiration for the way in which the President had led the Democrat Party to victory in the recent elections, and for the Government's restraint and moderation after assuming power. It is a source of confidence to us, Mr. McGhee said, to have this recent proof of the true nature of democracy in Turkey.

Thanking Mr. McGhee, the President replied that this was a new event in the life of Turkey but it did not represent a personal victory for the President. Any compliments are due to the people of Turkey, who have attained a high degree of political maturity. Turks for a hundred and fifty years have fought and shed blood over the problem of attainment of democracy, and the success evidenced by the recent election is the fruit of their efforts.

Mr. McGhee said the United States is proud to be a partner with Turkey in the "company" which the President had referred to, and that we view it as a partnership of equals; we do not make policy exclusively, for that must be done on a mutual basis. We would like to widen the basis of Turkish-American consultation on world issues, especially on issues in this general part of the world. He said that he was convinced that Turkey has a very important role to play in the world, particularly in the Middle East, and the United States is anxious to help her play that part.

The President said, concerning the importance of the role being played by the United States in world affairs, that while the Korean effort is officially a matter for the United Nations, the United States is carrying virtually the whole burden. Turkey is proud to be with the United States in Korea, and the President has been told that some countries in Europe are saying that Turkey made its decision to participate in Korea only in an effort to obtain a United States guarantee.

The real point, the President said, is that Turkey wants to make its share of the sacrifices and to do its duty in the creation of a free and democratic world. The "company" in which Turkey and the United States are partners is a fine concern, and the President was sure that it will pay extremely good dividends.

Ambassador Wadsworth added, as we rose, that he was happy and proud to be working for so fine and so successful a "company".

740.5/2–951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford),[1] at London

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 15, 1951—5 p. m.

Todep 251. This is State–Def msg re Depto 494 Feb 9.[2] Text press release satis with fol comment: Communiqué shld also cover ur points 2 and 4. Wording point 4 shld clearly indicate SACA and SHAPE are equal and mutually supporting hdqrs. Ur points 1 and 3 shld not be covered either in communiqué or in additional info released as Adm Fechteler will announce both his deputy and location of his hdqrs in due course. We will need final text communiqué as agreed with De Greef prior to release deadline.

FYI text ltr from Pres to Fechteler fols:

"Feb 1951 My dear Adm Fechteler: The North Atlantic Treaty Nations have agreed that a Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, shld now be appointed and have requested that I designate a US officer. I have designated you for this new internatl command which embraces a large area under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I am informed that the Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Org will issue a directive to you concerning your responsibilities and authority as the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

You are assigned hereby operational command of the US Armed Forces assigned to the US Atlantic Command to the extent necessary for the accomplishment of your mission.

You are hereby authorized to have officers and enlisted personnel of the US Armed Forces and civ employees of the US Govt on your staff as you consider appropriate in numbers and grades as necessary.

I am sending copies of this ltr to the Secy of State and to the Secy of Def for their guidance.

In designating you as one of the Supreme Allied Commanders in the North Atlantic Treaty Org, I am sure you have the confidence of our own country and the confidence of the other member nations of the NAT Org. I consider it an honor to the US that these member nations have requested me to designate a US officer for this position. As Pres

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[1] Drafted by Knight who signed for Secretary Acheson. Cleared with Bonbright (EUR).

[2] *Ante*, p. 465.

of the US and Commander-in-Chief of this country's Armed Forces, I have suggested your name for appointment to this high office with pleasure, and I wish you every success as the first Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman"

Ltr now undated. Will insert same date as for press announcement when latter date determined.[3]

ACHESON

[3] In telegram Depto 510 of February 15, from London, Spofford informed the Secretary of State that at the 10th meeting of the North Atlantic Council Deputies on February 14 a preliminary discussion was held on the Fechteler appointment but that final consideration was deferred pending approval by the British Defense Ministry. (740.5/2–1551)

740.5/2–2051 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, February 20, 1951—5 p. m.

Depto 534. 1. Reference appointment Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. Depto 531 [1] reported UK concurrence still outstanding. Private inquiry indicates British desire some limitation of powers of naval commanders. Precise nature not stated. Foreign Office hopes prevail Defense Ministry concur appointment under terms proposed resolution since latter joined in approving DC–24/2 [1] at fourth meeting DC and thresh out terms of reference later. Meantime final actions deputies held up which hope will not be for long.

2. To meet views expressed yesterday's meeting Deps as well as your telephone message Achilles transmit below revised draft press communiqué for reconsideration at tomorrow's meeting deputies. Revised draft also being transmitted De Greef:

"*Verbatim text:* Admiral William M. Fechteler of the United States Navy has been named Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, the North Atlantic Council Deputies announced today.

The North Atlantic Council, acting on recommendations adopted by the Defense Committee at its October meeting in Washington and its meeting in Brussels last December, requested the United States to designate an officer to fill the post of Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. The President of the United States subsequently designated Admiral Fechteler, whose nomination has now been unanimously approved by the North Atlantic Treaty Defense Ministers and the North Atlantic Council Deputies.

Admiral Fechteler will be supported by an integrated international staff drawn from the countries contributing forces to the North Atlan-

[1] Not printed.

tic Ocean Command. This command and General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe are mutually supporting commands which will coordinate their activities under the guidance of the standing group."

If you desire further changes above, request notification prior tomorrow's meeting.

3. Re Todep 259 [2] timing release impossible pending final action deputies. Plan is Chairman Council Deputies will notify release time to all concerned thereafter.

4. Fechteler appointment carried briefly most London morning papers attributed to official announcement Copenhagen of Danish Government approval. No interpretative or speculative comment except in *Mail* and *Telegraph* which played front page with guarded speculation on scope of command. Do not believe this should change plans for simultaneous release Washington, London, Brussels.[3]

SPOFFORD

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[2] Not printed.

[3] In telegram Depto 543 from London dated February 21, Spofford informed Knight that the British were ready to concur in the appointment of Admiral Fechteler but only if the last sentence of the American resolution pertaining to SACLANT's powers and functions was deleted. "In these circumstances," Spofford added, "I propose withhold US agreement pending resolution of difficulty in accordance with your telephone instruction." (740.5/2–2151) In telegram Depto 545 of the same day, Spofford informed the Secretary of State that action on the Fechteler appointment had been deferred at the 12th meeting of the NAC Deputies pending concurrence of the United Kingdom. He added that the Netherlands stated approval of the appointment subject to the stipulation that the Atlantic Command would not infringe upon the North Sea area currently under British Home Fleet Command. (740.5/2–2151) In Telegram Todep 268 of the following day, Acheson informed Spofford that he was to use his own judgment "as to whether or not action shld be pressed at tomorrow's mtg deputies. While we wld welcome early settlement, we wish to avoid deadlock or open split in Deps. Therefore may be advisable let dust settle to ascertain effect of debate" currently going on in the British Parliament concerning the British position on an Atlantic Command "before proceeding further. If appropriate you might remind British that UK has accepted DC 24/3 at Council level and 24/2 at Defense Comite level which clearly set forth pattern and principles for current action re appointment Fechteler." (740.5/2–2251)

740.5/2–2251 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, February 22, 1951—6 p. m.

Depto 546. Knight from Spofford.

1. Reference appointment Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic heated discussion in House this afternoon. Churchill asked for state-

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[1] Repeated information priority to Paris as 1555 for MacArthur.

ment about appointment Supreme Sea Commander.[2] Attlee replied NADC had agreed appointment should be made and should be American. An American had already been nominated and announcement his appointment expected shortly.

Churchill attacked bitterly. Was there no capable British officer? Does not Britain lie key to all communications? Are not sea approaches in event submarine attack vital our life? Why when British experience longer and wider than any and when just agreed so much pleasure appointment Eisenhower, we should have resigned claims to command Atlantic?

Attlee replied weakly appointment made jointly Atlantic powers, no country could dictate.

Churchill returned charge suggesting this argued great decline British influence and esteem. Inquired what effort Prime Minister made press British claim. Did Prime Minister simply accept fact British are to be brushed aside.

Debate went on this fashion 25 minutes during which Attlee several times drowned out. Churchill asked if matter finally settled or whether Prime Minister would in view widespread feeling appeal to US consider matter in all friendship and loyal feeling comradeship. Said US would be ready treat loyal allies fairly and generously.

Attlee said first would certainly look into matter and later reiterated, "I have said I will reconsider it".

2. Since above debate Hoyer-Millar has called say uncertain what will result from debate but suggested holding up final action in Deputies over weekend. Expect further word from British. Please instruct.

SPOFFORD

[2] Although no official statement had been issued by Eisenhower's headquarters, it was announced in Copenhagen on February 19 that the Danish Government had approved the appointment of Admiral Fechteler as SACLANT. The text of the Danish announcement is in Folliot, *Documents on International Affairs, 1951*, p. 62.

740.5/2–2351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, February 23, 1951—3 p. m.

Depto 547. Air Marshal Elliot told me last evening that the Prime Minister had called him in immediately after Fechteler question in Commons yesterday. Elliot said that Prime Minister had not been fully prepared for question and that he had therefore gone fully over background of DefCom action and other NAT action to prepare for coherent discussion today. Elliot did not indicate what Prime Minister's

[1] Repeated information to Paris as 1558, for MacArthur.

position would be but gave me his personal view that the whole question would be straightened out over weekend; that it was purely a matter of politics in which they felt Churchill had taken advantage of situation and had been "very naughty".

Eden told member my staff last night that question had arisen because of widespread disappointment among British people that no major appointments were going to British; that Labor backbenchers shared this view; that conservatives had arranged Churchill to ask question since he could raise it for discussion without being offensive to Americans in way which no other member either party could. He also made similar statement to other Americans, with some implication that some members government supported Churchill view. No evidence to substantiate this since attitude Makins, Hoyer-Millar level indicates pretty clearly Government surprised by vehemence of attack.

In view situation here and possibility further parliamentary debate this afternoon believe desirable withhold action over weekend. No indication yet this morning British Government position.[2]

SPOFFORD

[2] On February 24, Acting Secretary of State Webb cabled Spofford, *inter alia*, that "State and Def agree our position shld be maintained and that Fechteler shld be appointed. If helpful, you may announce simultaneously with Fechteler appointment that his Deputy will be British. As to timing when matter shld be further pressed in Deputies, you have full discretion." (Todep 269, 740.5/2–2451)

740.5/2–2651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY LONDON, February 26, 1951—8 p. m.

Depto 558. Following is Joint Embassy–USDep report of discussion in Commons this afternoon which followed Attlee's statement re appointment Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, text of which being cabled separately.[2]

As soon as PM had finished reading statement which was listened to with close attention by House, Churchill who had been furnished copy shortly before Attlee commenced, said that in view its complex nature he wished time to study statement before determining whether or not he would ask that subject be debated later. He did, however, wish to compliment PM on having displayed more knowledge of subject than on previous occasion.

Conservative back bench did not fall in with Churchill's suggestion that matter might be considered at another time and instead fired series

[1] Repeated information priority Paris as 1582, passed to MacArthur.

[2] Depto 559, not printed (740.5/2–2651). The text of Attlee's statement may be found in Folliot, *Documents on International Affairs, 1951*, p. 62.

of searching questions at Attlee including such points as who would exercise operational command of British units in Eastern Atlantic: who would be in command in Mediterranean, whether British admiral had been proposed for position Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic; who would control British merchant shipping. PM stressed that all forces in Eastern Atlantic would be under operational command of British commander and these would include not only British units but American units and those of other NATO countries. Latter replying to Churchill and Eden agreed there would be authority transfer and concentrate forces between Eastern and Western Atlantic as necessary. He said command Mediterranean not yet decided and stated definitely British merchant shipping would be allocated by British Government. He resented hotly implication that this command system had been imposed upon British. Rather there had been full discussion by military authorities and technical consultants and while the British Government naturally took full responsibility for its decision it had followed the advice British Chiefs of Staff throughout.

PM reiterated point made in opening statement that system envisaged would prove more expeditious re movement of naval vessels between Eastern and Western Atlantic than that in effect in war and pointed out in this connection that supreme commander would operate under direction standing group. Churchill took issue on these points as well, asserting Combined Chiefs of Staff had served highly useful purpose in war and that he considered it regrettable that Combined Chiefs of Staff had been dispersed. Attlee drew attention to fact that HMG had not been responsible for that action. At one point Attlee stated it had been put to government by the advisors that it was essential in wartime to have powers to transfer forces.

Twice during discussion Attlee asked that House postpone questioning until it had time to study his statement. His suggestion was shouted down on both occasions, while Speaker refused to accept point of order raised by Labor back bencher asking him to invoke cloture. Attlee who displayed increasing signs of anger continued to deplore discussions and observed "I would like everyone in this house to realize we do not want to drive rifts between Allies, but I must say some of questions from all parts of House seem to be directed towards that." Similar line was taken by Labor back bencher who asserted action of opposition in raising issue had done more to create anti-Americanism than anything Communists had done for past three years.

Speaker finally concluded discussion despite protests by Churchill and Blackburn (Ind) after another Labor back bencher had given notice that he would raise matter on adjournment. (i.e. parliamentary maneuver which is customarily employed by opposition to obtain additional discussion of a government answer considered to be unsatis-

factory, but in this case obviously intended to rescue PM.) Under parliamentary rules such discussion may take place on any day after usual 10 p. m. adjournment and must be voted on before consideration can be given to it. (Accordingly, no assurance in this case that question will be discussed at an adjournment although it can always be made subject of formal debate.)

House was in angry mood throughout discussion and PM did not have usual support of his own side. We therefore feel question of appointment Admiral Fechteler is still open and HMG will wish delay action Deputies but expect advise Hoyer-Millar later. In any case matter has now become domestic political issue and we have not heard last of it even though UK Government continues to stand on present agreement.[3]

[SPOFFORD]

[3] In telegram 4674 from London of February 28, Ambassador Gifford reported on a speech by Emanuel Shinwell before the Foreign Press Association in which the Minister of Defense noted, *inter alia*, the existence of what he characterized as "impatient and ill-informed criticism" about the NATO command organization in general and the Fechteler appointment in particular. Shinwell added that it was essential that opposition leaders in British politics not be permitted to "befoul Anglo-American relations" for by so doing "we are making a gift to a potential aggressor." This did not mean, Shinwell concluded, "that we should truckle to the United States and become a body of 'yes men'. All that I am asking is that we should fully appreciate the tremendous significance of the American contribution and act reasonably one with another." (740.5/2–2851)

In telegram 4832 from London of March 8, Gifford informed the Secretary of State that the inclusion of three "Britishers" in the recently announced list of seven appointments to Eisenhower's staff had done little to assuage British feelings in the Fechteler affair. He added that His Majesty's Government was anxious to delay debate on the Fechteler appointment until after the Easter recess concluded on April 3 in hopes that by that time all NATO military appointments would have been announced and a White Paper issued setting forth "facts in proper perspective." (740.5/3–851) For further documentation on Eisenhower's subordinate command appointments, see editorial note, p. 498. The British White Paper in question, entitled *The System of Command Established Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, was published on April 17 (Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1951, p. 29) and included as Appendixes "A" and "B" charts on The Higher Military Organization of NATO and The System of Command in NATO which are printed p. 459.

Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 092.2 North Atlantic Treaty

The Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in Southern Europe (Carney) to the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe (Eisenhower)

TOP SECRET LONDON, March 8, 1951.

MY DEAR GENERAL: Prior to his departure, Admiral Sherman[1] expressed the thought that it would be useful if I wrote to you outlining facts and factors having a bearing on the Mediterranean command structure as evolved in the various discussions in which he par-

[1] Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations.

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ticipated. The conference at your headquarters, the discussions with the First Lord and the British Chiefs on 5 March, the exchange of thoughts with Ambassador Gifford and Ambassador Spofford, and the various talks between Sherman and myself, covered a wide range; in endeavoring to extract the meat from those discussions I shall stick to basic matters as I see them. Sherman will receive a copy and will be able to offer his own comments.

With respect to the inevitable political considerations, internal politics, national psychology, current economics, and post-war aspects all enter into the picture and I shall endeavor to give recognition to them in appropriate measure.

The resolution of the Mediterranean command problem starts with the relatively easy military appraisal of tasks to be accomplished and forces available for their accomplishment; discussions with the British over a period of about three years evolved general agreement as to what must be done and how it would be done. The diagram is easy to draw until we try to fill in names and nationalities; at that point conflicting national interests come into the debate.

These national interests involve ephemeral goals and desires and fears; also, however, important long-range prizes and penalties are at stake. The British, particularly, are taking the long view and there is a corresponding need for far-sighted statesmanship in our camp to monitor what may on the surface appear to be only a military command matter.

A clue to the problem of determining the NATO command structure can well be sought in the purpose and scope of the war which we are trying to avert. The communist spider in the center of the Eurasian web can, and undoubtedly would, extend the radial lines of his web in every direction—to the north against the Scandinavian peninsula, to the west against the Western European peninsula and the British Isles, to the southwest through the Balkans to the Mediterranean, to the south through the Middle East and to the southeast into Southeast Asia. All of these radial Russian pressures would be part and parcel of a single Russian effort. By the same token, no effort by any of the free peoples should be considered except as a part of a single great war for freedom.

Fighting in Pakistan, the Middle East, Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Scandinavia, would all contribute to the draining of Russian potential and would have a direct bearing on your success in the defense of Western Europe, which is agreed to be the task of primary importance. Under that concept every effort by European NATO countries—and Greece and Turkey should be considered as closely related to NATO—should be coordinated by SACEUR. Collaterally, the operations on SACEUR's flanks should contribute to the over-all

SACEUR scheme and it is vitally important that military, political, economic and psychological strengths be built up on the flanks.

With specific reference to the Mediterranean flank, the effort of NATO forces must fit into the SACEUR plan.

Again, with specific reference to the Mediterranean, it is also the shortest pathway for support to the adjacent Middle East theater. However, the initial resources in the Mediterranean will be so limited that duplicate forces cannot be afforded, nor can we afford clean and permanent division of the forces-in-being in the Mediterranean; they must be pooled and we must capitalize on the mobility of naval and air forces for quick redeployment for the best serving of SACEUR and the Middle East. The countries on the north shore of the Mediterranean must all be considered as a part of SACEUR's right flank, the efforts in those countries should be coordinated by a single regional authority, and that single regional authority should be a subordinate of SACEUR. Because the efforts of those countries will be entirely dependent upon the control of the Mediterranean, it seems apparent that there can not be a separate autonomous *Supreme* Commander of naval forces in the Mediterranean.

If that is the concept of Freedom's war in Europe then, next, we should examine Freedom's resources—in this instance with particular reference to the Mediterranean. The U.S. is primarily responsible for the bolstering of Italian strength and morale, and the Italians place chief reliance in the United States, both presently and for the future. The same is true of Greece and of Turkey. The Allied forces in the Mediterranean region will consist of Italian and Greek ground troops, all predominantly supplied by the U.S., plus French troops in North Africa also dependent on U.S. support for equipment, plus a smidgin of British ground troops and American marines; (Turkish effort will be closely related to Mediterranean effort and is responsive to U.S. help and guidance). The naval forces will be preponderantly American in numbers and vastly predominant in the variety of tasks which they can undertake; e.g., such solely U.S. capabilities as carrier strikes and support, aerial mining, "special" aerial attacks, aerial ASW,[3] amphibious operations, and tactical air support from Navy and Marine squadrons. Initially, the air activity will be almost entirely U.S. Navy-Marine. It is over these predominantly American forces that the British advocate British command. The sensitiveness of British pride is understandable but the immutable fact is that the British Navy is not only much smaller than the U.S. Navy, but it also lacks the comprehensive inventory of weapons and techniques possessed by the U.S. Navy. Even in the field of anti-submarine warfare, where the Royal Navy did such a distinguished job in World War II,

[3] Antisubmarine warfare.

techniques have changed vastly with tremendous emphasis on air, and the U.S. Navy is technically and numerically pre-eminent in that activity. It would appear to be our responsibility to our own country, and to the world, to retain leadership where the facts of leadership are established by existing and future relative strength and capabilities.

Throughout this discussion I am bearing in mind the fact that Yugoslavia may well become an important factor, and there, again, the usefulness and effectiveness of the U.S. vis-à-vis Britain would appear to point toward the fact that the U.S. could make the more important contribution.

We should never be unmindful of Britain's right and responsibility to nourish the Middle East theater. We have always recognized the soundness and propriety of the British controlling an LOC through the Mediterranean to the Middle East, and the command scheme which, for some time, was mutually acceptable to the U.S. and Royal Navies, envisaged such an LOC and envisaged the fact that it would probably be under British command.

All of the foregoing arguments point toward the establishment of a Mediterranean theater commanded by a U.S. naval officer under whom would be placed South European operations, strategic direction of the naval striking force, coordination of the various national naval responsibilities, and under whom there would be a major Allied naval command, with appropriate surface and air units, for the maintenance of the East-West LOC under British command. The Task Force principle would be invoked as necessary, and the various maritime coordination jobs would be easily solved. Disregarding today's hypertension this still is a sound concept and one which would be readily accepted by the Italians, Greeks, and Turks, and with some safeguard reservations, by the French.

So much for the statement of various American views.

The British Chiefs had luncheon with me on 5 March and Admiral Sherman so steered the discussions that they consisted chiefly of expressions of British reasons in support of the British advocacy for supremacy in the Mediterranean. It seemed to me that these conversations brought out some important underlying British thinking and they therefore deserve close attention.

In the first place, great emphasis was laid on the touchiness of the British political situation, the feverish pitch of public opinion (which, incidentally, as of this writing, has subsided to such an extent that Admirals can barely get on the sport page) and the absolute necessity for placating public opinion and protecting the existing Government by giving the British supreme command of the Mediterranean. Very little of the discussion was on the basis of military effectiveness or relative effort, and none on comparison of economic and military contributions.

When Sherman expressed the thought that Fechteler's title might well be downgraded, there was unanimous and strong opposition, and it would probably be wise to bear in mind the fact that Fechteler as a "C-in-C" rather than a "Supremo" offers far less reason for the compensatory assignment of a British Supremo in the Mediterranean.

When Sherman hypothecated a situation in which Eisenhower retained control of the U.S. Navy striking force, it appeared that this contingency may not have occurred to the British Chiefs who all thought that the U.S. striking force should be under the British Supremo who would lend or assign that striking force for SACEUR's support on demand.

The suggestion that we should consider what would remain to the British Supremo if he did not have the U.S. Naval striking force, also appeared to be disconcerting; it is obvious that the forces so remaining would be pitifully small and inadequate—particularly if the British carry out their present expressed intention of redeploying garrison troops and air from Malta to the Middle East.

The British Chiefs re-affirmed their adherence to the triumvirate principle; Admiral Sherman listened but did not debate the subject.

The luncheon meeting lasted for about four hours but I believe that I am correct in my recollection when I say that the bulk of the Chiefs' argument in favor of British supremacy in the Mediterranean was predicated on current political and public relations aspects, and dwelt only superficially on the realities of military tasks and available forces. One very interesting viewpoint was elicited and should be mentioned: there appeared to be considerable sentiment in favor of the British Supremo in the Med being responsible to the Standing Group and it is my recollection that they advocated Standing Group direction of any transfer of forces to SACEUR.

One final word concerning this luncheon meeting: the British Chiefs expressed the thought that a considerable degree of unanimity of thought had been achieved in the meeting and that they, the British Chiefs, felt that Sherman was in pretty general agreement with their views. I consider this point to be of great importance because the British record of this meeting might make this point. *The fact of the matter is that the discussion was purely exploratory and I do not recollect Sherman's expressing agreement on any of the cardinal British points advanced.*

After listening to the British Chiefs, one thing emerges as paramount according to my viewpoint:

There is urgent necessity for defining SACEUR's interest and authority in the Mediterranean.

Examination of the British proposals gives rise to several extremely interesting thoughts:

(1) They would hamstring SACA's authority but leave him with a grandiose title.

(2) SACA's grandiose title calls for a corresponding British title in the Mediterranean.

(3) The piecemeal British proposals would add up to British command on SACEUR's left flank, British command on SACEUR's right flank, control of the Balkans operations, command of the Middle East, and probably command of South Asia.

(4) The operations on your right flank would, through an interlocking command directorate, be tied to the Middle East and both Med and Middle East would be under the Standing Group.

(5) SACEUR would have to obtain the loan of U.S. Naval fighting forces from SACMED for support of operations in South Europe.

(6) Through the device of supplying the commanding officer only, the British would gain control in Italy, Greece, and Turkey, all of whom owe their strength to the U.S., all of whom prefer American command, and all of whom regard British over-lordship as distasteful.

I have two or three more thoughts to offer for your consideration and then I will terminate this opus.

It is my personal belief that the term "Supreme" as applied to the Med would lead to common British belief in the actuality of such supremacy; American reaction to this might well be adverse if the statistics were known; on the other hand, withdrawal of forces from SACMED for use by SACEUR might well be considered by British public opinion as welshing on an agreement. I believe that the designation of a SACMED would inevitably lead to dissatisfaction, confusion, and hard feeling.

It is difficult to conceive of our relinquishing, or abdicating, the post-World War-II American leadership which we have built up by vast economic and moral support. If we are leaders, it is on the basis of actual accomplishment and current future capability for accomplishment; by the same token military prestige can not be legislated but must be based on capabilities for accomplishment—forces—as well as on tradition. It is difficult to see how British prestige can be enduringly synthesized by the device of titles unless we are ready to credit to British leadership the accomplishment and potentiality of American contributions.

If the broad objective of war is the achievement of favorable post-war conditions, we cannot discount the importance of wartime leadership as a factor in the determination of post-war position and prestige. It would seem that American national interests for the future must be considered in connection with any assumption and discharge of military responsibilities. Finally, world position in times of peace is determined largely by trade and the advancement of commercial interests, and national security is largely dependent on accessibility to

raw materials. If our commercial, economic, and security interests were to be dominated and restricted by any other nation, our own position would suffer accordingly and our wealth, our way of living, and our standards would be adversely affected.

I hope you will forgive the length of this letter. The issues at stake are as complex as they are grave, and the need for reviewing all the points discussed by and presented to Admiral Sherman appeared to necessitate reasonably good coverage.

I am looking forward to visiting your headquarters again after my Malta meeting with the British Middle East Cs-in-C. I need not assure you of my full and complete support in the tremendous undertaking to which you have dedicated yourself.

Respectfully and sincerely, ROBT. B. CARNEY
Admiral U.S. Navy

Copy to: Admiral Sherman (via courier)

740.5/3–951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, March 9, 1951—2 p. m.

5295. Alphand called on General Eisenhower yesterday to pay respects.[2] Following is résumé of conversation:

General Eisenhower expressed concern over tendency of NAT countries to adopt highly nationalistic approach to problem of selecting individuals to fill positions in SHAPE and command structure. Some nations seemed to view appointments as means of enhancing national prestige rather than as real responsibility which engages not only individual but also government. Recent flare-up over Fechteler and Conservative demand in House of Commons for UK air commander are cases in point and clearly demonstrate lack understanding of importance of substance and public relations aspect such questions. General said great damage could be done effort to build up European defense strength if discussions re appointments and other matters were constantly injected into parliamentary and public discussion on the basis that these posts were something to be eagerly sought by each nation and therefore the legitimate objects or inter-country struggles. Such discussions not only were divisive but gave real ammunition to our enemies. In particular General expressed view that NATO (through deputies) should impress on all members tremendous im-

[1] Sent to London as 1268, Spofford from MacArthur.
[2] On February 21 General Eisenhower had established the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe, in temporary facilities at the Astoria Hotel in Paris. (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. *First Annual Report*, Paris, April 1952, p. 8)

portance of public relations (*a*) in creating common understanding and belief in NATO, and (*b*) in taking every precaution to prevent debate and hence further misunderstanding on questions which were in the discussion stage.

Alphand said he agreed completely with General and thought he might well bring this question to attention deputies in next meeting. He mentioned fact that command structure for central sector was not yet agreed and there appeared to be certain divergent views on relationship of ground and air commands, particularly French desire to have tactical air under central sector commander. He assured General that French would not leak anything re discussions now in progress this question, particularly meeting with Juin.

General Eisenhower said he was faced with many problems and heavy responsibilities. He had not sought the job as SACEUR and had only accepted it because the NAT nations had requested and President had urged him. He then outlined in broad terms some complications re air and ground command in central sector and again emphasized that acceptance of command entailed responsibilities. He also pointed out that insofar as tactical air is concerned, France will have very little for at least several years and that it would be in their own interest to see a solution which would attract maximum air in defense of central sector under system which would provide best possible air support for ground forces. He believed he had solution in mind which would best meet this problem and stressed again fact that SHAPE was great collective enterprise which could only succeed if all members pulled together as team with great common objective rather than narrower national objectives in mind.

Alphand then mentioned his role in conference on European army [3] said he was always at General's disposition to furnish information about it. Since European army would if negotiations were successful be under General Eisenhower, he felt it important for him to be kept fully informed on an informal basis so that if French had ideas which would create difficulties for SHAPE they could be modified. General thanked him for this offer.

BRUCE

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[3] For documentation on the Pleven Plan for a European army, see pp. 755 ff.

740.5/3–951 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, March 9, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 609. Knight from Spofford. Further to Depto 602,[2] have now received SG telegram Stand 62 indicating SG has requested military representatives to obtain authority to approve terms of reference on behalf their governments.

1. I propose make statement Deputies 12 March explaining procedure and indicating further action Deputies relating appointment Fechteler will be suspended pending agreement on terms of reference.

2. Reference proposed resolution contained Todep 239,[3] suggest if above procedure followed the last sentence might well be changed to read:

"His powers and functions over forces when assigned to his command are set forth in (blank) (Department please supply SG document number) and will be issued separately."

3. To meet situation resulting from Parliamentary question believe advisable make some changes press communiqué and backgrounds oral statements. Will forward suggestions soonest by air despatch.[4] In meantime, would appreciate you consult Defense and advise what, if anything, might be included oral statements concerning terms of reference.[5]

SPOFFORD

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[1] Repeated for information to Paris as 1709.

[2] From Spofford, dated March 9, it reported that Defense Committee Chairman DeGreef had received a message from the Standing Group asking his agreement to a procedure under which the Standing Group would formulate terms with reference to the appointment of a Supreme Commander Atlantic and submit them to the Defense Committee for approval.

[3] Of February 6, p. 464.

[4] Airgram Usdep 13 from London, March 12 (740.5/3–1251), not printed.

[5] Acting Secretary of State Webb approved the procedure outlined by Spofford in paragraph 1, above, in telegram Todep 295, March 12. Webb added that further action on the Fechteler appointment in the Council should not be taken until approval of the terms of reference had been obtained from all NATO countries by the Standing Group and that Spofford would be advised when such approval had been obtained. "Further information para 2 and 3 will be provided later." (740.5/3–951)

740.5/3-951 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford),[1] at London

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 9, 1951—7 p. m.

Todep 291. This is State–Defense message. Please withhold Deps action concerning appt. Fechteler as Supreme Commander NAO, even if Brit willing concur res as now drafted.

FYI this is based on JCS desire consult with Admiral Sherman upon his return early next week.[2]

If some action necessary in Deps to postpone decision and if you are pressed by Brit explain reason US desire for delay you may use your discretion reveal above reason. We expect be able cable further instrs before end next week.

WEBB

[1] Message drafted and approved for transmission by Knight, cleared by JCS, Defense, S/ISA, BNA, and Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews, who signed for the Secretary.

[2] Admiral Sherman was then in Western Europe for talks with various NATO governments and military commanders concerning the best means of creating coherent, integrated naval commands for the Atlantic and Mediterranean regions. Regarding this subject, see Draft Minutes of State–JCS Meeting, March 14, *infra*.

State–JCS meetings, lot 61 D 417, Jan–June 1951

Draft Record of a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon Building, March 14, 1951 [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

PRESENT

General Bradley	Mr. Matthews
General Collins	Mr. Nitze
Admiral Sherman	Mr. Perkins
General Vandenberg	Mr. Byroade
Admiral [*General*] Twining	Mr. Ferguson
	Mr. Marshall
General Bolte	Mr. Tufts
Admiral Davis	Mr. Lay
Admiral Lalor	Mr. Gleason
Colonel Carns	

[Here follows the section on various aspects of the German problem, pages 1–9 of the Record.]

[1] For information concerning the meetings between Department of State officials and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during 1951, see footnote 1, p. 58. The source text was probably prepared by the Department of State. There is no indication that it was cleared with any of the participants.

Report on Admiral Sherman's Tour

General Bradley: Could you outline for us some of the things that you have in mind as a result of your recent tour through Europe?

Admiral Sherman: Beginning in 1946, we engaged in joint planning with the U.K. As regards the Atlantic, we agreed in September 1948 that there should be a Supreme Commander in the event of war for Atlantic naval operations. The U.K. wanted the headquarters in London but after some discussion we agreed that the headquarters should be in the United States. We felt that London might be an untenable position in the event of war. There was also the consideration that the U.S. would be making up any deficiencies in the North Atlantic since the U.K. would be faced with a shortage of forces in terms of its world-wide commitments.

As regards the Mediterranean, Admiral Conolly was [to be] the Supreme Commander for this region and had three British commanders under him for land, sea and air. The U.S. Mediterranean Fleet was regarded as a mobile offensive force under the Supreme Commander.

With the organization of NATO, new arrangements were necessary. NATO planning could not include the Middle East. As you know, NATO planning was divided into three regions, one of which was the MO (Mediterranean Occidentale). Admiral Conolly (who has now been replaced by Admiral Carney) was to be the Supreme Commander for the MO region. However, the question of how naval forces in the Mediterranean were to be handled has always been fuzzy.

I talked with Lord Fraser about this problem last October. His proposal was that the U.S. should have the top command in the Mediterranean and that the U.K. should have the naval command. I thought that it would be better the other way around because I knew of the proposed Atlantic arrangement. In other words, for the Mediterranean I thought it would be desirable for the U.K. to have the Supreme Command and the U.S. to have the Naval Command. An element in my view was that the U.S. would furnish the bulk of the naval forces in the Mediterranean.

The next development after this conversation with Lord Fraser was that he prepare a memorandum on the problem which envisaged a U.S. Supreme Commander for the NATO part of the Mediterranean and a separate command for the rest of the Mediterranean area. The proposal involved the feeding back and forth of naval forces in some vague way. The proposal rested on the distinction between the two naval functions in the area, namely the protection of lines of communication through the Mediterranean and the support of any land operations in the area.

Now we come to the point of the leak in Denmark which touched off public knowledge in the U.K. of Admiral Fechteler's appointment.[2] Ambassador Gifford told me that it was originally planned that the question in Parliament concerning this appointment would be asked by a Liberal. Then the Government decided that that might have disastrous potentialities. Therefore, Eden was informed of the problem and an arrangement was made with him to ask Churchill to put the question. Churchill agreed. Apparently, this was all done with the knowledge of the British Navy. Mr. Attlee was not properly briefed and Churchill took advantage of this to embarrass him. This touched off the controversy which was not entirely spontaneous. The only men who stood up for the arrangement were Dalyrymple and Scofield. Lord Fraser left town. That was the situation when I left for London.

I went to Paris where I talked with General Eisenhower. He still had his command problem to work out, including the appointment of a staff and of deputies. He required commanders for his northern and southern flanks. He had already advanced over here before his departure the view that he had to have command over the naval forces covering his flanks, and this had been agreed.

When I reached London, I had as usual appointments to see the principal people in the U.K. Government and in the Admiralty. Ambassador Gifford felt that things had progressed and that the controversy was quieting down. The campaign had now become a concerted effort to get a Britisher appointed as Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean—and for reasons that were not primarily military in character. Unlike the Atlantic which is a wide open space, the Mediterranean is a complicated political and economic area. In my conversations with the British Chiefs, I told them that I could not express a JCS view, that I was seeking information and that as far as I was concerned, if it was politically possible, I would be glad to see Admiral Fechteler's title changed to "Allied Commander in Chief, Atlantic". I was emphatic that the British Chiefs had to support the position they had already accepted. They were deriving some satisfaction from the turn of events. For one thing, the U.K. Navy was on the front page of every newspaper. When we got around to this Mediterranean business, the principal speaker was Slim. He was the great advocate of a British Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean area. I think that what we have to face is that an attempt is being made at the governmental level to establish a British position in the Mediterranean which will tie in with the British position in the Middle East and increase their influence there. They are trying to upset and to

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[2] On February 19, the Danish Government had officially announced that Denmark had approved a proposal of the North Atlantic Council for the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic Ocean and that Admiral Fechteler had been selected for the post. (*Survey of International Affairs, 1951*, p. 28.)

reverse the developments of the last six years which have resulted in our acquiring the dominant military position in the area.

As to how we can best proceed, I suggest that we should not press the Atlantic issue and that we should avoid getting hooked with the title of Supreme Commander for the Mediterranean so long as we are not clear on the commander's terms of reference. I further suggest that we should go slow for the time being on the Mediterranean issue.

Within the last forty-eight hours, Mr. Attlee has requested General Eisenhower to make his recommendations regarding his command structure, including the commander for his southern flank. So the British are still pressing, largely for political reasons.

My conclusions are about as follows: (1) Certain NATO headquarters have got to be set up because General Eisenhower's show has to be ready to function at the earliest possible date; (2) certain subsidiary organizations also have to be set up. As for the northern flank, General Eisenhower envisages a command located in the British Isles, whereas the British are thinking in terms of a tri-partite arrangement with headquarters in Norway. As for the southern flank, General Eisenhower envisages a headquarters in Naples under Admiral Carney. This would include French North Africa and Italy and also Greece, when and if Greece is admitted to NATO. He wants this headquarters to be responsible for his southern flank and for all air, land and sea operations related to the defense of this flank. General Eisenhower is willing to let the British have a separate command in the Mediterranean.

Mr. Perkins: I am not clear regarding the relationship between Admiral Carney's command and this separate Mediterranean command.

Admiral Sherman: No one is clear about it. If the Mediterranean were larger, I could understand the usefulness of a NATO Mediterranean Command and a U.K. line of communications command. However, I do not believe that we can afford two separate naval commands in the Mediterranean in the event of war. If political considerations did not intrude, the proper way to organize would be to put one man in control of the whole show—including the Aegean and the Balkans. Because of political factors, it may be necessary to come to a less logical arrangement. We have agreed to await General Eisenhower's views.

A separate point of some concern to me is the difficulties associated with the establishment of a headquarters in Naples at this time, with a U.S. Supreme Commander who would have a French and Italian and perhaps another deputy. Paris is a large place, but wherever we establish these headquarters we handicap our efforts to some extent. Any headquarters of this kind creates a certain amount of local resentment. Unfavorable local reactions are inevitable to the privileges and standard of living, etc., of our people. We do not want to incur too many

disadvantages in order to establish a headquarters. It seems to me that the best headquarters for the southern flank would be a naval vessel in the Mediterranean.

MR. MATTHEWS: Did you talk to Ambassador Dunn about this problem?

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Yes, and he is also apprehensive. I think the first lesson to learn from all of this is that we should talk, in the first instance, about responsibilities and tasks rather than command assignments.

GENERAL BRADLEY: We have always been clear that the responsibility in this area is primarily British. However, we are putting a lot of resources into the area and this is necessary from a cold war point of view.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: We have to look at this problem from two points of view: (1) What is the best military organization for the contingency of war; and (2) what will best serve our interests from the point of view of the cold war?

GENERAL COLLINS: It should be emphasized that the JCS has not changed its view on the necessity for the U.K. to take primary responsibility for the Middle East in the event of war. We will have a hell of a job fulfilling our responsibilities in Western Europe.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: I might mention one further sidelight which may be of some interest and amusement. When I was returning home I took off from Italy and agreed not to refuel in Spain because of French and British sensitivities about our Spanish policy.[3] I decided that it would be bad to land in French Morocco in view of the recent excitement in that area.[4] This left only Gibraltar and so I decided to land there. While I was there, the U.S. Naval Attaché in Madrid came down to see me and I also lunched with the British Commander there. It was all very pleasant. Lord Fraser had just left Gibraltar to go to Spain on a visit and I thought that this was desirable for the British would thus appear to be taking the initiative as regards Spain. Then on my return home, I found this most interesting despatch concerning Lord Fraser's activities in Spain (Admiral Sherman's reference was to the report that Lord Fraser was being accompanied back to Britain by a senior Spanish General, presumably for the purpose of discussing British-Spanish cooperation in defense matters.).[5]

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[3] See volume IV.

[4] For documentation on U.S. policies toward the French Protectorate in Morocco, see volume V.

[5] On March 8 Consul General Plitt at Tangier reported to the Department of State in telegram 331 that Admiral Lord Fraser in the course of a visit to the commander of the Spanish military zone of Algeciras, Lt. Gen. Carlos Martinez Campos, had said that "British authorities seriously concerned USAF program Morocco and France in connection establishment NATO headquarters, France where that office under General Eisenhower is becoming so preponderantly American that over-all effect equivalent occupation France and Morocco by US." Fraser

MR. PERKINS: This report has been confirmed by another report from Tangiers. It seems to me that our Embassy in the U.K. should take this matter up.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Where did Tangiers get the information?

MR. PERKINS: I believe it is from a separate source.

MR. MATTHEWS: Do you know the Spanish General in question?

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Yes, he is a good, intelligent and restrained man.

Mr. MATTHEWS: I believe he is now on a British carrier with Lord Fraser.

MR. PERKINS: Whether we are right on the purpose of these conversations is a question we are not sure about.

GENERAL BRADLEY: There have been so many irritants in our relationships with the British in recent months that I think we may have to have a showdown with them sometime in the near future. The incidents include Admiral Fechteler's appointment, the publicity concerning the Malta Conference,[6] the F–86 issue, the Spanish question and finally the rather rude British criticisms of the military conduct of the campaign in Korea. I am not sure that these things should be taken up on a governmental basis but perhaps we should sit down, as we have before, with the British Chiefs and call each other names for a while.

GENERAL COLLINS: Might we not be able to find out from the Spanish General what the nature of his conversations were? I think that the timing with which we step in is very important.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: The explanation of these difficulties may lie in something which Mountbatten told me. I want to be very careful to protect the security of the source of this point of view. He told me that the British are increasingly apprehensive regarding the effects upon them if the development of U.S. policy leads to the involvement of the U.K. in a war. The continent would be occupied in the event of war and the U.K. would suffer very heavy damage, if not obliteration. They are worried about the possibility that when our rearmament program is substantially complete, we will feel that we are in a position

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purportedly explained that "British did not want Spain become another such zone American occupation," and in order to forewarn Spanish military authorities of the American objectives in Spain, Fraser was said to have invited the Spanish commander aboard the British battleship *Vanguard* in Gibraltar to travel incognito to England "where British military authorities prepared fully acquaint Campos with American plans for European defense." In telegram 4884 of March 12 from London, Ambassador Gifford told the Department of State that "Knowing Admiral Fraser and his personal attitude, as well as that of British Chiefs of Staff and HMG, we are confident that Department's assumption this is malicious gossip is correct." (611.52/3–851, 611.52/3–1251)

[6] On January 23–24 and March 13, Admiral Carney, then Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, met on the island of Malta with Gen. Sir Brian Robertson, the British Commander in Chief of Middle East Forces to discuss the defense of the Middle East. For related documentation, see volume IV.

where we will have to take some action before our equipment becomes obsolete. I do not know his political position but he is a man of considerable influence who has good relations with both Parties, who is called upon by the King for advice and who, of course, is influential in the Admiralty. I believe that he was sincerely expressing an important British point of view. I think that some such anxiety lies behind such irritating incidents as we have been experiencing.

MR. MATTHEWS: I think you are right. How can we allay this anxiety? How can we show that we do not want war?

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: In my opinion, the anxiety is coupled—contradictory though it may seem—with the view that things are going to be all right. Optimism breeds discord more than the hot breath of impending disaster.

MR. PERKINS: Did you talk with the French regarding the Mediterranean problem?

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: I very carefully avoided this topic in all my discussions with the French. However, a French General told me yesterday of his Government's concern with this problem. He thought that we should go ahead with the establishment of a headquarters for the MO region. He thought that a Britisher should have the naval command, but he indicated that it would be desirable for the Supreme Commander to have a French general as his deputy. I may say that this increases my apprehensions regarding Naples as the headquarters.

MR. MATTHEWS: We are going to hear a lot more about this especially in view of the Pleven talks.[7]

GENERAL BRADLEY: I told General Ely this morning that we have had conversations for years with the British regarding various problems just as we have had conversations with the French. I pointed out that we were going to have tri-partite talks regarding Far East problems. I emphasized that we have got to continue to deal bilaterally with other countries insofar as we have problems of a bilateral character.

GENERAL COLLINS: We must not be stampeded into including the French in every meeting with the British.

GENERAL BRADLEY: The JCS feels that NATO matters are and should be handled with the British and French in the Standing Group, that Latin American matters are dealt with in the Inter-American Defense Board and that other problems which fall outside the NATO area and Latin America must be dealt with bilaterally. This cannot be avoided. We are going to have to have bilateral talks with many countries.

MR. PERKINS: I think that the immediate problem with the French is their participation in conversations regarding the Middle East.

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[7] For documentation concerning the visit to Washington of French Prime Minister René Pleven January 29–30, see volume IV.

GENERAL BRADLEY: I thought so also and this may be the real problem, but it does seem that the French desire a Standing Group for world problems.

MR. PERKINS: There is a good deal of evidence that they want to be included in discussions of the Middle East.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: The French worries regarding the Malta Conference would never have arisen if the U.K. had not spilled the beans to the French.

MR. MATTHEWS: The British always like to inflate their special relationship with the U.S.

GENERAL BRADLEY: They must have had some dirty reason for acquainting the French with this Conference.

GENERAL COLLINS: One of the questions that is always asked on the Hill is how much latitude do we have to consider problems from the point of view of our own interests. The Hill is concerned about these multi-lateral arrangements because they think that arrangements inhibit our freedom to take decisions in terms of our own interests.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: I think that we should stress that point with the French. We can tell them quite frankly that Congress will not tolerate the extension of multi-lateral arrangements and that Congress insists that except for NATO and the Inter-American Defense Board we have got to be free to consider other problems on a bilateral basis.

GENERAL BRADLEY: The Congressmen have asked me how many countries have to give their approval before we can take this, that or the other action—for example, the use of the A-bomb.

MR. MATTHEWS: Of course the French rejoinder would be that we do talk with the British regarding the Middle East.

GENERAL BRADLEY: The rejoinder to that is that the French have no forces in the Middle East and have therefore no contribution to make. The purpose of our discussions with the British is the coordination of our efforts in the area. The French have nothing to be coordinated.

GENERAL COLLINS: It is necessary to coordinate with the British in order to relate our efforts at the present time with our actions in the event of war.

MR. NITZE: This problem is related to the problems of the present meeting of the Deputies in Paris. We must always remember that the basic Russian tactic is to divide the West and to exploit every opportunity for this. They will keep the pressure up if they can until they find some issue on which the U.K. or the French will run away from us.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: While we must continue to talk bilaterally, we should try to prevent this from becoming an issue between us and the French or any other country. However, if it does become an issue then

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I think we have no choice but to assert our right to have bilateral discussions.

[Here follows the concluding page of the Draft Report which records a brief discussion of the next meeting of the group.]

740.5/3–1651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, March 16, 1951—noon.

5448. From MacArthur. Re Para 2 Depto 602 (London repeat reftel to Brussels).[2] Fol is record that part of General Gruenther's conference with liaison officers on February 16 indicating how top SHAPE appointments wld be filled. Record this mtg was reproduced and given all liaison officers.

"How do we intend to fill those other positions? We are looking over very carefully available officers in countries who might be able fill positions of D/C's and A/C's.[3] We have so many Americans in staff there is danger of over-Americanizing it. Perhaps we have too many here now. It may be good way to get Americans interested in Europe and on other hand it might give impression Americans are trying dominate staff.

"Question of natl prestige comes up in selection of officers. I hope very much that feeling does not develop. Jobs are extremely important—difficult ones to fill. It is going to be matter great urgency that we get best man for each job. We can make mistakes. Considering problems we have had, we must have men of wide experience. Certain nations might feel they shld have man in certain position. We want avoid handling it that basis, but on ability of officers. If Chiefs of Staff feel they do have officers who cld fill these posts, I wld be very glad have that info. Wld also be very grateful that when you felt strongly when certain man isn't put in given position, for instance, there won't be any hard feelings. Principle of rotation (one year) is very definitely in General Eisenhower's mind without any rigid control. I don't think question of natl prestige will come up but if it is to be problem I want to be told about it. We must have harmonious relationships, because inherent nature of our problem is difficult one—if we started out with any friction we will be in bad way. Prestige that any country shld acquire due to an officer being in certain position is not so great. Real prestige is going to come in measure of forces that are furnished by countries. Prestige matters are relatively insignificant

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[1] Repeated information to London for Spofford as 1319 and to Brussels as 254.

[2] Not printed; it contained Spofford's report of March 9 of a conversation with a staff member of the Belgian Delegation to the Council of Deputies in which the Belgian had asked whether Eisenhower had selected his top staff appointments as a "result bilateral conversations British." He was informed that the United States Delegation to the North Atlantic Council "was neither consulted nor informed" by SHAPE on such matters presumably because of their exclusively military nature. (740.5/3–951)

[3] Presumably the reference here is to deputy and assistant chiefs of staff.

ones. I welcome your frank views this matter. We shld like have your cooperation so that when we do make decisions you will do your best to see they are presented in proper light. Obviously there are going to be subsections in each staff section—there will be representation all nations. Natl point of view isn't going to be one of things members of staff will be representing anyhow. That is why *you* are here."

[MacArthur]
Bruce

740.5/3–1651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT Paris, March 16, 1951—noon.

Unnumbered. Perkins from MacArthur (no distribution except as directed by Perkins). Since his arrival here General Eisenhower has been grappling with problem of command structure. It impossible to exaggerate how complex this question is involving as it does apprehensions, considerations of both national and individual pride and prestige, certain latent traditional jealousies, etc.

To avoid premature public and Parliamentary discussion on this question (which might (1) cause repercussions not unlike those caused in UK by question of SAC Atlantic, or (2) induce NAT members to adopt rigid and unyielding positions) info re multiple discussions which have been going on has been held very tight. End of last week General Eisenhower worked out satisfactory solution to command structure of central sector (which was complicated by French desire have air subordinate to ground commander, Paris Embtel 5266).[1] Yesterday he was able to reach very satisfactory solution for northern command structure which had also been hung up. No question it is due entirely to General Eisenhower that solutions were found to which all could honestly agree.

Last night General Eisenhower cabled his recommendation on command structure to SG in msg SH–20202 (Shapeto 2) March 15.[2] He also recommended date for public release this INFO and in meantime recommended absolute secrecy so that story won't leak piecemeal prior to SHAPE announcement. (This latter point most important in terms impact over here.) Suggest you contact Defense with view to seeing Shapeto 2 which gives full details re command set-up. [MacArthur.]

Bruce

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[1] Dated March 9; renumbered as 5295 by the Department of State and printed p. 485.

[2] The military message under reference here has not been found in Department of State files; regarding the emergent NATO command structure, see the editorial note, *infra*.

Editorial Note

A series of headquarters staff appointments and European defense command appointments for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were announced by General Eisenhower's headquarters between March 6 and 20, as follows:

North Atlantic Staff appointments: Deputy Chief of Staff (Administration), Lieutenant General Marcel Maurice Carpentier (France); Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans), Air Marshal Edmund C. Hudleston (United Kingdom); Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence), Major General Sir Terence Airey (United Kingdom); Assistant Chief of Staff (Organization and Training), Major General Francis W. Festing (United Kingdom); Assistant Chief of Staff (Personnel and Administration), Rear Admiral Ferrante Capponi (Italy); Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans, Policy, and Operations), Major General Pierre-Louis Bodet (France); Assistant Chief of Staff (Logistics), Major General Edmond H. Leavey (United States). European Defense Commands: Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery (United Kingdom); Deputy Supreme Commander (Air), Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders (United Kingdom); Deputy Supreme Commander (Naval), Vice Admiral André Georges Lemmonier (France); Commander in Chief, Allied Army Forces in Central Europe, General of the Army Alphonse Juin (France); Commander in Chief, Northern Europe, Vice Admiral Sir Patrick Brind (United Kingdom); Commander in Chief, Allied Air Forces in Central Europe, Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad (United States); Naval Flag Officer, Central Europe, Vice Admiral Robert Jaujard (France); Commander of Allied Army Forces in Norway, Lieutenant General Wilhelm Tangen-Hansteen, Commander in Chief of the Norwegian Army; Commander of Allied Army Forces in Denmark, Lieutenant General Ebbe Görtz, Commander in Chief of the Danish Army; Commander of Allied Air Forces, Northern Europe, Major General Robert K. Taylor (United States).

General Eisenhower's headquarters further announced that the command organization in Southern Europe would be made public subsequently and that the command of Allied land forces in that region would be given to an Italian general. Eisenhower's headquarters further stated that General Eisenhower would request the Brussels Treaty Powers to transfer to his command some of the responsibilities of the Western Union Commanders in Chief Committee, which would have to fit into the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

740.5/3-951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford),[1] at London

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 22, 1951—6 p. m.

Todep 320. This is State–Defense msg. Further to our Todep 295 [2] and re your Depto 609. We believe fol procedure shld be followed in finalizing appt Admiral Fechteler as SACLANT.

A. Further action by Deputies shld wait until approval terms of reference has been obtained from all NATO nations by Standing Group, as indicated our Todep 295.

B. Last sentence proposed res contained Todep 239 [3] shld be modified to read as fols:

> "His powers and functions over forces when assigned to his command will be generally in accordance with D.C. 24/2 and D.C. 24/3, and will be issued separately by the Standing Group with the approval of Governments."

Additional guidance on press release and statements will be forthcoming shortly after study uragam Usdep 13.[4]

ACHESON

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[1] Message drafted and signed for the Secretary of State by Knight and cleared by Perkins (EUR) and Defense.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 487.

[3] February 6, p. 464.

[4] Dated March 12, containing Spofford's latest suggestions concerning a revised press communiqué on the Fechteler appointment (740.5/3–1251). In telegram Todep 330 of March 28, Acheson informed Spofford that the Military Representatives Committee of the NAC had approved the Terms of Reference for SACLANT and had agreed to issue them to SACLANT when he was appointed. Acheson therefore recommended that the NAC Deputies be asked to finalize the Fechteler appointment (740.5/3–951). In telegram Depto 712 of April 3, Spofford reported that the United Kingdom had accepted the original wording of the first sentence of the American resolution proposed in telegram Todep 239. Spofford added that the British now urgently desired to "complete action in deputies and publicize appointment prior to Mon 9 April when expect issue white paper" and to open "defense debate in Commons." In telegram Todep 349 of April 5, Secretary Acheson replied with pleasure to the news of British acceptance of the original American proposal, but he told Spofford he was "still desirous that for the record you shld ask UK Rep in Council Deps whether UK Govt has any remaining objection or reservation re appointment US officer as SACLANT" (740.5/4–351).

740.5/3–2451 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, March 24, 1951—4 p. m.

5683. In course of Assembly debate re provisional twelfth of mil budget, Gaullist Deputy Jean-Paul Palewski proposed amendment requiring govt to "define its policy re Western def strategy" and in particular re NATO staff appointment. He referred to critical newspaper editorial in *Le Monde* of Mar 22 which called attention to "singularly reduced prerogatives" of General Juin as central sector commander as compared with these of Admiral Brind (who in northern sector has direct command over air forces). *Le Monde* attributed difference between Brind and Juin authority to contrast between expression of natl consciousness in Britain on occasion of Fechteler appointment, and "virtual lack of public interest re Atlantic staff appointments in France."

Pleven replied for govt, pointing out complexity of problem, organization of coalition command being unprecedented in peacetime, and added: "each nation putting up an important contribution to collective security must have feeling that it assumes functions which correspond to (extent of) its contribution. This principle has always guided French Govt and gen staff in their discussions with American mil authorities and govt." Pleven explained further that since northern sector command involves principally naval and air forces, command problem is different there from central sector and that French Govt, "has obtained what it considers essential," namely placing of all central ground forces under command of a French General. Pleven also indicated that General Norstad is deputy to Juin for purposes of tactical support while reporting directly to Eisenhower re strategic air.

The Palewski amendment (which was beaten 356 to 32) is in line with recently stepped-up Nationalist propaganda line of RPF Member of De Gaulle's directing council, referring to the General's recent question about US air facilities in Morocco (Embtel 5032, Feb 27),[2] has recently indicated to Embassy that such themes can be expected to bulk still larger in RPF propaganda as election campaign gets underway, that "no unfriendliness to US is implied" and that underlying such propaganda is policy of "not letting nationalist appeal become monopoly of Commies."

BOHLEN

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[1] Repeated to London as 1390.

[2] For documentation concerning U.S. interests in air facilities in Morocco, see volume v.

781.5/5–151

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Department of State has had under continuing study the desirability and feasibility of the United States entering into reciprocal security arrangements with Turkey and Greece.[2] You will recall that the last decision taken by the United States in this connection was at the time of the September meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council in New York, which was to the effect that the two countries should not be invited to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty, but should be invited to associate themselves with such appropriate phases of the military planning work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as are concerned with the defense of the Mediterranean. This position was adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Council and was communicated to the Governments of Turkey and Greece, which subsequently accepted the invitation.

The United States position was formulated after appropriate consultation with the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[3] In concurring with the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense in a letter dated September 11, 1950[4] recommended that:

(*a*) The United States now support the granting of associate status to Turkey and Greece in order that their representatives may participate without delay in coordinated planning.

(*b*) As soon as the defense of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is reasonably assured, the United States consider raising the question of full membership of Turkey and Greece in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

(*c*) Serious consideration not be given at this time to granting Iran either consultative or associate member status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In its letter, the Department of Defense further stated that from the military point of view it would interpose no objection to the United States, United Kingdom and France joining to give informal assurance to Turkey that a Soviet attack against it would probably mean

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[1] Drafted on March 19 by William Rountree, Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, and Edmund J. Dorsz, Deputy Director. Cleared with Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews, the Policy Planning Staff, RA, EUR, and the Office of International Security Affairs.

[2] The issue of additional security guarantees to Greece and Turkey was the subject of a series of telegrams between the Department of State and the U.S. Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Charles Spofford, during the first 3 weeks of March. See telegram 4163 from the Department to London of March 14 and telegram Depto 666 from London of March 22. (740.5/3–1451; 740.5/3–2251)

[3] See memorandum of September 9, 1950, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Johnson, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. v, p. 1306.

[4] See *ibid.*, vol. III, p. 278.

the beginning of global war and that the United States, United Kingdom and France would act accordingly.

The present arrangement has not been satisfactory to Turkey for a variety of reasons. The Turkish Government has several times in recent weeks reiterated at the highest levels its request for a full-fledged security arrangement with the United States either on a bilateral or some multilateral basis. The Turkish position was highlighted in recent conversations in Ankara which Assistant Secretary McGhee had with the Turkish President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. There are enclosed for your information copies of memoranda of these conversations,[5] in which the Turkish authorities emphasized the real and effective contribution which Turkey can offer to the common cause. It is clear, however, that Turkey will insist that it have a full-fledged security arrangement with the United States if it is to maximize its contribution. While the Greek Government has not pressed the matter to the same degree as the Turkish Government, it remains the Department's view that the extension of a security commitment to Turkey would, for political reasons, require that a similar arrangement be made for Greece.

On February 22, 1951 the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission held at Istanbul[6] concluded that the attainment of United States politico-military objectives in Turkey and Greece, and consequently in the entire Middle Eastern area, requires that the United States enter at the earliest possible moment into reciprocal security arrangements with Turkey and Greece. The conference recommended that urgent consideration be given to this step, and set forth in a telegram[7] to the Department of State, a copy of which is attached, the considerations upon which its conclusions were based.

A full-fledged security arrangement would insure Turkish belligerency in case of aggression which involved the United States. Further, it would be an important factor in obtaining Turkey's cooperation in security measures which might only indirectly benefit its security but which would be of considerable value to the anti-Soviet coalition as a whole. The United States has not been in a sufficiently strong position to press the Turks to undertake a number of measures which would be of strategic importance to the United States. Among such measures are the following:

1. Controlled mining of the Turkish Straits, which the Department of the Navy is understood to advocate. The Turks fear that if the Straits are mined the Soviets will renew their demands for a revision of the Montreux Convention and possibly subject Turkey to other forms of pressure.

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[5] See memorandum of conversation by Rountree, February 12, p. 466.

[6] For documentation on the Conference of Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission, Istanbul, February 14–21, see volume v.

[7] Telegram 305, February 21, from McGhee at Istanbul, not printed.

2. Agreement with the United States on the use of air and other bases which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider essential. While these bases would undoubtedly be of great value to the United States in view of their proximity to vulnerable targets in the USSR, such a request would be viewed by the Turks as another indication that they are being asked to contribute their strength but are not being permitted the same guarantees of protection as are given to Western European countries. Moreover, the existence of bases in Turkey developed by the United States would appear to be of limited value if we were not assured of immediate Turkish participation in the event the United States becomes involved in hostilities with the Soviet Union. Neutrality would render such bases in Turkey of potential value only.

3. The supply of additional combat units for service with the United Nations military forces, as recently suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Due to internal political factors, the Turkish Government would probably be unwilling to contribute more troops unless it could assure the Turkish people that a security commitment had been obtained or unless it felt that experience to be gained by military units would be of great value to the Turkish armed forces (the Turks have, however, agreed to furnish replacements for their Korean casualties).

4. Mutual defense arrangements between Turkey and its neighbors. High Turkish officials have made it clear that such arrangements would be undertaken only within the framework of a broader security arrangement to which the United States is a party.

The question of whether or not reciprocal security commitments should be entered into with Turkey and Greece, as well as the question as to the most desirable form for such commitments, of course involves many problems, most of which were considered by the Departments of Defense and State when the matter was studied prior to the last meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council. Some of these are:

(*a*) The extent to which a security commitment would serve as a provocation to the Soviet Union;

(*b*) The political and military organizational and planning problems involved, including questions of command;

(*c*) The extent to which the United States and the other powers participating in the commitment would in fact be able to extend assistance to Turkey and Greece in the event of hostilities;

(*d*) The effect upon the North Atlantic Treaty powers of United States action in widening the scope of its security obligations;

(*e*) The effect upon countries of the general area of Greece and Turkey which would not be included in the security commitment;

(*f*) The extent to which the security commitment might lead to a relaxation by Turkey and Greece of their efforts to develop their maximum strength to resist Soviet or satellite aggression;

. . . . . .

(*i*) The effects of the extension of a security commitment to Turkey and Greece upon their requirements for, and expectations of, additional United States military, economic or other aid;

(*j*) The effects of such new commitment upon the ability of the United States, United Kingdom, and other participants in NATO to carry out their commitments elsewhere in the world.

The Department considers that the time has now come when the advantages to be derived from the extension of a security commitment to Turkey and Greece must be carefully reviewed and weighed against the disadvantages. In this connection it considers as pertinent the following factors set forth by the Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission in their communication to the Department.

(A) Political situation in Turkey presently reveals such strong popular as well as official demand for security commitment as to assure the United States of maximum flexibility in arrangement offered and minimum commitments required;
(B) If offer not made soon, there is reason to believe that Turkey will veer toward policy of neutralism, which will always have strong basic appeal. Until commitment is extended to Turkey, there is no assurance that Turkey will declare war unless attacked;
(C) In order to assure immediate co-belligerency and utilization in collective security action of military potential which Turkey is building with United States help, commitment on part of United States is required;
(D) Commitment on part of United States is required for assurance of immediate United States and allied utilization of Turkish bases in event we are engaged in hostilities;
(E) Initially at least, Turkey in entering into security arrangement with United States would be committing more than the commitments which she would receive; and
(F) Conference is convinced that, if security arrangement is offered Turkey, it must at same time be offered to Greece. Foregoing considerations apply also to Greece, particularly point (D). Moreover, apart from this important political consideration, Greece can contribute strong defensive forces and bases.

With reference to the form a United States security guarantee might take, the Department suggests consideration of the several alternatives set forth in the telegram from the Middle East Chiefs of Mission. These are:

1. Through adherence by Turkey and Greece to NATO, either

   (*a*) as separate regional grouping, or
   (*b*) directly.[8]

2. Through bilateral arrangements between United States and Turkey, and United States and Greece.
3. Through multilateral arrangement among United States, United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece.
4. Through some other plan which, taking into account the complex political, military and administrative problems involved, will still accomplish the purpose of bilateral security undertakings as between the United States and Greece and Turkey, having always in mind the factor of urgency.

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[8] For a discussion of the question of Greek and Turkish membership in NATO, see Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York, 1969), pp. 569–570 and *Mike, The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson*, vol. 2 (New York, 1973), pp. 70–72 and 85.

It is understood that Admiral Carney, who participated in the Conference of the Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission, transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a recommendation similar to that made by the Conference to the Department of State, and it is assumed that the appropriate military authorities are now giving consideration to the matter. In view of the desirability of arriving at an early decision upon the question, I would appreciate receiving as soon as possible the views of the Department of Defense.

Sincerely yours, [DEAN ACHESON]

740.5/3–3151 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 31, 1951—8:15 a. m.

The following is the text of Depto 666, March 22 from Ambassador Spofford for your information. In this connection it should be noted that we are giving thought to the need for further security guarantees to Greece and Turkey, but we have not made up our minds about the necessity for such additional guarantees and even less as to the form they should take if we should decide that they are desirable.

"No Distribution Outside State. From Spofford. Ref Deptel 4163. While my competence to comment on question of extending additional security guarantees to Greece and Turkey is naturally limited, I welcome opportunity afforded by reftel to do so in light of our experience with NATO.

"Arguments set forth by Middle Eastern Chiefs of Mission are strongly persuasive in favor of some form of mutual security arrangement. My thinking is along fol line:

1. From strictly US point of view, there wld apparently be no difference in commitment which US wld assume whether Greece and Turkey were admitted to NATO or included in separate collective defense agreement or bound by bilateral or trilateral arrangement with US. Dept will have noted error in Mid East Mission chiefs tel para (2) stating Congressional action not required (see page 18 for RelCom report on NAT).[2]

2. From point of view of Greece and Turkey my understanding is that their principal objective is to enter into security agreements with US and perhaps UK as powers best able to contribute to their defense and that, aside from fact that NATO is going concern and Greece and Turkey feel "excluded", they have little interest in entering security arrangement with Scandinavian, Benelux and other smaller countries.

3. Conversely, I believe it wld prove extremely difficult to secure

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[1] Drafted by Henry L. Staples (EUR), cleared with NEA, sent to Ankara, Athens, Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, Oslo, Ottawa, Reykjavik, Rome, and Moscow.

[2] Reference is to the Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6, 1949, on the North Atlantic Treaty (S. Exec. Rept. 8, 81st Cong., 1st sess.) text in *Basic Documents*, vol. 1, p. 825.

agreement of all NAT govts (which in most if not all cases wld require parliamentary approval) to Greek and Turkish adherence to treaty. While I have not discussed subj with other NAT deputies except French, since Sept, I doubt that position then taken have subsequently been modified, i.e., strong opposition to Greek or Turkish membership in NAT by smaller nations, open mind by Italy and UK. Alphand last night asked me about accuracy of press reports that US was again actively considering NAT-Turkish relationship. I denied knowledge of present status of your thinking. He said French were opposed to any closer relationship than that agreed in Sept, but wld be anxious to be included in any discussions on Eastern Med security. He obviously had Malta fresh in mind.[3]

4. I believe view of smaller nations is that Greek and Turkish membership wld be disadvantageous both to their short and long term security interests, by extending their own commitment and risk, and also disadvantageous to their long term econ and polit interests. This point of view represents, I think, hopes of majority of NAT countries that treaty will be effective in countering short range threat to their security and eventually provide basis for closer association of Western Eur democracies with US and Canada in a lasting sense.

5. Concept of North Atlantic community based on common tradition, heritage, democratic institutions, and religion of present parties, provides one basic element of strength of present treaty and differentiates it from purely mil alliance. We shld consider whether inclusion of Greece and Turkey wld be viewed, not merely by Communist propaganda, but also I believe, by public opinion in many NAT countries as tending to vitiate this concept and make treaty appear merely an instrument for containment of USSR.

6. At present NAT has a limited and comparatively homogeneous membership. I wld fear that extension of present membership (except probably in due course to include Ger and Spain) wld reduce its effectiveness. There is, of course, no provision in treaty for any form of limited membership, which in any event wld not be psychologically satisfactory to Greece and Turkey.

7. Nature of North Atlantic community and requirements of integrated defense go far beyond common mil planning, as for example in coordinating production, establishment of integrated forces, etc. These factors may not be similarly applicable in case of Eastern Med. A separate collective security arrangement wld presumably be drafted, as NAT was, to take particular account of realities of particular situation. I would assume that an Eastern Med arrangement wld differ considerably from NATO with respect to organization even though treaty might closely resemble NAT.

8. There shld of course be close coordination of mil planning between any Eastern Med arrangement and NATO.

9. As seen from here best measure of extending additional security guarantees to Greece and Turkey wld on balance appear to be separate collective defense arrangement under Art 51 of UN charter with Greece, Turkey, UK and US as essential members, whole arrangement to be related to, but not part of NATO."

ACHESON

[3] Reference is to French concern over exclusion from Anglo-American military talks held on the island of Malta on January 23–24 and March 13. For documentation, see volume IV.

Editorial Note

On April 2 General Eisenhower signed the order formally activating the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). He thereby assumed effective command of all Allied armies in Europe, including forces in Germany and troops stationed in the Western Mediterranean area. General Eisenhower also stated that the proposed European Army would be a very acceptable part of his command when it came into being. (*New York Times*, April 3, page 8) In telegram 5867 from Paris of April 2, reporting on General Eisenhower's remarks at his press conference that day, Chargé Bohlen stated, *inter alia*, that in reply to a question regarding the inclusion of Middle Eastern nations in the Atlantic Pact, General Eisenhower had said that "as a soldier" he felt the mission of SHAPE "had nothing to do with defense of Middle East. Its mission was concerned only with NATO countries, he noted, and with Western European areas of those countries. General Eisenhower added, however, that he looked with greatest concern on nations of Middle East. He affirmed his admiration for efforts of Greeks to defend themselves from Communist aggression and recalled his excellent relations with members of Turkish military staff." (740.5/4–251)

Secretary's memoranda, lot 53 D 444, April–May 1951

Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, to the Executive Secretariat

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 9, 1951.

Mr. Acheson called me last night about 5:30. He said that he had just had a call from General Bradley. General Bradley and the JCS want to send a telegram to Ambassador Spofford in London asking him to hold up on action on the Fechteler appointment. General Bradley told the Secretary that the deputies were to have acted on it today. He said also that the JCS wanted to have them study a British White Paper [1] which has recently been issued on this matter before any final action was taken on the appointment. General Bradley said that the Paper contained some provisions on command which they thought were not satisfactory and they feared some "shenanigans" on the part of the British.

General Bradley asked the Secretary to concur in a telegram to Spofford asking that he hold up. The Secretary told me that he be-

[1] In telegram Depto 728 from London of April 7, Spofford informed the Secretary of State that the British would not formally issue their White Paper until after further discussions concerning a Mediterranean command and that it was unlikely that the matter of the Fechteler appointment would be debated in the House of Commons during the coming week (740.5/4–751). The paper was issued on April 17 and approved the appointment of an American as Supreme Commander Atlantic. See footnote 3, p. 479.

lieved that the case as presented by General Bradley was a good one and he agreed to the transmission of the telegram with the phrase the Secretary of State concurs in it.[2]

Mr. Acheson asked me to check with the appropriate people about it and, if there was a strong feeling that we should not have agreed to this delay, to call him back.

I talked to Mr. Vass who in turn got in touch with Hayden Raynor and Ridgway Knight. Mr. Vass called me back and said that they all agreed that the action was appropriate. Mr. Vass did not think it necessary to inform Mr. Perkins or Mr. Cabot last night.

Could the foregoing be passed to the appropriate people for information.[3]

L. D. B[ATTLE]

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[2] The telegram was sent as JCS telegram 87964 on April 8 (telegram Depto 742, April 10, 740.5/4–1051).

[3] Mr. Battle added a handwritten marginal note reading: "Mr. Perkins, Mr. Cabot, Mr. Matthews."

781.5/4–1351

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET ATHENS, April 13, 1951.

[No.] 1644

Subject: Security Arrangements for Greece and Turkey

Reference is made to the recommendation of the Istanbul Conference of Chiefs of Mission "that the U.S. enter at the earliest possible moment into reciprocal security arrangements with Turkey and Greece," [1] to recent indications that Greek and Turkish public opinion are becoming increasingly apprehensive and resentful at the failure to include their countries formally within the Western defense framework, and to the Department's Top Secret circular airgram of March 31, 1951 [2] transmitting Ambassador Spofford's views as to the form which security arrangements comprising Greece and Turkey might assume.

This Embassy feels strongly that the most urgent and delicate problem existing in our relations with Greece is that of formalizing these security arrangements in the most feasible form at the earliest possible moment and that continued delay will detract from and perhaps, if an emergency should suddenly arise, vitiate the important contribution which Greece and Turkey could otherwise make to Western defense. An added factor of significance is that the problem of the relationship of Yugoslavia to the Western defense system, complicated enough at

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[1] See volume v. See also the letter of the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense, dated March 24, p. 501.

[2] *Ante*, p. 505.

best, is rendered even more difficult by uncertainty as to the position of Greece and Turkey in that system. The significance of all these considerations is enhanced by recent indications that peace in the Balkans continues to rest on a most precarious foundation and that a Soviet-inspired attack on Yugoslavia and perhaps Greece this year can by no means be ruled out.

The security arrangement for Greece and Turkey preferred by the Istanbul Conference was their adherence to NATO. It is obvious from the history of this proposal, since it was first raised by the Turks almost a year ago, that it has disadvantages, particularly from the point of view of some Western European countries, which make it difficult to bring about. These disadvantages are well set forth in Ambassador Spofford's comments. On the other hand, the Department is well acquainted with the advantages of this solution which prompted the Istanbul Conference to give it first preference.

This Embassy continues to believe that, taking all the factors on both sides into consideration, participation in NAT is the best solution of the problem. We feel that too much weight may have been accorded to the supposed extension of the commitments of the present NAT members involved in the inclusion of Greece and Turkey, taking into consideration the fact that, whatever our paper commitments may be, a combination of moral, political and strategic factors would in any case oblige the US and UK to assist Greece and Turkey in resisting a Soviet or Soviet-inspired attack, to the greatest extent possible in the light of US–UK capabilities and other obligations. On the other hand, we are not sure that all parties concerned have given due weight to the very important military contribution which the immediate participation of the Turkish and Greek armies and the availability of Turkish and Greek bases would bring in case of Soviet aggression in Europe outside the Balkans. In other words, we feel Greece and Turkey would in balance represent an asset rather than a liability to NAT military capabilities. The question of whether Greece and Turkey can be identified with "Europe" or "Western civilization" and hence should form a part of an evolving Atlantic Community would seem to be distinctly secondary, since participation in the NAT at this time does not involve a commitment to an ultimate political union or federation which, even if it should emerge, would not necessarily include all the present members of NAT.

Nevertheless, it is realized that the obstacles to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NAT at this time may be too great to be overcome and that, in view of the urgency of the matter, another solution may have to be found. This Embassy is inclined to believe that a broad Eastern Mediterranean Pact would involve as great or greater difficulties than the inclusion of these two countries in NAT. No other Near or Middle Eastern country would contribute real strength to

such an alliance, the Palestine issue divides them sharply among themselves, and the US and UK would be obliged to assume new commitments without commensurate return.

All in all, the best alternative might be a four-power pact among the US, UK, Greece and Turkey, to which France and/or Italy could be joined if either so desired and to which Yugoslavia might ultimately adhere. Such a pact would involve mutual obligations which would (1) provide Greece and Turkey with the assurances of support they seek, (2) ensure that Turkish and Greek forces and facilities were available to the Western Powers at the outset of war wherever it might break out, and (3) knit Turkey and Greece into the fabric of Western defense organization and planning. For these objectives to be fully achieved it would be desirable that, even though Greece and Turkey were not members of NAT, their armed forces be placed under the command of General Eisenhower and, perhaps also, of any subordinate NAT commander who may be selected for the Mediterranean area. While such an arrangement would have some of the untidiness which usually characterizes political compromises, it should satisfy the major parties at interest and would have sufficient flexibility to permit an evolution in the future along whatever lines seem most appropriate in light of developing circumstances.

The Embassy would appreciate receiving the Department's comments as to whether it believes a scheme somewhat along these lines would have any possibility of general acceptance.

JOHN E. PEURIFOY

740.5/4–2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State [1]

RESTRICTED LONDON, April 20, 1951—1 p. m.

5528. Embtel 5518 April 19.[2] In reply to Churchill in NATO Command debate last night, Shinwell stated opposition's threat to reduce his salary was "of little consequence" to him. However, what really mattered was "maintenance of most friendly relations between UK and America," and "any criticisms, any suggestions, any utterances calculated to exacerbate feelings and relations wld render great disservice not only to both countries but to all countries concerned with NATO." He said he regarded command organization which has resulted from negotiations among NAT powers as "considerable achievement." As consequence considerable pressure "we were able to persuade" Pres to appoint Eisenhower to Command of West. In addition, Brit were able to secure designation Montgomery as Deputy

[1] Repeated to Paris as 2068 for information MacArthur.
[2] Not printed.

Supreme Commander and appointment of Englishman as Deputy Supreme Air Commander.

Shinwell took issue with Churchill's statement that naval appointments determined at low level. On contrary they had been decided by UK and US Chiefs of Staff together with those of other NAT members. Brit had not initiated proposal that Amer be designated Supreme Commander Atlantic. However, they concurred in view post shld be established as part of unified control designed to avoid mistakes and errors last war. Furthermore, Brit Admiral who wld have command East Atlantic wld exercise control over what wld likely be "main operational area" running from southern tip Greenland to Cape Finisterre. Also Brit wld have "exclusive control" UK coastal waters and Deputy Supreme Commander Atlantic wld be Brit. Shinwell stated command Mediterranean was still under discussion and expressed hope that by referring to matter Churchill had not "thrown spanner into works." Re Royal Navy, which from tone his remarks Churchill apparently seeking to "denigrate", Shinwell said it was still "very strong" and wld be integral part of defense organization "we are building up in conjunction with eleven nations."

He concluded with expression hope that "feelings between ourselves and US will not be strained as result this debate" and that "very shortly" NATO Command organization wld be completely finalized "to advantage all countries concerned."

As anticipated proposed motion of censure which terminated debate was defeated by vote of 291 to 280.

Full text debate by airpouch.

GIFFORD

781.5/5–151

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretaries of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs (McGhee) and for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, April 24, 1951.]

Subject: Greek-Turkish Security Commitment

On March 24, you sent a letter (Tab A) to the Secretary of Defense [2] asking for Defense views with respect to:

(1) Whether reciprocal security arrangements should be entered into with Turkey and Greece; and

(2) The form such a security commitment should take in the event the answer to (1) were in the affirmative.

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[1] Drafted by Henry Labouisse, Director, Planning Staff, Bureau of European Affairs, and Edmund Dorsz (GTI).

[2] *Ante*, p. 501.

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The letter set forth several alternative forms of a security commitment for Defense consideration. These were:

(1) Through adherence by Turkey and Greece to NATO either as (*a*) a separate regional grouping or (*b*) directly;
(2) Through bilateral arrangements between the US and Turkey, and the US and Greece;
(3) Through multilateral arrangement among US, UK, Turkey and Greece; or
(4) Through some other plan which, taking into account the complex political, military and administrative problems involved, will still accomplish the purpose of bilateral security undertakings as between the US and Greece and Turkey, having always in mind the factor of urgency.

In line with item (4) above, S/P prepared a draft Mediterranean treaty [3] (Tab B), textually similar to the North Atlantic Treaty, involving a security arrangement between the US, UK, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey, and eventually other Mediterranean powers. This paper was subsequently submitted on an informal basis to the Defense Department and was taken into consideration along with the contents of your letter of March 24.

The Secretary of Defense replied in a letter dated April 14, 1951 [4] (Tab C), to which was attached a memorandum and a study paper [5] from the Joint Chiefs of Staff embodying a summary of their views and recommendations. The Secretary of Defense states in his letter that he concurs with the Joint Chiefs of Staff study and favors their recommendation for adoption of a policy whereby the US would propose and support early membership to Turkey and Greece in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

At a meeting with Deputy Undersecretary Matthews on April 17, attended by officers of EUR, NEA, S/P, and S/ISA,[6] the Defense Department's letter of April 14, 1951 was discussed. The attitude of the group was that the US should take steps leading towards the granting of a security commitment to Greece and Turkey. However, the question of what form the commitment should take was to be submitted to you for decision on the basis of such recommendations as the appropriate offices might agree upon.

Since this meeting, S/P has prepared a memorandum [7] (Tab D), to which is attached a memorandum of conversation with Secretary

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[3] Dated April 3, not printed (781.5/5–151).
[4] Not printed (781.5/5–151).
[5] Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley, dated April 10, with an attached "Summary of Views and Bases for Joint Chiefs of Staff Position on Security Arrangements for Greece and Turkey," April 9, and a copy of the S/P draft of a Mediterranean Treaty; none printed (781.5/5–151).
[6] No report of this meeting has been found in the Department of State files.
[7] Memorandum dated April 19 on the problem of how best to utilize the elements of strength in the Mediterranean area, particularly Greece and Turkey, in the defense of the West; not printed. (781.5/5–151)

Finletter of the Air Force,[8] outlining the advantages and disadvantages of the various types of security commitment that have been considered. Each type has some favorable aspect; all have a number of difficult complicating factors.

As a result of this consideration, we have concluded that, upon the assumption some public action is necessary and desirable to afford a security commitment to Turkey and Greece, the NATO membership for Greece and Turkey is the preferred form. The principal factors which support this conclusion are:

(*a*) The views of the Defense establishment;
(*b*) Simplification of political problems connected with command structures;
(*c*) Relative simplicity and speed, from standpoint of US reaction, of extending NATO membership as compared with other forms, having in mind the fact that Congress is familiar with the NAT and has called for the utilization of the military strength and resources of Turkey and Greece (also Spain and Western Germany) in paragraph 9 of Concurrent Resolution 18; and
(*d*) Turkey and Greece are already associated with the NAT for planning purposes.

The main factors which would suggest seeking some solution other than NATO membership are political:

(*a*) The concept of the North Atlantic community of countries with common cultural, religious, social and economic heritage and future does not readily lend itself to the thought of Greco-Turkish participation;
(*b*) Natural reluctance of most members of NATO to see a broadening of security commitments, the immediate benefits of which they may not perceive;
(*c*) Complications resulting from an enlarged membership;
(*d*) Varying reluctance of other NATO members, based upon combinations of the above factors, which may be overcome only at the cost of some goodwill and diplomatic credit;
(*e*) If it would be possible to resolve the Anglo-Egyptian base problem[9] through some regional organization including Greece, Turkey and Egypt, this possibility would be prejudiced by placing Greece and Turkey in NATO at this time.

In our view, no other proposed security arrangement affords the military strength that can be obtained through NATO membership, nor does any such other proposal eliminate to a controlling extent the

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[8] Memorandum by Villard of a conversation on April 3 with Finletter and Under Secretary of the Air Force McCone, not printed (781.5/5–151). Finletter expressed a preference for Greek and Turkish membership in NATO as opposed to creation of a Mediterranean or other regional defense pact outside NATO.

[9] For documentation on the concern of the United States with Anglo-Egyptian relations, see volume v.

political problems inherent in the NATO solution. For example, other possible solutions have these serious objectionable features:

I. Bilateral arrangements (US–Greece; US–Turkey)

(*a*) It would be extremely difficult to obtain Congressional approval of bilateral security commitments;

(*b*) If done, the US would find it more difficult to refuse similar commitments to other nations;

(*c*) It would cut at the foundations of our present policy of building a regional defense system through multilateral action.

II. A Mediterranean pact (US, UK, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey).

(*a*) This would multiply the problems of the major powers by creating overlapping and contending organizations and command structures;

(*b*) A Mediterranean pact which omitted certain Mediterranean countries, such as Egypt, would pose serious political problems;

(*c*) If Egypt were included, it would hardly seem possible to omit Israel; if the latter were also included, the remaining Arab states would be resentful;

(*d*) A pact with all Mediterranean countries would prove unwieldy and would cause us most serious operating and political problems;

(*e*) It would be difficult to persuade Congress of the necessity for an entirely new pact if its only purpose is to include Greece and Turkey in the Western defense structure.

Two further factors should be borne in mind, no matter what type arrangement is considered:

A. Any approach to the Congress regarding inclusion of Greece and Turkey in a security arrangement will necessarily raise the question of Spain.[10] It may be possible, however, for our military authorities to convince the Congress that the military potentials of Greece and Turkey are more immediate to us than is Spain's.

B. Any act at this time in publicly bringing Greece and Turkey into the Western defense system could possibly serve as the ignition point in our relations with the Kremlin. It is not possible to forecast whether or not this action would be considered sufficiently provocative by the Kremlin to cause it to alter its time schedule. It is therefore most important for us to be sure that the added strength of Turkey and Greece at this time is of great enough importance to justify this risk. In any event, no public action should be taken by us pending the outcome of a CFM.

On the assumption that it is considered necessary for us to accept the risk mentioned in the preceding paragraph, we favor as a preferred course of action, after consideration of the various elements involved, the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO. Accordingly we suggest, on the above assumption, a course of action which

[10] For documentation on the question of Spanish participation in the defense of Western Europe, see volume IV.

would involve sounding out the British and French Governments, with a view to determining as soon as possible how far those Governments would be inclined to support us in action designed to induce the other NATO powers to agree to Greek-Turkish admission into NATO. If these soundings should indicate that pressure for Greek-Turkish admission to NATO would unduly strain our relations with the NATO powers, we would suggest that the question of a Mediterranean pact should be looked into further.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that:

(*a*) you approve in principle, as the most feasible plan for according security commitments to Greece and Turkey, the membership of those countries in NATO;

(*b*) you authorize the making of discreet, informal soundings of the British and French Governments concerning their attitude in this matter;

(*c*) pending further developments, discussions of this subject be closely guarded and that our present thinking be indicated to no country other than the British and French;

(*d*) in the interim, a careful review be undertaken in the NSC to evaluate the importance of a reciprocal security arrangement with Greece and Turkey in its relation to the possible effects on Soviet action.

Concurrences: [11]

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[11] There is an indication on the source text that this memorandum had the concurrence of Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews, Ambassador at Large Jessup, and the Committee of International Security Affairs and that the Policy Planning Staff had noted the foregoing recommendations. Attention was also called to approval of the document in the memorandum of a conversation with President Truman on April 30. The memorandum by L. D. Battle, dated April 30, said that the President had agreed with Acheson that NATO was "the best arrangement into which to bring Greece and Turkey" and that it was all right to begin to discuss this as outlined in the paper. (Secretary's memoranda, lot 53 D 444, March–April 1951)

740.5/4–2451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

SECRET ANKARA, April 24, 1951—11 p. m.

674. During past weeks Turk public and press have grown increasingly preoccupied with urgent need for firm security arrangement that would, on contractual basis, link Turkey to Atlantic Pact Powers or directly with US. This vital question has colored Turk reaction to recent international developments, such as disorders in Iran, trouble

between Israel and Syria,[1] and MacArthur's recall,[2] all of which, in Turk opinion, bear out thesis that Turkey cannot be left without security guarantees in face of deteriorating world conditions.

Turks claim, with considerable justification, that their request for NATO membership is a lead from strength rather than from weakness. They profess, with evident sincerity, inability to comprehend reluctance certain NATO Powers to accept offer of "strongest army in Europe" and of only nation in Middle East with mil power capable of resisting aggression and which with Greece, cld constitute "Eisenhower's strong right flank".

Concurrent resolution US Congress specifically naming Greece and Turkey,[3] as well as semiofficial statements that France not "unsympathetic" to Turk aspirations re security guarantee, have raised public hopes. Furthermore, press speculation almost universal that "informal conference" in Ankara of Turk Ambassadors from London, Paris and Rome, culminating in 3½ hour mtg Apr 23 with Pres Bayar and high govt officials, has been mainly concerned with formulation new approach re NATO membership to be presented to appropriate officials certain European powers by FonMin Koprulu on occasion forthcoming mtg FonMins of Council of Europe.[4]

Local feeling now quite different from what it was at time Turk request for NATO membership presented to FonMins in New York last Sept, when it was apparent Turk Govt hardly dared hope for affirmative reply. General optimism at this time based on Turk performance in Korea,[5] widespread recognition that Turk armed forces represents firm bastion in shaky Middle East, and growing realization of non-Communist world that all elements of strength, regardless of their geographical location, must be brought into unified security arrangements to resist Sov imperialistic intentions.

No significance attached to actual form which security guarantee might take. Nihat Erim in April 24 *Hurses* editorial states: "Turkey's latest approach (i.e., by Erkin to Dept last Jan) has left every form open for America—whether it is acceptance into Atlantic Pact, America's participation in British-French-Turk alliance, a separate regional agreement for the Mediterranean, or even any other form that America may establish, as long as Ankara and Wash unite under a written guarantee".

There is too, in press and official circles, undercurrent of appre-

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[1] For documentation on the disorders in Iran and tensions between Israel and Syria, see volume v.

[2] For documentation on the relief of General MacArthur as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command in Korea, see volume VII.

[3] See editorial note, p. 524.

[4] For documentation on U.S. encouragement of efforts toward the economic and political integration of Western Europe, see volume IV.

[5] For documentation on Turkish participation in the Korean War see volume v.

hension lest present high national morale may weaken if early conclusion some such arrangement with West not achieved.[6]

Foregoing is pertinent to consideration penultimate para Embtel 663, April 19.[7]

WADSWORTH

[6] On April 30, Turkish Ambassador Erkin "expressed disappointment" to McGhee over the fact that he had nothing "concrete to take back to Turkey" regarding an early American security commitment to Turkey. For more than 2 years, Erkin continued, he had been reporting to Ankara that the U.S. Government was considering the matter and yet nothing of consequence had been forthcoming. Turkey might be forced to take security measures of its own if the United States did not move soon, the Ambassador said, adding that this did not mean that Turkey "would 'shake hands with Russia.'" McGhee hastened to assure Ambassador Erkin that the United States was giving "thorough and active study" to the problem and he urged the Ambassador to impress upon his Government that it "not 'rock the boat' by taking some new line or new measure that might upset the good progress that is being made in reaching a solution to this problem." When queried as to whether the United States had discussed the question with other NATO countries, McGhee "replied that he felt he could say that we had had continuing discussions since last September with the principal NATO countries on the general subject, but he did not elaborate further." (Memorandum of conversation, by C. Robert Moore of the Office of Greek-Turkish-Iranian Affairs, April 30, 740.5/4–3051)

[7] Telegram 663 of April 19, from Ankara reported Ambassador Wadsworth's concern that anticipated cuts in projected economic and military aid would create a "very difficult public relations problem" with the Turks and would strain further their ties with the West (782.58/4–1951).

740.5/4–2851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 28, 1951—2 p. m.

4957. Eyes only Gifford and Spofford. JCS do not want to proceed with designation Adm Fechteler as SACLANT.[2] Last statement Shinwell in Commons April 19 [3] and several personal statements by high Brit naval officers to US colleagues indicate beyond reasonable doubt that Fechteler not considered as exercising real command authority entire Atlantic, that Brit Adm commanding North Eastern sector would have *de facto* absolute powers with result that Brit attribute to Fechteler little more than role of purveyor US naval forces to Brit Commander in North Eastern Atlantic. Such interpretation Fechteler's role and powers unacceptable to US. Also obvious that Brit patriotism has been aroused by Churchill's political exploitation of Fechteler appointment. Furthermore, we have clear indication UK

[1] Message drafted by Perkins and Knight; cleared by Admiral Sherman of Defense, S/ISA, and Matthews: and transmitted by Knight.

[2] This telegram was in response to Spofford's telegram Depto 851 from London of April 28 requesting information on the status of the Fechteler appointment and what should be said if an inquiry were made on the subject in the NAC. (740.5/4–2851.)

[3] See telegram 5528, April 20, p. 510.

Gov now anxious for completion Fechteler appointment as facilitating subsequent designation Brit Adm as Supreme Commander Mediterranean. Latter would be unwelcome to Fr, Itals, Greeks and Turks and probably to other interested nations in addition to being unacceptable to us and to SACEUR who vitally interested in closest coordination between SHAPE and future Mediterranean Command organization and to whom the President has assigned operational control of US ships in Med. State shares JCS concern on these developments. Therefore we have concluded that the whole naval command problem shld be reviewed as an inter-related and interdependent whole by the Mil Comite and have in mind instructing Spofford to introduce resolution to this effect in Deps.

We are, however, full aware of pol importance this entire issue in UK and of possible unfavorable effect of such a course of action upon an already insecure Brit Gov. How we can proceed presents a real problem. Despite the fact that Adm Sherman offered to review the situation when he conferred with the Brit Chiefs in London in early March [4] and again by dispatch to Lord Fraser in mid-April, this is not generally known. Therefore any action on our part wld have the appearance of our having deliberately held our hand until the Brit Gov was thoroughly committed and then refusing to act simply to embarrass the Gov and to contribute to its downfall. This same argument wld also hold if it was decided to hold an election in the near future until time elections were over.

There seem to be two alternatives open to us in the circumstances: one is for us to ask for review of the matter which has the disadvantages mentioned above; and the second wld be for the Brit to ask for a review of the whole situation which of course wld be very difficult for them to do now in view of what has just happened in the Commons. They cld perhaps however do this at some time in the future basing it on the reason that a study of the Mediterranean Command situation had revealed that the whole naval picture shld be studied together and asking that it be approached from that point of view. A delay shld be possible on Fechteler appointment if the Brit did not press for action in the Deps.

However if the review is to be any good it might well result in an American commander in the Mediterranean or a split command in the Atlantic with the UK commanding the North Eastern part. This wld be for all intents and purposes buying Churchill's contentions and it seems unlikely that the present Brit Gov cld agree to any such set up.

We are very anxious to get urs and Spofford's advice as to how to

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[4] See Draft Minutes of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, March 14, p. 488.

proceed.[5] On mechanics it is our feeling here that the matter shld be taken up with the Brit before it is introduced in the Deps and that it shld be done here with both State and Navy participating. In the meantime, of course, it is of great importance that none of this be known by anyone else.

ACHESON

[5] Ambassador Gifford replied in telegram 5692 from London of May 1 that he and Spofford agreed that, despite the political difficulties which reopening the SACLANT problem might involve for the United Kingdom, the whole question of the "naval command picture," including the Mediterranean command situation, should be reviewed as a whole. Moreover, "We fully concur that matter shld be discussed with UK before it is raised in Deps. We believe approach to UK shld be in Wash and at senior service rather than political level." (740.5/5–151)

Editorial Note

On May 7, Acheson held a further conversation with the President on the subject of a Greek-Turkish security commitment. The Secretary recommended that the proper course was to wait for several days to see whether the Four-Power Talks at Paris would result in the formal convening of a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting and that, if they did not, confidential talks should begin with the British and French looking toward a proposal to admit Greece and Turkey to NATO. The President replied that he had been giving the matter much thought and that he approved the course recommended (Secretary's memoranda, lot 53 D 444, May–June 1951). That same day, the Department of State air pouched to the Embassies in London and Paris various materials relating to the problem of Greek-Turkish membership in NATO, including copies of the memorandum and enclosures from McGhee and Perkins to Acheson of April 24 (printed page 511). The materials were sent to London as airgram 2068 and to Paris as airgram 1803 (781.5/5–751).

On May 8, Acheson cabled Bruce and MacArthur in Paris that the Department was considering an early approach to the British and French Governments with a view to determining how far those Governments would be inclined to support Greek and Turkish membership (telegram 5918, 740.5/5–851). By May 12, Acheson had become concerned at the growing number of press accounts of the United States position on Greek-Turkish NATO membership, especially in light of the Four-Power Talks at Paris (telegram 5206 to London, 740.5/5–1251). In telegram 5922 from London, May 13, Ambassador Gifford agreed with Acheson that, in view of the wide publicity given the United States position on Greece and Turkey, approaches to the British, the French, and the NATO Council of Deputies should be made at the soonest possible moment, and he stated that he was asking for an early appointment with Foreign Secretary Morrison and sug-

gested that either Bruce or Bohlen in Paris see Foreign Minister Schuman (740.5/5–1351). Acheson replied that he would telephone instructions to Spofford on May 14 (telegram 5210, May 13, 740.5/5–1351). On May 15, Gifford and Spofford reported that they had presented Permanent Undersecretary of State Sir William Strang with an *aide-mémoire* (*infra*), written by themselves, based upon material sent in airgram 2068 of May 7, a copy of which had also been sent to Morrison at his country residence (telegram 5930 from London, May 15, 740.5/5–1551). The same day, Chargé Bohlen cabled from Paris that he had delivered an *aide-mémoire* to the French Foreign Office that morning and, "Since British will unquestionably immediately consult with French, I thought it best to present *aide-mémoire* with identic text to that given British in order to avoid speculation as to possible discrepancies in wording." (Telegram 6939, 740.5/5–1551)

740.5/5–1551

The Embassy in the United Kingdom to the British Foreign Office[1]

TOP SECRET

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1. The United States Government has for some time had under continuing study the desirability of strengthening the security commitments between the western powers and Greece and Turkey. Such action is considered essential in the light of both political and military considerations.

2. Political factors include the desire of Greece and Turkey to become full parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, their dissatisfaction with their present limited form of association with it, the importance of ensuring their belligerency on the side of the West from the outset of any hostilities between the USSR and the West, the feeling in Greece and Turkey that neither their existing treaty ties with the UK and France nor the so-called "Truman Doctrine" are sufficient to deter Soviet aggression against them, and the importance of preventing in Greece and Turkey the development of public support for a policy of neutrality.

3. From the military point of view it is essential to secure the southern flank of the NAT forces, to control the Mediterranean Sea and to secure air and sea communications throughout that area. Conversely, it is important to ensure that the USSR is not afforded a protected flank for its possible operations against Europe and/or the Middle East as would be the case if Turkey remained neutral. In addition, the

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[1] Copy transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 5518, May 15, from London.

entrance of Greece and Turkey on the side of the Western Powers at the outset of a general war would (*a*) force upon the Soviet a significantly large diversion of effort, (*b*) contribute to and facilitate the defense of the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East and (*c*) provide a major contribution of strength to the Western Powers.

4. One way of accomplishing the objective of strengthening the security commitments to Turkey and Greece would be by the conclusion of a "Mediterranean Treaty" with terms similar to those of the NAT. There are, however, serious objections to the conclusion of such a treaty: (*a*) It would establish a new military organization which would overlap with the NATO, duplicating and complicating many of the military functions of the latter; (*b*) It would not achieve the basic objectives of insuring collective action against aggression on the part of all of the nations of Western Europe; (*c*) It would involve competition for military forces and material between the two separate treaty organizations whereas under a single pact, such as the NAT, the military forces and materials available to the pact nations are allocated among those nations by common agreement; (*d*) It would require the establishment of additional military commands, channels of command and communications which would be unwieldy and would seriously complicate military operations and planning; (*e*) It would open the possibility of having to include various other countries in the Mediterranean area such as Syria, Israel, Egypt, etc. Such a possibility involves obvious and serious difficulties and complications.

5. Another means of strengthening the security commitments to Greece and Turkey would be to invite these countries to adhere to the NAT. This course has obvious advantages: (*a*) It would be the quickest and easiest way of bringing these countries into the overall defense picture, an advantage of great importance in the light of the present world situation; (*b*) It is the preference of Greece and Turkey themselves and would, therefore, increase their cooperativeness and facilitate their participation in military planning for the area; (*c*) It would insure their immediate belligerency in the event of war and thus greatly facilitate Western military operations; and (*d*) Greece and Turkey are already associated with NATO for planning purposes.

6. There are, of course, objections to Greece and Turkey adhering to the NAT: (*a*) The conception of the North Atlantic community of countries with common cultural, religious, social and economic heritage and future does not readily lend itself to the thought of Greco-Turkish participation; (*b*) Most parties to the NAT would probably be reluctant to see a broadening of their security commitments, the immediate benefits of which they may not perceive; (*c*) There would be obvious complications resulting from an enlarged membership.

7. In the light of the above it is the view of the United States Government that the disadvantages of a Mediterranean pact outweigh its

advantages and that the advantages of Greek and Turkish adherence to the NAT outweigh its disadvantages. The United States Government, therefore, favors the adherence of Greece and Turkey to the NAT.

8. The United States Government believes that the relationship of Greece and Turkey to the NAT should be discussed by the North Atlantic Council Deputies at a very early date. It hopes that the British Government will share its views that their adherence to the Treaty will be the best solution and would welcome an early indication of its views. A similar approach is being made to the French Government.

9. Despite the recent unauthorized publicity on this subject, the United States Government hopes that any public indication that it is currently under intergovernmental discussion can be avoided.[2]

LONDON, May 15, 1951.

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[2] The Department of State, in telegram Todep 435 to London (6179 to Paris) dated May 17, suggested minor changes in the wording of the *aide-mémoire* delivered to the French and British on May 15, which would make the text acceptable for presentation by Spofford in the meeting of the Council Deputies on May 21. (740.5/5–1651) The following day, telegram 7043 from Paris informed the Department that the French Cabinet had met on the subject of the *aide-mémoire* and decided that France could take no position on the matter until after the forthcoming elections. The Embassy believed that in the meantime the French Foreign Office would probably suggest a study and recommendations on military aspects of the problem by the Standing Group of the NATO Military Committee and would object to discussion of the subject in the Council Deputies prior to formation of a new government. (740.5/5–1851)

Telegram 439 to London (6222 to Paris) dated May 19 stated that after consideration of telegram 7043 from Paris, and in the absence of further information on British thinking, it was believed advisable for Spofford to proceed with his presentation of the U.S. position at the Council Deputies meeting on May 21. (740.5/5–1851)

Editorial Note

Exploratory discussions between officials of the United States and United Kingdom relating to command problems in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Middle Eastern areas were held in Washington on May 16 and May 24, 1951. Among others representing the United States were Messrs. Matthews, Nitze, Bonbright, and McGhee of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The British delegation was led by Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks and Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot.

At the opening of the talks, United States officials pressed for resolution of the Mediterranean command problem without an attempt at that time to resolve command arrangements in the Middle East where neither NATO nor the United States had substantial interests or responsibilities. Franks, who subsequently admitted that he had not come to the first session with any firm instructions, countered with a defense of British desires to see established a Supreme Commander,

Mediterranean, who would be British, and under him a Commander in Chief responsible for all naval forces in the Mediterranean, who would be American. Franks stated that British thinking was informed by the conception of the Mediterranean area as a distinct strategic entity—a "unitary sea"—washing the shores of both Europe and the Middle East; he also admitted that the United Kingdom hoped for "some degree of equivalence" for itself "between the picture in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic", i.e., an exact reversal of roles so that as British commanders were currently envisaged as occupying a subordinate role in the Atlantic, they would be supreme over American commanders in the Mediterranean.

Admiral Sherman replied that he rejected the idea of resolving the Mediterranean command problem on the basis of that proposed for the Atlantic because he did not like the existing Atlantic arrangement with its plethora of subordinate commands controlling "rather meager resources". After some further discussion in which Sir Roger Makins pressed the wishes of his Government to have a Supreme Command, Mediterranean, General Collins suggested that the naval perspective was not a sound basis for judgment, that the Mediterranean should be viewed chiefly as a line of communication, and that during World War II most of the fighting in the region had taken place on the ground or in the air. He added that General Eisenhower currently envisaged a NATO front stretching no further than to Yugoslavia and Greece and therefore the Middle East should be a separate area under British control. Sherman replied, *inter alia*; "The danger is that in trying to meet desirable political and emotional views we end up with a bad military arrangement".

After further discussion, attention focused on the promise and problems of establishing a separate Middle East Command under a British Supreme Commander with the naval commander-in-chief Mediterranean under NATO responsible for the supply line from the NATO front to the Middle East. Among the problems of an MEC would be (*a*) the paucity of resources which the United States could provide even though the Joint Chiefs admitted that American interests in the Middle Eastern region were growing with the possible admission of Turkey to NATO and the existence of United States training missions in Turkey and Iran, and (*b*) problems with the French with respect to administrative and prestige factors involved in Middle East command arrangements.

At the conclusion of the first meeting, however, the Americans expressed no objection to Franks' informing London that (1) proposals for a Supreme Allied Commander Middle East (to be British) had been raised and considered; (2) that a single naval commander for the entire Mediterranean area who would be American seemed preferable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and (3) that while the above arrange-

ments were being further worked out, the appointment of Admiral Fechteler as SACLANT should be pressed.

At the second meeting, discussions continued without a binding conclusion or set of conclusions being reached. United States officials were willing to accept the concept of a separate but interlocking Middle East command structure with NATO, but lengthy discussion ensued on the British proposal for a supreme naval commander in the Mediterranean. Sherman argued that the Mediterranean area was not a strategic entity and he raised the issue of properly demarcating lines of responsibility, using the Balkan region as an example. As the meeting closed, General Hull of the United States Army proposed agreement in principle to establish a Middle East command within "a reasonable time" and Ambassador Franks acknowledged Sherman's objections to a unified Mediterranean naval command that might be under British control by admitting that "one major fact is that the forces that can be imported into that area—and they are naval and air and they are American—should be under American control". With these acknowledgments of continuing dilemmas, the meeting agreed to inform General Eisenhower of the discussions and adjourned.

These two meetings were in a series of several inaugurated in early 1951. For further documentation on Anglo-American meetings, see volume IV. The full minutes of the meetings of May 16 and May 24 are in the PPS files, lot 64 D 563, 720 UK.

Editorial Note

On February 15 President Truman approved NSC 103/1, "The Position of the United States With Respect to Greece," and directed its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies under the coordination of the Secretary of State. NSC 103/1 had been originally drafted in NEA as a position paper elaborating the policy to be applied in the event of a Soviet satellite attack against Greece. As a result of subsequent suggestions from the NSC staff the paper was broadened to include economic and political considerations and hence became a "country paper" in which was summarized and projected United States policy toward Greece, which stressed an expansion of existing security arrangements with that country. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 103/1)

On May 11 the National Security Council considered NSC 109, "The Position of the United States With Respect to Turkey." This paper stressed the need for an early conclusion of reciprocal security arrangements with Turkey, including the incorporation of Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The covering note to this document, written by the Executive Secretary to the National Security

Council, proposed that the appropriate paragraphs of NSC 103/1 be revised to incorporate a similar policy with respect to the inclusion of Greece in NATO. In a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Marshall of May 22, dealing with NSC 103/1 and 109, General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, reaffirm their position as indicated in their memorandum to you, dated 30 April 1951, that United States security interests demand that Turkey and Greece be admitted as full members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)." (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 109)

On May 24 President Truman approved the revisions of the statement of policy on Greece contained in NSC 103/1 as proposed by the National Security Council in NSC 109 so as to stress the need for an early admission of Greece as well as Turkey to NATO as a formal policy of the United States Government. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 109). For documentation on the origins, elaboration, and approval of NSC 103/1 and NSC 109, see volume V.

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, 723 Near and Middle East

Memorandum of Conversation, by John H. Ferguson of the Policy Planning Staff [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 31, 1951.

Mr. Burrows came in to tell me of a message received by the British Embassy from London concerning further discussions of command arrangements in the Mediterranean and Middle East.

He explained that the British Chiefs had indicated that they were pleased at the progress that was being made and that they understood that General Bradley and General Vandenberg were going to be in Europe within the next week or so and hoped they might have an opportunity to discuss these matters with them in London. They were also suggesting that General Bradley ask Admiral Sherman to accompany him and participate in the discussions.

Mr. Burrows referred to the fact that the Ambassador had spoken to Mr. Matthews after the last joint meeting and had mentioned that he thought perhaps a discussion among a smaller group would be useful as the next step, and that the British felt the possibility of discussions between the British Chiefs and some of our Chiefs in London might serve this purpose. Mr. Burrows said that he did not want us to have the idea that this represented any change in the arrangements for arriving at a decision on these matters but rather the desire on the part of the British Chiefs to take advantage of the

[1] Copies to Under Secretary Matthews, EUR, NEA, and Nitze.

presence in Europe of some of our Chiefs. He said that Air Marshal Elliot was speaking to General Bradley and was suggesting a meeting in London about the 8th of June.[2]

[2] See U.K. record of a meeting held on Friday, 8th June, 1951, p. 528. The question of a Mediterranean Command was raised briefly at the end of the State–JCS meeting on June 6 when General Collins stated that General Eisenhower "is insistent on the importance of doing something quickly about the Southern European Command" of NATO, Collins reiterated the JCS position on the issue which was that "we should not try to settle on command arrangements outside the NATO area at this time," and he reported that General Eisenhower shared this view and "had been glad to hear that we had backed him up" in the discussions with the British. The JCS pressed for the immediate appointment of Admiral Carney as Commander in Chief of the Southern European Command of NATO (State–JCS meetings, lot 61 D 417, Jan–June 1951).

740.5/6–151 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Barbour) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET Moscow, June 1, 1951—6 p. m.

2047. Infotel May 22,[2] Paris 6830 to Dept May 10.[3] In light of expressions of apprehension of Sov reaction to admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO, Emb is encouraged to submit comments on general subject of possible Sov attitude toward proposed formal guarantees to those countries under any of the alternatives suggested.

Although aware of Russian sensitivity to military situation in Black Sea area, Emb believes that, particularly in light of recent developments in Iran, need to check any trend toward neutrality on part of Turkey outweighs foreseeable risk. If Emb's analysis correct, greatest provocation to Sovs is increasing general buildup of military strength in US and Western Europe and any resort to broad military action by Sovs as means of dealing with situation would be geared to meeting this menace rather than to dealing with individual problem arising from what in reality as far as present period is concerned, is largely just formalization of existing short term physical capabilities and political attitudes. Present Brit and Fr undertakings with respect to Greece and Turkey as well as Amer mil assistance to them must surely be interpreted by Sovs as indicating that under present circumstances, at least, the defense of these two countries would be fully supported by the three major powers concerned. Thus chances are that unless they could feel confident of coping with the bigger problem, the Sov reac-

[1] Repeated information to Paris as 627, London as 370, Athens as 26, Ankara as 24.

[2] Circular telegram to Ankara, Athens, Moscow, and the NATO countries other than France and the United Kingdom, not printed, enclosing a packet of documents regarding the question of Greek-Turkish participation in NATO (740.5/5–2251).

[3] Telegram from the Chargé in Paris, Bohlen, not printed, which referred to the Soviet reaction "which is sure to be strong in view of extreme sensitivity of Soviets about anything military affecting Black Sea area and Turkey." (740.5/5–1051)

tion would be more vigorous employment of psychological, political and economic weapons in effort to nullify long range advantages that could be derived from participation of these two countries in tighter collective security arrangements.

Bilateral US–Greece and US–Turkey treaty guarantees would draw fiercest fire from Sovs who would undoubtedly quickly seize opportunity to blast away at basic justification for present free world collective security arrangements and exploit what they would picture as righteous indignation at direct US guarantees to states occupying strategic positions in immediate proximity to USSR.

Although inclusion Greece and Turkey in NATO rather than in a Mediterranean pact would probably provoke more violent Sov propaganda reaction, it may be that the Sovs would as a practical matter consider this alternative better suited for their purposes. Whatever prospects they may have for success, Sovs seem for the present to be making a big play for mass popular support as means of reinforcing security of USSR, rather than undertaking new governmental agreements with free world states directed toward this end. As part of this program they have relied heavily on picturing themselves as intended victims of projected aggression. As the Paris talks further stress, Atlantic Pact is important element in this campaign. Since Sovs have from its inception labelled pact as aggressive they can be expected to make full use of one interpretation already expressed in West that inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO allegedly transforms nature of that organization from a defensive to an offensive one. Likewise, they would be quick to exploit diverging views which would arise in discussions in Parliaments of NATO countries as means of promoting disunity throughout the area.

In addition this propaganda bonanza, inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO would give rise to new situation in the NE highly susceptible to Sov exploitation in their growing endeavor to penetrate into that area. With both Greece and especially Turkey in NATO, the Arab countries, Israel and perhaps even Iran, could well feel that they had been somewhat isolated by this development and had nowhere to go for collective security arrangements of greater immediacy than UN. Sovs might be able to play profitably upon this theme in NE countries particularly if Iranian problem [4] does not reach early solution.

Mediterranean pact composed of US, Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey at outset might serve more as rallying point to those countries if and when their need for collective security becomes greater.

Having in view problem presented by intention on part of Sov Union to expand outward at any point along perimeter of Sov orbit if

[4] See volume v.

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opportunity permits, eventual maintenance of security for neighboring states through collective arrangements would seem to call for more flexible procedure of regional problems taken into account. Mediterranean pact might be linked to NATO on somewhat flexible basis and established basis for forging continuous chain of defense groupings along entire Sov orbit periphery.

Under such arrangement effectiveness of NATO as homogeneous pivotal unity as pictured by Spofford in Dept airgram of Mar 31 (control 4798)[5] would be enhanced.

There could hardly be development more encouraging to Sov hopes to disrupt free world unity and determination to resist aggression than failure to admit two such willing and effective applicants as Greece and Turkey into formal collective security arrangements with three major Western powers. Embassy adds its support to active measures being taken in this direction.

BARBOUR

[5] Circular airgram quoting the text of Spofford's telegram Depto 666 of March 22, p. 505.

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, 720 UK

United Kingdom Record of a Meeting Between the British Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley), London, June 8, 1951 [1]

TOP SECRET

LORD FRASER, in welcoming General Bradley, said how grateful the Chiefs of Staff were that he had been able to find the time to visit them. There were, he said, a number of points which they would like to discuss with him.

GENERAL BRADLEY replied that he much regretted that it had not been possible to bring with him Admiral Sherman, as had been pro-

[1] This record was included as a confidential annex to the British Chiefs of Staff meeting on June 8. A notation on the source text indicates that this is copy one of two copies and a marginal note reads: "copy 2 handed to Mr. Matthews 6/12/51." Presumably, General Bradley was given a number of copies of the UK minutes either before his departure from England or soon after his return and he, in turn, passed two copies to the Department of State. Bradley apparently traveled to London to fulfill the invitation extended by Air Marshal Elliot in late May. See memorandum of conversation by John Ferguson, May 31, p. 525. Bradley first visited France, arriving in Paris on June 2 for talks with Generals Eisenhower and Gruenther, French Defense Minister Moch, and various French military leaders. On June 4 Bradley also met with General Marras, Chief of the Italian General Staff. Bradley then visited Britain from June 6 to June 9. In a press conference at Paris on June 2, Bradley declared that he favored the admission of Greece and Turkey, as well as of Spain, to NATO "from the military point of view," and added: "It is my belief that we ought to have as many together as possible to build up collective defence. The more of us who can be put together the better we are going to be." (*Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1950–1952*, p. 11514)

posed* by the British Chiefs of Staff, so that they could discuss in detail Command arrangements for the Mediterranean. General Vandenberg was already in Europe, and they had endeavoured to make it a rule since operations in Korea commenced that there should be at least two of their number in Washington the whole time. He went on to say that he was not able to commit the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in any way, but he would naturally take back for their consideration any views that were expressed at the meeting. He would also inform the State Department of their views, where necessary and appropriate, at one of their weekly meetings.

Command Arrangements in the Middle East

SIR WILLIAM SLIM said there seemed to be general agreement on the necessity for an allied Middle East Command Organization. The proposals for this Command Organization which had been put forward by the United States went a long way on the lines on which the British were thinking. He considered, however, that the Command Organization for the Middle East must be something very much more definite than the United States had so far proposed and must be capable of functioning in war. The United States had suggested that various Middle East countries, should, if they so wished, take their place on a "Middle East Co-operative Defense Board." He did not consider that this would be a wise move initially, although naturally it might become possible as the result of subsequent developments. The British Chiefs of Staff consider that, at the outset, members of the Board should be drawn from those nations only who were in fact members of N.A.T.O. or who were associated with NATO. Turkey and Greece should be part of the Middle East Command Organization which must be linked in some way with NATO. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff did not consider that the Middle East should necessarily—at any rate in peace—come under the Standing Group, but rather under some separate body in Washington composed of the present members of the Standing Group wearing different hats and joined, possibly, by representatives of Turkey and Greece.

GENERAL BRADLEY expressed his general agreement with the necessity for an effective Allied Command Organization in the Middle East—effective in both peace and war. He said that it was debatable whether Greece should be part of this Organization or whether she should come within General Eisenhower's Command. Politically, it could be argued that Greece was part of the Balkans. However, this question of Greece could be settled later as the result of discussion. Turkey's role was of necessity purely a defensive one, and she would naturally wish to command her own forces on the home front. On the other hand, Turkey must be part of some Command Organization and under some outside Commander both for purposes of planning and

*COS (W) 38. [Footnote in the source text.]

in order that any support which might be given her, particularly from the air and the navy, could be properly co-ordinated. General Bradley was of the opinion that the Turks themselves would not like being under the British Commander in the Middle East.

As regards the question whether the Middle East Command should come under N.A.T.O., GENERAL BRADLEY pointed out that it was unlikely that the State Department would agree to such an arrangement, since it would mean that the N.A.T.O. Organization would be becoming world-wide, and the time was probably not yet ripe for such a step.

The French would certainly jump at any suggestion that the Standing Group should control the Middle East, since it would mean that the Standing Group was in fact assuming responsibility for the global direction of war. Such a step might have serious repercussions in other parts of the world; for example, there would certainly be objections from the South American countries, and Commonwealth countries would no doubt also express strong feelings against it.

GENERAL BRADLEY agreed that the suggestion that the Middle East Command should come under a separate body in Washington, composed of the present members of the Standing Group wearing different hats, might well produce a workable compromise, but that this solution would require further considerations.

Command Arrangements in the Mediterranean

LORD FRASER said that careful consideration had been given to the United States suggestion for the division of the Mediterranean, with the British Mediterranean Fleet confined to the Eastern end. This suggestion would, in fact, mean that the whole British Mediterranean Fleet would have to be withdrawn from the remainder of the Mediterranean and it would entail leaving the British bases in Gibraltar and Malta. From the British point of view the United States proposal was not a practicable proposition. The First Sea Lord then outlined the British counter-proposal which, he stated, had received Ministerial approval, the previous evening and had already been transmitted to Washington for discussion with the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. This counter-proposal was as follows:—

(i) Under the British Supreme Commander, Middle East, would be the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, who would command and operate all the British naval forces and bases throughout the Mediterranean to meet the naval requirements of the Middle East Command and any additional allied requirements from British bases.

(ii) Admiral Carney would be the Commander-in-Chief, Southern Flank, and would command and operate all United States naval forces in the Mediterranean to meet the naval requirements of General Eisenhower.

(iii) The British Naval Commander-in-Chief and Admiral Carney

would keep in very close touch and co-ordinate naval and maritime air operations throughout the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. They would also co-ordinate the activities of allied naval forces in the Mediterranean.

He gave General Bradley a copy† of this proposal in diagrammatic form.

LORD FRASER continued that he felt that this proposal overcame the difficulties of both sides and would enable the United States Sixth Fleet to accomplish its primary mission of supporting the Southern Flank. He said the British Naval Commander in the Mediterranean would at the same time be the British naval member of the Middle East Command Organization. He would be responsible for the running of British bases in the Mediterranean and for the routing of British convoys through the Mediterranean. Gibraltar would certainly be a bottleneck which would require very careful co-ordination, as would the various other problems connected with the naval operation of the Mediterranean. However, given good-will on both sides, there was, he contested, no reason why joint functional control of the Mediterranean should not present a practicable proposition.

GENERAL BRADLEY said that this new proposal of joint functional control of the Mediterranean was very much in line with his own way of thinking, and he felt that it might well present a practicable solution to this thorny problem. He would certainly discuss the suggestion with Admiral Sherman and his colleagues on his return to Washington. He agreed that the British Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean would naturally be responsible for the running of British bases and the routing of British convoys through the Mediterranean. On the other hand, convoys which were proceeding in support of Admiral Carney's Southern Flank would be the responsibility of Admiral Carney. This dual control of convoys would naturally require extremely close co-ordination between the two Admirals; but it could and would work.

Command Arrangements, Southern Flank

SIR WILLIAM SLIM informed General Bradley that the British Chiefs of Staff had now agreed that General Eisenhower should set up his Command Organization for his Southern Flank under Admiral Carney on similar lines to that of his Northern Flank under Admiral Brind, i.e.:—

Commander-in-Chief, Southern Flank and Commander, Naval Forces, alloted to that Sector	ADMIRAL CARNEY
Commander-in-Chief, Land Forces, Southern Flank	An Italian General
Commander-in-Chiefs, Air Forces, Southern Flank	An American Air Officer

†Annex. [Footnote in the source text.]

A condition to this agreement was that Admiral Carney's sphere should not extend to Greece, Turkey or to the Mediterranean as a whole, it being clearly understood that future decisions concerning the position of Greece and Turkey and concerning Command in the Mediterranean, were still under consideration and were not affected by the Command Organization of the Southern Flank. A message‡ to this effect had that morning been despatched to the Standing Group.

GENERAL BRADLEY expressed his approval of this action and said that it would certainly be a great relief to General Eisenhower; it should enable him to forge ahead with his Southern Flank Command Organization.

Command Arrangements in the Atlantic

GENERAL BRADLEY said that he was concerned with the Command arrangements in the Atlantic. These arrangements, which had been agreed by NATO after long and careful study, had received a very lukewarm reception in the United Kingdom and had been heavily criticized by both politicans and the public, including many renowned retired British Admirals. The United States hesitated in accepting the responsibilities of this Command under such conditions, and he suggested that it might even now be preferable to set up an Atlantic Command Organization on the same lines as that now proposed for the Mediterranean. He pointed out that dual functional control in the Atlantic had worked satisfactorily during the World War II.

LORD FRASER said that he felt that the United States were possibly taking too great account of the publicly expressed views of retired British Admirals on this subject. Even though these Admirals were men of great renown with a wealth of past experience, they did not appreciate the full complexity of the problem and were not aware of all the arguments which had been given careful consideration in producing the present answer—an answer fully supported by the Admiralty. Admittedly joint functional control in the Atlantic had worked satisfactorily in the last war; but it must be remembered that initially the Command arrangements in the Atlantic had been the sole responsibility of the United Kingdom, and that only after these arrangements were fully functioning and operations in the Atlantic in full swing had the United States come in and been able to fit into the existing organization. In the present circumstances, where planning and arrangements were starting *ab initio* and where two great naval powers were directly interested from the outset, a Supreme Commander in the Atlantic undoubtedly produced the most satisfactory organization for Atlantic Command. He further pointed out that politically it would be almost impossible for the British Government to go back on the present agreement for a Supreme Commander in the Atlantic.

‡COS (W) 44. [Footnote in the source text.]

GENERAL BRADLEY expressed his understanding of the position.

[Here follow a discussion of British policy with regard to Persia, Hong Kong, and trade with China and a brief report by General Bradley on the general situation in Korea.]

Annex

Draft Proposal Prepared by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff Committee

TOP SECRET [LONDON? June 8, 1951.]

COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION



Note: SACME (Brit) Command would be a fully integrated command linked to N.A.T.O.
Greece and Turkey would be associated with this Command.

740.5/6–1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by Ridgway B. Knight of the Office of European Regional Affairs[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1951.

Mr. de Margerie called this morning at his request and stated that the French Embassy had received instructions from the French Foreign Office to approach the Department of State at a high level in order to press for military consideration of the Mediterranean Command problem by the Standing Group national representatives. After

[1] Copies to Deputy Under Secretary Matthews, Nitze of the Policy Planning Staff, Perkins and Martin of EUR, Byington and Godley of WE, and Colonel Hartshorn of Defense for Admiral Sherman.

consideration of the problem in the French Embassy, it was decided, however, to make the first approach at the working level.[2]

Mr. de Margerie stated that the French Government was most anxious to see the military aspects of the Mediterranean Command problem discussed from the "purely military point of view" in the Standing Group. He referred to the conversation of April 18, 1951 in the Standing Group and alleged a resulting commitment on our part to discuss these problems. In connection with this reference, he did not, however, make clear whether the French Government was anxious for these talks to proceed in the Standing Group acting as the Standing Group, or between the three national representatives acting as such and outside of the NATO context. Mr. de Margerie had seen the Standing Group telegram establishing the command structure of SACEUR's Southern flank. He expressed the belief, however, that while his Government would welcome this development as a definite step forward, its urgent desire for military discussions with the U.S. and U.K. concerning the Mediterranean as a whole would not be diminished.

In the course of the conversation, Mr. de Margerie indicated that the French favored an extension of Admiral Carney's command under SACEUR[3] and were correspondingly not over-anxious to see the British Middle East Command assume considerably greater importance. When queried about the French Government's specific views, Mr. de Margerie stated that the Embassy had received no instructions along such lines and that the only purpose of his *démarche* was to foster a general consideration of the Mediterranean Command problem on the military level and not to express any definite views. It was made clear that the French are quite conversant with our difficult situation with the British concerning the appointment of Admiral Fechteler as SACLANT. He stated, however, that regardless of this and other political considerations, it was the French Government's view that the military discussions concerning the overall Mediterranean setup could and should be pushed forward.

Having only recently returned from three weeks in Europe, I was able to state that I was not informed as to the latest developments in this field other than the Standing Group action concerning General Eisenhower's Southern Command. Mr. de Margerie specifically requested information as to the reasons which were preventing the joint consideration of this problem, allegedly agreed on April 18, and the prospects for such talks in the near future. It was made clear that the

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[2] In a conversation at the Department of State with Perkins and Godley on June 5, Mr. C. E. Steel of the British Embassy stated "that he had received a telegram from the Foreign Office to the effect that the French in London were exerting 'tremendous' pressure on the British Foreign Office to arrange the follow-up meeting re Malta." (770a.5/6–551)

[3] Admiral Carney was Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

French Embassy will take further steps in connection with this question in the absence of what it may consider an answer satisfactory to the French Government.

Editorial Note

On June 18 SHAPE headquarters in Paris announced the appointment of Admiral Robert B. Carney, United States Navy, as Commander of Allied Forces in Southern Europe, thus completing the NATO regional command structure under General Eisenhower. At the same time, two other appointments to Southern European Command assignments were announced by SHAPE. General Maurizio Lazzaro Castiglione, Italian Army, was appointed to command Allied Army Forces in Southern Europe, while Major General David Schlatter, United States Air Force, was appointed to command Allied Air Forces in Southern Europe. The SHAPE announcement stated that Admiral Carney would also command those Allied naval forces allocated to General Eisenhower in southern Europe. Admiral Carney had been and continued in command of United States naval forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. Department of State *Wireless Bulletin*, June 18, 1951, page 3.

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, 720 UK

United States Minutes of a United States–United Kingdom Meeting on Questions of Atlantic, Mediterranean and Middle East Commands, Washington, June 19, 1951 [1]

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET

Participants: U.S.: General Vandenberg
General Collins
Admiral Sherman
Colonel Carns
Mr. Matthews
Mr. Perkins
Mr. Lewis Jones
Mr. John Ferguson

U.K.: C. E. Steel
Air [Chief] Marshal Sir William Elliot
F. W. Marten
Brigadier R. H. Barry

[1] There is no indication in the source text of the American officers responsible for the preparation of this record.

MR. MATTHEWS: I believe that Mr. Steel has some views of his full Government on the matters we have been discussing in these meetings.

MR. STEEL: Yes, but may I start on something else for a moment. I should like to speak about Greece and Turkey in NATO.[2] Do you really feel that full membership of Greece and Turkey on the same basis as everyone else in NATO is necessary? Or would you feel that Greece and Turkey might be taken in on the basis of relationships with those directly concerned?

MR. MATTHEWS: We have given this matter full study and considered the various alternatives, and we have concluded that the best answer would be membership in NATO. I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff have come to the same conclusion.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: May I amplify my views? You have a situation where if you look at the map from the bottom of the Baltic to the top of the Adriatic that is where you must hold. If you take the distance from the Adriatic to Turkey and from Germany to northern Norway, you find you aren't stretching the line in the direction of Greece and Turkey any more than you are in the other direction. From the point of view of the real center of gravity, you aren't getting extended more in one direction than in the other. The right and left flanks have about the same significance.

MR. STEEL: I see the logic of that. As far as we are concerned, we would be delighted to have Greece and Turkey in NATO. . . .

. . . . . .

MR. MATTHEWS: I think it represents the Secretary's view.

MR. STEEL: I think there were three points outstanding in our discussion: (1) the distribution of the Naval Command; (2) where Greece and Turkey fit in; and (3) the form and structure of the Middle East Command. I'd like to ask Bill Elliot to outline our proposal, though I think you already know a good deal about it from General Bradley's conversations.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: Without going over past history, the point we directed ourselves to in part was the command. You put out the suggestion there might be an adjustment in the Mediterranean picture by the creation of an Allied Command in the Middle East. The thoughts of the British Chiefs have moved along these lines. They have agreed on the command arrangements for the southern flank, reserving Greece and Turkey. The lines of their thinking beyond that are that there should be set up as a counter-poise a Supreme Allied Commander in the Middle East, to be held by a British officer, this command linked to NATO. They think that by virtue of the responsibilities he will have he should be a soldier. Secondly, the British Chiefs think that the Command should be a fully integrated command with an American

[2] For documentation on the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, see pp. 460 ff.

element on the headquarters staff. There is no suggestion you would be asked to contribute forces, but to give it real character it should include an American element. Equally, there should be appropriate participation by the Commonwealth. There are meetings in London day after tomorrow with the Commonwealth Defense Ministers on their contributions to defense.

Next we come to Greece and Turkey. The military view quite definitely is that Greece and Turkey should be associated with the Middle East Command. Furthermore, there should be something more than the cooperative board you suggested. There should be a Middle East Defense Board with the Middle East Commander as chairman and this board should be comprised of the U.S., France, Greece and Turkey and anyone else in NATO it would be desirable to have. That body should be the link between the Middle East Command and NATO. Against that background you will see how we bring Greece and Turkey in.

Without going into many of the points that might be argued, the broad strategic argument is that the British recognize the Aegean and Dardanelles are beyond the right flank of Eisenhower and the left flank of the Middle East. This is where we parted in our thoughts the last time we talked. While you may feel the left flank is assured, if taken care of by Eisenhower, we feel that Eisenhower's flank is assured through the Middle East Command. As far as the Naval Command is concerned, the British Chiefs have moved away from the idea of one commander by accepting Carney on the southern flank. They would like the joint functional role to be shared by Carney and Eddleston very broadly; the division of responsibility would be that Eddleston would command all British Naval vessels and bases and be responsible to the Middle East Command for convoys through the Mediterranean to the Middle East. Admiral Carney would command all U.S. Naval forces, be responsible to Eisenhower for naval requirements, and would share with Eddleston the naval requirements that should be shared between them.

Mr. Matthews: May I ask a question at the outset? I wasn't clear of the role of France in the Middle East you had in mind.

Air Marshal Elliot: There would be an Allied Command in which the French, the British, the U.S., Greece and Turkey would be represented on the Joint Defense Board. I don't think on details of command we would see the French in the command headquarters. They make no contribution.

Mr. Matthews: You can anticipate a lot of anguish over that.

Air Marshal Elliot: Well, that's something that could be agreed upon later.

Mr. Steel: I don't think that should make much difference in the long run.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: I should think the easiest thing to agree on would be setting up a Middle East Allied Command. If France insists on participation we could arrange something.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: It doesn't seem to me, Forrest, that this proposal takes care of your worry about two naval commanders.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Well, let me raise some questions. One is as to how you would visualize the coordination of the movement of convoys from Gibraltar to Malta, I mean the movement of aircraft, surface vessels—traffic in general. Until the time of the invention of the airplane, I could easily visualize what we have been discussing.

Second, if the Russians make the move I would expect and come down between the Alps and the Turkish land mass I would visualize them coming down with ground and air. In that type of action, who would fight that battle as far as air, navy and armies are concerned? I would think the ground armies would be Greek and Turkish forces in Europe and possibly the Yugoslavs. Other than indigenous ground troops, it would be primarily navy and air that would be needed.

I think those are the two questions we should answer so that we can see what forces would be used and arrive at a sound solution.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: I am sure you don't want me to answer in detail. With respect to your first question, admittedly there would be need for close coordination between the Naval Commanders. There should be a strong military liaison section from the Middle East Command at Carney's headquarters for both navy and air. When convoys are destined for Eisenhower, all the resources of the British Navy and bases would be placed at Carney's disposal quite unreservedly. When you get to the eastern end of the Mediterranean you would want a strong liaison element of Carney's headquarters with Eddleston. I would think this would make the coordination possible.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: With respect to Turkey, I think something like that could be worked out. I see a little more difficulty with Greece. I see more difficulty in the Aegean problem also. I would think Carney and Eddleston, if asked to work out something for the protection of shipping against air and submarine action, would require some kind of division of area responsibility. If you have the Russian onslaught between the Alps and Turkey I think you would have a serious problem.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: Well, to turn to your second question, which relates to the time the issue would be joined, that is where we broach the real difference between us. Is it the responsibility of the Middle East, or Eisenhower? We believe it should be a Middle East responsibility. There will certainly have to be a line drawn somewhere.

If I may speak just on the naval and air side, if there were not an attempt beyond mining and air action, the conduct of naval and air operations could be carried out by close association between the two

commanders. It is only when you visualize the Russians coming down that actual warfare requires a decision and the drawing of a line.

MR. STEEL: I know we are all trying to see what will happen, but in any case won't we have to make adjustments of forces with relation to events?

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Not only adjustments of forces but of boundaries also.

GENERAL COLLINS: I think we could draw a line and solve this thing, and one fellow could yell for help if he needed it. I don't visualize the Russians capable of forcing the Dardanelles and capitalizing on it from a naval point of view to any great extent. Possibly they could capitalize on it with submarines but I doubt it. So from my point of view, I think there is a natural division. Greece would be difficult to separate from the Balkans. Greece is geographically in the Balkans and politically Yugoslavia must be in as well as Greece. This is the land operations part—an attack would be overland with respect to Greece.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: I quite agree.

. . . . . .

GENERAL COLLINS: I would like to know what the Russians could do from the naval point of view if they had the Dardanelles. I don't see how anything could threaten us from the naval point of view until they got to Malta.

. . . . . .

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: I think you do have to decide what the Russians will do. We are trying to find the place of Greece and Turkey in World War III. If you look at it only as the southern flank, then Greece falls into the European theater. If you look at the broad theater, why should the Russians go down to Greece if they are driving into Western Europe? I see a drive to Greece as a threat to the Middle East and not to Europe. . . .

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: . . . So the Russian job to be done in that part of the world is to advance into Greece and cut off the Mediterranean and turn west to Italy. So your job is to stop that advance. What are you going to use to stop it with—indigenous ground forces, navy and air. Someone has to work this out. As I see it, there are three things the Russians can do:

1. Move across the plain between the Alps and the North Sea,
2. Advance around the coast of Scandinavia,
3. An area advance across the Balkans, opening the Dardanelles until eventually the Russians are sitting in the center of the Mediterranean.

If the Russians turn west from Greece, it is Carney's job, if they turn to the Middle East, it is the Middle East Commander's job.

MR. MATTHEWS: May I ask how you visualize the Russian campaign in the Middle East?

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: I agree with Admiral Sherman as to the possibilities of an attack in Europe. I don't think the third one would be applied unless they intend a Middle East campaign. I agree with General Collins on that. It would be an irritation to us to have them in Greece and the Dardanelles but it would require great effort on their part and I don't think they would do it, unless they had planned a campaign in the Middle East. This is one way and I think the first and easiest way to move to the Middle East. They would try to cut us off and starve us in the Middle East in this fashion as the Germans tried to do.

As far as air bases in Turkey are concerned, they could be used to resist attack by the Russians on the Middle East or Europe.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: I agree, but with the hope that they would not do either of these things until they carried out their other mission.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: I agree, but the fact you could use them to hit Europe doesn't mean that Turkey is in Europe.

Now the Russians can also come down through Iran and Iraq. I think they would first assure their right flank in Greece and the Dardanelles. That is why we feel Greece and the Dardanelles are strategically of first importance to the Middle East.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: I feel the first way for a country with a large army who have air forces is to get around the eastern end of Turkey through Iran.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: But if we can hold the Mediterranean, we can quickly reinforce the Middle East.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: I part company because I think the direct route is through Iran which will occupy the Middle East Commander and this is quite separate from the Balkan-Aegean problem. I think the Middle East problem is ground and air and the Balkan-Aegean problem involves all three services.

. . . . . .

GENERAL COLLINS: I think the Russians will come down through Iran and through the Aegean also. I do think the threat of coming down through Greece is largely to the Middle East.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: The reason the German threat wasn't turned to the West when they got to Greece was that the Germans turned toward Russia. You won't wait 'til the Russians get to Greece before you start fighting and the fellow who is going to do the fighting is the one in the Mediterranean and he must have the necessary forces, and they can only come from General Eisenhower.

GENERAL COLLINS: I think that is largely a case of timing. I don't think for sometime there will be forces, ground or navy, to spare from Eisenhower for use in that area. There may be some air available.

I think everything Ike has will be committed to Northern Italy and Yugoslavia and he won't be able to worry about the Balkans. If Greece is overrun and the Dardanelles opened up you might then transfer Greece to the Middle East since the defense will be in the Middle East.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: Aren't we projecting ourselves too far into a war? Aren't we trying to find the machinery to capitalize on the forces, not so much in Greece, but in Turkey which is the important thing.

. . . . . .

MR. MATTHEWS: May I ask how you visualize a set-up by which the Middle East Command is tied into NATO. How would the countries that aren't NATO members fit in?

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: The broad picture is a British Supreme Allied Commander with an integrated allied headquarters under him, Below that, there is the Middle East Defense Board of which a Britisher is Chairman. The members of the Board would be the U.K., France, U.S., Turkey, Greece and Italy, if you like, but not any of the Middle East countries. The Middle East Command wouldn't be under NATO and the strategic direction would be from the three of us.

. . . . . .

GENERAL COLLINS: . . . I'd like to ask Admiral Sherman what difference there is between us on responsibilities.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: I don't think we disagree if Greece is in Europe and the difference certain is that we would shift the line in the light of developments.

GENERAL COLLINS: Well, I guess there is no difference between us.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: No.

As I see it, you have a military structure which we will call the Allied Supreme Commander and you have to build a defense against letting the Arab states and Israel into that command. The only thing I have been able to think of to accomplish that is NATO.

Then below that command, you have a Middle East Defense Board which tries to coordinate what the people in the area do for themselves and there you have to give the local people a hearing, so that the Board must be below the commander.

MR. STEEL: A lot of these people are reluctant to join anything pointed at Russia. NATO is so considered by them, but there could be a consultative body between NATO and the local people.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Another thing is the domestic problem here. I expect to have a terrible time getting appropriations for the Middle East. I think you could set up a NATO thing there and we will get into less trouble. So from a practical political point of view the path is easier if you give a NATO halo to the Allied Command in the Middle East.

MR. MATTHEWS: Lewis, do you wish to comment?

MR. JONES: Well, I am afraid this looks like business as usual. It treats these countries as small and hopeless and says we are going in to defend them. We don't think this is the way to handle these people, with their emerging nationalism. I can't think of a single state . . . that would welcome this imposition from above. I think they must have the idea of being helped to help themselves. What worries us very much is that we can't think for these people; we must roll with the nationalism punch.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: That is why I think the command should be a NATO command and the Defense Board an outlet for the local people. One is a command which you want to keep separate from the local people if you can.

. . . . . .

MR. STEEL: We will have to consider the Commonwealth contingent and take care of them in the command.

GENERAL COLLINS: If you can ever settle the Kashmir problem you might get something real out of Pakistan.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: We are pretty much agreed that the weak spot is Greece and there isn't much we can do about it unless we can count on the Yugoslavs. Russia can drive down the East coast to Greece and we haven't solved anything. We will have two commands split down the middle. I think we could make Crete uninhabitable if they took it, but they could make it so tough from the air from Greece that we couldn't supply much by sea.

Greece should be in Europe but shouldn't they be represented on the Defense Board or in the command. In case things go in that direction with this kind of arrangement doesn't that pretty well meet the points of view of both sides of the table.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: I wonder if we could recapitulate? One, you agree on an allied Middle East commander.

MR. MATTHEWS: As far as I am concerned this is tentative.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: Certainly.

One, a Middle East allied commander in fact as well as name with the U.S. and the Commonwealth on the headquarters staff.

GENERAL COLLINS: You will have difficulty getting clearance for a U.S. element on the staff but I quite agree from a military point of view. Of course we can't make a commitment to provide forces.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: I agree.

MR. MATTHEWS: You will have to have the French on the headquarters staff I think.

. . . . . .

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: From the strategic point of view the Turks would be in the command (Air Marshal Elliot said Standing Group,

but it seems unlikely he meant that). Then in connection with this arrangement there would be a Defense Board.

MR. MATTHEWS: Wouldn't the Board be separate? What about that, Lewis?

MR. JONES: We think the Board must have a new look. To be successful it must begin with the cooperative concept with the local people.

MR. MATTHEWS: So the Middle East Defense Board should be separate.

MR. PERKINS: It would not be NATO.

MR. MATTHEWS: No.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: The British command would wear two hats—one as chairman of the Defense Board.

GENERAL VANDENBERG: I think you would make a mistake to announce both things at the same time.

GENERAL COLLINS: Is it necessary that he be the same fellow?

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: The conception of the Board in the minds of the British Chiefs of Staff was that it should be the link with NATO. Now we are saying that the Board should be set up for the small fellows in the area, so it is quite reasonable to think of it as separate.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Perhaps the chairman should be a political fellow who could also be the political adviser to the Supreme Commander.

MR. MATTHEWS: The Board would also provide a cover for the missions we would have out there.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: We are coming around to your conception of a cooperative Defense Board, aren't we?

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Yes, I think we are.

MR. JONES: Did you have in mind that the Board would be located in Faid?

MR. STEEL: You couldn't put the political organization in Faid. The Commander would have to be there but the political board should be in Cairo.

MR. MATTHEWS: Would the Egyptians want a NATO Commander in Faid?

MR. JONES: From the point of view of the locals, it might be better to take it to Cyprus. Then they would work to get it back to Egypt. I think the location is an important point and you might consider Cyprus as the location for part of it.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: That's a very good point to consider.

MR. STEEL: The hope is that the Egyptians can be given enough of a place to feel their honor is satisfied.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: Then finally, in recapitulation, this Command should be locally responsible for planning with Turkey.

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Now, how do you see Greece?

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Greece associates itself with Eisenhower except that Greece might have liaison with the Middle East Command and vice versa.

MR. STEEL: Greece should be provisionally in Eisenhower's command but with liaison in the Middle East headquarters.

GENERAL COLLINS: You would not publicly say anything about the "provisionally".

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: Now as to the Mediterranean, we propose a joint functional association between the two naval commanders.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: With the understanding that they must work out some form of area responsibility.

MR. STEEL: There should be primary responsibility by areas.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: That would have to be worked out in some detail and it would have to be continually adjusted.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: So it is a combination of areas and functions.

MR. PERKINS: I am confused about the relation to the defense board and to whom the Supreme Commander would report.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Can't you define the command as not applying to an area but say that he commands such forces as the NATO countries and their associates can make available to him for the defense of the Middle East?

. . . . . .

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: Should we try to get a short note to put up as to what we think? [3]

MR. MATTHEWS: I think so, but we will want to talk to the Secretary.

MR. STEEL: All of this is *ad referendum*.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: There is an urgency about it. We are about to start talks with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers.

. . . . . .

GENERAL VANDENBERG: If this leaks, our chance of getting it done becomes small.

AIR MARSHAL ELLIOT: I agree. What one wants is really only a suggestion that you would, for instance, become a part of the headquarters.

MR. MATTHEWS: We will see how fast we can move.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: When could we meet again?

MR. STEEL: Perhaps what we need is a very short minute.

ADMIRAL SHERMAN: Why don't we meet later this week? I'd like to get the matter settled.

GENERAL COLLINS: I wonder if it would be useful if you said that you had had discussions with the Americans in which you proposed certain things.

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[3] See draft memorandum by John Ferguson, "Command in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East," July 6, p. 551.

MR. STEEL: We could say that our discussion has been at the Chiefs of Staff level with no government sanction.

There followed a discussion as to the nature of the defense board and it seemed to be generally agreed that this board would be advisory in nature, would include such representatives of the local countries as cared to join it and would deal with political and economic as well as military matters.

740.5/7–351

The Department of State to the British Embassy [1]

CONFIDENTIAL

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Government of the United States has studied the *Aide-Mémoire* left by the British Embassy with the Department of State on June 13, 1951, No. 23147/68/51, concerning the adherence of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty, responding to the *Aide-Mémoire* left by the United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom with the Foreign Office on May 15, 1951.

The United States is in full agreement that a thorough examination should be undertaken of the political and military issues involved as in fact, is being done in the Council of Deputies as to political questions and by the Standing Group on military aspects. The alternative suggested in the third paragraph of the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* [2] is one which was carefully considered by the United States Government before reaching its decision that the adherence of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty constituted the preferable solution.

Ambassador Spofford, the United States Representative on the Council of Deputies, in which discussion of this whole question is now taking place, is fully informed as to the reasons which led this Government to discard this alternative and would be fully prepared to discuss this or other aspects of the question with representatives of the British Government in London at any time.

The proposal of this Government with respect to the adherence of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty was put forward on its own merits without reference to the question of the possible adherence of Spain.

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[1] Drafted by Wolf of RA and Raynor of BNA. Circulated for clearance on June 29, and cleared with GTI, RA, and OSD.

[2] The offer of a unilateral security guarantee to Turkey by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

As the Embassy is aware, discussions have been taking place in Washington with respect to the Command problem.

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1951.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson

Charles M. Spofford

Ridgway B. Knight

W. Averell Harriman

David K. E. Bruce

Walter S. Gifford

George Perkins

Secretary of Defense Marshall, President Truman, and Secretary of State Acheson see General Eisenhower off on his trip to Europe, January 6, 1951.

Ambassador Dunn and Italian Prime Minister de Gasperi welcome Secretary of State Acheson to Rome, November 23, 1951.

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, 723, Near and Middle East

Draft Memorandum Prepared by John Ferguson of the Policy Planning Staff

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1951.

COMMAND IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST

I. At a State–JCS–UK meeting on this subject on June 19, 1951,[1] a discussion was held which resulted in a suggested solution along the following lines:

a. Admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO.

b. An Allied Middle East Command, which would be a NATO command, under a British Supreme Allied Commander, in which the U.S., the U.K., France and Turkey would participate, it being understood that the U.S. would not assign forces to such command. Turkey would come under this command, but Greece would come under Eisenhower's southern command.

c. The forces under such command would be such forces as the NATO members and their associates (i.e., the British Commonwealth) assigned to such command, with consideration being given to offering the Turks the subordinate post of the Allied ground commander.

d. The headquarters of the Supreme Allied Command Middle East would not be established in a Middle Eastern country, but in some such place as Cyprus.

e. In addition to the Allied Middle East Command, a Middle East Defense Board, under British chairmanship, would be established to obtain the voluntary cooperation of the Arab States and Israel in the defense of the Middle East, and would act in an advisory capacity to the Allied Commander, Middle East. The U.S., France and Turkey would participate in such Board.

This suggested proposal had the tentative approval of the JCS.

II. The British representatives consulted London and tabled a proposal in the Standing Group similar to the one described above except in two respects:

a. The British questioned the desirability of making the Supreme Allied Command Middle East a NATO command, and

b. They also questioned the desirability of establishing the headquarters of such command in Cyprus rather than Egypt.

III. Some of the State Department representatives also had reservations about the suggested arrangements, and proposed the following changes:

a. That the NATO command be called the Supreme Eastern Allied Command, in order to avoid the implication that the command ex-

[1] A record of this meeting is printed, p. 535.

tended geographically over the entire Middle East. The Eastern Allied Command would be assigned only forces of NATO members (i.e., U.S., U.K., France and Turkey).

b. The Supreme Allied Eastern Commander be British, and the British continue their own Middle East Command, naming the same man to both posts.

c. The Allied Eastern Command and the British Middle East Command headquarters should both be located in Cyprus, but the Middle East Defense Board should meet initially in Turkey and subsequently in other countries of the Middle East.

IV. NEA agrees that there should not be a NATO command extending over the whole of the Middle East, but they feel there should be an Allied Middle East Command in which we would participate. They therefore agree with the British revisions of the tentative JCS suggestion.

V. The State Department representatives who favor a NATO Supreme Allied Eastern Commander and a separate British Middle East Commander argue as follows:

a. The only way the Turks can be persuaded to accept a British command is by admitting the Turks to NATO and asking them to put their forces under a NATO command.

b. Since the Command would be a NATO command it cannot now embrace the Arab States and Israel which are not members of NATO.

c. During the cold war the Arab States and Israel are not likely to put their forces under any allied commander in any case, and, in the event of hostilities, the arrangements can be altered. In the meantime the Middle East Defense Board can plan for the defense of the Middle East and try to prepare for indigenous assistance in the defense of the Middle East should hostilities occur.[2]

d. The creation of an Allied Middle East Command now would appear to be an extension of our commitments and would raise domestic political problems.

VI. NEA argues as follows:

a. The problem is to plan for the defense of the Middle East, the real prizes of which are the Persian Gulf oilfields and the Cairo–Suez area, and which is particularly vulnerable from an invasion through the Caucasus. The command should, therefore, face this squarely and embrace at least Eastern Turkey, Iran, the Arab States and Israel. Since the defense of this area is not directly related to defense of the NATO area, and none of the countries except, we hope, Turkey, are members of NATO, it should not be a NATO command.

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[2] Pages 4–6 of the memorandum were written as an addition by G. Lewis Jones of NE and submitted to Under Secretary Matthews on July 9 with the comment: "The new pages set forth NEA's thinking more clearly than John Ferguson's original draft." (Memorandum by Jones to Matthews, July 9, Policy Planning Staff files, lot 64 D 563, 723 Near and Middle East)

The fact that NATO countries have or may have troops here does not change this fact any more than it does in the Far East. It will mislead and dishearten the people of the ME to imply that Western interest in their defense is confined to the protection of the southern flank of NATO.

b. Since Israel and some of the Arab States may be willing to place their forces under some degree of allied command prior to hostilities, and others in the event of hostilities, there must be a non-NATO command functioning and gradually expanding its orbit in the area. Such a command cannot be quickly and satisfactorily improvised in event of war. It has the important Cold War function of encouraging and justifying the pro-Western elements in each of the ME states to make common cause with the West. Americans participating in such command will be necessary to attract the required measure of support. The allied command would seek and generate during peace the active cooperation of all of the states in the area in building up their indigenous forces; it would recommend regarding arms requirements, coordinate activities of outside training missions, and prepare defense doctrines and coordinated plans for joint military action by ME states in event of war. These objectives can be accomplished in conjunction with cooperating states even though these states are not willing to place their forces under the command in time of peace. To start with a command structure less clear cut and purposeful from the point of view of ME states would either delay their response or make it so half-hearted as to be useless.

c. The Middle East Defense Board cannot perform the functions of a competent command and staff organizations the MEDB is a flexible and experimental organism designed to elicit the maximum indigenous support for the command by conveying a sense of area participation even though at the outset a sound basis for this will be lacking—the Board will be primarily an advisory front organization.

d. Although it is not essential to this plan, NEA believes that the Turkish forces in the East and West of Turkey can best be treated separately from a command and tactical standpoint, just as U.S. forces in Europe and the Caribbean. Once the Turks decide how their forces shall be divided between these theaters the two theater commanders face quite separate tactical problems: the commander in the Dardanelles–Bosphorus area would be part of Eisenhower's southern flank; the other as a part of the defense of the "Mountain Line" blocking Russian entry into the Middle East through the Caucasus. This fact cannot be changed by changing the names of area commanders. Turkey's entry into NATO is a different problem from that of the command of Turkish forces once she is a member. Once in, she will assume full NATO responsibilities and receive all available assistance to which she is entitled. Her participation in NATO must, however, be rationalized by a command structure related to her own particular military situation. Those forces in western Turkey, which form a part of the general Balkan–Aegean complex, can be directed, as in the case of Greek forces, by Eisenhower's southern command. Those in Eastern Turkey can be directed by the Allied Middle East Commander through a Turkish deputy.

e. American participation now in a non-NATO allied command for the Middle East need not involve U.S. commitments beyond presently contemplated supply programs and training missions, and therefore should not cause domestic political difficulties. Such participation would generate more respect for the US-UK-French Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950 which is the most positive factor for peace in the Middle East.

In light of the increasing decline of British prestige in the ME, the small number of troops which Britain now has in the area or is likely to be able to bring into the area in event of war, the uncertainty and the inevitable time delay in the buildup of Commonwealth forces, in first instance primary reliance for ground forces for the defense of the ME must be placed in the Turks. In the event the British prove themselves unable to fulfill their projected role, Turkey would be the logical country to take over primary responsibility for the defense of the ME. At present there is reason to doubt that Iran, the Arab States and Israel would welcome Turkey in this role.

740.5/7–651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 6, 1951.

Participants: Mr. B. A. B. Burrows, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. James C. H. Bonbright, Acting Assistant Secretary
Mr. G. Lewis Jones, Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs

Mr. Burrows called today at his suggestion to advise the Department of the initial Turkish reaction to the British Foreign Secretary's message of July 3rd to the Turkish Foreign Minister on the subject of Turkey's admission to NATO in connection with Turkish participation in a Middle Eastern defense set-up.[2] The British Ambassador in Ankara delivered Mr. Morrison's message to the Turkish Foreign Minister on the 4th of July. Mr. Köprülü said that Turkey received the indication of British support for Turkey's membership in NATO with

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[1] The memorandum was prepared by both Bonbright and Jones.

[2] The British memorandum of July 3, and its covering note, neither printed, were shown in strictest confidence to Ambassador Wadsworth by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuat Köprülü, on July 6. In telegram 16, July 7, from Ankara, not printed, Wadsworth transmitted the bare substance of the memorandum and said that Köprülü, had not pressed him for comment (740.5/7–751). A copy of the memorandum was handed to the Department of State on July 5 by the British Embassy and transmitted on that date to Ankara as telegram 12, repeated to Cairo for information as telegram 26, not printed (740.5/7–551).

"pleasure and relief". Mr. Köprülü seemed "pleased" and the British Ambassador felt that he understood fully the "package deal" involved, i.e., UK support for Turkey in NATO is contingent upon Turkey's being prepared to associate itself in the defense of the Middle East along the lines set forth in Mr. Morrison's message.[3] The British Ambassador reported that he felt Mr. Köprülü "favorably disposed to play the role that the UK wants in Middle East defense". Mr. Köprülü stated that Turkey is prepared to collaborate with the US, UK and France in the defense of the area. However, the Turkish Foreign Minister's acceptance was only in principle and the definitive Turkish reply will follow later.

Mr. Burrows commented that the Foreign Office felt the Turkish response "rather satisfactory".

He then went on to mention two or three points which he said would be put up to us at the meeting next week which Sir Oliver Franks spoke to Mr. Matthews about today. These points include the following:

(1) Would the US be willing to put pressure on the Turks to accept the "package deal" as a condition to coming into NATO? (We told him that this idea of a "package deal" had not come to our attention before we saw Mr. Morrison's message to the Turkish Foreign Minister yesterday,[4] and that, as Mr. Burrows knew, our approach to the Turks with regard to entering NATO had been without strings. We could not say at this stage that we would go beyond this.) Mr. Burrows emphasized that he thought it would be most helpful if the US could push the Turks along at this stage.

(2) Next in importance to the British is our approach to the French, and Mr. Burrows hoped that we would be willing to put added pressure on them immediately. (In this connection the British have informed the French of their approach to the Turks, but so far have not approached any other NATO country.)

(3) The British appreciate that the approach to the smaller countries will also involve difficulties, but an important factor in securing their acquiescence to Turkey's membership in NATO will be the members of the Standing Group showing a united front.

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[3] The message proposed that Turkey (and Greece) be invited to accede to NATO under Article 10, and at the same time Turkey join the United States, United Kingdom, and France in establishing an integrated Allied command headquarters in the Middle East. Also, the three Commonwealth countries likely to produce forces for that area, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand, together perhaps with Egypt, should be invited by the Four Powers to participate in this command. Additional arrangements should be made for associating the other Middle East countries with the defense of the area. (740.5/7–551)

[4] See footnote 2, above.

740.5/7–1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, July 11, 1951—8 p. m.

232. Fol is informal translation of FonOff note dated July 10 handed to me last night by Schuman, referred to in Embtel 209, July 11 [2] and in my immed preceding tel. Original text going forward by pouch.

Begin translation. French Govt has already had occasion make known to Govts of US and UK its views concerning the different ways of associating Greece and Turkey with def of the West. In particular, French rep at Council of Deps of NAT has made it known that his preference was for a special pact rather than for direct adherence of the 2 countries in question to the Atlantic Pact, without there being any hostility involved on our part, in principle, toward the latter solution. It was indicated that French Govt wld not take any definitive decision prior to formation of next cabinet, concerning the polit formula which it wld choose.

French Govt has been informed most recently of the suggestions of Brit Govt concerning the politico-mil aspects of this problem. It appears that those suggestions can be summarized as follows:

Brit Govt wld be prepared accept the entry of Greece and Turkey in Atlantic Pact provided the latter country be made part of the Middle Eastern theatre of operations under an integrated command, and provided that theatre, which wld include Egypt and certain members of the Commonwealth in addition to Turkey and the 3 great Western Powers, be placed under a special mil organism that assures its high-level strategic direction. That organism wld be composed of the present members of the standing group, to which wld be added representative of Turkey. As far as Greece is concerned it would be attached to theatre of operations of Supreme Allied Commander, Eur. Finally, according to the indications given to standing group by the Brit rep, there wld not be a naval command for entire Mediterranean but the creation of 2 separate commands, one entrusted to a Brit admiral and attached to Middle East, the other entrusted to an Amer admiral and attached to Eur.

If above summary actually corresponds to views of the Brit Govt—even while it is realized that they are not yet definitive—French Govt deems it necessary to communicate at this time to Brit and US Govts certain observations which these views call forth, inasmuch as the specifically mil aspects of the problem are same for both of the solutions that are envisaged (conclusion of a regional pact or extension of Atlantic Pact to include Greece and Turkey) and those mil aspects are in any event independent of the polit solution.

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[1] Repeated to London for Spofford.

[2] Neither printed. Telegram 209 reported Schuman's comment that it was impossible at this time for the French Government to take any more definite position than that expressed in the *aide-mémoire* due to the fact that there was currently "no Fr Govt. in existence." (740.5/7–1151)

Whatever formula therefore which may be adopted definitively for association of Greece and Turkey with Western defense, French Govt must make it known that it wld find it impossible to accept a mil organization in which Turkey wld be part of a theatre of operations that wld not be under the top-level strategic direction of the standing group as it is now constituted. Such an organization, in the view of French Govt, wld run counter to the desired goal for it wld allow neither the close coordination of the def plans among Eur, Mediterranean and Middle East, nor wld it permit the efficient distribution of common resources, both of which are the essential reasons why the Atlantic powers consider it necessary to associate Greece and Turkey with Western def. French Govt has already indicated the view to Brit and US Govts that since we are confronted with a possible adversary who by his very nature responds to a single strategy, it is indispensable that the Western powers shld as soon as possible have at their disposal an organism for the direction of strategy that wld be capable of encompassing at same time the various possible theatres of operation. French Govt considers that only the present standing group can be that organism and that consequently the Middle Eastern theatre which wld be constituted shld be placed under its direction regardless of what the limits of that theatre might be, and that it shld have the same relationship to standing group as the Eur theatres of operation.

As regards the limits of the Middle Eastern theatre, French Govt agrees with Brit Govt in considering that it shld not include territory of Greece, which shld come under the Supreme Allied Commander, Eur.

As far as Turkey is concerned, 2 solutions appear possible either, it cld be attached to SHAPE as in case of Greece, or it cld be attached to Middle Eastern threatre. In any event, particular attention will have to be paid to the polit and mil questions which are involved in problem of the Straits notably in relation with the internatl treaties that are in force and to which Soviet Union is a party: Instrs will be sent concerning this to the French rep on Council of Deps, who will inform his colleagues.

Finally, on the point whether or not single naval command shld be established for entire Mediterranean, and how responsibilities in that zone shld be divided, the French Govt considers that this question must be thoroughly examined by the standing grp; but it wants even now to underline the position that in view of its interests on both shores of Western Mediterranean, notably French presence in North Africa and in view of the strategic bases which France has in that area, organization that is adopted shld allow a French admiral to exercise the principal inter-Allied responsibilities.

Instructions in conformity with above indications have been sent to French rep on the standing group, to allow him to continue the discussions that have been proceeding for several months on the subj of the organization of the command in the Mediterranean and the Middle East; and French Govt hopes that those discussions will now lead to a successful conclusion.

Finally, French Govt hopes very strongly that the 3 govts will stay in the closest possible contact on all problems covered in present note

and that moreover, in conformity with jointly agreed decisions, any separate initiative with govts of Athens and Ankara, which might prejudge a commonly agreed solution by the 3 govts, will be avoided.
End translation.

BRUCE

740.5/7–751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 12, 1951—8 p. m.

32. FYI only. While US support of NATO membership for Turks is without strings, conversations with UK past few weeks indicated latter tended link UK support NATO membership Turkey with participation Turkey ME defense. US made clear its view NATO membership Turkey Greece is prerequisite upon which solution various area problems wld depend. "Package deal" Morrison's msg (Deptel 12 July 5) [2] was not discussed with US before delivery Turks; however its ultimate objective, i.e. securing Turk participation ME defense, as well as NATO, is in line trend conversations here.

We would prefer not to comment on "package deal" since in our mind this diplomatic gambit poorly calculated from point of view of Turk psychology. In our view, Turks have figured out way meet gambit and will doubtless adhere position mentioned para 5(*b*) urtel 16 July 7.[3] For our part, we will urge UK not to press package deal aspects in light favorable Turk disposition play larger role ME as indicated by Turk FonMin to US and UK Ambs. End FYI.

You are authorized tell Turk FonMin UK has informed US of Brit approach. US is glad Brits have offered to support Turk admission to NATO, and we welcome FonMin comment re Turk interest in security and defense ME and Turk willingness participate actively therein.[4] This is in line our wishes since we have long desired Turk prestige, influence and mil strength be brought to bear in working out a solution of complex and manifold problems of area defense. We continue work actively for Turk inclusion NATO and hope Brit support will greatly assist favorable NATO decision.

ACHESON

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[1] Repeated to London for Spofford. Drafted by Dorsz (GTI) and Director of Near Eastern Affairs G. Lewis Jones; cleared by EUR and Matthews (G).

[2] Telegram 12 to Ankara, not printed, transmitted Morrison's memorandum of July 3. See the memorandum of conversation by Bonbright, p. 554.

[3] Telegram 16 from Ankara stated that Foreign Minister Köprülü "viewed Morrison's second point (that Turkey shld join in establishing ME command) not as condition precedent to extension of such support [British support for Turkey's adherence to NATO] but rather as justification for earlier evinced British hesitancy in matter and as suggestion, which he also welcomed, that the Four Powers consult together with view to reaching mutually agreeable program for ME defense." (740.5/7–751)

[4] See footnote 3, above.

740.5/7-1451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council, at London (Spofford)[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 14, 1951—2 p. m.

Todep 20. Depcirtel 44, Jul 12.[2] Dept informally but reliably told JCS now desire Fechteler appt soonest and particularly wish final action while Sherman abroad.

Desire ur views best means proceed in view long delay, complications and Brit feelings in matter. You shld not discuss subj outside US circles until further instructed.[3]

ACHESON

[1] Message drafted by Knight, cleared in substance with Perkins.

[2] Not printed. Admiral Sherman was in Madrid between July 15 and July 17 for talks with Generalissimo Franco concerning possible U.S. base rights in Spain. For further documentation, see volume IV.

[3] On July 17 Acting Secretary of Defense Lovett formally requested of Secretary of State Acheson "that appropriate action be taken in the Council Deputies to proceed with Admiral Fechteler's appointment . . ." (740.5/7-1751). That same day, the Secretary of State cabled Spofford in London stating that he should "discuss procedure with Br in view determining course of action mutually satisfactory. Subsequently you may proceed in Deps at your discretion, consulting Dept only if you anticipate complications." (Todep 25, July 17, 740.5/7-1751)

740.5/7-1451

Draft Anglo-United States Agreement Prepared by the United Kingdom Representative on the Standing Group (Elliot)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, July 1951.]

COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, together with representatives of the Department of State and representatives of the British Embassy and British Joint Services Mission, suggest that the following tentative

[1] A covering memorandum by Admiral Sherman dated July 14 stated that the source text was handed to him by Air Marshal Elliot, and that Sherman had examined the source text, considered it "satisfactory from a military point of view." Admiral Sherman added, however, that it was doubtful if Egypt would agree to subparagraph (5). Sherman recommended that the U.S. Representative on the Standing Group, Admiral Wright, be instructed to agree to Standing Group action along the lines of the British draft "insofar as its military features are concerned." Political features of the draft would have to be resolved on the political level. (740.5/7-1451) The source text and Admiral Sherman's memorandum were sent to Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews, Admiral Wright, RA, and S/ISA. An undated covering memorandum conveying these documents from RA to S/ISA reads: "Mr. Cabot, I understand this to be the latest paper submitted by UK to Standing Group, Ed Martin." Italicized portions printed here are in the source text.

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proposals be put to Governments regarding Command in the Mediterranean, South East Europe and the Middle East:—

(1) Greece and Turkey should be admitted as full members of NATO *subject in the case of the latter to Turkish agreement to play a full part in the defense of the Middle East under an Allied Middle East Command.*

(See below.)

(2) There should be an Allied Middle East Command on the Headquarters of which will be included, U.S., U.K., Commonwealth, French and Turkish officers. This Headquarters would command such forces as members of NATO and their associates made available for the defence of the Middle East area, it being understood that *at this time no U.S. forces would be so available.*

(3) The Middle East Command will be *closely associated with NATO by means of a special system of control, the form of which will require elaboration in further detail. This should be effected by the action of the four NATO members of the Middle East command, namely France, Turkey, U.K., and U.S.A., whose representatives might meet in Washington.*

(4) There should be a Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East, who should be a British officer. The U.S. will use their good offices to make this proposal acceptable to the Turks. Consideration should be given to offering the Turks *some high appointment in the Command Organisation.*

(5) The Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East, should *if possible be located in Egypt. Egypt should be offered participation in the Command Organisation in return for placing the necessary facilities at the disposal of NATO forces.*

(6) Greece will form part of SACEUR's Command but be represented at the Allied Headquarters, Middle East, by a liaison mission.

(7) Turkey will form part of SACME's Command but will be represented at Headquarters, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, by a liaison mission.

(8) In the Mediterranean, the C-in-C, Allied Forces, Southern Europe (who is also C-in-C, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean), and the C-in-C, British Mediterranean Fleet will each control his own forces and bases and will be responsible for the security of his own sea communications, subject to such joint allocations of area responsibilities as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time. Each would maintain liaison at the other's Headquarters.

(9) In order to obtain the voluntary co-operation of Middle Eastern countries in the defence of the Middle East, there should be established a Middle East Defence Board, *consisting of political and military representatives of* the U.S., U.K., France, and Turkey. *These four countries would invite countries able and willing to contribute substantially to the defence of the area to be associated with them on the board. Consideration should be given to the manner in which the Commonwealth countries should be associated with the Middle East Defence Board. There should be individual liaison arrangements between the Board and the Middle East states not represented thereon.* The Board would be responsible to the countries participating in its

membership. The Board would act in an advisory and consultative capacity to national agencies and also to SACME.

(10) Any action towards the establishment of the Middle East Defence Board must await the admission of Turkey to NATO.

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, 723 Near and Middle East

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

COMMENTS ON BRITISH DRAFT PAPER [1]

A. The British paper seems deficient in that it does not provide for any command relationship between Turkey and NATO. It is felt that such a command relationship should be established for the following reasons:

1. The Turks having gained admission to NATO would naturally expect to be related not only to the Deputies and the Military Committee but also to the Standing Group.
2. Turkey as part of NATO should be included in military planning and to do this it is important that their military situation be related directly to the Standing Group.
3. If Turkey is not included in the command set-up but is included in a separate Middle East Command, it would certainly alarm some of the smaller members of NATO as they would believe that NATO obligations are extending over the whole Middle East and therefore make it that much more difficult to persuade them to take Greece and Turkey into NATO.

Therefore, it seems important that provisions should be made for Turkey to participate in the NATO command set-up. There are three possibilities which immediately occur:

1. Turkey might be part of SACEUR's command and related to the Southern European Command as is proposed for Greece.
2. Turkey might be related directly to the Standing Group.
3. An Eastern Command might be established of which Turkey might be a part and which might include British naval and perhaps US air and which would also report directly to the Standing Group.

There are probably variations of the above or other schemes which might fit the requirements.

B. Paragraph (1): The underlined material should be eliminated.

C. Paragraph (2): The underlined material should be changed to read: "It is not contemplated that U.S. forces would be so available."

D. Comments on Paragraph (5) being prepared in NEA.[2]

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Not found in Department of State files, but see Annex to "Memorandum to Admiral Davis, July 18," *infra.*

E. Paragraph (7) is unnecessary, and should be covered by whatever provision is made for relating Turkey directly to the NATO Command.

F. Paragraph (8) ought to be rewritten to include the French Naval Commander in the same category as the U.S. and British Naval Commanders.

G. Comments on Paragraph (9) being prepared in NEA.

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, 723 Near and Middle East

Memorandum by John H. Ferguson of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Davis)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1951.

Subject: Draft Anglo-U.S. Agreement on Command in the Mediterranean and Middle East.

Attached [1] is a revision of the draft agreement on the Middle East command [2] which reflects the views of the State Department. In brief, the revisions are as follows:

a. In paragraph 2 the last sentence has been revised in order to remove the implication that U.S. forces will be available in the near future.

b. In the third paragraph the question of whether or not a system of control over the Middle East command is necessary is left open.

c. In paragraph 4 the desirability of including a Turkish officer in the Middle East command is emphasized.

d. In paragraph 5 it is suggested that if Egypt is not politically possible as the location of the headquarters, Cyprus be considered.

e. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the British draft have been combined in one paragraph and reference to SACEUR has been deleted. It is the State Department view that since the paper deals with the Middle East command it is only necessary to refer to a Greek liaison with such command and that the relationships of Turkey to the NATO commands need not be settled at this time. It is therefore stated that Greece and Turkey will have relations with the NATO command through the Standing Group. This will provide an opportunity for whatever relationships seem most desirable and will also leave open the question of whether the Turks will be asked to or will desire to assign any of their forces to a NATO command.

f. In paragraph 8 of the British draft (paragraph 7 in the State Department revision) a reference to the French Naval Commander Mediterranean has been included. Since this paper will be dealt with by the Standing Group, it is felt that it would be better to anticipate French reaction and deal with it when the paper is introduced.

g. In paragraph 9 of the British draft (paragraph 8 of the State Department revision) the cooperative nature of the Board has been

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[1] Annex, below.

[2] Reference is to the July British draft proposal of the Anglo-American Agreement on Command in the Mediterranean and Middle East, p. 559.

spelled out in somewhat more detail so that the emphasis will be on the efforts of the Board to secure cooperation from the Arab States and Israel. The British draft seems to limit possible membership on the Board and the State Department suggests that the Board should be open to participation by all of the Arab States and Israel, irrespective of their present defense capabilities. The State Department draft also spells out in more detail the proposed activities of the Board.

h. Paragraph 10 of the British draft (paragraph 9 of the State Department revision) makes Turkey's membership in NATO a prerequisite of the establishment of the defense board. The State Department believes that Turkey's admission to NATO should also be a prerequisite to the establishment of the Middle East command.

JOHN H. FERGUSON

Annex

Draft Anglo-United States Agreement Prepared in the Department of State[3]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1951.

COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, together with representatives of the Department of State and representatives of the British Embassy and British Joint Services Mission, suggest that the following tentative proposals be put to the Governments regarding Command in the Mediterranean, South East Europe and the Middle East:

(1) Greece and Turkey should be admitted as full members of NATO. The U.S. considers that it is desirable that Turkey play a full part in the defense of the Middle East under an Allied Middle East Command, and is prepared to urge this course upon Turkey as soon as it is a NATO member.

(2) There should be an Allied Middle Eastern Command, on the Headquarters of which will be included U.S., U.K., Commonwealth, French and Turkish officers. This headquarters would command such forces as members of NATO (including Turkey) and their associates made available for the defense of the Middle East area. It will also assume command of the forces of such non-NATO states of the Middle East as voluntarily make their forces available. It is not contemplated that U.S. forces would be so available.

(3) The Middle East Command will not be a NATO command. It will, however, be closely associated with NATO by virtue of the association of U.S., U.K., Commonwealth, French and Turkish officers at its headquarters. In event that a system of control is required, the representatives of the four NATO participants in the Command might meet in Washington.

(4) The Commander of the Allied Middle East Command should be a British officer. The U.S. will use its good offices to make this pro-

[3] A marginal notation states that this draft was written by G. Lewis Jones of NE and approved by McGhee of NEA and Perkins of EUR.

posal acceptable to the Turks. It will be desirable for a Turkish officer to hold a high appointment in the Command such as Commander of Land Forces.

(5) The Headquarters of SACME should if possible be located in Egypt. The feasibility of the Egyptian location in time of peace will depend on political factors arising from the present exacerbation of Anglo-Egyptian relations and upon Egyptian willingness to permit Israeli officers to come to Egypt. If this is not possible the Headquarters might be located in Cyprus.

(6) Greece will be represented at Allied Headquarters, Middle East, by a liaison mission. As members of NATO, Greece and Turkey will have relations with the NATO Command through the Standing Group.

(7) In the Mediterranean, the C-in-C, Allied Forces, Southern Europe (who is also C-in-C, U.S. Naval Forces, Mediterranean), the C-in-C, British Mediterranean Fleet, and the Commander of the French Naval Forces, Mediterranean, will each control his own forces and bases and will be responsible for the security of his own sea communications, subject to such joint allocations of area responsibilities as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time. Each would maintain liaison at the other's headquarters.

(8) In order to maintain the voluntary cooperation of Middle Eastern countries in the defense of the Middle East there should be established at SACME Headquarters a Middle East Defense Board to be the focus of indigenous efforts to increase the defensive capabilities of the Middle Eastern States. SACME or his delegate should be the Chairman of the MEDB. On the Board should be representatives of the U.S., U.K., France and Turkey, but the emphasis should be on the Board's voluntary membership from Middle Eastern States, and every effort should be made to establish the Board in the form most likely to elicit the maximum cooperation from the area. It will represent an opportunity for establishing between the Western Powers and the States of the Middle East equal-to-equal cooperation on defense matters. The Board would be open to the voluntary participation of the Arab States and Israel, irrespective of their present defensive capabilities. Consideration should be given to the manner in which the Commonwealth countries should be associated with the MEDB. The Board would be responsible to the countries participating in its membership and would (*a*) act in an advisory and consultative capacity to national agencies and to SACME; (*b*) proceed with defense planning for the area and assure implementation of these plans by ME States; (*c*) serve as a clearing house for arms aid and training missions requested from the U.S., U.K. and France, and (*d*) be the medium for dealing cooperatively with any other defense problems affecting the ME as a whole.

(9) Prerequisite to the establishment of the Command structure outlined above, including the establishment of the MEDB, is the admission of Turkey to NATO.

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, 723 Near and Middle East

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Martin)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1951.

Participants: Mr. Steel—British Embassy
Mr. Bonbright—EUR
Mr. Martin—EUR

Mr. Steel opened the conversation by expressing his desire to correct an impression, which apparently we had received through Mr. Achilles in London that the British no longer held as firmly as they had to the idea that the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO should be conditional on agreement with the Turks on Middle East Command arrangements.[1] Mr. Steel stated there had been no change in the UK position and they still felt it was essential that an understanding be reached with the Turks before they were admitted.

He also made reference to several press reports suggesting that the Turks may have reconsidered the general expression of willingness to work out Middle East Command arrangements which they had given to the British in response to the British note informing the Turks that they were supporting their membership in NATO subject to the working out of Command arrangements.[2] He wondered whether we had received any indication that the Turks were now unprepared to go ahead in the Middle East. He was informed we had no indication of any such desire of the Turks to back out, but of course this was a question which we had not undertaken to discuss with the Turks, still believing strongly as we did that Turkey and Greece should be admitted to NATO with no conditions attached. So long as this was the case, we thought it inappropriate to raise with the Turks the question of their views on Command arrangements.

Mr. Steel said he thought he understood our opposition to any conditions on the admission of Greece and Turkey but he thought it was a quite untenable position. He had the impression from the reports of the Deputies that not only the UK but many of the smaller countries would be unwilling to act favorably on the admission of Greece and Turkey until they knew what the Command arrangements would be and what they would be committing themselves to support. He thought it would be better to face up to this fact and be prepared at the Septem-

[1] In telegram Depto 139 from London of July 31, Theodore Achilles, Vice Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council, informed the Department of State that the United Kingdom had agreed to a September meeting of the Council but was "insistent on linking ME command with Gr-Turk decision . . ." The telegram is printed in full on p. 628.

[2] See memorandum of conversation, July 6, p. 554.

ber meeting [3] to state on the basis of discussion with the Greeks and Turks what Command arrangements were likely to be established.

Mr. Steel expressed the personal idea, which he planned to send to London, that a desirable next step would be for the British and US Ambassadors to outline to the Turks the Middle East Command arrangements set forth in a document recently submitted to the Standing Group, and reflecting the agreed note of June 19,[4] in order to insure that there was no question about the Turks going along with what we had in mind. We repeated our opposition to attaching any strings to Turkish admission.

Mr. Steel went on to say he thought it would be desirable for the Standing Group to complete action on the UK paper now before it and distribute it to the members of the Military Representatives Committee so that all the other NATO countries would know what the Standing Group views were. He indicated that Air Vice Marshal Elliot had made such a proposal at a recent meeting [5] and thought it was favorably received. In passing, he also indicated he understood the US agreed that the three questions on Command in relation to admission of Greece and Turkey, submitted by the Deputies to the Standing Group,[5] should be put aside and that effort should be concentrated on getting out the Standing Group paper referred to.

He implied several times in the course of the conversation that there was complete US–UK agreement with respect to Middle East Command arrangements. He referred to an arrangement under which Turkey would be under a Middle East Command which would report to the Standing Group of NATO, with which Turkey would sit when Middle East questions were under discussion.

He suggested that the next step might well be for the British and American military to get together to discuss procedures in acquainting other NATO countries of our Command ideas and undertaking discussion with the Turks. It was suggested to him that we had heard that the British were anxious to have another substantive discussion on Command arrangements which might well be undertaken before procedural matters were discussed. He indicated he thought perhaps this was the case. (It was not wholly clear whether he actually believes that there is virtually complete US–UK agreement on Middle East Command. In any event that was the idea which he seemed to wish to convey.)

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[3] Reference is to the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council which met at Ottawa, September 15–20. For documentation, see pp. 616 ff.

[4] See the draft memorandum prepared by John Ferguson on July 6 entitled Command in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East and the undated British counterdraft submitted to Admiral Sherman by Air Marshal Elliot in mid-July, pp. 551 and 559.

[5] No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

740.5/8–951 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, August 9, 1951—5 p. m.

Depto 175. Burin des Roziers tells me that Fr position on Gr and Turk, subj to confirmation when new govt formed,[2] is as fols:

Fr wld have preferred separate inter-locked pact but wld "not oppose" full membership provided command structure satisfactorily settled. Their idea of satisfactory solution is that Turk as well as Gr shld be under SHAPE and that any ME command shld be under SG as such rather than separate body composed of SG members and Turk. Their fear is that such separate body, even though composed of three persons who comprise SG wld, with addition of Turk and possible dominion representative, have interests and responsibilities in conflict with those of SG. When I suggested this seemed more distinction than difference and that SG members wld certainly not vote differently under different hats, he reiterated Fr considered question of divergent and possibly conflicting interests and responsibilities one of great importance. Also indicated that wld constitute enlargement of SG in which Italians might claim share, and dilution of its authority. I suspect this attitude is combination of long-standing Fr desire to have SG authority extended beyond NATO area and their fear that their minority continental position in SG, as opposed to US and UK who are preoccupied with Middle Eastern as well as Eur theaters, wld be further weakened in another body which included reps of Turks and possibly another dominion. He stated that unless any Middle Eastern command were directly subordinate to SG as such Fr wld not agree to full membership.

SPOFFORD

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] René Pleven formed a new French Government on August 11. For documentation on the French governmental crisis of summer 1951 see volume IV.

S/ISA files, lot 52–40, box 119, NAT Council Preparations

Working Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1951.

GREECE AND TURKEY AND NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

PROBLEM

To induce the British and French to give unqualified support to inclusion of Turkey and Greece in NATO, including cooperation in obtaining the agreement of other NATO members to inclusion.

US OBJECTIVE

To obtain the agreement of the North Atlantic Council, at the Ottawa meeting, to the inclusion of Turkey and Greece in NATO.

BRITISH POSITION

1) Decision should be taken at Ottawa to recommend that Turkey and Greece be invited to adhere to Treaty.

2) Immediately after Ottawa, three Powers should hold discussions with Turkey as NATO "member elect" to give Turkey full information on proposed Middle East Command with immediate object of securing its agreement to an approach to Egypt.

3) Announcement of Middle East Command under British leadership should be made at same time as announcement of SACLANT (US).

FRENCH POSITION

While other arrangements would have been preferred, admittance to NATO will not be opposed but following desiderata should be satisfied:

1) Standing Group's authority should extend over area covered by proposed Middle East theatre.

2) There should be an integrated staff for Middle East theatre in which French officers would be represented at all levels.

3) Turkish forces should be under NATO rather than Middle East Command control.

4) A French admiral should exercise principal interallied responsibilities in Western Mediterranean under whatever overall NATO Mediterranean Command is established.

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[1] This document was approved on August 29 and was designated WFM T–3c on September 7. For further information on the preparation of this and similar documents pertaining to the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings of September 10–14, see editorial note, p. 1195.

POSITION TO BE PRESENTED—Summary (more detailed background attached)

1. The most practicable means of assuring association of Greece and Turkey with Western defense is their admittance into NATO as full members.

2. Turkey's admittance into NATO should not be made conditional on its prior agreement to accept the role assigned to it in the proposed Middle East Command.

3. U.S. believes Turkey's inclusion compatible with Preamble and Article 2 of Treaty.

4. U.S. keenly aware of necessity of giving new impetus to concept of North Atlantic community and demonstrating by action as well as words that U.S. retains long-term interest in NATO and its broad objectives.

5. Turkey's ever increasing alignment and cooperation with Western democracies should be encouraged.

6. U.S. public opinion and Congressional sentiment highly favorable to Greeks and Turks at present with strong feeling that they should be included in Western defense system. Negative NAT decision may hence have serious repercussions on Mutual Security Program.

7. Fear that USSR might consider inclusion Turkey and Greece in NATO provocative believed of little significance.

8. NATO membership for Turkey and Greece not expected significantly change either magnitude and timing of efforts required of all NATO countries or amount, scope and planning of U.S. aid to meet their defense and economic programs.

DISCUSSION

The following argumentation has been presented by the U.S. in the Council of Deputies:

1. The most practicable means of assuring association of Greece and Turkey with Western defense is their admittance into NATO as full members.

a. Standing Group and Political Committee reports emphasize the importance of Turkey and Greece to Western defense and the necessity of assuring, in the event of an aggression against the West, that they respond as NAT countries. Inclusion of Turkey and Greece in NATO will enhance US-UK-French lines of communication and the possibility of obtaining future post strike bases for U.S. strategic air offensive.

b. Any proposals made Turkey regarding its relationship with Western Powers in which full partnership and equality not implicit will be bitterly resented, will make acceptance most difficult, and may contribute to the development of neutralism.

c. Participation in a Mediterranean Pact closely linked to NATO but concerned only with military cooperation would be considered by Turkey as the equivalent of second-class membership in NATO and an indication of the West's unwillingness to accept Turkey as a partner in other than military fields.

d. Inclusion in a Mediterranean Pact would not automatically commit Turkey and Greece to take action in the event of an aggression against a NATO nation unless such a commitment were specifically established. It is most unlikely that the Turks and Greeks would agree to such a commitment unless it were reciprocal.

e. There is strong Congressional support for admittance of Turkey and Greece into NATO. Such support would probably be extended to a Mediterranean Pact, but there would be greater insistance on the inclusion of Spain.

f. Creating a new organization, even though less complex than NATO, would involve inevitable delay. Further delay in concluding satisfactory security arrangements with Turkey will only intensify Turkish doubts of the willingness of the West to accept Turkey as a full partner.

2. Turkey's admittance into NATO should not be made conditional on its prior agreement to accept the role assigned to it in the proposed Middle East Command.

a. Only logical that Turks would expect to participate in discussions leading to the creation of a Middle East Command in which they would be expected to provide the bulk of ground forces.

b. U.S. believes in sincerity of Turkish Government's statement that it considers defense of Middle East is indispensable to defense of Europe and that once admitted into NATO, it will be prepared to enter into negotiations with interested parties with view to playing its proper role in Middle East defense and taking adequate measures in common with them.

c. Turkey's willingness to participate in the proposed Middle East Command depends upon prior unqualified acceptance of Turkey into NATO.

d. U.S. believes that the proposals agreed to by the Standing Group covering the relationship of Turkey to Middle East Command and of the Command to NATO [2] should be considered as tentative only. They cannot be finalized until after Turkey has been admitted to NATO and has been given an opportunity to present its views on them and to accept them. Pending such action, no announcement regarding the creation of a Middle East Command should be made.

e. Assuming that the tentative proposals for a Middle East Command which have been agreed to by the Standing Group are acceptable to the U.S., UK, and French Governments, the U.S. will use its best efforts to obtain Turkey's acceptance of those

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[2] Appendix 2, p. 573.

proposals after its admission into NATO. However, changes in these proposals resulting from discussions with Turkey would in no way justify reconsideration of Council action, either formally or informally, in position taken by Executive Branch of Governments in seeking ratification to Turkey's admission.

f. As for the other NATO members, while their commitments will be extended if Greece and Turkey are included in NATO, inclusion of Turkey as NATO member in the Middle East Command will not extend commitments of NATO members beyond extension that would result from the creation of a Command including only the U.S., UK, and France.

g. Proposal that French admiral exercise principal interallied responsibilities in Western Mediterranean should not be linked to question of inclusion Turkey and Greece in NATO as it is problem to be solved irrespective of their inclusion.

3. U.S. believes Turkey's inclusion compatible with Preamble and Article 2 of Treaty.

a. Turkey actively associated with NATO members in international and regional organizations concerned with long-range political, economic and cultural cooperation, viz, UN, Council of Europe, OEEC, PCC, etc.

b. Turkey subscribes fully to principles democracy, individual liberty, rule of law as known and practiced by most Western Powers. Tradition observance such principles less well established and of more recent origin but progress steady and gap rapidly closing.

c. Present-day Turkey considers Western civilization is likewise its heritage.

4. U.S. keenly aware of necessity of giving new impetus to concept of North Atlantic community and demonstrating by action as well as words that U.S. retains long-term interest in NATO and its broad objectives. (Suggested action is outlined in separate paper.)

5. Turkey's ever increasing alignment and cooperation with Western democracies should be encouraged.

a. Turkey is becoming increasingly important factor in world affairs.

b. Turkey provides a valuable medium through which Western ideas and methods can be transmitted and made understandable to those countries whose link with West is more tenuous.

c. Denying full membership in NATO to Turkey would be viewed as Western rebuff to country which has westernization as keystone its policy.

d. Admission to NATO would enable West, with fullest Turkish cooperation, to advance free world objectives in vital Middle East.

6. U.S. public opinion and Congressional sentiment highly favorable to Greeks and Turks at present with strong feeling that they should be included in Western defense system. Negative NAT decision may hence have serious repercussions on Mutual Security Program.

7. Fear that USSR might consider inclusion Turkey and Greece in NATO provocative believed of little significance.

a. UK and France already linked to Turkey by Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

b. U.S. interest in Turkish security amply evident since 1947 in military and economic aid programs and in statements of highest government officials.

c. Turkey and Greece already formally associated with NATO for certain phases of planning for Mediterranean defense. Full membership merely logical extension this association.

d. USSR undoubtedly appreciates that attack on either country could be expected to lead to global war, regardless of their inclusion in NATO.

8. NATO membership for Turkey and Greece not expected significantly change either magnitude and timing of efforts required of all NATO countries or amount, scope and planning of U.S. aid to meet their defense and economic programs.

Appendix 1

Working Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, August 28, 1951.]

ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN COMMAND

The term, Mediterranean Command, is now a misnomer since the findings of the NATO Standing Group have focused attention on the structure of a Middle East Command and have used the word Mediterranean to refer to two subsidiary naval commands, one in the Eastern Mediterranean under the Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East, and one in the Western Mediterranean under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The British want to pair the announcement of a British Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East (SACME) with the announcement of an American as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT). The timing of these announcements is still at issue and we are anxious to activate the Atlantic Command under Admiral McCormick.

The Standing Group are however willing to defer announcement of SACLANT if this is necessary to defer Middle East Command announcement. They attach more importance to necessity of proper approach to Turkey and Egypt before announcement of Middle East Command than they do to early announcement of SACLANT.

Appendix 2

Working Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, August 28, 1951.]

SUMMARY OF REPORT BY THE INTERNATIONAL PLANNING TEAM TO THE STANDING GROUP ON COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST

(SG 80/4, August 22)

The NATO Standing Group recommends that there must be unified higher strategic direction for the Middle East area as a whole and that there must be coordination between the European and Middle East Commands as well as unity in the higher strategic direction given to them.

The Standing Group proposal provides for a Middle East Chiefs of Staff Committee, similar to the NATO Military Committee, with initial representation consisting of US, UK, French, Turkish and Commonwealth officers. This Committee should be served by a Middle East Standing Group consisting of the UK, US and French representatives of the NATO Standing Group who would serve in a dual capacity in order to provide the coordination and unity of higher strategic direction. The Middle East Standing Group would provide higher military direction for SACME. Assisting this Standing Group should be a Middle East Military Representatives Committee composed of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of those countries who are members of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Those aspects of the higher military direction for the Allied Middle East Command which relate to the defense of North Atlantic Treaty area of which Turkey is a part will be the primary concern of NATO. Other aspects will be the primary concern of the Middle East organization. The NATO Standing Group Middle East Standing Group will determine whether any given problem should be handled by NATO or the Middle East organization, or by both.

The Standing Group also recommended that at the time an Allied Middle East Command under the British was established there should be some form of organization (tentatively called the Middle East Defense Board) which would act to secure the cooperation of the Middle Eastern states, which will not initially want to participate in the Command.

Specifically, the Standing Group believes that a Supreme Allied Commander and Headquarters should be established to command an Allied Middle East Theatre, that the Supreme Allied Commander

should be British, and that the Allied Middle East Headquarters should have initially the same representation as indicated above for the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

The Allied Middle East Command should be divided in two parts as follows:

(1) A Northern or Turkish sector under Turkish Command.
(2) A Southern sector under British Command.

There should be two principal Allied Naval Commands in the Mediterranean, one subordinate to SACEUR and the other subordinate to SACME, each primarily responsible for the support of his respective Supreme Commander. Within these two major Naval Commands and subordinate to them, other Commands should be established; one of the most important of these will be the one in the Western part of the Mediterranean. Detailed division of responsibilities should be worked out by the two principal Allied Naval Commanders referred to above in consultation with the appropriate National Naval Commanders and with each other. Their recommendations should be submitted to the Standing Group through the two Supreme Commanders concerned.

Editorial Note

The problems surrounding the creation of Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Middle East military commands and the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO were discussed during the course of the first meeting between Acheson and Morrison on September 10 and the first, second, and seventh meetings between Acheson, Morrison, and Schuman on September 12 and 14 at the Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings. Morrison stated that owing to "political necessities" the United Kingdom could not go ahead with such vital NATO matters as the announcement of the Atlantic Command until the Middle East Command could also be announced. At several points, Secretary Acheson stressed the need for a decision on the admission of Greece and Turkey at the forthcoming Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council, and the United States drafted a proposed procedure for the accession of the two countries to NATO. However, the communiqué issued by the three Foreign Ministers at the close of the meetings on September 14 was silent concerning both the establishment of regional commands and the Greek-Turkish issue. For further documentation, see pages 1163 ff.

Editorial Note

On September 20 the North Atlantic Council at the close of its Seventh Session at Ottawa recommended to the member governments

that Greece and Turkey be invited to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This recommendation climaxed 4 days of debate and discussion on the issue both within and beyond the Council. Both the Norwegian and Danish Council representatives expressed strong initial reservations concerning the wisdom of extending the NATO commitment to Greece and Turkey, but these reservations were ultimately withdrawn. The Council also agreed to a protocol which all Deputies would have to shortly sign outlining the steps required to bring about Greek and Turkish accession. For further documentation, see pages 616 ff.

740.5/9–2051 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 20, 1951—7 p. m.

213. For Amb. You are requested to deliver in person the fol msg from Pres Truman to Pres Bayar as soon as possible: (For Athens: Pls deliver identical msg to Venizelos substituting Greece for Turkey where appropriate)

"I wish to convey to you my deep personal gratification, as well as that of my govt, at the decision of the NAT Council, mtg in Ottawa, that subject to ratification by their govts they wld extend to Turk an invitation to become a full member of the NATO. I am sure that you have by this time recd from the Pres of the Council a formal notification of this action.

"I am particularly pleased with this decision because I know that it represents the fulfillment of a deep desire on the part of the Turk govt and Turk people, and a recognition of the valiant efforts Turk has made, in the post war period, to maintain her independence and integrity in the face of persistent threats and pressures. We have, as you know, long had the desire that Turk be invited to accede to the NAT. We have had the firm conviction that Turk can contribute greatly to the objectives of the Treaty, which represents a milestone in the efforts of the Atlantic community to create a security system to protect their independence and their common ideals.

"Turk will, I feel sure, benefit greatly from her membership in the Treaty Organization. As a signatory of the Treaty, Turk will have the same rights and, of course, will assume the same responsibilities as other members. We are glad that the excellent cooperation between your country and ours, which has enabled us, since 1947, to assist in

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[1] Drafted by C. R. Moore and by Elbrick of RA, cleared with NE and Defense, and repeated to Athens. These messages to the President of Turkey and the Prime Minister of Greece were subsequently released to the public and published in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 8, 1951, p. 571. The formal reply (undated) of President Celal Bayar of Turkey, thanking President Truman for continued moral and political aid to Turkey and recognition of Turkey's determination to defend its sovereignty is printed, *ibid*, October 22, 1951, p. 650. The formal reply of Prime Minister Venizelos of Greece, dated September 24, thanking President Truman for his continued support of Greek independence and of Greek desires to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty is printed *ibid*.

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the building up of Turk's econ and mil strength, can now be fitted into the larger framework of the NAT.

"It will take some time to meet the constitutional requirements for parliamentary ratification by the various govts, including our own, of the action taken by the Council before a formal invitation can be extended. I hope, however, that the time to achieve this can be reduced to a minimum.

"I wish to assure you once again of our pleasure at the prospect of welcoming Turk into full membership in the NATO to which we attach such great significance. We look forward to working with Turk in this org to help build the bastions of the free world for defense against the Commie menace which Turkey knows so well."

We assume Gr-Turk Govts will wish make above msg public, which Dept wld welcome. Pls inform Dept re Gr-Turk plans for release, so that appropriate steps can be taken here.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding of steps required to effect formal invitation and accession of Gr-Turk to NATO, you are authorized, in your discretion, to explain informally procedure outlined Dept circular 247, Sept. 10.[2] Resolution and Protocol (particularly revised Art VI of Treaty) have undergone certain modifications in NAC mtg and therefore texts communicated ref circular shld not, be transmitted to Gr-Turk Govts.

WEBB

[2] Not printed.

740.5/9–2051 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 20, 1951—7 p. m.

214. For Ambassador. In addition to Pres Truman's msg to Pres Bayar contained in Deptel 213 [2] Sept 20, you are requested to deliver the fol secret msg from Pres Truman to Pres Bayar, which shld not be made public without prior clearance with Dept.

"Turkey's accession to the Treaty Org will give rise to many practical problems with respect to participation in the Org and its various subsidiary bodies. Although no formal arrangements can be made until Turkey accedes to the Treaty, I believe it wld be desirable at an early date to have conversations of a purely preliminary nature between your Govt and reps of some of the members of the NATO.

"There is, in addition, a closely related and very important question which it might be well to discuss in the same way. As we have advised you informally, prelim discussions have been held between the US, UK and France with respect to the setting up of a ME Command, which

[1] Drafted by Moore of GTI and cleared by Defense, Martin of EUR, and Jones of NE.

[2] *Supra.*

wld make it possible to organize, through a coop effort, the mil defense of that area as a whole. In the light of the important role Turkey has in the defense of the ME, we hope Turkey will participate as a founding member of such a Command.

"If it wld be agreeable to Your Excellency, I wld be glad to send to Turkey as US rep for these talks our highest mil rep, Gen Omar Bradley, Chairman of our JCS, who, perhaps accompanied by high Brit and Fr mil reps, cld discuss these matters with you"

Please inform Dept as soon as messages delivered and Pres Bayar's reaction thereto.

Please inform your Brit colleague of contents above messages. Brit Emb here has shown Dept proposed msg from Morrison to Köprülü which Brit Emb Ankara undoubtedly will make available to you. Suggest you coordinate your respective approaches to Pres Bayar and Köprülü.

WEBB

740.5/9–2251 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 22, 1951—3 p. m.

PRIORITY

225. Re *NY Times* art Sept 22 stating Pres Truman has assigned Harriman and Bradley to prepare way for earliest inclusion Greece and Turkey in NATO and referring to their departure for Europe and Near East within ten days. Info along following lines being given for background and not for attribution in response to press inquiries: In the course of discussions of the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa it was suggested that the US, UK and France send military representatives to Turkey and Greece for preliminary discussions of their participation in the NATO (after ratification by the present members of their inclusion). The possibility of the US sending such a representative is now being considered and if one goes it will probably be General Bradley. There are no present plans for Mr. Harriman to go to Turkey or Greece.

WEBB

[1] Message drafted by Moore. A marginal note reads: "Background statement cleared with: Defense—Col Newland, White House—Mr. Tubby, RA—Mr. Elbrick." Repeated to the Embassies in Egypt, Greece, the United Kingdom, and France.

740.5/9–2451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT ANKARA, September 24, 1951—7 p. m.

283. Supplementing Embtel 280, Sept 24 in reply Deptel 229, Sept 23.[1]

1) President Bayar attended by Foreign Minister Koprulu received me as arranged. He had he said already read with highest gratification translation prepared by Foreign Officer of President Truman's first message; its text would be broadcast by Ankara Radio this evening. He would read with equal interest and satisfaction, he felt sure, the secret second note he understood I was to hand him.

2) I did so, with translation prepared by Embassy. This he read slowly aloud, then with customary courtesy asked if there was anything I wished to add. I answered that second message of course spoke for itself, but I welcomed opportunity to recapitulate and add one point made by Department in my most recent instructions. As I saw it there were three questions before us:

a) Did he share President Truman's hope that Turkey would participate as a founding member in the setting up of a ME Command?

b) Would it be agreeable to him were President Truman to send to Turkey at a very early date our highest military representative, General Bradley, for conversations, with the appropriate Turkish authorities, of the purely preliminary and private nature which Foreign Minister Koprulu had already informed me he would welcome? and

c) A new question: Would he—if his answer to my first question should be, as we sincerely hoped, in the affirmative—approve Turkey cooperating with the British and ourselves in urging on Egypt acceptance of a similar invitation that it too participate as a founding member in setting up MEC?

3) I then outlined very briefly Department's arguments for MEC and reason for and urgency of this suggested approach first to King Farouk and then to Egyptian Govt. President listened attentively, then made general reply. Based on brief notes which I took, its highlights (with paragraphing representing pauses for translation) were as follows:

I thank you sincerely for this best of good news; this is one of the happiest days of my life. I, my govt and people, are deeply grateful. Please convey to your govt our appreciation for the great help it has given Turkey. At an early date I will write of our thanks and feelings to your President.[2]

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[1] Deptel 229 had asked Ambassador Wadsworth "most urgently" if he had received Deptels 213 and 214 of September 20 (pp. 575, 576). Embtel 280 reported the reception of Deptels 213 and 214 and Wadsworth's short delay in obtaining an appointment with Foreign Minister Köprülü who was returning from Istanbul. (740.5/9–2351; 9–2451)

[2] See footnote 1, p. 575.

I have now read his second message and listened to your words. I am certain of its importance. I see also need for urgency in the case of Egypt. I am in agreement in principle with all this message says and with what you have added as to your govt's views.

I will submit these desires to my govt. I am sure you will receive early reply.

I am in agreement that we should discuss together these matters of highest importance and all other similar matters as well.

We have all our heart in it. By building the security of this country and of ME we shall contribute to securing security of free world.

Please convey to President Truman our deeply grateful greetings and appreciation.

4) President Bayar paused and, after exchanging a few words with Foreign Minister, continued in substance:

Egypt, like other newly independent countries this area, is highly sensitive to presence foreign troops. Egypt is particularly sensitive because British troops there seem continuance of historic occupation.

Today we have only good intentions, but it is difficult make Egypt understand. Our Foreign Minister has long sought similar formula which, while not offending national feelings, will assure strategic position. We recognize fully need for maintaining Allied troops there. We sense that your formula offers an only answer.

5) In reply I spoke of latest word from Ambassador Caffery (Deptel 219, Sept 21)[3]. Foreign Minister commented he too sensed urgency and believed our formula of inviting Egypt to participate in founding MEC offered only hopeful solution.

6) I then spoke of General Bradley. It might well be I said, that with postponement of next AP council meeting until after British elections, ratifications of Turkish invitation could be had so as to permit Turkey to be represented as full NATO member. Meanwhile the suggested preliminary conversations could not but be immensely helpful to us all; that we lose no time seemed vital. I had been told of Foreign Minister's comment when seeing British Ambassador in Istanbul yesterday (see my immediatetly following telegram). I ventured in reply to urge that advantages of Bradley visit to Turkey would far outweigh any disadvantages.

7) After confirming sense his remarks to British Ambassador, Koprulu replied. Partly by implication and partly directly he gave me to understand that, if General Bradley were on tour and should wish visit Turkey for what would appear to be private exchange of views—and not as head of Allied military mission of such outstanding top brass—he would be welcome. This, Koprulu added, was however

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[3] Telegram Deptel 219 of September 21 repeated telegram 343 from Cairo, September 20, in which Ambassador Caffery reported British concern over probable Egyptian abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the agreements of 1899 regarding the Sudan and also reported, *inter alia*, that King Farouk had intimated that he would welcome the inclusion of Turkey "in any proposed regional set-up" for the Middle East.

only his personal views; it would of course have to be confirmed by Turkish Cabinet.

8) In closing remarks I arranged see Koprulu tomorrow should he wish; and President, after reiterating his earlier remark re need for cooperation in all matters of high interest and common concern, again voiced sincerest appreciation President Truman's two messages.

Department please repeat to Cairo and elsewhere as desired.

WADSWORTH

740.5/9-2251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT ANKARA, September 25, 1951—5 p. m.

289. Supplementing Embtel 283, Sept 24 :[2]

1. FonMin phoned this morning to say PriMin with himself attending would receive me at noon. Cabinet, with Pres Bayar presiding, had met for three hours last evening after my audience with Pres.

2. Opening conversation PriMin said Cabinet wished him confirm thru me to US Govt its full concurrence in Pres Bayar's remarks to me; also its own formal expression of appreciation to US Govt on this most happy and important development. Collaboration and cooperation with its NATO partners would govern future Turk policy. Meanwhile, Cabinet welcomed proposal for preliminary private conversations and consultation.

3. This brought us to Cabinet views on my three questions which I may recapitulate as follows:

(*a*) Would Turkey participate as founding member MEC? FonMin gave answers: To Turkey defense of ME is vital. It follows that there must be a MEC and that Turkey should be member thereof on equal footing. Therefore Turkey "warmly welcomes and accepts invitation in principle", all details of org and command to be by common agreement among members.

PriMin added that he envisaged not simply Allied command to mask existing situation, but true interallied org and command.

(*b*) Would Turkey welcome early Bradley visit? Again FonMin gave answer: He had already told Brit Amb and me that visit of formal Allied Mil Mission, especially prior to Turk admission to NATO, seemed undesirable in our common interests as there was reason to believe it would offend smaller NATO countries. Same could be said for Arab countries, especially Egypt where today anti-British feeling runs high. Turkey itself would feel no embarrassment whatsoever at visit of high Brit and French generals, but in common interest, if Turkey is to play, as it hopes, important role in gaining collabora-

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[1] Repeated to Cairo.

[2] *Supra.*

tion Arab states, present seems logical time for Bradley visit, which would indeed be welcome, but too early for others.

PriMin added: "These are present views our govt expressed in all friendship; we shld appreciate receiving those of your govt. Especially as regards Arab countries, we wish avoid false step at outset."

(*c*) Would Turkey cooperate with US and UK in urging Egypt accept formula of and participate in founding MEC? PriMin answered: "Very warmly" and indicated that he hoped Gen Bradley would visit Egypt after Greek and Turk visits.

FonMin added that Cabinet had shared his views as to substance and urgency of approach to Egypt. "But for approach to other Arab countries", he added, "We must prepare the ground most carefully. Were they to be invited today they would probably say no. In their case the question is essentially dipl before it can become military."

4. PriMin hopes Dept may find it possible to wire by Fri Sept 28 expression its views on Bradley visit (requested para 3(*b*) above) as he plans provincial visit over weekend. Emb suggests reply be sent via emergency niact military channel.

Dept please repeat elsewhere as desired.

WADSWORTH

740.5/9–2551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, September 26, 1951—9 p. m.

247. Dept most appreciative prompt and understanding response Turks as outlined Embtel 289 Sept 25.[2]

Dept can appreciate reluctance Turk Govt to discuss mil and Command arrangements prior to action by legislative bodies of present NATO members to formally accept Turkey in NATO. We believe Turks shld know, however, that NATO members were informed at Ottawa that we were considering sending high milit officer to discuss milit arrangements with Turks on informal basis and that UK and France might do likewise. Hence we do not feel that smaller NATO nations wld react unfavorably to informal Tripartite mission.

We have taken position that no command setup can be prepared for prelim consideration by present NATO nations until matter is discussed with Greece and Turkey. Furthermore no NATO command structure involving Grk-Turk participation can be approved by NATO until Grk and Turk reps are officially sitting as members of the Milit Comite and Council, fol their acceptance into NATO. It was our idea that the top milit reps of the US, UK and France, were the ones who shld discuss command arrangements with the highest Turk

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[1] Message drafted by Jones and Stabler of NE and Moore of GTI, cleared by Perkins and Defense, and repeated to Paris, London, and Cairo.

[2] *Supra.*

authorities. We considered this arrangement as being the one which wld indicate to the Turks and the Grks our appreciation of their importance in the Org and that it warranted a visit by our highest milit auths.

The procedure wld be that after discussions on the NATO command arrangements, the ideas of the Turks and Grks wld be incorporated, along with the ideas of the other nations concerned, into a staff study which wld then be presented to the milit reps of all the countries concerned including Greece and Turkey. After further comments from these nations, the paper wld then be amended as necessary and resubmitted to those nations, in order that all NATO nations including Greece and Turkey can be prepared to act on it in the milit comite and Council mtgs after the formal admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO.

While we believe the above to be important, we also believe it is urgent that MEC arrangements be worked out earliest and we do not see how this can be done without discussions between representatives of the US, UK and France and Turkey. While Turkey may feel that Gen Bradley can appropriately discuss ME Command arrangements informally with Turks on behalf all three, Dept requests you pt out to Turk FonMin why we feel Bradley–Slim–Fr Mission is so important. UK will lead in presenting proposals to Egypt. If Bradley alone visits Turkey this likely be interpreted by Egypt as reflecting adversely UK status MEC in which Brits will play major role.[3] Slim–Bradley–Fr visit designed originally emphasize solidarity powers and multilateral character proposals partly as background for approach Egypt. Thus while we fully understand reasons why Turk desire to restrict visit to Bradley, we are nevertheless confronted with above dilemma and wld appreciate Turks giving matter most serious consideration. We believe another important factor from Turk viewpoint is that tripartite mission wld give Turks valuable opportunity to present their views on MEC to highest level mil reps of three countries.

Re Arab states, we agree with Turk Govt that we must proceed with caution and careful preparation. While undoubtedly there will be elements in those states opposed to any form of collaboration with Western powers, we believe that MEC will gain support, perhaps gradual at first, because (1) it may be basis for settlement Anglo-Egypt question and (2) it provides structure for ME defense in which Arabs are vitally concerned. We consider that multilateral nature of MEC, including Turkish participation, has important appeal and shld be

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[3] Ambassador Caffery in Cairo reported on September 30 that there had been as yet "No significant Egypt reaction NATO invitation Greece–Turkey." He added that "Considerable speculation and comment on reports Britain planning propose Middle East defense plan and Turkey mentioned in story from London as possible three power del to seek Egypt's views. Reactions rumored Brit proposals skeptical to negative among officials public and press." (Cairo telegram 389, 740.5/9–3051)

stressed. On balance therefore we believe tripartite milit mission to Turkey wld have desirable impact on Arab States and set stage for multilateral coop.

Due other pressing commitments, it may be ten days before Bradley or tripartite mission can arrive in Turkey. Despite this delay we wld welcome Turk reaction on above earliest.

Pls keep Brit colleague fully and simultaneously informed on all developments (urtel 290 Sept 26).[4]

ACHESON

[4] Not printed.

780.5/9–2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT ANKARA, September 28, 1951—4 p. m.

305. On Sept 27 I showed to Brit Amb, who returned Ankara from Istanbul previous day for express purpose seeing Foreign Minister, texts my tels reporting interviews with President Bayar (Embtel 283, Sept 24)[2] and with PriMin and FonMin (Embtel 289, Sept 25).[3] Also showed him Dept's reply to these two msgs (Deptel 247, Sept 26).[4]

2. Brit Amb then outlined for me views expressed to him previous day by FonMin in answer to Brit *démarche* of Sept 23: FonMin stated Turk Govt agreed in principle (*a*) to participate in MEC as founding member and (*b*) to support with US a Brit *démarche* to Egypt designed to deter abrogation 1936 Treaty. Turkey he added, cld more effectively support such *démarche* if fully informed of representations already made and those to be made to King Farouk and Egypt Govt.

Re projected visit tripartite mission, FonMin reiterated apprehensions as to reaction Arab States and small NATO countries, stating Turk Min at Hague had sent second msg indicating continued Dutch opposition to MEC planning prior ratification Turk admission NATO (further details contained in para No. 3 this tel).

Brit Amb was able apprize FonMin that tel just recd from London informed him Dutch had modified attitudes apparently recognizing desirability military talks if of preliminary nature only.

In conclusion, Brit Amb commented, FonMin "seemed to agree" to desirability early preliminary military conversations but, recognizing urgency Egyptian situation, did not feel that *démarche* at Cairo need be contingent thereon.

[1] Repeated to Paris for MacArthur, London and Cairo.
[2] *Ante*, p. 578.
[3] *Ante*, p. 580.
[4] *Supra*.

3. On Sept 26 at FonMin's request, Asst Sec Gen FonOff Nuri Birgi called on me to report second tel from Turk Min Hague referred to above. In absence Dutch FonMin had called on Sec Gen Dutch FonOff to express appreciation Dutch support of Turk admission to NATO. Latter declared, on basis tel just recd from absent FonMin, that Holland and certain other members NATO did not favor entry of Turkey into command outside framework NAT and without prior consultation NATO members. In other words, Holland favored Turks performance tasks incumbent on it as member NATO within framework pact.

4. In belief FonMin wld wish give careful consideration to closely reasoned arguments Deptel 247, Sept 26, Emb prepared written memo containing complete paraphrase Dept's views as expressed in ref msg which Counselor Keith delivered to Asst Sec Gen Birgi 8 p. m. Sept 27. Birgi gave assurances that memo wld be immediately transmitted to FonMin who wld see me near future.

WADSWORTH

740.5/9–2951 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 29, 1951—5 p. m.

Todep 199. 1. In view importance Dept attaches to Slim-Bradley-French visit to Turkey to carry on informal and preliminary military discussions with Turks re their participation in NATO bodies and proposed MEC, Dept concerned over apparent attitude Dutch and certain other NATO members as reported by Turk FonOff in Ankara tel 305 Sept 28 to Dept (rptd London 5, Paris 8, Cairo 11).[2]

You will recall Secretary informed NAC members at Ottawa that US considering sending high milit officer to Turkey to discuss milit arrangements on informal basis and that UK and France might do likewise. On assumption such action wld not endanger early action by NATO countries to complete formalities for Turk Greek accession NATO, Dept has been urging Turk Govt agree to receive Slim-Bradley-French visit.

Suggest you discuss matter with Brit Dep in view London report to Brit Amb Ankara that Dutch had modified attitude. You may also wish sound out Dutch Dep, reassuring him, if necessary, of preliminary nature proposed mil discussions. Dept wld welcome your early comments.

2. Dept wld be interested in info re likelihood other NAT countries will be prepared to sign on Oct 3 Protocol on Turk Greek accession

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[1] Message drafted by Moore of GTI, cleared by NE and RA, and repeated to The Hague, Paris, Cairo, and Ankara.

[2] *Supra.*

NATO or when they may be expected to take this action. Do you feel it wld be helpful for Dept to request our Ambs in NAT countries urge early action on respective govts.[3]

WEBB

[3] Spofford responded to Todep 199 in telegram Depto 390 from London on October 1 stating "Believe no possibility signing Greek-Turk protocol October 3 but will keep trying for signature later this week." The French were the "most serious obstacle," Spofford added, stating that the Embassy in France "received impression Fr unlikely be willing sign soon." (740.5/10–151)

740.5/10–251 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), in London [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, October 2, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 206. Re Spofford–Perkins telephone conversation of today [2] regret impossible provide you any specific forecast re Cong action on adherence of Gr–Turk to NATO.

Present disposition leaders in Senate is to drive hard for adjournment and resist introducing any new matters. Senate majority leaders still express hopes to adjourn by Oct 13 but estimate is that around Nov 1 more likely with present volume unfinished business.

Have found no evidence opposition in Senate to adherence Gr–Turk and wld think possible secure favorable action within week or ten days if Comite [3] agreed to consider. Have promised to consult with Comite before Protocol is submitted to Senate and of course cannot do so until Protocol is signed. Cannot be sure that delay might not be caused by opposition developing either on grounds drive to adjourn or on grounds action this subj shld follow rather than precede action on Jap Peace Treaty.

Have not asked views this point Senators principally interested Jap Treaty, partly because Dept has not made up its mind whether it wants to present Gr–Turk ahead of Jap Treaty. We have been waiting to see how soon Protocol cld be signed in order to know how practical it might be to secure action on Gr–Turk at this session.

As we see it, situation now somewhat reversed and your problem is how much pressure to expend for signature Protocol in view uncertain US ratification this session.

On balance we had better keep up steady pressure for signature of Protocol but not make all-out effort which cld only be justified by certainty of Senate action at this session.

[1] Drafted by Martin of RA, cleared by EUR, GTI, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

[2] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

[3] Presumably the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.

We will keep you fully informed of developments on this matter here.

WEBB

740.5/10–251 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 2, 1951—6 p. m.

1583. Tentatively planned Gens [*Gen*] Bradley and [Field Marshall Sir William] Slim and possibly Fr Gen arriving Athens from Paris evening Oct 10 have brief general discussion with Grks re their membership various NATO bodies and their integration into NATO overall command structure. Group will fly Turkey morning Oct 12 for similar discussion Turks. Suggest you inform Grk Govt Gen Bradley wld welcome opportunity if projected trip materializes and if Grk Govt finds acceptable, to stop off Athens for above purpose. Pls advise Dept Grk response earliest.

Brit Emb Wash assumes Slim wld visit Athens concurrently with Bradley. Has requested confirmation from FonOff and info re Brit approach Grk Govt. Suggest you check with Brit Amb before informing Grk Govt.[2]

FYI only. One of prin objectives of trip is enable top level mil reps three countries discuss with Turks co-related arrangements Turk participation proposed Middle East Command in hope creation of such command with Egypt well as Turk participation. It is hoped that settlement of Anglo-Egypt question will be found through MEC.[3] Greece not involved MEC problem.

WEBB

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[1] Drafted by B. F. Dixon of GTI and cleared with Stabler.

[2] In telegram 1605, October 5 from Athens, Ambassador Peurifoy reported Prime Minister Venizelos statement that the Greek Government would be pleased to receive the Bradley–Slim–French mission (740.5/10–551).

[3] For documentation on the interest of the United States in Anglo-Egyptian affairs see volume v.

740.5/10–251 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 4, 1951—5 : 03 p. m.

Todep 211. Depto 396, Oct 2, rptd info Paris 619.[2] If minor changes in Gr–Turk Protocol desired by Brit and Fr include any changes

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[1] Message drafted by Parsons of RA. Cleared by H, GTI, and RA. Repeated to Paris.

[2] Not printed.

whatever in amendment to Art 6, full clearance here by interested Depts likely be required. This wld of course further reduce chances submission of Protocol as finally agreed upon to Senate before adjournment. Thus, apart from desirability prevent opening up of text to renegotiation, we must if possible avoid risk of action which cld easily delay one of important steps in process bringing Gr–Turk into NATO. Relationship of this to delicate, urgent ME negotiations shld be obvious to Brit and Fr. Hope they will respond to ur efforts preclude introduction into CD of changes in text agreed at Ottawa.[3]

WEBB

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[3] In telegram Depto 406 of October 4, Spofford reported from London that the NAT Council had undertaken to consider British-sponsored drafting changes in Article 6 "based on recommendations UK legal experts." Later that day, in telegram Depto 413, Spofford reported that the Deputies had instructed the Working Group to draft a summary of the Ottawa exchange of views on the world situation and had agreed that a committee of legal experts should at once prepare a definitive draft of the protocol concerning Greece and Turkey taking into account the British draft changes. In telegram Depto 420 of October 5 from London, Spofford reported that the French had also submitted changes relating to Article 6. In telegram Depto 421 of October 5 from London, Spofford said that "Although most deps responded to USDep's statement indicating they would be in position to sign" the protocol during the week of October 8, "Danish requirement protocol be considered before signature by its Parliament which is now in recess and which does not plan to meet again before Oct 15 indicates sometime during later part of week of Oct. 15, earliest date for signature by CD" [NATO Council of Deputies]. (All telegrams found in file 740.5/10–451 and 740.5/10–551.) The Acting Secretary of State responded to these telegrams in telegram Todep 224 of October 6 stating that "Dept greatly disappointed at failure Depts to adhere to Protocol to which they committed themselves (by C7–D/26) at Ottawa . . ." It was the Department of State's view, Webb added, that only "minor drafting changes can now be considered" and the principal French amendment which related to Article 6 was substantive because its intent was to amend the Article whether or not Turkey should accede to NATO. "You shld request Brit and Fr to withdraw their amendments and inform them that to persist in their efforts to re-negotiate the protocol will result in delaying whole process of accession with consequent ill-effects on pending MEC talks. Dept is convinced proposed Br and Fr changes do not improve document." (740.5/10–551)

740.5/10–551 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 5, 1951—7 : 49 p. m.

288. Amb Erkin will call on Pres Truman Oct 9 at 12 : 15 to present Pres Bayar's replies to Pres Truman's two notes re decision NAC at Ottawa.[2] Text unclassified note will be released 12 : 30 Washington

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[1] Drafted by Snyder of GTI, cleared by NEA, and approved for transmission by Dorsz.

[2] The reference here is to President Truman's messages of September 20 to President Bayar; see telegrams 213 and 214, to Ankara, September 20, pp. 575, 576.

time that day [3] and Wireless Bulletin will carry. Text of secret msg which will not be released quoted below FYI:

"I fully concur with your view to hold conversations, of a preliminary nature, with respect to many practical problems which will arise with Turkey's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Org.

As you point out, these conversations will acquire an official character and will pave the way to final decisions only after Turkey's formal accession to the said Org.

Since we have heretofore entertained the view that the defense of the Middle East from strategic as well as economic standpoints is of prime necessity for the preservation of the security of the free world, I, too, believe that it wld be equally beneficial to take up as a topic of conversation of the same nature the question of organizing the Mil defense of that area. In fact, the effective solution of this problem which presents multiple mil and polit aspects, can only be achieved through Turkey's active participation in the negots in this respect.

The fact that Gen Omar Bradley, Chair of The Joint Chiefs of Staff whom you contemplate to assign as United States representative to study all these matters with us and with the Brit and Fr reps, holds various high responsibilities, makes me feel confident that the projected conversations will be carried out with full auth and in an atmosphere of most cordial understanding." [4]

WEBB

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[3] See footnote 1, p. 575.

[4] For documentation on the visit of Generals Bradley, Slim, and Lécheres to Greece and Turkey in mid-October to discuss possible establishment of a Middle East Command, see volume v.

740.5/10–651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, October 6, 1951—4 p. m.

Depto 425. 1. I talked with Starkenborgh yesterday twice at some length on subj further NATO consideration MEC arrangements. I opened conversation by stating I had been giving thought to procedure for following up Ottawa decisions in the interest of speed and avoiding any misunderstandings; that I wld be interested to know his views in the light of the interest in the problem shown by Neth at Ottawa. He said he welcomed discussions since matter had been left somewhat fuzzy in Ottawa Council decision, adding that he personally felt Stikker "had backed down too quickly" on insisting that there be preconsultation with smaller powers before any contact with Turks. He asked what the SG was now proposing to do, to which I replied that SG was awaiting comments from mil reps on SG Command paper to

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[1] Repeated to Paris and The Hague.

be submitted, and that as of several days ago comments had been few and not of great consequence. Starkenborgh stated Neth views were of military and polit nature, and felt shld be dealt with both thru mil reps/SG and Deps. He offered to give me memo covering their views, which he handed later in the day.

2. As to proposed visit Gen Bradley, Marshal Slim and Fr officer to ME, Starkenborgh had heard from Brit that Gen Bradley was preparing to go but had not understood that Brit and Fr were included. In discussing purpose of mission I emphasized exploratory nature of talks, also suggesting timing was dictated by Egyptian crisis and gen Middle East tension, and that purpose of mission was much broader in scope than narrow problem NATO Command arrangements. At one point he said he understood Turks did not seem anxious to discuss Command arrangements at this time, to which I replied my info was also that Turks were not pressing matter but were anxious to be helpful in gen ME picture.

3. He came to my office later in day and gave me two documents, text of which being dispatched by separate cable.[2] He described these as working papers which represented present Cabinet thinking, but not formal or final Neth Govt position. Paper A represents alternative ideas as to Command structures in order of preference. Paper B summarizes Neth objections to the SG proposal. I reserved final comment, but on paper B pointed out their whole series of objections proceeded on a misinterpretation of the SG paper, recalling statements of Secretary and others at Ottawa on equality status of Turk in NATO and other principles of Command arrangements.

4. My impression talk with Starkenborgh is that Neth insistence on pre-consultation may have modified somewhat since Ottawa. It is clear, however, that Neth, and same probably holds for the other small countries, expect to be heard on Command arrangements and will be very sensitive to anything that looks like too fast and firm action on Command structure as a result of forthcoming talks in Ankara. Public statements as to Bradley mission are particularly important for obvious reasons.

5. I suggest following procedure:

a. That the SG notify mil reps of fact and gen purpose of Bradley mission to ME as soon as possible, if this has not already been done. Purpose wld be to emphasize exploratory and gen character mission. Deps cld be given same info at next mtg 10th.

b. SG shld put some deadline on comments thru mil reps. Apparently not clear to non-SG powers that these expected.

c. At some point Dept shld be asked to make any comments of political nature. This shld probably be deferred until results of Bradley mission are known and can be reported.

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[2] Depto 424, October 6, not printed (740.5/10–651).

Precise timing of foregoing and subsequent steps depends on factors not known here. Earlier rather than later opportunity for non-SG powers to express views will, I believe, go far to avoid differences on subsequent steps, particularly with Neth and Den.

SPOFFORD

740.5/10–651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1951.

Mr. Hessellund-Jensen called on me this noon at his request under instructions to deliver a message received from his Foreign Office on this subject. The message in general paralleled that contained in Embassy Copenhagen's telegram 283 of October 5 sent to London as Copenhagen's 29.[2] Specifically, he said that Denmark very much regretted her inability to promise to sign the Protocol before October 20. The message indicated that our desire to have it signed by the 10th of October could have been met if the Danes had known of this earlier. It pointed out that the Danish Foreign Minister had stated at Ottawa that it was necessary to place this matter before Parliament before they could sign as such a promise had been made by the Government. Parliament is now in its regular "study" recess. The Danes say that to assembly Parliament, in what would amount to an extraordinary session during the recess, would create the impression of American pressure and that they believe this would be very detrimental to U.S.-Danish relations. The message stated that Ambassador de Kauffmann who is at Copenhagen had been consulted and that he agrees with the foregoing.

They, therefore, feel unable to place this before Parliament until immediately after it reconvenes. It is expected that Parliamentary consideration thereof would take at least two days and, therefore, signature cannot be promised before October 20.

The message also indicated that the Government felt certain of a clear majority for the Protocol and felt there was no doubt whatsoever as to the outcome of the debate.

I stated that without consulting with Mr. Perkins on this matter I could reply only personally. On this personal basis I said I appreciated the difficulty the Danes found themselves in but that the information contained in the message was discouraging. I said this would almost certainly mean that our Congress could not act to ratify the

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[1] Copies to EUR, RA, NEA, the Embassy in United Kingdom for Spofford, and the Embassy in Denmark.

[2] Not printed.

admission of Greece and Turkey until January and that this delay would be serious because of various important ramifications flowing from the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO. I added that I was delighted to hear that his Government felt there was no question of the outcome of the Parliamentary debate.

G. H[AYDEN] R[AYNOR]

Note: I reported this conversation to Mr. Perkins who agreed that under these circumstances and also because of the doubt as to whether our Congress in any event could or would act before adjournment that we should not press the Danes further on this matter.[3]

G. H[AYDEN] R[AYNOR]

[3] This decision was conveyed to Spofford at London in Todep 225 of October 8 (740.5/10–851).

740.5/10–551 : Memorandum

The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1951.

Subject: Atlantic Command

Situation on the appointment of an American Admiral to the North Atlantic Command is as follows. The British, from prestige reasons arising out of Churchill's attack on the idea of having an American Atlantic Commander[2], do not wish to announce the North Atlantic Commander until such time as a Britisher has been named Supreme Commander for the Middle East.

Doc Matthews and I discussed this with the Joint Chiefs before Ottawa. They agreed at that time that the establishment of the Middle East Command with the British Commander in the hope of saving the Egyptian bases was of overriding importance and therefore that they were prepared to delay pressing for the announcement of the North Atlantic Commander until such time as the Middle East Command

[1] Sent through the Executive Secretariat and initialed by Webb. This memorandum was in response to a telephoned inquiry from Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett as to the status of the Fechteler appointment. Lovett "said that for some months there had been a lot of argument between the British and ourselves about command of the North Atlantic. Admiral Fechteler was the American appointee; he is now Chief of Naval Operations and Admiral McCormick would normally be in command." Lovett complained that the "matter doesn't seem to be making progress; that he doesn't know whether it is a case where we are delinquent with General Eisenhower, or whether the British have said they want to talk about it at Rome," during the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council in November. In response, "Mr. Webb promised to check to see what is holding the situation up." (Memorandum drafted in the Office of the Under Secretary of State, October 5, 740.5/10–551)

[2] See telegrams Depto 546 and 5528 from London of February 22 and April 20, pp. 475, 510.

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was announced. We do not know when the Middle East Command may be announced, but certainly that should be worked out before the Rome meeting of the NATO Council. Admiral Wright is thoroughly familiar with this and Admiral Fechteler was present at the meeting of the Chiefs when the matter was discussed.[3]

[3] A marginal note reads: "Mr. Webb phoned Mr. Lovett's office with this information at 6 p m, Oct. 10, 1951, RGB."

740.5/10–951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY [PARIS,] October 9, 1951—7 p. m.

2096. For Perkins Eur from MacArthur. Distribution at Perkins' discretion. Gen Bradley met with Gen Eisenhower and UK and Fr Chiefs this morning at SHAPE to discuss West Mediterranean Command arrangements. Satisfactory agreement was reached on a French West Mediterranean Regional Command and subsequently approved by Fr Cabinet.

It was agreed that press release on new arrangement wld be issued later at date to be agreed by Fr and UK Govts.

In view of agreement on press release and fact that other non-SG members of NAT do not have info on West Med Command agreement, foregoing shld not be divulged.[1] [MacArthur.]

BRUCE

[1] On November 28 it was announced that Admiral Carney's allied naval command in the southern European area would be divided into two parts. A French admiral would exercise command in the West, while an Italian admiral would command the sea approaches to Italy. Vice Adm. Antoine Sala, who held, and retained, command of all French naval forces in the Mediterranean was appointed Commander in Chief of the West Mediterranean Regional Command. On December 22, Admiral Girosi of the Italian Navy was appointed Commander in Chief of Italian Sea Approaches. (Folliot, *Survey of International Affairs, 1951*, p. 32)

Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 092.2 North Atlantic Treaty

Memorandum by the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe (Eisenhower) [1]

[PARIS,] October 9, 1951.

Responding to your request, I present my general view regarding the possibility of including Turkey as a part of my command.

From the standpoint of the reputation of the Turks as excellent fighting men, any commander would be delighted to have them in his organization. Moreover, Turkey's demonstrated determination to

[1] Addressed to General Juin, Field Marshal Slim, and General Bradley.

oppose Communistic aggression clearly makes her a valuable addition to the NAT Organization. Beyond this, Turkish strength is of great significance to the accomplishment of the task presently assigned to me, which is the defense of Western Europe, from Norway to Italy. The southern flank of this front will, of course, be directly affected by developments in Eastern Europe and Turkey, which region not only dominates the land routes to the Middle East, but safeguards the eastern approaches to the Mediterranean. But in considering the question of military organization and command, we are forced to consider the hard facts of geography and distance.

Despite the important contribution Turkey can make to the defense of my southern flank, I consider it militarily impracticable to watch over the interests and development of the Turkish armed forces from SHAPE, and to control operations from this headquarters. I, therefore, believe that it would be in the best interests of NATO and of Turkey itself if Turkey should be included in the Middle East Command. On the other hand, it is obviously essential that close liaison be established between Middle East Command and SHAPE. I shall always stand ready to give such assistance to the Middle East Command as the exigencies of the situation require.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

740.5/10–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 12, 1951—11:12 a. m.

1779. Fol FYI only. At Ottawa Brit reversing previous position opposed coverage Cyprus by Art 6 of NAT. US Del understood reasons to be: Any hostile act against Cyprus cld be done only after having violated mil elements or terrs to be covered by NATO, and in any such case fat wld be in fire; area Cyprus not indigenous to Eur or Atlantic area but part Middle East; and Brit reluctance have fon (read Grk) troops on Cyprus. CD adopted Brit position. Resulting protocol providing for modification Art 6 of Treaty excludes Cyprus without expressly so stating. Key wording in protocol "or the Med Sea" designed to mean over and in those waters but not encompassing an area (Cyprus). Grk and Turk islands covered as integral part metropolitan Greece and Turk.

Later UK sought delete "or the Med Sea" as restricting meaning of "North Atlantic Area" in other parts NAT unqualified by this phrase,

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[1] Message sent concurrently to the Consulate at Nicosia as 61. Drafted by B. F. Dixon of GTI and cleared with RA, the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, and the Executive Secretariat.

and perhaps to make it clear Cyprus not covered by NAT. They also proposed interpretation minute to make explicit Cyprus excluded. Re this Dept informed Spofford fol:

"UK preoccupation with Cyprus at this point not appreciated. As explained earlier, Dept perfectly clear that (*a*) Cyprus is not included by text of Art 6 in Apr 4 version, and (*b*) Cyprus is not included by proposed text Art 6, agreed at Ottawa.

"Under these circumstances, UK interpretative minute on Cyprus (para 3, second section Depto 430) is unneces and undesirable from standpoint possible reactions in Greece and Turk. Publication such minute wld exacerbate Anglo-Greek differences re Cyprus and wld give rise unneces speculation in Turk of significant exclusion island geographically so close to Turk and also so strategically located with respect to ME." Neither Brit proposal accepted and phrase extant.

Though not immed obvious, Dept realizes when omission becomes clear will undoubtedly highlight Cyprus situation and arouse Grk suspicion. Latter will probably be particularly true upon full Grk participation and access documentation NATO. Cypriot communists may use omission allege Western disinterest security Cyprus and nationalists to allege security coverage Cyprus can only be had through Enosis which wld automatically give coverage Cyprus. Grk Emb here has already made inquiries re Cyprus and NATO but believe they unaware this particular situation. When protocol revealed to Grks Dept proposes explain omission along lines para 1 above and endeavor convince Grks this perfectly logical action. If neces will also state it has no bearing Grk position vis-à-vis Cyprus.

Dept wld appreciate Athens Nicosia views this matter.

ACHESON

740.5/10-1251: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET ATHENS, October 12, 1951—5 p. m.

1707. Visit General Bradley and colleagues[1] to Athens was outstanding success. General Bradley informed me that he was impressed by spirit and morale of Greeks and presentation their capabilities and needs by Greek Chiefs of Staff. Greeks were delighted and encouraged by conference with high NATO authorities even prior to their formal admission. Fol were most significant points emerging from military conversations:

Greeks urged that Greece should be part of SACEUR ['s Command]

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[1] Field Marshal Sir William Joseph Slim, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, and Gen. Charles Lécheres, Chairman of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of France and their staffs.

rather than Middle East Command. While NATO generals delivered no decision on this point, they raised no objection to Greek proposal. Some question arose, however, as to assignment Greek Navy since it appeared that Middle East Command would have responsibility for closing Turk Straits and defending Aegean sea. Greeks, however, felt it wld be very awkward for their Navy and Army which it is designed to assist, to be under separate commands.

. . . . . .

In closing conversations Field Marshal Slim emphasized heavy demands on US–UK for weapons and fact that while every effort would be made increase supplies to Greece no reinforcement of equipment to Greece either now or at start of war could be promised. As soon as Greece is integrated into NATO, it must present its needs to CINC South (Carney) who will do his best meet requirements. Slim concluded "it is better to expect nothing and get something than to expect much and get nothing". Greeks were not discouraged by this pessimism and stated they would meet their obligations under whatever circumstances might arise.[2]

PEURIFOY

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[2] A copy of the U.S. minutes of the conference of United States, United Kingdom, and French Military Representatives with the Greek General Staff in the Greek General Staff Building, Athens, Greece, at 1015 hours, October 11, is in file 740.5/10–1251.

General Bradley reported upon the meeting in telegram MATUR 17622, October 13, 1951 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That telegram read in part as follows:

"1. Had very successful exchange of views with Greek Chiefs of Staff on 11 Oct in meeting attended by Field Marshal Slim, Gen Lecheres and myself. Was favorably impressed by Greek attitude. They stated they are ready to assume their full responsibility in NATO. Although saying that they considered they should receive assistance, if required Greece would fight alone to carry out her assigned tasks.

"2. Greeks consider their primary role is in the Balkan theater and that they should be a part of Gen Eisenhower's command. They consider that steps should be taken to secure the cooperation of Yugoslavia with the west. They were informed that if Greece were included in SACEURs Command it would probably be a separate command under CINC Southern Europe.

"3. Greeks were asked what would be their position with regard to Greek Naval Forces if the Middle East Commander was assigned the responsibility for the defense of the Aegean Sea and the Dardanelles. In reply they pointed out that Greek Navy was required for defense of Greece and support of Greek Army and therefore should be under SACEUR. They would be willing to cooperate with the Middle East Commander on orders from SACEUR but did not wish to assign Naval Forces to the Middle East Command unless they had a surplus to the needs of the European Commander." (JCS Files)

740.5/10–1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT ANKARA, October 12, 1951—9 p. m.

349. Tripartite mil mission arrived Ankara at noon and in course formal calls on Min Nat Def, FonMin, Chief Gen Staff and PriMin, has recd sincere welcome and assurances Turkey's keen desire make maximum contribution to NATO and ME defense. Mtg with PriMin continued half-hour beyond allotted time.

Three points made by him merit special mention:

1. PriMin himself would preside tomorrow's all-day "business" session. He would be assisted by Min Nat Def, FonMin and Chief Gen Staff and their principal assistants. He asked and we agreed that three mil chiefs be accompanied by their chief assistants and by Brit, French and US Ambassadors.

2. He fully shared our view that, if Egyptian Govt extended invitation, tripartite mil mission shld become quadripartite,[2] a Turk general with appropriate assistants to accompany them on Cairo visit. PriMin and FonMin felt strongly such visit highly desirable this time on political as well as mil grounds, always assuming receipt of formal invitation from Egyptian Govt.

3. Towards end meeting PriMin handed each mil chief a copy of top secret memo entitled "The Position of Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty Org". Full text is given in my immediately fol tel.[3] We shall study it this evening, discuss it with Turks tomorrow and report reactions thereafter.[4]

Gen Bradley concurs.

WADSWORTH

[1] Repeated to London, Cairo, and Paris for MacArthur.

[2] See editorial note, *infra*.

[3] Telegram 350 from Ankara of October 13, not printed, reported the Turkish estimate of Turkey's strategic position, its present armed strength, its potential wartime strength, and its military, economic, and financial needs (740.5/10–1351).

[4] For documentation on the Conference of U.S., U.K., and French Representatives with Turkish Prime Minister and Staff at Ankara on 13 and 14 October 1951, see volume v.

Editorial Note

On October 15, the text of the protocol agreed to by the North Atlantic Deputies providing for the extension of an invitation to the Governments of Greece and Turkey to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was released by the North Atlantic Council Deputies in London. The United States Deputy Representative on the Council, Charles M. Spofford, was authorized to sign on behalf of the United States. Following ratification of the protocol by all member governments, an invitation to Greece and Turkey to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty would be extended by the United States on behalf of

all parties, and the protocol would enter into force when Greece and Turkey formally accepted the invitation. The text of the protocol is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 22, 1951, page 651, and also in Folliot, *Documents on International Affairs, 1951*, page 65.

Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 092.2 North Atlantic Treaty

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley) to the President

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 18, 1951.

1. In accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty Council agreement at Ottawa and with your messages of 20 September to President Bayar of Turkey and Prime Minister Venizelos of Greece,[1] I proceeded to Athens, Greece, and to Ankara, Turkey, between 9 and 15 October, accompanied by Field Marshal Sir William Slim of the United Kingdom and General Charles Lecheres of France, to exchange views with the pertinent authorities of those nations concerning their admission into NATO.

Paris

2. As a preliminary step, it was necessary that there be resolved the French demands for a substantial naval command in the Western Mediterranean, upon which point at Ottawa the French had secretly conditioned their approval of the acceptance of Greece and Turkey into NATO. This question was resolved at a conference at SHAPE between the three NATO representatives and General Eisenhower.[2] The resulting agreement was accepted by the French Cabinet and was well within U.S. position, in that it provided for only two major naval commands in the Mediterranean (U.S. and U.K.) and placed the French Western Mediterranean naval command directly under Admiral Carney, COMNAV South, under the over-all command of General Eisenhower.

Greece

3. The conferences at Athens between the three representatives and Greek military authorities resulted in a very successful exchange of views.[3] I was very much impressed by the friendliness, determination and attitude of cooperation of all Greeks I met, from the King and Queen on through the Chief of Staff and the Chiefs of the Services. They emphasized that, although they needed much material assistance,

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[1] Regarding these messages, see telegrams 213 and 214, September 20, pp. 575 and 576.

[2] Regarding this conference, see telegram 2096 from Paris, October 9, p. 592.

[3] Regarding Bradley's visit to Greece, see telegram 1707, October 12, p. 594.

they would fight under any conditions in order to defend Greece and to meet her NATO obligations.

4. The Greeks believe that they should be a part of General Eisenhower's command, which view is generally concurred in by the Standing Group nations. They presented very positive views that all possible steps should be taken at the earliest time to secure the cooperation of Yugoslavia with the West. A major problem which presented itself was that of the responsibility for the defense of the Aegean Sea and the Dardanelles; this will require resolution as soon as the outlines of commands contiguous to Greece can be definitely decided upon. Each Greek Chief of Staff emphasized the many equipment deficiencies in his arm, but pointed out the Greek potentialities in manpower and trained reserves, which potentialities have already impressed us.

Turkey

5. The situation in Turkey was more complex, but I consider that our exchanges of views there with the Prime Minister and other high Turkish authorities were most illuminating and helpful as an initial step.[4] The Turks were insistent that their nation be considered an inseparable part of the Europe which is facing Russia (not as a Middle East nation on a parallel with the Arab States) and that they should, therefore, be under the command of General Eisenhower; most important to them is their prestige and their internal political situation. They insist that they must first become a member of one of the already-established NATO commands. However, Turkey recognized the need for and promised to strongly support the establishment of a command in the Middle East which will include non-NATO nations; in this connection, Turkey is insistent that this problem is separate from and secondary to their prompt integration into an existing NATO command. One important facet of the problem which was deliberately avoided was that of the nationality of the Middle East commander under whom the Turkish forces would be operationally assigned. Our advice from all informed sources in Ankara was that the Turks would not accept being directly under a United Kingdom commander, which, as you know, is presently contemplated. As a result of the discussions, general agreement was reached that:

a. Turkey should be integrated into NATO on a full equality basis as soon as possible, and

b. That a Middle East command, in which Turkey would participate, was necessary.

Near the end of our discussions it became evident that the Turkish aversion to being considered as a Middle East nation remained so strong that the three representatives tentatively agreed to call the proposed new organization the Eastern Mediterranean Command.

[4] Regarding Bradley's visit to Turkey, see telegram 349, October 12, p. 596.

6. As in the discussions in Athens, I was much impressed by the resolute spirit of the Turks, their attitude of cooperation, their deep respect for the United States, and their eagerness to assume their new obligations in NATO, as well as in a command structure in the Middle East.

Egypt

7. The military representatives were prepared to visit Cairo also, presumably with a Turkish military representative, for the purpose of exchanging pertinent military views with the Egyptians concerning the importance of their joining in a Middle East command structure. From both the political and military points of view, the maintenance of efficient Allied bases in the general Suez area in peace or in war is a vital necessity; a cooperative attitude on the part of the Egyptians would assist materially in solving this problem. However, as you know, the preliminary political discussions in Cairo had not, in the view of Mr. Acheson, progressed sufficiently to warrant military representations, and therefore the trip to Cairo was not made.

General

8. In my opinion these visits were most successful and worthwhile, even though they were only for the purpose of exchanges of views and, therefore, did not result in any decisions being reached. The Greek and Turk authorities were highly gratified at the opportunity to emphasize to the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff their respect for the United States and their gratitude for the assistance the United States has already given them. Both nations are pleased at the invitation to join NATO, and I am convinced that each of them will be a valuable asset to NATO.

9. Of course, there are many equipment deficiencies in both the Greek and Turkish armed forces. On this point I assured authorities in each nation that the United States would maintain its interest in their welfare, but I emphasized that the people of the United States were of the sure conviction that U.S. aid could not continue indefinitely in its present proportion, and that each recipient nation must take positive steps toward its own self-sufficiency.

10. In my opinion, we must now move forward with all possible expedition to accomplish NATO ratification of the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO, and then to be prepared to take at once the necessary steps toward placing each nation in its proper place in the NATO command structure. Particularly with respect to Turkey, this problem will be complicated, since it will eventually involve political arrangements with the Arab and other non-NATO nations.

11. I am initiating the necessary recommendations for action to accomplish the above at the earliest time.

OMAR N. BRADLEY

740.5/10–1951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassies in Turkey and Greece [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 19, 1951—6:41 p. m.
PRIORITY

FYI Greek-Turkish Protocol opened for signature London at US request on Oct 17 and signed that day by Deps representing US, UK, Belg, Canad, Ice, Neth, Port, Nor. Remaining four countries expected sign Oct 22. However, in view anticipated adjournment Cong tomorrow Protocol not submitted to Senate. If adjournment delayed there remains slight possibility submission but prospects not favorable.

If Cong adjourns tomorrow you may in your discretion express to FonMin Dept's regrets that due to adjournment of Sen Protocol cld not be submitted for action at this session. You may also indicate that US made special arrangements to sign Protocol Oct 17, without waiting for several other countries which had not yet completed parliamentary and other requirements, in order be prepared take advantage remote possibility that Sen wld remain in session long enough enable action be taken on Protocol. Dept will, of course, work actively for early Senate action after Cong reconvenes Jan.

ACHESON

[1] Message drafted by Moore of GTI and cleared with RA and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs. It was sent to Ankara as 354 and Athens as 1904. It was repeated to London for Spofford.

740.5/10–1751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 20, 1951—6:17 p. m.

Todep 257. Re Depto 466, Oct 17.[2] Without prejudice Dept's position re adoption interpretive para suggested by UK, following concerns 23(B) para 5 Depto 466, Oct 17 shld UK suggestion be adopted:

Both Dept and Amer Emb Athens believe that gen knowledge at this time of exclusion of Cyprus is capable of increasing agitation both

[1] Drafted by Dixon of GTI and cleared by Perkins. Repeated to Athens and Nicosia.

[2] Not printed. It reported that the draft protocol on the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO had been signed by Spofford. It also reported, *inter alia*, that the Deputy Representative from the United Kingdom had requested the amendment of paragraph 23 of the agreed Council minutes of October 10 with the argument "that some minutes of mtg at which text" of the protocol "adopted shld be given to Greece and Turkey when they are invited to join NATO and that agreed minutes without quoted summary do not clearly cover points." The amended paragraph 23 suggested by the United Kingdom, which Spofford believed "amounts to interpretive minute," read as follows:

"23. To sum up, the deputies, in approving the text of the protocol as given in C7–D/27 (second revise), agreed that

in Greece and Cyprus for union Cyprus with Greece. (Some possibility union question may be raised Sixth Session UNGA). Cypriot communists might use exclusion allege Western disinterest security Cyprus. Nationalists and Grk proponents of union might use exclusion show security Cyprus can only be insured through union with Greece. Unless carefully handled believe exclusion may prove irritant in Anglo-Greek relations.

For foregoing reasons and until MEC takes more form Dept believes advisable in general interests soft-peddle Cyprus exclusion. Specifically Dept believes inadvisable make express mention of exclusion in interpretive comment. Rather prefer follow outline of protocol by indicating "or the Med Sea" was to cover forces, etc., in and over waters of Eastern Med.

Since US as depositary NAT wld conduct formalities of admission, US in discussing meaning of protocol cld at that time point out to Greeks and Turks exclusion of Cyprus logical development for reasons such as: 1) Cyprus area not indigenous to Eur or Atlantic area, but situated such as to be natural part of MEC. 2) Most improbable any attack cld be made against Cyprus without first having violated areas and waters covered by NATO.

ACHESON

(*a*) When the European defense community had been established it wld be necessary to consider its position in relation to the treaty and, in particular, to Art 6 thereof;

(*b*) Article II (1) of the protocol covered the Greek and Turkish Islands in the Mediterranean and Malta and its dependencies, but not Cyprus;

(*c*) The protocol did not affect the interpretation placed on the words 'North Atlantic area' in the preamble and in Articles 5 and 12 of the treaty;

(*d*) The words 'North Atlantic area' in the new Article 6 were to be interpreted in precisely the same way as they had been interpreted up to the present in the original Article 6 of the treaty." (740.5/10–1751)

740.5/10–2351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Canada [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 23, 1951—6: 15 p. m.

116. Is Canad position Parliament not to approve Gr-Turk Protocol until US, UK and Fr have all ratified (3rd para Ottawa tel 68, Oct 22)[2]? US was unable submit Protocol to Senate this session because time insufficient prior adjournment. Thus, whereas all others can act before Rome mtg, US ratification impossible before Jan. This delay highly regrettable in light need to develop and finalize at earliest possible moment plans for Gr and Turk participation NATO. It is also

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[1] Drafted by Parsons of RA. Cleared by BNA, GTI, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs. Repeated to London.

[2] Not printed.

unfortunate in light effort establish MEC soonest. If delay caused by fact Senate in recess is further prolonged by unwillingness other NATO nations to act prior to US, serious setback to NATO and ME planning possible and much value of Ottawa decision on Gr–Turk may be lost.

US intends submit Protocol as soon as Senate convenes again and to press vigorously for prompt action. Preliminary soundings with members Fon Relations Comite favorable and no serious opposition to ratification now anticipated. Suggest you discuss matter with External Affairs expressing hope Canad action may precede rather than follow US. Prompt action by Canad cld be very helpful in keeping up momentum and influencing NAT members complete requisite action with their Parliaments.[3]

ACHESON

[3] In telegram 74 from Ottawa of October 26, Ambassador Woodward stated that Foreign Minister Pearson was unwilling to request Parliamentary ratification of the Greek-Turkish Protocol before action by Congress because a lead by Canada "wld be paradox when protocol involves new mil commitment assumed at US instance altho Canada has only remote interest ME defense and plays no part in MEC." Pearson assured Woodward that once Congress ratified the Protocol, the Canadian Parliament, which would be sitting at the same time, would swiftly follow (740.5/10–2651). In telegram Depto 630 of November 16, Spofford in London reported that Pearson had reconfirmed this commitment. Chargé Hughes in Iceland reported in telegram 80 that the Icelandic Parliament had passed a resolution authorizing the government to ratify the Protocol. On December 14, Howard Trivers, the First Secretary at Copenhagen, reported in Despatch 517 that Denmark planned to ratify immediately after action by Congress, and Consul William Trimble at The Hague stated in telegram 599 that the Netherlands Government was taking the first steps toward ratification which would probably occur before the end of January. (740.5/11–1651; 12–1451)

740.5/10–3151 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, October 31, 1951—5 p. m.

Depto 537. Deputies 76th mtg Oct 30.

1. Field Marshal Slim outlined recent mtg of SG in Paris and subsequent mil discussions in Ankara and Athens. He pointed out Paris decisions based on assumption of Turkey's full and equal obligation as NATO member; that defense of ME essential to protection of European flank; and that large Turkish contribution to forces of ME Command essential.[2] . . .

[1] Repeated to all NAT capitals, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Wiesbaden, Ankara, and Athens.

[2] In a joint telegram to London and Paris (Todep 282 and 2543 to Paris) dated October 30, Acting Secretary of State Webb reported the Department's belief that Turkey would "steadfastly" adhere to the position outlined in telegram 396 from Ankara of October 26 that Turkey "as integral part of Eur standing as entity against Russia, shld fall under SACEUR (Eisenhower Command) and that Turk aspirations re direct relationship to a NATO Command must be satisfied (and formalities of accession to NAT completed) before Turks will formally participate in MEC." (740.5/10–3051)

Slim said Athens discussions were entirely mil in tone. Greeks noted importance their position as base for Balkan operations and their isolated position and hoped Yugoslavia cld be brought closer to West. Greeks thought if this possible it wld be logical for Greece to be under Eisenhower command. He reported strong effort to counteract Greek and Turkish presumption that NATO membership wld lead to greater mil aid.

With this he contrasted Ankara discussions which were entirely polit in tone, with emphasis throughout on importance to Turkey internally of being accepted as European. He reported strong Turkish desire, for this reason, to be under Eisenhower and added that Turks agree to participate fully in MEC.

Slim concluded with statement that info gained in purely exploratory discussions now being used in preparation of further studies in Washington (in which Greece and Turkish mil reps invited to participate) which he expected wld result in list of proposals for NAC action in order of their mil desirability.

US asked if Greece and Turkey had suggested they attend Rome mtg as observers. Slim replied question not raised but Greece and Turkey welcome opportunity to join Washington mil discussions. Personally he questioned desirability their presence Rome.[3]

Denmark asked what was basis of press report that ME Command question cld only be solved by NAC. Slim said since this is NATO command, ultimate authority must of course be derived from NAC. Belgium asked if all variant plans assumed MEC wld be a NATO command. Slim said yes. Belgium wished to be sure NATO wld have control in action and policy in any ME Command.

Replying to Belgian and Netherlands questions, Slim outlined contemplated mil structure with SG wearing two hats, present NATO commands and ME Command subordinate, latter having separate MEC of reps of Turkey and non-NATO countries interested in ME. Netherlands expressed concern about ability of such complex structure to function and asked if Turkey had continued to insist on being under Eisenhower or if they had proposed alternative plans. Slim said Turkey had never insisted but this was their strong wish and that alternatives had not been discussed in Ankara.

Slim said Turks willing to discuss all aspects but wld not take any action such as actual establishment of MEC before they were full NATO members. Netherlands was less concerned about war when structure wld depend on actual situation than about peacetime relationships. Netherlands thought more feasible a NATO command over Turkey and a separate ME Command with appropriate staff links between the two. Slim pointed out that without Turkey MEC wld be skeleton.

[3] Reference is to the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council which met at Rome November 24–28. For documentation, see pp. 693 ff.

To Canadian questions, Slim said Greece cld be under either SHAPE or MEC but that Aegean and Turkey must be part of ME Command.

Netherlands asked if Greece had suggested how Yugoslavia cld be brought into relation with West. Slim said no, but that Greek mil were thinking Yugoslavia shld be brought into NATO.

Slim's discussion was full, frank, and well recd.

[Here follow a summary of the remainder of the 76th meeting of the Deputies which dealt with NATO and Soviet bloc military and political capabilities and discussion of the date of the Rome meeting of the NAC.]

SPOFFORD

740.5/10–3151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 1, 1951—7 : 51 p. m.

Todep 289. Depto 537 Oct 31.[2] FYI Slim's report to CD differs on fol points from US understanding of Bradley, Slim, Lecheres talks Athens and Ankara.[3]

1. Greeks did not link bringing Yugo closer to West, either directly or by implication, with question of whether or not they shld be under Eisenhower command.
2. In light of SG 80/4, US has considered MEC as NATO command only insofar as def of Turk is concerned; whereas Slim apparently interpreted SG 80/4 and variants thereof as placing entire MEC under NATO control.
3. Although Slim said Aegean must be part of MEC, we never agreed that Gr or Aegean cld go to MEC.

We see little advantage in revealing to CD possible differences between US and UK on these points but especially in ref to subpara 2 wld appreciate further clarification on just what Slim had in mind. In meantime, it may be neces give further consideration here as to whether matter shld be taken up with Brit through other channels.

WEBB

[1] Message drafted and transmitted by Parsons. Cleared by Defense, EUR, GTI, and NE. Repeated information to Paris.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] For telegrams 1707 from Athens and 349 from Ankara both of October 12, 1951, see pp. 594 and 596.

Editorial Note

On November 3 the Soviet Embassy presented a note to the Turkish Government protesting the inclusion of Turkey in NATO and charging that Turkish territory was about to be used as a base for

aggressive acts against the Soviet Union. The Government of Turkey replied on November 12, categorically denying the Soviet charges. A further Russian note of November 30 reiterated Soviet belief in the aggressive designs of NATO and warned that the adherence of Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty would undoubtedly cause serious harm to the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. (Folliot, *Documents on International Affairs, 1951*, pages 68–71.) For further documentation on Soviet displeasure with Turkey's decision to align itself with Western military command systems, see volume V, pages 1 ff.

Editorial Note

On November 5 in telegram 394 to Ankara, repeated to Spofford in London, Acting Secretary Webb reported that the Standing Group of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Council had, on November 33, issued invitations to the Turkish and Greek Governments through their military attachés in Washington asking each government to designate a planning officer for staff conversations with the Standing Group in Washington. The conversations would be on the planning level and would be an extension of the military conversations which had taken place in October in both Athens and Ankara between Generals Bradley, Slim, and Lecheres and military officials of the Greek and Turkish Governments. In telegram 428 of November 7 from Ankara, Ambassador Wadsworth stated that the "Turks definitely intend send mil rep Wash in accordance understanding reached during Bradley visit . . . " (740.5/11–551 and 740.5/11–751)

740.5/11–751

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of the Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, to the Minister in the United Kingdom (Holmes)[1]

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL LONDON, 7 November 1951.

1. In accordance with your request, and with Admiral Fechteler's permission. I am furnishing herewith, for forwarding to Mr. Acheson, a brief of the highlights of the conversation which took place during Admiral Fechteler's luncheon with Mr. Churchill on 5 November. Admiral Fechteler has requested that, in forwarding this information to Mr. Acheson, the latter be informed that these highlights of the conversation have been taken from notes hurriedly dictated immedi-

[1] The author of this memorandum has not been identified from the source text or from Department of State files. A copy of the memorandum was sent to Admiral Fechteler.

ately after the luncheon, and that as yet Admiral Fechteler has not had an opportunity to review his notes in the light of a more mature recollection of statements made at the luncheon.

2. Mr. Churchill greeted Admiral Fechteler by saying that he, Mr. Churchill, wanted to meet Admiral Fechteler in order to assure him that there was nothing personal in Mr. Churchill's objections to the assignment of Admiral Fechteler as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

3. At luncheon, Mr. Churchill launched immediately into the subject of the Atlantic Command. What apparently disturbed him most was the matter of insuring British authority over the approaches to the British Isles. Admiral Fechteler assured him that, under the agreed terms of reference, the control of those waters would remain the sole responsibility of the British.

4. Mr. Churchill insisted that he saw no necessity for an over-all single commander in the Atlantic, and harked back to the command arrangements between the British and U.S. in the Atlantic during World War II, an arrangement which Mr. Churchill thought had been quite satisfactory then and would be for any future war. At this point in the conversation, Admiral Fechteler gained the impression that the shipping losses we had sustained in World War II in the Atlantic and the narrow margin by which we had won the submarine war had perhaps escaped Mr. Churchill's memory. When an opening occurred, Admiral Fechteler emphasised the fact that whereas the Germans possessed about fifty submarines in 1940, the Russians now have over two hundred. He further told Mr. Churchill that under the proposed organization of the Atlantic Command the British would control shipping in the Northeastern Atlantic; i.e., northeast of the line running generally from the southern tip of Greenland to the northern boundary of Portugal.

5. Mr. Churchill said that his present plans are to be in Washington 12–15 December, going to Canada first. He intimated that the Atlantic Command question would not be resolved until he had talked with the President.[2]

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[2] In telegram 1034 from London of November 13, p. 706, Spofford informed the Embassy in France of Churchill's "intention to reserve matter" of a Supreme Command in the Atlantic "for discussion with Pres in Jan." The subject was further debated and discussed during the Rome meetings.

6. As Admiral Fechteler was taking his departure, Mr. Churchill said that the former's assurances as to British authority and responsibility with regard to British home waters had removed his principal objection to the Atlantic Command plan, but that he still was not convinced that an over-all Allied Commander in the Atlantic was necessary.

Editorial Note

Regional command problems within NATO and the creation of a Middle East Command were discussed at length during the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Rome between November 24 and November 28. The Council took up these problems during its second, third, and fifth meetings on November 24, 26, and 28, respectively, and the NATO Defense Ministers discussed them at a meeting on November 26. In addition the delegations from the United States, United Kingdom, and France met informally at the Foro Italica on the morning of November 27 to discuss the relation of the proposed Middle East Command to NATO. A draft resolution was agreed to which stipulated that the Council would have final authority to approve any future plans to coordinate a Middle East Command with contiguous NATO command areas. At its fifth meeting on November 28, the Council agreed to request the Standing Group to press for further progress on command arrangements for the Mediterranean and Middle East and directed it to make a definitive report on the subject through the Military Committee at the next Council Session, which was subsequently scheduled for Lisbon in February 1952. At this meeting, the Council also approved the following Reports prepared by the Military Committee: "Terms of Reference for the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic;" "Proposals for NATO Command in the Channel and Southern North Sea Area;" and "Division

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of Responsibilities in Wartime between National Territorial Commanders and Supreme Commanders and Subordinate Allied Commands." Finally, Secretary Acheson on November 29 held separate conversations with Ambassador Huseyn Baydur, the Turkish observer at the Eighth Session, and Evanghelos Averoff, the Greek observer, concerning various matters dealing with the impending Greek and Turkish admission to NATO. For documentation on the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council see pages 693 ff.

740.5/11-2651

Memorandum of Conversation, by C. R. Moore of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 26, 1951.

Participants: Hon. Feridun C. Erkin, Turkish Ambassador
Mr. McGhee, Assistant Secretary—NEA
Mr. Moore—GTI

Problem: Turkish Government fears that Turkey is to be divided into two Commands and is unwilling to accept such an arrangement.

Action required: Consideration of Turkish position in light of Command arrangement proposals which may result from Rome NAC meeting.

Action assigned to: GTI

Ambassador Erkin referred to a request made several weeks ago that the Turkish Government appoint a military representative to meet with the Standing Group.[2] As the Ambassador had understood that the Standing Group was primarily interested in transmitting a communication, rather than in military discussions, he had proposed to his Government and received its agreement, that the Turkish Military Attaché in Washington be appointed for this purpose.

The Military Attaché subsequently met with the Standing Group, presumably a formality, and later with planning officers attached thereto. At that meeting, according to the Ambassador, one of the American officers implied that the *Aide-Mémoire* which the Turkish Government had given to the British, French and American Ambassadors following the Bradley–Slim–Lecheres visit,[3] had been drawn up solely in the light of Turkish interests. He had then inquired of the Military Attaché what the views of his Government would be were Western Turkey, including the Straits, to fall under one Com-

[1] Copies to Deputy Under Secretary of State, Executive Secretariat, Policy Planning Staff, Defense, EUR, RA, and the Embassies in Turkey, United Kingdom (for Spofford), and France (for MacArthur). This memorandum was not written until December 7.

[2] Editorial note, November 5, p. 605.

[3] Not printed.

mand and Eastern Turkey under another. This led the Ambassador to conclude that the United States favored such a solution to the Command problem. At the same meeting a British Representative had advanced the possibility of Turkey and Greece falling under a new NATO Command and not under SACEUR.

The above discussions had disturbed the Ambassador considerably and he had reported them to his Government. He now wished to inform Mr. McGhee of its reply. The Turkish Government freely admits that the *Aide-Mémoire* was framed in the light of Turkish interests but it considered that these interests coincided with the common interests of the NATO countries. With reference to the proposal of a divided Command, the Government found this unacceptable and reiterated its belief that all of Turkey should fall under SACEUR.

Mr. McGhee commented that the question of divided Command was only one of a great number of possible solutions to the Command problem which had at one time or another been considered by the Standing Group. He did not, however, believe that it was a solution which our military people favored. There was no question as to Turkey's entry into NATO with full and equal rights and obligations and no question that all of Turkey, a NATO territory, would fall under a NATO Command within that framework. The problem was to work out Command arrangements which would be the most suitable from a military point of view. As our top military people were now in Rome, he could make no definite statement on their present thinking as to the details of the Command relationship but he could state that there was no change in our position that Turkey should be fully integrated into NATO. He added also that, as indicated on previous occasions, Command proposals would be discussed with the Turkish and Greek Governments before any final decision was reached.

The Ambassador seemed reassured by Mr. McGhee's comments.

740.5/12–751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, December 7, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 692. Re Todep 395.[2] Assume it wld be desirable to have Greek and Turkish Govts acquire early familiarity with NATO background.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Athens, and Ankara.

[2] In the course of explaining to Spofford why the Greeks and Turks could not be invited to participate in the final stages of the work of the TCC, telegram Todep 395 suggested that "it might be more useful and realistic to have NAC Deps invite Grk and Turk Govts to send a rep to London. The purpose would be to have these reps work with the Deps Internatl Staff to acquire NATO background and history and familiarize themselves with NATO procedures and activities." (740.5/12–751)

procedures, and activities. Presumably this cld best be done by inviting them to send observers to attend deputies mtgs. Only two problems are sensitivity of Parliaments and documentation. On former believe we shld privately sound out Danes and Dutch before taking action. Assume from reftel that US Senatorial sensitivity no longer involved since attendance at regular deputies mtgs and access to NATO documentation wld appear to approximate full membership more closely than attendance of observers at Rome. Assume we contemplate that after due security clearance their reps cld see NATO documentation but not be given it physically either for themselves or their govts pending full membership.

Leave to US del TCC comment on any form of association with that exercise.

Trust Athens, Ankara, and Washington will scrupulously keep possibility of association with deputies from knowledge of Greeks and Turks pending action by deputies. Will report further on Dutch, Danish and other reactions as soon as obtained.

SPOFFORD

740.5/12-751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, December 7, 1951—9 p. m.

3428. From MacArthur. Fol is summary of conversation on 30 Nov between Gen Eisenhower and Lt. Gen. Grigoropolous Chief of Staff of Greek Army:

Gen. Grigoropolous stated purpose his visit was to outline to Gen. Eisenhower Greek views on possible command structure arrangements for Greece and Turkey. One possibility envisaged Greece's joining Gen. Eisenhower's command and Turkey's joining MEC; another possibility was combined Greek-Turkish command under Gen. Eisenhower but with certain provisions involving Turkish defense against east and northeast as well as Dardanelles and Bosporus. There were also other possibilities.

Gen. Grigoropolous said if Greece and Turkey were to join such a combined command, Greece wld be forced to concentrate its 140,000 troops at strategic points to counter any threat by 160,000 Bulgarian troops and 50,000 Albanian troops. As a result, Greece wld be left with only comparatively small forces available to defend eastern Thrace. Since Turkey too wld be able to deploy only small forces to that area, additional forces wld be required to provide for its defense.

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[1] Repeated to London for Spofford and to Athens.

Gen. Grigoropolous hoped satisfactory arrangements cld be made with Yugoslavia in which case Greek and Turk situation in Balkans wld be materially ameliorated.

Gen. Grigoropolous outlined bearing of Greece's econ position upon her milit status. Presently there were 10 divisions in being, with an additional division callable upon short notice. Plans called for two more to be trained and equipped. Last year ECA contribution had been $80 million. Current info indicated a considerable cut in next year's amount. This might place govt in position of having to choose between continuing its present social/econ program and cutting down on army. Gen. Grigoropolous felt Greece's position was somewhat different from that of other countries in west Eur inasmuch as in case of Greece it wld be matter of maintaining a mil structure already in being, whereas in other cases it was mainly a matter of building up a milit organization. In response Gen. Eisenhower said there were a number of possible solutions for command structure for Greece and Turkey. These were being considered by NATO auths; thus far he had no info as to what decision might be expected. Gen. Eisenhower stated he had an open mind re command structure and he wld agree to any reasonable decisions from NATO bodies concerned. In any case, he wanted Gen. Grigoropolous to rest assured that whether or not he, Gen. Eisenhower, wld be in command of Greek and/or Turk forces, he wld be sincerely interested in seeing both Greece and Turkey in healthy and strong milit position. [MacArthur.]

BRUCE

740.5/12–751 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1951—6:45 p. m.

Todep 402. Confirming phone call to Elbrick, Dept intended by last substantive para Todep 395 (rptd Paris 3364, Athens 2711, Ankara 483)[2] that Gr-Turk Govts wld send to London civil servants who wld later work on NATO matters in their respective capitals. It was not intended that these reps shld attend mtgs of CD or any other NATO body but shld merely work with internatl staff who wld familiarize them with NATO problems and procedures so that after admission to NATO, two Govts cld handle NATO matters as smoothly and competently as possible. In talking with Gr Emb here, we merely said we

[1] Message drafted by Parsons of RA, cleared by Moore of GTI. Repeated to Paris for USDel, TCC, and MacArthur.

[2] See footnote 2, p. 609.

wld look into problem of how to assist Gr to acquire NATO background soonest and made no commitments. Therefore, they cannot be anticipating type of assoc which was assumed Depto 692.[3] We have not contacted Turk Emb. Hope it will not be difficult correct any misapprehension which may have developed London. Gr-Turk reps wld, of course, have to be cleared to see NATO docs as indicated ref para of Todep 395.[4]

WEBB

[3] Dated December 7, p. 609.

[4] After a further exchange of telegrams between Spofford and the Department of State (Depto 700, December 12; Todep 409, December 14) clarifying the Department's position that Greek and Turkish representatives might be permitted to observe and learn NATO procedures but not participate in any NATO body before admission, Spofford reported on December 19 in telegram Depto 732 that he had raised the question of inviting Greek and Turkish representatives to London in the Council Deputies where he encountered no opposition. "Chairman invited deps to notify secretariat of their govt's views at earliest date in order that necessary arrangements can be made without delay." Spofford promised to inform the Department when such clearance was received. (740.5/12–1251, 740.5/12–1451, 740.5/12–1951)

740.5/12–1951

Memorandum of Conversation, by C. R. Moore of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 19, 1951.

Subject: Turkish Views on the NATO Command Relationship

Participants: Mr. W. M. Rountree, Director, GTI
Mr. Melih Esenbel, Counselor, Turkish Embassy
Mr. C. Robert Moore, GTI

Problem: The Turkish Government reiterates its position on the NATO Command relationship.

Action Required: None, unless some change in the present United States position seems imminent.

Prior to this meeting Mr. Esenbel informed Mr. Moore that Ambassador Erkin had been instructed by the Turkish Foreign Ministry to transmit to Secretary Acheson the Turkish Government's views on the NATO Command relationship. As the Ambassador is on leave and some time may elapse before he has an appointment with the Secretary, Mr. Esenbel thought it advisable to convey the message to the Department and arranged to see Mr. Rountree for this purpose.

Mr. Esenbel stated that the Turkish Government had taken note of the impending visit of Prime Minister Churchill to the United States [2]

[1] Copies to EUR; Division of Research, Near East; Executive Secretariat; Policy Planning Staff; Deputy Under Secretary of State; Defense; and the Embassies in Turkey, France, and the United Kingdom.

[2] Prime Minister Churchill visited Washington between January 5 and 18, 1952.

and felt it quite likely that among the questions to be discussed at meetings in Washington would be that of Command arrangements for Turkey as a NATO member. The Government wanted to make its position very clear on this subject, as it had already done in the *aide-mémoire* which it submitted to the American, British and French Governments in late October,[3] i.e., it should have in NATO equal responsibilities and equal rights and should be attached to the same Command (the Eisenhower Command) as the other NATO participants. The Turkish Government believes that its NATO Command relationship must be worked out first and that only after this has been done will it be able to consider what additional responsibilities it may be able to undertake in the Middle East Command. Mr. Esenbel added that it may be some time before the Middle East Command can be effectively organized and that the primary problem now is to solve the problem of Turkey's position in SACEUR, which, from the military as well as the political point of view, makes the best logic.

Mr. Rountree stated that our military and political people were very aware of the Turkish position on this issue. Secretary Acheson, he recalled, had indicated to Ambassador Baydur in Rome that we had sympathetically studied the Turkish *aide-mémoire* and that he felt a solution along the lines of Turkey's inclusion in an existing NATO Command under General Eisenhower would ultimately be developed. Mr. Rountree added that there has been no change in the United States position since that conversation.[4]

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[3] See memorandum of November 26, p. 608.

[4] On December 27, Turkish Ambassador Erkin returned to the Department of State for a further conversation on the NATO–MEC Command relationship with Messrs. Berry and Moore. The Ambassador reiterated his Government's view that Turkey belonged to the NATO community and that Turkey's place within the command structure should be determined prior to the actual establishment of a Middle Eastern Command. Berry "assured the Ambassador that there had been no change in this Government's position." (Memorandum of conversation, December 27, 740.5/12–1951)

740.5/12–2851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET ATHENS, December 28, 1951—5 p. m.

2948. Fol is résumé Embs views on problem NATO and arrangements Greece and Turkey. Emb aware current thinking in Wash which advocates separate NATO command a C-in-C East under Brit commander who in turn wld be under SACEUR. Emb recognizes general question US–UK relationships and allocation regional military commands on world-wide basis play predominant part in determining final solution. Nevertheless Emb feels compelled review some of rea-

sons for which from Embs more parochial point of view proposed solution seems undesirable.

Grk reluctance accept Brit commander has been strongly stated and frequently reiterated even by King. Brit prestige in Greece today may well be at lowest ebb in history of Grk-UK relationships. Not only is feeling running high in connection Cyprus issue [1] but has been aggravated by fundamentally opposing Grk-UK interests with regard to recognition of Farouk as king of Sudan [2] and has reached climax as result unfortunate UK handling Grk candidacy for SC.[3] Under these circumstances there is tendency some elements reopen old accounts and hold Brit liable for what they regard as past sins such as UK policy in Greece during and immed after occupation, etc. Announcement withdrawal Brit police and prison mission and eventual announcement withdrawal Brit milit mission will reduce even further Brit prestige in Greece.

Fact that in view all these circumstances Grk forces placed under command Brit NATO commander coupled with fact that Amer econ assistance has been materially reduced is likely to be interpreted as an abdication of Amer position and influence in Greece in particular and in NE area in general. Consequently our ability effectively develop and direct US policy in Greece and area will be correspondingly diminished.

It is important Amer influence in Greece be maintained at highest possible level not only because of strategic position of Greece but also because it is essential that diminishing level of US econ aid be used with greatest possible effectiveness if grave econ and polit consequences are to be avoided. We must not forget that Greece continues to be primary example of effectiveness of Amer fon assistance techniques. This is a polit fact of major importance particularly in Middle East, South Asia and other underdeveloped areas of the world.

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[1] For documentation on the Cyprus issue, see volume v.

[2] For documentation on Egyptian interest in the Sudan, see *ibid.*

[3] For documentation on Greek candidacy for a position on the Security Council of the United Nations, see vol. II, pp. 78 ff.

If command responsibility under NATO milit organization implies auth for proposed C-in-C East review troop dispositions equipment program, etc., we have serious reservations as to effect which may be produced on work accomplished here under milit assistance program and as to milit missions continued effectiveness. Both Grks and to certain extent our own milit people mistrust Brit motives in establishing C-in-C East. They fear interests of this area may ultimately be incorporated with and subordinated more basic Brit interest in Suez area and Mid East. On Grk side this goes so far as to anticipate that requirements may be made on Grk milit forces for service in Mid East. This they wld stoutly resist. There is also apprehension that equipment requirements of Grk forces as developed under Brit regional commander might well be designed primarily to serve possible Brit interests in Mid East.

. . . . . .

We believe possible domestic US polit repercussions of submitting tremendous US investment in Greece and Turkey to considerably greater measure Brit control must be carefully appraised. Assistance of Greece and Turk continues receive wider margin of bipartisan polit support than almost any other aspect our fon policy. We have been impressed by fact that almost every congressional party visiting Athens has expressed keen interest and dissatisfaction at any intimation that Brit influence this area exceeds degree of Brit financial participation.

In summary we do not believe there is any US interest in this area which will be served by placing Grk and Turk NATO forces under Brit command. We realize ultimate decision this matter will probably be taken on basis of world-wide considerations our relations with UK. Even in this respect however we question whether US actually serving Brit interests (and presumably therefore our own) by imposing British leadership in this strategic area where it will in fact be resented. Moreover it wld seem dangerous employ Brit as an instrument US policy in those areas where UK hegemony has been rejected and UK

prestige irrevocably damaged. It is extremely doubtful whether in light serious reverses to Brit prestige in area and extreme Brit sensibility to their position Brit policy can under present circumstances provide balanced leadership which is so vitally needed. Foregoing pertains principally to problem command relationship as it affects Greece. It does not purport examine problem as it pertains to Turk which US attempting develop into factor great positive strength or need for continued dynamic US leadership in ME area as whole where Brit policy has proved barren and inflexible. While it is obviously in US interest to shore up Brit prestige and authority whenever and wherever feasible I do not believe US interests can be advanced over long term by pretending internatl position of UK is more powerful than it actually is or by conferring upon UK measure of authority which can be exercised only with active US support and through sufferance of other powers. I believe US interests wld be best served by continued discharge of responsibilities which US has already accepted in this area.

PEURIFOY

D. THE SEVENTH SESSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, OTTAWA, SEPTEMBER 15–20, 1951

1. Preparations for the Session, May–September 1951

740.5/5-1051

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1951.

Subject: Next Meeting of North Atlantic Council

Rossi-Longhi has written Spofford that the Italian Government would welcome a meeting of the new North Atlantic Council in Rome in the near future, with both Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers in attendance.[2]

It has been impossible on several past occasions to accept offers by the Italian Government to act as host for meetings of NATO bodies. Reference is made to the official invitation extended in February 1950 with regard to the third meeting of the Defense Committee (held in The Hague April 1), as well as to several informal feelers relating to meetings of the Council itself. It would seem appropriate, therefore, to give favorable consideration to the current Italian invitation.

It is recommended that Ambassador Spofford reply to the inquiry along the following lines: that in principle we would recommend

[1] The source text was initialed by Secretary Acheson.

[2] Spofford reported the contents of the Rossi-Longhi letter to the Department of State in telegram Depto 852 from London, April 30 (740.5/4–3051).

holding the next meeting of the Council in Rome. However, it is impossible to tell now whether this can be done as it seems unlikely that any meeting of the Council could usefully be held before July 1. Unfortunately, because of the possibility of a CFM meeting after that date, it might be necessary to hold the next Council meeting in Washington, or if not there, perhaps in Paris at the time of the General Assembly. If you see no objection to holding out this vague hope to the Italians, we will communicate to Spofford along these lines. It is, of course, possible that there might be a Council meeting after the CFM, if that is not too prolonged, which could be held in Rome with the annual meeting in Paris before the General Assembly.[3]

[3] This recommended reply was approved and instructions to this effect were transmitted to Spofford in telegram Todep 440 to London, May 21 (740.5/5–1051).

740.5/5–1951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 21, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 444. 1. Ref Depto 958.[2] Belgian Amb. saw Secy this afternoon in accordance Van Zeeland's instructions in latter's capacity as chairman NAT Council and asked for US views on five points:

a. Is it desirable to consider having mtg of Council this summer?
b. What shld be precise date of such mtg?
c. Where shld mtg be held?
d. Shld mtg include both FonMins and DefMins?
e. What are our initial reactions to following tentative agenda?

"*Agenda*:

(1) Formal approval of the modifications of NATO structure and practical implementation of the new regime.[3]

(2) Progress report on state of national rearmament of each of the Pact countries.

(3) Report and discussion of the international integration within the Twelve-Powers of program for defense, for rearmament and for production.

(4) European army.[4]

[1] Drafted by Edwin M. Martin, Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, and cleared with Thomas D. Cabot of S/ISA; repeated to Paris for MacArthur.

[2] Not printed; it reported that Van Zeeland was going to suggest to the Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries that a Council meeting be held in early July. (740.5/5–1951)

[3] For documentation on the structural reorganization of NATO, see pp. 460 ff.

[4] For documentation concerning the interest of the United States in the efforts to create a European Army, see pp. 755 ff.

(5) Examination of results of conversations at Bonn regarding participation of Germany in Western defense.[5]
(6) Possible repercussions of an eventual four power conference on rearmament of North Atlantic countries.
(7) Possible examination of observations made by the Chiefs of Staff Comite shld the latter meet before the Council."

2. In course discussion Van Zeeland view was stated as being there shld be mtg before annual mtg in conjunction with General Assembly in November and that if mtg not held in July, might be difficult to justify mtg prior to annual mtg. It was also stated that Van Zeeland felt if mtg were to be held in July, ample time shld be provided for Deps to lay foundation for mtg which cld really accomplish something, including careful development of agenda and discussion of issues which Council shld consider. It was suggested that exact timing might best be fixed by Deps in light of developments in international field such as possible CFM[6] and in light of progress made in preparing important agenda items for Council decision. It was also indicated that tentative suggestion had been received that mtg might be held in Rome. It was stated that all FonMins are being contacted at this time for their views.

3. For such use as Amb. might want to make of it, Secy indicated some informal and initial reactions as follows:

a. It was desirable to try to arrange for mtg of Council this summer.
b. It was important that such mtg be in position to make real progress toward objectives of Treaty.
c. Approach outlined on behalf of Van Zeeland of having Deps work out agenda and review over considerable period of time subjects to be discussed by Council in order focus attention on important issues was eminently correct.
d. Precise timing of mtg wld be affected by date at which Fr Govt, resulting from forthcoming elections, was in position to act, by timing of CFM if one were to be held since Council mtg held before CFM might be considerably handicapped in making decisions, and by desirability of getting our foreign aid bill out of way as necessary prerequisite for going ahead in some important fields, as well as by status of important agenda items.
e. That location of mtg wld be determined largely by when it was held.
f. With respect to proposed agenda, one item which Council might be in position to consider and which was not listed was association of Greece and Turkey.[7]

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[5] For documentation concerning the meetings at Bonn which dealt with certain aspects of a German contribution to Western defense, see pp. 990 ff.
[6] This is a reference to the Four-Power Exploratory Talks which were being held in Paris in order to reach agreement on an agenda for a possible Council of Foreign Ministers meeting which would follow. For documentation on these meetings, see pp. 1087 ff.
[7] For documentation concerning the possible admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO, see pp. 460 ff.

4. It was agreed that response to questions raised by Van Zeeland wld be provided at earliest possible time.

5. Your comments are requested.

ACHESON

740.5 MAP/5–2551 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, May 25, 1951—5 p. m.

Depto 994. ToISA. Re Todep 444 [2] and Depto 958,[3] have received letter from Belg dep informing me of action Van Zeeland has taken in consulting other NAT govts re council mtg. Copies this letter being circulated other deps in order that they may be fully informed consultation being carried out through normal diplomatic channel.

Re Belg Amb's interview with SecState, we have noted preliminary comments made by latter. Question of timing is one which seems to us most difficult to decide and, unless present pace of certain NATO activities accelerated and decision reached fairly soon on possible CFM, believe may find that council mtg may not be possible much before time for annual mtg in conjunction with GA.

Concur that location of mtg depends largely on timing.

Re proposed agenda agree that association of Greece and Turkey might be ready for council consideration, although we will be in better position to assess this possibility in two or three weeks time. We will have further detailed comments on proposed agenda but believe that these shld be set forth in CD rather than in reply to Van Zeeland. Recommend that in reply to Van Zeeland US take position that refining and preparation of agenda is task which shld be entrusted to CD and that latter shld proceed with this work forthwith.

US dep staff is beginning preliminary work on substantive preparation for council mtg. Expect this work will continue for next month or so. We think it is most important that work we do here be in pace with Wash thinking and accordingly suggest that reps from State and Defense be sent to London at least five weeks before date of any proposed council meeting to assist in preparatory work. Will also consult OSR here.

SPOFFORD

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[1] Repeated to Brussels.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra.*

740.5/7–351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, July 3, 1951—5 p. m.

Depto 10. Personal for Secy from Spofford. Believe date for next council session shld be fixed in near future in order that specific preparation by govts and staff can be expedited. Since timing of possible 4 power FonMins mtg is so indefinite, suggest we proceed to fix date for council on basis for earliest timing for fruitful discussion of major suggestions. Principal topics will probably be:

1. Greece–Turkey.
2. Germany.
3. Gap,[1] and perhaps,
4. Burden sharing.

First cld be discussed probably any time after mid-Jul but it seems doubtful that others cld be adequately prepared before early Sept. Nov session in connection UNGA wld be too late and Sept 15 is almost too close to latter date. Accordingly suggest Sept 15 as target if agreeable to you and Gen Marshall. While Todep 497 [2] gives me auth to work out timing and other matters with deps I wld not wish to suggest date without being sure it was agreeable to you both.

While Rome wld seem satisfactory for Sept mtg, it may be well to avoid decision on place at this time in view of possibility 4 power mtg in Wash might develop.[3] Rome wld also seem suitable for Nov or Dec mtg in connection with Paris UNGA and you and Gen Marshall might therefore prefer a Sept mtg in US or Canada. Pearson has expressed mild interest in having it in Ottawa but believes Van Zeeland shld keep chair until end of '51.

SPOFFORD

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[1] The word "gap" began to take on special meaning in the early 1950's when used in discussing NATO problems; it was usually meant to imply the difference between the force requirements established by the Medium Term Defense Plan and what each member country had actually committed itself to provide by way of its own defense program. For documentation concerning problems relating to this "gap," see pp. 1 ff.

[2] Not printed; it informed Spofford that he should seek agreement with the other Council Deputies concerning the questions of agenda and the time and place of the next meeting (740.5/6–851).

[3] For documentation concerning the Four-Power Exploratory Talks in Paris, see pp. 1086 ff.

740.5/7–751

Memorandum by the Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1951.

Subject: Time and Place of Next NAT Council Meeting

Discussion:

A recommendation from Ambassador Spofford with respect to the next meeting of the NAT Council is contained in Depto 10 which is attached.[2] He concludes that plans should be laid to hold a meeting about September 15. He suggests that if there is to be a meeting in Europe in connection with the General Assembly, a September 15 meeting might be held in Washington or Ottawa.

Questions involved in deciding upon the date and place have been discussed with interested persons in the Department and with representatives of ECA and Defense. There is general agreement on the following appraisal of the situation.

Since no meeting has been held since December, it would be highly desirable, from the standpoint of public interest in NATO and of a get-together of NATO Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers, to have a meeting at the earliest possible date. On the other hand, the long lapse of time makes it unwise to hold a meeting without reasonable prospects of substantial achievements.

The three big subjects pending are admission of Greece and Turkey, arrangements for German rearmament, and acceptance of uncommitted force requirements under the Medium Term Defense Plan.

Discussions of the problem of Greece and Turkey in the Deputies can be wound up in a couple of weeks. It is unlikely that agreement can be reached without a Council meeting. It might be possible to have a successful Council meeting by the first of August on this subject. From the standpoint of our relations with Turkey, it would be highly desirable to take action at the earliest possible date. Defense Department does not appear concerned from a military standpoint about delay until September or October.

While it is difficult to forecast when German rearmament proposals will be ready for Council action, they will clearly not be ready by the first of August. It is even doubtful if we will be ready by September 15. October 15 would be a much safer date. It will be very difficult, in view of public interest in this problem, to hold a Council meeting at which no action is taken on it.

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[1] Drafted by Martin and cleared in substance with GER, NEA, EUR, the Department of Defense, and ECA.

[2] *Supra.*

An early decision as to the assignment of the force gap is desirable from the standpoint of military, financial, and production planning. On the other hand, there is some belief that this is not a good time to ask our European partners to accept a major new assignment. Moreover, the MTDP is being reviewed by SHAPE and substantial revisions may result. This review is scheduled to be completed early in September. The JCS is reconsidering its decision of May 28 to submit a U.S. proposal for allocating the gap to the Standing Group now, and may decide to delay action some time. While a September 15 date to consider this problem is possible, an October date would be preferable. August is out of the question since there must be not only military but also economic recommendations for consideration by the Council.

It is probably also out of the question to expect the French to be ready on any of these subjects by an August 1 date and it may well be difficult for them to be organized with final positions by September 15.

The U.S. position at a Council meeting would be stronger if Congress had acted favorably on Foreign Aid Legislation, possible but not likely by September 15.

If the meeting is put over to October 15 there may not be any need for another meeting this calendar year in connection with the General Assembly.

Conclusions:

In view of the urgency of getting ahead with Greece–Turkey, in view of the desirability of an early Council meeting from the general political standpoint, and in view of the tendency of some countries to procrastinate in making the difficult decisions that are involved in these agenda items, it is recommended that we instruct Spofford to seek to secure agreement of the Deputies for September 15 as a planning date for a Council meeting including these three topics. It should also be understood, however, that the final decision cannot be made until some time after the first of August, when it may prove necessary to postpone the meeting into October.

No decision should be made at this time about a meeting in connection with the General Assembly.

In view of the uncertainty of a meeting in connection with the General Assembly and the desirability of having the next meeting in Rome, it is recommended that plans be made on the basis of holding a projected September 15 meeting in Rome.

Recommendation:

That you secure the agreement of Secretary Marshall to this position.

740.5/7-2551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, July 25, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 51. London for Achilles. From Perkins and Cabot. We are discussing with Secy tomorrow afternoon, Thurs, draft msg which fols and are anxious get your reactions as to whether or not you think procedure proposed below satis:

"There are three principal problems which need to be discussed and settled by Council of NATO. These are:

(*a*) Ger mil contribution.
(*b*) Admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO.
(*c*) MTDP gap.

"To resolve (*a*) above, it will be neces to have mtg of three Mins of Occ Powers to agree on acceptable plan for Ger participation in def. This will also involve working out neces polit arrangements with Ger. It will also be neces after such agreement has been reached to submit appropriate aspects of proposed plan to other NATO members with sufficient time for them to give adequate consideration before there can be final action by Council on those matters of concern to NATO.

"On (*b*) above, it will be neces bring sufficient pressure on countries now not willing to support admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO. Council action does not require any previous formal NATO action other than present Dep discussions.

"(*c*) above probably involves laying on table at Council mtg various factors in connection with gap and, fol discussion thereof, an attempt to secure agreement as to course of action to be followed by NATO and individual countries to insure adequate def in time. This requires consideration of gen issues involved, preferably by Council, and Council instructions for preparation of recommended course of action by appropriate subordinate NATO bodies.

"With these factors in mind, it has seemed to us that perhaps fol sched of mtgs shld be agreed upon: There shld be mtg of three FonMins on Sept 12 or at latest on 13, preferably in Wash. There shld be mtg of NATO Council in Ottawa on Sept 17. If neces or desirable, there cld be further mtg of three FonMins after Ottawa mtg. (In this connection it might well be desirable to associate Adenauer with three FonMins discussions in hopes of reaching agreement with him at that time.) Finally, there wld be NATO Council mtg in Eur, probably Rome, last of Oct or first of Nov.

"What we have in mind in this sched is fol: We wld hope that at tripartite mtg in Wash three Mins cld agree on scheme for Ger mil contribution neces polit arrangements. In any event, in all probability they cld reach agreement on most of important issues involved in these questions even though there were details left to be worked out later.

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[1] Drafted by George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and cleared with Cabot of S/ISA, Bonbright of EUR, Calhoun of GPA, Martin of RA, and Dorsz of GTI; repeated for action to Paris for Bruce, Byroade, and MacArthur and to Frankfurt for McCloy.

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Whatever results, three FonMins wld report and explain results of their study of Ger problem in accordance with Brussels resolution [2] to mtg of Council in Canada on Sept 17 even if final agreement had not been reached in Wash. No final action cld probably be expected on this matter at Ottawa mtg as it wld be neces for other Govts represented there to submit conclusions from Wash to their Govts (unless rapid progress on mil proposals requiring NATO approval shld permit Govts to consider them adequately in advance).

"At Ottawa mtg also we wld hope that definitive action cld be taken on admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO, and that start at least cld be made with problem of gap.

"Mtg scheduled in Eur for end Oct or first Nov shld be able to complete any neces action on Ger contribution and wld continue discussion of gap problem and such problems as were left over from Sept mtg.

"It is our feeling that sched such as this avoids difficulty which we encountered in New York last fall when we sprang significant proposal on Council without prior notice and that by announcing publicly that further mtg wld be held in Eur end of Oct we wld avoid at least in large part difficulty of having mtg on subjs which wld not reach final conclusion.

"US is ready to agree to this sched. We urge you put this up to other NATO countries at earliest opportunity. Canada has informed us that if they do not know by Aug 1 at latest, they will be unable arrange mtg in Canada in mid-Sept, therefore immed action is required. We will telegraph you later suggestions as to what form announcements might take to secure as favorable publicity as possible."

Foregoing has not been discussed with Def. We wld appreciate telephone call giving us your views.[3] [Perkins and Cabot.]

ACHESON

[2] The Brussels resolution, also referred to as the Brussels agreement or decision, is presumably NATO Council Document C6–D/1 of December 13, 1950, a joint report by the NATO Military Committee and the NATO Council Deputies on the subject of German participation in the defense of Western Europe. For text, see D–D/196 (Final) and D/MC–D/2 in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 531–547, and, in particular, p. 538, footnote 1.

[3] Memoranda of telephone conversations were not found in Department of State files.

740.5/7–2651 : Telegram

The United States Vice Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Achilles) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, July 26, 1951—1 p. m.

Depto 112. Dept advise Ottawa. In Deps' discussion yesterday of date and agenda of Council mtg, it was agreed that if mtg held in Sept it shld be in Ottawa September 15. (UK suggested opening formalities and procedural questions cld be dispensed with 15th and work get under way promptly on 17th. Accommodations will be available

[1] Repeated to Paris.

until 22nd and, if necessary, for smaller groups after that). Canada believed that with Fon Mins in San Francisco and Fin Mins in Washington, opportunity for mtg in North America shld not be missed, said Deps shld take definite decision soonest and make public announcement; held target date principle not practical and decision imperative within next few days if accommodations and transportation are to be arranged.

US (Todep 51 [2] not then received) with some support from France maintained that date shld be tentative until certain that definitive action possible on major questions such as Eur Army and Ger, the GAP, burden-sharing infrastructure, and Greece–Turkey. Nor without instructions. All others wished fix Sept 15 date immed.

Belg and UK argued that mtg of Mins to exchange views even if major issues not ripe, highly desirable. UK said question of Greece and Turkey cannot be carried further by Deps, that interim report on burden-sharing expected from FEB by late Aug, that UK proposal, to be introduced soon, may facilitate agrmt on infrastructure, and, altho tripartite mtg on Ger anticipated in early Aug, that Council mtg shld not be deferred pending definitive tripartite action at unpredictable future date. UK and Canada held that there wld be sufficient material ready to justify Sept mtg and that other issues and final decisions cld, if necessary, be deferred for Rome mtg before GA.

In view of consensus that Sept mtg desirable and that, because of necessary preparations, accommodations, and transportation, it is impractical further to defer decision, US agreed to report discussion with view to obtaining before July 30 yes or no decision of govt on Sept 15 mtg. If answer favorable, shld also inform Secretariat soonest of approx size of delegation. (Pls instruct urgently. Expect approx eight wld go from USDep staff not including clerical assistance.)

In reviewing list of possible items for agenda (D–D(51)180 [3]), most Deps agreed that NATO reorganization, formula for sharing civilian costs and civilian budget estimates, and formula for sharing SHAPE and subordinate HQ costs and budgets need not appear as agenda items but wld be covered in Deps' report to Council and might of course be commented upon by Mins. Altho it was pointed out that Deps can act for Mins, UK Dep doubted that he wld be authorized to approve budgets and thought Gaitskell wld wish these on agenda for Mins' personal sanction. Most others believed Deps shld approve budgets as matter of principle.

Addition of infrastructure to agenda wld depend on progress in WG.

UK, Belg, Fr, Neth suggested that agenda include "progress of rearmament program" for discussion by Def Mins and that this shld

[2] *Supra.*
[3] Not printed.

be based on reports of mil agencies and might include statements from those who wished to make them on natl programs (which UK thought wld be useful in dispelling suspicion that all members not doing their full share). Agreed that Deps' shld include sections by DPB and by FEB on econ impact of defense effort and burden-sharing which UK hoped wld lead to Fin Mins' discussion of overall econ problems, and Mil Comite report on such questions as development of command structure and revisions DC/28.[4]

Altho Nor not sure that discussion of Grk–Turk had been carried as far as possible in Deps, there was genl agrmt that if WG summary of earlier discussions completed and referred to govts next week and resulting views raised in Deps about August 15, that subj wld then be ready for Council consideration. Fr and UK expressed view that no political decision possible until mil questions of command structure settled.

Fr suggested Eur Army and Ger participation in defense shld be considered together. UK doubted that tentative Aug tripartite mtg will have carried subj by Sept to point where Council cld take definitive action, but with Belg, believed Mins' discussion useful in any case. Nor believed that question shld not be raised if govts had not had time to study latest developments. US indicated that it considered usefulness of Council mtg wld depend considerably on possibility of progress on Ger question. Also pointed out that if Council customarily met at brief intervals, public wld not expect important results but with present interlude of nine months, psychological effect of unproductive mtg wld be unfortunate.

Deps will meet July 30 to consider WG report on Grk–Turk, complete discussion of Soviet foreign policy and act finally on Council mtg. Will probably then adjourn to permit govts to study major open questions, and meet again about August 15.

ACHILLES

[4] Text of DC–28 was approved by the NAC at its meetings in Brussels during December 1950.

740.5/7–2851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1951—2 p. m.

Todep 58. State–Defense message—pass Dept of Defense. Have had thorough discussion at highest level of prospects Council mtg in mid-

[1] Drafted by Martin and Parsons and cleared with Jessup of S/A, Cabot of S/ISA, Perkins of EUR, Nitze of S/P, and McGhee of NEA; repeated to Paris for MacArthur and Schuyler, Frankfurt for McCloy, and all other NATO capitals.

dle Sept followed by annual mtg around end rather than middle Oct. Have considered carefully and appreciate comments recd so promptly to Todep 51.[2] Situation seems to us here to be about as fols:

1. It wld probably not be possible make any major progress on Ger problem or gap problem at Sept Council mtg.
2. To attempt to prepare for any careful discussion of these problems at such mtg would divert time and energy of persons working on problems themselves and might even delay final solutions. This we cannot afford.
3. Important that public reaction to Council mtg after 9 months lapse not be one of severe disappointment, especially as about that time crucial decisions may be in the making on US aid legislation.
4. If Sept meeting is held we must get favorable action on Greece and Turkey at such mtg. This will involve securing active Brit support without resolution of command problem which it now appears will have to be delayed until after Turkey's admission to NATO.
5. We are keenly aware of desire of other NATO countries to have Council mtg in Sept and place great emphasis ourselves on morale factors involved.

In these circumstances, best course of action we have been able to develop wld involve public announcement by Van Zeeland of time and place for annual mtg of Council which presumably is Rome end Oct. He wld also announce simultaneously that advantage wld be taken of presence in U.S. around mid-Sept of many of the FonMins and FinMins to hold preliminary mtg of these Ministers in Ottawa for general discussion of current non-military NATO problems. This meeting will not include military matters now before DefMins in preparation for end Oct meeting.

In background discussion with press an effort wld be made to give impression that this was in part mtg to receive useful progress reports but that decision to meet was primarily because of strong desire of members to take advantage of favorable opportunity to get together. This of course is desirable per se because of important issues on which wholehearted cooperation of members will be required over coming months. We cld also point out that to hold these two mtgs was in accord with view that Council shld meet more frequently which has not hitherto been possible.

Privately to Deps, you shld make it clear that US is most anxious that at this mtg final action on Greece and Turkey be taken; otherwise we face great risks of losing full support of Turkey. U.S. does not believe that alternative methods other than full NATO membership of associating Greece and Turkey with West are satisfactory. If Turkey is not promptly more closely associated with West, we believe that the overall risks to the West will be gravely increased.

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[2] Dated July 25, p. 623.

It wld be desirable to keep very close fact that definitive action on Greece and Turkey wld be sought. If Greece and Turkey are voted in as we expect, we wld of course have desirable achievement to announce.

It is important to note for reasons given above that no subj shld be scheduled for Sept mtg which wld require either MC to meet prior to such mtg or presence of DefMins at such mtg. Thus at Sept mtg reports on such subjs as command structure, revision DC/28, reorganization of NATO military structure will not be submitted but will be deferred for annual mtg end Oct.

You should present above position to Mon mtg. We realize other Deps will bring forward specific subjs for Sept 15 mtg as in fact they already have (Deptos 112 [3] and 117,[4] Jul 26) and that they may wish to agree on specific agenda for that mtg. If possible you shld endeavor prevent adoption at this time of any formal agenda for Sept mtg and certainly prevent any announcement thereof. We have, however, no objection to preliminary listing of subjs to be placed on agenda for annual mtg.[5]

ACHESON

[3] *Supra.*
[4] Not printed.
[5] In telegram Todep 59 to London, July 28, the Department informed Spofford that he should not allow the agenda to become crowded with secondary subjects. While some of these topics were important and must be discussed, the Department felt that the Council should deal primarily with the most vital issues to help build its prestige as an important body (740.5/7–2851).

740.5/7–3151 : Telegram

The United States Vice Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Achilles) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, July 31, 1951—2 p. m.

Depto 139. Ref Depto 138.[2] Private discussion with various deps before yesterday's mtg on US proposal re Sept council session (Todep 58 [3]) elicited generally favorable initial reaction from Fr, Ital, Canada and Nor.

UK agreeable on two stages, avoidance at Ottawa of substantive discussion on Ger and gap, and primary emphasis on fin and econ questions but insistent on linking ME command with Gr-Turk decision and on importance Shinwell attached to early personal discussion by

[1] Repeated to Paris, Ottawa, and Frankfurt.
[2] Not printed; it reported on the discussion within the Council of Deputies meeting of July 30 during which the U.S. Deputy recommended that the Council hold its regular session in Rome in late October with an earlier meeting in Ottawa beginning on September 15 for consideration of nonmilitary questions (740.5/7–3151).
[3] *Supra.*

Def Mins of progress and shortcomings of def effort. Hoyer-Millar had just come from mtg with Shinwell at which strong telegrams had been approved on these points to Franks and Elliot as result reports from them. Fol my talk with him in morning, he conferred again with FonOff and Def Min so that his statements at afternoon mtg were made in light of their consideration of US proposal. He also reiterated privately importance which Eisenhower had attached in his conversation with Morrison to early mtg attended by all three Mins. He admitted having advised several other Deps privately of UK views on ME command structure and thought Northerners at least wld insist on settlement of that before final action on Greece–Turkey.[4] (This was substantially borne out at afternoon mtg.)

Belgians and Danes were insistent Def Mins attend, former in view previous decision that first mtg of reorganized Council shld be attended by all three Mins and because Belg Def Min strongly wishes attend,[5] latter due to importance his govt attached to knowing what ME command wld be before making final decision on Greece and Turkey. He stated possibility of inclusion in ME command of non-NAT countries other than Greece–Turkey increased his govt's hesitancy on agreeing to full Greek–Turk membership and it wished to know exactly what was involved in order to assess possible indirect commitments.

Alphand, while in gen agrmt with US position, was inclined to prefer skipping Sept mtg. He indicated Schuman wld prefer not to go to Ottawa or even to Wash for tripartite mtg and that he himself wld strongly prefer not to take time out from EDF discussions for either purpose.

Iceland and Luxembourg took no part and will presumably accept any gen agrmt.

Position of others in summary is as fols:

1. Gen agrmt that Sept mtg, if held, shld (*a*) be announced as preliminary to Oct mtg, (*b*) not undertake serious substantive consideration of Ger or gap, and (*c*) seek final decision on Gr–Turk but otherwise devote primary attn to non-mil aspects NATO problems.
2. Fr and probably Nor and Neth wld prefer no Sept mtg. (First due to preoccupation with Ger, second with Greek and Turk and last due to apparent impasse.)
3. Italy supports US but has no strong views other than desire for early decision on Gr–Turk.
4. All except US and Italy believe presence of Def Mins at Sept mtg essential if Greece–Turkey to be settled and desirable for gen discussion of progress in def and production fields.

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[4] For documentation concerning the problems relating to the creation of a Middle East Command, see pp. 460 ff.

[5] For documentation concerning the reorganization of the Council and other organs of NATO, see pp. 1 ff.

In circumstances, we recommend from USDep point of view that US agree to Sept mtg which wld (1) be announced as preliminary to Oct mtg, (2) avoid major susbtantive discussion of Ger or GAP, (3) seek final action on Greece–Turkey, (4) be attended by all three Mins, and (5) "deal with such problems as may be ready for discussion or action".

Principal disadvantages of this course wld be:

1. Possibility of failure to secure decision on Gr–Turk. On this point am confident Nor wld not block gen agmt if it can be reached with others.
2. Diversion of time of def personnel. Believe this nevertheless necessary for some personnel if agmt on Gr–Turk to be achieved and worthwhile for others if general discussion designed to invigorate def effort.
3. Public disappointment over meager results. Believe this cld largely be met by proper info handling at prelim mtg.
4. Probability that fin and econ problems and measures to deal with prod deficiencies cited by Herod will not be prepared adequately for more than preliminary discussions. Nevertheless, believe prelim discussion of these wld be useful.

Principal advantages wld be:

1. Sept decision on Gr–Turk.
2. Stimulus to def program from personal exchange of views by all three mins at that date on progress and impediments.
3. If possible, enough prelim info on Ger and gap being given non-SG govts to facilitate Oct agmt on these problems.
4. Demonstration of US willingness to go along with majority view where major interests not involved but nevertheless, recognize weight of enumerated disadvantages, particularly (4). If you consider they outweigh advantages, recommend we seek abandonment of Sept mtg entirely.

ACHILLES

740.5/7–3151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET NIACT PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1951—9 p. m.

Todep 62. State–Def message. For Achilles. We have considered urgently Deptos 138 [2] and 139 [3] and most particularly position of all NATO members, except US and Italy, that presence of DefMins at

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[1] Drafted by Parsons and cleared with Perkins of EUR, McGhee of NEA, Dorsz of GTI, and Admiral Wright and Col. Beebe of Defense; repeated for information to Paris for Bruce and MacArthur, Frankfurt for McCloy, and all other NATO capitals.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra*.

[3] *Supra*.

proposed Sept mtg essential if admission of Greece and Turkey is to be acted upon favorably. In essence, situation now appears to us as fols:

1. Test of whether we want Sept mtg is whether we can get final action on Greece and Turkey. As we do consider favorable action on Turkey shld be taken without further delay, we continue to desire Sept mtg but feel every other country shld understand that this is item of business we wish to conclude at that time, but only on simple basis of admission without any conditions as to command relations.

2. As we wld participate in such mtg with firm intention of bringing about final action on Greece and Turkey, we cld not deny DefMins right to come to mtg as each country wishes. This does not modify our view in Todep 58 [4] that no military problems as such will be decided.

3. Brit seem to disregard Turkish insistence that they will not discuss command structure prior to admission. The heart of the Middle East Defense structure is Turkey. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to proceed with discussions of the Middle East command structure at this time, which would alienate the Turks. The first step would be to secure Turkish admission to NATO. We shld persuade the Brit to withhold their proposal on Middle East Command structure until after the question of the admission of Greece and Turkey has been settled. We do not think Brit shld be too concerned at this as we are confident that this problem can be worked out satisfactorily. Furthermore, discussion command structure wld require prior mtg of Mil Comite and possibly put us in position of also having to discuss in substantive way mil aspects of other problems. This, we desire to avoid.

In light of foregoing, you shld inform Deps we agree to Sept mtg on understanding:

a. Serious attempt will be made to reach decision on Greece and Turkey;

b. Mtg to be announced as preliminary to Oct mtg;

c. NATO and Middle East command structure not to be decided at Sept mtg, therefore no prior mtg of Mil Comite;

d. No major substantive discussion of Ger or gap;

e. Mtg to deal "with such problems as may be ready for discussion or action". (We understand this phrase from Depto 139 to refer to public announcement of purpose of this preliminary mtg.);

f. Mtg to be attended by all three Mins, DefMins, in addition to others, as countries prefer. (FYI and for such use as you see fit, we here have no commitment that General Marshall will attend.)

ACHESON

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[4] Dated July 28, p. 626.

740.5/8–151

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1951.

Subject: NAT Council Meeting

Just before leaving for the Pentagon Mr. Perkins had a telephone call from Mr. Achilles in London who reported that the Council meeting for mid-September is "on".

It was agreed that the meeting would deal only with the question of Greece and Turkey plus financial and economic problems. The Deputies will work on the specific agenda when they reconvene after the middle of August.

It was agreed that the meeting would be open to attendance by three Ministers from each country, while leaving it to each Government to decide who and how many they would send.

The Canadian Deputy, Mr. Wilgress, told Mr. Achilles that Foreign Minister Pearson believes we will not have too much trouble getting Greece and Turkey in, following his discussion with the Scandinavians.

Mr. Achilles reported that the British Deputy, Mr. Hoyer Millar, had talked with the British military and believes that progress is being made in swinging the British towards our position. (I take this to mean that they will not insist on prior firm decisions on command structure prior to voting on the admission of Greece and Turkey.) Hoyer Millar reminded Mr. Achilles, however, that the UK were not the only ones concerned and felt that we should be ready to give some indication at least of our thinking.

We will presumably obtain amplification of the above by telegram in the course of the afternoon.[1]

[1] In telegram Depto 147 from London, August 1, Achilles reported on the discussion during the Council of Deputies' meeting of August 1 and explained the positions of the various countries concerning the question of time and place for the next meeting of the Council (740.5/8–151).

740.5/8–451 : Telegram

The United States Vice Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Achilles) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, August 4, 1951—2 p. m.

Depto 161. ToISA. 1. In beginning intensive preparation for September Council mtg we are working on understanding that (1)

[1] Repeated to Paris and Heidelberg.

Greece–Turkey is only major question on which completed action is anticipated; (2) No strictly military questions as such will be considered and no prior meeting of military committee will be held; (3) minor items shld be kept off agenda. At same time, we assume Washington wishes mtg utilized to maximum advantage in preparing for concrete action in October and in stimulating further progress in common defense effort.

2. Clearly one limiting factor is shortness of time between now and Sept mtg and between that and Oct mtg. Intensive use must be made of these three months if major results are to be achieved at Rome mtg.

3. Believe one major accomplishment of Sept mtg cld be laying out course of action to be followed during ensuing six weeks by all NAT agencies looking toward Council consideration at Oct mtg of full MTDP requirements efforts to meet them and steps necessary to fill forces, production and financial gaps. This wld involve, prior to Sept mtg, intensive work perhaps by senior *ad hoc* working group of representatives of Deputies, SG, FEB and DPB (see Depto 192 [2]) with view to examining reports of each in relation to others and recommending course of action preparatory to Oct mtg. We might perhaps be able to introduce elements of ISAC D–4/7*a* [3] and costing exercise. Each of these documents shld be related to accomplishment of and problems related to MTDP.

4. At Sept Council we wld suggest general review of international situation as at previous mtgs and general discussion (as proposed by UK) by all Ministers concerned of individual and collective progress in implementing defense program. It shld result in council instructing Deputies and other bodies re intensive preparatory work on problems indicated for consideration at Oct mtg.

5. No doubt you are considering how Sept mtg can best be used to give impetus to European defense force and prepare way for Oct action on Ger.

6. It is to be hoped present impasse 1951 airbase program can be removed and US negotiating position on signal communications program defined before Council mtg as several govts may propose infrastructure as agenda item and criticize US position under it.

7. From point of view of governmental, parliamentary and public reaction to Sept mtg at home and abroad we must seek balance between demonstrating accomplishments in defense effort and stimulating further efforts to meet existing deficiencies. In this connection magnitude of what DC/28 commitments (let alone total MTDP) mean in terms of specific national action and impact are just beginning to be appreciated by European govts. We have also for some time sensed in Europe

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[2] Presumably a reference to telegram Depto 152 from London, August 2, not printed. /-

[3] See footnote 1, p. 193.

general uneasiness and psychological problem reported by Katz in Repto 711, July 16,[4] plus some doubt as to whether more intensive effort was really necessary (aside from questions of econ and polit practicability) or whether US was not exerting undue pressure due to its exuberant strength which permits its own tremendous effort to be made without serious hardship. This is partially due to increased confidence which development of strength over past twelve months has brought.

8. Problem is to develop this confidence into increased energy rather than complacency. "Shock treatment" now appears much less advantageous and cld produce more opposition than stimulation. It wld seem preferable to use (1) full and frank discussion of available info on requirements and costs, progress, shortcomings, specific bottlenecks and means of overcoming them, coupled with (2) seeds of hope for brighter not-too-distant future.

9. As elements of latter, we wld suggest:

(*a*) Emphasis on (I) progress made and its effect on Soviet policy as well as (II) inadequacy of progress so far and need for greater effort.

(*b*) Emphasis on present intensive defense effort as "capital investment" which can, as soon as it is completed, be reduced to maintenance basis and greater resources again be devoted to civilian production. This wld include something along line of Katz proposal (para 7 of Repto 711), and

(*c*) Emphasis that US in pressing for admission of Greek–Turk definitely does not consider that this transforms NAT into strictly milit arrangement of convenience or that US has in any way lost interest in wider objectives of defending and improving democratic institutions and economic progress of western civilization, including progressively closer long-range association in North Atlantic and European communities in non-milit as well as milit fields.

Last also of immediate importance in obtaining acceptance of Greek and Turk by those now most opposed to membership.

10. At least preliminary guidance on foregoing needed soonest.

Ecato 1104[5] received since forgoing was drafted provides welcome indication of parallel thinking.

ACHILLES

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[4] Not printed; it reported a conversation between representatives of the NATO member countries who were in Paris to attend a meeting of OEEC. Milton Katz, U.S. Special Representative in Europe, informed the Department of State that these European leaders had unfortunately allowed the purpose of NATO and its defense buildup to take on a negative character in the minds of their citizens and therefore their defense programs had come to be regarded as a kind of castor oil which has to be taken (740.5/7–1651).

[5] Not found.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, documents OTT D–1*a*–D–10

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Parsons) to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1951.

Subject: Coordination and Control of NAT Council Meetings

1. The September 15 NAT Council Meeting in Ottawa will be the first at which three Ministers from each country may be present as members. In the case of the US, the Defense Minister (General Marshall) is not committed to attend nor will we know for some time if he will do so. On the other hand, we may possibly have two "Finance Ministers" as Mr. Snyder thus far has said only that he would not object to Mr. Foster (or his representative) attending. Problem number one is, therefore, the composition of our top level representation.

2. Problem number two arises from the recent reorganization of the NATO structure. Prior to the reorganization, the Secretary of State represented us in the Council, the Secretary of Defense represented us in the Defense Committee and Ambassador Katz represented us in the Defense, Finance and Economic Committee (but other countries were usually represented by Ministers). Although the revised Terms of Reference of the Council,[1] as now organized, states that "the members . . . shall represent their respective governments", there is much in the background of this problem to lead members, perhaps most particularly US members, to think, albeit subconsciously, as representatives of their Departments rather than of the government as a whole. In my opinion, the problem of effective coordination of the US delegation may be more than usually difficult and yet, as the September meeting is the first of the now triple-headed Council, it is essential that precedents for sound coordination and control be set.

Under these circumstances consideration should be given to establishment of such principles as the following (which are routine at other international conferences):

(*a*) The Secretary of State is the senior delegate of the United States.

(*b*) The Secretary of State (through his immediate assistants) also has coordinating responsibility. As a corollary to this, our position on the various agenda items must be, as at any other conference, US, not Departmental, position.

(*c*) The State Department should be responsible for organizing and servicing the delegation. In fact, as well as in name, we must have one, not three, delegations.

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[1] For documentation concerning the reorganization of the NATO, which included revised Terms of Reference, see pp. 1 ff.

(*d*) Communications to and from Ottawa, most especially instructions to our representatives, should go through one channel, namely, State (although Secretary Marshall, if present, and Mr. Foster will certainly be in communication with their Departments, at least informally).

In persuading the other Departments as to the need for making our delegation an effective unit along the foregoing lines, our arguments are fortified by:

(*a*) Mr. Lawton's (Budget Director) statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, cleared with President, which included among other pertinent passages:

(1) "The Secretary of State is the senior representative of this government on all NAT Council meetings",

(2) "Ambassador Spofford sits as chairman of the NAT Council of Deputies . . . represents the President and receives his instructions through the Secretary of State".

(*b*) The chairman of the International Security Affairs Committee is the State Department member, Mr. Cabot.

3. The third problem is procedural and we may wish to consult on it through the Deputies in London, with other countries, especially Canada, the host country this September. In essence, it includes the following questions:

(*a*) Will each category of Ministers meet with their opposite member separately?

(*b*) Will the Council meet only in plenary sessions with all three Ministers attending together? Or

(*c*) Will there be a combination of (*a*) and (*b*)?

One possible solution might be to have each group of Ministers meet on agenda items in which they have the predominant interest. If this were done, it would have to be decided as to whether their decisions were decisions of the Council, or whether plenary sessions should then consider them. However, this method is open to objection as unduly cumbersome and fails to recognize that in many NATO matters political, military and economic aspects are so intertwined that more than one Minister from those countries might well insist on being present when the issue was thrashed out.

Perhaps the most practical solution is to have a meeting of the full Committee only to deal with the entire agenda but leave to each country the decision as to whether one or all of its participating Ministers should be present for any given item. Additionally, if any set of Ministers, such as the Finance Ministers, wishes to meet apart informally, they could do so but their meeting would not be a meeting of the Council.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, documents OTT D–1*a*–D–10

Memorandum by the Acting Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat (Barnes) to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 8, 1951.

The following, for what they are worth, are my reactions to the memorandum of August 7 to you from Mr. Parsons [1] on the subject of Coordination and Control of NAT Council Meetings.

1. The point raised in the first paragraph does not appear to constitute a "problem". The position of the Secretary and of General Marshall (or his alternate—at Brussels it was Secretary Pace) is recognized. Secretary Snyder has been invited and Mr. Foster has been told that, regardless of the Snyder decision, he can go. Mr. Foster clearly recognizes that he ranks below Secretary Snyder in the government. I do not feel it would be helpful, nor is it necessary for us to attempt the concept that we have four ministers facing the three of the other governments. Mr. Foster would rather have to be considered a top adviser on economic questions. This relationship has been reviewed at length with Mr. Foster by Mr. Webb, and the Secretary has requested that Mr. Webb discuss it with Secretary Snyder and Mr. Foster together (presumably while he is in San Francisco) in the event that Mr. Snyder plans to attend. It seems to me that we face a far more difficult situation if Mr. Snyder decides not to go and names one of his assistants, rather than Mr. Foster, as his alternate.

2. While I agree with Mr. Parsons' statement of the case in paragraph 2, I disagree with his recommendations that we seek advance clarification with the other agencies of the principles which should govern the delegation. It seems to me beyond question that the Secretary of State is the senior US representative to NATO. As such it falls to his staff to make arrangements, organize the delegation, and so forth. This has always been accepted in the past, and there is every indication in recent discussions with Defense, Mr. Snyder and Mr. Foster that it is accepted now. The fact of the reorganization of NATO, which may create complications in the meetings themselves, should not lead us to give any indication that we have doubts as to our position. Meetings will be called by State, arrangements made by State, documentation provided by State, and reporting done by State. The fact that we are the official channel to both the Canadian Government and Mr. Spofford gives us a guarantee that we can maintain control. Of course, we cannot prevent the Defense representatives or Mr. Foster from utilizing their own communication channels from Ottawa, but we could not do this even if we sought advance clarification of the role of the State Department in this matter.

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[1] *Supra.*

3. The point raised in the third paragraph is an excellent one, and it is my opinion that we should draw up a telegram to Ambassador Spofford asking him to explore this question with the Canadian Deputy and if appropriate, with all the Deputies. It is here that we encounter the greatest difficulty resulting from the reorganization of NATO and one which could cause untold confusion at Ottawa if there is not some agreed line in advance.

ROBERT G. BARNES

740.5/8–1051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 10, 1951—8 p. m.

Todep 84. We have been trying visualize procedure at Sept Council Mtg which is first at which three or more Mins may be present as members and represent their govts. Fol queries are indicative of some of problems which will have to be faced. In our view, they are problems for Van Zeeland and Deputies to settle, especially as precedents for future meetings of Council will be set. They shld not be left for Canada as host at Ottawa to settle.

(1) Will all Mins meet together in plenary sessions or will there be separate mtgs of groups of Mins, such as Fin Mins, or For Mins, or Def Mins?

Comment—We do not wish to encourage separate mtgs of categories of Mins. As indicated Todep 62 [2] there is, for instance, no commitment that SecDef will attend. We recognize, however, that groups of Mins will, if they so desire, get together separately but we shld prefer to regard such mtgs as informal.

(2) If plenary sessions only are held, will each country determine whether to be represented by one or all of its ministers basing its decisions presumably on the nature of the agenda item under consideration?

Comment—In our view, each country shld be free to decide which of its Mins it wishes to have present during Council consideration of each agenda item. For a number of reasons, we do not think it wld be satisfactory to us for agenda items to be assigned to separate mtgs of any category of Mins. Many NAT questions involve political, military, and financial considerations, which are difficult to separate out, and, therefore, it wld be preferable not be committed to exclusive consideration of such questions by only one minister even though that Min wld be following an agreed national position.

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[1] Drafted by Parsons and cleared with Cabot of S/ISA, Jessup of S/A, and Bonbright of EUR; repeated to Paris for MacArthur and to Ottawa.

[2] Dated July 31, p. 630.

(3) If different categories of Mins meet separately, will their mtgs be considered a mtg of the Council or will plenary sessions be required to act upon their recommendations?

Comment—We consider that if Mins meet separately they cld only recommend to but not commit the Council.

(4) Will agenda questions be grouped by subject matter in such a way that certain Mins will not need to remain throughout the conference.

Comment—It might be very convenient if this cld be arranged although for reasons indicated under two it wld not be easy to do so. In general, we believe procedure shld be as flexible as possible in mtg wishes of Mins.

Info on thinking among Deps, and your comment required.

This tel has not been cleared with other agencies.

ACHESON

740.5/8-1651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, August 16, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 214. Re Todep 84.[2] We have been giving thought to points you raise and other procedural aspects Ottawa mtg. Agree these matters shld be settled by Van Zeeland and CD rather than host govt. In capacity as chairman CD have circulated for discussion at next CD mtg fol proposal for conduct council mtgs:

Begin verbatim text. With reference to D-D(51)86 (final),[3] NATO reorganization, and in particular section II thereof, it is the understanding of the Council Deputies that in general, the mtgs of the NAC will be conducted as follows:

1. The council shall act in plenary session at which each govt shall be represented by whichever minister or ministers, or other duly accredited representative or representatives, it seems desirable.

2. The council in plenary session may find it convenient, depending on the nature of the agenda, to appoint ministerial committees, e.g., composed of foreign ministers or defence ministers or finance ministers, to consider specific questions. Such committees shall make recommendations to the council in plenary session.

3. If practicable, the agenda for council sessions shall be so arranged as not necessarily to require the attendance of all ministerial representatives throughout a particular conference.

4. The mtgs in a particular session will be so scheduled as to allow as much time as possible for informal consultation between ministers. *End verbatim text.*

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not found in the Department of State files.

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Above provisions answer points raised reftel. Re para 2 above, believe nature agenda for Ottawa mtg does not make possible use of ministerial committees apart from plenary sessions. However, as matter general procedure we believe in future may be desirable have some problems dealt with by categories of ministers. Also think it important that at council mtg categories of ministers get together to discuss matters of particular concern to them and that contact between ministers in this manner will be beneficial. You will note that such ministerial committees are to be established by council in plenary session and wld not necessarily be planned in advance council mtgs altho agenda wld be arranged with eye to using ministerial committees in interest of speeding council's work.

Important concept is that council should act only in plenary session.[4] This is fully in accord with idea that council should act as council of govts.

SPOFFORD

[4] The Department of Defense took strong exception to this sentence and argued that this would nullify the entire concept of the reorganization of NATO in which the Defense Ministers became members of the Council (memorandum by Parsons, August 22, CFM files, lot M–88, OTT docs 1*a*–10). The Department of State therefore instructed Spofford in telegram Todep 132 to London, August 23, not to consider any ministerial committee which might be formed to advise the Council as a subcommittee of inferior status (740.5/8–2151).

CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, Miscellaneous Sept 1951 meetings

Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) and the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1951.

Subject: Congressional Consultation on the September Meetings

In connection with the different international meetings scheduled for September, it seems to me that we should give early consideration to the question of securing necessary consultation with the Congress. This problem has too often in the past been the forgotten step-child of our preparatory work, and has been solved at the last minute by having the Secretary report to the two committees on the eve of his departure. With the best performance, this can hardly impress the Congressional leaders as "consultation". In addition, we have to adjust our plans this time to the fact that the Secretary will be leaving for San Francisco on August 30 and will return only in time to commence the talks with Mr. Morrison and Mr. Schuman.

We have reviewed this question with Mr. McFall's office and come to the conclusion that the best approach would be the two of you to

seek a meeting during the next two weeks with the European subcommittees in the House and Senate to discuss with them our plans for the discussions with the British and French. In particular, an outline of our thinking as set forth in the recent messages to Morrison and Schuman would appear to serve a most useful purpose on the Hill at the present time.

In addition to this step, I think we should also suggest to the Secretary that he take advantage of some occasion in San Francisco to review some of the overall considerations involved in these meetings with the group that will be present as delegates and alternates to the Japanese peace conference. At a later time, we should review the question of whether any further consultation is desirable with respect to the NATO meeting, though it seems to me that we might reserve our major emphasis on this until later in the fall in connection with the Rome meeting.

If you have any comments on this matter, Mr. McFall and I would be glad to talk to you about it.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

740.5/8-2351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, August 23, 1951—6 p. m.

Depto 254. Agenda for Ottawa mtg as drafted by deps August 20 (Depto 236) [2] and 22 is as fols:

I. Opening address by the chmn.
II. Adoption of agenda.
III. Exchange of views on world sitn (deps will try next week to develop outline to guide discussions under this item).
IV. Discussion of activities of NATO.

(A) Report of CD to NAC, to include:

(1) Report of chairman CD.
(2) Progress report from CD.
(3) Progress report from DPB.
(4) Progress report from FEB.

(B) Statement by mil rep (SG liaison said nature of statement. if any, still uncertain).

V. Association of Greece and Turkey with West def.

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] Not printed; it informed the Department of State about the discussion of the proposed agenda for the Ottawa meeting which took place in the Council Deputies meeting on August 20 (740.5/8-2151).

VI.[3] Report on status of def effort by each member country. To meet Neth apprehension that this wld involve discussion detailed burden-sharing data, deps agreed with UK that this shld be merely factual status report which wld provide basis for questioning and that fin and econ implications shld be discussed in connection with FEB report. (UK will furnish outline to be discussed by deps)

VII. Nat def plans—proposals for coordinated action by NAT agencies particularly in preparation for Oct mtg of NAC.

VIII. Future development of NATO (deps agreed that item IV shld cover past while VIII shld be directed at plans and objectives)

IX. Other business.

X. Communiqué.

Tentative grouping by days as fols (Todep 118[4]):

Saturday: Items I, II, III.
Monday a. m.: Item IV.
Monday p. m.: Item V.
Tuesday a. m.: Item V.
Tuesday p. m.: Item VI.
Wednesday: Item VII (conclude item V if necessary).
Thursday a. m.: Items VIII, IX, X, leaving Thursday p. m. to conclusion any unfinished business.
Thursday p. m.: Adjournment.

This shld enable def reps to cut their attendance to Tues and Wed if they so desire.

Re para 7 Todep 118, agree no advance issuing press release on suggested agenda. Article in Paris *NY Herald* yesterday clearly indicates someone has leaked item VII of agenda. Will not bring up issuance of press release in CD unless further word received.

SPOFFORD

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[3] Items VI, VII, and VIII were later rearranged, largely as a result of discussion in the Council Deputies meetings during the weeks leading up to the opening of the Seventh Session in Ottawa. Draft item VIII was moved forward to become item VI; items VI and VII then became VII and VIII.

[4] Not printed.

740.5/9–451

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, September 4, 1951.

No. Usdep 17

Ref: Depto 297 [1] and Depto 298 [2]

Subject: Discussion at Council Deputies Meeting August 29, 1951.

The following is an outline of the discussion which took place in the Council Deputies, August 29, 1951, on the question of a report by a military agency being presented at the Ottawa meeting of the Council:

General Lindsay said that the Deputies' views had been reported to the Standing Group as follows:

(*a*) no military subjects are to be discussed at Ottawa,
(*b*) a progress report is needed and might possibly be cleared through MRC,
(*c*) the Chairman of the Standing Group should present this report and be available for consultation.

He said the Standing Group has replied that it is responsible to the Military Committee and reports and acts at the direction of the Military Committee. The Military Representatives Committee cannot replace Military Committee except perhaps for overriding reasons which do not now exist. The Ottawa discussions are to be non-military and the Standing Group report would lead to confusion so long as other issues are open. Any report would have to be in the name of the Military Committee which should, therefore, approve it. A report by the Standing Group Representatives would lead to questions and these could hardly be answered without Military Committee approval. A purely factual report would be of no interest or use, since military steps taken since Brussels, SHAPE organizational measures, etc., are all public knowledge already and a recapitulation by the Standing Group would be of no assistance to the Council. The Standing Group adhered to its original views and requested that the Agenda exclude any report by a Military Representative.

UK then said that they insist command structure be included in the Agenda, either separately or to be discussed under some other item, possibly Greece–Turkey. This is their position whether the Standing Group is to be represented or not.

General Lindsay said that the Standing Group views on the command problem in connection with Greece and Turkey would be sub-

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[1] Not printed; it briefly summarized the discussion in the Council Deputies meeting which began with General Lindsay's recommendation that item IV (2) of the Ottawa agenda (statement by military representative) be omitted from the final agenda (740.5/8–3051).

[2] Dated August 30, p. 258.

mitted to governments through the Military Representatives Committee.

UK hoped SACLANT might be discussed.

Canada said, by Standing Group logic, discussions of SACLANT would not be possible without a meeting of the Military Committee.

The Netherlands Deputy said he understood the Standing Group would not be present and therefore will not speak "in support of its own proposals."

The French said the Standing Group position is indefensible and called attention to Section 11 (*c*) of the Reorganization Paper and particularly to the statement that the Standing Group represents the Military Committee when it is not in session.

UK asked what the Standing Group would do if the first action of the Council at Ottawa was to send for them.

Netherlands said that it is very difficult to say what the Standing Group is and where it stands in NATO. The question had been evaded before but now arises as an inescapable question of principle, although it is too late to take any further steps to change the Standing Group position on the Ottawa meeting. He considered that after time for reflection it will be necessary to proceed to consider the position of the Standing Group to decide whether the Standing Group does exactly as it pleases, forcing its opinions to prevail, subject to nobody's advice or comment.

The Norwegian Deputy said the Netherlands Deputy touched on the unanimous sentiment of all non-Standing Group countries. Despite General Lindsay's undoubtedly competent reporting of earlier discussions to the Standing Group, it now appears that only one possibility remains. Non-Standing Group governments must make it clear to the others that this is an important question of principle. In New York 7 Ministers took a dubious view of Standing Group relations to the Organization but bowed to the U.S. opinion. Everybody wants the military apparatus to work. Everybody recognizes the position of the great powers and the need to limit the membership in some higher bodies. The present situation, however, is impossible. If, as seems true, the military apparatus is unsatisfactory, the question must be raised again. He requested Standing Group powers to make this clear to their governments.

UK said he certainly had every sympathy for the non-Standing Group views and further he was extremely irritated to have been made ridiculous by their insisting that command be discussed at the meeting and the simultaneous refusal of his own military to participate.

The Belgians associated themselves with the Netherlands view, and asked if it would be possible to discuss reorganization at Ottawa without the Standing Group.

Italy said this question of principle must be clarified soonest because the organization will not function otherwise.

The Canadian Deputy said he would like a clarification of the relations between the Organization and the Standing Group. He did not like the existence of the Military Committee being used as excuse for inaction or delay. They associated themselves with the views of the Netherlands and Norway.

USDep said that he would convey the views expressed to his Representative on the Standing Group, that the close relationship which was hoped for is not in evidence, and that it is not clear why this is true.

General Lindsay suggested that Norway's "condemnation of the Standing Group" should be conveyed to the Military Committee, of which the Standing Group is the servant.

The Norwegian Deputy replied in anger, "This is entirely unacceptable. The Military Committee is being used as a subterfuge and an excuse. The Norwegian member of the Military Committee and certainly many others would have made a meeting before Ottawa possible."

The Canadian Deputy said that we hear that a meeting of the Military Committee is impossible, yet action is taken, for instance in connection with the question of Greece and Turkey command. He insisted that the relationship between the Military Committee, the Standing Group and the Organization should be clarified.

The UK said the simple fact is that the interposition of the Military Committee between the Standing Group and the Council doesn't work. Perhaps the present structure would be necessary in an emergency but the only sensible thing is that the Standing Group should respond to the Council which, apparently, it will not do.

The Netherlands referred to such words in the Standing Group messages as "information is unnecessary", "unimportant", "not needed", implying that the Standing Group was not competent to make such judgments alone. Netherlands considered the French reference to Section 11(*c*) of the Reorganization Paper entirely justified and repeated that after more careful consideration they would raise the whole issue for further action.

Mr. Spofford said that one factor which should be considered is that the Standing Group had understood the Ottawa agenda was to be primarily non-military and that this was emphasized in the Standing Group discussion when they agreed that no Military Committee meeting was possible before Ottawa without interrupting other important work. He felt the Standing Group might respond that the present situation is not a precedent for other meetings and in general the Military

Committee could meet before the Council. He assumed General Lindsay would report views expressed and US would, with France and UK, discuss the question with their representatives on the Standing Group.

The Deputies then agreed that Item IV(2), "Report by Military Representatives", should be deleted from the Agenda, although Netherlands suggested half jokingly that it be left in order that the question might be raised in Ottawa as to what had happened to the report.

CHARLES M. SPOFFORD

CFM files, lot M-88, box 253

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Program in the Economic Cooperation Administration (Cleveland)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 6, 1951.

U.S. POSITION AT OTTAWA

I

At Ottawa, the irresistible force is about to meet the immovable body. All of our Yankee ingenuity is going to be directed toward the job of convincing the Europeans that the military requirement for defending Western Europe is larger, and costs more, than the sum total of all national efforts by the NATO countries. The Europeans, at the same time, are getting ready to counter our story about the MTDP gap with a unanimous view that they cannot do more than is now planned.

If these two sets of opinions are allowed to come into direct conflict, without a pretty clear understanding ahead of time as to how the resulting dog fight is going to be resolved, we will have produced a major international crisis, in which the Europeans including the U.K. are lined up against the United States. Moreover, the fracas will be public, and will be accompanied by a rash of statements and more or less authorized leaks to the press justifying the respective American and European positions.

The preliminary bouts have pointed up very clearly the nature of the real conflict. At London, Ambassador Spofford presented to the Council of Deputies, and later to the Inter-NATO Working Group, the U.S. view about the MTDP gap. According to all reports, it fell pretty flat. The Europeans did not, as we had hoped, agree that there was a gap that needed to be filled by future national commitments. Instead, they made sure that the North Atlantic Council did not receive a briefing on the gap from any multilateral body. At the same time in Paris, the Europeans (under British leadership) were engaged in making sure that the FEB interim report would be limited to a

discussion on present defense programs and commitments, and that it would not identify any margin of resources that could be devoted to picking up any part of this gap between national commitments and total military requirements.

These events have made it necessary for the United States to place the problem of the MTDP gap before the North Atlantic Council at Ottawa as a unilateral statement. Yet it is clear that, without careful preparation of the ground, any such presentation will be met with chilly silence. If the U.S. is to avoid both the actuality and the appearance of a deep schism in the Atlantic alliance, it will be necessary for the U.S. to go to Ottawa with a plan for action on this subject that takes into account the known feelings of the Europeans as well as the present U.S. position.

II

The opinions of the Europeans on this subject are now pretty well known, and are becoming better known as Ministers of Finance from the various European countries arrive in Washington.

Our discussions with the British have highlighted their view that their presently announced defense program (£4700 million over the period of the MTDP) is going to be very hard to achieve, given the deterioration in Britain's external economic position, both on dollar and non-dollar account.

The Italians have said that they are not inclined to ask for a supplemental defense appropriation this year (as we have been urging them to do), and that next year's defense budget will be about the same size as prospective defense expenditures for the current year.

The French have been hinting broadly in the public press that their defense program may have to be reduced from presently announced levels.

The Dutch have been very conservative about making commitments at all, and are very quick to point out the real economic difficulties which a large defense program would bring in its wake.

And the Belgians have spent several months justifying a small defense effort by claiming that they were fulfilling their total commitment and steadfastly refusing to admit that they are financially capable of taking on a large commitment.

These attitudes on the part of the Europeans are reinforced by the treatment which Congress has given to the estimates for European economic aid in fiscal year 1952. The Europeans have always been fully aware of the great importance of the economic aid portion of the total U.S. assistance program. That same multiplier that we have been using to buttress our case for economic aid on the Hill is now operating in reverse as European Ministers cut back their estimates of what is financially feasible to a degree that reflects in a disproportionate manner the effect on economic aid of the Congressional meat ax.

III

There is not much encouragement, then, in the assets side of our NATO balance sheet, either in Europe or on Capitol Hill. What about the requirement side?

The whole discussion in Washington of the MTDP gap rested on a military statement of the military requirements. By and large, those parts of the U.S. government concerned with political, economic, and financial matters have taken as given data the military judgments that went into the Medium Term Defense Plan. Moreover, this same attitude has carried over into the NATO itself, so that judgments by the Standing Group have not really been reviewed by the people concerned with political possibilities, production capabilities, and the provision of the necessary funds.

Thus, in the ISAC Study about the MTDP gap, we started with the requirements as a given factor, and tried to figure out ways and means of covering the total requirement. The civilian members of ISAC did not really review the requirement as such, nor did any civilian agency (within the U.S. government or multilaterally in the NATO organization) even participate in the costing process.

When you stop to look at it, this is a pretty remarkable state of affairs. Normally, within any government, a military judgment as to what is required to do a military job is never fully accepted by the people responsible for budget decisions and the raising of revenue. Indeed, the military planners are often given a ceiling figure against which to make their budget, and the cloth of "military requirements" is cut accordingly. The amount of water in U.S. military requirements estimates has historically been large, particularly during World War II, so that the pulling and hauling between the military planners and the people holding the budgetary purse strings has been a healthy administrative tension. It is therefore quite extraordinary that in the case of the Medium Term Defense Plan, no civilian budget or finance people, in any of the individual NATO governments or in the NATO organization as such, really had a chance to screen the military requirements and argue about the size of the total requirements with the people responsible for planning under the Standing Group.

Looked at this way, it is easy to see one reason why the Medium Term Defense Plan is larger than the sum of NATO government plans for carrying it out. This reason is that most of all of the European governments do not believe that the total military requirement is as large as the military planners (including their own military people) say it is. This attitude on the part of precariously balanced Cabinets is normal, natural, and understandable. It does not, of course, mean that they *could* not take on a larger total defense load. But it does explain what they mean when they react so strongly and so uniformly against "buying the gap unseen".

The requirements picture is further complicated now by the submission of a SHAPE requirement that, in effect, competes with the MTDP for acceptance as the requirements side of the NATO balance sheet. The fact that the SHAPE plan is not costed, and that its impact on present national commitments and the country distribution of further defense loads is uncertain, simply adds to the difficulty of arriving at a firm NATO military requirement which the member Governments will agree is financially feasible. The SHAPE plan makes it difficult for the U.S. to put all its chips, in the Ottawa presentation, on a "gap analysis" based on the Medium Term Defense Plan that is already nearly two years old.

IV

Viewed in the light of these comments, the biggest task which NATO must now undertake is to develop and adopt a realistic military requirement which (*a*) gives promise of building the defenses of Western Europe to a point where the Russians can be fought effectively on the European continent, (*b*) is agreed by the whole group of NATO nations to be economically and financially feasible, and (*c*) is composed of identifiable tasks allocated to individual countries (and to the European Defense Force on the continent when it is created).

It is clear from the experience of NATO so far that a military requirement answering to this description will never be produced by separate international groups of military experts, production experts, and financial and economic experts, all sitting separately in more or less water-tight compartments. A realizable military plan must involve a combined judgment as to what is necessary from a military standpoint, what is physically possible, and what is financially and politically practical. This kind of plan will, of course, be a compromise. Presumably it will involve a larger total of national commitments than the sum of present national commitments against the MTDP. Equally probably, it will involve a total load which is less than the present estimated cost of the MTDP. It should represent the practical limit of European contribution to the defense of Europe, plus a judgment as to how much of the total U.S. security budget can and should be devoted to that same purpose. It would represent, in the last analysis, a political judgment as to what relative weight should be given to military and economic situations. It would not wholly satisfy defense ministers, chiefs of staffs, financial ministers and foreign ministers. But NATO would have, for the first time, a central plan and a common guide for the whole NATO effort—not just another "exercise".

How can such a plan be developed, and on what schedule? Two factors stand out as of special importance:

(*a*) It must be a joint production of military and economic planners, and

(*b*) it should be adopted this fall if it is to have any influence on national defense budgets for fiscal years beginning variously on January 1, April 1, and July 1, 1952.

V

The following plan of action would fit these specifications. It might produce the kind of plan described above, and on the necessary schedule. There are, no doubt, other ways of getting it done, but this seems a practical one.

1. As now intended, the U.S. would make at Ottawa a full presentation of its conclusions about the gap, followed by a discussion of the need for a military plan which is regarded by all the NATO partners as financially feasible.

2. After the necessary diplomatic preparation with the other delegations at Ottawa, the U.S. would propose (or get another delegation to propose) that a special group of high-level government experts be designated to work out and present to the Rome Council meeting a military/financial plan for the defense of Western Europe. These "experts" would be drawn as individuals primarily from the larger countries with perhaps a very few from the smaller NATO partners. In the case of the U.S., U.K., and France, at least, both a senior military and a senior economic person would be drawn into the group. General Bradley is the obvious example of a military officer for this purpose. Sir Edmond Plowden is an obvious example of an economic officer with the necessary rank and experience. (Perhaps the level should be raised still further, to include such people as Mr. Harriman.)

3. This group would consider itself responsible both for developing a practical plan and for getting it sold, at least to the executive sides of the larger governments, prior to the Rome meeting.

4. The group might well take the SHAPE plan as a military basis, and the present national commitments as a starting point for adding to total financial commitments.

5. A summary of their report would be published at some stage, presumably after the Rome meeting, so that the peoples of the NATO countries could get some idea, in broad outline, of the total military, financial and political plan to which they are being asked to contribute in their own defense.

Obviously, the important thing is not the particular mechanism by which such a plan gets put together, but the principle that the plan must be a military-cum-financial plan, *not* a military judgment in a vacuum which is then reviewed by financial experts in a vacuum. However, it is reasonably clear from the brief experience so far with the Inter-NATO Working Group that this task cannot be undertaken by a group which is three of four levels down from the top, and which has little real power to influence the participating governments.

Planning on the present basis is now bogging down in NATO. But the emergence of SHAPE as a headquarters with ideas of its own makes realistic NATO planning possible. And the certainty of an

impasse between the U.S. and the Europeans if we proceed along present lines makes a New Look necessary to the political health of the Atlantic alliance.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 253

Memorandum by the Chargé in Canada (Bliss) to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

SECRET OTTAWA, September 14, 1951.

Subject: Greece and Turkey

Today the Greek Ambassador called to give us the latest tidbits regarding the Greek-Turkey question.

1. At New York yesterday Trygve Lie gave a dinner for the Danish Delegation, at which the Greek UN representative was present. There was frank discussion of the admission question, in the course of which Thorkil Kristensen, Danish Finance Minister, indicated that he intended to make a speech at Ottawa in opposition to the admission of Greece and Turkey, apparently for the record only and for home consumption in the Socialist party. He was strongly criticised for this by Kraft, the Foreign Minister, and by Hansen, one of the delegates. In the end he appears to have agreed that he would not push the Opposition to the point of insisting that Denmark vote against the proposal. It would appear that Kristensen has so much political strength that his delegation will probably not be able to shut him off entirely.

2. The Greek Ambassador called yesterday on Heeney at External Affairs and received assurances that Canada now favors the admission proposal. A week ago the Ambassador felt that Canada was a little doubtful. He deduces that Canada has now received assurances of unqualified British support and is now therefore firmly in favor. (In our view he rather overestimates the British influence on Canada.)

3. The Portuguese delegation, according to the Greek Ambassador, started for Ottawa with the intention of opposing the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO on the ground that this should be posponed until Spain could also be considered for admission. He now understands that this intention is considerably weaker and that Portugal will probably go along.

4. His Turkish colleague, who has been working closely with the Greek Ambassador in Ottawa on this problem, has informed him that Turkey, having refused to accept a conditional invitation to membership, has now indicated that if an unconditional invitation is approved there will be no opposition to placing Turkish forces under British command in the Mediterranean.

2. Proceedings of the Session

Editorial Note

The Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council, which began meeting in Ottawa on Saturday, September 15, was the first Council Meeting of 1951, following by 9 months the previous session in Brussels in December 1950. Many of the Cabinet Ministers who attended these meetings were also involved in the ceremonies surrounding the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan in San Francisco, September 4–8; the meetings of the Boards of the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund, in Washington, September 10–14; and the bipartite and tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting in Washington, September 10–14.

More than 30 Ministers were present for the 5 days of meetings. The leading representatives of the NATO countries were as follows:

Belgium Paul van Zeeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Jean van Houtte, Minister of Finance
Colonel E. R. V. G. A. DeGreef, Minister of Defense
Andre de Staercke, Council Deputy

Canada Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs
Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defense
Douglas C. Abbott, Minister of Finance
L. Dana Wilgress, Council Deputy

Denmark Ole Bjørn Kraft, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Thorkil Kristensen, Minister of Finance
Erhard J. C. Quistgaard, Chief of Defense
V. de Steensen-Leth, Council Deputy

France Robert Schuman, Minister of Foreign Affairs
René Mayer, Minister of Finance
Georges Bidault, Minister of National Defense
Hervé Alphand, Council Deputy

Iceland Bjarni Benediktsson, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Gunnlauger Pétursson, Council Deputy

Italy Alcide De Gasperi, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
Giuseppe Pella, Minister of the Budget
Randolfo Pacciardi, Minister of Defense
Alberto Rossi-Longhi, Council Deputy

Luxembourg Pierre Dupong, Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Labor
Victor H. J. Bodson, Minister of Justice, Public Works, Transportation and Touring
André Clasen, Council Deputy

Netherlands Dirk U. Stikker, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Cornelius Staf, Minister for Defense
Pieter Lieftinck, Minister of Finance
Johannes R. M. van den Brink, Minister of Economic Affairs
Jonkheer A. W. L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh-Stachouwer, Council Deputy

Norway	Halvard Lange, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jens Hauge, Minister of Defense Eric Brofoss, Minister of Trade Johann Georg Raider, Minister in the Norwegian Foreign Office Dag Bryn, Council Deputy
Portugal	Joao Pinto da Costa Leite, Minister of the Presidency Paulo Cunha, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ruy Ennes Ulrich, Council Deputy
United Kingdom	Herbert S. Morrison, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Hugh Todd Gaitskell, Chancellor of the Exchequer Emanuel Shinwell, Minister of Defense Frederick R. Hoyer-Millar, Council Deputy
United States [1]	Dean Acheson, Secretary of State John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury William C. Foster, Administrator for Economic Cooperation Frank H. Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army Charles M. Spofford, Council Deputy

In the compilation that follows, the telegraphic reports of all the Council meetings are printed with the exception of the first formal opening ceremony. The main indicator series of telegrams sent from Ottawa during the Council meetings were Sectos and Tosecs which were normally sent from and to members of the United States Delegation. Deptos and Todeps are the series indicators for telegrams from and to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council. The United States minutes of the Council meetings are not printed but are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 92 and CF 93, and the CFM files, lot M–88, boxes 159 and 253. Both of these files also contain the preparatory papers which were written as background papers for the United States Delegation by a Steering Group within the Department of State as well as other miscellaneous supporting materials.

An attempt has been made in this compilation to note all the formal actions of the Council including a reference to the Council Document involved. The texts of the most important resolutions approved by the Council are included as they were transmitted to the Department of State in telegrams.

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[1] The entire U.S. Delegation is listed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, September 24, 1951, p. 514.

740.5/9–1651 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL OTTAWA, September 16, 1951—1 a. m.

Secto 6. This is brief report first closed session seventh meeting NAC held 3 p. m. Sept 15, Ottawa.

Agenda Item I.

Van Zeeland read opening address being distributed all dels.[2] He stressed necessity of making decisions promptly and getting on with job using best tools available rather than putting off decisions until perfect job could be done. Thought perfectionist approach had held up mil production in Eur considerably.

Agenda Item II.

Agenda approved as submitted except that Acheson suggested preliminary discussion Item VI be held immed before discussion of agenda Item IV so that WG cld be promptly established to make recommendations which cld be considered at time agenda Item VI reached. Suggestion adopted.[3]

Agenda Item IV [*III*]—World round-up.

A. *Canada* (Pearson).

1. Noting this first meeting of reorganized council representing govts, suggested Council meet 3 times per year thus assisting in planning work of NATO and avoiding public impression that meetings were result of crises calling for important decisions. Noted little lessening of World tension since Brussels with morale higher and less fear immed attack. Although West stronger, must continue work for further strength particularly in light of aggressive attitude by Russia in FE. Urged balance must be maintained between failure to rearm and pressing rearmament so fast that domestic economies became vulnerable to Russian internal attack. Thought situation Korea might make Russia turn more to tactics internal disorders. To counteract this possibility thought economic advancement of peoples must be given every consideration. Also mentioned the difference between short-term problem in next few years and long-term problem thereafter. Today historic turning point development NATO as non-mil objectives for first time under consideration. This gives opportunity plan long-term

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[1] Repeated to London, Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, Paris, Oslo, Lisbon, Rome, and Luxembourg.

[2] The text of the opening speech by the Chairman, Paul Van Zeeland, was circulated among the NATO Delegations as Council Document C7–D/8.

[3] The agenda proposed by the Council Deputies had been transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Depto 254 from London, August 23, p. 641. The proposed agenda was circulated at the Ottawa meeting as Council Document C7–D/7.

economic problems. Thought enemies were worried as much about unity of NATO as about NATO's strength. Necessary strengthen unity in face of such difficult problems as German participation in defense of West, closing gap, burden-sharing exercise and rearmament problems.

B. *Denmark* (Kraft).

1. Spoke of progress since first NAC mtg and of contribution US and Can thereto. Mentioned increasing feelings shown Strasbourg [4] that it was worth making sacrifices prevent third world war. However, economic gains of past must not be lost. Purpose of NATO to prevent war, not to win it. NATO not confined to purely military matters, but is permanent.

[2.] Organization anxious to hear Acheson's view on Item VI. Spoke of value Denmark to NATO in defense Baltic and Northern flank. Believed Denmark's contribution sometimes under-rated. Thought NATO shld be careful avoid risk war in building up its forces, particularly to avoid propaganda that NATO had aggressive designs. Mentioned that complete denial exports from West to East wld have serious consequences and increase World tension. Although appeasement is to be shunned, there are serious dangers in preparing too vigorously for war. Political problems of today common concern of small and large countries and required consultation.

C. *France* (Schuman).

1. Spoke of relationship between Fr and Ger which must be based on common institutions rather than on treaties and agreements which might be broken. Discussed conferences held Paris on Eur Army [5] stating that conferences have resulted in a report which Fr Govt was willing to accept. Stated that Ger was willing accept general principles contained in report, but that various military, legal and financial details had to be worked out. These were in the hand of subcoms. It is hoped that report can be submitted to NAC in Rome and agreement reached there after which debate in Parliament soonest to seek favorable vote on broad lines BDC [*EDC*] described briefly certain portions report relating to supra-national authority to control admin and financial aspects of EDF. EDF does not derrogate from concept of NATO, but by creating stronger Eur control thereby NATO will become stronger.

D. *UK* (Morrison).

1. Reported briefly on Bonn discussions between occupying powers and Ger concerning participation Ger in Western defense.[6] Discussions

[4] For documentation on the Council of Europe which met at Strasbourg, November 26–December 10, see volume IV.

[5] For documentation concerning the attitude of the United States towards the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community (EDC), see pp. 755 ff.

[6] For documentation concerning U.S. participation in discussions relating to contractual relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, see pp. 1446 ff.

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with Gers commenced Jan and continued until June when detailed and technical report submitted. Germany refused agree safeguards required by the occupying powers on ground it wld make her an unequal partner. After report, talks suspended because of progress made in EDF conferences. UK desired to give whole-hearted support to EDF which was bold and visionary idea which would require, however, considerable thought and work before it became a reality. UK now sending general officer to work with military comite of EDF conference in Paris.

2. On general situation, Morrison noted grounds for satisfaction that policy of containment was working as there had been no fresh Communist aggression since last mtg. Also referred to Korean fighting and cease fire talks. Mentioned problems in ME talks and four deps in Paris on agenda for proposed CFM. Noted that we are in dangerous period while relative weakness of West doesn't match strength of East. After build up West must be alert to maintain proper relative position. He called for necessity of political leadership so that morale of people maintained and they would glory in willingly accept sacrifices to avoid another war. Propaganda of the right sort cld accomplish much. Emphasized necessity for proper standard living among masses. Warned against more conciliatory propaganda line from Moscow. Thought there was no evidence of any change in Soviet intentions as dictatorships must have an enemy to keep people from looking closely at internal problems. Firmness and restraint required to weather difficult period ahead until reasonable military equality between West and East achieved. At that time situation shld be reviewed.

E. *US* (Acheson).

1. Urgency of present situation relates itself to co-existence with Soviets. He traced historically Soviet power system and noted that novel problem was that in 1917 conspiracy gained control of state without losing its character as a conspiracy. Soviets at same time stressed to their people the vulnerability of their frontiers and their inevitable victory over capitalism. Last war removed Ger and Japanese check on Soviets leaving rest of world weak and vulnerable to neutralism. ME and FE have become inflamed with nationalism and desire freedom they are not yet ready to use. Western powers demobilized. As result Soviets increased pressure on East and West to push borders out and endeavor to maintain weakness of West to achieve objective without war. Attempted to keep Germany, Korea and Japan from recovering and becoming united, attempted to divide West powers to prevent West from rearming, to make UN impotent and defeat general disarmament. Facing this problem econ policy of West in Eur has been most successful and now military efforts proceeding well. Progress is being made and problems can be solved. Soviet has made

no advance and has lost Yugo as ally. Discussed progress in FE since war and insuperable difficulties there encountered. Fighting today in many areas of FE, spread of which UN in Korea is discouraging. New treaties in Pacific will help provide for future. FE is true test of Soviet intentions if Soviets so wished fighting in Korea and Indochina wld cease. Danger of spread of Korean War is considerable and no reason to be optimistic about peace talks. Renewed attack will be met with great power. Further requests to resume talks wld be accepted. Also discussed ME problems where nationalist agitators, badly governed and exploited, used West as scape goat. Patience and firmness needed.

2. Re urgent need strengthen NATO, efforts must be made to have Ger participate in defense of West as self-respecting associate. He read prepared statement of occupying powers regarding new status being granted Ger at time EDF created. UK, France and US will only retain supervisory authority to cope with problems relating to present division of Germany and its security. In all other fields new contractual arrangements wld result occupying statute repealed, troops wld be defense forces and not occupation troops. Ambs wld take place of High Comms. Further report to NAC when negotiations concluded.

3. Final observations: (1) EDF wld be a real step forward toward Eur community and shld have full support (2) He recognized importance of standard of living of people but stated that urgent military preparation settlement of German participation and non-military objectives must be done together and at once.

740.5/9–1651 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL OTTAWA, September 16, 1951—1 p. m.

Secto 7. Report on Sat evening mtg which was continuation of afternoon mtg on item III, covering statements by Nor and Port reps: Lange urged continued emphasis on joint NATO evaluations of world situation in order each nation in determining national policies may do so on basis of common appraisals of facts. In order these periodical reviews by council may be meaningful other NATO bodies shld report fully and continuously to respective nations on developments. Lange noted if there is very real possibility of serious danger in Eur in summer of 1952, and if possible worsening of situation in Korea may be

[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Copenhagen, Brussels, The Hague, Oslo, Lisbon, Rome, Reykjavik, Luxembourg, and the Department of Defense.

taken as indication of worsening of situation in Eur, then Eur nations shld keep their forces at home in order they not find themselves overextended in face of danger. Lange supported Canad suggestion that Council reaffirm devotion of member nations to democratic foundations of society which members have in common. He noted devotion of NATO countries to democratic principles is basic binding force holding nations together. In this connection stated reports of US bilateral negotiations with Spain [2] are very disturbing to Nor people. He stated Nor wld like public assurances that US is not trying to pave way for eventual assoc of Spain with NATO.

Port rep stressed present danger and predicted an increase in tensions until western powers have achieved adequate defense level. He stressed danger of weakening internal economies of nations in striving for adequate defense against external aggression and urged continuous attention be given to strengthening economic and social fabrics of member nations. Dr. Costa Leite pointed to recent agreements with US on Azores bases as evidence of Port willingness cooperate with other NATO members. He supported Lange's emphasis on need for full consultation in NATO before national policies which affect all members are put into effect.

Van Zeeland suggested possible utility of giving greater publicity to the business before council by giving agenda in full to press, by having Council members discuss in public items being considered by Council, and by making public parts of national statement made on Item III. Acheson gave firm no to suggestions, and urged privacy of Council deliberations be maintained even at risk of offending press. He insisted that utility of council mtgs wld be destroyed if their privacy is lessened. Lange supported Acheson and chairman did not pursue suggestions any further.

It was agreed that business of Council be wound up by Thurs noon and that in order to complete agenda morning mtgs shld begin at ten and afternoon mtgs at 3 with possible evening mtg on Mon only. Chairman is endeavoring to make arrangements for simultaneous translation in order to save further time.

Mtg was adjourned until Mon, Sept 17, at 10 a. m.[3]

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[2] For documentation on the interest of the United States in Spain's participation in the defense of Western Europe, see volume IV.

[3] The following message was added to Secto 7 by telegram Secto 8, September 16. "Port expressed disagreement with Lange's statement re Spain and said that all elements of strength should be used to further defense of West. Costa Leite expressed satisfaction over developments since last year when expressed same viewpoint and said he did not share Lange's fears. However, he did not openly refer to bringing Spain into NATO." (740.5/9–1651)

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 93

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

SECRET [OTTAWA,] September 16, 1951.

Present: Mr. Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway
Mr. Acheson
Mr. Spofford
Mr. Perkins

Mr. Lange immediately raised the question of the contribution of Norway to the UN forces in Korea. He indicated that they had a shortage of trained personnel both in the non-commissioned and officer ranks. Also, they had been impressed by the pressure from SHAPE to build up their own forces as rapidly as possible. This indicated that it was unlikely that they could send the battalion requested to Korea. However, they had thought that perhaps they might send a special group trained in winter warfare which might be useful in training leaders in this field. This group would be less than a battalion but would have a belligerent status.

Mr. Acheson indicated that this was an interesting suggestion and even though not what we hoped for was far better than Norway's present lack of participation. He suggested that Mr. Lange talk with General Bradley on the feasibility of such a proposal.

Mr. Lange then raised the question as to whether the NATO should advise its Members on priority—such as Korea vs. the defense of Europe.

Mr. Acheson indicated that he felt this might cause trouble with the UN because it would look as if the NATO was setting itself up as the final arbitrator for military requirements. Therefore, he felt that these problems should be decided individually.

Mr. Lange then raised the question of the US negotiations with Spain.

Mr. Acheson replied that the United States had made it clear that it was not our intention to take Spain into the NATO. Spain has three types of facilities which are important to us: (1) anchorage rights; (2) aircraft landing rights, which is important from the point of view of refueling fighter aircraft in transit; and (3) over-flight rights. Because of these desired privileges, the United States was willing to consider reasonable requests from the Spaniards which should be (1) limited to costs of the improvements of the facilities which we desired to use and (2) reasonable economic aid. He further pointed out that he had great difficulties with public opinion in the United States which was unable to distinguish between our willingness to support Franco who was a dictator and our willingness at the same time to support Tito who was equally a dictator.

Mr. Lange pointed out that the difference between the two was that Franco split up our friends, whereas Tito split up our enemies.

Mr. Acheson pointed out that he felt it would be helpful to stress the limited objectives we were seeking and the limited aid we would be giving.

Mr. Lange said that one of the most unfortunate things about the Spanish approach was that it had coincided with our announcement concerning Greece and Turkey in the NATO. This made many of the peoples of Europe feel that we were giving up the original concept of the NAT, which was that of an integrated community, and that this idea was one that had taken hold in Europe and was growing in strength.

Mr. Acheson indicated that he hoped that something might be done under Article 2 of the NAT which would reassure the peoples of Europe.

Mr. Lange asked why Mr. Acheson had suggested a preliminary discussion of Article 6 on the agenda.

Mr. Acheson said that he felt that Item VI was worthy of hard thought, that this would not be achieved unless the discussion was focused, and, therefore, some action should be taken early in the meeting to focus the discussion when we came to Item VI.

Mr. Lange agreed but felt that any recommendations that were made should not exceed the possibilities of fulfillment.

Mr. Lange then took up the question of Greece and Turkey in the Command picture. As he understood it, Turkey in the Command structure would be out of NATO and in the Mediterranean Command. This would give Turkey a different status from other NATO countries and might set a precedent.

Mr. Acheson replied that he did not feel that this was the situation. Actually, the position of Turkey was one of added responsibilities—not a special position.

Mr. Lange then asked about the feasibility of a Middle Eastern Pact.

Mr. Acheson pointed out that this would not achieve the reciprocal guarantees which membership in NATO provided and mentioned the great difficulty of the membership problem in the organization of any Middle Eastern or Mediterranean Pact. The Middle Eastern Command would protect the Turkish flank and therefore was of great interest to the Turks. It would also be possible to bring the Commonwealth countries into such a Command and ultimately it might be possible to bring in the Arab States and Israel. This could be done without mixing up this situation with the NAT. He explained the dual relationship of the proposed Command, where Turkey as a Member of NATO would come under NATO, and in connection with Middle Eastern problems would come under the Middle Eastern Command.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 93

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

SECRET [OTTAWA,] September 16, 1951.

Subject: Meeting with Mr. Kraft

Present: Mr. Kraft, Foreign Minister of Denmark
Mr. Acheson
Mr. Spofford
Mr. Perkins

The Foreign Minister indicated that there was real opposition to the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO in his country. While the opposition which had existed in the creation of NATO, and particularly the admission of Italy into it, had been largely overcome, now that it would be faced with the admission of Greece and Turkey the opposition to the concept of NATO would start all over again and would augment tension in his country. He also said that the method of announcement had caused real trouble.

Mr. Acheson agreed that the method of announcement had been most unfortunate and completely unintended on the part of the United States.

Mr. Kraft indicated that it showed a disregard for the small Powers which was most unfortunate. He said that he would be obliged to oppose the suggestion and that the Standing Group paper was not pleasing to Denmark. He also said that the suggestion indicated in the beginning to the addition of other members into the NATO. Mr. Kraft raised the question of the power of the Standing Group in matters of this kind.

So far as Denmark was concerned, their attitude would depend on that of other countries. They might be able to reconsider their decision to oppose as they did not want to be the only ones to veto. However, before he could agree not to veto he would have to check with his Government again.

Mr. Acheson pointed out the interest which the United States had in the natural entity of the NAT. He said that he could understand that some of the countries felt that Greece and Turkey were far away and that Turkey was a country of different traditions. He further pointed out that Greece was the originator of democracy, and that the last elections in Turkey had indicated that Turkey was becoming a democratic nation in the real sense. Mr. Acheson went on to say that the real question was whether or not you were giving or getting more out of the arrangement. The protection of the southern flank of the European Command was an important element. Greece and Turkey not only protected this flank but also added real military strength to

NATO. He pointed out that if the Soviets attacked Greece and Turkey, to all intents and purposes the Western countries were committed to come to their defense, but that if we were attacked there was not a reciprocal commitment that these two countries would come to the defense of the West.

Mr. Kraft mentioned that both countries belonged to the UN.

Mr. Acheson admitted that this was true but that the UN commitments were not binding, and that if both these countries were bound and if Yugoslavia came in on the side of the West it would pin down a great many Soviet troops and keep them away from Western Europe. There were also considerable assets in Greece and Turkey from the point of view of our air forces. He felt that if NATO were one country it would be wise to make an alliance with Greece and Turkey because we were not increasing our liability but adding to our strength.

As to the Command question, Mr. Acheson indicated that if Greece and Turkey were in NATO their defense as NATO Powers would be directed from NATO as was that of other countries. But we did have to recognize that Turkey faced two ways and that this was an important factor in the geographical picture of the Middle East. The whole Middle East was of considerable importance to Europe particularly because of the oil resources and its line of communications facilities. It was also of great importance to pull the Middle East together and Turkey could help in this task. All this resulted in the dual command set-up proposed by the Standing Group.

Mr. Acheson indicated that there were three principles involved. One was that NATO was to be responsible for the territory of NATO Members. The second was that NATO was not responsible for the territory of non-members, particularly in this instance the Arab States. The third was that the common direction of effort was important and desirable. He felt that perhaps these principles should be made known and that a public report on the problem might be useful.

Mr. Kraft said that the comments of Mr. Acheson had been very helpful but that in the final analysis he had to recognize that admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO would mean additional commitments.

Mr. Acheson stated that he did not believe that the commitments were increased.

Mr. Kraft said that he felt that this might tend to precipitate war now and that the West, particularly Denmark, was not now ready. All in all, he felt it was very difficult to explain to his people. Later, if they had more time, they might be able to bring popular opinion around to support this additional membership, but indicated that this might involve a period of as much as a year or two. He then asked about the possibility of a Mediterranean arrangement.

Mr. Acheson pointed out that the great difficulty with this was that it was not a reciprocal obligation and that it was important to have reciprocal commitments from Greece and Turkey to the NAT countries.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 253

Memorandum by the Chargé in Canada (Bliss) to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

[Ottawa,] September 17, 1951.

Subject: Greek Representations

This morning the Greek Ambassador delivered to the Embassy the attached memorandum [1] with a request that its contents be brought to the attention of the U.S. Delegation. The Ambassador also requested your advice as to whether or not he should present a similar memorandum to the delegations of the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, Belgium and Iceland. He further asked for a copy of the resolution to be presented to the Council regarding the admission of Greece and Turkey.

After consultation with yourself, Mr. Perkins and Mr. McGhee this afternoon I informed the Greek Ambassador, on the authority of Mr. McGhee, that there is no occasion for concern on the part of Greece regarding the admission problem and that this memorandum raises a problem which in fact does not exist. While we feel that the delivery of the memorandum to the other countries listed would do no harm we feel that it is not really necessary. However, Mr. Perkins and Mr. McGhee felt that this Greek statement might help to reinforce our views, particularly with the United Kingdom. In the end the Ambassador stated that he would deliver the memorandum to the U.K. Delegation and not to the others. He also expressed great appreciation for the reassurances of Mr. McGhee.

In accordance with your observations on the drafting of the resolution I told the Ambassador that the United States Delegation had prepared a draft for internal delegation purposes and that nothing had occurred yesterday at the meetings between Foreign Ministers which produced any revisions in our draft. However, I declined to give him a copy of our resolution since it is for internal purposes only, and I told the Ambassador that the resolution actually to be presented to the Council will in fact be drafted by a committee appointed for the purpose. I think he would have liked to have a text to telegraph to Athens, but in the circumstances he must agree that it would serve no useful purpose.

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[1] Not reproduced.

740.5/9–1751 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL OTTAWA, September 17, 1951—11 p. m.

Secto 12. ToISA. Fol summarizes NAC meeting 10 a. m. Sept 17 which concluded item 3, had brief preliminary discussion item 6 and began item 4.

De Gasperi referred Italy position in zone of immed danger and said even if Italy's economic ills overcome, peace treaty limitations wld inhibit Italian effort. Full efforts all partners needed despite preliminary successes for which Marshall Plan largely responsible. It was now time to turn to democratic offensive and West should have dynamic propaganda policy. De Gasperi outlined value of even temporary employment for Ital labor in def effort and activation of plants now idle. He made further plea for action to remove discrimination. Re Eur def community Italy had agreed this concept all along but took into account organizational problems, especially common financing, involved in this step towards federalization. Therefore, means should be found for temporary solution which wld obtain Ger contribution to defense. Lange praised spirit of item 3 discussion, but felt summary needed to clarify its meaning. He proposed and council agreed chairman of deputies shld prepare summary which wld include appreciation of world situation. He felt document such as this wld aid govts when they went to Parliaments for funds.

Before taking up item IV council had preliminary discussion of item VI proposed by US on Sat.

Acheson opened discussion, stating time had come for careful consideration non-military aspects NATO re which it had welcomed various initiatives by Stikker. NAT was far more than defensive alliance as it represented will of peoples to develop their freedom and common heritage. Importance we attach to development NA community shld be made clear to all. Moreover, this had bearing on defense which today must counter both military and ideological aggression. Our peoples would make sacrifices more readily if they realized what they were doing was not for military reasons alone.

Wld be desirable expand present practice of exchanging views on policy matters through council and deputies and also wld be desirable endorse OEEC manifesto.[2] Obviously desirable raise living standards and thereby reduce need for artificial external assistance. Acheson suggested chairman appoint small subcomite consider with chairman

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[1] Repeated to The Hague, Paris, Oslo, Copenhagen, London, Rome, Brussels, Frankfurt, Lisbon, Reykjavik, and Luxembourg.

[2] For documentation concerning this manifesto and U.S. interest in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), see volume IV.

and chairman of deputies and other members of council means make clear importance attached by govts to non-military objectives and suggest lines of future action.

Stikker made long statement explaining he had not spoken under item III of agenda because views he wld have expressed equally appropriate under this item.[3] Analyzing Pax Sovietica, Stikker said Soviets regard politics as war by other means and their peace campaign was really act of war in Sov sense of word. He ascribed uneasiness in West Europe to worsening econ position which followed Korean war and resulting impetus for rearmament. While general willingness make sacrifices existed, any further lowering present standards wld endanger social peace on home front. Balance needed between military and economic efforts. NAT framers considered it constitutional action which they hoped wld some day give rise to NA community. Proclamation of determination establish Atlantic community might well reverse present mood of apathy and uncertainty. Govts shld examine means for practical realization this concept and movement for Atlantic federation union originating in US was of particular interest although hardly ripe for immediate use.

Even though Atlantic community long-term target, should start now provide broader platform for cooperation than afforded under present practice to clarify NATO objectives (1) common def, (2) polit coordination and frequent consultations on foreign policy, (3) econ, financial and social cooperation towards full employment, increase in productivity, progressive elimination trade barriers, stability of balances of payments, equitable production and distribution raw materials, price stabilization for essential commodities, and (4) coordination of info and cultural activities.

Stikker suggested possibility creating NATO advisory committee on info, issuance of "declaration of intentions" to move towards closer association, and endorsement of European manifesto. Declaration should set forth achievements under NATO and repeat firm intention work towards closer association and establishment of Atlantic community within framework UN. Care shld be exercised avoid duplication overlapping other orgs in this field.

Schuman stated France had always insisted on (1) avoidance excessive military character, (2) connection between social economic, and military problems, and (3) solid basis for military cooperation through establishment spiritual and economic community of interests. France supported Acheson's initiative and hoped wld lead to practical results without overlapping or competition between groups. Schuman also referred to aims of proposed committee and emphasized need to strengthen propaganda which was now primarily defensive.

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[3] Stikker's statement on the Atlantic Community was made from a prepared statement which was circulated at the meeting as Council Document C7–D/13.

Morrison agreed to proposal but said cooperation must be practical. It was well to have vision of military, economic, and social cooperation, but far better to move step by step in sensible way. Proposal accepted on basis chairman wld later submit names and terms of reference.

After brief presentation [4] SG intelligence estimate of present situation and defense capabilities, [De Greef] criticized report as not giving clear picture existing forces and efficiency. Considered report slightly frightening. Suggested council invite Eisenhower Rome.

Shinwell reviewed progress UK program, citing familiar statistics and warned against emphasis on gap rather than present plans to fulfill commitments. Made five general points: (1) Speedy political decisions on which military decisions based are essential. Cited infrastructure, stating hopeful decision be reached while here; Germany, on which progress being made: use of idle production capacity; and solution economic difficulties; (2) must meet time-phased commitments with forces fully equipped and trained for emergency action; (3) when standing forces ready task not ended. Members then must build effective reserves behind forces; (4) reserves must be ready for action in few days or few weeks; (5) prerequisite of military strength utmost cooperation in NATO, with full consultation between Defense Ministers and planners.

Claxton raised Canadian proposal for reorganization MRC,[5] citing SG treatment (i.e., SG draft report proposing country force allocations by non-SG members without full consultation) of gap as indicative inadequacy present arrangement. SG members obviously had consulted govts in accepting paper while no such chance for non-SG members review allocation.

Italy outlined plan meet present commitments on time and indicated prepared do more than treaty permits, stating already agreed in military planning to future force levels in excess treaty limits. Supported Belgian and Canadian statement as did Netherlands. Lange, while supporting Canadian reorganization proposal, stated national auths and distance partly to blame for difficulties with SG. Proposed that SG intelligence appreciation be prepared for council with a summary of discussion of agenda item III which Spofford preparing at NAC direction.

Pace welcomed frank discussion and opportunity Defense Ministers give views to SG. Emphasized importance viewing present situation in proper perspective, thought very substantial progress since Brussels, although much still remains be done. Requested Bradley speak, clear up misapprehensions re SG. Bradley said he thought discussion

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[4] General Paul Ely was the first speaker when discussion of agenda item IV began. He informed the delegations that a fuller report would be forthcoming at the Eighth Session of the Council in Rome.

[5] For documentation concerning the reorganization of NATO, see pp. 1 ff.

raised three points: (1) Re intelligence estimate it wld be of more value if allow adequate time to prepare. Also C of S of each NAT member shld have chance study SG intelligence estimate and discuss it in MC meeting Rome; (2) re gap he explained any paper must have first draft and gap treatment by SG was not in any sense allocation but first cut at problem based on best info SG cld obtain; (3) re reorganization SG he pointed out this on Rome agenda and MRC should study for discussion three.

Janne discussed DPB report, describing present system uncoordinated natl programs and problems in undertaking integrated program. DPB mission to follow and expedite natl programs, find surplus capacity, coordinate Eur production with US MDAP. Mentioned US interest in offshore procurement of ammunition and spares, and Van Zeeland pre-financing scheme. Emphasized planning must be internatl if progress to be made, suggesting NATO direction of funds for procurement. Herod described unutilized capacity in Eur which wld go long way to fill deficiencies and called for solution financial bottleneck, said DPB has no responsibility or auth do this and asked council solve fin and raw material problems.

740.5/9–1851 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET OTTAWA, September 18, 1951—1 a. m.

Secto 13. ToISA. Report on Mon afternoon mtg, continuation morning discussion Item IV, Beaulieu made remarks on FEB report re proposals to correct inequality of def burden; suggested FEB be invited complete its report with additional info re defense budgets required for implementation of commitments; stated FEB interim report tries to establish basis for distribution of burden; pointed out that US-Canadian econ power has doubled since 1938 and Eur increased by 40 percent; pointed out lack of raw materials; lack of machine tools, deterioration in B/P and increased prices; coordinated action necessary to rectify. If US econ aid below anticipated level as indicated, it wld cause some changes in Eur plans. No simple magic formula cld be devised for burden-sharing but principle of productivity cld be applied within limits. Requested NAC approve FEB analysis; requested more info on def programs and approval FEB program for further work.

Spofford made fol comments CD progress report: Deputies made progress in many fields; difficulties encountered (as in infrastructure)

[1] Repeated to The Hague, Paris, Luxembourg, Oslo, Copenhagen, London, Rome, Brussels, Frankfurt, Lisbon, and Reykjavik.

have been due in part to legal and admin practices but solution wld and must be found; glad to hear emphasis delegates placed on exchange of views; closer coordination between treaty agencies required; efforts needed bring balance between assets and requirements; greatest achievement of CD is of solidarity, unity of purpose, mutual confidence and trust.

Bidault stated Fr Govt thinks reports set forth excellently fundamental problem now before NATO, that of determining relations between mil needs and financial means; stressed urgent need for balance sheet; supported Bradley suggestion that intelligence appreciation be given at Rome.

Van Houtte (Belgium) stated only thru coordinated action can we bring about increased production; full utility of US-Canadian aid can best be achieved thru multilateral action; pointed up Bel's prefinancing scheme to solve DPB monetary problem; def budgets to be considered in FEB as only those portions of the def budgets which go to carrying out the MTDP.

Pella[2] (Ital) pointed out large part of available production and manpower capacity was in Italy and wished ways and means wld be found to utilize this lest potential source of strength become weakness; favorably impressed with US decision to use off-shore procurements; FEB report was first step in effort to bring equilibrium and urged rapid conclusion of this work; wished FEB not only consider budgetary aspects of the problem but also take acct of countries available resources.

Abbott (Canada) stated it was Canada's hope that reports wld bring out facts upon which govts can decide on political basis fair distribution of burden; hoped that then wld be no agreement by experts as to burden-sharing as this was matter for political determination by govts.

Van den Brink[3] (Neth) pointed out all countries know their fair part and do not like to see pressures brought to bear to do more; stressed Neth terrifically exposed world trade conditions; reaffirmed views that it ready to do fair share.

Kristensen of Den attacked principles underlying burden-sharing formula; stated def expenditures for this exercise shld be restricted to NATO costs; that NAT income must be adjusted to acct for unused and undeveloped resources as it is future we are interested in, not past; requested that FEB study impact on countries if more required; sighted deteriorating B/P and inflationary trends; launched into Den position on East-West trade stating that West derived more advantage from Eastern trade than disadvantages.

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[2] According to the United States minutes of this meeting (US MIN–4), this statement was made by the Italian Minister of Defense, Pacciardi, rather than by Pella (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 93).

[3] According to the minutes cited above, this statement was made by the Netherlands Minister of Finance, Lieftinck.

Gaitskell (UK) stressed need for making distinction between paper plans and plans of action and stated UK plan was latter; real problem is not financial but econ; stressed need for closer collaboration between FEB and DPB; UK like Den lives by trade; UK will do everything increase coal exports; be mistake to assume we can increase defense efforts, standard living and still maintain favorable B/P and have no inflation; if milit situation is so dangerous then we must simply fill mil requirements by revising out econ policies and put them on war footing.

Mayer of Fr said we must never lose sight of two hypotheses as both being equally probable though contradictory (1) sudden attack in near future and (2) long period of cold war with its intense mil preparations; pointed out Fr's poor financial-econ status due to shortages and increased prices of resources and US reduced econ aid.[4]

Costa Leite (Portugal) pointed out great disparity of resources among countries stating that formula for determining burden has limited significance; stressed fact that Portugal is but small poor agric country but that she was ready to make max effort.

Brofoss stated Nor had made many sacrifiices and was confronted with inflationary problems and requested that FEB be invited study this problem.

Acheson restated US position re East-West trade.[5] Foster stated that US was confident that countries can get job done; urged that consideration be given to reduce traffic barriers; gave comparative figures between Western and Soviet bloc production capacity and pointed out that speedy effective high-level conversion and mobilization of this preponderance of resource will mean ready mil power. Snyder restated that mil effort can be achieved with maintenance of econ stability and pointed out that inflationary trends were not restricted to Eur area. Pace reassured Council of US desire to coordinate US aid with Eur production and that US planned to go forward with substantial off-shore procurement.

Van Zeeland proposed that deputies prepare paper on exchange of views for future meeting in order focus proposals and suggestions. Acheson supported.

Council launched into item V. Acheson and Pace set forth advantages to be gained by NATO with adherence of Greece and Turkey to Pact and gave reasons for proposed command org of Middle East. Morrison fol with support for full membership; Schuman and Stikker also supported US proposal but called attention to fact that their parliaments had to ratify. Other dels to be heard from tomorrow.

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[4] According to the minutes cited above, a brief recess followed Mayer's remarks. Costa Leite resumed the discussion when the evening meeting opened at 6: 10 p. m.

[5] For documentation concerning the interest of the United States in East-West trade, see vol. I, p. 993 ff.

Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 092.2 North Atlantic Treaty

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley) to the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe (Eisenhower)

TOP SECRET US EYES ONLY OTTAWA, September 18, 1951—3:51 a.m.
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE NOFORN NO DISTRIBUTION

As you know, the problem of admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO and the associated question of a unified Middle Eastern Command under a British Commander to include Turkish forces is foremost on the Agenda of the Ottawa Meeting. This project is fully supported by the US and UK, but a few nations are doubtful and hesistant primarily for political reasons. However, present reading of the situation indicates eventual acceptance during the Ottawa meeting.

France concurs in admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO but advances two conditions to her acceptance of Middle East Command concept. One condition to her acceptance relates to the status of a French senior officer in the Middle East Command. We believe this can be satisfactorily resolved. The second condition relates to a French Naval Command in the Western Mediterranean.

US position in this matter has been governed by JCS guidance which reads as follows:

"(a) That there should be only two principal allied Naval Commands in the Mediterranean, one subordinate to SACEUR and the other subordinate to SACME, each primarily responsible for the support of his respective supreme commander.

(b) That all naval activities in the Mediterranean be within and subordinate to either of these two Naval Commands except coastal activities.

(c) That all naval operations in the Mediterranean be conducted by these two Commanders and in those areas and tasks where responsibilities overlap, the necessary coordination of plans and operations be worked out by them or their delegated subordinates.

(d) That in view of Shapto 25,[1] it is appropriate to recognize French and Italian naval responsibilities in the Western Mediterranean with the understanding that these commands will be within the Naval Command structure for CinC Southern Europe for overall command and coordination, and for the assignment of tasks along either area or functional lines as necessary for the accomplishment of the primary mission of support of SACEUR's southern flank."

In order to meet the demands of the French and the desire of our Department of State, it has been suggested that we go somewhat be-

[1] Not found in Department of State files.

yond this position and your Shapto 25 by submitting the following proposal to the French:

"The Standing Group agrees that the Naval Command in the area of the Western Mediterranean situated west of Sardinia should be exercised by a French admiral.

"This Command will be within SHAPE's Southern Naval Command. The latter will retain and exercise in this zone such functional responsibilities as may be necessary for the accomplishment of his missions. Overall command will be exercised by the Naval Commander under CinC Southern Europe.

"Subject to the foregoing, the Terms of Reference of the French Naval Commander will be in harmony with those of the Commanders of adjacent areas."

The last sentence in this proposal considered in relation to the first sentence is primarily for French public consumption at the time of the announcement of the British Commander Middle East and US Commander of the Atlantic. Our interpretation of this last sentence would place the French Command west of Sardinia in co-equal status with a corresponding possible Italian Command east of Sardinia, and on this basis the paragraph appears acceptable.

The French have not accepted this proposal and we are advised that this proposal somewhat modified may have been discussed by the French Government with you.

We are reluctant to get into the details of your previously approved Command arrangements but may be forced to do so for French political reasons in order to assuage French public at the time of the announcement of the other two Commands. I am presenting this picture to you in order that you may know my views on the matter and to invite your comments should you desire to send them. Should you desire to comment, your views should reach us as soon as possible, as the Greek and Turkish problem will be voted on in the Atlantic Council prior to adjournment on Thursday.

[BRADLEY]

740.5/9–1851 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

SECRET OTTAWA, September 18, 1951—5 p. m.

Secto 15. ToISA. Tuesday a. m. session began 10 a. m. resuming discussion Greece and Turkey. Fol discussion Dane said he needed consult

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[1] **Repeated to The Hague, Paris, Oslo, Copenhagen, London, Rome, Brussels, Frankfurt, Lisbon, and Reykjavik.**

536-688 PT 1--81---45

Copenhagen so council next took up item VII since steering comite appointed consider item VI not ready report.

. . . . . .

Shinwell noted were number of matters in reports of primary concern to Defense Minister and proposes Defense Ministers retire to consider their problems, reporting to council later. Referred again to "paper plans" which would not meet commitments even if finances and equipment available and urged frank talk among Ministers about reserves, terms conscription, deployment naval forces, etc.

Claxton stressed value all Ministers being exposed to all aspects NATO work and suggested full council have opportunity participate general discussion before Defense Ministers withdrew for frank technical talks. Benediktsson made general statement, citing US base agreement under NATO and lauding US spirit of equality in negotiations. Pace agreed separate mtg, proposing frank session Defense Ministers fol by report to council for further discussion. Italy agree, provided there wld be detailed report for council consideration.

Acheson proposed opportunity be taken for mtg Foreign Ministers have preliminary discussion item VIII. Pointed out had been considerable informal discussion among dels and confusion re proposal apparent. Stikker suggested Finance Ministers attend also, which agreed.

After several dels indicated desire have Defense Ministers participate discussion item VIII, agreed adjourn plenary session, Defense Ministers remaining to consider reports. Foreign Ministers and Finance Ministers reconvene three p. m. for preliminary consideration item VIII to be joined by Defense Ministers at close their mtg.

740.5/9–1851 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET OTTAWA, September 18, 1951—6 p. m.

Secto 16. Re final paragraph Secto 15.[2] Shinwell opened Defense Ministers consideration country reports on defense effort emphasizing concern over readiness existing NAT forces in being. SACEUR report to SG cause for concern since not only was prospect mtg overall requirements not encouraging but worse still existing commitments not being effectively met. He stressed vital necessity of having existing forces and those currently being raised battle worthy. Not only must standing forces be battle ready but majority of reserves must be ready for action by D plus 30. If reserves only ready subsequently might be too late. Shinwell felt situation required frank discussion.

De Greef (Belgium) chairing Defense Ministers agreed on necessity effective forces which in turn depend on length military service, proper mobilization procedures, basic and advanced unit training, etc.

Bidault agreed in principle and indicated French program wld achieve this result.

Claxton gave long detailed report on Canadian effort assuring Canada wld meet DC–28 [3] commitments on time.

Danish rep indicated Denmark planning meet commitments.

De Greef stressed importance Defense Ministers needling govts to agree on infrastructure. Also asked General Bradley to specify adequate length of military service. Bradley replied that this involved different national considerations of geography, manpower, etc. and felt it unappropriate for him to answer. If Defense Ministers wished this they shld request it of MC.

Shinwell then proposed Defense Ministers recommend council ask SG to request SHAPE and other NATO commands to report to MC prior Rome council meeting on readiness of NAT forces allocated and earmarked for SHAPE. Defense Ministers agreed on test of recommendation to be submitted to afternoon plenary session. Fol is text of recommendation subsequently approved by council which also agreed invite General Eisenhower to Rome meeting (See immediately following telegram [4]): "In accordance with request of council, Ministers of Defense recommended: (1) forwarding reports on each country's defense effort to standing group and military rep comite for transmission to SHAPE and other commands as appropriate; (2) asking standing group to request SHAPE and other NATO commands: (*a*) to submit

[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Copenhagen, Brussels, Luxembourg, The Hague, Oslo, Lisbon, Rome, and Reykjavik.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] See footnote 4, p. 626.

[4] *Infra.*

to military comite for next meeting of council in Rome an appreciation of the readiness and effectiveness of forces allocated and earmarked for NATO which, in their view can be immediately available for battle in event of war breaking out; and (*b*) to suggest any military steps which shld be taken to improve immediate availability of forces."

740.5/9–1851 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET OTTAWA, September 18, 1951—7 p. m.

Secto 17. Council reconvened in plenary session Tuesday p. m. and unanimously approved Defense Ministers recommendations re item VII: (*a*) fol reports tabled NAC re country's defense effort to SG and MRC for SHAPE and other NATO commands, (*b*) ask SG to request SHAPE and other NATO commands (1) to submit to MC for NAC mtg Rome an appreciation of readiness and effectiveness of forces which can be made immediately available for battle, (2) to suggest any mil steps which shld be taken to improve immediate availability of forces and (*c*) to invite General Eisenhower to proceed to Rome to give appraisal and recommendations.

Secretary Pace circulated prepared US report on defense effort [2] without making it basis for discussion. He fully supported early readiness proposals and stressed that US making both "early plans and later plans" to encompass situation ahead.

Claxton made announcement that upon SHAPE's recommendation, Canada planned to send in new brigade group to form part of northern army forces with UK-Belgian-Netherlands forces.

Council closed discussion item VII, adjourned until 10 a. m. Wednesday when will discuss draft report from WG on item VI.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Copenhagen, Luxembourg, Brussels, The Hague, Oslo, Lisbon, Rome, and Reykjavik.

[2] The statement by Pace concerning the defense effort of the United States was circulated as Council Document C7–D/17, September 18, 1951.

740.5/9–2051 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET OTTAWA, September 20, 1951—1 a. m.

Secto 27. During sessions of Council September 19 [2] consideration given to resolution submitted by five power sub-committee under Item VI, three papers proposed with reference Item IV on future meetings, order of business, and DPB and FEB reports, and paper prepared by special meetings of Ministers on Item VIII. Resolution proposed on Item VIII creating high level temporary committee to study coordinated analysis defense plans was approved by Council (Secto 23) [3] as was resolution on defense production and financial problems (Secto 24).[4] Council will meet Thursday a. m. to consider papers mentioned still under consideration and to continue discussion Item V suspended from Tuesday morning meeting.

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[1] Repeated to The Hague, Paris, Oslo, Copenhagen, London, Rome, Luxembourg, Brussels, and Frankfurt for Handy.

[2] This telegram, not printed, reported on the proceedings of the eighth and ninth meetings of the Council at 10:00 a. m. and 3 p. m. on Wednesday, September 19.

[3] *Infra.*

[4] Not printed; it informed the Department of State concerning the substance of the resolution which was circulated at the meetings as Council Document C7–D/20. The resolution noted the reports of the various agencies of NATO as called for in agenda item IV and requested closer coordination between all NATO agencies, civilian and military (740.5/9–1951).

The progress reports from the Standing Group, the Defense Production Board, the Financial and Economic Board, and the Council Deputies were circulated as Parts I–IV of Council Document C7–D/1. The report of the Chairman of the Council Deputies, which is printed in full on pp. 272–279, was circulated as Council Document C7–D/3.

At opening of morning meeting Council took up proposed declaration on future development NATO [5] setting forth concept that peoples of NA Community are united to preserve their freedom and develop their common heritage of democracy, liberty and rule of law. Fol brief preliminary discussion, Council adjourned until 3 p. m., to study text. During break private meeting of one Minister from each country called at suggestion chairman to consider further proposed [goals] under Item VIII. Discussion re Item VI proposal continued at afternoon session with several proposals for minor revisions. No significant discussion aside from slight dispute on possible mention of UN, proposed by Morrison and defended by Acheson. De Gasperi expressed gratitude efforts of Ministers meet Italian concern re discriminatory treaty provisions though these not mentioned. Lange suggested consideration be given at some point in future deliberations to associating Parliamentary reps in Council work.

Fol another break Council took up and approved Item VIII resolution.[6] Spofford pointed out NATO coordinating group now serving CD wld continue and function as means of providing info to proposed high level committee. NATO coordinating group *ad hoc* body and therefore proposed committee created no jurisdictional problem. Council next turned attention papers submitted under Item IV.[7] Adopted proposal covering DPB and FEB reports, with Neth rep noting smaller countries wld have difficulty coming up to high and expensive standards of performance which might be possible on part of other countries. Proposal re order of business set aside for further study and consideration Thursday.

Finally Council agreed that more frequent regular meetings NAC should be held three or four times a year but postponed final action re date and place of next meeting. UK rep pointed out British Government wld require two to three weeks after October 25 elections before it cld properly participate in Council mtg and Schuman called attention possible conflict with UN in event postponement.

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[5] The declaration referred to here was read by Van Houtte, discussed, and then circulated as Council Document C7–D/18 for individual study before further discussion. For action on this resolution, see telegram Secto 32 from Ottawa, September 20, p. 683 and footnotes thereto.

[6] See *infra* and footnotes thereto.

[7] See footnote 4 above.

740.5/9–1951 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL OTTAWA, September 19, 1951—8 p. m.

Secto 23. ToISA. Fol resolution approved NAC this afternoon re agenda Item VIII[2] subj only possible minor language changes:

The North Atlantic Council, convinced:

(1) That the creation of adequate strength, based on a sound econ foundation, to deter aggression and provide for the defense of the North Atlantic area requires the cooperative marshalling and most effective use of the resources of the NAT countries.

(2) That there is required as an immed next step an analysis of the issues involved in reconciling on the one hand the requirements of external security, in particular of fulfilling a militarily acceptable NATO plan for the defense of Western Eur with, on the other hand, the realistic politico-economic capabilities of member countries.

(3) That such an analysis must not interfere with urgently required further steps to fulfill present national commitments for force contributions.

Agreed:

(1) That a temporary committee of the Council be formed to carry out the analysis afore said and to submit to the Council its findings, including possible course of action.

(2) That the committee shall consist of individuals appointed by each of the member govts who are either Ministers of or closely related to the govt of their respective countries and who are particularly qualified for this special task. The committee shall elect from among its members a chairman and one or two vice-chairmen. An executive bureau will be formed; it will be composed of the chairman, the vice-chairmen, and any other members whom the committee may choose to appoint, if necessary, according to circumstances, with a view to expediting the work of the committee.

(3) That the committee shall be entitled to call for information, advice and assistance from all members govts.

(4) That all military and civilian NATO agencies are hereby directed to give the committee such assistance as it shall require. Arrangements to this end may be worked out in consultation with the Council Deputies and the *ad hoc* NATO joint working group, and may include, for example, statement by the responsible military agency, for planning purposes, of time-phased country-allocated force and infrastructure requirements for the defense of Western Eur; an examination of the organization and equipment of basic national military units with regard to their contemplated roles in the defense of Western Eur, their training and operating requirements (including infrastructure) and the making of recommendations on economy measures to

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[1] Repeated to The Hague, Paris, Luxembourg, Oslo, Copenhagen, London, Rome, Brussels, and Frankfurt.

[2] This resolution was circulated as Council Document C7–D/19 Final, "Resolution for Coordinated Analysis of NATO Defense Plans."

obtain effective military force requirements at minimum cost; a review of the production capabilities existing in the various countries so as to enable the supply of standardized or non-standardized military items for the equipment of necessary forces as expeditiously as possible and at minimum cost; the costing of defense requirements; and the analysis of production, financial and econ possibilities and implications.

(5) That the committee shall make a progress report to the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council and shld complete its analysis and report its findings to the Council not later than first Dec 1951.[3]

[3] On September 26, President Truman announced his appointment of W. Averell Harriman as U.S. Representative to the TCC. For the official announcement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 8, 1951, p. 572.

740.5/9–1951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President

SECRET NIACT OTTAWA, September 19, 1951—midnight.

Secto 25. For the President from Secretary. Council session has been noteworthy for harmony and for increasing sense cooperation between PC's. While difficulties coordinating fully govt actions twelve sovereign countries remain great, community spirit developing and US leadership always recognized as unavoidable is increasingly accepted. I was especially pleased by comments reps of Den and Iceland with whom we recently concluded base agreements. Both expressed full appreciation for manner in which US conducted negotiation and paid homage to democratic sense equality which US displayed notwithstanding huge discrepancy size and power of parties.

Ottawa session also significant as first NAC attended by DefMins and FinMins as well as FonMins in accordance with last spring's reorganization of NATO structure. While presence of so many Mins somewhat delayed proceedings, I believe distinct benefits will be derived from this personal participation of three senior Cabinet officials each govt. This should lead to broader understanding complexity of our security tasks. There has been minimum speaking for record and all have displayed real desire come to grips with problems.

It is, of course, too soon fully assess result of session as only ends tomorrow. In judging results to date you should bear in mind the objectives which we had set for ourselves at this session. Primary purpose was obtain favorable action on admission Greece and Turkey. In addition, we wished pave way for acceptance by exec branches of NATO govts of solid military plan at subsequent NAC in Rome. Our third major objective was reassure our NATO allies increasingly fearful that US considered NATO only as mil alliance without regard for econ and soc realities or cultural matters. This concern recently enhanced by our pressure for admission Greece and Turkey, especially latter,

which Scandinavian and others were reluctant to accept as lacking Eur, Christian and democratic background. While a handicap in this instance, the seriousness with which these countries considered NATO as nucleus for gradually developing North Atl community holds promise for future.

Greece–Turkey item introduced Mon and fully supported by US. UK, Fr and Italy. Other countries expressed varying degrees acceptance with Nor and Dutch stressing that their action due to desire not block will of majority. This would have resulted from their negative vote because of unanimity rule. Danish rep said not permitted by his instructions to vote aye. Discussion interpreted to permit Dan rep request new instructions from Copenhagen and will resume tomorrow when I expect favorable action by council. This action will take for recommendation to govts that they invite Greece and Turkey join NAT. As preliminary action required by constitutions most countries, we must expect delay two or three months before Greece–Turkey accede. This, however, will not prevent talks with Greek-Turkish govts with view establishing command set-up.

Re non-mil aspects NATO press has displayed fanciful imagination in reporting alleged action and decisions. We have done our utmost to rebut allegations that we have committed ourselves to econ programs for Eur at expense US taxpayer. We have made no such commitment of any kind. We have supported resolution estab ministerial comite consisting of Bel, Can, Ital, Dutch and Nor reps to make recommendations on (*a*) pol coordination and frequent consultation on foreign policy; (*b*) closer econ, fin and soc cooperation within NAT organization or thru other agencies; (*c*) collaboration in fields cultural and public info.

Re offshore procurement, we only expressed interest in helping use idle equipment facilities which would also provide Eur with some needed foreign exchange and would also develop alternate sources mil production which could be most useful under war time conditions shipping shortages. No figure mentioned as to amount such US procurement.

Re hastening acceptance firm mil plan, council has taken a major step this general subject, now generally referred to as "operation wisemen". Resolution adopted today provides for temporary comite of twelve reps of Cabinet rank and on which I hope Averell Harriman will serve as US rep and we expect, would be elected chairman. There will be a small exec comite consisting of chairman and vice chairman. Resolution directs all NATO agencies (this includes SHAPE) to place their services full disposal comite. Purpose is to make synthesis starting with valuable work done by deps and NATO agencies in mil, econ and fin fields but which have not yet been fitted together. It is hoped comite members will be statesmen with broad vision who will

tackle problem both in terms of requirements of mil situation and of econ and fin potential. Every effort will be made by comit insure most severe screening mil requirements while at same time seeking ways and means use most efficiently econ strength of West to pay the bill without disrupting economies. Comite instructed to present interim report Rome and "findings" no later than Dec 1. I hope this work will lead to economically feasible and militarily adequate plan to insure security NATO countries.

Most report grave worry Eur countries over deterioration their internal economies under impact post Korea defense programs has been unanimous. All have stressed that mil build up at accelerated rate which US has been advocating would result in run-away inflation and econ chaos, would foster communism and thus be self-defeating.

While next meeting had been generally though informally accepted as in Rome, Oct 29, UK elections Oct 25 now leaves question open as to place and date of future meeting. We have not had time discuss with other delegations this problem. Until we can make more definite plans, appears advisable not to comment.

ACHESON

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 93

Memorandum of Conversation, by Ridgway B. Knight of the Office of European Regional Affairs [1]

TOP SECRET [OTTAWA, September 20, 1951.]

Subject: Middle East Command and Greece and Turkey

Participants: The Secretary
Mr. Morrison, UK Foreign Minister
Mr. Schuman, French Foreign Minister
General Bradley
Air [Chief] Marshal Sir John [*William*] Elliot, British Member, Standing Group
General Piatte, Deputy to General Ely, French Member, Standing Group.

Mr. Schuman outlined the French position as follows: The French Delegation had received instructions to vote for the admission of Greece and Turkey at the Ottawa meeting of the NAC. However, with reference to the Middle East Command it was impossible for him to go beyond acceptance in principle of this command. He outlined the two French reservations which had already been communicated to the UK and to the US during the Tripartite Discussions in Washington on

[1] Knight was Coordinator of International Conferences for the period September through November 1951.

12–14 September. These would have to be satisfied before the French Government could give its final approval.

(*a*) *French assistant to the Middle East Commander:* Mr. Schuman submitted a paragraph outlining the French position. (Admiral Wright has the only copy given to us, together with the translation done on the spot)[2]. Substantially, the French requested that there be a French major general who will serve as assistant to SACME, and receive appropriate responsibilities and authority to discharge these responsibilities within the geographical limit of the Middle East Command.

(*b*) *Command set-up in the Western Mediterranean:* Mr. Schuman also submitted a paragraph outlining the French position. (Admiral Wright has the only copy given to us, together with the translation done on the spot.[2]) The heart of this French reservation is to the effect that the command must be geographic in nature rather than functional and that the French admiral in command thereof should have a status "analogous" to that of the naval commanders in adjacent areas. The French insist that their admiral who already has the functional responsibility for protecting the LOC between southern France and North Africa, receive a geographic command in addition thereto. However, this geographical command would not include those functional responsibilities which would have to be attributed directly to Admiral Carney.

The Secretary and Mr. Morrison pointed out that this French reservation could constitute a major problem depending on exactly what the French had in mind: Was it proposed that the French admiral come directly under General Eisenhower (through interpretation of the word "analogous" applying to the relationship between the French admiral and Admiral Carney) or would the French be willing to have the Admiral serve under orders of Admiral Carney (through interpretation of "analogous" to other naval commanders subordinate to Admiral Carney)? It was also pointed out that whatever arrangement was established should be entirely satisfactory to General Eisenhower as the first mission of all allied naval forces in the Mediterranean was the support of SACEUR.

Mr. Schuman answered that the French Government was not excluding the possibility that their admiral would be subordinate to Admiral Carney, but that this was a point which could not be settled by itself, but would have to be part and parcel of an all-over settlement of the French Command for the geographical naval command in the Mediterranean which should provide minimum satisfaction to French aspirations. He referred to French public and parliamentary opinion which would be very insistent and vocal on this subject.

Mr. Acheson summed up to the effect that a decision could obviously not be reached today as he was not qualified in this highly technical

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[2] Not attached to the source text.

military field and that General Bradley would have to consult with the other US Chiefs of Staff as well as confer with General Eisenhower. Likewise, Mr. Morrison indicated that he would be obliged to consult his Government and the UK chiefs of staff. The Secretary then proposed that first things be considered first and that the three powers vote in favor of admission of Greece and Turkey at the Council Meeting in the afternoon and agree to postpone the settlement of the questions pertaining to the M.E. Command, which however important they were, had a lower priority. The Secretary proposed that subsequent to favorable action by the Council, General Bradley, whom the US Government intended to send to Turkey to discuss the Middle East Command and obtain Turkish views as to Turkish participation therein, together with a British military representative (Mr. Morrison subsequently designated Field Marshal Slim) stop over in Paris on their way to Turkey. In Paris General Bradley and Field Marshal Slim would discuss the Western Mediterranean Naval Command problem with General Eisenhower and the French staff. It was hoped that these conversations would be successful and that a French military representative of high rank would then join his British and American colleagues and proceed with them to Ankara where all three would talk with their Turkish opposite numbers. (Jointly or severally, the point was not made clear but the inference was that the three representatives would speak jointly with the Turkish staff.)

Messrs. Morrison and Schuman accepted this procedure and General Bradley stated that he hoped these conversations in Paris could take place within a week to ten days.

Mr. Morrison raised the question as to whether mention should be made in the British communication to the Turkish Government that the principle of an integrated Middle East Command had been accepted by the US and by the French.

Mr. Schuman said that unfortunately this was not yet a fact. While he had expressed agreement in principle to the Middle East Command, he had specifically stated that final and definite approval could only be forthcoming after minimum satisfaction of France's reservation relating to the Western Mediterranean. It was thereupon agreed that all three governments could only refer to their own views and to actions they had taken or proposed to take themselves and would not refer to the other two powers.

In the course of the conversation, Mr. Schuman stressed to Mr. Morrison that it had to be thoroughly understood that in voting that afternoon for the resolution pertaining to the admission of Greece and Turkey in NATO, France and [*in*?] committing itself only to the precise language of the resolution and that in so doing France was not committing itself to anything beyond that language (i.e., he wished to

make abundantly clear to Mr. Morrison that in voting for the admission of Greece and Turkey, he was accepting no commitment—direct or implied—in regard to the Middle East Command).

740.5/9–2051 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY OTTAWA, September 20, 1951—7 p. m.

Secto 32. NAT mtg concluded 4:15 p. m. after fol action today:

1. Adopted res recommending to govts they undertake steps necessary to enable invitation be issued Greece–Turkey accede to NATO. Council also took note of protocol which deps wld shortly sign to accomplish steps required bring about accession.[2]

2. Adopted final communiqué including announcement council agreed recommend to govts that Greece–Turk be invited accede.[3]

3. Adopted res under item VI (future development of NATO) on NAT community.[4]

4. Adopted res on item IV requesting certain action by NATO agencies fol up reports presented to this session.[5]

5. Council took note under item IV (other business) of agreement on infrastructure. It also agreed to Nor suggestion that CD study and recommend procedures to restrain leakage council business to press during mtg.

6. Re implementation item VIII (wise men res) council decided that if countries had not designated reps, substitute cld attend first mtg which wld be held Paris earliest possible time.

7. In view statement by Morrison that regardless outcome elections UK cld not participate mtg late Oct, council decided arrange date for Rome mtg thru CD.

8. Van Zeeland turned chairmanship over to Pearson of Canada at end of mtg.

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[1] Repeated to The Hague, Paris, Oslo, Copenhagen, London, Rome, Brussels, and Frankfurt.

[2] The draft resolution concerning the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO was circulated as Council Document C7–D/23 (Revised) of September 20; the protocol that accompanied it was circulated as Council Document C7–D/25 of September 20. Both the resolution and the protocol texts were transmitted to the Department of State once they were approved; see telegram Secto 31 from Ottawa, September 20, p. 689.

For a more detailed account of the discussion concerning the accession of Greece and Turkey which took place in the Council, see telegram Secto 33 from Ottawa, September 20, *infra*.

[3] For text of the final communiqué see p. 691.

[4] This resolution was circulated as Council Document C7–D/18 Final, "Future Development of NATO, Other Than in Connection with Defense Plans"; the text of the resolution as adopted by the Council was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 29 from Ottawa, September 20, p. 687.

[5] This resolution was circulated as Council Document C7–D/21, "Draft Resolution with Respect to Item IV of Agenda" of September 19; the text of the resolution as adopted by the Council was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 28 from Ottawa, September 20, p. 686.

Highlights of debate were as follows: Prior adoption res upon future development of NATO Mayer of France suggested amendment emphasizing promotion stability and well-being through NATO and other agencies during rearmament period. Fol debate in which Acheson pointed out this item supposed to relate to long term measures, amendment was modified decreasing somewhat emphasis on measures for purposes economic improvement and indicating these shld be applicable both during rearmament period and thereafter.

Before adoption item IV res calling on NATO agencies for certain reports to next council mtg Pace in accordance position previously taken proposed amendment to provision which implied DFB cld take steps integrate defense production programs only after adoption by member countries. Council accepted amendment indicating DPB cld endeavor integration during formative period such programs.

(Text docs adopted by council being reported separately; also for additional info re Greece–Turk see separate tel.[6])

As CD cld not conclude procedural aspects Greece–Turkey admission before lunch, council resumed discussion this item after lunch.

On the communiqué, language was provided covering the agreement on infrastructure and after some debate it was agreed to retain the term "infrastructure" in the communiqué. Pace made point NATO criticism in important US quarters has centered on purported failures infrastructure problem so that report of progress shld make positive reference using this term. Text communiqué pouched separately.[7] Chairman congratulated everyone and adjourned the seventh session of the council.

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[6] The telegrams referred to here are accounted for in footnotes 2–5.

[7] The text of the communiqué was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 30 from Ottawa, September 20, which is not printed. For the formal text, as presented to the press on September 21, see p. 691.

740.5/9–2051 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET OTTAWA, September 20, 1951—8 p. m.

Secto 33. Fol receipt of instr by Danish FonMin permitting him vote favorably, NAC this p. m. agreed recommend to govts they take steps accordance their respective procedures to enable invitation be extended to Greece–Turkey to accede NAT. Matter came to council for action in form recommendation from CD that council adopt res, and take note

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[1] Repeated to The Hague, Paris, Oslo, Copenhagen, London, Rome, Brussels, Frankfurt, Ankara, and Athens.

of protocol which CD members proposed sign on behalf of govts when duly authorized.

Protocol had to be entirely separate document because, contrary earlier indications (Secto 19, Sept 18) [2] Fr delegation unable accept, for domestic political reasons, US procedure suggested under which protocol was annexed to res. It was therefore impossible to commit council fully to protocol itself. No major substantive changes in text of protocol or proposed amendment Art 6 which appears therein (but not in res). Text of amendment as follows:

"For the purpose of Art V an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack (1) on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the territory of Turkey and on the islands of any of the parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; (2) on the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the parties were stationed on the date when the treaty came into effect, or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer."

Van Zeeland, as outgoing chairman, has formally notified Gr and Turk Ambs in Ottawa, five p. m. today (ref Secto 22, Sept 19).[2]

When debate resumed on Gr–Turk in council this p. m. Nor and then Denmark announced their agreement followed later by Port and Netherlands, subj to same reservations as before incl principle of equality of rights and obligations. Morrison stated imperative enter into preliminary discussions with Gr and Turk and that US proposed to make exploratory approach.

Debate ensued when Stikker insisted he wld be unable explain command position to his Parliament and thought preliminary discussions shld be held first with all members NAT before they were undertaken with Gr–Turk. If this not done, action in some legislatures might be prejudiced. Stikker also objected to Fr suggestion that Gr–Turk might be present at Rome as observers as this wld be prejudice freedom of decision by govts who had to ratify necessary steps to admit. Fr suggestion was then dropped.

One other difficulty which arose was objection Italy to any amendment Art 6, and its suggestion that treaty be amended by interpretation. This suggestion also dropped.

Although Stikker had pressed his point, debate passed off with no evidence of serious lack of harmony and US, UK and Fr paid tribute to spirit in which Danes and others had accommodated themselves to views of majority.

In course of debate, Acheson alluded to words "armed attack" in Articles 5 and 6 and said he felt it valuable to recall that general in-

[2] Not printed.

terpretation these words has been and is that such attack was one of national significance and not merely local incident as for instance one due to mistake of subordinate mil commander. This was, he felt, reflected in Art 5 language that each party shld take "such action as it deemed necessary" and thus reaction govts cld be adapted to nature and seriousness of attack.

740.5/9–2051 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET OTTAWA, September 20, 1951—1 p. m.

Secto 28. ToISA. Fol test [*text?*] res approved NAC this morning re agenda Item IV: [2]

North Atlantic Council: With respect to reports presented to seventh session by NAT agencies:

(1) Request that the MilCom, in its report to next mtg of Council, include: (*a*) Estimate of relative strength and capabilities of NATO and Soviet bloc forces at present and in immed future; (*b*) Comments on proposals for reorganization NATO mil structure.

(2) Request that CD, in relation to report requested from MilCom in para 1(*a*) above, provide similar estimate concerning industry and economic resources.

(3) Request that DPB, in considering production programs, keep itself informed of progress in each country in actual placing of production orders and deliveries of finished material.

(4) Request that FEB, in analysing financial and economic efforts, with respect to defense, of each member govt and of group as whole, keep itself informed of actual execution of budgets and financial programmes, and especially of commitments and payments made.

(5) Request that DPB explore and develop means obtain integration of defense production programmes of member countries.

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[1] Repeated to The Hague, Paris, Oslo, Copenhagen, London, Rome, Brussels, Luxembourg, and Frankfurt.

[2] A brief summary of this Council meeting is contained in telegram Secto 32 from Ottawa, September 20, p. 683. Regarding action on this resolution, see footnote 5 thereto.

740.5/9–2051 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL OTTAWA, September 20, 1951—1 p. m.

Secto 29. ToISA. Fol text res approved NAT this morning re agenda item VI: [2]

"Statement by NAT Council re North Atlantic Community.[3]

"Peoples of North Atlantic Community are united under NAT present their freedom and develop their common heritage of democracy, liberty and rule of law. During past two years, since treaty came into being, NA countries have joined in collective efforts for their defense. They will continue work together closely to consolidate NA Community. All obstacles which hinder such cooperation on an equal footing shld be removed.

"Persistent attempts which have been made and are being made divide peoples of NA Community will fail. Those who made these attempts do not understand nature or strength or close ties between free peoples of NA Community. Preservation of peace is very essence of that Community, and free discussion as to how this can best be done is source of continuing strength.

"It was threatening international situation that brought 12 nations of NA Community formally together under NAT to create sufficient strength to preserve their freedom and liberty. Series of so-called peace offers as vague in language as they are obscure in content are made from time to time. Peoples of NA Community will test these offers by deeds that follow them. They will never reject any genuine move for peace, but will not be deflected from building up their defensive strength by mere empty words about peace.

"Strengthening of NATO in past two years has developed in minds of peoples strong sense of their common interests and ideals. There is desire within NA Community to meet specific needs in all fields where close collaboration will advance welfare of Community.

"One source for further development of NA Community is Art II of NAT which states:

" 'Parties will contribute towards further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about better understanding of principles upon which these institutions founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international econ policies and will encourage econ collaboration between any or all of them'. Clear sense of direction in which Community is developing shld make it easier take practical steps towards that end.

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[1] Repeated to The Hague, Paris, Oslo, Copenhagen, London, Luxembourg, Reykjavik, Rome, Brussels, and Frankfurt.

[2] A brief summary of this Council meeting is contained in telegram Secto 32 from Ottawa, September 20, p. 683. Regarding action on this resolution, see footnote 4 thereto. For documentation concerning the background which led up to this resolution, see pp. 1 ff.

[3] The text of this Council statement was released to the press on September 21 and is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1, 1951, pp. 524–525.

536-688 PT 1--81---46

"Council has therefore decided to set up Ministerial Comite composed of representatives from Belgium, Canada, Italy, Netherlands and Norway, to consider further strengthening of the NA Community and especially implementation of Art II NAT.

"Committee, assisted by Council deputies, will, in particular, consider and make recommendations to Council on fol matters:

"(*a*) Coordination and frequent consultation on foreign policy, having particular regard to steps designed to promote peace;

"(*b*) Close econ, financial and social cooperation designed to promote conditions of stability and well-being, both during period of rearmament and thereafter, within NATO or through other agencies.

"(*c*) Collaboration in fields of culture and public information.

"In these and other ways Council will build up inner strength of NA Community, without duplicating work of other international organizations which promote same objectives.

"Council endorses recent declaration of OEEC which called on all sections of Eur community to increase production and play their part in collective effort for peace and well-being.

"In developing NA Community, Council wld act in conformity with and seek to strengthen purposes and principles of charter of UN. It is only by work and by enlightened understanding of free peoples everywhere that cause of freedom and Democracy will be upheld against any challenge."

End statement, fol terms ref of comite:

"1. Council has decided set up Ministerial Comite consider further strengthening of NA Community and especially application of Art II of NAT.

"2. Members of comite will be:

"(*a*) Belgium, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Norway.

"(*b*) Chairman of CD.

"3. Comite will provide for consultation with other members of Council as required.

"4. Comite, assisted by CD will, in particular, consider and make recommendations to Council on following matters: (see points *a*, *b*, *c* above).

"Comite will bear in mind importance of avoiding implication of work already being done by existing bodies.

"5. Comite will make report to next mtg of Council."

740.5/9–2051 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET OTTAWA, September 20, 1951—6 p. m.

Secto 31. ToISA. On recommendation of deps NAC this afternoon [2] adopted fol draft resolution re procedures necessary for accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO and approved following draft protocol:

RESOLUTION ON ACCESSION GREECE AND TURKEY

The North Atlantic Council.

1. *Having considered* proposal put forward for accession of Kingdom of Greece and Republic of Turk to NAT.

2. *Satisfied* that security of NA area will be enhanced by accession of Greece and Turk to NAT.

3. *Having examined* question of amendments which might be desirable in provisions of NAT.

Recommends: to govts which are parties to treaty:

4. That, pursuant to Article 10 of treaty, each govt take whatever steps may be necessary to enable it to agree that Kingdom of Greece and Republic of Turk be invited to accede to NAT and thereupon notify its agreement to govt of USA: that thereafter Greece and Turk shall become parties to treaty upon date of deposit of their respective instruments of accession with Govt of the USA.

5. That, as from date of deposit with Govt of USA by Govt of Republic of Turkey of its instrument of accession, an appropriate modification of Art 6 of the treaty shall enter into force.

Agrees:

That these purposes wld be achieved and the requirements of treaty wld be met by bringing into force a protocol in accordance with procedure set forth herein.

Further recommends:

That such a protocol, prepared in English and French texts, be signed, as soon as possible, by members of council deps, duly authorized by their respective govts.

PROTOCOL [3]

Parties to NAT, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949

Being satisfied that security of NA area will be enhanced by accession of Kingdom of Greece and Republic of Turk to that treaty,

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[1] Repeated to The Hague, Paris, Oslo, Copenhagen, London, Rome, Brussels, Frankfurt for Handy, and Luxembourg.

[2] A brief summary of this Council meeting is contained in telegram Secto 32 from Ottawa, September 20, p. 683. Regarding action on this resolution and the protocol, see footnote 2 thereto.

[3] The text of this protocol was released to the press on October 15 and is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 22, 1951, pp. 650–651.

Agree as follows:

Article I. Upon the entry into force of this protocol, Govt of USA shall, on behalf of all parties, communicate to Govt of Kingdom of Greece and Govt of Republic of Turkey an invitation to accede to NAT, as it may be modified by Art II of present protocol. Thereafter Kingdom of Greece and Republic of Turk shall each become a party on date when each deposits its respective instrument of accession with Govt of USA in accordance with Art X of treaty.

Article II. If Republic of Turkey becomes party to NAT, Art VI of treaty shall, as from date of deposit by Govt of Republic of Turk of its instrument of accession with Govt of USA, be modified to read as follows:

"For the purpose of Article V an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack—

(i) On the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian depts of Fr, on the territory of Turk and on the islands of any of the parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

(ii) On the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Eur in which occupation forces of any of the parties were stationed on the date when the treaty came into effect, or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer."

Article III. Present protocol shall enter into force when each of the parties to NAT has communicated to or deposited with Govt of USA its notification or instrument signifying its acceptance thereof. Govt of USA shall notify all parties to NAT of the date of receipt of each such notification or instrument and date of entry into force of present protocol.

Article IV.

Present protocol, of which English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in archives of Govt of USA. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that govt to govt of all parties to NAT.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed present PROTOCOL.[4]

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[4] The signatures were omitted from the telegraphic copy.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 93

Communiqué of the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council

[OTTAWA,] September 21, 1951.

1. The North Atlantic Council has concluded its Seventh Session, in which for the first time the member governments were represented by Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers and Economic or Finance Ministers. The new composition of the Council reflects the wide fields in which coordination is being steadily developed.

2. In an exchange of views on the world situation, note was taken of the growing confidence and strength of the Atlantic community in a world of continuing tension. The Council was informed by the Occupying Powers of the progress of discussions directed toward the establishment of a new relationship with the German Federal Republic. It was also informed of the statement made by the three foreign ministers after their meeting in Washington in which they welcomed the plan for a European Defense Community of which Germany would form part.

3. The Council, considering that the security of the North Atlantic area would be enhanced by the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty, agreed to recommend to the member governments that, subject to the approval of national Parliaments under their respective legislative procedures, an invitation should be addressed as soon as possible to the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to accede to the Treaty.

4. The Council considered the reports submitted by the military and civilian agencies of the Treaty Organization:

(*a*) The Standing Group reported on the establishment and development of the integrated force under General Eisenhower, and progress on other military matters.

(*b*) The Defense Production Board reported on the problems relating to the further development of production and recommended means of dealing with these problems.

(*c*) The Financial and Economic Board presented a report analyzing the economic and financial impact of the NATO defense effort with special reference to the equitable sharing of the burden.

(*d*) The Council Deputies, the permanent working body of the Treaty Organization, reported on their activities in political, organization, and administrative matters and in developing closer coordination between the Treaty agencies.

(*e*) The Chairman of the Council Deputies summarized the major issues before the Organization and suggested action to meet them.

As a result of the study of these reports, the Council issued guidance and directives to the respective agencies concerning their future work.

5. All member governments recognize as their joint aim the building up defense forces to a sufficient level of strength, and the no less im-

portant objective of a sound and stable economy necessary to support that effort. The reports of the Defense Production Board and of the Financial and Economic Board, and the discussion thereon, have indicated a number of difficulties in the production and economic fields. The member countries recognize the need to surmount such difficulties in order to assure the continued progress of their efforts to strengthen the free world. The Council has noted the danger of inflation, the burdens which increased defense efforts place on the balance of payments, and the obstacles to an adequate defense arising from price and allocation pressures on raw material supplies. The Ministers recognized that the common effort requires a common attack upon these problems, and agreed to take such action severally and jointly as they deem appropriate to find solutions to them.

6. Accordingly a temporary committee of the Council was established to survey urgently the requirements of external security, and particularly of fulfilling a militarily acceptable NATO plan for the defense of Western Europe, and the realistic political-economic capabilities of the member countries, with a view to determining possible courses of action for their reconciliation so as to achieve the most effective use of the resources of the member countries.

7. The Council received reports from the member governments on the status of the defense effort in their countries and referred them to the military agencies and appropriate commands for study and recommendations to improve the early effectiveness and availability of forces.

8. The Council noted that agreement had been reached on the financing of an "infrastructure" program of airfields, communications, and certain installations for the support of forces. These projects will continue without delay.

9. The Council has issued a separate statement making clear the importance which the member governments attach to the development of the Atlantic community, not only to safeguard their freedom and common heritage on an equal footing but also to strengthen their free institutions and to advance the well-being of their peoples. The statement announced the establishment of a ministerial committee to study and recommend lines of future action toward these objectives.

10. The Council resolved that, in order to develop more effective unity of action, and in accordance with its duties as the institution for forming the policy and directing the operations of the Treaty Organization, its meetings would be held more frequently and at more regular intervals. In order to continue progress on the problems discussed at the Seventh Session, it was agreed that a further meeting of the Council would be held in Rome in the near future.

E. THE EIGHTH SESSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, ROME, NOVEMBER 24–28, 1951

1. Preparations for the Session, July–November 1951

Editorial Note

In telegram Depto 10 from London, July 3 (page 620), Spofford suggested that while Rome might be satisfactory as a location for the next planned session of the North Atlantic Council in September, it might better serve for the following meeting which was tentatively planned for November or December and could thereby be coordinated with the next meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. The Department of State responded in telegram Todep 51 to London, July 25 (page 623), with a recommendation that Ottawa serve as the location for the September session of the Council, which would follow immediately after preliminary meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, planned for Washington, and that Rome would then be the location for the next session in late October or early November.

On the same day that the Department's instructions were sent to London, the Council Deputies tentatively agreed that if a meeting were held in September it should be in Ottawa on September 15; this information was transmitted to the Department in telegram Depto 112 from London, July 26 (page 624). With the support of the Department, Ottawa was formally selected by the Council Deputies as the location for the next Council session during their meeting of August 1. When Spofford inquired concerning an opening date for the Rome meeting several days later, the Department recommended that no definite date be announced until the end of the Ottawa meeting where it could be included in the final communiqué (telegram Todep 76 to London, August 4, 740.5/8–451).

During the last meeting of the Seventh Session on September 20, the subject of the next meeting was discussed. The British said that their elections would not allow them to meet for any international conferences until the middle of November. Acheson's suggestion that Paris might serve as the best location for the next session since the General Assembly was meeting there in November was not accepted by the Council and the decision was made to meet in Rome although no date was set. The Council Deputies were instructed to make the arrangements for the time of the next session. For documentation concerning the Seventh Session of the Council held in Ottawa, September 15–20, pages 616 ff.

740.5/10–451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 4, 1951—7 : 44 p. m.

Todep 217. Re Rome NAC mtg, US Govt favors Nov 24 or 26 as planning date, with preference for Nov 24. Sun hiatus after opening session proved of distinct value Ottawa for talks with other dels and for internal US Del work.[2] As Rome NAC mtg shld consider Ger problems and in view their many complex facets which must be worked out in prelim negots in Bonn, Paris and London to permit NAC action, we can not definitely firm up this date now. Nevertheless we most anxious do all we can to achieve our objective of having mtg by Nov 24 and don't wish cast doubts on its feasibility which might provide temptation to slow down schedules of work in various fields. Not only most important make progress on Ger, but urgent we reach earliest possible agreement as to mil requirements (i.e., revised MTDP).[3] Also essential Council receive interim TCC report [4] and supply guidance before findings transmitted govts on Dec 1 for their consideration prior to final Council action.

Shld it be suggested that NAC planning date be set for Dec 1 to coincide with deadline set for Wise Men's findings, you can state it wld be most difficult for Sec thus prolong his stay in Eur. If Nov 24 date established as target by Deps now, difference of one week shld not be major complication for comite of Twelve.

Shld Nov 19 be suggested, we do not wish appear slight UN in favor NATO in eyes of non-NAT countries and by so doing give weapon to Sov propaganda. We believe Nov 24 shld permit NAT FonMins carry out their participation UNGA in accordance with past practice. Perhaps after breather they wld reassemble Rome. This wld not be case with Nov 19 date as FonMins wld give impression cutting short their UN participation and rushing off to Rome. Further factor arguing for later date is necessity of leaving time for possible mtg of three Mins fol GA and before NAC to settle any unresolved Ger issues resulting from prelim negots.

Re time daily schedule, we much prefer 11 : 00 a. m. and 3 : 30 p. m. for daily session. Earlier mtgs might give impression more work being

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[1] Drafted by Ridgway B. Knight of the Office of European Regional Affairs and cleared by EUR, UNA, White House, RA, Department of Defense, Treasury, S/ISA, ECA, and GER; repeated to Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Frankfurt, and Bonn.

[2] This reference concerns the meetings of the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council which met in Ottawa. The first meetings were held on Saturday, September 15, with no meetings scheduled for Sunday; the meetings then continued from Monday to Wednesday of the following week.

[3] For documentation concerning the Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) see pp. 1 ff.

[4] For documentation on the Temporary Council Committee (TCC), sometimes referred to as the "wise men", see *ibid.*, which includes the interim report.

done, but we believe to contrary that availability more time for work with other dels and within ours outside plenary hall more productive of results and wld, in final analysis, speed up, instead of retard NAC work.

For action Rome Emb. Because pressure of work NAC mtgs, please express our view to Ital Govt US preference for minimum entertainment especially during first few days. While we cannot commit Sec one way or other this far in advance, he has strong personal preference for absolute minimum social activities. You might bear in mind that, due to pressure of work, Sec forced cancel social engagements Ottawa. We believe easier limit social functions if we express our views earlier rather than later when plans made or well advanced.

WEBB

740.5/10–1851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 20, 1951—6 : 18 p. m.

Todep 259. For Spofford and Gifford for info.

1. Fully agree we shld resist suggestions at this time for postponement Rome mtg NAC (Depto 474 [2]).

2. Apart from value Nov 24 target date as source of pressure for progress on Ger, EDC and related problems, interim report of TCC to be presented at Rome mtg bears important relation to successful completion TCC exercise on schedule. Interim report shld not be regarded merely as info provided for convenience of NAC because it happens he scheduled meet late Nov. On contrary, interim report is important in that NAC debate on it shld reveal as closely as possible what NAT Govts can be induced to accept. As this may greatly influence final report due Dec 1, Rome mtg shld, if at all possible, not be deferred.

3. It is daily becoming more clear, particularly in relation to extension of security guarantee to Ger that Ger membership in NATO will soon have to be faced. (Deptel 2528, Oct 19, to Frankfort, Bonn 146, Paris 2338, London 2112.[3]) Fr view that Ger relation to NATO be exclusively through EDC basically unacceptable to Ger as it wld give Ger status inferior other EDC members who are also members

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[1] Drafted by J. Graham Parsons of the Office of Regional European Affairs and cleared with Perkins of EUR and Laukhuff of GER; repeated to Paris for Bruce and MacArthur, to Frankfurt for McCloy, and to Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it reported Spofford's speculation that Hervé Alphand, French Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council, would request a postponement of the NATO meeting in Rome because of the lack of progress on the German problem. (Telegram Depto 474 from London, October 18, 740.5/10–1851)

[3] *Post*, p. 1555.

of NAT. Moreover, extension security guarantee by EDC alone wld be unsatisfactory because US and UK not included and US and UK in extending guarantee must insist on reciprocal commitment which Ger membership in NATO wld provide. This probably means that least Ger can accept before signing contractual relations agreement and EDF treaty is firm tripartite assurance at time of sig that they will support Ger candidacy NATO. Problem re foregoing is Fr whose opposition to NATO membership for Ger wld crystallize if pressed too soon to face up to situation which will gradually reveal itself to them in more insistent fashion as weeks go by. Since we only have five weeks if EDF and contractual agreements are to be completed by Rome mtg, as planned, we wld like you consider whether Alphand's visit to London may provide opportunity for you to edge into this problem with him in private conversations in which you wld be speaking in personal capacity. Problem must, of course, be approached with extreme caution and if right opportunity does not come we wld much prefer you leave it alone.[4]

Bruce in Paris may wish also in his talks with Schumann and other key officials to take a similar line when opportunity offers.

ACHESON

[4] For documentation concerning the European Defense Community (EDC), see pp. 755 ff.

740.5/10–2551 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, October 25, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 508. Ref Depto 473[2] and 502.[3] Discussed with Hoyer-Millar today coordination of various Ger questions in preparation for Rome. He at first indicated preference for postponing Rome mtg but believe he now agrees on importance of having mtg even if final action impossible on either Ger or TCC. He stated, incidentally, that Harriman had told Makins TCC report wld not be finished before December 5.

He stated UK also preoccupied with pulling ends together and EDC–NATO relationships. Their preference was for earliest possible tripartite discussion not necessarily at ministerial level and that discussion next week by three Deps, assisted by whatever experts each govt considered desirable, wld be useful before question discussed by CD. He indicated UK thinking on EDC–NATO relationship generally

[1] Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Frankfurt.
[2] Of October 18, p. 891.
[3] Of October 23, p. 898.

along lines of Depto 473, considered Ger membership in NATO essential, and Fr unreadiness to face it raising numerous otherwise avoidable difficulties.

SPOFFORD

740.5/11-251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, November 2, 1951—9 p. m.

Unnumbered. Pearson (Canad) and Spofford have just discussed with me urgent question of determining whether Rome NATO mtg shld be held on November 24 or postponed. Fol are various considerations and national positions.

UK position: Pearson reports in conversations with Eden latter urged postponements to December 8. Eden apparently has in mind this wld be better from point of view Ger negotiations and TCC report.

Fr view: Schuman told me this morning that he wld like postponement until Jan. This view seems to be affected by problem of his debates in Parliament on EDF. He probably also has in mind lack of completion of negotiations on Ger contractual arrangements.

Italian view: Spofford thinks Italians might be considerably upset by long postponement, but wld not object to postponement of one or two weeks.

Pearson has no personal preference, but indicated undesirability of holding mtg if nothing cld be accomplished. He thought postponement to December 8 might permit action on TCC report and on Ger negotiations. He will agree to whatever date others approve.

Spofford reports no vigorous feeling among smaller NATO members. On the EDF he believes some paper cld be submitted by November 24 which wld place before NAC those aspects of EDF bearing on NATO relationship even though problems such as budgetary arrangements which do not concern NATO still remained unsettled. He reports Harriman expects to have TCC report finished November 31 and printed by December 5. This wld not seem to allow time for full govt consideration even if mtg were postponed until December 8. Will discuss this aspect with Harriman tomorrow.

Am asking McCloy for preliminary statement his views, but will discuss further with him, Byroade and Perkins [2] on Mon. Will also probably discuss with Eden Sun night.

Pointed out to Pearson problem from point of view of completion of our budget in Dec.

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[1] Secretary of State Acheson was in Paris to attend the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly; for documentation on these meetings, see vol. II, pp. 477 ff.

[2] Byroade and Perkins accompanied Acheson to Paris and later Rome.

Promised Pearson definite US view on Mon evening since time is very short particularly for planned military comite mtg week before 24th. Accordingly hope to receive your views on those of Def on Mon.

ACHESON

740.5/11–351 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, November 3, 1951—2:48 p. m.

Tosec 5. For the Secretary. Reurtel Nov 2 we believe we shld stick to Nov 24 date but consider that decision shld be influenced primarily by views of those already in Eur who are in more immediate touch with Ger and TCC questions. In gen, our views have not changed since departure Perkins and Byroade who shld be available to you in Paris by Mon.

It seems to us delay of one or two weeks wld not make major difference re either Ger or TCC although no doubt it wld help particularly re Ger. We understand even short delay, however, wld make it impossible for Lovett, Snyder and Bradley to attend, which wld be most regrettable. Any delay wld also raise possibility of further postponements and generally relax pressure to move ahead with key issues. Success of Ottawa mtg showed value of holding mtg even when concrete results not assured in advance. Furthermore, it seems to us better to proceed with mtgs as regularly scheduled rather than wait for each important agenda item to be fully worked out before bringing mins together. This wld inevitably tend to undesirable long gaps between mtgs such as occurred between Brussels and Ottawa. Postponement might also be interpreted by smaller NATO countries as indicating desire Big Three to reach prior settlements important questions and only hold NAC mtgs when these cld be presented for rubber stamping.

Of course, if we go ahead with Nov 24 mtg or one held only shortly thereafter, we might face need for further brief mtg, presumably in Jan. This latter mtg wld be neces because of Ger question and also possibly to put seal of Council approval on work of TCC which it created at Ottawa. Nevertheless in our opinion, most considerations lead to conclusion that we shld hold to Nov 24.

We are strongly opposed to Schuman suggestion of postponement to Jan which wld have effect of once more permitting Fr to shy away from some of realities of EDF–NATO–Ger complex. Also such long postponement might do Itals considerable disservice.

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[1] Drafted by Parsons and cleared with Bonbright and Martin of EUR, Lewis of GER, Department of Defense, and Deputy Under Secretary Matthews; repeated to London as Todep 297.

Believe important new consideration in favor Rome mtg Nov 24 raised by final sentences para 3 Har 122 (Norforn 14) Nov 1.[2] Balance this tel also pertinent to consideration of date for Rome mtg.

Def viewpoint set forth in Lovett's msg to you (Tosec 2 Nov 2 [3]) and has not changed.

WEBB

[2] Not further identified.

[3] Not printed; it reported the views of Secretary of Defense Lovett which favored no postponement of the NATO meeting. Lovett stated that his schedule would not allow him to attend the meetings if they were held later than the 24th. (740.5/11–251)

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 96

United States Minutes of the Bipartite Discussion With Mr. Anthony Eden, Monday, November 5, 1951, 3:00 p. m.[1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET [PARIS, November 5, 1951.]

PRESENT

United Kingdom	Mr. Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary Mr. Lloyd, Minister for State Sir Pierson Dixon, Deputy Permanent Under-Secretary Mr. Bowker, Superintending Under-Secretary for the Middle East Mr. Parrott, Chief of UN Division, Foreign Office Mr. Shuckburgh, Private Secretary to Mr. Eden
United States	Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State Mr. Lewis Jones Mr. Hayden Raynor Dr. Philip Jessup, for the latter part of meeting

. . . . . .

Rome Meeting

The Secretary indicated that Mr. Schuman had suggested that this be put off until the end of December.[2] He said, however, that the

[1] During and between sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France met for a series of bipartite and tripartite meetings in Paris; they also met in Rome between sessions of the North Atlantic Council. For a description of these meetings and the subjects discussed, see the editorial note, p. 1312.

In the records of the U.S. Delegation that accompanied the Secretary of State to Paris and Rome, these minutes were designated as Nov B M–2.

[2] For a record of this discussion, see telegram Actel 2 from Paris, November 2, in volume IV.

United States very much preferred to go ahead with the meeting on November 24, as scheduled, but would be quite agreeable to another meeting in January. He indicated that Secretaries Lovett and Snyder both had to be back in Washington early in December and could not attend the meeting at the end of December. He said that several Presidential messages to Congress, including specifically the budget message, had to be prepared before Christmas. He said that, in this message, the foreign aid part needed to have something additional from the European side in order to be effective. He said that Mr. Harriman had told him that, insofar as the work of the TCC was concerned, it made little difference as to whether the meeting was held as scheduled or later, because on the 24th, even though the final report would not be completed, he would be in a position to set forth the principal issues which the report would raise.

The Secretary said that one of the key questions would be whether we should continue to proceed as in the past on the basis of a military intelligence estimate of the enemy capabilities and attempt to plan to meet this even if it might bankrupt everybody, or, alternatively, whether to attempt to make effective what we already potentially have. He said that obviously an issue such as the foregoing had a direct effect on the whole United States mobilization and foreign aid program, specifically with respect to the priority to be accorded in the next fiscal year to assistance to Europe.

The Secretary said that he felt we should proceed with the Rome meeting, as scheduled, realizing that all that can be done in the latter part of November is to lay out the program and pose the issues, but that we could agree to meet again in January for the purpose of taking decisions. He said that he thought there would be great value in stating the issues and having a frank discussion on them. He thought, for instance, if General Eisenhower could attend and comment on the issues that it would be of invaluable assistance to the governments in reaching the decisions they would have to make over the holiday period.

On the question of Germany and the European Defense Force, it would be useful to get in Rome reports on exactly where we now stand. He said that, while he had yet to discuss this in detail with Mr. McCloy, in a telephone conversation with Mr. McCloy, he had expressed the view that a two week postponement would not materially change the situation.

The Secretary referred to the serious impasse in which we find ourselves because of the insistence of the Germans in wanting to know before they proceed further exactly how they stand with respect to admission to NATO, on the one hand, and the French view, on the other hand, that this issue cannot be raised at this time.

Mr. Eden first inquired why the November meeting couldn't be held in Paris, and the Secretary said that over his minority opposition, the Ottawa NAC Meeting had decided on Rome.

Mr. Eden then said that this program was agreeable to him.

The Secretary said that Mr. Schuman would not like it as he felt that we were not ready for the meeting, and Mr. Dixon added that he thought Mr. Schuman was thinking in terms of a short meeting in Paris merely to receive the TCC report. The Secretary expressed the view that that was not the purpose of the meeting; that what we needed to do was to get a statement of the problems which would be raised in the report and to discuss these problems. The Secretary added that we had been in trouble in the past, because we had felt the Council should not meet until action could be taken, and that he thought we should get away from this and adopt the policy of holding regular meetings. Sir Pierson Dixon added that he thought Schuman was against the meeting in addition to the reasons cited above because the European Defense Plan was not ready. Mr. Eden said that he personally thought the EDF was not advantageous to France, as, in a limited arrangement such as that, in contrast to a broader arrangement of a NATO Army, the Germans would be in a position to play a more major role.

The Secretary concluded the discussion by saying that he would discuss the matter with Mike Pearson and attempt to persuade him to proceed with the meeting in Rome as scheduled.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 96

United States Minutes of the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting at the French Foreign Office, Tuesday, November 6, 1951, 10:30 a. m.[1]

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

[PARIS, November 6, 1951.]

PRESENT

France	*United Kingdom*
Foreign Minister Schuman	Foreign Secretary Eden
M. Parodi	Mr. Lloyd
M. de la Tournelle	Mr. Dixon
Ambassador Bonnet	Mr. Shuckburgh
Ambassador Massigli	Mr. Bowker
Ambassador Chauvel	Mr. Jebb
M. Maurice Schumann	Mr. Parrott
M. Broustra	Ambassador Harvey
M. de Bourbon Busset	
M. Lacoste (for part of the meeting)	

[1] In the records of the U.S. Delegation that accompanied the Secretary of State, these minutes were designated as Nov T M–1.

United States

Secretary of State Acheson
Ambassador Bruce
Ambassador Gifford
Ambassador Jessup
Mr. Perkins
Mr. Raynor
Mr. Knight (for part of the meeting)
Mr. Lewis Jones (for part of the meeting)
Mr. Wainhouse (for part of the meeting)

. . . . . .

Rome Meeting

Mr. Acheson said that he had been in touch with Washington on this matter and the opinion in the US Government was strongly in favor of proceeding with the meeting on the 24th as scheduled. He said Secretaries Lovett and Snyder would not be able to come over for a meeting in December and that he himself had to be back in Washington by about December 1. He said all of the Cabinet would need to be there in connection with the preparation of the Budget Message which had to be completed before Christmas. He said he had to be there because of the foreign aid part of the message. He said he understood Mr. Harriman felt that there would be very little difference between a meeting on the 24th and a meeting a week or so later because he felt that the main points which would be set forth in a report would be known by the 24th and could be discussed then. Mr. McCloy generally felt the same way with respect to Germany; that a delay of two weeks would not make any substantial difference. The Secretary indicated that he felt a further meeting would be needed in January for decisions after the Governments had studied the TCC report, and that he hoped also that in January it would be possible to take definitive action with respect to Germany and EDF.

Mr. Eden indicated that this proposal was quite agreeable to him but he wanted to point out that the UK "Wise Man" was not optimistic about much being ready on the TCC by November 24th.

M. Schuman asked if the meeting should not be held in Paris. Mr. Eden seemed attracted to this idea. Mr. Acheson told M. Schuman that he had been deserted by him on this question in Ottawa when the decision had been taken to meet in Rome. The Secretary said he thought it was very important not to injure the sensitivity of the Italians by making a change. Mr. Schuman said he thought that the January meeting would be more attractive to the Italians than the November one. Mr. Acheson said that he thought this matter of location was one that Mr. Pearson as Chairman should work out. This was the way the matter was left.[2]

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[2] Shortly after Spofford was informed that the three Foreign Ministers had agreed on November 24 as the opening date for the Eighth Session of the Council, he advised the Council Deputies of this decision. Although their reaction was one of skepticism initially, they finally agreed to firmly set the date for the 24th (telegrams Depto 575 and Depto 578, November 6, 740.5/11–651 and 740.5/11–751, respectively).

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 96

United States Minutes of the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting at the French Foreign Office, Friday, November 9, 1951, 11:30 a. m.[1]

[Extract]

SECRET [PARIS, November 9, 1951.]

PRESENT

France Foreign Minister Schuman, Ambassadors Bonnet, Massigli and Chauvel, M. Maurice Schumann, M. Parodi, M. de la Tournelle, M. Lacoste, M. Broustra, M. Bourbon Busset, and M. Laloy

United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Eden, Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Dixon, Mr. Jebb, Mr. Shuckburgh, Mr. Bowker, Mr. Parrott and Ambassador Harvey

United States The Secretary, Ambassadors Bruce and Gifford, Assistant Secretary Perkins, Messrs. Raynor, Knight, Battle, and for a portion of the meeting Ambassador Gross, Mr. Byroade and Mr. Wainhouse

. . . . . .

NATO Meeting

Foreign Minister Schuman opened the discussion by raising the question of the date. Mr. Eden observed that he thought we had agreed to proceed with the date of November 24. M. Schuman indicated that this date was difficult for him as he had a Foreign Affairs debate that day and also had to attend a meeting of the French High Council on November 26. After further discussion, it was agreed to meet as scheduled on the 24th in Paris provided difficulties on changing from Rome were not raised by the Italians. M. Schuman said that he is in touch with the Italians on this subject and had hoped to have an answer by the time of the meeting but that it had not come in. It was left that M. Schuman will inform Minister Pearson of Canada as soon as he hears from the Italians.

There was some discussion as to the date of the second part of this meeting. Minister Schuman at first stated that it would be held late in December. Mr. Acheson, however, indicated that his thought had been to hold this meeting late in January. There was no dissent to this. The implication of the discussion was the second meeting would be held in Rome should the first meeting be held in Paris.

[1] In the records of the U.S. Delegation that accompanied the Secretary of State to Paris and Rome, these minutes were designated as Nov T M–2.

536-688 PT 1--81---47

740.5/11–1251

Memorandum by Ridgway B. Knight of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)[1]

SECRET [PARIS,] November 12, 1951.

Subj: Your Luncheon Tomorrow with General Eisenhower, the Secretary, and Mr. Harriman.

1. I discussed with Doug MacArthur this general question after we had initiated it in your office.

2. We came to the conclusion that the major positive achievement of the Rome meeting should be the laying of the foundation for the battle readiness by next summer of those divisions now potentially available. As far as the new MTDP (SG20/37[2]) is concerned, it should be one of the major topics for the January meeting of the NAC. Consequently, we came to the conclusion that the following items should come up at Rome together and in the following order:

(1) The intelligence report requested at Ottawa on the strength and capabilities of NATO and of the Soviet bloc. While this report should be distributed ahead of time, we thought it would be wise to have the highlights of the report presented by a spokesman of the Standing Group (perhaps General Bradley). Not only would this provide an appropriate introduction but it would also make certain that all the Ministers at the table would be familiar with the essence of this report before hearing Mr. Harriman and General Eisenhower.

(2) Mr. Harriman to make his personal report on the status of the TCC. We are of the opinion that as the November objective is the immediate readiness of available forces other than the MTDP as a whole, Mr. Harriman should speak before General Eisenhower. (On the contrary in January Mr. Harriman should speak last as his field is the synthesis of the military and the economic in relation to the NATO's complete military objective.)

(3) General Eisenhower speaks. In addition to explaining the reasons why it is so important to place available divisions in a state of full battle readiness as soon as possible, he might appropriately speak on the necessity of firming up our political and military plans by the January meeting, of the urgency of obtaining a German contribution, and of the crying need for more energetic NATO information policies on the part of all countries and more particularly of European NATO nations.

Doug and I believe that even though the Military Committee agenda does not absolutely require General Eisenhower's participation, nevertheless it would be well worth his time to meet with the NATO Chiefs

[1] Knight was given the additional responsibility during the period from September through November 1951 to serve as the Coordinator of International Conferences.

[2] Not found in the Department of State files.

of Staff on November 23rd as suggested in Deptel 2841.[3] The resulting psychological uplift to the Chiefs of Staff and particularly in the case of those of the smaller NAT countries would be worth the time. On this assumption, and in view of General Eisenhower's desire to return to his headquarters as soon as possible, the following order of the agenda would appear to be appropriate:

Saturday afternoon, Nov. 24th—Public opening of the Council with newspapermen, cameramen, et cetera. As this public session should not take more than half an hour to one hour at the most, it should be possible after a brief recess for the Council to hold a closed meeting when the following items could be disposed of:

Item I. Chairman's opening statement (if he wishes to make one in addition to his statement during the public meeting).

Item II. Adoption of agenda, procedure, and decisions as to handling of the press during the Rome meeting.

Sunday, Nov. 25th—No NAC meetings. Day devoted to additional briefings if necessary, internal delegation work, and *ad hoc* negotiations with other delegations as may be appropriate at the time.

Monday, Nov. 26th—Item III, Presentation by Standing Group representative (General Bradley?) of intelligence report on Soviet and NATO capabilities.

Item IV. Mr. Harriman's report on the TCC's report to date.

Item V. Statement by General Eisenhower.

If any time is left it should be devoted to starting discussion on Item VI, Command Questions, in view of General Eisenhower's interest in this subject.

Tuesday, Nov. 27th—Item VI, Command Questions. Close of consideration.

Item VII. Other military questions resulting from Military Committee.

Item VIII. German participation in Western defense. (Report by Alphand on status of EDF talks)

Item IX. Report by Committee on North Atlantic Community.

Wednesday, Nov. 28th—Item X. Reports by NATO agencies, if any.

Item XI. Exchange of views on political matters (German unity, et cetera).

Item XII. Other business.

Item XIII. Communiqué.

While in principle we only wish to hold one Council meeting a day, it would, of course, be possible to call exceptionally a morning meeting or an evening meeting should this be necessary in order to conclude by the close of business Wednesday the 28th.

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[3] Not printed; it stated that the Military Committee was planning on meeting on November 20–21, would hold a joint meeting with the Council Deputies on November 22, and was scheduled to meet with General Eisenhower on the 23d. (740.5/11–1051)

740.5/11–1351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State, at Paris [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, November 13, 1951—7 p. m.

1034. For Secretary and Perkins. Subj is Rome action on MED–Middle East Command arrangements and terms of reference appointment SACLANT.[2]

Hoyer-Millar yesterday told me his instructions were that items heretofore on agenda relating to MED–Middle East Command arrangements and SACLANT terms of ref shld be deleted since UK thought ques not ripe for discussion or decision at Rome. (He mentioned matter generally in CD.) I said my instructions not clear, but I doubted that we wld wish now to agree to eliminate these agenda items. Believe agmt on US position important. In this connection note Def Dept desire that action be taken at Rome to pave way for subsequent discussion with Greece and Turkey.

Since Greek–Turk protocol has not yet been submitted for ratification by Den, Neth and govt action to this end has been expressly conditioned upon satisfactory command arrangements believe it essential that there be discussion by council at Rome of basis upon which Greeks and Turks are to be approached. Believe this desirable even if there is not agmt within SG–MilCom. Mtg of DefMins cld ventilate whole question and in so doing satisfy preoccupations of Danes and Dutch. Attempt to pass over subj without discussion wld have unfortunate repercussions.

Action on appointment of SACLANT raises difficult polit problem here because of PM's previous position and intention to reserve matter for discussion with Pres in Jan. In spite of foregoing it seems to me consideration shld be given to high level approach to Brit, pointing out adverse public reaction and reaction smaller treaty partners if after one year from Brussels agmt on appointment US officer as SACLANT major treaty partners have been usable to take action.

SPOFFORD

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[1] Repeated to the Department of State as Depto 610, which is the source text.

[2] For documentation concerning the Middle East Command and the question on Greek and Turkish membership in NATO, see pp. 460 ff.

740.5/11–1351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, November 13, 1951—8 p. m.

Depto 611. Deps 79 mtg Nov 12.

1. Deps adopted agenda for Rome mtg. Under "exchange of views on polit matters" Canada and chmn reported Pearson felt list of three or four topics desirable and suggested: (*a*) Korea; (*b*) Egypt; (*c*) recent Sov notes to Nor; (*d*) Yugoslavia. Neth dept said Stikker felt no subj merited debate now. Deps will consult govts further for additions or approval these suggestions.

Chmn said Eisenhower statement wld be gen and for conveniences shld be early in session, and that TCC report wld be an interim oral statement. Timing these items, as for all others, left for final agreement with Pearson.

Under Ger defense participation chmn said three reports wld be basis of discussions: Occupying powers report on Petersberg discussions, Fr report on EDF, and occupying powers report on contractual arrangement. UK commented contractual arrangements report difficult to produce before conversation with Adenauer finished. SG rep said MC wld wish study EDF reports. French replied negots still underway, but certain agreements had been reached and those on milit aspects cld be reported to MC for study. Chmn said Rome action on Germany uncertain beyond noting reports, but as sit devel question of EDF–NATO relationship must be settled. Fr said they plan to present at Rome their proposal on juridical and structural links.

Under command arrangements Belgium questioned "terms of reference of SACLANT." UK replied practical sit is unchanged. UK also doubted that there could be useful discussion of East Mediterranean and ME since Greek rep had just arrived in Wash and Turk not yet.

Deps approved procedural suggestions and press policy for Rome mtg and agreed to meet in Rome Nov 23. Brief joint mtg with MC same day.

2. Can dep summarized meeting of North Atlantic community committee and said that report to Rome being prepared with view to obtaining council sanction of lines of action proposed and decisions reached.

3. Dep noted Fr and UK willingness to implement most arts of milit status treaty pending ratification. Chmn announced all countries have now indicated prepared to waive passports and visas. Referred to WG UK proposal for claims procedure under Art 8 and referred to SG

[1] Repeated to Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Luxembourg, Oslo, Paris, Rome, Lisbon, Reykjavik, Moscow, and Wiesbaden.

questions of standardized identity forms, movement orders and vehicle markings.

4. Chmn submitted proposals for a high level advisory committee on NATO info.

5. Deps agreed to obtain SG comments on amendments to paper on NATO security committee further.

6. Italy in gen statement on Sov fon policy said present Sov aims far beyond traditional Russian imperialism. Noted Moscow control of world Communist activities and recent stiffening of Sov policy. Italy warned against being taken in by Sov proposals for five-power conf. Urged vigorous counter-propaganda.

Canada commented Sov's use UN to foster nationalism in dependent areas to pose as defenders of peace and to add to confusion and conflict in the West world. There was gen agreement with this. Neth commented that UN less useful to USSR recently and noted possibility that World Peace Council will be developed into Commie UN. UK and Nor agreed, but UK and Can foresaw no imminent withdrawal of USSR from UN.

Can stated Sov aggressive policy necessarily accepted calculated risk of war. Korea possibly a miscalculation.

Fr detected a tendency to accept cold war as normal sit and warned against possibility of imperceptible drift into hot war.

Deps generally agreed that Sov will not hesitate to expedite "inevitable" capitalist collapse by cold war tactics. Neth doubted Russians would risk gen war in face of West superior potential and need for consolidation within Sov bloc. Nor noted Stalinist doctrine rules out co-existence doubted that Russ wld resort to more than localized hostilities altho subversive promotion of unrest particularly in the ME and exploitation of econ instability and West war weariness and defeatism wld continue. He emphasized Sov differentiation between just and unjust war and saw no ideological barrier to Sov milit aggression.

UK commented that first aim of Sovs is preservation of state and regime and this is reason for large Sov army which will also be used to threaten West, but only in last resort to attack West.

US felt that as Sov objectives impinge more and more on West, risk of war is greater and USSR might decide to strike while its strength is greater.

Deps gen agreed Sov objectives fairly clear but there is no rigid timetable. Policy is gen opportunistic, taking advantage any polit vacuum. Neth noted US is main target Sov fon policy.

Fr, Neth, Nor, US, and UK commented on acute Sov sensitiveness to devel in Ger. Nor felt quite possible war cld be provoked by miscalcu-

lation particularly in Ger and Sov border areas. UK commented that Sov backed by confidence inevitable world revolution will never begin war as response to provocation or to avenge insult before they are ready. Nor felt prestige immensely important to Sov Govt.

WG will summarize discussion.

7. Next mtg Nov 14 which will possible be last before Rome.

SPOFFORD

740.5/11–1451 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, November 14, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 616. At CD meeting today [2] (Todep 330, Nov. 13 [3]) UK dep said Gr Amb had called on him and made formal request that Gr Govt be invited send rep to participate in some capacity in Rome council mtg. He then proposed that Gr and Turk Govts be invited send observers to council mtg. Proposal immediately supported by Canad, Fr and Nor deps, Ital dep sure his govt wld not object but wld confirm. Other deps not instructed but agreed consult govts and inform chairman their positions within next few days. (Neth rep stated later today that Neth Govt had no objection to inviting Gr–Turk observers.) CD agreed that after chair heard from all dels he shld consult with chairman, NAC, re further action (i.e., to extend invitation if all agree).

USDep said formal Gr request presented new situation. Previously, US had thought best not extend invitation but to have Gr and Turk Ambs at public session and social functions. Under circumstances, he wld consult US Govt again. Please instruct urgently.

Subsequently CD discussed whether observers, if invited, shld attend only plenary sessions or committee mtgs as well. Consensus was that they shld attend only council plenary sessions.

SPOFFORD

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[1] Repeated to Paris for USDel, Ankara, Athens, and Rome.

[2] For Spofford's report of the proceedings of this 80th meeting of the Council Deputies, see telegram Depto 614 from London, November 14 (740.5/11–1451).

[3] Not printed; it reported the Department of State's views that the Greek and Turkish Ambassadors in Italy should be invited to the opening public session and to various social functions. The Department did not favor inviting Greek and Turkish observers to the Council meetings (740.5/11–151).

740.5/11–1451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, November 15, 1951—7:16 p. m.

Todep 342. Ref Depto 616 Nov 14, rptd Paris 1042, Ankara 38, Athens 45.[2] Gr Amb called today and raised question inviting Gr and Turk observers to Rome NAC mtg.

We told Amb we feared such action might risk antagonizing Senate fortify opposition there and delay us in common objective bringing Gr and Turk into NATO. Gr Amb clearly grasped fact we think it unwise have Grks and Turks present Rome but do not know if he will suggest to his Govt withdrawal of request. We did not mention to him our view that reps of countries not bound by NATO engagements shld not be present when Council deals with issues of vital importance to members. As foregoing indicates, this tel confirms attitude expressed to you in Todep 334 [3] which crossed reftel.

You may, of course, tell Pearson or other Deps we shld be glad have Gr and Turk Ambs Rome invited to opening public session and to social functions (ref para 2; Todep 330, rptd Paris 2870, Athens 2321, Ankara 423 [4]).

WEBB

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[1] Drafted by Parsons and cleared with Dorsz of GTI; repeated to Paris as Tosec 37, to Ankara, and to Athens.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed; it reported the Department of State's position, which it reaffirmed more strongly this time, that Greek and Turkish observers not be invited to the Rome meetings of the Council. (740.5/11–1351)

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 3, *supra.*

740.5/11–1551

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Dorsz)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1951.

Subject: Possible Senate Attitude towards Greek-Turkish Participation as Observers in Rome NAC Meeting

I asked Mr. Brown for his opinion of possible Senate reaction if we should authorize Ambassador Spofford to go along with the recommendation of the UK delegate supported by most of the other NAC deputies that Greece and Turkey be invited to send observers to the Rome NAC meeting. Mr. Brown thought that our concurrence would adversely affect our ability to get early Senate consent to the protocol. Some Senators already oppose expanding United States commitments

to the extent required in the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO. We must, therefore, be careful not to take any action which would seem to prejudge Senate approval of the protocol.

After talking to Mr. Wilcox of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Brown told me that Mr. Wilcox had suggested that we consider the following formula if (1) we find ourselves alone in objecting to the presence of Greek and Turkish observers at Rome, and (2) this position proves embarrassing. In such case, we might say that the United States would interpose no objection to inviting the Greeks and the Turks. However, we would have to record the fact that the presence of such observers might prejudice our getting quick Senate ratification of the protocol. Further, we would want the Council of Deputies to know that we might later have to inform the Senate of the reasons for our action.

740.5/11–1751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, November 17, 1951—1 p. m.

Depto 637. Re Todep 342 [2] and Todep 334.[3] US is only Govt which reported any reservation to inviting Gr and Turk to send observers to Rome. In view heavy US pressure for unanimous agrmt to invite them to adhere to treaty this sitn has evoked some amusement in those few to whom we have mentioned US reservation. After consultation with Secy and Perkins we have decided US cannot possibly hold out alone and Pearson is today issuing invitations to send observers. Am working with him with view to limiting invitation both as to numbers and scope as much as possible. If any congressional questions raised, believe our line shld be that observer question not raised at US initiative but supported by all but US which cld not hold out alone after its pressure on others on behalf Gr and Turk or without nullifying Gr and Turk goodwill gained by previous US attitude.

Todep 348 [4] just recd. We will make clear to Pearson and others that observer matter naturally can in no way affect Senate prerogative on protocol or prejudge its attitude.

SPOFFORD

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Ankara, and Athens.
[2] Of November 15, p. 710.
[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3, *ibid.*
[4] Not printed; it stated that since the United States had withdrawn its objection to Greek and Turkish observers at the advice of Acheson and Perkins it was important that it be made clear that this in no way infringed on the prerogatives of the Senate (740.5/11–1651).

740.5/1–1951 : Telegram

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

SECRET PARIS, November 19, 1951.

Subject: NATO Matters

Participants: Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson (Canada)
The Secretary
Mr. Philip C. Jessup

At luncheon today the Secretary discussed with Mr. Pearson the plans for the Rome meeting. He outlined the ideas which General Gruenther and others at SHAPE had concerning the procedure and the arrangements at Rome with particular reference to the participation of General Eisenhower. Mr. Pearson said that he had also discussed the matter with General Eisenhower and was in general agreement with the plans and thought they could be carried out. He said that the present plan was to open the meeting on Saturday with a public session of one hour from twelve to one at which he would speak and de Gasperi would follow as the representative of the host country. Foreign Minister Kraft of Denmark was also very much pleased at the prospect that he could speak at that time since he had the feeling that it was usually Stikker and Lange who spoke on behalf of the smaller countries. Mr. Pearson said that some remarks from Mr. Eden as a new member of the Council would also seem to be appropriate. The Secretary indicated that he did not wish to speak at that time.

Mr. Pearson then referred to the meeting which would be confined to the military and the defense ministers at which purely military matters would be discussed. There would then be the regular Council meeting at which there would be the presentation on behalf of SHAPE followed by the statements of Mr. Harriman and General Eisenhower. He agreed with the Secretary that there should not be any immediate off-the-cuff discussion of the statements, but that there should be time for the members of the Council to consider them over night and make any comments the following day.

The Secretary said that he thought the Rome meeting should not be considered merely as preparatory to a January meeting. In fact, there are important decisions to be arrived at and these should be fully discussed and concluded at Rome. The action in the January meeting should register government approval of these decisions. He said, for example, that Stikker and others should bring out clearly whether there are serious constitutional difficulties in the way of approving the European Army plan. There should be no attempt at Rome to gloss over these difficulties but they should on the contrary be brought out very frankly so that we would know whether it was possible to continue along this line or whether some entirely different approach had

to be followed. Similarly, in regard to the report of the Wise Men there should be frank discussion and an indication of the direction in which the governments intended to move. The Secretary stressed that this was a time at which we really had to come to grips with the question whether the entire effort was going to bear fruit or whether we needed to plan on some entirely different basis. He said that this was a problem which could be successfully solved only if Mr. Pearson would devote himself to bringing out the real results which we needed at the Rome meeting.

[Here follow discussions concerning a possible meeting place for the January meeting of the North Atlantic Council and a brief mention of French monetary problems.]

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 98

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley) to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

TOP SECRET [ROME,] 23 November 1951.[1]

Subject: Middle East Command and Place of Turkey and Greece in the NATO Command Set-up.

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that political considerations require that Greece and Turkey be placed. at least initially, in an existing NATO command; i.e., under General Eisenhower. We have a chart showing this command arrangement in the Mediterranean. However, the solution shown on this chart should not be considered as a governmental position as it has not been approved by the Secretary of Defense or the Department of State. Further, it has not been discussed with Greek and Turkish representatives nor the Military Representatives Committee. It has been discussed with the French and British on the military side but it was emphasized that it is only a tentative view and may be changed after further discussions.

We feel that we should avoid any decision on this matter at the Rome meeting because:

(1) It cannot be decided until Greece and Turkey are formally members of NATO and participate in the decision.
(2) We do not have a firm position.
(3) The matter has not been discussed by the Military Committee.

Before action is taken the Standing Group should prepare a formal position paper which can be shown to the other countries concerned, including Greece and Turkey and their views obtained.

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[1] The copy in the JCS file carries the date "22 November 1951".

Turkey insists that the Middle East Command does not include territory of Turkey. As thus defined the Middle East Command is no longer a NATO command, involves no NATO territory and no action should be taken on such command here at Rome, nor should we take any action on the association of such a Middle East Command with NATO.

O[MAR] N. B[RADLEY]

2. Proceedings of the Session and Related Papers

Editorial Note

At noon on Saturday, November 24, 1951, the opening meeting of the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council was begun in the Foro Italico in Rome under the chairmanship of Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada. At his invitation, Alcide de Gasperi, Prime Minister of Italy, welcomed the delegations of the NATO powers, including the observers from Greece and Turkey. More than 300 delegates attended the Council meetings representing the 12 countries that belonged to NATO. The leading representatives of the NATO countries were as follows:

Belgium	Paul van Zeeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs
	Jean van Houtte, Minister of Finance
	Colonel E. R. V. G. A. DeGreef, Minister of Defense
	Andre de Staercke, Council Deputy
Canada	Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs
	Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defense
	Douglas C. Abbott, Minister of Finance
	L. Dana Wilgress, Council Deputy
Denmark	Ole Bjørn Kraft, Minister of Foreign Affairs
	Thorhil Kristensen, Minister of Finance
	V. de Steensen-Leth, Council Deputy
France	Robert Schuman, Minister of Foreign Affairs
	René Mayer, Minister of Finance
	Georges Bidault, Minister of National Defense
	Hervé Alphand, Council Deputy
Iceland	Bjarni Benediktsson, Minister of Foreign Affairs
	Gunnlauger Pétursson, Council Deputy
Italy	Alcide de Gasperi, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
	Guiseppe Pella, Minister of the Budget
	Randolfo Pacciardi, Minister of Defense
	Alberto Rossi-Longhi, Council Deputy
Luxembourg	Joseph Bech, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense
	Andre Clasen, Council Deputy

Netherlands	Dirk U. Stikker, Minister for Foreign Affairs
	Johannes R. M. van den Brink, Minister of Economic Affairs
	A. R. Tammenoms Bakker, Acting Council Deputy
Norway	Halvard Lange, Minister of Foreign Affairs
	Jens Hauge, Minister of Defense
	Dag Bryn, Council Deputy
Portugal	Joao Pinto da Costa Leite, Minister of the Presidency
	Paulo Cunha, Minister of Foreign Affairs
	Ruy Ennes Ulrich, Council Deputy
United Kingdom	Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
	R. A. Butler, Chancellor of the Exchequer
	Lord de L'Isle and Dudley, Secretary of State for Air
	Frederick R. Hoyer-Millar, Council Deputy
United States [1]	Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
	John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury
	Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense
	Charles M. Spofford, Council Deputy
Greece	Evanghelos Averoff, Observer
Turkey	Huseyin Regip Baydur, Observer

Following the pattern set during the Seventh Session of the Council in Ottawa, meetings were scheduled to begin on Saturday, November 24, with a break on Sunday which would allow for informal meetings between delegations, and then meetings beginning Monday of the following week and continuing until Wednesday, November 28. While the Council meetings were in progress, Secretary of State Acheson also held bipartite and tripartite meetings with the Foreign Ministers of France and the United Kingdom, as well as with other European officials. A record of several of these meetings is included in the compilation that follows.

The telegraphic reports of all the meetings of the North Atlantic Council are printed in the following compilation with the exception of the first formal opening ceremony. The main indicator series for telegrams were Secto and Tosec which were normally sent from and to members of the United States Delegation. Actel and Telec were occasionally used for telegrams sent by and to Acheson himself or his personal staff. Depto and Todep were the indicator series for telegrams from and to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council. The United States minutes of the Council meetings are not printed but are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 98, and the CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, Rome. Both of these files also contain the preparatory papers which were written as background

[1] The entire U.S. Delegation is listed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 3, 1951, p. 918.

papers for the United States Delegation by a Steering Group within the Department of State.

An attempt has been made in the following compilation to identify document numbers and titles that were discussed by the Council or received for information; all formal Council actions are accounted for as well.

740.5/11–2551 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET ROME, November 25, 1951—5 a. m.

Secto 77. Fol adopted this afternoon [2] as agenda 8th session:

I. Opening statements.
II. Adoption of:

1. Agenda.
2. Press regulations.

III. Reports by permanent NAT agencies:

1. Mil Committee.
2. Civilian agencies.

(*a*) Council Deputies.
(*b*) DPB.
(*c*) FEB.

IV. Exchange of views on polit matters.
V. Estimate of relative strength and capabilities of NATO and Sov bloc forces at present and in immed future.
VI. Report on readiness and effectiveness of NATO forces.
VII. Statement on progress of work of TCC.
VIII. Statement by Gen Eisenhower.
IX. Ger participation in Western defense.
X. Report by Committee on North Atlantic Community.
XI. Other business, including date and place of next mtg of Council.
XII. Communiqué.

ACHESON

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris for SHAPE, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reykjavik, Lisbon, Athens, Ankara, Ottawa, and Luxembourg.

[2] The agenda was approved at the second meeting of the Council on Saturday, November 24. A record of this meeting is printed *infra*.

740.5/11–2551 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET ROME, November 25, 1951—5 p. m.

Secto 78. Opening second mtg [2] 8th Session NAC, Pearson moved adoption agenda which accepted without discussion (Secto 77 [3]). Council then approved CD paper on press regulations [4] providing for limited press briefings and authorizing Chairman speak to press which Pearson said he interpreted not as instruction but as permission.

Under Item III, report of MC referred to Def Mins without discussion and reports of CD, FEB and DPB noted by Council.[5]

On agenda Item IV, Pearson called on Secy for comment re developments in Far Eastern area. Secy said he had been over ground before with most those present and wld make only brief comment. Problem, he believed, divided into two parts: (1) Area in present and (2) efforts for strength in future.

In FE, actual fighting is going on—emphasis is not on subversion, but on open mil action. This true Indochina, Malaya as well as Korea. Fighting is Communist-directed and could be stopped if Moscow gave word. There is diversion men and material to area not unconnected to NATO effort.

Secy said he had nothing specific to say on Korean negots. Ridgway following liberal and he thought, wise policy informing press fully as possible. Secy had been asked whether he optimistic or pessimistic regarding Korean settlement. He felt it mistake to reach either optimistically or pessimistically to developments caused by Communists. It was necessary be patient and stolid in face various Communist maneuvers. The UC is realistic capable and doing good job in handling negots. He wld welcome talks on private basis if anyone desired discuss particular points.

Re sitn if no armistice, Secy said this obviously wld call for additional effort by all concerned because mil sitn wld then have to be considered as being more serious. If there were armistice, was essential for UN show vigor in reconstruction of Korea. Wld be mistake go into

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris for SHAPE, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reykjavik, Lisbon, Athens, Ankara, Ottawa, and Luxembourg.

[2] The second meeting, held on Saturday, November 24, began at 3:30 p. m.

[3] *Supra.* The agenda which was formally approved by the Council was circulated as Council Document C8–D/2, "Provisional Agenda for Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council."

[4] Not printed; it stated that information on the current agenda would be released to the press not as a formal statement of the business before the Council but as a general statement of items under consideration. This paper was circulated as Council Document C8–D/1, "Press Regulations."

[5] The "Reports to the Council by the Civilian Agencies of NATO," which the Council took note of under Item III of the agenda, was circulated as Council Document C8–D/3.

North Korea until satisfactory polit settlement but withdrawal South Korea wld be most unwise and must not happen. Re question contributions, others must contribute to burden resulting rebuilding Korea. On polit side, settlement must be considered by UN agency and, since SC obviously unsuitable, smaller new body shld consider final polit settlement for Korea. Settlement must be considered by itself and not mixed in with other current questions. Such procedure wld in itself test desire of Sovs for peace.

Re future Pacific area, Secy recalled developments of San Francisco Conf, noted that Jap Diet has ratified treaty, and said Pres will send to Cong Pacific Treaties, Jap Treaty and Greek-Turkish Protocol as first order business when Cong reconvenes. Pacific arrangements are not NATO type org, but are nucleus for further constructive effort in area.

When no other Council members chose to speak, Pearson said whether an armistice was achieved or not, which are hoped wld occur, he personally impressed by Secy's remark "certain things will begin to flow". He thought one point where this might occur wld be in UN and that Vishinsky might attempt gain certain advantages relating to entire Far East which wld be difficult handle and wld require consultation.

Eden next reviewed developments relating to Egypt and Sudan. He recalled Egyptians had renounced 1936 Treaty and declared that Condominium Agreement no longer in force. Egyptians have been informed in advance re MEC proposals but had acted on abrogation in spite this development. Egyptians had not considered MEC proposal which was unfortunate for them and for free world. Although labor force important to effective functioning Canal base, base can be maintained without it. However, Brits were seeking labor "locally or elsewhere". Brits will do all possible confine area of difficulty to Canal Zone. They are assisting Egyptian police and relations with Egyptian mil are excellent. Danger lies in threats of mob law and inactivities unofficial bands harassing Brit mil installations. Sitn serious. Traffic in Canal affected but not stopped. Eden referred to complete censorship; said that all observers wld do great service simply by setting forth accurate picture events. Egypt had sent complaint to ILO re forced labor. Brits welcomed opportunity show real picture and had asked ILO observer come Canal Zone. Four-Power offer to Egypt still open and it was hoped "some Egyptian Govt" wld see fit cooperate in united effort. He believed it essential maintain united front in def of sanctity of treaties. Stikker referred to problem arising from Egyptian request new diplomatic reps present credentials to Farouk as King of Sudan. Egypt may have its reps abroad present new credentials granted by Farouk under his new title. He asked Eden's advice as to how NATO

Govts shld respond. Eden said recognition of title wld give new sovereignty over Sudan and prejudice future of Sudan. He referred to new constitution which Egyptians prepared for Sudan without consultation Sudanese. UK has pledged early self-govt for Sudan which he hoped wld be effective as early as end 1952, which wld give Sudanese alternatives associating themselves with either Egyptians or UK or neither.

De Gasperi said Italy followed with interest developments in ME area because of position in Mediterranean. Italy has been particularly interested in adherence Greece and Turkey to NATO. He felt West cld not under-estimate consequences of current developments in ME. Essential to insure internal and external def of area and inclusion of Arabs in unified def agreement was important.

Averoff, Greek observer, said Greece under considerable pressure from Egyptians to accept new title and was difficult for Greece ignore Egyptian demand because of large Greek population in Egypt. He wished to observe that if NATO group passed "precise declaration" re this matter certain nations wld see their interest. He said Greek Cabinet has considered matter and has decided not to recognize new title. Eden thanked Averoff for expression of unity and consideration, especially since it was difficult to give.

Lange of Nor discussed recent exchanges of notes between Nor and USSR. With regard to Sov complaint relating to construction of bases on Spitzbergen, he explained that Treaty of 1920 and Sovs does result in limitation on exercise of Nor sovereignty over Archipelago. In remainder country Nor will build bases on Allied pattern. He commented on offensive and violent tone Sov notes and said it belief his govt Sov intention was intimidate Nor people and render difficult implementation govt's def plans. He referred similar notes delivered Turkey and said there were two possible explanations for Sov diplomatic offensive. First was possibility Sovs might really fear development bases, thinking of those being constructed Iceland and Greenland. If this so, Nor reply had given adequate assurances no such bases being constructed. Second explanation might be Sovs were preparing for action. There had been increase Sov naval and commercial maritime activity in area and Nor had requested evaluation from SHAPE. Sovs might be bldg opinion within Sov and satellite areas which wld justify their action.

Pearson called on Schuman for discussion of Indochina sitn. Schuman said France had also been objective of diplomatic offensive. He believed West must always remember Sov notes were propaganda. Sov propaganda efforts had failed in Fr. He then reviewed five years which Fr had carried fight Indochina and said fight becoming increasingly one of common interest. Communist domination China had allowed

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direct contact with rebel groups in periphery countries to south and proved that there was link between some of earlier quasi-NAT groups and Moscow. Although not yet any volunteers, there were deliveries modern arms by Chinese. Fighting had been difficult at various times and only help from US got Fr over some bad moments. Sitn now well in hand but he cld not say it wld soon be finished in victory. Fr have 300,000 combat troops in area which showed they were making an exceptional effort. Brit def Suez Canal not only def international law but great aid to Fr its efforts Indochina because of logistical problem supporting Fr forces. As for expenses more than one-third Fr budget diverted to fight in Indochina. Fr wanted do everything possible strengthen NATO but Fr also felt Far East important to West community. He desired Korean peace but recognized result might be diversion "volunteers" against southern countries. NATO shld be prepared consult on question if new assault occurred against other free people.

Pearson commented on need for mtg Sov diplomatic offensive and said that great deal cld be done by continuing effort in GA. Those Council members returning Paris shld bend efforts this direction.

Chairman announced Mil Committee wld meet 9 a. m. Monday to hear Eisenhower and at 10 the Def Ministers wld meet.

Next plenary mtg called for 3 : 30 Monday.

ACHESON

740.5/11–2551 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET ROME, November 25, 1951—6 p. m.

Secto 80. Re exchange views reported Secto 78 [2] believe brief interpretive comment useful. Several observers remarked on brevity of session. Entire discussion lasted approx one hour. Believe this explained by recency Ottawa meeting and paucity of significant political developments in interim. No evidence of reluctance to comment or question; entire atmosphere very informal and relaxed. Presentation and discussion of specific items avoided duplicating general political round-up and created more sustained interest.

Indirect consequences of possible Korean armistice seemed foremost political problem in minds of Mins. Pearson's response to Secy's statement suggested that armistice might intensify pressures on some

[1] Repeated to London, Paris for SHAPE and OSR, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reykjavik, Lisbon, Athens, Ankara, Luxembourg, and Ottawa.
[2] *Supra.*

NATO members to reconsider and make up their minds on their long-range China policy. Eden indicated concurrence with Pearson view. Perhaps more significant was fear expressed by Schuman that armistice wld result in increased Chinese activity IC and weaken Fr capacity to hold in this area. By emphasizing great expense IC hostilities to Fr and importance IC to West community as whole, Schuman laid clear foundation for future NATO consideration Fr position in event unfavorable IC developments. (Furthermore, this presentation could be useful to strengthen Fr claim to have their IC costs credited to their "dues" to EDC.)

Responses to Eden statement Egypt problem indicated general desire provide Brit maximum practicable support. Significantly, DeGasperi stressed importance of solution satisfactory to Arab world and hinted at possible Ital mediation role.

Re Lange's statement, see Secto 74 [3].

Pearson's remarks on continued collaboration in meeting Sov dipl offensive in UN very general but we believe sufficient for broad purposes Rome D–17*a* [4] and anticipate no further discussion this subject at current session.

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[3] Not printed; it reported that Norway's position regarding the Soviet notes had stiffened and that this made an excellent impression on the Council (740.5/11-2451).

[4] Not printed; this Department of State preparatory paper, Rome D–17*a* of November 21, 1951, concerned the U.S. position on Soviet propaganda in the United Nations concerning NATO (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 98).

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 98

Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs in the Office of European Regional Affairs (Vass) to the Coordinator of the United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council (Knight), at Rome [1]

[ROME,] November 26, 1951.

Subject: Meeting of Defense Ministers, November 26, 1951.[2]

1. *Revised MTDP Force Requirements (M.C. 26/1).*[3] After general discussion of the necessity to avoid conflict with the TCC exercise, the DefMins approved the U.S. resolution without change. The British proposed to add a clause calling upon governments to avoid taking any measures in the short-term which would prejudice the attainment of the objectives of the plan. After some discussion the UK withdrew

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[1] Both Vass and Knight were members of the U.S. Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council.

[2] The meeting was held at 10:00 a. m. on Monday, November 26.

[3] Military Committee documents referred to in this document are not found in the files of the Department of State.

their amendment, having made their point in the course of the discussion.

2. *Report of Military Committee* (*M.C. 5/3*). The report was approved without discussion.

3. *Report on Middle East Command* (*M.C. 38*). At the suggestion of the chairman discussion of this paper was postponed so that the interested member governments could explore the possibility of taking a further step on this problem during the course of the present session.

Upon further consideration of the Middle East Command Report the DefMins agreed to a resolution requesting the Council to note the report but indicating that it was not considered that detailed Council discussion at this time was desirable. The resolution also urges the Standing Group to press on with this problem as a matter of urgency.

4. *Terms of Reference of SACLANT* (*M.C. 22/10*). The Norwegian Defense Minister made a strong and persuasive statement in favor of immediate action on this long standing issue. He pointedly asked when the Council may expect to see SACLANT operation as a practical reality. Mr. Lovett stated that the U.S. shares this sense of urgency and hoped that we could at least act upon the Terms of Reference. He indicated that the U.S. was prepared to appoint SACLANT as soon as the issues were resolved.

The U.K. recognized the importance of the problem but stated that they were not in agreement on some aspects of the papers. They formally reserved on the Terms of Reference of SACLANT as well as blocking his appointment. After being pressed, particularly by Norway, as to when and where further discussions would take place, the U.K. indicated that they would hope to have the matter ready for action in the next Council meeting in January. Finally, the U.K. agreed to a suggestion by the chair that the papers would go forward to Council as approved by the other 11 Defense Ministers and could go into effect immediately upon notice that the U.K. had withdrawn its objection, which would appear as a part of present Council action. However, the U.K. indicated they saw no hope of resolving the issue prior to the next Council meeting.

5. *Channel Command* (*M.C. 34*). Approved without discussion.

6. *Relation Between Allied and National Commands During Wartime* (*M.C. 36*). The Defense Ministers approved a resolution to be forwarded to Council requesting that the paper be referred to the Deputies for consideration of the legislative and political aspects, and report to the next session of the Council, or action by Deputies on behalf of governments if agreement can be reached prior to the Council meeting.

7. *Standardization of Small Arms* (*M.C. 35*). Mr. Claxton made a strong statement urging action to resolve this issue, stating that it

was "euphemistic" to describe the paper as a "Progress Report", since it simply reported that the disagreement had not been resolved. Mr. Pace reviewed some of the problems involved and pointed out that our experience with this issue would have beneficial results in creating machinery for the solution of other problems in this general field. He pointedly remarked that this example might show governments the desirability of considering the overall effect when announcing actions on behalf of their own country.

The Defense Ministers agreed to a resolution to the Council stressing the importance of the standardization of small arms, urging the Standing Group to press on with this study and requested the DPB to continue its study of the production aspects and also examine the advantages in procurement and supply of a single weapon, and requested that this report be acted upon by the Military Committee and the Deputies, who would be charged to make recommendations to Council.

8. *Other Business.* Mr. Claxton suggested the desirability of a report on the status of legislation implementing the Armed Forces Status Agreement. He suggested that it would be appropriate for the Deputies to make this report. Mr. Bidault stated that France is prepared to take the necessary steps but gave no indication of timing.

The Norwegian Defense Minister raised the question of NATO issuing guidance as to the information which could be made available to Parliaments. He specifically cited the desirability of making available some of the information contained in the report on Relative Strength of NATO and the Soviet Bloc.

740.5/11–2651

Memorandum by Ridgway B. Knight, Coordinator of the United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council, to the Secretary of State

SECRET [ROME,] November 26, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

The following represents what I asked permission to tell you when this evening's meeting broke up.

1. There is no doubt but that the creation of the European Defense Community would materially improve the possibility of realizing our military objectives more efficiently.

2. However, there is a grave problem in my mind as to the realistic possibility of obtaining ratification by parliaments of the Treaty now contemplated, involving surrender of sovereignty over very large proportions of national budgets and national production.

3. While I was too busy in France to see many of my old political contacts, I left with the definite impression, based on 40 to 50 conversations with different Frenchmen, that neither the parliament nor the people would ratify the EDC Treaty in its present draft. One of my friends who is a Cabinet member hardly knew anything about it.

4. I do not believe that the parliamentary debate which Ambassador Bruce referred to will be conclusive. I would not be surprised if the French Parliament voted favorably on the principle of a European Defense Community but would refuse to ratify the Treaty when the individual Deputies will have become aware of exactly what such ratification would imply in concrete terms.

5. In other words, I do not believe that the present impulses in Europe towards European federation are sufficiently strong to overcome, in the future with which we are dealing, the organized opposition for personal and selfish reasons of labor unions, business men, and politicians. Unfortunately, I fear these oppositions control a majority, and not only in France.

6. If these assumptions are correct, it would seem that the only hopeful possibility for achieving a "full-blown" EDC lies in causing a kind of catalytic reaction through a strong political shock. An example of such a shock might be an announcement by the U.S. that it has reached the conclusion that the "unity of Europe" has now become essential, and that its aid to Europe can be continued only on the condition that Europe immediately take decisive steps toward federation. Perhaps less drastic measures would suffice, but at the very least it seems that very active American pressure would be necessary in order to overcome existing obstacles.

7. Obviously, this kind of decision on our part would present the gravest obstacles, both at home and in terms of our relations with our allies. In addition, it might actually delay the attainment of certain immediate military objectives. At the same time, it may be well to note that recent developments at Strasbourg seem to presage much stronger congressional pressure next year for an "all-out" U.S. position on European unity.

8. Short of such a decision for active intervention on our part, I see little chance, if any, for the adoption of the EDC as presently contemplated. Even so, it does not necessarily follow that the recreation of the Wehrmacht offers the only prospect of a German defense contribution. Such a contribution might yet be achieved by a "short treaty", which would establish a European army with a truly integrated military structure and would accept the principles of a common budget and common defense production for later implementation. I know that many of the people who have been closest to the Paris conference feel that falling back on a short treaty would be synonomous with post-

poning indefinitely the creation of a real European Defense Community. There are also obvious difficulties in finding a formula for a short treaty which would fully satisfy French security demands. Yet, I suggest that we would be better off to attempt such a solution—providing an immediate military asset plus a solid foundation for future progress toward unity—than to continue the present impasse indefinitely.

9. Personally, I suggest that we give serious consideration to the pros and cons of the so-called "shock treatment".

RIDGWAY B. KNIGHT

CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, Rome

Memorandum of Discussion at Informal Meeting Held at the Foro Italico, Rome, on Tuesday, 27th November 1951, at 10:00 a. m.[1]

TOP SECRET

PRESENT

FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM
H.E.M. Robert Schuman	Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden
H.E.M. George Bidault	Lord de l'Isle and Dudley
General d'Armee Aerienne Charles Francois Lecheres	Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Slessor
General de Corps d'Armee Paul Ely	Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot
M. Alexandre Parodi	Sir Pierson Dixon
M. Roland de Margerie	

UNITED STATES

The Hon. Dean Acheson
The Hon. R. A. Lovett
General of the Army Omar N. Bradley
Mr. George W. Perkins
Vice Admiral Jerauld Wright, USN
Mr. Ridgway B. Knight
Colonel R. E. Beebe, USAF

Subject: Middle East Command and Its Relationship to NATO

This record is based on the notes at the meeting and is an agreed record of the informal proceedings for the information of the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

MR. EDEN opened the conversation and raised the question of the Middle East Command (MEC). He was concerned over the number of proposals that had been made, and he wished to take up one of the proposals which had been discussed with General Bradley on his recent visit to London. He then outlined the third proposal of the attached document, an agreed record of the meeting between the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British

[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which indicated that this memorandum was circulated as preparatory paper Rome D–25 of November 29, 1951.

Chiefs of Staff in London on 14 November 1951, containing "Various Proposals Concerning Command Arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East".[2] He said he had discussed this proposal with General Eisenhower who had said that if otherwise agreeable it would be acceptable to him. It was very obvious that the Greeks and the Turks were determined to be under SHAPE for particular reasons, such as getting American equipment. It seemed obvious to him, however, that Turkey must in some way contribute to or be in the MEC in order for the latter to be effective.

General Bradley said that he had cabled back the views he had obtained on his visit with the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, the French Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower. He had recently received a message from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to this. Their message did not make any mention of one of the several proposals that pertained to an arrangement for an Eastern Commander who would wear two hats—a NATO hat and a Middle Eastern hat. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff did, however, discuss an arrangement for splitting NATO Naval Force into separate naval commands in the Eastern and Western Mediterranean, if that were the plan. He expressed his view that the "two-hat" proposal may come later, but since S.G. 80/4 [3] was refused by Turkey, there did not seem to be any point in pressing this view. He felt that it was of the utmost importance to first get Turkey into General Eisenhower's Command. Later we should tackle the problem of the "two-hat" aspect. He repeated his view of the importance of first getting the NATO (Aegean) Command, then a Middle East Command, and then a combined command of the two if that were found to be desirable.

. . . . . .

Sir John Slessor said that the Aegean Command and the MEC were completely interdependent and raised the point that the MEC will have the bulk of the air support required for that area. Mr. Lovett reminded him that much of the support for the Aegean would come from the naval air in the Western Mediterranean. Marshal

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[2] For documentation, see pp. 460 ff.

[3] See Appendix 2 to the Working Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the Washington Foreign Ministers meeting of August 28, 1951, p. 575.

SLESSOR gave it as his view that Admiral Carney would be very much pinned down in the Western Mediterranean.

MR. EDEN said that in practice we might have a Middle East Standing Group who might be the same as the present Standing Group, in a separate role. GENERAL BRADLEY replied that this was the proposal in S.G. 80/4, and suggested that this was agreeable to the Franch, to which they assented. MR. EDEN said that he liked the Standing Group as a basis for a "two-hat" solution. Under such an arrangement one would have another "SHAPE" under the Standing Group in the Middle East area.

MR. EDEN went on to say that it seemed to him that the United States was worried over the political difficulties of associating the MEC to NATO. MR. LOVETT referred him to the United States draft resolution on this subject C8(D)-D/2 (attached)[4]. In this connection he said he very much favored a draft French version (attached)[5] based on this same resolution. The intent of this resolution was to allay the fears of the Danes and the Netherlands and others, such as the Norwegians, that they were politically agreeing to an association not clearly defined and they might later find themselves in a difficult position. Smaller countries felt that their voices were more powerful prior to final decisions. MARSHAL SLESSOR reminded the group that in the Defense Minis-

[4] Not printed; it concluded with the following resolutions:

"The North Atlantic Council hereby resolves that:

a. All NATO nations must have a full voice in the direction of matters relating to the defense of the area covered by the Treaty.

b. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization should not become involved in the defense arrangements of Middle East nations which are outside the North Atlantic Treaty area.

c. The Middle East nations outside the North Atlantic area should not become involved in the defense arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

d. Any coordination of a Middle East command which may be established outside the NAT Area with contiguous NATO Commands will be as agreed by the Council after such a Middle East Command is established and its nature known."

[5] Not printed; the debated second paragraph of the French draft read as follows:

"Recalling that all of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries must fully participate in the direction of the defense of the area covered by the Treaty; that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization must not find itself involved in defense arrangements relating to the Middle East nations situated outside the Treaty area; and that these countries should likewise not be involved in defense arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

ters meeting the day before they had moved that there should be no discussion of this problem. GENERAL BRADLEY replied that this was the United States view; this resolution had been drafted to be kept in reserve. He pointed out that there is no clear solution as yet to the command problem, at least in the United States' mind. We must also remember that it is necessary to secure information from the Greeks and the Turks before reaching a final decision. MARSHAL SLESSOR agreed and indicated that it would be necessary to discuss the matter further in the Standing Group. GENERAL BRADLEY agreed with this last point and said that we must consider all of the views in the Standing Group, including those of the Greeks and the Turks and then, having succeeded in arriving at a joint view, to pass such a solution to the Military Representatives Committee as well as the Greeks and the Turks.

MARSHAL SLESSOR suggested that if we could assure the small powers that there were no obligations outside of NATO by statements for the record that would be sufficient to which MR. LOVETT replied that that was the very point of the French version of the resolution on that matter. He also said that it was this consideration that had led him to distribute the document. MR. ACHESON expressed his view on this point that this was indeed a Council aspect. The Dutch and the Danes had informed him that it was necessary to discuss the command arrangements in order to receive a thorough understanding of the matter before they could ratify the protocol on the entry of Greece and Turkey into NATO. What worried them was that if they ratified now, later they would be confronted with a command arrangement which was a *fait accompli* and in which they had had no voice. Their position now was somewhat that of black mail in the sense that they could force discussions on the matter. He felt that the Council action should be more progressive; that it must be more than a statement "off-the-record". He supported the idea of a simple resolution in order to satisfy them in case this matter came up. He inquired if anyone would be in a position to talk about the NATO command aspects.

At this point in the discussion a detailed exchange took place on various amendments to the French draft covering Mr. Acheson's point. MR. EDEN first proposed that the fourth point (*d*) of the United States draft was satisfactory but he did not like the previous three points since they might prejudice the final form of the command arrangements which had not yet been agreed. For the same reason the United Kingdom objected to the second paragraph of the French version and suggested several alternative wordings, particularly applying to the second phrase. These suggestions did not prove acceptable to the United States, who felt that they must stick to the fact that it is necessary to show that an actual legal separation exists between NATO and the

MEC. MR. LOVETT's suggestion that paragraph 2 of the French version be eliminated and that the resolution simply be the first paragraph of the French version followed by the last paragraph of the United States version, was agreed to (attached).[6]

MARSHAL SLESSOR inquired if this meant that the four powers must first set up a separate MEC and then at a later date settle its relationship with an Eastern NATO Command. MR. ACHESON said this was his view. Once the two commands had been established the United States would support a proposal for a "two-hat solution" at a later date. MR. EDEN agreed that an attempt should be made to find a solution along these lines.

MARSHAL SLESSOR commented that this means we must set up a NATO Command at once. GENERAL BRADLEY said that the word "established" in the draft United States resolution meant only that there must be an agreed arrangement for setting up the command, in the same way as we had agreed a year ago to set up SACLANT. MR. EDEN then inquired whether the Commander of the NATO Command could be the same Commander as the MEC. MR. LOVETT expressed some doubt that this would necessarily work out that way, but in setting up an MEC now it would not have to be done completely, and perhaps the matter of the appointing the Commander could be taken up later. GENERAL BRADLEY pointed out that we had had the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group for over a year without a Commander. (*Note:* This matter was not further discussed.)

There was unanimous agreement that the three powers would not raise the matter of the MEC in the Council nor bring forward the agreed draft resolution unless the subject were raised by other countries. MR. EDEN suggested that the matter must come up definitely on the agenda at the next Council meeting for a discussion of a "two-hat or one-hat" proposal. GENERAL BRADLEY pointed out that no final decision was possible until Greece and Turkey were definitely admitted to NATO. MR. EDEN agreed that this was the case.

GENERAL BRADLEY sketched out a simple illustration of command arrangement and this received general acknowledgement with recognition that it would have to be studied in detail. After inspection MR. EDEN said that as far as the Eastern Mediterranean was concerned, this offered a possible solution if the other NATO members would accept it.

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[6] The tripartite agreed version of the draft resolution read as follows:

"Whereas the signatory powers of the North Atlantic Treaty are naturally interested in the relations which may exist between their organization and a Middle East Command when it will be established, the North Atlantic Council decides as follows:—

Any co-ordination of a Middle East Command which may be established outside the N.A.T. Area with contiguous N.A.T.O. Commands will be as agreed by the Council after such a Middle East Command is established and its nature known."



Meeting adjourned at 10:55.

740.5/11–2751 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET ROME, November 27, 1951—4 p. m.

Secto 88. Pearson opened third meeting NAC [2] by announcing arrangements made for SHAPE film crew to record meeting. No sound.

Agenda item V re estimate relative strength capabilities NATO and Soviet forces (MC–33 [3]) submitted. No discussion. Chairman pointed out subject would be covered later in meeting by presentations Gruenther and Eisenhower and would be subject discussion tomorrow's meeting.

Agenda item VI re readings and effectiveness NATO forces (MC–31 [4]) submitted by Military Committee chairman Baele who said Gruenther presentation would cover.

Gruenther presented SHAPE report re agenda items V and VI. Said item V basically capabilities report and related to what Soviets

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reykjavik, Lisbon, Ottawa, Athens, Ankara, and Luxembourg.

[2] The third meeting, held on Monday, November 26, began at 3:30 p. m.

[3] Not printed. MC–33, "Estimate of the Relative Strength and Capabilities of NATO and Soviet Bloc Forces at Present and in the Immediate Future," was renumbered and circulated as Council Document C8–D/4. The Council agreed to receive this report for information.

[4] Not printed. MC–31, "Report on Readiness and Effectiveness of NATO Forces," was received for information by the Council.

can do, not their intention. Soviets have 175 divisions, satellites between 65 and 70, and total approximately 20,000 aircraft. Sub fleet estimated 300, weak or surface vessels. SHAPE plan expects Soviets would employ 17 divisions northern sector, 70 to 120 central sector, 20 in south in attack West Europe. Emphasized magnitude figures indicate Soviets would operate from preconceived war plan and not accidental touching-off hostilities and would require 30 days gain full strength. SG estimate Soviets can maintain such attack logistically. Estimate 8,000 aircraft could be employed by Soviets. Did not dwell on capacity Soviet economy sustain war, but estimate general Soviet economy today better able sustain than German economy World War II. SHAPE strategy is to meet attack with "forward" strategy, hold enemy to East using air and ground counter-offensive covering forces to gain time mobilize. Use German forces obvious because location requires participation.

SHAPE estimates West requirement meet and contain Soviet thrust at 46 divisions D day and 97 divisions D plus 30. Pointed outsize Soviet division approximately two-thirds West division. Consider fire power equal due attachment Soviet artillery anti-aircraft divisions to regular forces. Thought Soviet division lasting power less than that West division. NATO air requirement 7600 aircraft, not counting approximately 1500 UK and French home defense. Emphasized figures not precise but gave order of magnitude required. . . . NATO forces 31 December 1951, 24 divisions D day and 44 D plus 30. Estimate 31 December 1952 is 30 and 55. All troops not now under SHAPE but at least earmarked. All divisions cannot be considered fully effective due deficiencies training and equipment. Eisenhower has made recommendations re how to make effective through training and management reserves. NATO air strength 31 December 1951 is 1580 aircraft with 3250 aircraft projected 31 December 1952. Planes lack full effectiveness due shortage spare planes and pilots and particularly insufficient air fields. Pointed out 51 fields promised end 1951 but actually only 16 now operational. However, 35 expected by March 1952. Planning program may have been too ambitious but fact is too few fields available and high percentage these in exposed German area. Mentioned infrastructure plan calling for 50 additional fields 1952. SHAPE hopes Council will expedite administrative procedure because air power vital to defense sector and is dominant factor warfare.

Emphasized role navy carriers, particularly in operation emergency plan. Total 16 carriers needed operate in NATO waters. SHAPE urged speedy action in agreeing command structures, particularly SACLANT.

Necessary establish realistic estimates military requirements. Did not believe NATO efforts could be labelled failure if equipment and troops not immediately available. Appraisal question degree success achieved so far did not take into account new methods warfare, such as atom bomb and guided missiles. Chance requirements can be reduced as result scientific developments. SHAPE realized impact on economies in carrying out plan but felt immediate steps should be taken reach capabilities figure which would not only be deterrent to aggressor but would give West equal effectiveness in field. Mentioned TCC–SHAPE and other NATO–SHAPE relationships as increasingly effective and said that if statistics resulted pessimistic picture, should be remembered morale is indeterminable factor achieving superiority and West should lead that regard. Cautioned that Soviet rearmament effort increasing and mentioned significant increase satellite troops and war production. SHAPE not pessimistic, felt progress significant; was good spirit and good relations with various military commands and ministries. Officers assigned SHAPE able and had crusading spirit of confidence.

Harriman presented TCC progress report.[5] Reviewed Council directive and set forth history and structure TCC. Said guiding principles following from central objective TCC most rapid practicable build-up of balanced effective combat forces were:

(1) Appraising present status NATO defense position both individually and collectively.
(2) Defining political and economic feasible program for progressive build-up toward acceptable security position for Atlantic community.
(3) Reflecting principle balanced collective forces in which contribution members mutually inter-dependent and each country contribution appropriate its position, and
(4) Outlining concerted and cooperative actions in both military and economic fields which are required achieve NATO objectives.

Relations with individual countries good and conferences characterized by informal and free discussion. TCC has not yet begun formulation conclusions and recommendations but certain key problems and requirements already apparent. One major field involved necessary measures get military resources now at hand into most effective condition and press forward with development additional military strength. Matter priorities and allocations equipment discussed with each country. Appears general accord that recommenda-

[5] The 12-page "Progress Report by the Chairman of the Temporary Council Committee to the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council," which contains the verbatim record of Harriman's report, was circulated as Council Document C8–D/8. Rome D–24*a*, November 26, 1951, which was an NAC preparatory paper for the U.S. Delegation, contains the outline report which provided the basis for Harriman's oral presentation to the Council (CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, Rome).

tions from Eisenhower and other NATO commanders be given priority consideration in allocation equipment in order attain maximum defensive strength with limited resources available. US has accepted this concept and is reviewing administration end-item aid so as relate priorities and allocation these items to developing military capabilities West Europe. TCC recognized it will not be able provide full solution to difficult problems production and supply equipment. However, were attempting relate current program production to particularly urgent requirements of phased build-up. US off-shore procurement program would be of considerable assistance in activating capacity Europe, but could not alone provide solution production problems Europe. Stressed only thru economic as well as military cooperation could common interests and national interests be effectively realized.

TCC effective, determined group. Harriman urged member governments give maximum individual discretion to their TCC representatives. Said projects by individual countries should not be held up in anticipation TCC report, but was essential that NATO agencies and governments proceed with build-up. Emphasized need for cooperation to obtain increased European coal production. Concluded by saying added conviction West could obtain secure position and meet hopes their peoples. Was untenable that West must live in fear of Soviets. Reviewed industrial and man-power capacity Europe and North America as compared with USSR and satellites. There could be no security on individual basis but through collective effort West had ability to change pious words into action.

Plowden, UK representative Exec Bureau TCC, followed with statement stressing burden-sharing and fact nations and peoples had to have confidence that other countries and peoples were contributing a fair share to common effort.

Under agenda item VIII, Eisenhower said he had two comments on preceding presentations. Thought TCC report gave some measure of progress NATO and set forth ability to cooperate and consequent benefits. Thought also emphasized great capacity NATO machinery get away from pious statements and get results. Re Gruenther's presentation, said set forth ability SHAPE to do work. SHAPE's staff worked round clock for preservation peace. He did not seek role philosopher but felt no man could walk thru Rome and not be aware full record our civilization. Altho NATO mtg briefly in Rome, men fifty years from now will be aware its effort if problems facing it are met with fortitude and confidence on part of its leadership. NATO sought no monuments to its accomplishments but that of giving free men an opportunity to live as they desire. Recalled SHAPE motto and quoted from St Luke "When a strong man, armed, keepeth his palace in order, his goods are in peace". Strength West was in moral fiber and

integrity its individuals and nations. The intelligence and freedom which produced economic systems and science, and capacity to arm if necessary, were "goods" West was guarding. Was not merely material property, but way of life which was being protected. We could not destroy from within by overburdening ourselves because economic life equally valuable as creation military strength. Goals set for the end of 1952 and 1953 left him cold—they were annual allotments our resources. What we sought was peace of mind and tranquility. We should not sit awaiting Soviet move. Only lack of unity prevented us from easily achieving our goal. Soviet police state has unity but West, if it saw its enlightened self-interest, would realize each country was served by progress of all. No one nation could provide necessary security. Old ideas of sovereignty would be impinged upon—is now necessary pool sovereignty. If we did not succeed in coordinating our military requirements to abilities our economies, we would destroy both. If leadership which we produced was equal to task, problem was not so important. We have come to think of morale as stemming from material things such as food and shelter, but morale really results from appeal to heart of man provided reasonable wants met.

Eisenhower said he next wished discuss favorite topic, idea European unity. Problem of unification should not be alibi for not doing something today, but that was necessary do something now with what we have. Advantages of unity for West Europe were obvious. Single balanced military force for whole area would be lighter burden for each country. Costly prestige forces would be eliminated. We need German assistance if we can work out plan which gives respect to them and respect to ourselves. We must have European army. This would provide us with willing German strength without traditional risk German remilitarization. He emphasized need for solution which would satisfy Germans because we could not have second-rate troops or hirelings. Schuman Plan must go forward and must be successful. Nothing more important, however, than that people West countries should have clear understanding of facts. Govts must agree and peoples must agree (this was responsibility of leaders). Public understanding concept collective security through cooperation must be brought about, otherwise no hope for any plan defense. This can be done and must have priority. If isn't, we will be victims either our own laziness or of Soviet propaganda. Ability to defend Rhine was one thing, is entirely different matter to mount offensive to Vistula. We could not possibly do latter. All propaganda assaults by Soviets this connection are specious. Soviet leaders know it and we know it, but is essential that people know it.

SHAPE and subordinate military groups have good staffs. Instinct of self preservation would make what now seems impossible merely difficult. We are going to fight even if war is forced on us tomorrow.

Only Soviet advantage, outside large disposable military force, is unity. However, fear of machine gun behind backs of men loses effectiveness in the face of other machine guns and Soviet unity may well disintegrate. Free men in trouble tend to cling together. In conclusion, Eisenhower said he was keenly appreciative of responsibility which rested on Council members.

The fourth meeting of Council was scheduled for Tuesday morning, 27 Nov 11 a. m.

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740.5/11–2751 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET ROME, November 27, 1951—10 p. m.

Secto 93. NAC Chairman Pearson opened fourth meeting, eighth session Tuesday a. m.,[2] calling for Defense Minister's report on revised MTDP and comments on agenda items V–VIII. Claxton presented Defense Ministers report (MC 26/1 final plus corrigendum containing views Canadian, Portuguese Ministers [3]) and draft resolution on defense capabilities sent Dept Secto 83.[4] Commented on difficulties involved citing necessity gradually adapting national sovereignty towards successful collective action, burden-sharing, and standardization. Following discussion below council approved resolution as amended. (See Secto 91 [5])

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reykjavik, Lisbon, Ottawa, Athens, Ankara, and Luxembourg.

[2] The fourth meeting, held on Tuesday, November 27, began at 11:00 a. m.

[3] MC–26/1 Final, "Revised Medium Term Force Requirements and Recommended National Contributions," and its corrigendum, as well as a covering note by the Defense Ministers, were circulated as Council Document C8–D/7. A draft resolution on "Increased Defense Capabilities," which was recommended to the Defense Ministers by the U.S. Delegation, was also presented by Claxton and circulated as C8–D/7 Final.

[4] Not printed; it transmitted the text of the draft resolution which concluded:

" . . . [the] Council

(1) Takes note of action MC and requests that TCC in preparation of its final report should give consideration, insofar as mil part of its work is concerned, to revised MTDP (MC 26/1) as agreed by MC.

(2) Directs that upon issuance of TCC report, MC, in light of recommendations set forth in such report and evaluation of current intelligence on Sov bloc, submit its comments of report to Council sufficiently prior to next meeting permit action by govts at such meeting.

(3) Requests that member nations meanwhile take cognizance of immed necessity of proceeding on 1952 portion of plan as immed step in securing finally approved mil objectives and that this be done in light of (*a*) recommended priorities of NATO commands and agencies; (*b*) over-all training requirements; and (*c*) need for provision of long-lead time requirements.

(4) Directs all NATO commands and agencies, after consultation with countries concerned, to bring about greatest feasible defense combat capability of NATO forces in 1952 and progressively thereafter towards agreed security objectives." (740.5/11–2651)

[5] Not printed; it reported that the draft resolution on "Increased Defense Capabilities" was approved with two minor changes in wording (740.5/11–2751).

536-688 PT 1--81---49

In discussion Italian Finance Minister Pella stressed importance early submission TCC report noting only then cld countries take final decisions. Butler (UK) supported Pella on need for awaiting TCC report, citing importance home front economy battle and stressing equity theme of burden-sharing along lines Plowden's statement at third mtg. Noted physical difficulties, specifically material shortages, which must be overcome and national commitments undertaken outside Europe by certain NATO members in common interest which also must be considered nevertheless NATO task to receive priority. Italian Defense Minister Pacciardi commenting General Gruenther's presentation stated Italian Govt cld not accept without reservation limited SHAPE calculation of threat to southern sector and stressed fullest preparation must continue in all directions.

Council referred to deputies request by Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange for guidance on info contained statements at third mtg which might be disclosed in interest of education of national Parliaments and public opinion, both in public statements and in confidential discussions with Parliamentary committees. Also referred to deputies Danish Minister Kristensen's request for comprehensive survey economic and industrial resources of NATO group and relation to those of Soviet bloc and for study of nature of political thinking and Kremlin and estimate of Soviet intentions.

Under agenda item IX Pearson called for Schuman's report on EDC conference [6] and Acheson's report on contractual arrangements. Schuman reviewed background of conference and cited degree of agreement reached on basic integration principles. Stated level of integration wld be army corps with its supporting corps elements. Basic air unit one half wing, approx 75 planes, under tactical Air Command. Stressed that lasting solution German problem cld only be found in integration Germany with European community and necessity of collaboration EDC with NATO, stating use of European army forces wld be entrusted from outset to SHAPE.

Commenting on Schuman's statement, Stikker urged that EDC include all free countries of Western Europe, specifically UK and Scandinavian countries. Also said many questions not solved or discussed thoroughly Paris including financial support of EDC, nature of EDC defense authority and role of proposed Council Ministers. Van Zeeland noted exchange of views on EDC had been on technical level and technical differences must give way to political principles. Urged earliest consideration by Ministers. De Gasperi noted that since task of common defense extremely urgent, temporary compromise formulations required, but stressed must be only temporary

[6] For Schuman's report, which was circulated as Council Document C8–D/5, see pp. 933 ff.

and be considered preparation for substantial unification Western European countries.

Secretary's report on discussions of contractual arrangements,[7] including Nov 22 mtg of US-UK-French Foreign Ministers with Adenauer, cited progress toward conclusion overall agreement on general relations and subsidiary agreements on transfer of responsibility of occupying powers to Fed Rep, status of foreign forces in Germany, logistical and financial support of German contribution to western defense and security safeguards. Expressed hope contractual arrangements wld be completed by end of Dec and urged completion EDC by same date so both cld be considered by next NAC session. Tabled US draft resolution on EDC recommending early attention to problem of correlating EDC–NATO obligations and organizational relations and consultation by chairman Council Deputies and chairman EDC conference to insure NATO views on relation of EDC to NATO be reflected in proposed EDC treaty, and urging that EDC report be given council at next session for consideration.

US draft resolution referred to afternoon mtg of CD together with one indicated as forthcoming from the Benelux dels in attempt arrive at agreed EDC resolution to be presented council mtg 10 a. m. Wednesday. Deputies also directed consider Stikker suggestion council meet in next session with limited number advisers.

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[7] Secretary Acheson's report is contained in Rome D–8/5*a*, a document prepared by the Department of State and dated November 26, 1951. A copy of this report is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 98.

740.5/11–2951 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET ROME, November 29, 1951— 4 a. m.

Secto 105. Pearson opened fifth meeting NAC [2] with announcement deputies had not completed work considering draft resolutions on EDC submitted by US and by Benelux countries on previous day. Deputies would present draft before meeting concluded.

Pearson presented report of Defense Ministers.

I. MT force requirements covered in previous discussion.

II. "Military Progress of NATO" (MC 5/3 final)[3] received by council for info.

[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reykjavik, Lisbon, Ottawa, Athens, Ankara, and Luxembourg.

[2] The fifth meeting, held on Wednesday, November 28, began at 10:00 a. m.

[3] Military Committee documents referred to in this document are not found in the files of the Department of State.

III. "Proposals for reorganization of NATO Military Structure (MC 22–11 final) received for info.

IV. "Progress on Command Arrangements for Mediterranean and Middle East" (MC 38 final) noted, and agreed request SG press further development and make definitive report through mil comm next council meeting.

V. "Terms Reference for Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic" (MC 22–10 final) approved. Canadian Defense Minister Claxton suggested clarification record indicate terms were approved subject reservation UK, and when UK concurrence forthcoming implementation commands structure possible without further ref to council. Eden said understood Claxton point but preferred text be allowed stand.

VI. "Proposals for NATO Command in Channel and Southern North Sea Area" (MC 34)[4] approved.

VII. "Division of Responsibilities in Wartime between National Territorial Commanders and Supreme Commanders and Subordinate Allied Commanders (annex C to MC 36 final)[5] approved. This directs CD review MC 36 re political and constitutional points involved and return SG with any recommended modifications. Report by CD and mil com requested for next council meeting.

VIII. Annex D to MC 35 and MC 35–1[6] on standardization small arms and SA ammunition approved. Resolution stresses importance making progress in standardization and directs SG give high priority studies this matter.

IX. Infrastructure deferred for discussion later in meeting.

X. Recommendation re "national legislation on rights and immunities of NATO forces" accepted and deputies asked report on progress national legislation in process or being considered by each member country.[7]

XI. Council noted Defense Ministers recommendation re "information concerning NATO forces" to effect full support should be given efforts provide adequate public information on activities NATO forces to extent consistent with security.[8]

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[4] The resolution approved by the Council, based on MC–34 Final, was circulated as Annex B to Council Document C8–D/9 and read as follows:

"*The North Atlantic Council:*

Having noted the Military Committee's proposals for the Establishment of a NATO Command in the Channel and Southern North Sea Area (MC. 34(Final)),

Having noted the proposed terms of reference for the Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel and Southern North Sea (MC. 34/1),

Having further noted the nomination by the United Kingdom Government of Admiral Sir Arthur John Power as Allied Commander-in-Chief, Channel and Southern North Sea.

Resolves:

That the recommendations of the Military Committee be accepted and

That the appointment of Admiral Sir Arthur John Power as Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel and Southern North Sea be confirmed."

[5] The resolution approved by the Council, based on MC–36 Final, was circulated as Annex C to Council Document C8–D/9.

[6] The resolution approved by the Council, based on MC–35 Final and MC–35/1 Final, was circulated as Council Document C8–D/9, Annex D.

[7] This recommendation was based on paragraph X of the "Report of the Defense Ministers to the North Atlantic Council," Council Document C8–D/9.

[8] This recommendation was based on paragraph XI, *ibid.*

Council considered draft resolution covering Norwegian and Danish queries to be referred CD mentioned Secto 93.[9] Acheson objected to para calling for CD study economic capabilities NATO countries as compared Soviet bloc. Pointed out would duplicate TCC, and deputies could not handle huge project this nature. Danish Finance Minister Kristensen said had no objection in light TCC report to postponing study econ capabilities. Council accepted referral to CD of request for documents to be used inform public and official groups at home and after some discussion accepted para requesting CD conclude study aims Soviet foreign policy. Acheson suggested most effective means synthesizing views latter point would be private discussion this topic by Foreign Ministers next meeting.

Spofford presented report re infrastructure consisting of comments by deputies on MC 32 and MC 32–1 [10] said there are still delays in implementation. MC 32–1 contained recommendations from SHAPE to avoid delays. These recommendations to be considered further by deputies, SG and SHAPE. Deputies now have agreed organizational and financial procedures for implementation. However, problem beginning rather than ending. Program estimated seven billion dollars through 1954. New items to be subjected to infrastructure formula including training facilities, radar installations and fortifications. TCC studying implications within its general terms of reference. Treaty agencies will have to work out recommendations made by TCC. With large program forthcoming arrangements must be made more effective. Re burden sharing, complex multilateral negots are slow and difficult. Maximum delegation of authority to reps necessary but no sign this will be forthcoming. CD recommended as soon as member govts have studied ref documents and TCC report, deputies in connection with SG and

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[9] *Supra.* The draft resolution that was under consideration by the Council was circulated as Council Document C8–D/13 and read as follows:

"*The North Atlantic Council:*

With respect to the reports and statements presented to the Eighth Session under Items V to VIII of its agenda,

Requests the Council Deputies:

(*a*) in consultation with the NATO military agencies, to prepare two documents based on these reports and statements, one which may be used for public distribution, and the other for Ministers to use only in confidential discussions with their parliamentary committees;

(*b*) in the light of the TCC report, to prepare a comprehensive study of the economic capabilities of the NATO countries as compared with those of the Soviet Bloc;

(*c*) to complete their study of Soviet foreign policy, its aims and means."

[10] Spofford's report to the Council on the "Physical Progress of Infrastructure" was circulated as Council Document C8–D/10 and contained the Council Deputies' comments on MC–32 and MC–32/1. The Deputies' recommendation was that as soon as the member governments have been able to study these two military committee documents, and, in light of the TCC and of SHAPE's infrastructure plans, the study should be considered further by the Council Deputies with a view to preparing a report for submission to the Council at an early date.

SHAPE prepare report for council and stimulate action by member govts where necessary. Report approved.

Pearson next raised question statement by NATO on flood relief in Po Valley. It was agreed to refer this deputies for agreement on text to be presented at afternoon meeting.

Council next received EDC draft mentioned para one. After discussion led by Claxton re status Allied forces other than those in occupation in Germany and assurance it was intended all forces be on equal footing, resolution adopted by council.[11] (Text cabled separately).[12]

Report by "comite on North Atlantic community"[13] presented by Pearson. Said report of interim nature because related to continuing activity. Requested approval and mandate to continue comm work. Report covered:

a. Coordination and consultation on foreign policy re steps designed promote peace. Basic principle to obtain action in common interest and prevent that against common interest. Qualifying factors such as activity in relation to UN limited community's ability. Need for consultation at early stages emphasized. Increasing role which deputies could play if given additional authority mentioned.

b. Possible relation between Parliamentary reps and NATO. Different positions in different countries made impossible this juncture specific recommendation.

c. Closer econ, social and cultural cooperation designed promote conditions of econ stability and well-being. Work FEB, OEEC, and conference on migration important this field. Desirable comm not cut across their work.

d. Collaboration in fields cultural and public info. Great need in world for info re NATO. However, believed individual countries should carry main burden and NATO should build conservatively on small organization it now has. Statement principles now under study.

Dr. Cunha said important not overload deputies and doubted NATO should become involved problems such as movement labor. Felt de-

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[11] The draft resolution, which appeared in earlier drafts as Council Documents C8–D/11 and C8–D/12, was rewritten by the Council Deputies and presented to the Council as C8–D/14. It read as follows:

"*The North Atlantic Council:*

Having received statements with respect to the status of negotiations for the establishment of a European Defense Community, and the status of negotiations with the German Federal Republic concerning the contractual arrangements to replace the occupation statute,

Hopes that the Paris Conference will conclude its activities at the earliest possible moment so that definitive report can be made to the Council for consideration at its next meeting, and

Requests the appropriate treaty agencies in the meantime to give early attention to the problem of correlating the obligations and organizational relationships of the European Defense Community with those of the North Atlantic Treaty so that discussions with the Paris Conference on this question may be held and concluded as soon as possible."

[12] The text of the resolution was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 98 from Rome, November 28, not printed (740.5/11–2851).

[13] The 21-page "Interim Report by the Committee on the North Atlantic Community" was circulated as Council Document C8–D/6.

sirable not increase number organizations related to NATO. Lange thought study might pay more attention internal structure NATO itself. Was time to reform our ways; too large assembly present now to discuss vital issues. Did not put forth specific suggestion. Thought deputies should delegate work to subcomites. Constant problem for Foreign Minister was to carry govt and Parliament along his lines thinking. Parliaments need same kind of education council members receive. Italian Finance Minister Pella stressed attention report paid to labor problem and related problems of manpower and unemployment. Said Italy needed external means to meet problem and that emigration must occur. Requested concrete action by comm. Pearson replied although regarded Pella's proposals as very serious he believed comm should continue study and report at next council meeting rather than attempt bring up concrete proposal while problem under consideration at Brussels. Re Lange's suggestion for organization NATO work comm would pursue this on priority basis. Eden said must be careful not multiply work without multiplying result. Felt other bodies could handle many problems social field. Was all right give deputies tasks in econ field but they should not be asked carry these out until TCC report available. Report adopted by council.

Pearson mentioned invitation of Portugues Govt to hold next council meeting Lisbon. Was decided hold this subject over until afternoon meeting along with consideration communiqué and statement re flood relief Po Valley.

740.5/11–2851 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

RESTRICTED ROME, November 28, 1951—7 p. m.

Secto 96. Sixth and final mtg eighth session NAC this afternoon [2] agreed convene ninth council session Lisbon, Feb 2, 1952. Approved statement on Po Valley flood relief expressing distress at disaster and note emergency help given by NATO members. Statement asks permanent Rome missions of NATO members keep in touch changing needs for relief and reconstruction in area.[3]

Approved final communiqué as revised (see Secto 95 [4]).

General Baelereuin quitted MC chair to Lt. Gen Foulkes, Canada.

Session adjourned 4 : 25 p. m.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reykjavik, Lisbon, Ottawa, Athens, and Luxembourg.

[2] The sixth meeting, held on Wednesday, November 28, began at 3:30 p. m.

[3] The proposed Council statement was circulated as Council Document C8–D/16.

[4] Not printed, but the text of the communiqué is *infra*.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 98

Press Communiqué of the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, November 24–28, 1951[1]

1. The North Atlantic Council has today concluded its Eighth Session in Rome. It was a regular meeting of the Council held in accordance with the policy announced at Ottawa of holding frequent meetings to exchange views and to develop more effective unity of action on a continuing basis. The meeting was the first held under the Chairmanship of the Hon. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Minister for External Affairs, and was attended by twenty-eight ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Defence.

Pending parliamentary approval of the decision to invite Greece and Turkey to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty, representatives of those two countries attended the plenary meetings of the Council as observers.

2. The Council considered progress reports from its military and civilian agencies. It instructed the pertinent agencies to put into action certain recommendations of the reports and to continue their work on others with a view to reporting further at the next session of the Council.

3. The Chairman and one Vice Chairman of the Temporary Council Committee informed the Council of the progress of the Committee's work directed towards the reconciliation of military requirements with political-economic capabilities. They stated that the Committee's final report and recommendations would be presented early in December for the consideration of members governments and the Council at its next session.

4. The Military Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of member countries, met in Rome before the Council Meeting. The Council considered the reports of the Military Committee, including one on the readiness and effectiveness of NATO forces. The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and his Chief of Staff made oral statements. The Council exchanged views and took decisions on various military matters dealt with in these reports.

5. The North Atlantic Council received statements with respect to the status of negotiations for the establishment of a European Defence Community, and the status of negotiations with the German Federal Republic concerning the contractual arrangements to replace the occupation statute.

The Council adopted a resolution expressing its hope that the Paris Conference would conclude its activities at the earliest possible move-

[1] Circulated as Council Document C8–D/15 and approved by the Council during its final meeting on November 28.

ment so that a definitive report could be made to the Council for consideration at its next meeting.

The resolution requested the appropriate North Atlantic Treaty agencies in the meantime to give early attention to the problem of correlating the obligations and relationships of the European Defence Community with those of the North Atlantic Treaty so that discussions with the Paris Conference on this question may be held and concluded as soon as possible.

6. The Council approved an interim report submitted by the Committee on the North Atlantic Community (consisting of representatives of Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway).

The report stressed the importance of further developing the habit of consultation on matters of common concern. The Council directed that fuller study be given to a number of proposals relating to economic, social and cultural matters and to the co-ordination of the activities of NATO civilian agencies with those of other international organizations. In this connection the Council recommended that particular consideration be given to facilitating the movement of labour from member countries with excess manpower to others where it could be effectively utilised.

The Council directed the Committee to continue its work.

7. The Council agreed that its next meeting should be held in Lisbon on February 2nd, 1952.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 98

Memorandum of Conversation, by Norbert L. Anschuetz of the United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council

TOP SECRET [ROME, November 29, 1951.]

Subject: NATO Command Arrangements Regarding Turkey

Participants: Ambassador Huseyn Ragip Baydur, Observer at Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council
The Secretary of State
N. L. Anschuetz, Member U.S. Delegation

Ambassador Baydur, presently Turkish Ambassador to Italy, called on the Secretary at 11 : 00 a. m. November 29th.

The Ambassador expressed his pleasure at seeing the Secretary and in representing his government at the Council meeting.

The Ambassador then said that his government had received information through the Turkish military representatives in Washington that the Standing Group had been actively considering NATO command arrangements with regard to Turkey. According to his information the British had advocated placing Turkey, Greece

and Yugoslavia under British command, possibly under the proposed MEC (Middle East Command). The American plan, as reported, provided that Turkey be divided into two commands militarily: the western part falling under the direct command of General Eisenhower, and the eastern part falling under the MEC under British leadership. The Turkish Government is concerned at this development. The Ambassador stated that it was impossible that Turkey should have political association with NATO, but that her military strength should be tied to the MEC with which Turkey has no contractual obligations. Such a situation would provide a critical internal political problem for the Turkish Government. He said that Turkey had already been under diplomatic attack from the USSR with regard to the MEC.

The Secretary replied that he could set the Ambassador's mind at rest. The Turkish *aide-mémoire* [1] (which was submitted after the visit of Generals Bradley, Slim, and Lecheres to Ankara) setting forth Turkish views with regard to command arrangements, had been sympathetically studied both in the Department of Defense and in the Department of State. The U.S. is clearly aware of the Turkish desire to be included in an existing NATO command under General Eisenhower. He felt that the Turkish Government could assume that a solution along those lines would ultimately be developed. We have clearly in mind that no decision on this matter can be taken without a complete exchange of views with the Turkish Government and until Turkey enjoyed the rights and privileges of full NATO membership. The Secretary added that in his conversations with General Bradley he had received no impression that the U.S. military authorities were at this time thinking of splitting Turkey into two military commands.

Ambassador Baydur expressed his pleasure at this information and assured the Secretary that Turkey was by no means hostile to the idea of the MEC, but was in fact prepared to cooperate with it at the proper time. In his opinion the proper time would arrive after a full assessment of Turkey's military and political obligations under NATO had been firmly established. He mentioned in this connection that he was somewhat concerned at the action of the present NATO Council in urging the NATO agencies to press for a solution to the command arrangements in the Middle East to be submitted to the Council at its Lisbon meeting in early February 1952.

The Secretary suggested that the proper procedure would be to examine the question of the MEC on the basis of certain assumptions: i.e. that Turkey would fall in the first instance under an existing NATO command directly under General Eisenhower. He added that he saw very little possibility of taking immediate action in connection with the MEC.

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[1] Not printed, but see telegram 349 from Ankara, October 12, p. 596.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 98

Memorandum of Conversation, by Norbert L. Anschuetz of the United States Delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council

SECRET [ROME, November 29, 1951.]

Subject: Greek Reaction to NATO Council Meeting

Participants: Evanghelos Averoff, Greek Observer at Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council
The Secretary of State
N. L. Anschuetz, Member U.S. Delegation

Mr. Averoff, Acting Foreign Minister of Greece, called at 11:30 a. m. November 29th.

He opened the conversation by saying that it was a privilege to have this opportunity to speak with the Secretary at a moment when the Secretary had so many important responsibilities in hand. He said he was pleased to be able to sit as an observer at the NATO Council meeting and that he felt that the NATO had great possibilities for Greece as an instrument for mutual cooperation in the defense of freedom. He added that at this moment, inasmuch as Greece herself possesses an army of 12 divisions, NATO can offer Greece very little in the way of security. However, in the future this situation should alter. Greece is bearing an extremely heavy military burden at this time. In the previous fiscal year Greece had devoted 48 per cent of her national budget to military expenditures, and during the current fiscal year 43 per cent of her budget was being devoted to military purposes. The Greek economy was beginning to bend somewhat under this strain. Mr. Averoff added that Greece did not wish to reduce the size of her military forces, but that Greece was determined to find ways of reducing the military budget by approximately 20 million dollars.

The Secretary replied that in many NATO countries the problem is to increase military expenditures, but in Greece the problem is to maintain them at their present level. The U.S. missions in Athens are fully prepared to cooperate with the Greek Government to eliminate any unnecessary military expenditures which might presently be in the budget.

Mr. Averoff said that notwithstanding the magnitude of American assistance to Greece, he felt that this had been an extremely productive investment on the part of the U.S. Had it not been for American assistance, Greece and Italy certainly would have been behind the iron curtain, and possibly France. History would record that the Marshall Plan was an act of high statesmanship. Greece is now a strong ally with 12 well-trained divisions with high morale and a determination to fight.

The Secretary said that he hoped the Greek-Turkey Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty would be promptly ratified by the U.S. Senate. He regretted that delay by the Danes after the Ottawa meeting of the NATO Council had prevented him from submitting the Greek-Turkey Protocol to the Senate for ratification before the Senate adjourned. No difficulty is anticipated, however, but there are certain formalities which must be observed. Mr. Averoff added that Mr. Eden had informed him that the British Government would probably ratify the Protocol within a week or ten days.

Mr. Averoff said that he wished the Secretary to know that the American Embassy in Athens was held in very high esteem. He said laughingly that Ambassador Peurifoy, with his open, friendly manner, had achieved a popularity which was almost dangerous. Mr. Averoff said that his government and he, personally, would be very happy to have the Secretary visit Athens. The Secretary recalled that General Marshall had visited Athens when he was Secretary of State. He said that he, too, hoped to visit Athens, but that it would not be possible at this time inasmuch as he had to return to Washington to prepare for Congressional hearings. Perhaps after the Lisbon meeting the situation might be different.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 98

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [ROME,] November 29, 1951.

Mr. Eden asked me to lunch with him today, sending word that there were some matters on which he really wished to have some words with me before leaving Rome for London. We talked alone for a half to three-quarters of an hour before lunch. He had in mind two main subjects.

The first was the European Army. He thought that the situation here was very critical. We either did something with the European Army or we endangered the whole NATO structure. This raised in his mind the question whether the United Kingdom could make any useful contribution at this point.

He referred to his press conference of yesterday saying that in fact he believed his attitude had been too negative. He believed that one paper had construed his remarks as being the introduction of new proposals. The other Italian papers had gotten what he really said, which was a somewhat negative attitude.

The question which he asked me was whether the UK, by doing something more positive and possibly by suggesting some sort of an institutional association, would help or hinder. He said that he had dis-

cussed this with General Eisenhower, who had urged him to stay out of the situation at the present time. I said that in my judgment the time was too short for any new initiative by the UK. Such action would give both the French and the Benelux exactly the excuse they needed to delay negotiations, and I, therefore, urged that he should not intervene in any way now.

He asked whether it would be helpful if General Eisenhower, General Montgomery, or Mr. Churchill, or all three expressed the purely military and professional judgment that from a military point of view a European Army would be effective. I said that I thought that this had already been done by General Eisenhower and might be done again, and that it would certainly be helpful to have professional military views in favor of it. I doubted whether Mr. Churchill would stick to professional military views and by some oratorical chance might introduce a confusing note.

Mr. Eden expressed the view that the release of General Eisenhower's speech to the North Atlantic Council would be a mistake. He thought that he should find another way of supporting the European Army from the military point of view. I agreed with this.

Mr. Eden said that he was at a loss to understand the exact status of the discussion or the exact nature of the differences between the French, Benelux, and others. I said that I was in the same state of confusion and had urged our Ambassador to get the Conference to reduce its view to drafts of a treaty. Mr. Eden thought that this would be of tremendous help. He thought that both the State Department and the Foreign Office should be vigorously engaged in thinking about this subject, because by the time we met in Washington in early January, we might be presented with a very critical problem. He thought that the matter had been restricted too much to a small circle in Paris and that nobody else knew what was going on. I agreed and said that I would alert the State Department.

[Here follows the second part of this conversation, which deals with Korea. For text, see volume VII.]

740.5/11–3051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President [1]

TOP SECRET ROME, November 30, 1951—10 p. m.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am most grateful for your kind note of encouragement.[2] It may be helpful to you to have some impressions

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[1] The source text was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Actel 28, November 30; copies were sent to the White House on December 1.

[2] Presumably a reference to telegram Telac 57 to Rome, November 29 (762A.5/11–2351) in which Webb reported that President Truman appreciated Acheson's reports and "was keenly anticipating" a further message on the Rome discussions.

from me at the end of the NATO meeting at Rome. The first is that the big problems remain unsolved and will need the most energetic work over the next 60 days, if we are to solve them.

In the international field we are experiencing what the production people call slippages. Three months ago we hoped that the Ottawa meeting would start the wheels moving for decisions at this Rome meeting on a defense program geared to economic capacity and upon the integration of Germany, both into the Western community of free nations and into the West defensive organization. But as you know, it became clear before this meeting, that the complexity of the German problem and the current stage of Harriman's work in the Temporary Council Committee meant that the Rome meeting would have to be a spur to get decisions by the end of January.

Realization that the session could not reach important decisions affected the atmosphere in which the meeting was held. There was definite lessening of enthusiasm and interest.

Another depressing factor was the knowledge that after Harriman's report, governments will have to decide definitely on the precise degree of military, economic and financial effort to be made in the next year. In Europe, this decision is hard because of low standards of living and, in many cases minute Parliamentary majorities. In France, the slender majority consists of a weak coalition of parties which do not see eye-to-eye on many key issues. The Communist parties remain strong in France and Italy and proclam daily that the defense effort is leading to runaway inflation and economic chaos.

In this situation, our goals for this meeting were:

1. Convince the various nations to take the necessary steps to achieve complete battle worthiness by the summer of 1952 for the military forces which now exist on paper.
2. Lay the ground-work for government decisions concerning the findings of the temporary council committee which should be expressed at the next Council meeting.
3. Ascertain the chances of success of the European Defense Community and establish a deadline by which the Paris conference, which has been drafting the treaty since March 15, will have to report either success or failure.

I think all countries now appreciate the urgency of making our existing forces fully combat-effective by next summer and of continuing to do so gradually as strength develops instead of placing our primary reliance on the development by 1954 of forces which at that theoretic date could, insofar as can be predicted now, insure the protection of Western Europe against Soviet attack. Here the US plays a key role. The combined effectiveness of the forces, which flank our own in Germany today depends upon our giving priority to equipping them instead of to reserve formations at home.

As to future action on Harriman's final report, our friends now know that it is quite impossible to expect an adequate defense without paying the corresponding price. They know that we cannot and will not pick up the check. I think that they will come through but it will take them longer than we had hoped. On our part, I think that we can and should demand greater efforts and greater efficiency in Europe, but we should not urge a degree of economic effort which is quite impossible for them adhere, and which, if attempted, would have internal social and economic results which would set back the whole rearmament program.

We were able to accomplish very little in the Council on the European defense force and the related question of a German contribution to defense. Schuman made a progress report on the status of the negotiations in Paris for the establishment of a European force which would include Germany. I reported briefly on the tripartite negotiations with the Germans regarding their future political status, saying that we were driving to finish our negotiations on this range of problems by Dec 31 and urging all to complete the defense arrangements by about that same date. This would allow us to take final action on both of these matters at the next Council meeting. A resolution was adopted indicating that this was the desire of the Council.[3]

The formal discussions in the Council on this subject did not reflect the confusion and strain presently in Europe over the establishment of a European defense force. There is a general feeling among Foreign Ministers that the project is not going well, that the French chairmanship of the discussions is weak and confused, and that the people making plans for establishment of the force are making a theoretical approach to the problem without regard to political and parliamentary realities in Europe. Both Stikker and Van Zeeland are extremely worried along these lines. De Gasperi seems prepared to go much farther towards a transfer of substantial sovereignty in the hands of central European organizations.

Although Adenauer did not raise the question, his key advisers indicated to us in Paris their concern that present plans of the French led to a half-way solution which would not work without complete federation in Europe. They indicated on their part that they were ready to go all the way to federation. In this situation the French, deeply divided at home and unsure of Parliamentary approval, seem uncertain as to which way to move. The problem is further complicated for Schuman in that there are two completely opposite views held in French circles as to the proper approach to Germany. In general the Foreign Office clings to its view that Germany is a major threat of the future and must continue to be bound by restrictions of

[3] For the text of this resolution, which was circulated as Council Document C8–D/14, see footnote 11, p. 740.

an occupational nature while those Frenchmen working on creation of a common force in Europe are convinced that there must be real equality given Germany or the whole effort will fail.

I spoke to Schuman privately about this range of problems making it very clear that in our judgment these negotiations must be completed by the end of the year and success or failure registered by that time. I assured Schuman that we considered the European defense community formula to be the best method of obtaining Germany's participation but that I had serious doubts that agreement could be reached unless negotiations were taken up by the Ministers themselves, particularly such matters as the establishment of common budget and common production program. This has been arranged. I am asking Bruce to furnish me without delay with actual texts now under negotiation at Paris and for all other information that may allow us to take a still more active role than we have heretofore in an effort to guide this complex project to early realization.

Eden shares my view that we must move quickly or face possible complete stalemate on the creation of a European defense force. He asked my view as to whether we thought it would help if they took a more active role and was considering, I believe, possibility that British forces on the Continent could be placed inside the common force through some arrangement.

I said that injection of this new element now would complicate negotiations and make impossible meeting the deadline of December 31. He should therefore hold off now. But in the end it may be the catalyst that can pull the whole matter together. If it later becomes obvious that the French Parliament will turn down the French initiative for the creation of this force or if the Benelux nations, with their close ties to Britain, appear about to bolt from the effort, a move by Britain along the above lines could be extremely beneficial. In view of the traditional British position towards developments on the Continent, I consider Eden's statement to me to be significant and extremely encouraging.

In separate meetings here with Schuman and Eden on tripartite matters left over from Paris, we reached sufficient agreement upon a short-term solution to the question of Germany's financial contribution to defense to allow McCloy and his colleagues to start negotiations with the Germans.[4] With a reduction of expenditures by allied forces in Germany to the minimum consistent with military efficiency, and with a realistic appraisal of the cost of raising German forces during their fiscal year which starts in April, we expect the Germans could meet expenditures there without any serious gap during that period. This whole problem is complicated by the fact that a common budget,

[4] For the text of the Foreign Ministers decision on German financial contributions to the defense of Western Europe, see p. 1685.

of which Germany would be a member, is under discussion in another forum. McCloy will have a difficult time on this subject but, with his observers at the Paris conference, is in a position to work the matter out as well as anyone. I am giving him this responsibility.

We did not reach agreement upon the nature and extent of prohibitions of manufacture of military items in Germany. I shall send you shortly a separate message on this subject.[5]

While the visible efforts of the Rome meeting are not impressive, I believe that the meeting served to impress everyone with the urgency of moving forward. The frictions and anxieties mentioned above are bound to accompany decision of matters affecting Germany and the establishment of a common force in Europe. It is useful that Ministers here had a chance in private to express their deep feelings on these problems. If solution to these problems is found before our next council meeting, it will be mainly because everyone is convinced that a solution must be found and that dragging matters along would spell failure. There is no doubt, however, that to reach a solution we will have to take a very active part, particularly with the French, to help them make their own plan and initiative a success.

It was Bob Lovett's first experience at a NATO meeting. He was most effective in all the discussions in which he participated and so of course was John Snyder.

We are sailing on Tuesday on the *Independence*, with John Snyder and Charlie Brannan. All of us are looking forward to a week's rest before plunging into the turmoil of the next session.

I hope that Key West has done for you everything that we hoped and that you are rested and thoroughly well.

With the warmest greetings to you and to Mrs. Truman, if, as I hope, she is with you. Respectfully and affectionately yours.

ACHESON

[5] Transmitted as telegram Actel 29, November 30, p. 1730.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 98

Paraphrase of Briefing by Ridgway B. Knight on the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Treaty Council in Rome, November 24–28, 1951 [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, November 30, 1951?]

In appraising the result of the Rome meeting, one should bear in mind that the objectives of the meeting were of a limited character.

[1] Knight, who was a member of the U.S. Delegation that accompanied Secretary Acheson to Paris and Rome, had the responsibilities for serving as Coordinator for International Conferences during the period from September through November 1951.

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We wished to put across to other NATO countries the Eisenhower objective of securing for European defense battle-worthy forces as soon as possible, de-emphasizing somewhat the longer range force requirements. We also wish to pave the way for the final report of the temporary committee of the Council (TCC). Finally, we wish to establish in the minds of the NATO countries the possible necessity of setting a cut-off date for the formation of the European defense community; the thought being that if by a certain date sufficient progress toward EDC had not been made, that we would re-examine the other possibilities for a German contribution to western defense.

The part of the participants of Rome was one of great seriousness. The atmosphere was heavy almost to the point of pessimism. This was probably due to the fact that the Europeans realize they must soon decide the extent to which they are able to go on rearming themselves and at the same time retain viable economies.

Major Topics in Rome

(1) Probably the most dramatic event at Rome was the triple presentation of the European defense problem by Gruenther, Harriman and Eisenhower. General Gruenther gave a masterful presentation of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Mr. Harriman was not so gifted at speech making but in the last five minutes of his presentation he managed to convey his personal views vividly. General Eisenhower's talk surprised a great many Europeans, coming from a military figure, because he talked mostly in terms of morals and psychology. There was some criticism of this at the time but the impression seems not to have lasted.

(2) *EDC*—The Council adopted a resolution which says very little. The U.S. had wanted to lay the groundwork for fixing EDC–NATO relations and to set deadlines for a completion of action on EDC. The French proposed this idea, wanting more time. The Benelux countries opposed, too, but on different grounds; they did not wish a U.S. resolution to pass which would give to the French representatives at the European defense conference a lever for extracting undesirable concessions from the Benelux countries. The U.S. resolution did not pass, but we think that in the corridor conversations we put across the U.S. views. Personally, the present plan for EDC seems least likely of adoption. The proposals for a common defense budget and common defense production arrangements involve too great an abandonment of sovereignty for acceptance in the near future. An alternative which would retain the agreed military setup for EDC but adopt only the principal of a common budget and common military production would seem more likely of adoption. Still another alternative, that of immediate European federation, seems quite premature. One was struck by the ignorance of the French people and even of French

parliamentary representatives of the actual EDC proposals. It is quite possible that in the forthcoming French parliamentary debate on the EDC the government will retain the confidence of the assembly but that when the EDC finally comes up for ratification, it will be turned down when deputies learn the full truth about the extent of abrogation of national sovereignty involved. The French must put on an extensive campaign of education about the EDC if it is to gain acceptance. The German people, on the other hand, seem somewhat better educated with respect to the significance of the present draft EDC treaty.

(3) *Germany and NATO*—This topic is, of course, closely related to EDC–NATO relationships. It appears at the moment that the only practical way to achieve any kind of German guarantee toward the NATO countries not also members of the EDC is to get Germany into NATO as soon as possible. The approach which seems most likely to have some result in this connection is to leave the matter to Messrs. Schuman and Adenauer for solution. They will be able to guage the political situations in France and Germany and perhaps contrive to have an unofficial French statement issued which would make it clear that France would support German membership in NATO at the proper time. The U.S. must make sure in this connection that the EDC contribution through NATO is made in such a way that a few small countries cannot prevent the EDC group from taking action in the event of war. Reference here is to Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty where each country is pledged individually and collectively to take action against aggression.

Tripartite Discussions on Germany

In the field of German financial contribution to defense we achieved success. We overcame French opposition to a plan for having the Germans contribute financially for a year ahead. In the field of security safeguards we made little progress. The London working group had come up with proposed controls which are almost unworkable in that they would require too extensive an inspection force. It would be better either to rely on a simple list of prohibited items such as submarines, planes and atomic weapons or to rely on the EDC arrangements regarding defense production to provide the necessary protection. On the latter alternative the French definitely said no, and on the former they asked to postpone discussions until they could study the matter further.

Minor Problems at Rome

(1) The report of the committee on the North Atlantic community was referred back to the committee for further study.

(2) The practice adopted at Rome of giving certain ministers assigned topics on which to speak instead of having a protracted dis-

cussion by all the ministers on the "world situation" proved to be an efficient method of proceeding.

(3) There were 300 people in the Council meetings in Rome, and this problem of numbers is one which must be solved if the Council is to engage in any sort of uninhibited discussion.

(4) The subject of parliamentary representation at Council meetings did not arise as such, but probably a majority of delegates share the views of the U.S. which oppose such representation.

(5) The subject of the Middle East Command was not debated at Rome. The Council merely adopted a factual report of progress in that field. However, there was a top level one-half hour discussion with the British and French on this matter and agreed matter of discussion resulted. We were agreed that for political reasons it will be necessary to start out with Greece and Turkey in a NATO command. The British wanted us to agree now that we would in the future support the "two-hat arrangement" which would mean that the commander of the Eastern Mediterranean theater would also serve as the Middle East commander. The British seemed to agree with us that it was not possible to finalize that arrangement now and that we would have to cross that bridge when we come to it.

Observations Made in Answer to Questions

There appeared to be much less fear of rash action by the U.S. than was displayed at Ottawa. The main reason why the European countries were so serious at Rome is that they fear that the risk of internal economic dislocations due to the defense effort may be greater than the risk of Soviet attack. For this reason, the TCC report is quite likely to call for lowered security goals. This connection may be worth mentioning that certain military officers wish to include in the Council resolution concerning the revised MTDP a statement to the effect that the MTDP would be altered when the TCC report was issued. We were able to forestall this concept, however, in place of a recommendation that the service chiefs would comment upon the TCC recommendations when issued. A long-range alternative to lowered security goals for the defense of western Europe is the stepping up of European federation. With respect to the lack of public knowledge in France and other European countries of the significance of the present draft EDC treaty, it is doubtful whether either the NATO information service or the national information services are doing enough.

The agenda for Lisbon will have three main problems before it: (1) action on the TCC recommendations; (2) NATO action with respect to the EDC; and (3) the relationship between Germany and NATO.

POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE QUESTION OF A GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE

A. ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE CONFERENCE FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF A EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY, AT PARIS, FEBRUARY–DECEMBER 1951

CFM files, lot M–88, Pleven visit

Paper Prepared in the Department of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 26, 1951.
Pleven D–2/1*a*

INTEGRATED FORCES AND EUROPEAN ARMY

Problem:

Whether the German contribution to North Atlantic defense should be in the form of German divisions integrated into the NATO force as desired by the overwhelming majority of the NAT countries, or in the form of smaller German units no larger than Regimental Combat Teams blended with other European units of the same size into an international European Army resting on a framework of European political institutions adequate to support and direct this non-national European Army. Pending solution, it was agreed at Brussels in December 1950 that German units no larger than RCT's be created as soon as possible.

U.S. Position:

We have informed the French that we would accept an invitation to send an observer to the Paris Conference soon to be called by the French Government in order to study practical ways and means to form a European Army and create the necessary supporting institutions. We have stated that we would assist towards the successful outcome of the proceedings. (The text of a letter from Secretary Acheson

[1] This paper was one of a series of negotiating papers prepared for American officials in connection with the forthcoming meetings in Washington between President Truman and French Prime Minister Pleven and their advisers on January 29 and 30. The original draft of this paper, document Pleven D–2/1, January 23, not printed, was prepared in the Office of European Regional Affairs by Ridgway B. Knight. The paper printed here represents the revision of Pleven D–2/1 carried out in the light of comments made at the Secretary of State's Daily Meeting on January 25.

For documention on the January 29–30 meetings between President Truman and Prime Minister Pleven, see volume IV.

to Mr. Schuman to be made public at an appropriate time appears as Appendix A.[2]) However, we have made it clear that we wish other European nations to reach their decision to participate or not of their own free will and that we will not exert pressure. We have also informed the French that we will only accept a formula resulting from the French initiative if it is entirely sound and practical both from the military and political points of view, if it does not delay an effective German contribution to the common defense and if acceptable to the NATO. As agreed at Brussels, we strongly support the creation of German units up to the agreed RCT level as soon as possible after the agreement of the German Government. Conversations between the three High Commissioners and the German Government are now in progress to this end.[3] When German RCT's are trained and formed, we intend to review the situation to determine whether they should be made into German divisions for the NATO integrated force or merged into the French-proposed European Army, depending on results of the Paris Conference, German performance, the general situation and on military requirements, due weight being given to the views of the Supreme Commander.

French Position:

The French insist that RCT's are militarily satisfactory. They remain opposed to the formation of German divisions which they view as conducive to the recreation of a German national army and of a German general staff. The French Government still holds to the position that the German contribution be in the form of units no larger than RCT's merged into an international European Army which, in turn, would constitute one of the major elements of General Eisenhower's command.

Recommendations:

That the President express our best wishes for the success of the Paris Conference and our willingness to assist in arriving at a successful conclusion.

That the President add, that in order to be acceptable to the United States, the recommendations of the Paris Conference will have to be sound and practical from the military and political points of view and not delay the build-up of effective strength.

That the President reiterate that irrespective of ultimate developments regarding the European Army, the U.S. continues strongly to support the creation of German units up to the agreed RCT or

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[2] Appendix A is not printed here. For the text of the letter to Foreign Minister Schuman dated January 27 and delivered on February 5, see *infra*.

[3] The reference here is to the meetings at Bonn between representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Allied Deputy High Commissioners to discuss certain aspects of a German contribution to Western defense, January 9–June 4; for documentation on the meetings, see pp. 990 ff.

brigade group level as soon as possible after agreement is reached with the Federal German Government.[4]

Discussion:

The Council adopted in September 1950 a resolution calling for the establishment at the earliest possible date of an integrated NATO force under centralized command, and considered German participation in North Atlantic defense.[5] The Defense Committee was requested to make specific recommendations regarding the method by which Germany could make the most useful contributions, bearing in mind the unanimous conclusion of the Council that it would not serve the best interests of Europe or of Germany to bring into being a German national army or a German general staff.

At the Defense Committee meeting in Washington in October a sharp split on this issue was revealed between France, weakly supported by Belgium and Luxembourg, and the other NAT nations, which delayed the establishment of the integrated force.[6]

France took the position that she would consider German participation only in the context of an international European army owing allegiance to the European community. German units no larger than battalions were to be blended in this army with same size units of other nationalities. This European army would be responsible to a European Defense Minister reporting to a council consisting of the several European Defense Ministers, in turn responsible to some kind of European parliamentary assembly.

The majority, including the United States which, however, took little part in the sometimes acrimonious debate, was of the opinion that the French plan was not practical and at best would result in lengthy delay because of the constitutional processes necessary to implement the political aspects of the French scheme which would require an appreciable surrender of national sovereign rights. Instead, these countries advocated the formation of German divisions, which would be integrated into the NATO force. There was, however, unani-

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[4] At his meeting with Prime Minister Pleven on the morning of January 30, the second of three American-French conversations on January 29 and 30, President Truman appeared to confine his remarks on the matter under consideration there to expressing thanks to the French Government for its invitation of January 26 to participate in the European Army Conference (see the editorial note, p. 765) and expressing the best wishes of the United States for the success of the conference. For the minutes of the Truman–Pleven meeting of January 30, see volume IV.

[5] The reference here is to NATO Council document C5–D/11 (Final), "Resolution on the Defense of Western Europe," September 26, 1950. For text, see telegram Secto 55, September 26, 1950, from New York, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, p. 350.

[6] For reports on the meetings in Washington in late October 1950 of the North Atlantic Defense Committee (the Defense Ministers of the NATO countries) see *ibid.*, pp. 406 ff.

mous agreement that no such German military unit should be larger than a division and that safeguards should be adopted against the rebirth both of a national German army and a German general staff.

After a deadlock had lasted for several sessions, the Defense Committee decided to refer the problem of the form of a German participation in the NATO defensive system to the Deputies and to the Military Committee, to study respectively and separately its political and military aspects and subsequently to prepare a joint report for the Defense Committee.

On December 18 the Deputies and Military Committee submitted their joint report to the Defense Committee and to the Council, which approved it.[7]

The essential points were:

1. The German contribution should be in the form of complete German formations with their necessary supporting arms and services for incorporation either directly or in the form of European units into the integrated NATO defense force.
2. Safeguards were specified for the general purpose of preventing both the development of an autonomous national Germany army, and the recreation of a German war industry capable of supporting by itself a purely German, as contrasted to NATO, war effort. It was also decided that the German contribution should be no larger than 20 per cent of the Allied forces allocated or earmarked for the integrated force.
3. The division was found to meet the requirements, but the regimental combat team or brigade group was declared acceptable "if this smaller unit is judged desirable for political or other reasons."
4. A European defense force operating as an element of an integrated NATO defense force was found to be militarily acceptable if its achievement under no circumstances would delay the contribution of Germany to the defense of Western Europe.
5. Took note of the French Government's intention to call a conference concerning ways and means to establish a European army.
6. The occupying powers were invited to discuss with the German Federal Government the question of German participation along the lines of the Military Committee's report.

Thereupon the Council approved the integrated defense force, the creation of a Supreme Headquarters and appointed a Supreme Commander, requesting the President to designate General Eisenhower to this post.

At the present time, the occupying powers are negotiating with the German Federal Government to obtain Germany's participation within the limits set forth by NATO and the formation as soon as possible thereafter of German regimental combat teams. Should these negotiations succeed, the eventual definitive employment of these RCT's

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[7] The joint report (resolution) summarized here is NATO document C6–D/1, December 13, 1950, "The Contribution of Germany to the Defense of Western Europe." See *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 538 ff.

will depend on a decision to be reached within NATO and which will depend on the results of the Paris Conference concerning a European army, the German Government's cooperation in the collective defense effort, the attitude of the German people, military requirements, and on world conditions when such German RCT's will be in existence due regard being given to the views of the Supreme Commander.

740.5/1–2751

The Secretary of State to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Schuman)[1]

[WASHINGTON,] January 27, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER: We warmly welcome your Government's initiative in calling a conference of the interested European powers to consider possible ways and means to implement the French proposals concerning the creation of a European army and its participation in the integrated Military Force for the defense of Europe which was established at the recent North Atlantic Council meetings at Brussels.

As I have said to you on more than one occasion in the past, the United States has given every evidence in statements, actions, and treaties of the depth and permanence of its interests in Europe, its support for closer European association, its willingness to cooperate

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[1] A draft of this letter had been handed to Foreign Minister Schuman by Ambassador Bruce on December 22, 1950, with the general understanding that it would not be released until after or simultaneously with the issuance of a French invitation for a European Army Conference and in no case without preliminary consultation with the United States (telegram 3699, December 29, 1950, from Paris: 740.5/12–2950). The draft letter is included in the documentation on the concern of the United States with the defense of Western Europe presented in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1 ff. Certain minor revisions in the draft letter (incorporated in the text printed here) were transmitted to the French Foreign Minister in mid-January. Schuman was agreeable with the revisions and promised to notify the United States well in advance of the convening of the European Army Conference (telegram 3738, January 16, to Paris: 740.5/12–2950 and telegram 4140, January 18, from Paris: 740.5/1–1851). The signed text of the letter printed here was formally transmitted to the Embassy in France under cover of instruction 351, February 3, which explained that minor drafting changes had been made in the earlier version in order to attune the text to the coming European army conference instead of to the conclusion of the North Atlantic Council session in Brussels in December (740.5/2–351). The letter was delivered to the French Government on February 5, and the text was released to the press the following day. Telegram 4465, January 29, from Paris, reported that Schuman preferred a delay in the publication of this letter which he intended first to use privately vis-à-vis other NATO governments (740.5/1–2951). Telegram 4000, January 31, to Paris, expressed the Department of State's reluctance to such use being made of the letter and indicated a preference for its earliest publication (740.5/1–2951). For a further explanation of the modalities of this letter, see telegram 945, February 10, to The Hague, p. 764.

with Europe. That this will continue and increase, is, I am convinced, the will of the American people.

If your Government, in close consultation with the German and other European Governments who wish to participate, can evolve the main outlines of a plan for bringing the free nations of Europe more closely together in the spirit so well represented by the Schuman Plan, we can reasonably hope for long term solutions of many of our problems, be they political, military or economic.

I do not need to remind you of the attitude which the Government of the United States has displayed on innumerable occasions, and in many forms, toward European Integration. My Government strongly favors it. If the European countries can work it out in a practical manner, a sound basis would be laid upon which military and economic strength can be built. A rallying point will be created around which a free and civilized Europe can muster its energies for a successful defense of its beliefs and the traditions of its history.

We know you also agree with us that it is of primary importance to press forward vigorously with the strengthening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We are convinced that the broad framework of the Atlantic Community, embracing a strong Europe, is an essential part of the free world structure and the attainment of global security under the United Nations.

The Government of the United States is happy to accept your invitation to send an observer to the conference which you have called for February 6 and will do its best to assist in bringing its deliberations to a successful conclusion.

Sincerely yours, DEAN ACHESON

740.5/1–2951 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 29, 1951—7 p. m.

439. Fol represents prelim guidance from polit viewpoint on projected Paris conference on Eur army and related polit institutions. It will be supplemented after Gen Eisenhower and Def officials have had opportunity to consider subj in relation to his responsibilities.

1. We have advised Fr Govt that we will, if invited, be represented by an observer and do our best to assist in bringing deliberations to

[1] This telegram was sent to Brussels, Ottawa, Copenhagen, Paris, Rome, The Hague, Oslo, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Frankfurt, Reykjavik, and Luxembourg. This telegram was drafted in the Office of European Regional Affairs and was concurred in by the Offices of Western European and British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, the Bureau of German Affairs, the Bureau of European Affairs, and the Ambassador at Large.

successful conclusion. We believe its successful conclusion is important to realization of certain major objectives which we share with Western Eurs, including (*a*) Basic Franco-Ger *rapprochement*; (*b*) Cement Ger into the West; (*c*) Strengthen common Atlantic def; (*d*) Closer assoc in Eur and North Atlantic communities. By "successful conclusion" we mean one which will effectively and realistically contribute toward attainment of these objectives. We emphatically do not mean acceptance by other countries of original Pleven proposal which was hastily conceived without serious mil advice and which Fr mil agree with all other NAT mil auths was unrealistic and undesirable.

2. "Eur" idea has strong popular appeal in many Eur countries including Ger. We should seek to utilize it to best advantage in working toward these objectives. At the same time, all aspects of Eur def must be constantly scrutinized and developed from viewpoint of overriding common objective of developing maximum collective strength of NAT countries, plus Ger, in minimum time and maintaining maximum unity of purpose and action. In terms of US interest, this means obtaining maximum cooperation from strong and loyal Allies in integrated def of North Atlantic area.

3. In all these fields basic criterion from US viewpoint is, of course extent to which any given action by Eurs promotes or prejudices US security and basic interests. North Atlantic community, which finds increasingly concrete expression in NATO, is accordingly framework within which we seek maximum development of common action in pursuit of basic objectives common to North America and Western Europe. Within this framework we can also support purely Eur actions insofar as they promote our common interests and strengthen North Atlantic community.

4. Although present differences in natl attitudes between (1) Ger; (2) France, with some support of Lux, Belgium and Italy; and (3) Others led by UK present severe handicaps, we believe these dangers can be avoided and substantial advances made toward attainment of objectives enumerated in 1 above, provided all concerned can be induced to subordinate local interests to overriding common interest of developing maximum integrated strength of North Atlantic community in minimum time.

5. Primary criterion by which we will judge result of conference is whether or not it serves to strengthen North Atlantic community. Insofar as conference deals with purely "Eur" institutions, our role will be strictly that of observer. We can, however, properly exert influence in seeking result which will meet that criterion. To extent that conference consciously devotes itself to strengthening North Atlantic community by developing Eur cooperation within and in support of NAT, we can

take a more active role. Other Eur nations who do not contemplate participating in "Eur Army" may well take similar position.

6. It is recognized that there may be a conflict between our long-term and immed objectives; i.e., it is conceivable that a constructive program for a militarily sound Eur army and supporting politically sound institutions cld result from the conference, but cause material delay in the build-up of our defensive strength. In such a case, we wld insist that there be no let-up in our def efforts, including a Ger contribution thereto, while agreeing that forces created in the meanwhile, including all Ger forces, wld be merged into the Eur army when activated.

7. Foregoing is intended as background guidance for any discussions of subj you may have rather than for any specific representations at this time. We wld welcome your comments.

ACHESON

740.5/2–151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Murphy) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET BRUSSELS, February 1, 1950—8 p. m.

1263. We are in agreement with general philosophy expressed Depcirtel 439, January 29.[2] Following comment is offered pursuant to paragraph 7 reftel:

1. As indicated Embtel 1246, January 30 repeated Paris 284, London 238, Frankfort 99[3] Van Zeeland, as chairman NATO Council has on a number of occasions proposed concept of a European army which is at variance with Department's view as expressed paragraph 6 reftel. Department speaks of agreeing that forces, including all German forces, would be merged into European army when activated, thus apparently comprising all units under command General Eisenhower. Van Zeeland, on contrary, envisages Eisenhower's NATO command as being composed US, British, French, Belgian, et cetera, divisions, plus extra element which would be dubbed "the European army". It would be this latter small group which would include any German formations which might be offered for NATO defense.

2. At Brussels on December 18 defense committee approved joint report of North Atlantic Council deputies and military committee in document C6–D/1 which was the joint report on German contribution to the defense of Western Europe.[4] On same day NATO Council approved recommendation of defense committee and therefore this

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[1] Repeated for information to Paris, London, and Frankfurt.
[2] *Supra.*
[3] Not printed.
[4] Regarding document C6–D/1, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 538 ff.

report. Accordingly, it would seem that thus far only terms of reference for forthcoming conference in Paris are as expressed in paragraphs 11 and 12 of document C6–D/1. These terms of reference are admittedly fairly vague. We do not know if French Government has prepared any more precise agenda for conference which convenes February 6. We presume as Department has intimated in paragraph 1 reftel that Washington has general picture of what each NATO government thinks should be done re European army but we frankly are in dark as to whether general consensus favors Van Zeeland's approach or whether majority NATO countries support concepts of one single European army made up of potentially 13 contingents, the 13th being Germany.

MURPHY

740.5/2–351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, February 3, 1951—3 p. m.

4262. 1. Shuckburgh to whom substance of Depcirtel 439 January 29 [2] was communicated and who had been working on instructions to Harvey, British observer, indicated that US and British positions are closely parallel on almost all points. He expressed opinion that main difference was degree of optimism as to possible useful results which conference might produce, adding that US appeared to entertain greater hopes than Foreign Office.

2. Shuckburgh stated that (*a*) as UK would not contribute forces to proposed European Army UK representative to conference would rightly have observer status, and (*b*) as observer he would not intervene in meetings unless, for example, some matter affecting UK position as occupying power or NATO arose then UK observer might ask to make a statement. Otherwise, his activities would probably be devoted to influence re discussions and decisions, etc., through informal conversations outside meetings.

3. Instructions to Harvey, Shuckburgh indicated, set forth three specific conditions which must in British view be fulfilled if proposed European Army to be acceptable:

(*a*) It must be completely within NATO framework;
(*b*) It must be militarily effective;
(*c*) There must be no tie-up between proposed European Army and Council of Europe. (British stand firm on position that matters of defense are outside competence of C. of E.).

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[1] Repeated for information to Paris.
[2] *Ante*, p. 760.

4. It was emphasized to Shuckburgh that US view is that it would be unfortunate if conference failed and that it is in interest of us all that something constructive result. Shuckburgh agreed although indicating he did not see what positive concrete contribution could result from conference.

GIFFORD

740.5/2–1051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 10, 1951—3 p. m.

945. Re Sec's ltr to Schuman [2] you are correct that our position was and is as outlined in Depcirtel 439, Jan. 29.[3]

FYI only, circumstances surrounding drafting of ltr must be borne in mind and which resulted in weighting ltr on "enthusiastic" side. You will remember protracted negot with Fr re form of Ger participation fol deadlock Def Comite Washington last Oct. While we did not accept their proposal re Eur Army we did agree to give them every opportunity to work out details of plan and further agreed to public ltr to Schuman in order to get Paris Conference off on best foot possible. We have not modified our position that Eur Army plan will have to be fully sound politically and militarily and not delay build of Western strength in order to be acceptable to us. We likewise maintain our position that we will not exert pressure on other nations to accept Fr proposals.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was repeated to Brussels, London, Paris, and Frankfurt.
[2] For the Secretary of State's letter of January 27, see p. 759.
[3] *Ante*, p. 760.

740.5/2–151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 12, 1951—5 p. m.

1102. Re Embtel 1263 [2] para 6 was designed to cover possible contingency that Paris Conference wld yield a politically and militarily sound program for Eur army but entailing some delay. In this case and only shld we be fully satisfied as to polit and mil soundness of proposals we might find it to our best interest to seek out further compro-

[1] This telegram was repeated to The Hague as 948, to Paris as 4225, to London as 3755, and to Frankfurt as 5529.
[2] Of February 1, p. 762.

mise which wld not delay the buildup of our collective strength while not foregoing availing ourselves of any possible constructive results of Paris Conference.

We fully agree with detailed understanding of Van Zeeland as to how a Eur army wld fit into NATO integrated force under first phase of Fr proposal. No further official explanation yet read from Fr re their proposal but their presentation at Washington in Def Comite made it clear they wld hope for second and final phase when all forces for def NAT area of NAT countries participating Eur Army including, of course, all Ger forces wld eventually be amalgamated into single Eur army.

We understand this hope but are not overly optimistic as to practicability.

ACHESON

Editorial Note

The Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community (or European Army Conference) was convened in Paris on February 15, 1951, and continued throughout the remainder of the year. The origins of the conference from its inception as the "Pleven Plan" in late 1950 are briefly described in the Department of State briefing paper Pleven D–2/1*a*, January 26, page 755, and in the paper prepared in the Embassy in France, page 789. Invitations to participate in the conference were addressed by the French Government on January 26, 1951, to all the European signatories of the North Atlantic Pact and to the German Federal Republic. At the same time the United States and Canada were invited to be represented at the conference by observers. Four of the invited governments, the German Federal Republic, Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg, promptly agreed to join France in taking an active part in the conference, while the remaining invited governments (Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom) decided to limit their participation to observer status. The United States and Canada agreed to send observers to the conference. Regarding the formal expression of support by the United States for the convening of the conference and the decision to send an American observer to the conference, see Secretary of State Acheson's letter of January 27 to Foreign Minister Schuman, page 759, and footnote 4, page 757.

The opening of the conference, initially planned for early February, was delayed until February 15 because of the French-Italian conversations at Santa Margherita, February 12–13. (For materials on these French-Italian meetings see volume IV.) The first meeting of the

conference was presided over by French Foreign Minister Schuman; see telegram 4846, February 15, from Paris, *infra*. Thereafter, Hervé Alphand, French Permanent Deputy Representative to the North Atlantic Council, served as president or chairman of the conference, aided by a secretariat drawn from the French Foreign Ministry.

The heads of the delegations to the conference were as follows:

Participants

France: Hervé Alphand
Belgium: Baron Jules Guillaume, Belgian Ambassador in France
German Federal Republic: *February–March:* Walter Hallstein, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs; *March–June*, Conrad Roediger; *June:* Theodore Blank, Bundestag deputy (June 1951)
Italy: Prof. Paolo Emilio Taviani, Parliamentary Deputy
Luxembourg: Pierre Majerus of the Luxembourg Foreign Ministry

Observers

United States: David K. E. Bruce, Ambassador in France
Canada: Maj. Gen. George P. Vanier, Ambassador in France
Denmark: Karl Kruse, Counsellor of the Danish Embassy in France
Norway: Rolf Andvord, Ambassador in France
Netherlands: Baron van Boetzelaer, Ambassador in France
Portugal: Marcello Mathias, Ambassador in France
United Kingdom: Sir Oliver Harvey, Ambassador in France

During the first phase of the conference, February 15–July 24, the principal forum for the conference was in plenary sessions attended by both participating and observer countries. Three committees (military, financial, and juridical), composed of representatives of the participating countries and chaired by the French representatives, carried on detailed consideration of conference proposals and papers. These three committees were supervised by a Steering Committee chaired by Ambassador Alphand and composed of the heads of the delegations of the participating countries. The Steering Committee reported periodically to the plenary sessions of the conference. In the first phase of conference activity there were 10 plenary sessions, 29 sessions of the Steering Committee, 15 sessions of the Juridical Committee, 14 sessions of the Military Committee, and 9 sessions of the Financial Committee. For a summary description and evaluation of the work of the conference through June 1951, see the analytical paper prepared in the Embassy in France, page 789.

Sessions of the conference were held in private, but the press was occasionally briefed after plenary sessions. The Embassy in Paris re-

ported by telegram on all plenary sessions of the conference and on most of the committee meetings. The Embassy also submitted to the Department of State periodic reports and evaluations on the course of the conference and related events and transmitted by despatch to the Department copies of the official documentation (records of meetings and formal conference documents) of the conference. These telegrams, despatches, and papers are included in the central files of the Department of State under file 740.5. A selection of the most important reports and papers is presented in the following pages. A comprehensive collection of conference records and papers, American delegation reports and memoranda, and related messages and papers for the period 1951–1952 is preserved in the EDC files, Lot 57 M 44.

740.5/2–1551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

PLAIN PARIS, February 15, 1951.

4846. Schuman opened conference for organization European army February 15 [2] with speech outlining along already well known lines political and military purpose of French proposal and its general content and noting for benefit Germans that all participants in conference were on basis of equality. It was agreed chairman would be French throughout and next meeting fixed for afternoon February 16 when Alphand will take over. French circulated document being summarized in separate message that is designed in FonMins words "serve as basis for discussion".[3]

As to purpose Schuman placed this proposal in same context as coal and steel pool plan insisted that "there is a European to organize" and that "this truth holds for organization of defense" since a European army within Atlantic force will be "permanent instrument for security of our continent an essential element of European integration" in pointing out that army was to be "accompanied by establishment of political institutions" he declared "work to which it (French Government) has invited your governments is in its opinion as much political as military".

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London, Oslo, Copenhagen, The Hague, Brussels, Rome, Lisbon, Ottawa, and Frankfurt; a copy was sent to Luxembourg, and copies were made available to the Department of Defense.

[2] Regarding the convening, membership, and organization of the conference, see the editorial note, *supra*.

[3] Telegram 4847, February 15, from Paris, not printed, transmitted a digest of a French Foreign Ministry summary of the 25-page French memorandum presented to the conference (740.5/2–1551). For the text of the official French summary, see Folliot, *Documents on International Affairs 1951*, p. 216, or *L'Année politique 1951*, p. 625. The complete text of the French memorandum was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 2323, February 16, from Paris, neither printed (740.00/2–1651).

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Schuman also insistent however that French plan has an immediate military purpose namely "to construct a military tool of sure efficiency to prove not only to our technicians but to our peoples that army of United Europe is fit to be used against an eventual aggressor with cohesion and vigor at least as great as in case of national armies".

FonMin particularly emphasized that French wanted European army wholly compatible with and a help to integrated Atlantic forces saying "if our initiative were to result in imperiling or simply in slowing up Atlantic defense if that were proved we would not hesitate to withdraw our proposal". Philosophy behind is summed up as follows:

"Atlantic defense and European defense have nothing incompatible about them—do not duplicate each other but are placed on different planes. Atlantic organization is a coalition system of national armies grouped under a single command. European army will be a supranational army being substituted for national armies progressively but definitively."

As to content of proposal core will be "a European defense commissioner collaborating with a Council of Ministers under supervision (controle) of an interparliamentary assembly". Schuman emphatic that such institutions necessary for army of democratic countries. Job of Commissioner will be to assure recruitment and training of contingents furnished by each country and "formation of European units".

Whole process will be gradual according Schuman who said French paper proposes certain processes and stages toward eventual goal of leaving only ceremonial troops (troupes de souverainete) and police and security forces at disposal of national governments. Within European army there will be no discrimination but in preliminary stages facts of situation dictate maintenance of separate forces by countries having overseas responsibilities. European army will be "constantly augmented by all units formed of available [forces?] that are to be used for European defense". Powers of Commissioner will increase as European army takes form.

In addressing delegations FonMin declared FedRep invited join with Atlantic Pact powers because "we cannot conceive of Europe without Germany". As to countries which had chosen to send observers he hoped latter would follow debates "with desire to be convinced that objectives proposed for part of the reality of Europe now being born". He declared presence of US and Canadian observers "proves importance that our American friends attach to our European undertaking".[4]

BRUCE

[4] For the text of Schuman's address, see *L'Anneé politique 1951*, p. 626. The speech is also extensively quoted and paraphrased in Adenauer, *Memoirs*, p. 348.

740.5/2–2351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, February 23, 1951—9 p. m.

4981. Re Embtel 4872.[2] Conference reconvened late yesterday to continue general discussion French plans for European army. Italian delegation made lengthy statement giving general support to idea as necessary step together with Schuman Plan [3] toward European integration. Welcomed French assurances plan within framework of NA defense which must not be hampered or delayed. Time has come to go beyond simple coordination of defense forces and move toward supranational system. Italian constitution forbids sending troops beyond frontiers and therefore necessary present European defense idea to Italian people. Political basis for European army can be established by treaty approved by parliament which would provide for German participation. As is important not to have multiplicity of international organizations, should utilize present or planned machinery such as Schuman Plan assembly. Asked whether Austria would be included in defense system, agreed with plan on relationship of Defense Commission to Supreme Commander, AFD [*and*] suggested that development of air forces be transferred entirely to first phase. On conscription, suggested that recruitment system should not be rigid or necessarily uniform, as it should be flexible enough to meet different conditions in several countries.

Alphand in reply said Austria not represented at conference, and while might participate in European army, this not contemplated for first stage. Basic idea was European army to defend Western Europe including Mediterranean area but starting point was difficult because of differences of fact, i.e. those who had forces and those who had not, and those who had overseas commitments and those who had not.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London, Brussels, Rome, The Hague, Frankfurt, Lisbon, Copenhagen, Oslo, Ottawa, and Luxembourg, and copies were made available to the Department of Defense.

[2] Dated February 16, not printed. It reported that at the second plenary meeting of the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community, Alphand presented a commentary on the French proposals along the lines reported upon in telegram 4847, February 15, from Paris (see footnote 3, p. 767). The conference tacitly accepted Alphand's suggestion that there be a general discussion of the French proposals followed by detailed study in political, military, and financial committees. At the suggestion of the American observer, Ambassador Bruce, it was agreed that the countries represented by observers would normally attend plenary meetings of the conference, could send representatives to meetings of the specialized committees when the agenda was of particular interest to them, and would be furnished complete conference documentation. (740.5/2–1651)

[3] For documentation regarding the attitude of the United States toward the establishment of a European Coal and Steel Community (Schuman Plan), see volume IV.

French agreed those differences should be minimized and Brussels decision on combat teams made this possible. From strictly military viewpoint combat team was not best solution but it represented compromise with political necessities. European army based upon a fusion of nationalities admittedly raised important difficulties and French Government cannot go beyond combat team idea without compromising its plan, but conference should decide if political aspects important enough to outweigh military disadvantages. Saw no difficulty in principle to transfer of air forces to first stage. Re recruitment is willing to discuss question of conscription vs. volunteers although not likely can escape conscription. Agree should not be multiplicity of political institutions and thought same assembly might be used for Schuman Plan and European army. Was not certain that Council Ministers of Schuman Plan could be used for army as might be necessary to give wider powers to Council for European army, at least in initial stages.

German delegation presented series of questions to which Alphand replied. On page 3 of French plan (see despatch 2323 February 16 [4]) reference made to Brussels decision of which Federal Republic not informed and would like text. French replied cannot answer on own authority but believed essentials given Federal Republic by US chairman of HICOM after Brussels meeting. German delegation asked if German units would be employed outside Europe and French replied that although certain countries had overseas security obligations, European army was for defense of Europe. German delegation asked for more precise definition of elementary units and was told that largest homogeneous unit of nationals is combat team from which mixed divisions would be formed. In reply to query on general reserves, were told that these would be composed of various units to support combat troops and Germany would participate. Asked if Defense Ministers can address themselves directly to Supreme Commander and were told this would be subject for careful discussion. Alphand thought answer should be yes in first stage. Germany said did not understand reference to support for combat teams by existing Allied divisions (section III of French plan). Were informed that until European army divisions were in existence, combat teams would have to be supported by various Allied divisions. Germany asked when could Federal Republic have air force and were told could participate in first stage if practicable. German delegation noted re section IV that Germany was classified in combat zone and asked for definition. Alphand said such zones were fixed by NAC and could not give reply on own authority. Other German queries relating to revocation of Defense Commission

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 3, *supra*.

and on technical military details were put over for later discussion in committees.[5]

No other delegations (members or observers) offered comment whereupon Alphand proposed creation of steering committee composed of participating members (but not observers) to give general directives so that committees could start work. German delegation stated both Hallstein, chief of German delegation, and high Bonn officials were concentrated upon Schuman Plan negotiations and consequently not in position to draft directives; proposed adjournment until next week. Alphand opposed this delay and was agreed that steering committee will meet today to make such progress as it can.

Dutch Ambassador [6] informed me that his government is continuing participate as observer and not as member conference. Representative Von Kessel says that his present instructions consist only of a number of clarifying questions and that Bonn has not yet finished its review of plan. Taviani, chief of Italian delegation, states that although Italian military are opposed to French plan, his instructions from De Gasperi are to make serious effort along lines of French plan provided (*a*) that French really mean business, (*b*) that plan will not hamper or delay Atlantic defense forces, and (*c*) that other European countries will cooperate. Italian Government willing to go far in real European integration and believes that sound political basis is required for European army. As starting point advanced proposal that in future war is unthinkable between countries represented at conference. He thinks there is considerable division of opinion still within French Government on merits of plan but feels determined effort should be made using French plan as basis for discussion, trying to reconcile it with military opinion. Germans have asked for session with us early next week and are patiently awaiting word from Bonn and probably comment from us.

Conference has gotten off to slow start and reluctance or present inability of smaller states to give reaction to French plan increases slow motion atmosphere. On other hand Alphand's clear and candid answer to Germans seems to indicate that French policy and originally vague

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[5] Telegram 7132, March 3, from Frankfurt, not printed, reported on a conversation between High Commissioner McCloy and Chancellor Adenauer. *Inter alia*, Adenauer observed that the French proposal to the European army conference seemed to him so deficient that he had taken steps to avoid any leaks about it for fear of adverse German public reaction. McCloy urged that the French proposal be taken only as a rough first working paper and that the German delegation to the conference state their points reasonably but forcefully with the confidence that other delegations would consider them fairly. McCloy assured Adenauer that substantial French groups did desire to work out a European army on the basis of real equality and that negotiations should be carried on with a view of obtaining French support for a sound scheme. (850.33/3–351)

[6] Baron van Boetzelaer

ideas have become more precise and that they are now ready to discuss the many practical problems which this plan evokes. There is certainly no take it or leave it attitude.

BRUCE

740.5/3–951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, March 9, 1951—1 p. m.

5293. French circulated today draft convention as basis for discussion which sets forth in 72 articles ideas they have previously advanced on institutional framework for European army. Document now being translated and will transmit airpouch.[2] Summary follows:

(1) First eight articles devoted general principles and institutions and give global figure on European forces projected. Institutions comprise defense commissioner, council of ministers, assembly, and court.

Commissioner invested with powers direct action and supervision which would enable him make decisions, formulate recommendations, and give advice. Decisions would be obligatory, recommendations would require application of objectives but leave means open, and opinions would not be binding. Council given task harmonizing action commissioner and governments including exchange of information and reciprocal consultation. Under provisions to be set forth in convention commissioner obliged to obtain opinion of council before taking decisions or formulating recommendation. Assembly composed of representatives of the peoples of the contracting states and exercises a control power over the administration of the commissioner. Court would assure respect for law in interpretation and application of convention.

European ground forces would be composed of infantry and armored divisions within which would be combined elements of different nationalities composed of homogeneous combat teams. To these divisions would be attached general reserves and logistical support. Tactical and defense air forces, composed of groups of elements of different nationalities would be established. Light European naval forces could be established on same principles. After establishment, European armed forces would be put at the disposal of Supreme Commander for European Defense.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Rome, Lisbon, Luxembourg, and Frankfurt, and copies were made available to the Embassy in Ottawa and to the Department of Defense. It was originally sent to the Department of State in error as 5264.

[2] A copy of the French draft convention summarized here was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 2621, March 14, from Paris, neither printed (740.5/3–1451).

Establishment of European defense organization to be realized in successive stages (etapes). First stage would be establishment of ground forces of 30 divisions with general reserves and logistical support sufficient for their own needs within the framework of Atlantic forces earmarked for European defense. Air forces would consist of 40 tactical groups (encadres) of three squadrons each and 12 defense groups of three squadrons each. Naval forces unstipulated.

First stage will include two phases (stades), as follows: contracting states will prepare the elements for the first echelon of forces, which would include 12 divisions of ground forces and 12 tactical groups and 6 defense groups for the air forces. The first echelon will be established at the beginning of the second phase by bringing together its constituent elements. In the course of this second phase the first echelon of forces so constituted will be progressively increased until objective fixed in the first stage is obtained.

(2) Articles 9 through 25 outline projected development during first stage and place obligation on contracting parties to prepare units destined eventually to be placed at disposal of commissioner. Duration of first stage not stipulated.

Commissioner should be appointed by common agreement and on basis of competence as soon as convention in effect, with renewable term of office of three years. Upon appointment commissioner defines armament and equipment needs of first echelon and establishes supply program. He furthermore will draft general regulations harmonizing national regulations on essential points and will organize and direct training schools. He will present a provisional estimate of financial expenses and will exercise supervision over the national forces earmarked for European army.

Re passing to second phase of first stage, commissioner will draw up plans for European air forces, organic texts regarding recruitment and general organization, regulations for administration and tactical and technical methods, a program for the unification of instruction, and plans for the integration of the first echelon of forces. He will likewise draft a plan for equipment of the second echelon of forces and a program for production of European armaments. For the execution of these projects commissioner will have disposal of sufficient personnel and financial resources to be provided by the contracting parties.

Council will be designated at same time commissioner chosen and each state will be represented by one member or deputy. Council will convene as often as necessary and at least every three months. Voting rights not stipulated, but weighted system implied. Commissioner will make regular reports to council. Council will fix provisional budget or organization. Any contracting government may oppose decision or recommendation of commissioner and council can annul by ⅔ major-

ity. Commissioner will submit his plans for second stage to council, which fixes final text by unanimous or ⅔ vote depending on subject matter of plan.

(3) Articles 26 through 46 set forth in some detail development envisaged during second phase of first stage, relationship of commissioner to council and his powers over European army itself. Assembly would be established at beginning of second phase and hold annual session. Its composition left open. Commissioner would present annual report to assembly, whose principal power would be right to dismiss commissioner by ⅔ vote. Court of justice, which would be that for Schuman Plan, would interpret convention and could on specified grounds annul assembly or council deliberations. Advisory opinions could be requested of it.

(4) Articles 47 through 56 relate to financial questions and provide that commissioner will draft annual budget which can be decreed by council with ⅔ majority. Expenses would be governed by payments from contracting states. Percentage of contribution by states not stipulated.

(5) Articles 57 through 65 relate largely to certain administrative matters such as seat of organization, official language, and immunities. It is specified that relation of organization with contracting states, other states, NATO, SHAPE, and Schuman Plan organization entrusted to commissioner.

(6) Articles 66 through 72 concern supplementary accords, amendments and ratifications. Ratifications by all signatories required before convention comes into effect. Convention open to all European states, but new state can be admitted only on unanimous favorable vote in council.

(7) Draft convention includes reference to military and financial annexes, but no text of either presented by French delegation.

BRUCE

396.1–PA/3–951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECERT PARIS, March 9, 1951—9 p. m.

5287. European army conference held first plenary session since February 22 [2] on March 8 and got into heart of matter with presentation German counterproposal as to size of national component of proposed international force. Germans failure declare explicitly at start

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Rome, Lisbon, Frankfurt, and Luxembourg, and copies were also made available to the Embassy in Ottawa and the Department of Defense.

[2] For a report on the conference plenary meeting of February 22, see telegram 4981, February 23, from Paris, p. 769.

that they accepted broad outlines other aspects of French proposals led French chairman Alphand into initial comment that he saw "nothing Europe [*European*?]" about German counterproposal, but meeting ended on happier note with agreement to study German statement plus supplementary explanations furnished in course discussion as well as defense by French General de Larminat of his delegation's proposal on grounds of its military practicability.

Next meeting will be of steering committee on March 15. Meeting opened with brief summary from Alphand on work steering committee covered in French draft convention distributed shortly before meeting (Embtel 5264, March 9 [3]). Meeting then heard prepared statement by German representative Roediger replacing Hallstein.

German proposal based on idea of common defense and FedRep's contribution to organization European army. Given geographic conditions of central Europe, west must oppose Soviet quantitative superiority by qualitative superiority consisting of "operating units", motorized, mobile and furnished with modern arms. Roediger claimed French proposal for mixed division including 16,000–17,000 combat troops does not entirely meet conditions that it is too unwieldy for rapid command and movement. Modern division must be based upon number of medium tanks and infantry in balanced proportion. German delegation had grave doubts of military efficacy of mixed divisions and cited several examples of difficulties that would arise through differences of language, execution of orders, artillery support anti-tank concentration, tactical air support, etc.

Conclusion therefore drawn by German delegation that all elements of operating units including tactical aviation should belong to the same nationality and be under same national command. In principle such an operating unit should be self-sufficient and so organized that could be combined according to the exigencies of the combat situation. Two types of such operating units are foreseen, one in which basic element would be infantry reinforced by armor, and the other, armor reinforced by infantry. The two types could then be combined, when required, into an efficient unit. The effectives of the "combat groups" should be formed in such fashion that when two are combined an "operating unit" results which would not be more than a combat force of from 10,000 to 12,000 men, depending on whether the two component groups were of same or different types. The combat group (6) would, in effect, be a small copy of a division in that it would include all arms essential for such a formation. German experience during the war indicated desirability of avoiding too rigid an organization of three groups.

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[3] See telegram 5293, March 9, from Paris, *supra*.

Combination of two combat groups would require establishment of staff of same nationality to which would be attached signal battalion and such specialized staff as might be required for reconnaissance, engineers, and artillery. Suggested that combat group of infantry should be 6,500 men and of armored units 4,500 men. Supply services could be concentrated at a higher command such as that of the staff of an army corps.

In conclusion Roediger contended these ideas merited profound examination by military experts and, in order to surmount political difficulties which German proposal might evoke, declared FedRep ready to renounce all armament production except small arms for police.

Alphand's immediate reaction to the proposal was uncompromising in tone. He described German proposal as animated purely by military considerations and taking insufficient account of political factors. French proposal based on integrated European army and he found no allusion to this in German proposal. Without such integration western Europe would have only a coalition army. Proposal was therefore not acceptable. It had been his understanding that neither French nor German people desired German divisions or German general staff. He then requested French military advisor General De Larminat to reply in detail to German proposal.

This reply was lengthy prepared statement purporting to show feasibility of mixed division concept both on military and political grounds. Although American RCT chosen as type, was not necessary to follow its organization precisely. More important to work out procedures for operation of mixed divisions as experience in last war had demonstrated. Standardization of communications and technique had greatly developed in last war and it was therefore a question of application and goodwill rather than of principle.

De Larminat gave many citations of integration in the field of aerial navigation both civilian and military and the same for naval task forces particularly in convoy duty. On exercise of command, pointed out that divisional orders can be expressed in schematic form that is practically international. This idea can be adapted and developed. Admitted that interpretative part of order is more difficult but could be worked out with assistance of interpreters particularly as military vocabulary has much in common. Cited French experience with English orders during war. On communications found no problem within RCT, and for their inter-RCT orders would establish liaison groups or pass through headquarters staff. Vocabulary can be simplified by use of common expressions and simple commands. Divisional commander could direct artillery support and anti-tank fire. As to air forces, certain arrangements are already under way for Atlantic forces and such liaison system could be adapted for European army.

De Larminat continued that supply problem not too difficult and can be worked out by schedules in advance. French troops during war were supplied both from UK and US sources and readily adapted themselves. Obviously munitions must be standardized by divisions. Concluded with statement that French objection was only against creation of national divisions. He thought delay in readiness division because of its mixed nationality would be only three months.

German representative then proposed that military committee examine the French and German statements, but Alphand objected because of lack of European elements in German proposal. German division could obviously be put at disposal supreme commander but that would not be contribution to European army. French have categoric opposition to German proposal not on basis organization RCT but on principle of mixed division and this cannot be decided by military committee. Roediger replied that German proposal does not necessarily envisage establishment German divisions but was directed toward most effective European army. Separate units would be under defense commissioner proposed in French plan, therefore a question of degree rather than principle.

As French and Germans seem to have locked horns, Italian representative intervened to stress necessity of finding compromise between military necessities and political realities. Suggested studying both statements taking into account over-all political objectives and then meet to consider how to proceed.

Alphand then stated that issue was clear in that Germans believed RCT inadequate on military grounds whereas French thought it was militarily sound and politically essential. He agreed that these positions should be considered after distribution of documents but not exclusively by military committee. Roediger likewise agreed that both political and military aspects be considered *pari passu.*

Belgian representative stated that difference between French and German views appeared boil down to question of whether largest national unit should be of 5–6,000 men or of 10–12,000 men. Alphand quick to state that French were certainly ready to discuss whether lowest international unit should be composed of two or of three national units, whether total strength should be 10 or 20,000 men. What appeared to him seriously objectionable in German proposal was that components of "operating unit" were all of same nationality and that this unit had staff of its own. He asked where a combined staff entered picture in German scheme.

Roediger then clarified German position by stressing that two RCT, would not necessarily be a division but an "operating unit", and by stating that while staff of operating units would be nationally integrated, international staff would come at army corps level. Army corps could obviously have units of three nationalities.

It was then agreed that Germans would incorporate these last explanations in their paper and conference would recess for several days to enable delegates to consider today's statements. Steering committee will be convoked March 15 to decide what to refer to committees.

Despite Alphand's attitude in meeting, both French and Italians hopeful that some progress had been made and way open for possible compromise. Germans also feel that way is not completely blocked but insist that conference can only go at slow pace. When suggested to Germans that conference might continue by discussing political institutions, Germans said would probably be ready to do so within a week but needed time consider French draft convention.

BRUCE

740.5/3–1551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, March 15, 1951—9 p. m.

5443. European army conference reconvened today in plenary session instead of steering comite because Ger desire to make prepared statement in elaboration of plan submitted last mtg. Ger proposal discussed in our tel 5287 [2] was limited to exposé of the size of minimum effective national contribution which as stated cld not be less than a basic operational unit. This, as described, amounted to small division. Today's Ger exposé indicated level at which European integration wld take place.

To this end they proposed that the basic European unit would be the army corps to be made up of 2 or 3 operational units (divisions) of separate nationalities. They proposed that support and supply wld be primarily a corps responsibility. To this end the corps staff and command wld have to have sufficient service units composed of different nationalities. In addition the corps wld have assigned directly certain mixed supporting arms of types where linguistic homogeneity is not of decisive importance, such as anti-aircraft and engineer elements. These might also include certain reserve elements and corps troops such as heavy armour and artillery. In summary the Ger proposal is to effect European unification at corps instead of divisional level and accentuate the unified nature of the corps by indicating the possibilities of blending nationalities in selected service and support elements.

Germans proposed that the details be referred to the Military Subcomite for study. They recognized that the question of tactical air forces and their integration wld also require expert analysis. They

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London, Copenhagen, Brussels, Frankfurt, Rome, Oslo, The Hague, Lisbon, and Luxembourg.

[2] *Supra.*

rptd, however their adherence to the principle of creating a unified and effective force animated by an European morale.

Alphand in reply stated that there seemed to be accord on the principle of integration, but difficulty arises on level of integration, as indicated above. Agreed however that proposals cld be studied by Military Comite altho Fr Del not now authorized to accept Ger proposal. Fr pointed out that in essence Ger view was to create European corps of 2 or 3 small national divisions as opposed to Fr view to build large European divisions consisting 2 or 3 national RCT's.

Taviani said Ital representatives approved examination by Military Comite but believed this Comite wld eventually have to receive political directives. Inevitable that Military Comite in proposing solution will run against political realities and, therefore, suggested presence of political representatives at Military Comite mtgs. Conference agreed that Military Comite wld meet tomorrow.[3]

Alphand then asked for comment on draft convention which evoked remarks from Itals to effect that powers granted under convention wld certainly be of great interest to Parliaments of participating countries. He also asked whether financial charges wld be in addition to military budget or wld be substitution taken from existing military budget. Alphand replied that the expenses wld naturally depend upon the size of the European Army, but that in early stages it wld be question of budget substitution rather than supplemental charges.

Taviani suggested a small comite of jurists to discuss institutional questions. Alphand agreed that this wld be advisable and comite will meet March 17.[4]

After this week conference will interrupt its work for Easter recess, resuming probably March 29.

BRUCE

[3] Telegram 5475, March 16, from Paris, not printed, reported that the meeting of the Military Committee of the European Army Conference was primarily given over to questions and answers on the French and German proposals regarding the composition of European army units (740.5/3–1651).

[4] Telegram 5567, March 20, from Paris, not printed, reported that a meeting of a Committee of Jurists of the European army conference had resulted in no particular answer to the questions raised (740.5/3–2051).

762A.5/3–1751 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET FRANKFURT, March 17, 1951—2 p. m.

Subject: Ger defense contingent.

7841. Bérard yesterday informally advised me that predicated on his own recent visit to Paris and subsequent discussion with Theodor

[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris and London.

Blank he has distinct impression mutually satis solution will be evolved for present divergent Ger-Fr views re Ger defense contingent and particularly differences concerning unit size and command. Stated Blank had indicated his hopeful view was based on report which Adenauer and he had recd from De Maiziere that definite progress is being made at Paris mtgs. Bérard stressed importance which Fr and Adenauer and Blank attach to creation true Eur army as real step toward Fr-Ger *rapprochement*. Further indicated Fr prepared and believes Ger similarly ready make concessions in view political importance achieving Eur army concept rather than adhering to rigid proposals their respective mil experts. Also indicated chief Fr concern is not so primarily with regard to actual unit size or other technical factors but rather to safeguard against any possible recreation of a Ger army. Fear of latter possibility is apparently chief Fr objection to NATO concept. Particularly emphasized that as time is important requisite for obtaining Fr-Ger agreement on major broad aspects of matter US shld refrain from urging haste or exerting pressure either here or in Paris or via NATO. Stressed that Fr consider Eur army is most far-reaching factor for genuine Eur integration and development better Fr-Ger relationship far surpassing Schuman Plan toward achieving this all important end. Further urged that since creation Eur army realistically depends on Fr and Gers it shld so far as feasible be left to these two elements to work out satis solution. Bérard conceded US cld probably force a solution on Fr but was certain Fr people wld ultimately recognize and resent such pressure thereby long range purpose of better Fr-Ger relationship wld be defeated.

Expressed hope I wld therefore counsel against haste or pressure on US part in this matter and in favor of giving Fr further opportunity play major role in working out satis solution with Gers. Bérard thought this wld be facilitated through discussion being handled primarily by non-mil reps with political considerations playing important role rather than sole emphasis on technical mil aspects. Have not checked with Blank correctness of Bérard's report of Adenauer–Blank attitude.[2] I stated that US position had consistently been to permit full opportunity for Paris negots to produce results and provided negots are not too protracted and results are militarily practicable this wld presumably continue to be our attitude. I naturally made no com-

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[2] Telegram 640, March 20, from Bonn, not printed, reported that Blank had told American representatives in Bonn that he was most pessimistic about the European army talks in Paris and did not expect any concrete results to emerge. Blank said that the French had made it obvious that they would not accept German units large enough to play an autonomous military role for fear that the Germans would use them to involve the French in a war of liberation of the east German territories and that, despite French agreement to discuss mixed corps in the Military Committee of the conference, they had privately told the Germans that French public opinion would never agree to such an arrangement. (762A.5/3–2051)

mitment which wld preclude our resuming active role any time we consider Fr-Ger efforts not producing desired results and in meantime to do nothing which cld appear to be putting pressure on Fr, particularly in regard to units which issue can be better settled in Paris. I feel this is practicable as a number of issues remain which can be explored here without any deliberate dragging of feet.

McCloy

740.5/3–951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 17, 1951—3 p. m.

4875. Department awaiting with considerable interest draft convention re Eur Army circulated by Fr delegation and will study document with greatest care. Meanwhile, Paris desp 2323, Feb 16,[2] and Embtel 5264 Mar 9 [3] appear to call for certain observations.

We cannot help but be struck by great emphasis placed on second phase of Eur Army proposals and on permanent institutions in contrast with meagerness of info concerning first phase. This first phase strikes Dept as being highly important as difficult escape conclusion that it will last long time, probably several years. This opinion based on assumptions appearing both ref docs that second phase cannot be ushered in before difficult and thorny questions settled, unification of training and command procedures, establishment of uniform mil code, setting in place of polit institutions.

Regardless of far-reaching polit importance second phase both in mil and polit fields, Dept tends believe that Eur Army proposals will stand or fall on provisions for first phase. In this connection we shld bear in mind US position shared by most other NAT countries and which has been made clear to Fr on several occasions: i.e., results of conference in order to be acceptable must contribute to overall strength of NATO, be fully sound both politically and militarily, and under no circumstances shld deter the contribution of Ger to the def forces of WE. Consequently it is feared that however desirable long-term plans might be, they cannot be considered unless sound and practical program established for first phase so as not to delay buildup of strength.

Therefore, Dept requests Emb for as much concrete info concerning first phase as will be possible without actions, vis-à-vis Fr Govt which might be interpreted as committing US in any way. In particular, we desire maximum info concerning Fr thinking as to size, status, re-

[1] This telegram, which was drafted in the Office of European Regional Affairs and was cleared by other appropriate offices and by the Department of Defense, was repeated for information to London and Frankfurt.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 767.

[3] See telegram 5293, March 9, from Paris, p. 772.

cruitment, training and use of Ger contribution during this period. This required in view of importance placed by Ger on equality of status or approximation thereof in Eur Army. In this respect, it wld appear that differentiations between two categories of nations, these having national forces in being, and those without such forces (i.e., Ger), extensively discriminate against Ger.[4]

[Here follows a number of detailed questions regarding the substance of the French proposal for a European Army.]

ACHESON

[4] In his telegram 5569, March 20, from Paris, not printed, Ambassador Bruce observed that the European army conference had so far concentrated largely on explanatory comment, and many of the questions raised by the Department had not yet been discussed or fully clarified. Ambassador Bruce promised to discuss the matter further upon his arrival in Washington for consultation. (740.5/3–2051)

740.5/4–1851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, April 18, 1951—5 p. m.

6295. From MacArthur. During informal talk with Gen Gruenther re European army, Alphand expressed personal view that agreement on size basic units and level of integration will be reached in "two or three months". Does not believe however that agreement can be reached until after (*a*) French elections;[2] (*b*) Big Four meeting.[3]

Re (*a*) above he explained that prior to elections virtually impossible for French to modify their present position. Re (*b*) he observed that since Ger demilitarization one of points Sov insist discussing in prospective Big Four French wld probably be most reluctant to reach any final agreement with Ger prior to Big Four mtg since this wld place them in position being accused by Commie propaganda of having prejudiced outcome or even sabotaging CFM.

Also perfectly clear from Alphand's comments that at this juncture political (rather than mil) aspects of level of integration of Ger units is all-important. [MacArthur.][4]

BRUCE

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London and Frankfurt.

[2] National elections were held in France on June 17. For documentation on the elections, see volume IV.

[3] The reference here is to the Four-Power Talks at Paris (The Conference of the Palais Marble Rose), March–June; for documentation on the talks, see pp. 1086 ff.

[4] Telegram 6221, April 14, from Paris, not printed, reported that at the sixth plenary session of the European army conference in Paris on April 13, Alphand indicated to American observers that agreement on the size of the basic unit and level and integration of the proposed army was likely after the forthcoming French elections, since prior to that time it would be difficult for the French Government to talk about anything resembling German divisions. Because of the danger of Communist propagandist exploitation of the division concept and for other reasons as well, the French Foreign Ministry was pursuing a policy of minimum publicity and was content to give the public the impression that the conference was deadlocked or quiescent. (740.5/4–1451)

740.5/5–951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, May 9, 1951—8 p. m.

6822. Steering comite Eur army conf has had three sessions since that last reported in Embtel 6052, April 10.[2] In course of these meetings it completed review of draft convention and addressed itself to special problems referred to it by juridical and financial comites (mil comite has so far submitted no differences to steering committee) additional session will take place May 11 whereupon plenary on same date will mark end of what might be called second phase of conf.[3] First phase was distinguished by confrontation of French and German theses on basic unit and by presentation of French draft convention, second phase involves blocking out of principal problems on understanding that the cardinal one of the level of integration is to be left aside for time being.

No observers took part in proceedings of steering comite. Fol account based on info furnished by De La Grandville, Fr secy of conference and by Von Kessel, member German del. Both emphasized that although certain difficulties have arisen, notably during last steering comite session, spirit of conf continues good and delegates continue hopeful something will come of it. Von Kessel said in fact that emergence of difficulties has served to give conf "atmosphere of greater realism" and has served rather to encourage his delegation. Comite work expected to continue according to outline which will presumably be presented by Alphand May 11.

Among differences that emerged are two in particular:

Italians, as already foreshadowed in reftel, have systematically attempted to cut down powers of commissioner and wound up in position where they proposed triumvirate rather than single commissioner. Juridical comite, unable to agree on this, referred matter to steering comite where French hope to arrive at compromise before the next plenary, by creating posts of deputy commissioners who would not however have veto over commissioner's decisions. French and Germans believe that Italians primarily motivated by prestige considerations since they cannot hope to get post of commissioner. French are strongly opposed to running army by comite and think little of Italian

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Copenhagen, Brussels, Rome, Oslo, The Hague, Lisbon, Ottawa, Luxembourg, and Frankfurt, and the Department of Defense was informed of its contents.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Telegram 6906, May 12, from Paris, not printed, reported that at the seventh plenary session of the European army conference on May 11, Chairman Alphand presented progress reports from the juridical, military, and financial committees of the conference. There was no discussion of the reports inasmuch as substantive discussions were taking place in the steering committee of the conference. (740.5/5–1251)

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argument that British sea lords are effectively running Brit Navy. Noteworthy that De La Grandville said all other delegates support Fr position but that Von Kessel told us Germans not prepared to force issue since they consider it not worth a showdown inasmuch as "SHAPE in the end will have effective control anyway".

Germans proposed that powers of assembly be increased, notably in financial field and advanced argumentation that national parliaments are more likely to vote necessary funds and that acceptance of convention itself more probable if purse strings effectively held by assembly. In making this proposal German delegate said to have argued that, after all, purpose before comite is to aid in creation supranational org, a statement against which Italians reacted rather sharply because they considered it too broad. De La Grandville said French del was left with distinct impression that Germans attempting to widen political scope of conf. Fr feel giving in to them would invite the same difficulties that have bedevilled Strasbourg[4] and that moreover stability and efficiency of Eur army organization would be impaired by supranational parliamentary structure by which commissioners might be overthrown as prime mins are in France. He indicated Fr also suspect that Germans might hope broader powers for Eur army assembly would lead to relinquishment remaining allied controls. Von Kessel, on other hand, said to us German proposal motivated by honest belief that ratification of convention would have better chance not only in Germany but perhaps also elsewhere if broader political representation is afforded each country. Here again Alphand is said to have compromise in mind by which greater financial powers accorded assembly but role will nevertheless remain consultative in essence as in case of Schuman Plan.

Agreement exists re German proposal that convention be drawn up in two parts: one the definitive "final" document, the other containing "transitional" arrangements. Germans here appear mildly disquieted by fact that Fr continue to talk of phase one and phase two with "first things first" attitude (implying possible delay in implementation phase two) and Fr on other hand appear still slightly fearful that Germans might make demands later when definitive phase is to commence. Kessel in this respect perceived no difficulty. Germans would sign convention and transitional arrangements simultaneously, he said, and date could be fixed when convention itself goes into effect. Probable that agreement on this point will be announced at next plenary.

BRUCE

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[4] The reference here is presumably to the Council of Europe with headquarters at Strasbourg. For documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the Council of Europe, see volume IV.

740.5/6–451 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY FRANKFURT, June 4, 1951—6 p. m.

9775. For Byroade from McCloy. Alphand, Arnauld Wapler and Bérard came to see me yesterday to post me on progress Paris meetings re European army and particularly to discuss forthcoming report on Petersberg discussions re German defense contingent by Deputy High Commissioners to High Commissioners who, in turn, will submit it to respective governments.[2] Alphand stressed importance from French standpoint of synchronizing Petersberg and Paris discussions and reports and not having NATO receive report re former prior to report re latter. Chief French basis for this view is that they do not want NATO countries to formulate positions regarding German contingent prior to receiving report of Paris meetings. Alphand continuously stressed steadfastness French view that German contingent must be integrated into European army. Alphand indicated French expected report of Paris discussions to be available toward beginning of July. In light foregoing we reached following understanding:

1. High Commissioners would forward report to governments as soon as possible after receipt from deputies. Expect this to be by June 9.

2. Question remains open for discussion with François-Poncet and Kirkpatrick.

(*a*) Whether High Commissioners will append comments to report;

(*b*) Extent of such comments, if any.

3. I would be prepared to submit report to governments and pass on to my government the suggestion as put forward by the French that governments withhold report from NATO until receipt of Paris report (provided not delayed). I am inclined to think there is some advantage in this suggestion as it may give opportunity to reconcile differences before transmittal to entire NATO group.

4. Deputy High Commissioners should send to NATO their usual monthly report regarding Petersberg discussions but would not send text of report discussed in this cable.

5. Agreed Bérard, who in chair, at meeting to be held today with Germans to finish text of report would make short tripartite statement, text of which will be forwarded separately after meeting, plus additional unilateral French statement concerning importance they attach to European Army concept in light of French opinion.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Ambassador Spofford in London, to Ambassador Bruce in Paris, and to General Handy in Heidelberg.

[2] For documentation on the meetings, at Bonn between representatives of the Federal Republic and the Deputy High Commissioners, January 9–June 4, see pp. 990 ff. For the report, dated June 8, by the Allied High Commissioners on these meetings, see p. 1044.

French envisage four power conference US, UK, Fr and Germany to discuss Petersberg and Paris reports with view to reconciling any differences. Alphand inquired whether I saw any difficulties in such conference going on at same time as CFM. I stressed importance avoiding delay, especially in light Russian divisions and air force in east zone. Further, in reply Alphand's inquiry whether US still wants German defense contingent and wants it immediately, I replied US has not changed its view as our military experts feel Germans essential to effective European defense. Alphand agreed this was view of his present government but could not indicate what view of new government might be after June 17. Agreed, however, defense measures not be delayed because of fear of provoking Russians. Alphand further indicated belief must proceed with German rearmament but avoid recreation of former German Army, general staff and power of Ruhr industrialists. He stressed importance European army concept, especially to make clear to French and Russian people determination not to permit revival of separate German military establishment which might have power to go off on Eastern campaign perhaps dragging west with it. Alphand deplored state of opinion in France and in England which was taking on a certain resentfulness to American presence in Europe and demands for bases, installations, etc. Said it was increasingly important to explain NATO, NATO airfields, infrastructure, etc. to French people, portraying it as triumph of French diplomacy which had requested and finally obtained such protection. I said I hold European attitude faulty, including German, due in my judgment not so much to failure of US propaganda but utter lack of initiative on part of local sources actively to combat Communist anti-American line themselves with well directed self-generated responses. Local leaders too hesitant to offset increasing tempo of anti-American Communist propaganda by their own statements. I hope this made an impression as I firmly believe more conscious effort along this line is urgently needed.

McCloy

740.5/6–2151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 21, 1951—7 p. m.

6988. Now Fr elections held,[2] we must move without further delay on question Ger participation in def of West. First task is to take

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Ambassadors Gifford and Spofford in London and to General Hays in Frankfurt. It was drafted by Ridgway B. Knight, Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs in the Office of European Regional Affairs, and was concurred in by the Bureaus of European and German Affairs and by the Department of Defense.

[2] For documentation on the French national elections of June 17, see volume IV.

action on report resulting from mil talks in Bonn between reps occupying powers and FedRep.[3] This requires initially tech consideration of report from mil point of view with object securing agreement on mil plane between US, UK and Fr which, in their capacity of occupying powers, have been acting as agents of NATO under NAC decision taken at Brussels in Dec 1950[4] and have been exploring with Gers their concept of suitable Ger contribution. While final agreement with Ger on this subj undoubtedly will require simultaneous agreement on polit plane re contractual relations, work must proceed simultaneously in polit and mil fields to avoid further loss of time.

At best, in mil field, we wld hope for agreement on mil proposals between occupying powers subsequently agreed more or less informally by Gers, depending on how different from their proposals, and then presented to NAC for approval and action on any changes from Brussels principles. However, it is realized that serious difficulties may be encountered with Fr and, shld US, UK and Fr agreement seem impossible as to action on Bonn report, we cld not exclude possible desirability of referring Bonn report to NAC without tripartite agreement. In latter case, it wld be necessary for Council subsequently instruct occupying powers further to consult with FedRep on basis of Council's decision. Final approval wld be required from Council. We hope this more complicated and time consuming procedure will be avoided through development agreed recommendations by UK, US and Fr to CD.

We have no illusion as to possibility coming to agreement with Fr on Bonn report on tech mil plane alone. Instead, we realize Fr mil rep wld wish refer certain aspects Bonn report to his Govt for polit decisions and discussions with US and UK at govt level. Thus, we envisage report to govts from mil reps embodying both points agreed from mil point of view and those which it was impossible to solve at mil level. These mil talks wld be followed by govt exchanges with view drafting common answer to Gers which, when agreed by them, wld become quadripartite proposal for submission to NAC.

We fully realize no agreement can be reached with Fr unless results Paris conference on Eur Army have received full consideration in connection with Ger mil contribution in gen and Bonn report in particular. Problem is therefore, where, how and principally when findings of Paris conference can be introduced into study of Ger contribution.

With above in mind, you are requested present *Aide-Mémoire* along fol lines to Fr Govt:

"US Govt has received report of Allied High Commissioners of their conversations with reps of West Ger Fed Govt, on question of Ger

[3] For the report of June 8 by the Allied High Commissioners for Germany on the meetings under reference here, see p. 1044.

[4] Regarding the decision under reference here, set forth in NATO document C6–D/1, December 13, 1950, see document Pleven D–2/1*a*, January 26, and footnote 7, thereto, p. 755.

participation in def of Western Eur. In furtherance of decisions of Brussels session of NAC in Dec 1950, US Govt attaches greatest importance to early consideration of this report by three Allied Occupying Powers in their role as agents of NATO.

"In interest of reaching early agreement on this important problem US invites reps of Fr and Brit Govts to confer with US in Wash, concerning mil aspects of contribution of Ger to defenses of Western Eur. These reps wld consider report of High Commissioners, and related matters, and reach such agreement as is possible on acceptability of mil aspects. Reps wld then report their findings to their respective Govts.

"US proposes that natl reps be those individuals now appointed to SG as mil reps of Chiefs of Staff of Occupying Powers, in capacity distinct from that of members of SG. Upon receipt of appropriate instrs from their govts these reps wld confer with objective of composing their respective views. Any matters upon which reps did not agree or any matters which they consider wld be beyond competence of Occupying Powers under provisions of NATO doc C6–D/1, or primarily non-mil matters, wld be duly set forth for res on governmental level. Their report of matters which they consider to be beyond competence of Occupying Powers wld include their recommendations as to what position three govts shld take on these matters. Fol conclusion of discussions, and not until then, three govts wld decide as to course of action to be taken within NATO.

"US is of opinion that discussions currently proceeding in Paris on proposal by Fr Govt for formation of Eur Army have proceeded to point where consideration of Ger contribution to Eur Army is pertinent to consultations suggested above. US wld therefore be prepared to consider any suggestion by Fr Govt to enlarge conversations to include discussion of relationship between proposed Eur Army and rearmament of Ger as specified in doc C6–D/1. Since procedures of three Occupying Powers as agents of NATO on rearmament of Ger will be duly reported to NATO, US suggests that it wld be appropriate to consider report as agreed by participants of Paris conference, which itself is to be reported to NAC.

"US considers it of importance that an early report on status of rearmament of Ger be made to NAC. Therefore, above conversations shld begin in early Jul 1951, and reps shld complete their report to their respective govts during Jul. It shld be objective of respective govts to confer on report of their mil reps and agree as to future course of action not later than Aug 15, 1951. US Govt perceives that undue delay on this important practical matter wld cause serious doubts as to seriousness of purpose of NATO nations to proceed in most expeditious manner for creation of an adequate defense of Western Eur.

"US Govt wishes inform your Govt that if alternative methods of conducting above mil conversations appear desirable it wld be pleased to consider your suggestions. It does, however, wish to point out competence of natl reps to SG for these discussions and their established relations with their Chiefs of Staff." [5]

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[5] Telegram 8043, June 23, from Paris, reported that the Embassy had that day delivered to the French Foreign Ministry an *aide-mémoire* along the lines instructed here (740.5/6–2351).

FYI only Gen Ely, Fr rep, indicates that he cannot agree to above procedure unless specifically so instructed by his govt. He has informed Gen Bradley that he wld prefer that this procedure be arranged through govts by FonOff representation. Gen Ely is in complete agreement with suggested procedure but does not feel he is in position at moment to so recommend to his Govt.

ACHESON

Paris Embassy files, 400 European Army

Paper Prepared in the Embassy in France [1]

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET [PARIS, undated.]

ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN ARMY CONFERENCE THROUGH JUNE 22, 1951

I. THE PROBLEM

1. To analyze the activities of the European Army Conference, to date, as a basis for assisting in the formulation of U.S. policy on the development of European defense.

II. BACKGROUND

2. The Occupying Powers were invited by the North Atlantic Council to discuss with the German Federal Government the question of German participation in the defense of Western Europe along the lines set forth in Council document C6–D/1 of 13 December 1950.[2] Other NATO nations were to be kept as fully informed as possible of the course of the discussions and of any steps taken to initiate German participation. In C6–D/1, the Council noted the French intent to call a conference on the formation of a European Army, and requested the Deputies to keep themselves informed of its progress, and in due course consider any recommendations made from the point of view of NATO requirements.

3. On 15 February 1951, the French Government called a conference to "study the means of organizing, for the common defense, a European Army, to come under unified European political institutions, along the general lines of the declaration made by Mr. Pleven on 24 October 1950."

4. With respect to any arrangements arrived at for developing a European Army, and a German contribution within same, the North

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[1] This paper, which was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to a brief, explanatory despatch 16, July 3, 1951, from Paris, not printed, was drafted jointly by Ambassador Bruce, Embassy Political Adviser Riddleberger, Second Secretary Koren, Second Secretary Cleveland, and Second Secretary Herz.

[2] Regarding the document under reference, see document Pleven D–2/1*a*, January 26, p. 755, and footnote 7 thereto.

Atlantic Council stated in part that: "The final test of all such arrangements must be whether, in the judgment of NATO, they were militarily effective and served to strengthen the North Atlantic Community." (C6–D/1, Paragraph 12) [4]

5. In the conclusions of the Military Committee report, approved by the Council as part of C6–D/1, it was stated that: "A European Defense force operating as an element of an integrated NATO Defense force, is militarily acceptable if its achievement under no circumstances would delay the contribution of Germany to the defense forces of Western Europe."

6. The Allied High Commissioners have discussed the question of a German contribution with the German Federal Government, to the extent of obtaining from the Germans a general indication of the terms under which they would be willing to make such a contribution, the nature of the contribution as they envisaged it, and a tentative time schedule for its development.

7. The High Commissioners have completed their discussion with the German Federal Government, and submitted their report thereon to their respective Governments on 8 June 1951.[3]

8. The European Army Conference is now, and has been for several months, examining the military, fiscal, and political aspects of the problem with a view to producing a draft treaty and accompany technical agreements which, if and when ratified by the governments concerned, will create the European Army. The conference plans to submit a preliminary report of progress to NATO and to the national governments by 10 July 1951.[4]

9. There has been no formal relationship between the Bonn discussions and the European conference, but the German delegation at the European Army Conference has presented in Paris essentially the same military proposals as at Bonn.

10. The fact that the Bonn discussions represented only an exchange of views, whereas the European Army Conference is actually negotiating an agreement, has resulted, especially in the military field, in German acceptance of some modifications to their Bonn views at subsequent Paris meetings. It thus appears that in some measure the German Bonn views are being overtaken in the Paris conference. Until the Paris results are approved, however, the Bonn position still must be considered as the basic German position.

11. The French made it very clear that no substantive issues would be resolved in the European Army Conference prior to the French general elections on 17 June.[5] No agreement can, therefore, be expected

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[3] See p. 1044.

[4] The interim report under reference here was ultimately completed on July 24; see p. 843.

[5] For materials on the French general elections, see volume IV.

on the size of basic units and the levels of integration until after the new French Government assumes office.

III. THE EUROPEAN ARMY PROPOSAL

12. The European Army Conference was opened in Paris on 15 February 1951 under French chairmanship. In opening the Conference Foreign Minister Schuman stated, as to its purpose, that the proposal was to be considered in the same context as the coal and steel plan, and insisted that "there is a Europe to organize" and that . . . this truth holds in the field of defense as well as in the political and economic fields. A European Army within the Atlantic Force will be a "permanent instrument for the security of our continent, and an essential element of European integration." He also declared that the work of the conference was, in his opinion, as much "political as military." Schuman stated that the French plan had an immediate military purpose, namely: "To construct a military tool of sure efficiency, and to prove not only to our technicians but also to our peoples that an Army of a United Europe is fit to be used against an aggressor with cohesion and vigor at least as great as in the case of national armies." [6]

13. At the opening meeting Schuman also emphasized that the French wanted the European Army wholly compatible with, and a help to the integrated Atlantic Force, saying: "If our initiative were to result in imperiling or simply slowing up Atlantic defense, and if that were proved, we would not hesitate to withdraw our proposal." He summed up the philosophy behind the European Army as follows: "Atlantic defense and European defense have nothing incompatible about them, do not duplicate each other, but are placed on different planes. The Atlantic organization is a coalition system of national armies, grouped under a single command. The European Army will be a supranational army, being substituted for national armies progressively and definitively."

14. Since the opening of the conference, the various aspects of the problem have been examined, either in plenary session or by appropriate committees: military, judiciary, and fiscal. The work accomplished by the various committees is discussed in detail in Section IV below.

15. The timing set by the Chairman of the Plenary Session, Hervé Alphand, was aimed at completing all non-controversial elements of the treaty and accompanying military agreement prior to the French elections and isolating, for subsequent resolution, those issues on which ready agreement could not be reached. The completion in June of the Bonn report, however, prompted the French to propose that a progress report be completed by 10 July containing as much agreement as

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[6] Regarding Schuman's opening address to the conference, see telegram 4846, February 15, from Paris, p. 767.

possible. The French are concerned lest the U.S., and subsequently NATO, take action on the Bonn report without concurrent consideration of the European Army Conference activities.

16. The procedure and phasing envisaged by the European Army Conference for the implementation of its plan, if and when agreed to, is essentially as follows:

a. 1st Phase (Approximately 18 months)

(1) Prepare, separately and under national supervision, the forces which are to be integrated at the start of the second phase.
(2) Complete plans and preliminary measures necessary to the second phase integration, and to the subsequent support of the forces concerned.
(3) Create the agencies required for the administration of the European Army.
(4) Prepare the essential regulations and military laws which will govern the European Army in the second phase.
(5) In general, take all steps necessary to insure the proper functioning, support, and development of the army in accordance with agreed plans.

b. 2nd Phase (After 18 months)

(1) Assemble national formations into the agreed integrated formations of the European Army.
(2) SHAPE to assume command responsibilities for European Army units on the same basis as for the national units of other countries.
(3) The European Defense Commissioner, or other appropriate European agencies, to assume responsibility for those functions not assumed by SHAPE.

17. The initiation of phase one would start with the signature of the Treaty, if preparatory measures are permitted; or, if not, as soon as the Treaty is ratified. In any event, it is the view of the conference that, during the period between the signature of the Treaty and its ratification by national governments, certain preparatory measures can be initiated in order to gain as much time as possible.

IV. THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

A. *Juridical and Political Organization*

Summary of status of treaty

18. The French Draft Convention has formed the basis for discussion. It calls for a framework not unlike that of the Schuman Plan: A European Defense Commissioner with large direct operating responsibilities and powers; a Council of Ministers which is to lay down broad policies for the Commissioner to follow and which can, under certain circumstances, entertain appeals against decisions of the Commissioner; an Assembly with limited control and supervisory powers; and a Court of Justice. In the French conception, which has by and

large prevailed, the Commissioner would clearly be the most powerful agency of the European Defense Organization, although he would be subject to certain checks and controls. Because there was virtual agreement that the institution of the Commissioner would have to be a powerful one, differences developed in the course of the conference over the precise nature of the institution of the Commissioner (whether it should not consist of more than one person) and over the extent to which the checks and controls upon him might be increased. Differences on this point are detailed below.

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28. The conference has benefited from the fact that some of its participants, in the legal field, are familiar with the legal work accomplished in connection with the Schuman Plan, or even participated in its drafting. This fact has not always been a blessing, however: The German delegation, for instance, has attempted to correlate the European Army treaty in its form and structure to the Schuman Plan treaty, and even if this is not a deliberate effort to interpose delay—and it does not appear to be such an effort—it is a handicap rather than an asset to the conference because the correlation (comparing of texts and insertion of equivalent passages and articles) is a time-consuming effort and not always a realistic one.

29. The caliber of the participants, however, has been good. The Italian member has participated actively even while emphasizing that he was talking without directives from Rome. The French delegation has commented on the high caliber of the German delegation and this may be taken as an encouraging factor. The German delegation has frequently given to understand that its position had been cleared with Bonn, or originated there, and this too is a factor indicating that the juridical transactions of the conference have not been conducted in a sterile atmosphere. According to the Secretary of the conference, "two of the three top legal experts" of the Federal Government are working in Paris as members of the German delegation. As stated above, the work has been of a high professional caliber.

30. The question of relations with NATO was at first shunted aside, but in recent meetings has received more consideration. The Italian delegate was the one who most persistently proposed that some relationship to NATO be established during the proceedings of the conference. He was also the one who desired the relationship to NATO to be worked out and laid down in a separate annex to the convention. To this, the German delegate, with the concurrence of his French colleague, replied that reference to the relationship with NATO in the body of the Treaty (as is now the case) was preferable, since "one did not wish to give the Americans the impression that the European Army could be easily divorced from NATO." Everyone agreed on that

occasion that the European Army would last even beyond the unlimited period provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty. The French, although indicating agreement with the need to relate all pertinent elements of the European Army to NATO, have insisted that this should be done later in conjunction with NATO agencies since this matter is of equal concern to them.

31. A major political issue is that of full German equality, and this issue has been both met and avoided: The conference itself is proceeding on the explicit assumption that there will exist full equality among the participants. The German delegation fears that the French consider that the definitive period would see full equality but that the transitional period would be one in which certain discriminatory features would exist. Since this issue has not come out into the open as of the writing of this account, it remains to be seen whether it proves to be insurmountable.

32. The conduct of deliberations in the juridical committee and the behavior of its members in private contacts point to the conclusion that the participating countries are sincere in their expressed desire to establish a European Army based on the principle of non-discrimination. The two principal participants have been particularly insistent on the genuineness of their intentions. This is a psychological factor of some importance in assessing the chances of success of the conference.

B. *Military Organization*

Summary of status

33. The Military Committee of the European Army Conference has convened once or twice a week during the period 16 March to date. The various delegations actively participated in the work and furnished numerous papers and studies aimed at reaching agreement on the European Army structure. The observers of the US, UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark were present at nearly all meetings.

34. The Military Committee agreed initially to put aside the highly political question of size of basic units and levels of integration, and to proceed with a discussion of all other military phases of the European Army structure with the object of reaching as much agreement as possible pending resolution of the above issue.

35. The German proposal, of Army Corps consisting of "operating units", raised the question of what should be the most effective basic organization for land forces, irrespective of the question of integration. The deliberations to date have been aimed at resolving this question as a prerequisite to determining levels of integration and the ultimate composition of European formations. To this end the Military Committee agreed on an agenda which included the discussion of corps troops, army general reserves, service elements, schools, policies, etc. Agreement on these elements was reached under both the French and

German basic unit proposals, and where a difference existed depending on the solution to be ultimately adopted, the alternatives were both indicated. The army of 3 corps and 10 divisions was used by the Military Committee as a basis for discussing the European Army organization. The overall magnitude of European forces envisaged, for planning purposes, was two armies and an air force of approximately 1800 first-line aircraft.

36. As of this date, the Military Committee has reached broad agreement on all issues considered, and is preparing a first draft of an overall technical military agreement which is to accompany the treaty and cover those points requisite to a clear understanding of the European Army plan, and its implementation with a minimum of delay. The report of the Military Committee is to be completed by 10 July 1951, and no further useful work can be accomplished after that by the Committee until the basic issues are resolved.

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Comments

45. The atmosphere of the work of the Military Committee has been constantly cordial. The German delegation in particular has cooperated very actively, and has benefited from detailed guidance received from its superior echelon in Bonn. On the other hand, the Germans were hampered by the lack of a general staff organization and records to draw upon; hence many of its comments were prefaced by the statement that they were general and based on the personal experience of the participating officers.

46. The French representatives on the Military Committee are highly qualified General officers, all of whom are on the personal staff of Defense Minister Moch. French proposals and papers are prepared at Defense Ministry level, but are not processed through the French chiefs of staff; nor do the delegates rely on the general staff for assistance.

47. The caliber of the Italian delegation is particularly poor. They have contributed very little to the discussions and their only comment on most issues is to submit, as an annex to the agreed solution, the Italian equivalent as it now is. The Italian military delegate has indicated to the U.S. observer that he seriously doubts if his general staff even reads the Military Committee reports, and that General Marras has a very low opinion of the whole conference. Belgian representation is relatively strong, and there is every indication that the Belgian chiefs of staff are following the proceedings and providing constant guidance to their delegate.

48. A lack of realism has existed in the deliberations, and there has been an apparent tendency to ignore completely the relationship between individual issues and their NATO counterparts. For example, the force goals selected for planning purposes for the initial Euro-

pean Army (20 divisions and 1,800 aircraft) bear no relation to the NATO (DC 28) force requirements, deficits, or known contributions. This is true not only with respect to totals but also with respect to types. It would appear that the European Army was being developed as a separate completely balanced force, to be contributed as a whole to the NATO integrated forces without regard as to whether it would fit into the overall balanced concept of the latter.

49. The ability of the nations actually to implement the agreements which they propose has not at any time been the subject of discussion, or doubt, within the Military Committee. Yet the initial combined school to be immediately established for senior officers and commanders proposes a student body of 100 such officers, although the participating nations have been unable to furnish adequate quotas of senior officers to existing NATO commands. A feasibility test of the present agreed plans for the creation of the European Army would probably uncover many difficulties, principally with respect to the time factors envisaged.

50. The Military Committee work to date has developed a favorable spirit of cooperation, and has resulted in many technical points of view being brought together to such a degree that, if and when political agreements are reached between governments, certain military measures can be implemented without undue waste of time.

51. Conversely, should governmental agreement on a German contribution be delayed, the conference has reached sufficient paper agreement on many military issues and on the goal of the conference to interfere substantially with the adoption by NATO of any separate course of action on the Bonn report. If the work of the European Army Conference does not turn out to be constructive in the development of a German contribution, it can certainly be used effectively to delay such a contribution.

C. *Financial Aspects*

Status of work

52. The work of the Financial Committee has centered around four major groups of questions: questions of budgetary techniques, questions concerning the content of the budget (expenditures), questions of financing (receipts), and the special problem of international transfers.

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Principal points of disagreement

60. Approval of Budget. The original French proposal was that the budget (literally "etat provisionel" or forecast of expenditures) should be approved by the Council, acting for the member governments. The Germans proposed that in order to strengthen the European quality of the organization and to ensure democratic control over the budget, the

final authority to approve the budget should lie with the Assembly. As the matter now stands, the delegates have under consideration two somewhat different drafts which can probably be compromised. The German draft provides that the Commissioner, like a national Minister, prepares the budget; that the Council, like a national Cabinet, approves it, with any modifications it may wish to make; that the Assembly then considers it, may amend it in any way it chooses which does not increase the total of all expenditures except for the purpose of restoring a previous cut from the Commissioner's proposal, and approves it; but that the Council may override any changes of the Assembly by unanimous vote. The other draft, apparently supported by the French and the Italians, provides for preparation by the Commissioner, submission by the Council to the Assembly for the latter's suggestions, with final action to be taken in every case by the Council.

61. When the budget is to go into effect. There has been disagreement as to the point at which the expenditures for troop upkeep and equipment (that is to say, virtually everything except the administrative expenditures of the Commissioner's office) should begin to figure in the budget. The original French proposal was that such expenditures would begin to do so only at the beginning of the second phase, when the units themselves passed under direct control of the Commissioner. However, the Italian delegation proposed that in order to provide for a reasonable sharing of the burden of the original preparation of these units, the budget should include the total cost of mounting all of the units being prepared for the European Army, and each country's direct contribution to the raising of its own troops should be deducted from its payment to the budget. In this way the burden of raising units for the European Army would be shared on whatever basis was decided upon in the Convention. The Germans have gone further than this, asking that account be taken of the fact that, whereas the other countries already have the framework of their units, Germany must start from scratch. They proposed that the other countries should make a particular contribution to the raising of German units. This suggestion has not been enthusiastically received by the other delegations and the matter is still under discussion.

62. Burden-sharing. The original French proposal was that the percentage contributions, to be fixed in the Convention, would remain in effect until modified. They could be modified by agreement among the member States at the end of five years, or sooner in the event of the adherence of a new State. The Germans agree to the setting of initial percentages, but wish those percentages, as well as subsequent revisions, to be calculated on the basis of a specific mathematical formula, which takes account of national income, tax burden, etc., and is progressive on the basis of "ability to pay". The Germans also wanted revisions to take place at two-year intervals. The other delega-

tions hold that there are too many factors involved to make possible the use of a mathematical formula and that the fixing of percentages must take place by negotiation. They think it would be mistake for such revisions to take place as frequently as the Germans propose except in the case of an extraordinary change in a country's situation, in which case a change can be considered under one of the general clauses of the Treaty.

Comments

63. The work of the Financial Committee has been competent but not brilliant. On matters of budgetary technique, in which its members are obviously experts, it has virtually settled all questions and no particular difficulties are to be anticipated. With respect to burden-sharing, while preliminary discussion has taken place, the Committee has not really come to grips with the knottiest problems. No delegation has as yet proposed national percentage contributions. The discussions on the expenditure side of the budget and on international transfers have been somewhat hampered by the lack of a precise knowledge of the organizational framework and specifically of the scope of the effort under the European budget. It is fair to say, however, that to date not very much imagination has been used in finding ways in which advantage could be taken of the unprecedented opportunities presented by the development of a European budget and centralization of European procurement. The procurement question has hardly been discussed.

740.5/6–2351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, June 23, 1951—2 p. m.

8040. Eur army conf met in plenary session 22 June. Alphand presented status work and comments as fols:

Reiterated objective of obtaining max mil integration, compatible with mil effectiveness, as essential step in Eur unification. Emphasized need for close liaison between Eur army plans and NATO but considered that detailed determination of relations can be arrived at only through discussion with NATO. Restated French aim that no discrimination shld exist in Eur army except as unavoidable due to differences in circumstances of participants, such as having forces in being and outside obligations. States that obvious link existed between Eur army conf and Bonn discussions, which must be considered concurrently since in his view no solution cld be derived from Bonn report alone due to fact that Gers will not accept all terms of Brussels

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Frankfurt, Copenhagen, Brussels, Rome, Oslo, The Hague, Lisbon, Ottawa, and Luxembourg, and copies were made available to the Department of Defense.

report and others wld not accept Ger Bonn proposals; hence, impasse exists with implied solution being Eur army formula.

Alphand announced intent to complete a report to govts by 10 July. It will represent no commitment but indicate areas of agrmt and disagreement and provide basis for considering Eur army activities in conjunction with Bonn report. Subsequent actions of conf will then depend on govt decision, either to provide dels with new instructions, or to hold mtg of mins to resolve major differences. Technical discussion will continue however.[2]

Principal differences remaining are: (*a*) size basic unit and level of integration, (*b*) def commissariat to be headed by one commissioner or a comite, (*c*) powers of assembly on budget, and (*d*) degree of detail (such as status of forces, etc) to be included in initial treaty. These issues will probably not be resolved by 10 July report.

Itals made statement to effect that Italy's cautious participation to date, and emphasis on cutting powers assembly, did not mean they don't support Eur army idea, but a representation here has not had continuing instructions from Rome since they did not wish to solicit same until our work had been complete to present an overall picture. July 10th report will provide basis for Ital Govt to consider accomplishments so far and, thereafter, they may wish to participate more actively. Del is however certain that govt will be pleased with progress achieved.

Roediger, Ger, made statement to effect that given more time a good many more issues cld be covered, and the magnitude of the proj called for progressing thoroughly and cautiously. Gers desire that as many issues as possible be covered, in principle, in the treaty since answers thereon will have tc be provided to parliaments in order that they can consider where such a treaty will lead to ultimately. This requirement precludes pushing off issues on def commissioner for later resolution, as French have frequently suggested.

Roediger further stated that Ger cannot divorce Eur army from other polit issues such as revision of occupation statute, nor cld treaty be signed until these issues (those presented at Bonn) were settled; hence, Bonn and Eur army activities must be brought together soonest.

Alphand suggested that press silence no longer nec now that elec-

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[2] Telegram 7836, June 17, from Paris, not printed, reported that the Steering Committee of the European army conference had agreed to submit a report to the participating governments outlining the progress of the conference to date and including agreed, disagreed, and reserved articles of the proposed treaty. French Delegate Alphand declared that the North Atlantic Council should be informed of the results obtained at the conference in view of the considerable differences revealed in the discussions between Allied and German representatives at the Bonn conversations on Germany's contribution to European defense. Ambassador Bruce interpreted Alphand's position to indicate that the French hoped that the report on the European army conference might allow the deadlock in the Bonn conversations to be bypassed and that the French might be willing to give in on the question of German divisions with a European army framework. (740.5/6–1751)

536-688 PT 1—80——53

tions were over, and recommended that the conf permit the release of a statement of today's mtg indicating conf was active. All agreed, but details were not to be divulged as yet.

BRUCE

740.5/6–2751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, June 27, 1951—7 p. m.

8138. Deptel 6988 June 21 (London Todep 538, Frankfort 8729)[2] and Embtel 8043 June 23 (London 2163, Frankfort 1134)[3]. In handing us reply to our *aide-mémoire* of June 23, whose text of which appears in our immed fol tel,[4] Wapler, Chief FonOff Atlantic Pact Division, made fol remarks:

1. Timing proposed in French reply came as close to that desired by us as was possible under circumstances. He added that first draft of report on Paris conference had already been completed.

2. Gen Ely cld now discuss Ger rearmament only on basis of his December instrs and these instructions cld not be changed until French Govt had closely examined conclusions of Paris and Bonn reports side by side. FonOff was particularly anxious that no discussions be undertaken with French rep tied to negative December instructions. (While Wapler did not mention this, new French Govt on basis election will be formed around July 10 and it will be this govt that will formulate new French position on German contribution.)

3. In response to question as to FonOff reaction to our proposed procedure, Wapler said he cld give only personal view at this time. In his opinion, which Embassy believes is probably shared by his superiors in FonOff, question of German contribution as political aspects, question cld have been settled on military grounds alone several months ago. Consequently Wapler's personal view is that representation of three powers at July talks shld reflect essentially politico-military nature of question and diplomatic representatives (perhaps Perkins for US, Franks for UK, and Alphand for France) shld participate as well as representatives in standing group of three powers acting as military representatives their respective chiefs of staff.

BRUCE

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Ambassadors Gifford and Spofford in London and to General Hays in Frankfurt.

[2] *Ante*, p. 786.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 788.

[4] Neither telegram 8142, June 27, from Paris, under reference here or the French Foreign Ministry *aide-mémoire* transmitted therein is printed. The *aide-mémoire* indicated that the French Government urged postponement of any tripartite discussions regarding the report of the Bonn meetings on German defense contribution until completion of the interim report of the European army conference and expressed a preference for the joint examination of the two reports by tripartite experts following a procedure agreed upon by the American, British, and French Governments after examination of both reports by each government. (740.5/6–2751)

740.5/6–2851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 28, 1951—4 p. m.

7155. For Bruce. We have considered, along with McCloy, problem of moving forward on question of Ger contribution to defense. Delay in initiation of Ger participation since Brussels Conference has seemed unavoidable in view polit situation in Ger, unacceptability of certain terms of Brussels Agreement to Gers, time-consuming preparation for termination of occupation regime, Fr elections, possibility of Four Power mtg, etc., etc. We believe that time for attempting remove this deadlock now at hand and US leadership shld be directed energetically towards that end.

The three Govts have already received report of HICOM on mil talks with Gers at Bonn.[2] We are attempting, through dipl channels, secure agreement of Fr and Br Govts that this report shld be studied forthwith by reps of their natl Chiefs of Staff on Standing Group in Wash.[3] In presenting this point of view we have asked Bruce emphasize to Fr this suggested procedure was in no way an attempt to rush final action on Bonn report prior to consideration of anticipated progress report on Eur army conference at Paris, but merely to start work now at hand. It is our desire to give the report from Paris fullest consideration and to have same group of mil reps consider Paris report as it affects Ger and give recommendations on a possible conciliation of the two approaches. If Fr and Brit agree this procedure, ground work will at least be laid for a mil consideration of both Bonn and Paris approaches to problem of Ger contribution.

Time element involved between an agreement with Gers on their participation in defense and realization of fully trained Ger troops

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[1] The presumed first draft of this telegram is included in the files under cover of the following memorandum of June 25 from Byroade to Acheson, Webb, Matthews, and Perkins:

"The attached message was drafted subsequent to the meeting on Friday [June 22] with the Secretary on problems raised in connection with the question of German participation in defense. McCloy and I are now in agreement as to its contents, but it has not been cleared elsewhere in Washington. In view of the time urgency, it is hoped the draft will be considered adequate as basis for an early meeting with the Secretary."

The draft telegram, which was largely identical with the text printed here, contained the following initial sentence: "The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered jointly the problem of moving forward on the question of the German contribution to defense." The meetings referred to or implied in Byroade's memorandum and the draft telegram have not been further identified. High Commissioner McCloy was in Washington for consultation.

The telegram printed here was also sent to London for Gifford and Spofford as 6196 and was repeated to Frankfurt as 8914 and to Paris for MacArthur. Substantially the same message was sent by Secretary of Defense Marshall to General Eisenhower as Def 95320, June 29, not printed.

[2] For the High Commissioners' Report of June 8 under reference here, see p. 1044.

[3] See telegram 6988, June 21, to Paris, p. 786.

leads us to conclusion every effort must be made to start this process at earliest possible date. We realize that fulfillment of this objective will mean return of substantial polit equality to Ger nation. This Govt is willing take this step rapidly, not only with a view towards facilitating Ger entry into defense but as a step designed facilitate wholehearted Ger alignment with West, which seems as capable of fulfillment now as in future, and possible more so at present time than if occupation were continued indefinitely. This subj will be considered separately with Fr and Brit. It is not a part of problem presented herein except perhaps on question of Ger membership in NATO. It is our view Three Powers shld, in conjunction with anticipated defense and polit agreements with Gers, support her for full NATO membership.

On mil side we may still have same perplexities that confronted us before and at Brussels. On one hand we had at that time US proposal for integration Ger units into a straight mil org of the Continent under NATO and on the other Fr proposal that Ger contribution shld be through the concept of a strictly Eur army along lines of Pleven Plan. The so-called Spofford compromise gained Fr acceptance that Ger contingents cld be formed and integrated under the US concept as an interim measure while plans for creation Eur Army under NATO were developed at Paris. For reasons well known to you, it was not possible create Ger units on this interim basis and a complete plan for a Eur Army under Fr concept has not been completed. We therefore still seem to face same dilemma as before.

A word may be in order as to our basic policy towards Eur Army concept. We favor this solution as a long term approach to problem of Eur defense as long as it is clearly a part of and under NATO umbrella. We must look forward to a future in which in one manner or another tension between East and West will be at least temporarily ameliorated. From such long term view point it is probably neither practical nor in best interests Eur or US that there shld be a US Commander in Eur or substantial numbers of US forces on Continent. We wld, however, regret to see concept of internatl forces that is now accepted ever disintegrate to point where nothing wld remain on Continent except natl forces solely under natl control. This is particularly important as regards Ger. We hope, therefore, that a complete and workable Eur army concept can be perfected. All practical steps shld be taken in this direction as long as in short run they do not unduly interfere with efficiency of forces for defense of Eur or complicate command structure, especially during present period of initial formation and training of forces. We think it most important any command structure which might evolve from a successful implementation of Eur Army be part of SHAPE command or org so long as that exists, and during its evolution shld not conflict in any way with realization of SHAPE command which is now in process.

In our view Ger counter proposals at Bonn have on whole been reasonable. It wld seem that logic wld be on our side if we firmly pressed the Fr to agree to many of the Ger suggestions as acceptable and desirable modifications of Brussels Agreement, and that Three Powers shld join in recommending such alterations to NATO as a whole. On the mil side this wld presumably remove Ger opposition to proceeding under Brussels Agreement and allow rapid decision on their part join defense effort.

We realize Fr may vigorously oppose this approach with argument that plan for a Eur army, now partially completed, wld be jeopardized by Ger adherence to an interim arrangement under NATO. This wld seem inconsistent with agreements Fr have already made but evidence we have here makes it seem this might be case.

We believe it unwise deviate materially from above approach, as it wld, if accepted, produce Ger units at earliest possible date. We also believe, however, that it is in interests our long range objectives in Eur to find some method of adding greater emphasis to Eur army concept if this is at all practical without undue delay in buildup of an effective defense of Continent. If possible we must find a means of obtaining Fr cooperation instead of reluctant acceptance or worse. Otherwise, we may anticipate being faced, as in past, with no appreciable advance in policy, particularly as regards Ger.

In view above, we have considered approaching Fr at early date with a proposal somewhat as fol: It has seemed to us from observing Paris talks on Eur Army concept that problems presented might be divided into three fields: (1) mil; (2) fin and econ, and (3) over-all polit direction by govts. The first or mil aspect problem seems to us to be quickly capable of solution through combining results of both Bonn and Paris talks in manner to be acceptable among Allies and to Gers themselves. Questions of fin and econ support of Eur army structure and supra-national polit direction of force appear to us to be more difficult, and, particularly as there has been less progress to date in these than in mil fields, to require a considerably longer time for solution. If there cld, however, be a conciliation of Bonn and Paris approaches to mil side of problem at early date, we wld be prepared lend our utmost efforts to Fr in supporting, or even helping devise, if they so desire, methods for completing a workable civilian super structure for Eur Army. In interim, while working out this process, formation of Ger units must proceed without further delay.

As regards point (1) above the important thing to impress upon Fr is that concept of a Eur force can never be realized until there is an organized force in the field and that once this process is in motion it will automatically ease solution of many problems now appearing difficult. This cld be obtained from very beginning on mil side by simple procedure of combining within NATO Army mil units of na-

tions that participated in Paris conference into internatl Corps, Armies, etc. This wld mean in practice that, as far as practicable, Ger, as well as other Eur troop units, wld only be combined with other Eur units. The command structure need not be a problem at present but it is fortunate that a Eur, Gen Juin, is already in command of ground forces of Central Sector. Thus from point of view of forces on ground, heart of Eur Army wld be already in existence. For present phase certain exceptions in Northern and Southern flanks wld probably be necessary as well as regards control of Air Forces on Continent but these wld represent minor elements which cld be easily adjusted as situation so changes to make SHAPE Command no longer necessary in its present concept. At that time Eur Army Command wld be able to fill gap. It shld of course be clearly understood that SACEUR wld have auth to deploy and assign units of Eur Army to achieve greatest mil efficiency.

If this system cld be put into effect, with such conciliation of Bonn and Paris studies to date as is acceptable to our mil reps, it wld seem simple practical and immediate approach to problem. Appropriate instrs cld be given SACEUR that, as far as mil situation permitted, he wld so organize and train forces to further Eur concept. The backbone of Eur Army wld be in existence and nothing more wld be needed initially except agreement of all concerned to further and complete the process.

Inasmuch as it is our desire, along with Fr, to insure that concept of a truly Eur army will be fully realized in future, we wld suggest that a polit protocol or treaty of simple form be concluded, by Eur nations indicating their determination to see concept of their forces in Eur being placed together under Eur supra-national civilian control put into effect at earliest possible date. This shld be in form of a commitment to each other that various natl forces in Eur wld never again return to a system of individual natl control. (In this connection, it seems to us the Eur concept is as acceptable in Ger as it is generally in France and that Fr shld be reassured by now that Ger is as susceptible to this approach as many of the nations on Continent). Treaty shld also provide for perfecting as soon as possible after signing of Treaty the machinery which wld be necessary to operate Eur Army. In interim other methods of furthering Eur concept might prove possible of inauguration at a very early date. For instance, in fin field an interim comite of fin ministers of various Eur nations might be established to coordinate their policies with respect to the support of armed forces and plan for permanent fin machinery of future. There might be pending completion of Paris plans such an *ad hoc* and interim arrangement among Def Mins, etc. These comites shld be able to accomplish a great deal towards effecting a common approach to such matters as length of service, pay standards, mil school system, etc. We

realize that above represents an over-simplification of many problems involved but feel we must proceed along simple lines.

After receiving your comments and obtaining a governmental decision in the matter, it is our plan approach Fr Govt quickly and on highest level in an attempt determine their intentions and sincerity of approach to problems presented by Eur army concept and a Ger contribution to defense. It must be emphasized that our goal wld be to secure an agreement which wld so clarify mil aspects of Ger participation that, when coupled with a broad polit agreement with Ger, wld present a package which we cld conscientiously consider for our own part as being reasonably acceptable to Ger Bundestag. We wld hope clarify both of these fields to that extent during next few weeks or at least by end of Aug.

Request your comments.

Defense is cabling Eisenhower for his views mil aspects above approach.

ACHESON

740.5/7–351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, July 3, 1951—11 a. m.

25. Dept pass urgently to Harriman; To ISA. Re your 7155, June 28.[2] During the past several weeks, I have had number of conversations exploring situation regarding Eur army conference and Ger defense contribution. These conversations induce belief that United States, by wise and decisive leadership, can contribute greatly to further integrating West Eur defense effort and speeding Ger contribution on sound basis. In many respects my views parallel gen line of action proposed in your cable, but with certain important modifications outlined below. Analysis of situation and comments on your cable are as follows:

General Comments:

1. I heartily concur in view your cable that US shld actively support Eur army for reasons of long-range security and other interests. If successful, such integrated army and related financial and econ steps, in conjunction with Schuman Plan, wld certainly further Eur federation. This seems only solution of Ger problem which will tie Ger closely to West and offer hope for constructive and peaceful

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[1] This telegram, which was transmitted in six separate sections, was repeated for information to London as 4 for Spofford, to Frankfurt as 3, to OSR for Katz, and to Paris for MacArthur.

[2] *Supra.*

future for Europe. This goal appears so basic in relation to long-term security of United States that no effort shld be spared to achieve it.

2. Any Ger contribution to defense outside Eur army framework seems certain to be serious blow to our objectives in Europe. US has officially stated its opposition to re-creation of German natl army and Ger gen staff. Many Americans and Europeans other than Fr are profoundly skeptical that Ger national character has so altered since last war that Ger People can be trusted not to succumb once more to that ardent Ger militarism, which has caused so much suffering in the past. Gers themselves have expressed preference to participate in defense through Eur army partly to promote Eur unity and partly from domestic fear of Ger army and gen staff by important Ger demo elements.

3. Yet Petersberg proposals [3] appear to create nucleus for Ger natl force through inspector gen and army corps commanders and their staffs. Step to gen staff wld be very short. After US commander and US troops are withdrawn, natl components in NATO will surely revert to separate natl armies unless there is permanent Eur political structure. Revival of Ger natl force wld make permanent Franco-German *rapprochement* most unlikely because of its effects on both French and Ger attitudes.

4. In addition to long-term aspects, I feel just as strongly that Eur army is best method of achieving our short-range objective of rapidly building Eur defense, including Ger contribution. This involves not only recruiting and training soldiers, but also promptly mobilizing and applying econ resources of continent for defense. Even in short run, efforts to rearm continent by natl action coordinated through committees will be costly and wasteful in time and resources. An integrated Eur defense structure shld produce effective defense more quickly, and strengthen NATO, by reducing number of its major elements to three: United States, Brit, and Europe. If these conclusions are correct, they strongly reinforce long-range reasons for supporting Eur army and emphasize vital importance for US to do all possible to bring it to reality. For this reason, I am stating below in some detail reasons for believing Eur army is also best and quickest way to obtain Ger contribution and effective defense.

German Contribution:

5. Your cable assumes that German contribution will be unduly delayed if it awaits completion and ratification of treaty for European army. You therefore propose interim solution based on Petersberg report and Brussels Decision. I believe, however, European army will

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[3] The reference here is to the meetings at Bonn between representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and Allied Deputy High Commissioners on aspects of a German contribution to Western defense; for the June 8 report on these meetings by the Allied High Commissioners, see p. 1044.

not delay but can speed up German contribution compared to efforts to force interim solution.

6. On this issue it is essential to analyze timing of either course on realistic basis. Petersberg report makes it clear that even if German proposals there were adopted *in toto*, substantial time is bound to elapse before German soldiers will be recruited. That report reiterates fact that the Germans will not move until contractual arrangements and related political issues are settled. Even with full cooperation from French, British and Germans, this seems likely to require at least four to five months, so that German defense action cld hardly begin before December at best. According to Petersberg report, Germans estimated that after such political decision had been taken, another four months would be required for preparation before any Germans cld be recruited, and that in following four months not more than 15 percent of total force would be in training. On this schedule, even if contractual relations were worked out by December 1, first soldiers would be recruited on April 1, 1952 and not more than 35,000 wld be in training until August 1, 1952.

Moreover, any such schedule is likely to be long delayed if US seeks to abandon many military safeguards embodied in Brussels Decision unless done within framework of European army. French and perhaps other countries will strongly oppose such change in NATO decision. Furthermore, if we force French acceptance of method of German rearming which they consider endangers their security, it is clear they will also not cooperate in rapid working out of contractual relations. On other hand, I believe that they will cooperate in dispensing with most of such safeguards and in working out contractual relations in conjunction with adoption of European army plan.

7. Even on above optimistic schedule, it wld seem that German contribution could be obtained on basis European army about as rapidly as under Petersberg proposals if French and Germans cooperate energetically to speed its completion, and US actively supports it. This depends on time required (*a*) to complete treaty, (*b*) to prepare for action under it, and (*c*) to start training.

8. One of main reasons for relative slowness of Paris conference has been uncertainty about real United States' attitude toward European army. Both Germans and French have had doubts whether United States really favored this solution. Even so, conference has succeeded in reaching agreements on many basic issues, although some difficult ones remain. Interim report to be submitted July 10 will show present status. With active help from United States and SHAPE, unsolved problems before conference should be resolved soon enough to permit treaty to be submitted for ratification by member countries by time contractual agreements with Germans are completed.

9. If that proves to be so, main issue is how long will be required to begin operations under such treaty. Conference so far has talked in terms of transitional period of 18 months during which each member country would train its forces with a view to later integration. During this period Defense Commission would (1) harmonize national regulations for training schools, pay standards, promotions, discipline, general organization, etc.; (2) supervise recruitment and training by member states of first units to be placed within European army; (3) make programs for integration of mil production. Various methods cld be found, however, to shorten very materially time required for getting European Army started.

10. With this [in] mind, Fr are already pressing conference to begin work at once with SHAPE in developing organization, regulations and other elements required from European def force. This wld aid accomplishment of SHAPE mission and therefore shld be of direct interest to it. Within European Army framework, Fr will go far in accepting larger units and foregoing other safeguards as proposed by Ger at Petersberg, especially if SHAPE works with comite of conf to agree on proper organization for effective mil force. If this course can be actively pursued, it shld be possible to have much of this preparatory work done in time to enable European Def Commissioner to organize necessary staff and assume his active responsibilities practically as rapidly as Ger agency cld be created under Petersberg proposals.

11. In transitional period, under current proposals, training of units of European Army wld be done by member nations for later integration, but Gers wld operate under allied supervision. Gers are almost sure to consider this discriminatory and not accept. Furthermore, like Petersberg proposals, this plan has serious disadvantage of entailing creation of Ger national staff not only for supply and admin of troops but for training even though under allied supervision.

12. A way out of this difficulty might be to create Eur Army as soon as treaty is effective. All existing troop formations of adhering nations and new recruits, including Ger, wld be assembled as European under Eisenhower's command for training and organization. These European forces composed of solely national formations could be integrated into European Army formations as fast as mil situation and technical conditions permit. Ger forces wld in this way enjoy full equality from start. As quickly as recruited, troop formations, including Ger, wld be immed European as they wld be transferred immed to Eisenhower's or European command. It wld thus not be necessary to create Ger national structure for training. Moreover, as you point out, fact that General Juin wld be logical commander and initial Fr preponderance

in forces shld tend to reassure Fr as contribution from Ger is gradually created. This solution might, therefore, be key to obtaining Fr and Ger cooperation in rapid recruitment of Gers for integrated European force, under conditions of equality demanded by Gers.

13. If these several courses followed, Ger contribution cld be obtained and training started at least as quickly under European Army as any other means.

European Army shld not complicate SHAPE command structure but somewhat simplify its problems. Paris conference wholly agreed that European Army wld operate within NATO structure and its forces be assigned to SHAPE command exactly as other national forces forming part of NATO integrated defense production.

14. I agree with you that financial and econ aspects of integrated continental defense grouping are probably more difficult problems. These problems will have to be solved, however, either with or without creation of European defense community (European Army).

Main problem of integration in North Atlantic grouping is basically continental. Defense production in US and in UK provides very high proportion all needs of their forces and can, therefore, be coordinated on national basis. On continent, however, much more than coordination is required if it is ever to achieve comparable level of self-sufficiency in production of expensive modern weapons. There shld be central authority to standardize weapons and equipment and to specialize production in order to avoid waste and duplication of facilities.

Moreover, size of defense forces we will wish European countries to maintain in active status after 1954 build-up can be permanent only through really integrated continental defense, less-expensive through better utilization of resources and supported by all who benefit from the defense.

15. We have been attempting to solve these financial and econ problems of integration thru NATO. So far they have proved insurmountable in this forum. Reason is that NATO organizations DPB and FEB cannot achieve satisfactory "burden-sharing" and integration of mil production without receiving some real centralized powers. Stated above, major need for such powers is with regard to continental efforts.

Present draft treaty of conf er visages common budget and del of authority to commissioner to establish common requirements and carry out procurement, thereby enabling effective mobilization of production for defense. This willingness of continental countries to give these necessary powers to what is in essence a common Eur Min of Defense cld also be utilized to give substance to NATO efforts in DPB and

FEB. Therefore, it is encouraging that you are prepared to use utmost efforts in supporting and helping to devise necessary civilian framework for an integrated continental defense under supra-national authority.

16. We also must soon face related problems of participation of Western Ger in NATO and of adequate contribution from Ger industry for Western def. A self-supporting continental defense effort is not feasible unless it is based on adequate contribution in defense production from French and Ger. However, Ger defense production as well as men under new Ger state must not be used again to threaten peace of European partners. One way to try to prevent this wld be through special controls on Ger, but Ger will not be willing to make defense contribution under such an approach. Adequate controls wld in themselves probably prevent Ger from making needed and desired level of contribution. Only alternative policy yet devised is to try to prevent rebirth of aggressive national aspirations by placing Ger resources and men in the service of all European countries by full integration on equal basis. The Schuman Plan gives promise of solving the problem of coal and steel in Ruhr in this matter. A similar policy for placing Ger manpower and munitions industry within framework of European Army has been endorsed by reps of Fed Govt. This policy shld facilitate acceptance by other countries of equal Ger status and contribution by reassuring them that added strength will be used by and with them and not against them.

17. Building strong, integrated, permanent force, depending upon same sources of supply, using same weapons, and trained and equipped according to same standards must, of course, be progressive, and urging adoption of interim methods to begin progress even now is appropriate. Your suggestion of interim comites of Fin Mins and Defense Ministers should be explored. Perhaps appropriate committees of European army conference could also work with SHAPE and NATO on other transitional and planning problems. Transitional duties of Defense Commissioner will include drawing up a list of requirements and programming European production. Staff-work now could probably shorten length time to perform this aspect of duties in transitional period.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

18. Conclusions from this analysis are as follows:

(*a*) Creation of effective European defense community, including European army and defense authority, is essential to achieve objectives of United States for European defense as well as for long-term security and other interests of United States.

(*b*) German contribution can be obtained at least as rapidly through the European army as by any other means.

(*c*) In interest of speed, economy and level of out-put, even for short-range, military production on continent will have to be integrated far more closely by delegation to strong central agency with power to decide and act. This is most vital during heavy buildup in next few years, moreover, if not done promptly, later integration will be prejudiced seriously.

(*d*) United States should, therefore, actively support speedy creation of the European army and shld make that its primary objective.

19. In light of these conclusions, I agree in large part with your views as to policy and action US should follow. I believe, however, that greater emphasis on prompt creation of European army will best promote short-term objective of rapidly organizing, training, and equipping effective defense forces. Further, I think that if your proposed approach to French were adopted by US, it might jeopardize prompt creation of European army by leading French to fear and Germans to think we view it as something to be worked for in future and not closely related to immediate problems. United States must make both realize that it views quick creation of army as of pressing and critical priority. That is only way to attain promptly our objectives of effective European defense with German contribution.

20. I agree that Petersberg and Paris reports should be considered together. But since estimates about timing and political feasibility are at heart of their evaluation, I doubt whether NATO should assign them first to military group to consider. French are likely to suggest their consideration in some other forum than Standing Group for this reason.

On military aspects, it might be wise to submit them to SHAPE for analysis and recommendations, as NATO agency responsible for organizing European defense. Also, SHAPE is best fitted to reach decisions promptly, especially since prestige of Eisenhower will make it easier for French and others to accept decisions and to work out compromises. Moreover, SHAPE will have to carry out whatever solutions are adopted and should therefore have part in working them out. Fact that conference is likely to propose starting work with SHAPE on certain of problems also underlines the value of SHAPE participation.

21. Accordingly, I recommend that:

(*a*) US should make explicit its strong support for setting up European army and its political framework promptly as most effective means for European defense and security now and in future.

(*b*) US should make clear to French that army must be effective as military force, and must provide basis for German contribution on real footing of equality from beginning. Thus, size of units, author-

ity of commissioner and transitional provisions must meet these criteria. Support of US depends on acceptance of this approach and genuine effort as speedy solutions.

(*c*) US should press conference to work out with SHAPE method of training troops in initial period such as to assure speed without risk of creating German military agencies. European force should be created from existing forces of member states as quickly as military and technical conditions permit.

(*d*) US should press conference to begin work promptly with SHAPE on plans for organizing army, and for other military aspects, with view to having these preparatory steps completed by time commissioner appointed. This will ensure closest coordination between SHAPE and European army.

(*e*) US must insist that French recognize that German contribution depends on return to Germany of substantial political equality and French must therefore cooperate actively in bringing about contractual arrangements with minimum essential restrictions. If this course not sincerely adopted, proposal for European army is clearly not serious. In other words, French must recognize that German integration with European community through Schuman Plan and European army must be their main safeguards and are not consistent with restrictive occupation policies.

22. This approach seems to flow logically from French proposal for European army. By taking this line, we are in best position to insist that French carry it through with its full implications, and modify certain of their present positions. If it then should become clear that new French Govt lacks sufficient authority and purpose to carry their proposal to early completion, we must face unhappy risks involved in pressing for creation of German forces on Petersberg basis for contribution to SHAPE, doing whatever we can to minimize prejudice to later absorption of these and other national units into a future European defense organization. French will certainly accept latter course, if at all, with bitterness and after long delays. Such rift in Atlantic community would be most damaging and great opportunity would have been missed to create real situation of strength in Europe, perhaps for period far into future.[4]

BRUCE

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[4] Telegram 132, July 7, from Paris, not printed, transmitted the text of a telegram from General Gruenther to Secretary of Defense Marshall, the substance of which was as follows:

". . . we have seen copy of US Emb cable Paris Nr. 25 dated 3 July and feel that the degree of SHAPE involvement in European Army question envisaged therein may be open to some misinterpretation. We have now held staff discussions with US Emb on problem and feel it is the intent of the Emb cable as well as that SHAPE cable reference as above [see telegram 131, July 7, from Paris, p. 820] that SHAPE's role shld be primarily one of advising and assisting European Army agencies during their formative stages. We are inclined to feel that assumption by SHAPE, even on an interim basis, of any of the functions actually envisaged for the European army organization wld, in fact, tend to delay rather that to expedite establishment of that organization as a going concern." (740.5/7–751)

740.5/7-651

Memorandum by the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, July 6, 1951.]

GERMAN REARMAMENT AND PROBLEMS OF THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

There are several groups of problems which present obstacles—and indeed serious threats—to the creation of an adequate defense for Europe. This memorandum deals with two or three of these groups of problems.

I

The first group of problems relates to the question of German participation. These may be stated in several ways. One way is to separate them, for purposes of identification, into the problems of the United States, the French (and to some extent the European), and the German points of view.

A. *The United States Point of View.*

I doubt whether it will be possible to provide the steady and sustained United States effort which is necessary to solve the European defense problem unless the question of German participation is settled in the not too distant future. This flows from the strong American characteristic of wanting to see a practicable program for the solution of a problem before whole-hearted and sustained American effort can be evoked.

To us it seems that, without enthusiastic German participation, the problem is pretty hopeless. In the first place, when we look at the map of Europe, it seems clear that the area to be defended must include Germany in order that there can be a practicable military operation. In the second place, it seems to us that, if the decision is made to abandon Germany, that country and its people will fall to the other side and that will make the whole problem unmanageable. In the third place, Americans are not going to work wholeheartedly for the defense of a country, the people of which are not sharing in the burden of their own defense.

For all of these reasons, from the American point of view, the solution of the question of German participation cannot be long delayed.

B. *The French Point of View.*

To the French the creation of the German army presents the gravest fears and dangers. They believe that this would raise the historical

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[1] The source text, which is unsigned, bears a marginal notation stating that this was a copy of the Secretary of State's original draft paper. Copies of this memorandum were sent to Matthews, Perkins, Nitze, Byroade, and Cabot. For the revision of this memorandum prepared by Jessup on July 12, see p. 827.

dangers of German military aggression; that it might lead to the involvement of Western Europe in a German crusade to recover Eastern Germany and the lost provinces; and that it would certainly involve putting Germany in the position of holding the balance of power and asking for bids from East and West for German favor. The French, I believe, will not cooperate in a program of German rearmament which does not give what they regard as adequate safeguards.

Furthermore, France will not cooperate in the essential program of progressive restoration of sovereignty to Germany until the military question is settled. Failure to get on with this program will raise the gravest questions of German adherence to the West.

It is for these reasons that the French have put forward the idea of a European Army which would include German units in such form and under such controls that, should British and American troops be withdrawn from Europe, the German contingents could not become disentangled from an abiding European defense structure.

We find many of the French proposals are impracticable from a military point of view. Furthermore the desire to establish economic and political institutions, which would support and control the Army, in complete and final form, raises such difficult problems as to promise a very long delay.

C. *The German Point of View.*

While it is hard to state this accurately, it seems true that the Germans would accept rearmament in a European setting in which they had a position of equality. They fear, as do the French, the re-establishment of the old military organizations, because they would carry the serious risk of increasing political control in Germany by the General Staff and the Officer Corps.

To them, the heart of the matter is the restoration of a large degree of sovereignty and a position of equality or lack of discrimination. This is just what the French will not accord until the military question is settled.

These three attitudes are producing stalemate. We Americans are impatient and wish to get on with German participation. The Germans and the French will not move—the French, because the military question must be settled before the question of German sovereignty can be attacked; the Germans, because the question of sovereignty and equality must be settled before they will move on the military matter.

It seems to me that two conclusions emerge from this analysis.

The first is that progress requires meeting all these points of view simultaneously and not picking one out for priority of treatment.

The second is that all the questions involved in meeting these points of view cannot be settled finally and completely before any practical, forward steps are taken—if these steps are to be taken in time.

Therefore, not only does progress have to be made in satisfying all points of view simultaneously, but it must be made by stages. And there must be sufficient guarantees to inspire faith that, while ultimate goals on every question cannot be reached at once, the ultimate goals are accepted by binding promises. I shall return to this matter after setting forth two other sets of problems.

II

The second group of problems arises from the fact which I have been told, and believe, that there is a great difference in continental acceptance between the economic program embodied in the Marshall Plan and the military rearmament program embodied in the Military Defense Assistance Plan.

This difference, I believe, comes from the fact that the economic program was and is accepted as a European program formulated by Europeans for Europeans. True the United States inspired, stimulated, and underwrote the effort. But there was a great sense of participation among Europeans—both participation in the formulation of the program and in its execution. There was also a deep conviction that it was a program for the benefit of Europeans.

With the military rearmament program I do not believe that this is the case. While there has been European participation, as in the working out of the Medium Term Defense Plan, it has come to be regarded by Europeans as an American plan imposed upon them by the United States, and imposed sometimes without full understanding of the limits of their capacities, the nature of their problems, and the effect which excessive burdens might have upon undermining the whole objective.

To some extent this comes from the fact that there is no central European planning and directing organization comparable to OEEC in the economic field. We have dealt bi-laterally with each nation. They believe that often we have not kept the whole picture in mind and that the guiding and driving hand is that of the United States.

I believe that this situation can be remedied and that it can be remedied in connection with the solution of the problems mentioned under I above.

III

The third group of problems is related to the financial, economic, and production operations under NATO.

The least satisfactory operations of NATO are those connected with the FEB (Financial and Economic Board) and the DPB (Defense Production Board). The reason for this is, in part, connected with the discussion under II above and, in part, comes from the fact that NATO is too large and too disparate an organization to deal with financial, economic, and production problems as a whole. Nobody really

expects that NATO is going to make decisions in these fields which will control action in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. These countries are able to work out programs for themselves and coordinate the programs.

The situation is different with the continental countries. There problems are much more similar to one another than they are to those of the partners over water. These are problems which have to be worked out by Europeans in the framework of continental Europe and then be assisted by the other partners.

There is need within NATO for pulling together the financial, economic, and production problems of the continental partners by those partners and for dealing with them together as a unit, rather than leaving them to generalized treatment which is equally acceptable to the United States, Great Britain and Canada.

These difficulties can, I think, be dealt with also in connection with those stated under I and II above.

A POSSIBLE METHOD OF APPROACH

The approach suggested is to take the idea of the European Army and see how it can be used to aid in the solution of the problems mentioned above.

The object should be, in the military field, to build on what we have under General Eisenhower—doing nothing which would confuse that military organization, but using it and stressing it for the purpose of creating what is in reality a European force in the field. It would be true that at present and for some time to come—perhaps for a long time—that force would be strengthened and stiffened by British and American contingents. But it would be a force which, as a military force, would not have to be changed in any fundamental way whenever the time came that the overseas contingents might be withdrawn.

Its continuance as a European force could be guaranteed by the most binding treaty obligations and by the creation over a period of time of supporting political institutions, dealing with financial support, economic support, production support, and the ultimate political bodies which would control the action and use of the army. Certain steps could be taken in all of these fields at once, but I doubt whether they could be final and perfect steps. Advantage should be taken of the fact that, due to the commitments of the United States and Great Britain in Europe and the presence of their troops there, factors of guarantee and safety are provided while these institutions are being subjected to actual experience and improvement.

Factors Relating to the Military Force in the Field. At the present time it can be stated that there is a European Army—not complete in all respects, but not very far from complete. At any rate, it is complete enough to take as a working basis.

It might be stretching things a bit to say that this European Army is the army commanded by General Eisenhower. Perhaps from the French point of view it might be a sounder approach to concentrate on the central ground force, commanded by General Juin. Here, one can say, is an army which will be fully organized and integrated in a command structure, at the head of which is a French General. It would have in it the bulk of the continental forces, and could have all of them if there were a simple treaty provision that, upon any dissolution of the NATO Supreme Command, the Northern and Southern Commands and the Air Force would be added to it.

It would be into this Army that German contingents would be integrated. I do not know whether it would raise any military problems to accept the idea that German divisions on the Petersberg model should be incorporated in army corps with continentals rather than with Americans and British. If this could be done, then it could be said that the possible withdrawal of British and American troops would not affect in any way the military integration of the German contingents.

This, of course, is probably over-simplified and undoubtedly deals with only a small part of the problem. But it might furnish the beginning of a pattern and enable the French to accept some of the Petersberg ideas of the size and structure of military formations of Germans for incorporation into this European Army.

Training. Mr. Bruce has suggested that, if the training of the European contingents destined for the defense of Europe were turned over at the moment the troops were raised to General Eisenhower's command (and in the case of the central ground forces, this would mean to General Juin's command), the need for a purely German military training organization would be removed and Germany would be on an equality with the other continental partners.

I do not know whether this is practicable, but the idea seems worth exploration.

There would still be need in Germany for an organization to perform many functions connected with the raising of troops, but I think that the French would have to give way on their demand that all of this should be under a European commander, with no German institutions supporting him.

The European Defense Commissioner. It would seem to me that, outside of the weapons field, there would be great need for standardization among the European partners of many things, such as, the length of service, exemptions from service, pay and allowances, training schools, promotions, etc.

Here is a field in which the functions of a European Defense Commissioner might begin as the Chairman of a Committee of Defense Ministers, including a German official, and possibly end by having for all the continental partners such authority as any executive official

would have over such matters in any of the countries. Perhaps the treaty might establish him with certain beginning functions, set out certain goals to be achieved, and provide for their achievement over a period of time in the light of experience.

A European Finance Minister for Defense. It might be possible for the treaty to provide for such a minister to begin as the Chairman of the Financial Ministers of the European partners, take over executive functions of the FEB for the continental partners, and provide the central point for discussion of American, Canadian, and possibly British assistance.

Goals might be set for the development of his office, possibly involving a requirement that his budget estimates for each of the countries would have to be incorporated without change in the various national budgets presented to their legislatures.

A European and Production Supply Minister for Defense. The treaty might set up such an office, the occupant of which might deal with the national ministers in the same way that the Finanical Minister would deal with his counterparts, and who would also take over for the European partners executive functions under the DPB, and should be the point of contact on production matters with the United States and others.

Provision might also be made for these three officers to form a Cabinet under one of them. They might start with the right to appear before the legislative bodies of the Cabinets of the continental partners.

Study might be given to some method of creating a supra-legislature made up of the various members of the different parliamentary bodies to pass authoritatively upon problems within this field.

The purpose of this speculative memorandum is to see whether there are not certain broad concepts which can be adopted without too much delay and which would permit, if adopted, a beginning both of establishing Germany in a position of equality with a progressive restoration of sovereignty and the beginning of the German contribution.

It seems plain to me that the question involving finance, production, and the ultimate control of the European Army go so deeply into the foundations of sovereignty that, if we attempt to solve all of these matters finally before any step is taken, it is likely that no step will be taken. But I think that a plan can be devised, which would be both inspiring and sensible, which would permit immediate steps to be taken to meet the problems which I outlined in I, II, and III above, and which would be capable of development under the blanket and protection of the NATO force and the political institutions, which might have the most far-reaching effect upon European political developments.

If a start could be made along these lines, it would also be helpful both in removing the idea that the whole defense program is an American program and that this country is pushing the continentals on for the purposes of American policy and also of removing the dragging and deadening effect of British skepticism regarding European unification.

The British and ourselves would both be outside the organization and yet deeply involved with it through NATO.

It also might avoid two very grave difficulties.

One is the difficulty involved in spelling every step out in minute detail. This raises all sorts of problems, many of which never eventuate. The development of our own Constitution shows that many of the problems foreseen did not occur and most of the really important problems were not foreseen.

It also avoids the difficulty of trying to evolve a scheme upon which the last and final word is said.

It tries to accomplish two things: Commitment to a goal, but not attempting the final formulation of the goal. This has dangers, but it also has possibilities.

I put these suggestions forward for criticism, and there is no requirement that this criticism must be constructive.

740.5/7–751 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in France (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, July 7, 1951—4 p. m.

130. Eyes only Perkins and Byroade from MacArthur (distribution at Perkins' discretion). Am repeating in immediately following telegrams (*a*) Gen Eisenhower's reply to Secretary of Defense re substance of Deptel 7155 June 28 Paris on which Gen Eisenhower received separate message from Secretary of Defense; (*b*) views (in message to Secretary of Defense) on Paris 25 July 3 to Dept. These messages will give clear indication his thinking.

For your background am adding following comments my own which I believe may amplify views:

1. European Army Organization must not be rigid in sense it would prevent Gen Eisenhower from deploying individual European units (i.e., German units) with British and American units if such is essential to achieve maximum military effectiveness.

2. View here is Gen Eisenhower must not become involved in ministerial functions or responsibilities which more properly should pass from National Ministers to new European Defense Organization.

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London as 24 eyes only for Spofford and to Frankfurt as 13 eyes only for McCloy.

3. If conference is held Paris to bring agreement between Petersberg and European Army reports, SHAPE could lend invaluable assistance by giving advisory guidance on those features which are directly related to relationship between European Army and SHAPE. However, responsibility for creation of European Army Organization and its direction must rest the responsibilities of the individual participating nations.

4. Our concept is that proposed European Army Organization would at appropriate time take over from existing National Defense Ministers the responsibilities for organizing, training, equipping, and administering all European army military units, such units when adequately trained to be made available to SACEUR as additional elements of his NATO defense forces. Thus SACEUR's relationship to new European army organization would be essentially same as his present relationship to National Defense Ministries.

[MacArthur]

740.5/7–751 : Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in France (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, July 7, 1951—4 p. m.

131. Eyes only Perkins and Byroade from MacArthur (distribution at Perkins' discretion). See immediately preceding message. Following from Gen. Eisenhower to Secretary of Defense for your information only.

Begin verbatim text: 1. Re Def 95320 June 29.[2] On basis that differences can be resolved which will make the army units combat effective, I concur with your views. I should like to emphasize the importance of two principles apparently already accepted in the statement of JCS views. These are, first, that the time-phasing of the build-up of forces now in progress for the effective defense of Western Europe must not be impaired or hampered by the manner in which the European Army concept comes into being; and second, that SACEUR's authority to deploy German units to augment Allied Army forces as he may deem necessary is clearly recognized.

2. It should be clearly understood also that the title "European Army" should not be interpreted as referred to a military field organization only; rather, we are referring to an agency which includes primarily a directing organization concerning itself initially with the problems of training, equipping, and administering forces later to be assigned to a NATO command. With this thought in mind, I believe that the title "European Defense Forces" might be a more appropriate one.

3. It is obvious that the success of such a concept depends upon the good will, sincerity, and energetic efforts of the European nations

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London as 25 for the eyes only of Spofford and to Frankfurt as 14 for the eyes only of McCloy.

[2] Substantially the same as telegram 7155, June 28, to Paris, p. 801; see footnote 1, thereto.

themselves, and that therefore the creation of the organization and its direction must be entirely the responsibilities of those nations. I am, of course, prepared to cooperate and assist in every possible way consistent with my mission in the furtherance of this concept. In rendering such assistance, however, I must avoid becoming involved in ministerial functions which more properly should be passed from national ministers direct to the new European Defense Organization at such time as that agency is prepared to receive and exercise them.

4. Subject to the above safeguards, I consider the approach outlined in your Def 95320 June 29 to be thoroughly sound. *End verbatim text.*

[MacArthur]

740.5/7–851 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, July 8, 1951—10 a. m.

Depto 35. Following are my comments on Deptel 6196.[2] In formulating them I have had benefit of consultation with US element of SHAPE.

1. Fully concur time has come to reassert vigorous US leadership toward breaking log-jam and realizing an early German contribution. Various time factors, not merely French elections and progress toward contractual relationship with Germans but also more basic one such as progress of West rearmament in relation to USSR and French rearmament in comparison to German, are now more favorable. On other hand, unless some definitive agreement is reached shortly other factors such as solution of Korea and Soviet efforts to weaken determination of West to build adequate security may tend before long to make agreement more difficult.

2. We have all along favored German membership in NATO as soon as practicable and believed that any European army must be integral part of NATO force and so organized as to facilitate rather than complicate Gen Eisenhower's task and strengthen his hand in developing effective integrated force. Present problem as we see it is to "marry" Bonn and Paris proposals in such form as to secure whole-hearted cooperation from both Germans and French in developing a sound practical program which will facilitate Eisenhower's task and contribute toward our basic objectives.

3. We recognize that astute Soviet moves toward relaxation of East-West tension might at some time create very strong pressures at

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris as 49 for MacArthur and to Frankfurt as 21.

[2] Same as telegram 7155, June 28, to Paris, p. 801.

home for withdrawal of US participation in collective defense effort. It was against this danger which Vandenberg repeatedly warned and which led to inclusion in Senate Foreign Relations Committee's report of statement, "treaty is in accordance with basic interests of US, which shld be steadfastly served regardless of fluctuations in international situation or our relations with any country." In view of physical power relationships it is difficult to conceive of the development at any time in foreseeable future of individual or collective strength of European members sufficient to stand up diplomatically or militarily to USSR except as part of larger effort in which US is full partner. Accordingly, while conditions may well develop so that US Supreme Commander or physical presence of substantial forces in Europe may be unnecessary it would seem dangerous to permit development of any thought of NATO defense framework as being temporary in comparison with European framework. Believe it important, therefore, that European army developments be considered as permanently rather than temporarily within NATO framework.

4. Concur that modification of Brussels agreement in direction of German Bonn proposals offers most practical basis for early development of specific German contribution. Likewise agree on importance of seeking sincere French cooperation rather than reluctant and obstructive acquiescence and that utilization of European army concept to such extent as US military and Eisenhower may consider practical is probably best method of obtaining it.

5. Look forward to learning latter's views on military aspects of US proposals but to me course indicated in paragraph 9 of reference telegram, particularly concept of combining military units of continental countries International Corps, armies, etc., within NATO force, seems practical approach. To extent that existing units under Eisenhower's command, and new Germany and other units as they are activated for it, are called "European" rather than national units this process should be greatly facilitated, it is assumed that any units, European or other, under his command could be combined or utilized in any manner he might direct.

6. With regard to economic financial and political fields, while French would certainly welcome maximum US support, believe that they and other Europeans would prefer to work out problems of civilian superstructure themselves, that they are in better position than we to do so from points of view of knowledge of their own problems and responsibility for coping with them and that they might consider US suggestions in this field inappropriate. However, Eisenhower may consider certain measures necessary or more desirable than others for best development of his integrated force and such suggestions from him could hardly be resented.

7. Success of Eisenhower's task in organizing effective integrated force for defense of West Europe is primary consideration to which development of both Bonn and Paris proposals must be directed. His position, therefore, seems focal point for amalgamating them and developing realistic future course. His responsibilities and function (as spelled out in D–C, 24/3 (final)[3] paragraphs 40(*d*), 43(*c*), and 44(*a*), (*b*), (*c*) and (*d*)) appear to involve in addition to strictly command function a number of peacetime responsibilities of a nature similar to, although more modest in extent than, those contemplated for European Defense Commissioner (Paris despatch 3636, June 19). Similarly, Brussels agreement (C 6–D/I)[4] provides for progressive putting into effect of such arrangements as might emerge from Paris conference provided they were practical and suitable for integration into NATO. Believe Eisenhower already has all authority necessary to do this.

8. As to procedure, believe that Bonn and Paris reports can be "married" only by those who can effectively agree to changes in them and that end product satisfactory to Eisenhower can best be achieved if SHAPE participates in process. Suggest this can best be done initially by informal working group in Paris in which US, UK, France and Germany participate with SHAPE furnishing such assistance and guidance as it considers necessary or desirable. Am advised French expect to request SHAPE views on Paris report at least informally. Suggest SHAPE be officially seized of both reports by governments concerned and requested to comment and that we seek UK and French agreement to establish such working group. Believe good approach for working group would be that suggested in paragraph 9 of reference telegram and that it could be amplified and developed into concrete plan along such lines as SHAPE considers most effective and desirable. While Bonn report apparently represents considerably greater degree of governmental commitment than Paris report, fact that both are presently being submitted to governments for their consideration provides desirable latitude and flexibility.

9. End product might be NATO directive to SACEUR to integrate combat forces of those nations who so desire into European army formations as part of his integrated force in accordance with plans developed by working group, assuming of course that those plans when completed are satisfactory to SACEUR.

SPOFFORD

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[3] This NATO Defense Committee document was the same as document C6–D/2, the report of the NATO Military Committee on the creation of an integrated force for the defense of Western Europe which was discussed and approved at the first meeting of the Sixth Session of the North Atlantic Treaty Council in Brussels on December 18, 1950. For the minutes of that meeting, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 585–595.

[4] For a summary of the documents under reference here, see the briefing paper prepared in the Department of State, January 26, p. 755.

740.5/7–1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, July 11, 1951—4 p. m.

212. In plenary European Army Conf July 10, Theodore Blank, new head of Ger Del explained Ger views on conf's interim report and Chairman Alphand offered preliminary Fr comments on Blank's statement. At this mtg there were officially transmitted to dels of observing states Fr draft of interim report and Ger substitute draft.[2] Former had been in hands participating states since June 29 but latter distributed to participants in Steering Comite mtg July 9. At that mtg Itals presented in writing some observations on Fr draft not yet available to Emb.

Steering Comite which includes only participating countries, began close examination two drafts of the report afternoon July 10. Press communiqué on plenary held to absolute minimum.

Fr and Ger reps at July 10 plenary tended emphasize differences in approach two dels but these differences appear by no means insurmountable. US observer expressed his personal opinion to effect that area of agreement appeared outweigh area of disagreement in course of urging, toward close of mtg, utility of agreeing as quickly as possible on conference's interim report and of exploring means whereby a contribution from Ger to western defense can begin quickly.

While repeating usual Ger emphasis on priority for military efficiency and Ger equality in creation of European Army, Blank went beyond mere question of drafting report to propose—as Ger del had not previously done in Paris Conference—that Petersberg report be basis for action for a Ger contribution while conf pursues its "long and arduous" work of estab supra-national army.

Alphand declared it was impossible for Petersberg report to be a basis for action because it had not been agreed to by Ger and the occupation powers and because Ger proposals at Petersberg went beyond safeguards laid down at Brussels. He stressed that Fr wished a contribution to defense from Ger but could only agree to this contribution in the framework of a European defense community thereby avoiding the creation of a Ger national army and general staff.

Blank very emphatic in repeated statements that Ger did not want a national army or a national general staff. He recalled his own origins

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[1] This telegram was repeated to London as 54 and to Frankfurt as 20; was sent by air to Copenhagen, Brussels, Rome, Oslo, The Hague, Lisbon, Ottawa, and Luxembourg; and was made available to the Department of Defense.

A copy of the official French-language minutes of this conference plenary meeting was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 133, July 17, from Paris, neither printed. (740.5/7–1751)

[2] The drafts under reference here have not been further identified. For the approved version of the Interim Report of July 24, see p. 843.

in Ger labor unions and stated necessary support from Ger people, a Bundestag and present Ger Govt for Ger defense contribution could only be obtained if it were clearly an integral part of western European forces. In arguing for starting raising Ger troops under Petersberg proposals Blank emphasized that Ger units wld be under SHAPE command as soon as formed. He considered that SHAPE command and prohibition of Ger arms production shld be sufficient safeguard against Ger militarism pending constitution of European Army. Blank stated no national staff was desired by Gers but Ger wanted participation in all international staffs including Atlantic Command proportionate to contribution in Ger forces.

Alphand expressed conviction that practical steps could be taken in military, finance, and production fields before ratification of European Army treaty in order to show determination to create integrated European defense force. He also declared Fr readiness have certain Ger preparations for defense contribution, specifically in parliamentary and admin fields, go ahead while conf still elaborating treaty. Although he did not think it wld be possible to have Ger units created as such under SHAPE command he declared his personal belief that it wld be possible to start them early by creating European contingents. Alphand asserted non-discrimination principle wld apply to transitional as well as final period under European Army treaty.

Blank explained that Ger substitute draft of interim report was designed give accurate picture of conf, be realistic not pessimistic. It was for this reason, Blank continued, that Gers had thought it necessary to underline disagreement on certain important points:

(1) Size of national units and level of integration;
(2) Tasks and composition of supra-national bodies, especially defense commissioner;
(3) Transitional arrangements.

On third of these points Blank pointed out that control to be exercised by Ger Parliament over Ger formations not elaborated. Bundestag, of which he was member, would insist on same degree of control over new Ger formations as was exercised by parliaments of other countries over their national contingents. Blank also emphasized basic principle for Gers that all proposals for agreements on Ger contribution, including proposals under Petersberg report were subject to revision of Ger's present international status. Unless Ger had equality outside as well as inside Eur Army, psychological conditions wld not have been created that wld permit majority of Ger people and parliament to support Ger defense contribution.

In reply to Blank's point on Ger parliamentary control over Ger formations, Alphand replied that this must be studied in light of principle of no discrimination inside Eur Army but also in light of situation

of fact and law outside Eur Army that put Ger in a special position. He repeatedly stressed that Ger's external obligations were beyond competence of European defense community conf. As to size of units and level of integration, Alphand declared that he had no instructions from his govt authorizing him to alter previous Fr position. By adding that this question shld be referred to govts, Alphand was clearly leaving way open for later Fr concession.[3]

BRUCE

[3] Telegram 228, July 11, from Paris, not printed, reported that Sauvagnargues, who was not a member of the French Delegation to the European Army Conference but attended the plenary meeting of July 10, referred to Blank's proposals as "La Bombe Blank" and offered the interpretation that the German Federal Republic was extremely disturbed by the current slight relaxation of East-West tension and was fearful that the quadripartite discussion of Germany might be raised before the European Army was firmly underway. Sauvagnargues speculated that the Germans greatly feared an East-West agreement on Germany at West Germany's expense and hoped that such an agreement would be rendered less likely by the *de facto* integration of West German troops into Western defense. (740.5/7–1151)

740.5/7–1251 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 12, 1951—8 p. m.

282. We cannot agree that Bonn report shld be supplied to Eur Army conference as "a basis for discussion". Our reasons for this view are: (*a*) Fr or Gers cannot prejudge forthcoming tripartite consideration of Bonn report. (*b*) Since US and UK not fully represented at Paris, we desire discuss relationship of two reports in this forum as in Deptel 6988 to Paris (Todep 538 to London) of Jun 21. Assume Ger Reps are completely free to take same position at Paris as they did at Bonn on the whole of their mil points as they have already done. Obviously Paris conference cannot discuss correctness of HICOM judgment in isolating points of disagreement contained in HICOM portions of Bonn report.

However, have no objection that Bonn report be supplied for info to individual countries participating Paris conference but shld be made clear to Fr that this to be done only on condition will not interfere with acceptance by Fr of some procedure along lines of reftel according to which the two reports shld be considered by three occ powers with view to making suitable recommendations to Council under Brussels decisions and directives.

FYI only, while we desire successful outcome Paris conference, we are concerned by apparent Fr tactics which seem to have for their goal

[1] This telegram, which was repeated to London as 265, was drafted by Martin and Knight of EUR/RA and was cleared in substance by Perkins of EUR, Laukhuff of GPA, Godley of WE, Satterthwaite of BNA, and Colonel Beebe of Defense.

the primacy of Paris conference proceedings at expense of delay in occ powers and NATO action on Ger rearmament problem as whole.

Time has not permitted concerting of position with UK here. You shld not transmit this msg to Fr without previous agreement with your UK colleague on course of action to be followed.

ACHESON

740.5/7–2351

Memorandum by the Secretary of State, As Revised by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, July 12, 1951.]

GERMAN REARMAMENT AND PROBLEMS OF THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

1. There are several groups of problems which present obstacles—and indeed serious threats—to the creation of an adequate defense for Europe. As a long-range policy we are interested in approval of progression toward closer European integration. Such a goal can be accepted in general terms without the necessity for delaying the immediate defense effort until solutions are found for the highly complex constitutional, political, economic and financial problems which would

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[1] This memorandum was transmitted by Jessup to the Secretary of State on July 12 under cover of a brief memorandum which explained that this revision had been prepared, in consultation with Perkins and Knight, in accordance with the Secretary's request of the previous afternoon. The memorandum printed here is a revision of Acheson's memorandum of the same title of July 6, p. 813. Substantial portions of the Secretary's original draft of July 6 remained unchanged in this Jessup revision and are not reprinted here. Editorial interpolations in the appropriate places indicate those major portions of the Secretary's draft which remained unchanged. Other briefer sections (numbered paragraphs 22–23, 26–27, 30, 33, 36, and 40) have been repeated here even though they were unchanged from the Secretary's original draft.

The memorandum printed here appears to be the text considered by Secretary of State Acheson and Secretary of Defense Marshall and their advisers at their meeting at the Pentagon on July 13; see Acheson's memorandum, July 16, p. 836.

A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to Ambassador Bruce in France under cover of a brief personal letter from Acheson which began as follows:

"We in the Department have been giving very careful thought to the problems of German rearmament and the defense of Europe. In order to clarify our own thoughts on these matters and isolate the various issues involved, I have prepared the attached paper, which is something of a 'think piece'. We have discussed it a bit here and Ambassador Jessup has gone over my draft and made some changes in it."

Secretary Acheson acknowledged that the memorandum covered matters already raised in telegram 7155, June 28, to Paris (p. 801) on which Bruce had already fully commented but urgently asked for his comments in the light of any additional thoughts that were developed in the memorandum. The Secretary further noted that the suggestions in the memorandum were put forward for criticism and ". . . there is no requirement that this criticism be constructive." In a handwritten postscript to the letter, the Secretary observed:

"This is a purely personal effort on my part greatly helped by your excellent cable. If you would get any ideas that Doug MacArthur and Gen. Eisenhower would have—again for my enlightenment and not as a governmental project—it would help. DA"

be involved in the eventual stages of integration. This memorandum deals with three of the groups of immediate problems.

I.

[Here follow numbered paragraphs 2 through 15 which were identical with Part I (less the final paragraph) of the Secretary of State's memorandum of July 6, printed p. 813.]

16. Therefore, not only does progress have to be made in satisfying all points of view simultaneously, but it must be made by stages. And there must be sufficient guarantees to inspire faith that, while ultimate goals on every question cannot be reached at once, the ultimate goals are accepted by binding promises.

II.

[Here follow numbered paragraphs 17–19 which were identical with the first three paragraphs of Part II of the Secretary of State's memorandum of July 6, printed p. 813.]

20. To some extent this comes from the fact that the Europeans have not taken hold of the problem of central European planning and direction in the military field as they did through OEEC in the economic field. We are at least partly to blame in so far as we have emphasized bilateral dealing with each nation. The European nations believe that often we have not kept the whole picture in mind and that guiding and driving hand is that of the United States.

21. I believe that this situation can be remedied and that it can be remedied in part in connection with the solution of the problems mentioned under I above.

III

22. The third group of problems is related to the financial, economic, and production operations under NATO.

23. The least satisfactory operations of NATO are those connected with the FEB (Financial and Economic Board) and the DPB (Defense Production Board). The reason for this is, in part, connected with the discussion under II above and, in part, comes from the fact that NATO is too large and too disparate an organization to deal with financial, economic, and production problems as a whole. Nobody really expects that NATO is going to make decisions in these fields which will control action in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. These countries are able to work out programs for themselves and coordinate the programs.

24. The situation is different with the continental countries. Their problems are much more similar to one another than they are to those of the partners over water. These are problems which Europeans have

to work out in the framework of continental Europe and then be assisted by the other partners.

25. Within the general NATO structure there is need for the development of organizations and procedures which will enable the continental partners as a unit to deal with their financial, economic and production problems as an integral part of the NATO effort but not necessarily in a manner identical with that which is appropriate for the United States, Great Britain and Canada as other partners in NATO.

26. These difficulties can, I think, be dealt with also in connection with those stated under I and II above.

A POSSIBLE METHOD OF APPROACH

27. The approach suggested is to take the idea of the European Army and see how it can be used to aid in the solution of the problems mentioned above.

28. The object should be, in the military field, to build on what we have under General Eisenhower—doing nothing which would confuse that military organization, but using it and stressing it for the purpose of creating what is in reality a European force in the field. It would be true that at present and for some time to come—perhaps for a long time—that force would be strengthened and stiffened by British and American contingents. But it would be a force which, as a military force, would not have to be changed in any fundamental way whenever the time came that the overseas contingents might be withdrawn. To state it differently, the force at General Eisenhower's disposal instead of being composed of perhaps twelve separate national forces would be composed ultimately of a European Army contingent plus national contingents from those NATO partners who do not participate in the European Army. For the purpose of this memorandum it is immaterial whether the European Army at any given stage includes three, four, or more national participants so long as the French and Germans are among those included. Military units within the European Army, like units from other national contingents, would be subject to General Eisenhower's disposal in accordance with SHAPE's military requirements.

29. The continuance of the European Army as a European force could be guaranteed by the most binding treaty obligations and by the creation over a period of time of supporting political institutions, dealing with financial support, economic support, production support, and the ultimate political bodies which would control the action and use of the army. Certain steps could be taken in all of these fields at once, but I doubt whether they could be final and perfect steps. Advantage should be taken of the fact that, due to the commitments of the United States and Britain in Europe and the presence of their

troops there, factors of guarantee and safety are provided while these institutions are being subjected to actual experience and improvement.

30. *Factors Relating to the Military Force in the Field.* At the present time it can be stated that there is a European Army—not complete in all respects, but not very far from complete. At any rate it is complete enough to take as a working basis.

31. It might be stretching things a bit to say that this European Army is the army commanded by General Eisenhower. Perhaps from the French point of view it might be a sounder approach to concentrate on the central ground force, commanded by General Juin. Here, one can say, is an army which will be fully organized and integrated in a command structure, at the head of which is a French General. It would have in it the bulk of the continental forces, and could have all of the forces of the nations participating in the European Army if there were a simple treaty provision that, upon any dissolution of the NATO Supreme Command, this would occur. From this point of view, General Juin would be wearing three hats—one as a general in the French Army, a second as Commander of the European Army, and a third under Eisenhower's command as Command[er]-in-Chief of the central ground force. If SHAPE were dissolved, the third hat would be disposed of but the second as well as the first would remain.

32. It would be into this European Army that German contingents would be integrated. If this could be done, then it could be said that the possible withdrawal of British and American troops would not affect in any way the military integration of the German contingents.

33. This, of course, is probably over-simplified and undoubtedly deals with only a small part of the problem. But it might furnish the beginning of a pattern and enable the French to accept some of the Petersburg ideas of the size and structure of military formations of Germans for incorporation into this European Army.

34. *Training.* Mr. Bruce has suggested that, if the training of the European contingents destined for the defense of Europe, were turned over at the moment the troops were raised to General Eisenhower's command (and in the case of the central ground forces, this would mean to General Juin's command), the need for a purely German military training organization would be removed and Germany would be on an equality with the other continental partners. Since it appears that General Eisenhower does not wish to have SHAPE assume basic training functions it might be possible to establish this function under General Juin's command in his capacity as Commander of the European Army rather than as a subordinate of General Eisenhower. In any case it would appear that the preliminary basic training might be organized on national lines without creating the kind of German military structure which the French fear and which we also oppose. These

are matters on which military advice is required but the idea seems worth exploration.

35. There would in any case be need in Germany for an organization to perform many functions connected with the raising of troops, but I think that the French would have to give way on their demand that all of this should be under a European commander, with no German institutions supporting him.

36. *The European Defense Commissioner.* It would seem to me that, outside of the weapons field, there would be great need for standardization among the European partners of many things, such as, the length of service, exemptions from service, pay and allowances, training schools, promotions, etc.

37. Here is a field in which the functions of a European Defense Commissioner might begin as the Chairman of a European Defense Committee, including a German official, and possibly end by having for all the continental partners such authority as any executive official would have over such matters in any of the countries. Perhaps the treaty might establish him with certain beginning functions, set out certain goals to be achieved; and provide for their achievement over a period of time in the light of experience. It should be possible to work out a formula which would give to the European Defense Commissioner requisite authority during the interim period. Subject to appropriate coordination with SHAPE, it might be agreed for example that at least certain parts of military aid would be made available only after certification by the Defense Commissioner that his specified requirements had been met.

38. *A European Finance Minister for Defense.* It might be possible for the treaty to provide for such a minister to begin as the Chairman of the Committee of the Financial Ministers of the European partners. He would provide the focal point for coordinating the financial efforts of the members of the European Army and with those of the European members of NATO. He would also provide the central point for discussion of American, Canadian, and possibly British, assistance.

39. Goals might be set for the development of his office, possibly involving a requirement that his budget estimates for each of the countries after approval by his Committee would have to be incorporated without change in the various national budgets presented to their legislatures.

40. *A European and Production Supply Minister for Defense.* The treaty might set up such an office, the occupant of which might deal with the national ministers in the same way that the Financial Minister would deal with his counterparts, and who would also take over for the European partners executive functions under the DPB, and should be

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the point of contact on production matters with the United States and others.

41. Provision might also be made for these three officers to form a Cabinet under one of them. They might start with the right to appear before the legislative bodies of the Cabinets of the continental partners. Appropriate organizational relationships between such a cabinet or its members and the NATO Council of Deputies would have to be developed.

42. Attention must be paid to the problem of selecting the three officers, having in mind the national jealousies involved. A possible approach would be to consider individuals who might be available and acceptable, for example Spaak as European Defense Commissioner and Stikker as European Finance Minister for Defense.

[Here follows the remainder of this revised memorandum (numbered paragraphs 43 through 52) which was identical with the final 10 paragraphs of the Secretary of State's memorandum of July 6, printed p. 813, beginning with paragraph "Study might be given . . ."]

740.5/7–1651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 16, 1951—6 p. m.

346. Pass MacArthur. Urtels 8138 and 8142 Jun 27.[2]

1. Dept gratified that Fr Govt agrees Bonn report shld be subj early discussions among 3 occ powers. While we believe Fr reply shld enable us reach agreement on procedure at early date, we do not believe acceptance all Fr suggestions wld permit as prompt action as we desire.

2. We especially regret Fr view that preliminary consideration of Bonn report shld not even be initiated until Paris report is ready. We have believed that need for prompt action on question of Ger participation in defense made imperative earliest possible start on consideration of Bonn report while awaiting Paris report. Nevertheless we are willing to agree that both reports shld be considered together, since Paris report is apparently almost completed.

3. Do not want any misunderstanding of our favorable attitude toward Eur Army plan, though Deptel 7155 Jun 28, rptd London 6196, HICOG Fkft 8194, shld have made that sufficiently clear. We feel it most desirable for reps studying Bonn report to have also before them

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[1] This telegram, which was also sent to London as 326 to be passed to Spofford and was repeated for information to Frankfurt and Bonn, was drafted by Laukhuff of GER/GPA and Knight of EUR/RA and was cleared by Matthews, Cabot of S/ISA, and Martin of EUR. This is section one of a two-section telegram. For section two, see telegram 347 to Paris, *infra*.

[2] Telegram 8142 is not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 800.

Paris report for consideration and comparison. Only this way can problem be considered from broadest angle, as well as full Fr cooperation be obtained. You shld make this clear to Fr, at same time making clear we are sorry that time which cld meanwhile have been used in immediate consideration of mil and polit questions arising from Bonn report shld have been wasted marking time waiting for Paris report.

4. While it wld be possible build case on Brussels decisions which charged occ powers with approach to Gers and which were not made dependent on results Paris Conf, we think wiser in our approach to Fr avoid such legalisms. Instead, we shld insist on urgency of proceeding with buildup of Western strength which requires incorporation Ger contribution. This urgency has increased in months elapsed since Brussels; while useful work has been done in Paris and Bonn time has been lost because of slow tempo due to such factors as Fr elections and CFM Deps talks. We are most anxious to move forward again and place great importance on Fr agreement initiate next phase, as proposed para 6. Consequently, you shld approach Fr Govt along fol lines.

5. We wld accept their concept as ultimate solution with adequate safeguards for Eisenhower's full power to dispose all units as he deems necessary but we cannot accept delay inherent in solving all practical problems involved. We wish start taking immediate steps for recruiting and training Ger units for NATO forces, steps which will be consistent with and even promote ultimate solution proposed by Fr. Fr position wld cause unacceptable delays because of necessity of finding in advance answers to intricate polit and finan problems, in addition to mil ones. Meanwhile as London's Depto 35 Jul 8 points out in its para 1, various factors may begin to operate to weaken Western determination and make agreement on Ger participation more difficult. While we therefore are prepared to go very far to meet Fr position stated in Embtel 8142, and are fully prepared to cooperate in finding such solution as most desirable one in long run if practical plan can be worked out and permanently set within NATO framework, we cannot accept Fr solution as only immediate one any more than in Nov in view urgency build up strength soonest.

6. We wld therefore again urge Fr Govt to authorize Rep on SG to join Brit and US members in examination of mil aspects of Bonn report and in isolating polit and other questions which shld be referred to govts as outside competence of SG. We propose that this study of Bonn report be begun in Wash on Jul 30 and that at same time there be begun in Wash study of polit questions involved by another group of three dipl Reps. We agree that Paris Conf report shld be studied by same groups at same time. Polit questions wld be those arising from

Bonn and Paris reports, including those isolated by SG Reps, but wld not include question of modifications in polit regime in Ger, which is now under discussion elsewhere. Thus we hope that three govts can have before them by Aug 13 recommendations based on Bonn and Paris reports. At that time and depending on nature these recommendations, on degree of agreement and on seriousness of conflicting views, decision will have to be reached as to level of tripartite forum in which to seek joint position as matter urgency. Not unlikely mtg three FonMins will be required at which decisions on Ger polit regime cld also be taken.

7. FYI only we agree with London's Depto 35 Jul 8 and Paris 130 Jul 7 that SHAPE guidance and consideration are essential Ger participation. Do not believe however that these problems can be moved forward fast enough at working party level and therefore feel they shld have consideration by SG Reps as proposed above and by dipl Reps in Wash (perhaps Franks and Alphand as suggested in Paris 8138 Jun 27) and Byroade–Perkins. Necessary questions shld be referred by mil Reps to SHAPE, as fast as isolated and perhaps SHAPE Rep cld come over in last stages of consideration. Attach particular importance to personal guidance Eisenhower. Tentatively we think this best secured through his participation in later FonMin mtg rather than at working group level. Do not believe shld bring in Gers until substantial coordination occ powers views have been obtained.

8. Approach Fr FonOff in this sense. London convey substance foregoing to Brit FonOff. Have received *aide-mémoire* from Brit Emb July 12 expressing general agreement with our original proposal and making a few suggestions entirely in line with para 6 above. Anticipate favorable response from Brit FonOff, therefore.

ACHESON

740.5/7–1651 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 16, 1951—6 p. m.

347. 9. We have meanwhile received various tels whose full discussion of problem furnish most useful contribution to its solution (Paris 25 July 3, rptd London 4, Fkft 3; Paris 130, 131, 132 July 7, rptd London 24, 25, 26, Fkft 13, 14, 15; London's Depto 35, rptd Paris 49, Fkft 21). We still awaiting Gifford's reaction.

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[1] This telegram, which was also sent to London as 327 and was repeated for information to Frankfurt as 407 and to Bonn as 28, was drafted by Laukhuff of GER/GPA and was cleared by Matthews, Perkins, Cabot of S/ISA, and Knight and Martin of EUR/RA. This is section two of a two-section telegram. Section one (telegram 346 to Paris) is printed *supra*.

10. Without undertaking point-by-point discussion of tels, we wish to comment on certain basic points. This comment is FYI and not to be passed on to Fr or Brit in its specific points at this time. Thus, fundamental issues are raised by statement in opening sentence of para 2 Paris 25 that Ger contribution to defense outside Eur Defense Forces framework will be serious blow to our objectives. This wld only seem to be true on two assumptions, first, that such contribution wld preclude later working out of Eur Defense Forces idea, and second, that US participation in NATO defense plans will terminate at some indefinite time in future. As pointed out in paras 3 and 5 above, whole tenor of Deptel 7155 June 28 was to effect that we wld hope for ultimate success of Eur Defense Forces plan. We wld have thought US attitude of support for this plan had been made sufficiently clear to everybody beginning with Secy's ltr to Schuman dated Dec 20.[2] As for second assumption, we think long-term interests of US will be best served not alone by development of Eur Army but by policy of permanent association with other nations in defense scheme for Atlantic area. We cannot be sure that western Europeans are sufficiently strong by themselves to outweigh Ger influence in future Eur Defense Forces. We thoroughly subscribe to views in para 3 of London's Depto 35.

11. There appears to be an increasing tendency to disregard the long-range problem of development of cooperation both in milit and other fields in the Atlantic Community, and to treat Eur integration and a Eur Army as final solutions for all problems including that of security against Ger. This is a dangerous tendency and we think it ought to be checked both in our own long-range interests and in the interest of bringing about more widespread Eur support for the idea of Eur integration, including Eur Defense Forces. Dutch, for example, are opposed to a Eur Army precisely because they fear it will expose them to Fr leadership (which they dislike) or to possible future domination by Ger or other unknown forces, unless closely tied in with the US and Brit in the North Atlantic Community. To be successful, our influence in favor of Eur Defense Forces must be combined with reassurances of active interest in the expansion and making permanent of North Atlantic cooperation.

12. We readily recognize delays inherent in producing Ger troops for contribution to NATO force whether along lines our 7155 or otherwise and our latest thinking here with regard to polit difficulties is that solution can and shld be found much earlier than Paris anticipates. On other hand our feeling has been that not only are some delay factors operative in case of Eur Defense Forces plan (e.g. necessity of completing contractual arrangements, etc.) but in addition there wld be delays attendant upon solution of most difficult polit problems sur-

[2] Regarding the Secretary's letter of December 20, 1950, see his letter of January 27, to Foreign Minister Schuman, p. 759.

rounding estab of common finan contributions, common training programs, common defense org, etc. Until these questions are solved, a Eur Defense Force is such in name only and does not go beyond what we suggested wld be possible under NATO org in our 7155.

13. We have particular difficulty in understanding precisely what scheme Paris has in mind under para 12 of its tel 25. Apparently SHAPE feels it shld not become involved in basic training of raw recruits, if we understand correctly para 3, Paris 131, and paras 2 and 4, Paris 130. Accordingly do not see how estab Ger recruiting and basic training org cld be avoided unless all Ger contribution is to be held up until Eur Defense org is agreed and set up as going concern. It is hard to see how Ger demands for equality are met by Paris' proposal and we wld welcome amplification of views on this point.

14. Dept wishes to emphasize it is wholly prepared support two points Eisenhower makes in para 1 of Paris 130. We also like and have adopted throughout this Section, Eisenhower's suggestion of substituting "Eur Defense Forces" for "Eur Army". This strengthens point we make in paras 10 and 11 above.

15. Essence of Dept's attitude (and this can be passed on to Fr and Brit) is that this whole problem must continue to be approached with open mind and that it is not necessary at this time to make choice as between the Petersberg and Paris reports. We believe soundest decision will be reached if we consider both of these reports on their merits and try to find, as we go along, answers to many problems which reftels usefully point out. We simply do not know on basis of any info now before us the practical answers to most important aspects of Eur Defense org. It is for this reason that we adhere to views expressed in first Section of this tel and believe it desirable to continue to press for earliest consideration of Bonn and Paris reports. We hope that you will be able to persuade Fr to agree to expedite this consideration as only way of determining what is most satis solution to problem from practical and polit viewpoint.

ACHESON

762A.5/7–1651

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 16, 1951.

This morning we had a meeting at the Pentagon on my memorandum entitled German Rearmament and Problems of the Defense of Europe.[1] Messrs. Jessup and Matthews attended with me. General Marshall had

[1] Under reference here is the memorandum by the Secretary of State as revised by Ambassador at Large Jessup, July 12, p. 827.

with him Mr. Lovett, General Bradley, Frank Nash and Colonel Beebe.

I reviewed the problem of the memorandum, which was to find a method of making progress on European rearmament which would renconcile the French, German and United States points of view. The concept of the European army or the European defense force seemed to furnish such a possibility. I stressed the importance of going forward simultaneously with the European defense force idea, the restoration of German sovereignty, and the raising of German troops. The discussion lasted approximately an hour, much of it devoted to clarifying possible misunderstandings.

Mr. Jessup read a telegram received this morning reporting the latest decisions of the Steering Committee of the European defense force talks in Paris.[2] General Marshall read views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by General Eisenhower on the earlier telegram along these lines.[3]

The principal concerns of the Defense representatives were: First, To get as early a start as possible on the raising of German forces. They believed this was essential to continuing Congressional support of MDAP. Second, they did not wish a European Army to interfere in any way with the organization and management of General Eisenhower's forces. The recent telegram from Paris seemed to meet many of their fears in this regard. Third, they stressed the importance of our not being trapped into a position where we would have accepted the European army as a step which must precede any other action, thereby depriving ourselves of any freedom of action and putting ourselves entirely in the hands of the French.

After discussing all of these factors fully it was decided that as soon as I had heard from Mr. McCloy and Ambassador Bruce I was to prepare a paper stating proposed US policy for discussion with Defense and later submission to the President. There seemed to be general agreement that this paper should be for internal US guidance and not to give to foreign governments. There seemed to be at least tentative agreement that the policy recommended might be to give the French and British a draft contractual agreement with Germany and plan for beginning the recruitment of Germans and to propose to them that we be prepared to discuss and settle the three matters either before the next NATO meeting or before the General Assembly, but in no

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[2] The reference here is presumably to telegram 289, July 15, from Paris, not printed, which reported that the Steering Committee of the European Army Conference had made appreciable progress in two meetings on July 13. The Committee had agreed to substitute the words "European defense forces" for "European Army," that General Eisenhower would have full power to organize and deploy European units as required by any military situation, and that the views of General Eisenhower would be duly taken into consideration before the Conference reached military conclusions. (740.5/7–1551)

[3] For General Eisenhower's views, see telegram 131, July 7, from Paris, p. 820.

event later than November 1. The three matters should be some sort of an agreement on a European defense force which would not necessarily be complete in all political and economic details but would be subject to reaching agreement on the latter two. These two should be the contractual arrangement with Germany and the plan for raising German contingents as soon as possible.

Our general attitude should be that we would be prepared to take these up simultaneously provided agreement could be reached by the date mentioned. If this were not agreed to, we would not be committed to wait on either of the other two for final conclusion of the European defense force talks.

The next step is for us to agree upon such a paper and then to present it to Defense and attempt as soon as possible to lay an agreed paper before the President.[4]

D[EAN] A[CHESON]

[4] For the joint memorandum of July 30 by Secretary Acheson and Acting Secretary of Defense Lovett and approved by President Truman on that day, which eventuated from the agreement recorded here, see p. 849. Regarding the preparation and approval of that joint memorandum, see the editorial note, p. 847.

740.5/7–1851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, July 18, 1951—6 p. m.

382. From MacArthur. Distribution as directed by SecState. Fol is text of personal msg from Gen Eisenhower to SecDef and SecState sent today thru US mil channels:

Begin text. Personal for Marshall from Eisenhower pass to SecState personal for Acheson from Eisenhower. Re SHAPE cables Alo 192 dated 6 July '51 and Alo 194 dated 7 July '51.

1. After continuing observation of the buildup of the integrated def force for the last six months, and as result of recent discussions with Bruce and McCloy as to the latest developments in the Paris negots, I am convinced that the time has come when we must all press for the earliest possible implementation of the Eur Army concept. Bruce, McCloy, and I are in full agreement that implementation of the Eur army concept despite the many complicated details which will have to be worked out, offers the best and earliest possible chance for a solution to the problem of (*a*) obtaining the necessary def contribution from West Ger, and (*b*) enabling the nations of WE to move toward the unity which they must possess if they are to make an adequate and sustained defense effort. I feel strongly that the US must exert constructive and vigorous leadership if a workable solution is to be found.

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London for Spofford as 88 and to Frankfurt for McCloy as 36.

2. I have also told Bruce and McCloy of my willingness to do whatever I can to break the present impasse and thereafter to assist as best I can to obtain Eur army units, including a Ger contribution at the earliest possible time. I am convinced that a solution of the problem of Eur def is impossible until we have solved the Ger problem.

3. I understand from Bruce that the Fr Govt is anxious for SACEUR to send an observer to the Paris Eur army conf but is reluctant to extend an invitation unless it is sure it will be accepted.

4. Having become convinced that the establishment of an Eur army will be a major constructive step, I now propose to support it in every possible way. Consequently, if you see any major objection to my accepting an invitation to designate an observer to the current Paris Eur army conf, I request that you notify me promptly. My thought is that after receipt of this invitation I wld advise the council deputies through the standing group of the invitation and my acceptance thereof. *End text.*[2]

Texts of Alo 192 and 194 contained in Paris Embtels 131 and 132 rptd London 25 and 26, Fkft 14 and 15. [MacArthur.] [3]

BRUCE

[2] The telegram quoted here was designated telegram Alo 208, July 18, from General Eisenhower at SHAPE Headquarters in Paris. It was the first item to be discussed at Secretary Acheson's regular meeting on foreign policy matters with President Truman on July 19. Secretary Acheson's memorandum of conversation on this item of discussion read as follows:

"We read together General Eisenhower's message and the reply which had been agreed upon between General Marshall and me. The President expressed himself as much pleased, both with the message and with the reply, and hoped that the presence of an observer from SHAPE at the Paris Conference and possibly at some time the personal intervention of the General, might speed up the whole development of the matter." (Lot 53 D 444, memoranda of conversations with the President)

The "reply" under reference by Secretary Acheson is presumably telegram Def 96731, July 19, to General Eisenhower, p. 842.

[3] Telegram 131, July 7, from Paris, is printed on p. 820; telegram 132 of the same date is not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 812.

740.5/7–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, July 19, 1951—1 p. m.

391. From Bruce for the Secretary only. No distribution except as he directs. Copy sent to Gen Eisenhower.

[1] An identical telegram, *mutatis mutandis*, was sent to the Secretary of State as telegram 529, July 19, from Frankfurt from McCloy. A memorandum of July 19 by Jessup, not printed, records a discussion in the Secretary of State's office on this telegram as follows:

"The Secretary said that we could not tie ourselves absolutely to the European Defense Force concept. Our position should be that if the Europeans can work out this plan and get a treaty so that decisions can be made in September we're for it. When the treaty is signed and the Contractual Agreement with Germany is agreed upon, Germany would go ahead with action in the Bundestag on the constitutional amendment and then proceed to raise troops and if the treaty was not ratified that would be the fault of Europe." (740.5/7–1951)

1. McCloy and I had joint discussion in Paris on July 17 with Gen Eisenhower and others on subj of Eur defense force (EDF). We found we had both recd your memo of July 13 [2] for comment. Since we reached same views on this subj we have prepared this joint reply.

2. Your memo (paras 1 to 26) contains what we consider to be accurate analysis of situation subj to comments below relevant to your paras 9 and 15.

3. We also agree with your view that constructive solution must come through Eur army. In order to break present stalemate, we are convinced, however, that it will not be sufficient to set creation of its institutions as future goal, but that their basic structure must be settled and agreed and in course of being created in definitive form. We believe that this can be done in way to avoid delay in completing treaty and to achieve German contribution speedily. Our reasons for this conclusion are set out below.

4. Fed Govt cannot recruit any soldiers until Ger constitution amended to authorize such action. This will require two-thirds majority in Bundestag. Moreover, Adenauer has repeatedly stated he cannot seek Bundestag action on mil contribution unless support of very large part of Bundestag is assured. To get such vote over probable sharpshooting of Schumacher, it will be necessary to present issue to Bundestag in way creating greatest popular appeal. Strongest inducement wld be package combining contractual agreement granting new status replacing occupation statute and high commission and treaty creating EDF. This wld appeal to (*a*) desire for substantial pol equality; (*b*) strong sentiment for creating Eur community; and (*c*) desire to establish effective defense further east. Any partial or piecemeal proposal can be attacked strongly by SPD and can hardly have required popular appeal.

5. French will clearly not agree to requisite change in German status or to Ger contribution without bitter opposition and costly delay unless EDF institutions are in process of actual creation and Ger contribution is within treaty framework. Interim treaty merely combining armies in field with agreement to work out Eur defense institutions in future will in all probability not be acceptable to Fr. This does not mean that treaty must contain details of solutions for all problems, but it must at least create institutions and empower them to develop solutions within terms of treaty.

6. Consequently there is no tentative or interim solution which will result in recruitment of a Ger soldier because it cld not meet these essential conditions. Unless Bundestag has before it solemn undertakings spelling out in substantial detail changed status and basic form of Eur army within which Ger soldiers will serve, Bundestag will

[2] The reference here is presumably to the memorandum by the Secretary of State as revised by Jessup, July 12, p. 827.

not (*a*) pass constitutional amendment or (*b*) vote defense participation.

7. For these reasons we are convinced that most practical and swiftest road to our objective is by working to complete basic treaty for EDF in shortest possible time. We shld use every influence and all appropriate pressures to get French-Ger agreement promptly on suitable treaty, creating Eur institutions and agencies with adequate powers to solve detailed problems and fixing basic principles to guide their solution. Conference is now actively considering proposals based on this concept. This wld permit progressive solution to problems of finance, production and admin much as you suggest. Under these proposals, treaty wld provide that Eur def comm wld act initially through existing defense agencies on regional basis but progressively take over discharge of full responsibilities regarding admin, common budget, and common procurement as rapidly as feasible.

8. By adopting this approach it shld be possible to complete treaty in final form for submission to parliaments by about same time as agreement on contractual relations will be ready for Bundestag ratification. This timetable presupposes full support from US Govt and active participation on part of US officials in deliberations of EDF conference as well as continuous advice and guidance from Gen Eisenhower. Fr and Ger officials are urging this course. Conference has already, on Fr initiative, adopted all mil suggestions thus far made by SHAPE. Size of units yet to be worked out but believe Fr will change their position to one acceptable to SHAPE. Conference is taking steps to obtain further SHAPE guidance. This procedure shld ensure practical mil solutions thoroughly agreeable to Gen Eisenhower. Fr officials have been made aware that support of United States and Gen Eisenhower hinges upon their giving an earnest of determination for speed and mil effectiveness.

9. In view of fact that Gers cannot recruit in any case until basis had been laid for constitutional amendment, we shld concentrate on means of shortening time thereafter for required recruiting and training of Ger-speaking recruits. On basis of discussions here, we believe it will be possible to accompany treaty by convention providing for training of recruits by SHAPE (and its subordinate structure) and existing defense agencies under delegated authority from EDF during an interim period until EDF agencies become operative and can progressively assume this function. Ger will need agency to handle recruitment and other matters which are to be on natl basis in all countries and to carry out certain admin and supply functions under delegation from EDF while common Eur institutions are getting under way. Useful work might be undertaken soon to prepare for this agency. Above procedures will avoid delay in recruiting and training of Gers

and will meet Ger demand for no discrimination even during initial period of EDF.

10. We have in mind time schedule which wld permit consideration of both mil and pol parts of package by FM at 15 Sept mtg. Present schedule provides that AHC report on contractual relations wld be sent to governments not later than 15 Aug. Report will indicate basis areas of agreement and matters of disagreement which mins will have to resolve.

Interim report of Paris EDF conference shld be completed within next week and submitted to govts. Report shld represent constructive basis for settlement of mil problems. This wld permit joint consideration of Bonn and Paris reports.

By time of FM mtg Paris EDF conference shld have under consideration draft treaty. By having FM thus consider mil and polit parts of package together at 15 Sept mtg, we shld obtain maximum Fr cooperation in working out acceptable contractual arrangements and in resolving other outstanding issues.

11. The above program seems to us soundest route to our objectives. Moreover, while we are fully aware of polit pressure at home for getting on with Eur defense and Ger contribution, we believe this program, if fully explained, wld be understood and supported by Amer public for several reasons:

(*a*) Ger contribution will be obtained as quickly as is possible and within framework offering greatest safeguards against Ger militarism in future;

(*b*) Eur central agencies wld greatly facilitate task of creating effective defense force for West Eur, mobilizing its econ resources for defense, and ensuring most efficient use of Amer mil assistance in building such defense;

(*c*) This wld further, perhaps decisively, Eur polit integration and help to overcome Amer impression of Eur weakness and confusion.

BRUCE

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 115: Telegram

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) and the Secretary of State to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Eisenhower), at Paris[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, 19 July 1951.

Def 96731. Noforn from Marshall and Acheson personal for Eisenhower AmEmbassy London England personal for Spofford.

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[1] This telegram and the message to which it replied (Alo 208, July 18, from General Eisenhower included in telegram 382, July 18, from Paris, p. 838) were approved by President Truman at a meeting with Secretary Acheson on July 19; see footnote 2, p. 839.

This telegram together with telegram Alo 208 were included as annexes to document NSC 115. Regarding NSC 115, see the editorial note, p. 847.

Limited distribution. Reference Alo 208. Greatly appreciate expressions of your views contained in your message of July 18 on subject of support for Eur Army concept. We are in complete accord with you that realization of this concept is important in achievement of United States political and military objectives in Eur. We also place great emphasis on French and Germans arriving at some agreement which will allow initiation of German units at earliest possible date and that completion of plan for European defense force should not defer this date.

Developments in past few days at Paris conference have been so rapid that it is difficult for us to judge here at this time where United States influence may be needed. We are therefore in complete agreement with your suggestion that you send an observer to Paris conference. Suggest that you consult Spofford in advance in order that he may have opportunity for prior informal discussion with certain deputies if he considers this advisable.

Paris Embassy files, 400 European Army

Interim Report of the Delegations to the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community to the Participating Governments [1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, July 24, 1951.

PREAMBLE [2]

The Delegations of the countries participating in the Conference for the Organization of European Defense Forces, which opened at Paris on January 26, 1951, herewith submit to their Governments a joint interim report on the results that have so far been achieved in the accomplishment of their mission.

The views set down in this interim report are those which were expressed by the Delegations in the course of the work of the Conference, and they do not commit the governments themselves. The governments remain free to modify in whole or in part the agreements reached at the conference.

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[1] The source text, an informal translation prepared in the Embassy in Paris, was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 236, July 27, from Paris, not printed. The French-language original of this Interim Report comprised 29 pages together with a 4-page annex on the origin and organization of the Conference. The translation comprised 49 pages, and the annex was not included therein. This Interim Report was formally approved by the Conference at its plenary meeting on July 24, reported upon in telegram 542, July 25, from Paris, *infra*. For a summary comparison of the major points of agreement and disagreement in the Interim Report, see William T. Nunley's paper of August 24, p. 862.

[2] In the source text, this preamble is preceded by a brief table of contents.

There are annexed to the present document a note on the origin and organization of the conference, and a list of members of the Delegations, both those that participated actively and those that attended as observers.

Chapter I

OBJECTIVES AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. The five Delegations of the participating Governments agreed to incorporate certain objectives and general principles in the Treaty on the Creation of a European Defense Community, particularly the following:

(*a*) The final aim is the fusion, under joint supranational institutions, of the armed forces of the participating countries with a view to assuring the defense of Europe on a permanent basis and to guaranteeing the peace against all threats, whether present or future. The forces necessary for the defense of the overseas territories of the participating countries would be excluded, as would be police troops.

(*b*) The moral strength and the European character of these defense forces will be guaranteed by as complete an integration as possible consistent with military requirements of the human and material elements that are gathered under the single European political and military authority.

(*c*) This integration must in no way reduce the efficiency and combat effectiveness of the forces of the West, but should on the contrary enhance them, without involving any delay in the implementation of Atlantic military plans.

(*d*) The institution of a Defense Community of the free peoples of Europe represents an essential step on the road towards European unification.

(*e*) The treaty will involve no discrimination whatever among the member states.

(*f*) The European Defense Community will have at its disposal certain resources in order to meet the common expenditures. Those resources will come chiefly from the contributions by the member states, which will be allocated equitably among them.

The European Forces will have a common supply system, and there will also be established a common armament program. In the long run, the costs which are involved for the member states in the organization of a common defense might certainly be less burdensome for the economy of each than would be the costs resulting from a defense effort organized within a purely national framework. As a matter of fact the standardization of arms and the specialization of armament production would make possible a better and more economical utilization of the resources of the participating countries. Moreover, the provisions of the treaty should be drafted in such a way that the European defense effort does not jeopardize the social progress that has been realized by the member states or to which they aspire.

(*g*) In all respects, and notably with respect to economic and armament matters, the European Defense Community will work in close cooperation with the nations of the free world, and in particular with those of the Atlantic Community.

2. The Conference considers it necessary, moreover, to emphasize that this enterprise has a purely peaceful character. On the military side, it has no other objective than to assure the defense of Europe against any aggression. Pooling the interests of peoples which have until now been opposed to each other, constitutes a guarantee for all that nationalistic considerations with all their dangers will disappear and will give way to the collective will of the European Community. This conception in no way does away with national patriotisms, but rather superimposes upon them a larger European patriotism.

3. *Relations between the European Defense Community and NATO*

In view of the threats which weigh at present upon the world, the conference recommends that all the command functions and other functions relating to the employment of the European Forces be assumed by the Supreme Atlantic Commander from the moment the European Forces are created. In particular, the Supreme Commander would have all the powers necessary to organize and deploy the European units to the extent that the military situation might require it.

In line with the above, the Conference considers that the establishment and functioning of the European Defense Community should be assured in close liaison with the appropriate organs of NATO and, with respect to matters within its military competence, in accordance with its directives. In view of the need to establish effective forces for the common defense as quickly as possible, liaison between the European Community and NATO is of special necessity in the following fields:

—organization and training of the forces,
—establishment of equipment programs,
—external aid,
—production problems,
—deployment of European units by country and area.

A more precise definition of the relations between the European Defense Community and NATO requires detailed discussions with the competent Atlantic organs. These discussions should begin as soon as possible in order that the contribution of all the member states to western defense may be brought about with the least possible delay, thanks to their participation in the European Defense Community.

The Conference calls attention, moreover, to the fact that the recommendations made to the Governments in the military field ought to be examined jointly with SHAPE before they are adopted, in order that the views of the Supreme Commander may be duly taken into consideration.

4. *Transitional Period*

The forces furnished by the participating countries will be European from the beginning in the sense that they will be immediately placed under the authority of the European Defense Community. It would, however, be necessary to have a convention separate from the Treaty creating the European Defense Community. That Convention would cover the transitional period while the political and military institutions are being created. During that transitional period, the Defense Community would hold all the powers and responsibilities that it would later exercise but would be unable to assume them completely because of the time-lag before the organizations envisaged in the treaty are physically created. The institutions would thus be created from the beginning, but their functioning during this transitional period would be subject to special rules which are described in Chapter VI of the present report.

[Here follow Chapter II—Institutions, Chapter III—Military Questions, Chapter IV—Financial Questions, Chapter V—General Provisions, and Chapter VI—Transitional Provisions, comprising 40 of the 49 pages of the source text.]

CONCLUSIONS

33. According to this provisional report, the delegations feel that, despite the difficulties inherent to the creation of a European Defense Community—because of the present structure of Europe—essential progress has already been made in view of attaining this objective.

While a large degree of agreement has been reached, important questions have not yet been settled and their solution will require new effort.

Aware of the necessity to create, without further delay, a European force sufficiently powerful to contribute to the discouragement of any aggressive intentions, the Conference submits this temporary report to the interested Governments and requests their instructions.

At the same time, the Conference will continue its work, especially within technical committees charged with preparing texts which are necessary to set up the Organization, and hope that these studies will be carried on in close contact with the Supreme Atlantic Commander and, if possible, with his assistance.

Paris Embassy files, 320 western bloc (military) : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, July 25, 1951—8 p. m.

542. European Army conference July 24 approved interim report to Governments. Copies of the 44-page report being airpouched to-

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Frankfurt, London, Copenhagen, Brussels, Rome, Oslo, The Hague, Lisbon, Ottawa, and Luxembourg.

gether with informal translation.[2] In approving report, conference noted point brought up earlier by Italians calling attention to restrictive features of peace treaty and need to remove them. Two specific observations of German delegation which likewise exceed framework of conference, having to do with (*a*) political status of Germany and (*b*) special financial considerations (that is, occupation costs), were also noted and by agreement incorporated in brief supplementary document[3] to be transmitted to Governments separately but at same time. This document going forward to Department with report.

Alphand announced, and conference noted with gratification, that General Eisenhower has agreed detail observers to its further proceedings.[4] There will be no interruption in conference work. Military and juridical committees resumed meetings today and financial committee will resume Friday or Saturday, outline for future work for all committees having been informally agreed upon yesterday. Plenary session yesterday was marked by homage which Blank paid to Alphand, and general good feeling and optimism concerning outcome.[5]

By agreement, Alphand held background press conference after meeting.

BRUCE

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[2] For extracts from the translated report under reference, see *supra*.
[3] Not printed.
[4] General Michaelis was designated by General Eisenhower to serve as SHAPE observer at the European Army Conference.
[5] This appears to have been the last plenary session during 1951 of the European Army Conference. When the next phase of the conference began on September 3 (see telegram 1420, September 3, from Paris, p. 878), direction of the conference devolved upon the smaller Steering Committee.

Editorial Note

At a meeting on July 16 between Secretary of State Acheson and Secretary of Defense Marshall and their advisers (see Acheson's memorandum, July 16, page 836), agreement was reached regarding the preparation of a joint memorandum for the President on policy with respect to the problems of the defense of Europe and the German contribution thereto. A first draft of the proposed memorandum was prepared by Jessup and cleared by Acheson, Matthews, Perkins, Cabot, Nitze, and Geoffrey W. Lewis, Deputy Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, by July 20. Jessup sent a copy of this draft to Frank Nash of the Department of Defense in a letter of that day (740.5/7–2051). In a memorandum for Secretary Acheson on July 25, Jessup reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and intermediate-level officers of the Department of Defense did not disagree either with the sub-

536-688 PT 1--81---56

stance or the wording of the draft memorandum, and no difficulties were expected from high-level Defense officials. Jessup indicated with approval, however, the feeling of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that approval for the memorandum should be obtained from the membership of the National Security Council. (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 115)

The final text of the joint memorandum of July 30 (*infra*) which contained only a few revisions of the draft of July 20, was presumably prepared as a result of consultation between State and Defense Department officials. In a memorandum to Secretary Acheson on the morning of July 30, Jessup observed that the joint memorandum had been signed by Acting Secretary of Defense Lovett in the absence of Secretary Marshall and was ready for delivery to President Thuman at noon of that day. Jessup pointed out that in accordance with an understanding reached with the Department of Defense, Secretary Acheson, when he presented the memorandum to President Truman for approval, was to suggest an informal procedure for securing the concurrence of other members of the National Security Council. (740.5/7–3051) An informal clearance procedure had previously been utilized in connection with NSC 82, September 11, 1950. (See *Foreign Relations*, 1950, volume III, pp. 273 ff.)

President Truman approved the joint memorandum of July 30 during a meeting with the Secretary of State at noon of that day. Jessup reported the Secretary of State's account of that meeting in a memorandum of July 30 to Nitze:

"The Secretary told me that the President had read the memorandum on 'Definition of United States Policy on Problems of the Defense of Europe and the German Contribution' signed by Mr. Lovett and the Secretary. The President immediately initialled it as approved. The Secretary suggested to the President that he would probably wish NSC approval through the informal procedure of a memo of decision which was utilized in the case of NSC 82. The President agreed but nevertheless gave the Secretary the signed copy of the memorandum with his initials of approval." (S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 115)

James Lay, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, promptly undertook special handling of the memorandum of July 30. National Security Council Record of Action 516, August 1, 1951, described the result of the special concurrence procedure as follows:

"The other Council members and the Secretary of the Treasury concurred in the reference memorandum on the subject by the Secretary of State and the Acting Secretary of Defense. The Assistant to the Director of Defense Mobilization also concurred on the assumption that there will be included in the terms of the German settlement arrangements for harnessing, under appropriate safeguards, German production for the benefit of the mobilization effort of the free world."

On August 2 the President, after consideration of the joint memorandum of July 30 and the concurrence recorded in NSC Action 516, formally approved the memorandum and directed its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the United States Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State (memorandum of August 2 from Lay to the Secretary of State: S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 115). The text of the joint memorandum of July 30 together with the substance of NSC Action 516 and the President's response thereto, together with the texts of telegram Alo 208, July 18 from General Eisenhower to Secretary of Defense Marshall and Secretary Acheson (text contained in telegram 382, July 18, from Paris, page 838) and telegram Def 96731, July 19, from Secretaries Marshall and Acheson to General Eisenhower (page 842) were circulated to the National Security Council as document NSC 115, August 2, 1951, not printed (S/S–NSC files, 63 D 351, NSC 115).

740.5/7–3051

Memorandum From the Secretary of State and the Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the President[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 30, 1951.

Subject: Definition of United States Policy on Problems of the Defense of Europe and the German Contribution

It seems to us desirable that you should determine certain general principles which will guide United States policy in bringing about most effectively and most rapidly German participation in the defense of Western Europe without arousing European antagonisms which would militate against continued European cooperation in the defense effort.

It is a basic assumption that a German military contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense force in Europe is necessary. This contribution cannot be secured until existing German and French objections have been harmonized. The Germans will not adopt the necessary amendment to their Constitution and the necessary legislative action authorizing military contributions until they are assured that they are to have a position of political equality and of nondiscrimination in military matters. From their point of view, this requires the restoration of a large degree of sovereignty. The French will not cooperate in the essential program of restoration of sovereignty to

[1] The source text was approved by President Truman in his own hand. This memorandum, as subsequently concurred in by the other members of the National Security Council and again approved by the President, was circulated as document NSC 115, August 2, 1951. Regarding the preparation, original signing, and promulgation of this document as NSC 115, see the editorial note, *supra*.

Germany until agreement is reached on certain limitations controlling German rearmament in order that they may secure what they regard as adequate safeguards for the future. At present, the French and German demands conflict with each other and produce a stalemate. By the very nature and interrelation of these two sets of demands, the stalemate cannot be broken unless simultaneous progress is made toward meeting them.

In the long run, the problem can best be solved in terms of more general Continental European arrangements. Due to the British attitude and the consequent attitude of certain European peoples such as the Dutch, satisfactory progress in terms of an increased measure of Continental European integration can be secured only within the broader framework of the North Atlantic community. This is entirely consonant with our own desire to see a power arrangement on the Continent which does not threaten us and with which we can work in close harmony. Under this pattern Continental European arrangements can be utilized to offset the individual fears of the French and the Germans while the broader North Atlantic Treaty Organization relationships, in which the United States participates, can be utilized to mitigate British and other fears of Continental European integration. These are, however, complex problems which can definitely be solved only over a period of years. The situation does not permit delaying progress on the defense of Europe and therefore on the German contribution until these problems are fully met in detail.

It is our conclusion that the solution is to be found in simultaneous progress on three points:

1. Agreement on the creation of a European Defense Force which would serve under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
2. A specific plan for raising German contingents at the earliest possible date; and
3. A political arrangement with Germany restoring substantial German sovereignty.

These three matters should be settled prior to November 1 and presumably be ready for action at the North Atlantic Council meeting now contemplated for the end of October. The United States position would be that our support of point No. 1 would be contingent upon the three points being treated simultaneously and within the indicated time period.

In regard to a European Defense Force, you are familiar with General Eisenhower's views as expressed in his telegram No. Alo 208,[2] and you have approved the favorable reply which we sent expressing

[2] For the text of the telegram under reference here, see telegram 382, July 18, from Paris, and footnote 2 thereto, p. 838.

our concurrence in his designating an observer to attend the Paris Conference dealing with this matter. We recommend that on this subject the position of the United States would be that we would make known in the clearest terms to the French as well as to the Germans and other countries concerned that the United States supports the concept and will be prepared to assist in its execution and implementation provided that certain conditions are met. These conditions would include the following:

1. The concept of a European Defense Force would include the evolution of such necessary administrative arrangements as would enable it to participate in the common defense of Europe, not simply for the support of individual national aspirations.
2. The European Defense Force would not constitute a separate European field army but would be based on the idea of European contingents which could be disposed of by the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe in accordance with military necessity.
3. The elaboration and implementation of the necessary administrative structures and political arrangements would not be a condition precedent to the actual beginning of the German contribution to the defense effort.
4. The administrative machinery for managing the European Defense Force would be appropriately related to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In regard to raising German contingents at the earliest possible date, the position of the United States would be that a plan should be agreed to which would provide for the earliest possible application on an interim basis of those aspects of a European Defense Force plan which would permit the immediate recruitment and training of German soldiers under such safeguards as may be required. Such a plan might provide, for example, that existing defense agencies or national agencies to be created could provide for the training of recruits under delegated authority from the European Defense Force during the interim period until the European Defense Force agencies become operative and can progressively assume this function. The United States would place great emphasis on including in the plan agreement which will allow initiation of German units at a specified target date and that completion of the plan for a European Defense Force should not defer this date.

In regard to the contractual arrangements with Germany for the restoration of German sovereignty, the position of the United States would be that we must move broadly and decisively in creating a new status for Germany. We believe that in general the Germans should be given full power to run themselves and that our mission there should be changed from one of "occupation" of the territory of a defeated

enemy to one of military assistance to a partner who is freely contributing to our mutual defense. This will involve abolishing the unilaterally-imposed Occupation Statute and replacing it with a negotiated agreement or agreements. It will involve the substitution of Ambassadors for High Commissioners and the consequent abolition of the High Commission. We expect to retain supreme authority in four fields only: (*a*) the right to station troops in Germany and to protect their security; (*b*) Berlin; (*c*) the unification of Germany and a subsequent peace settlement; (*d*) territorial questions. In keeping with its new status and its contribution to Western defense, Germany should be admitted as a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. So far as procedure is concerned, we plan to push forward the work now being carried on by the High Commissioners, but we are considering a proposal for a short cut to high-level government consideration which we would expect to lay before you for your approval.

DEAN ACHESON
Secretary of State
ROBERT A. LOVETT
Acting Secretary of Defense

Approved, July 30, 1951.
HARRY S. TRUMAN

740.5/8–1051 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, August 10, 1951—7 p. m.

819. On Gen Eisenhower's invitation I flew to SHAPE yesterday and had a talk with him. He had also invited Gen Sir John Whiteley, an asst Chief of the Imperial Gen Staff who was formerly asst Chief of Staff both AFHQ and SHAEF. Eisenhower read us part of a letter which he had written to Gen Marshall on the subj of the Eur army and German military contribution. He said that no time shld be lost in concluding arrangements which wld allow a start on German forces. He felt that the Eur army presented the only feasible means of bringing them into Western defense. He believes that the greatest element of delay will be the agrmts and arrangements necessary for a Eur Defense Min to function. He is prepared, if he can get satisfactory commitments from five govts involved, principally

[1] Repeated for information to Paris and Frankfurt.

France and Germany, to undertake on a temporary basis the functions of European Defense Minister in order to get the practical business of the recruiting, training and formation of the force started. He made it clear that he wld do this on a personal basis and not as SACEUR and that it wld naturally have to be for a limited period.

Gen Eisenhower authorized Whiteley to convey the foregoing to Shinwell. I shall not mention this to British until receipt of instructions from Dept. I have informed Spofford of foregoing.

HOLMES

Editorial Note

In letters to Foreign Secretary Morrison and Foreign Minister Schuman, transmitted by telegram on August 9 to the Embassies in the United Kingdom and France for immediate delivery, Secretary of State Acheson proposed a working program to enable the three Foreign Ministers to reach decisions on the problem of integrating a German contribution into the defense of Europe and establishing a new contractual relationship with the German Federal Republic. Secretary Acheson's proposed program was partly based upon the hope and possibility that the European Defense Community Conference would succeed and that a German contribution to Western defense could be quickly obtained through the establishment of a European defense force. For the text of Secretary Acheson's letter, see page 1164. The text was transmitted in a circular telegram of August 10 to Brussels, Ottawa, Copenhagen, Rome, Lisbon, Oslo, The Hague, Reykjavik, and Luxembourg, not printed. The Missions were to seek informal opportunities to express Acheson's views to key personnel in the governments to which they accredited. (740.5/8–1051)

In his response of August 17 (see page 1174), Morrison agreed that the establishment of a European defense force might well offer an acceptable solution, but he felt that there must first be assurance that such a force was a practicable proposition and could be satisfactorily organized for the defense of Europe. In two replies of August 25, Schuman concurred in the need for an early agreement on a European defense community but raised a number of specific problems bearing on United States relations with such a community.

740.5/8–1151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 11, 1951—2 p. m.

722. 1) If appears desirable after consultation with Fr Emb (re Paris tel 892 Aug 8 rptd Rome 39[2]) Emb auth urge on Itals desirability rapid action Eur Army Conf. May explain our understanding govts participating Paris Steering Comite not committed by attendance mtgs, and having understood Itals shared this view we unable understand their hesitation. You may also explain our interest in rapid action as described Secy's ltrs to Morrison and Schuman (Depcirtel 126 Aug 10).[3]

2) FYI Dept appreciates Itals attach similar urgency ques revision Ital Peace Treaty[4] for reasons closely analogous those set forth Secy's ltr on Ger relationships. Anticipate that Itals will one way or another learn of ltr and if have not already done so will perceive opportunity they have to assure that progress on Ital Treaty revision keeps pace with progress on Ger ques by blocking action in Eur Army Conf until assured their Treaty will be handled on approx same time table. Also anticipate deGasperi will want discuss Ital Treaty problem during or after Sep NATO mtg and request any info Emb has in this respect.

3) Accordingly, if Itals raise this aspect Emb auth inform them Dept appreciates urgency Ital Treaty ques and will endeavor conclude consultations with Brit and Fr during mtgs Secy with Morrison and Schuman prior Ottawa NATO mtg in expectation three govts conclusions and suggestions may be conveyed Ital Govt mid-Sep.

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Joseph N. Greene, Jr., of the Office of Western European Affairs and was concurred in by Matthews and James G. Parsons, Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, was repeated for information to Paris as 936 and to London as 923.

[2] Not printed. It reported that the Italian Government would not agree to any meetings of the Steering Committee of the European Army Conference prior to September 10. The Italian Government appeared to be unwilling to become committed to any text of a draft European defense treaty before that date. The French Ambassador in Italy was urgently instructed by his government to persuade the Italian Foreign Ministry to instruct the Italian representative to participate in Steering Committee meetings necessary to complete action on a draft treaty in the coming few weeks. (740.5/8–851)

[3] The circular telegram under reference is not printed. Regarding the Secretary's letter under reference, see the editorial note, *supra*.

[4] For documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the revision of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, see volume IV.

740.5/8–1451 : Telegram

The Chargé in Italy (Thompson) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET ROME, August 14, 1951—noon.

750. Pursuant Deptel 722, Aug 11 discussed European army question with Zoppi who stated Ital Govt had never considered this matter and that discussions so far had been held on authority officials or assumption they would never lead anywhere. In view far-reaching commitments involved governmental consideration was necessary before they cld proceed further. Said Itals were concerned since about one-third their budget went for military expenditure and place and manner of this expenditure major economic and social importance to Italy. Until political machinery agreed upon they would not know how control such matters would be exercised. Control over armed forces one of major attributes of sovereignty and he doubted if scheme practical unless there was a large measure of political integration which Italy favored but was not sanguine of accomplishment. He said papers had been given to PriMin to study during his vacation as a matter of urgency.

When I pointed out that attendance steering committee did not involve commitment and stressed bad impression that would be caused by Italy's blocking further action at this time, he agreed to send telegram to De Gasperi for instructions.

From earlier discussions with Vitetti we know Itals are concerned by inability ascertain just what political arrangements French have in mind. They have been evasive in answering Ital queries and Itals fear they are being asked to let the Fr play their cards.[2]

THOMPSON

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris and London.

[2] In telegram 1359, August 30, from Paris, not printed, the Embassy reported that Alphand had been informed by the Italian Foreign Ministry that Prime Minister De Gasperi had not yet studied the Interim Report of the European Army Conference and consequently would not send an observer to the September 3 meeting of the Conference Steering Committee (740.5/8–3051). Telegram 1049, September 1, to Rome, not printed, urged the Embassy to continue efforts to persuade Italian representatives to attend the Steering Committee meeting and to underline General Eisenhower's support for the European Defense Community (740.5/9–151). In a conversation with Italian Chargé Luciolli on August 31, not printed, Western European Affairs Director Byington expressed American concern over Italian nonattendance at the Steering Committee meeting and urged that an Italian representative be present at the meeting (memorandum of conversation by Byington, August 31, 740.5/8–3151). Telegram 1420, September 3, from Paris, not printed, reporting on the meeting of the Conference Steering Committee that day, indicated that an Italian representative had been in attendance (740.5/9–351).

740.5/8–2451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, August 24, 1951—5 p. m.

1184. Dept pass Defense. Subj is Eur def force. In response to your 1031, Aug 17[2] and 1066, Aug 18[3] I will send series related msgs. This one contains my comments on course of conf as a whole. Second cable[4] will report on present status of conf and progress since approval of interim report. Fol msgs[5] will contain comments and analysis of certain major points in conf interim report. Final msg[6] will contain my recommendations on best approach to Schuman on EDF and Ger contribution.

Course of the Conference.

1. In evaluating interim report, it is essential to consider course of conf and background and purpose of report itself.

2. From beginning, it was clear to objective observers that success of EDF conf in creating Eur def community wld depend on whether members could agree, in reasonable time, on plan which wld:

a. Provide effective mil force which wld receive support of US, Brit and other NATO members;

b. Assure equality of treatment for all participants including Gers, who rejected from start any discrimination.

Necessity for speech in working out plan and treaty was also apparent.

3. For several months conf made less progress than it shld have in developing a plan meeting these tests. Work of conf was impeded by several factors:

(*a*) French del, largely on account of pre-election atmosphere, was not prepared fully to apply criteria of efficiency and equality. Thus in dispute over size of basic unit, which received undue attention, French delegation had to adhere to original instructions for "combat teams" despite general recognition of military defects. Again, Gers were certain to reject as discriminatory original French proposal for maintenance by other countries of natl forces outside Eur forces while

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Frankfurt, Rome, Brussels, Luxembourg, and The Hague.

[2] Sent personal for Bruce and repeated as telegram 1010 personal for Gifford, not printed. It asked for Bruce's (and Gifford's) advice and recommendations as to the most effective approach to Schuman (and Morrison) regarding the European Defense Force and the German contribution when those matters were taken up at the forthcoming meetings of the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers in September. Bruce was also asked to provide a short summary on the status of the European Army Conference meetings. (740.5/8–1751).

[3] Not printed; it urgently requested an analysis of the Interim Report of the European Army Conference (740.5/8–1851). For extracts from that report, dated July 24, see p. 843.

[4] Telegram 1185, August 24, from Paris, *infra*.

[5] Telegrams 1265 and 1266, both of August 28, from Paris, the third and fourth in a series of five messages, neither printed (740.5/8–2851).

[6] Telegram 1216, August 25, from Paris, p. 865.

all troops from Ger wld be Eur, and for transition period during which Ger recruits wld have been trained under allied direction while recruits other members were trained under natl direction.

(*b*) Belief was general among Gers and others that US strongly preferred Brussels approach which formed basis of discussions at Petersberg, and did not take seriously idea of Eur def community. It was recognized that active US support was essential to successful creation of such a community.

(*c*) These conditions led to skepticism among participants about real importance of conf and consequent lack of interest by govts. Within French Govt this in turn played into hands of those who may have seen conf largely as opportunity for delaying German contribution, and weakened position of those who sincerely desired prompt creation of Eur def community.

4. Since early in July, atmosphere and attitude of conf have changed completely. French began to take initiative and others to play more active role. This was due to variety of causes:

(*a*) Submission of Petersberg report [7] to govts led French delegation to call for progress report by Paris conf. In taking stock of work up to that time, French del, without a govt, cld not yet change its position on size of units, it did, however, propose and secure adoption of number of other major decisions to meet requirements of mil effectiveness and equality. Certain of these are mentioned in this and subsequent msgs, especially radical inclusion of all troops in EDF from beginning and radical change in handling of transition period to meet test of non-discrimination.

(*b*) Petersberg report itself undoubtedly helped to revive interest in Eur Army. Rejection by Gers of number of safeguards provided for in Brussels decisions [8] led many Eurs to fear that outcome might be substantial recreation of Ger natl force, and that remaining safeguards which Gers did accept might prove illusory. These Eurs profoundly feared that creation of Ger forces under Ger natl control might endanger neighboring countries and Eur stability by encouraging Ger to attempt attain Ger unity, return of lost territories or other advantages vis-à-vis East by direct action.

(*c*) Experience with effort to organize def on continent by coordinating natl programs under NATO was leading many responsible officials to conclude that this method might entail so much waste and delay as to endanger maintenance of essential level of def or to risk undermining economies of Western Eur. These officials were reaching conclusion that creation Eur def community was best way to enable Western Eur to make adequate and sustained def effort.

5. Major substantive change agreed to in July meetings of conf and recorded in interim report was decision that all existing forces of

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[7] For the Report of the Allied High Commissioners for Germany of June 8, sometimes referred to as the Bonn or Petersberg Report, see p. 1044.

[8] Regarding the "Brussels decisions" under reference here, see the Paper Prepared by the Department of State, Pleven D–2/1*a*, January 26, p. 755, and footnote 7, thereto.

member states and all new forces created in those countries for def of Eur are to be included in EDF *from time treaty comes into force.* Only forces to be excluded will be those assigned to def of overseas territories and those required for internal security.

Initial French proposal had been that during eighteen-month "first phase", Ger forces wld be created under allied supervision while French, Ital and Belgian forces wld be prepared under natl direction. At end of that period, first segment of Eur Army wld have been created by amalgamating forces thus prepared. Even after end this first phase, natl forces wld have continued to exist. Eur Army under this formula could easily have been merely a device to keep down or to postpone Ger def contribution.

It was clear from beginning that it wld never be possible to reach Franco-Ger agreement on basis this proposal, in light Ger insistence on equal status. This position meant that if natl armies existed in other countries, Ger shld also have right to purely natl formations in addition to those assigned to Eur Army. Organization of natl formations wld have led to creation of Ger def min with full powers, German natl army and Ger gen staff. Conscious of fact that such a development wld have been entirely inacceptable to French and cld only have deadlocked and perhaps broken up conf, Gers did not press this line of argument; but it was not until concept was changed to include all forces for def of Eur in EDF that realistic planning for EDF became possible.

Furthermore, under initial French proposal, creation of Eur forces wld have meant simply addition of another separate army to existing natl armies. In each country one group of forces wld have been equipped and supported by single budget and production program and single administration, pay and training system of Eur community and another group by present natl organization. US wld presumably have had to provide equipment separately to each nation and to Eur force. Thus potential benefits of common Eur def effort wld have been largely lost and problems of NATO's and SHAPE wld have been further complicated.

6. Interim report itself was prepared at stage when implications of change in French approach and new influences of SHAPE and US Govt support had not yet had their full impact, and show this to some extent. Its purpose was to record progress so far in developing workable plan and to define certain basic issues which remain to be settled before plan can be made reality.

Present status of conf is reported in second tel this series.

BRUCE

740.5/8–2451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, August 24, 1951—2 p. m.

1185. Subject is Eur Def Force. This is second in series of messages described in Embtel 1184 [2] re Eur Def Force Conf. This cable deals with present status of conf work.

A. *General.*

1. Since issuance of interim report, essential effort of dels has been devoted to obtaining govt approval of report and guidance for future discussions. In view of support of Eisenhower, increased interest of US and other factors outlined in first tel this series, member govts apparently giving outstanding questions serious study and attention.

2. Fr Cabinet has appointed Interministerial Comite on Eur Def Force, composed of PriMin, FonMin, FinMin, Def Min, Dep Def Min and three Secretaries of State for Armed Forces. Since creation of new govt, interested mins have been studying interim report of conf and special report prepared by Alphand on discussions to date. Chiefs of Staff Comite (Fr JCS) met Aug 23 to discuss future work of conf on mil side. Interministerial Comite also met Aug 23 to make recommendations to Cabinet for final decision. Results these mtgs not yet available.[3]

3. Specifically, Interministerial Comite and govt are being asked:

(*a*) To reaffirm their approval of creation Eur Def community with all that implies concerning Fr armed forces, Fr contribution to a common budget, establishment of common armament program, and, in general, necessary transfers of soverignty to a supra-national auth;

(*b*) To approve principle that all forces of member countries for def of Eur be immed included in EDF;

(*c*) To accept that essentially mil problem of size and composition of basic unit should be settled on basis SHAPE recommendations, it being understood that, regardless of solution adopted, the basic units should in principle depend for command, armament, financing, tactical support, etc., on integrated higher echelons or auths; and

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Frankfurt, Rome, Brussels, Luxembourg, and The Hague and copies were distributed to the Department of Defense.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Telegram 1082, August 19, from Paris, not printed, reported that Alphand had distributed to interested French Cabinet ministers his report on the status of the European Army Conference and the questions of Germany's political status and defense contribution. Alphand was requesting agreement at the Cabinet level to proceed on the basis of the Interim Report of the Conference and on broad instructions from the Cabinet on major questions left open by the Conference. Telegram 1207, August 24, from Paris, not printed, reported that the French interministerial committee on the European Defense Force had met the previous day on the points referred to the Cabinet by Alphand's report. Discussions at the meeting apparently proceeded very favorably. The French Chiefs of Staff committee also met the previous day and took favorable action on the Interim Report. (740.5/8–2451)

(*d*) To agree to creation of Ger civil agency to handle recruitment, Ger representation in Council of Mins, and handling of def questions before Ger parliament, as well as to creation of necessary Eur agencies to carry out mil functions in Ger under auth of community during transitional period, to extent such functions cannot be delegated to SHAPE.

4. We have no definite info on status of govt action in other countries. Ger del has informed us that FedRep govt would settle its position on outstanding questions as soon as Adenauer returned. We understand that Blank will be ready to reopen discussions in Steering Comite early next week. Ital position is still obscure; however, we understand that under urging of some of its Paris reps, Ital Govt has begun to take serious interest in work of conf and may be expected give its del more backing than in past. In both Ital and Belgian case, Fr del believes attitude will depend on how firm a position is taken by Fr Govt.

5. Fr del hoping call members of Steering Comite back to Paris early next week to begin work on remaining problems on basis of positions taken by govt on interim report. At that time we will be in better position to judge results of govt consideration in other countries.

B. *Military Questions.*

6. Fr have informally requested assistance of SHAPE in drawing up specific goals for total forces, equipment and costs of Eur army for initial build-up period. This is required both to insure conf planning consistent with NATO objectives and to form basis for work of conf, especially in field of procurement and finance. SHAPE decision on this request now under consideration, and will be subj subsequent message.

7. Fr are proposing replace Mil Comite with permanent combined staff headed by senior mil del, to conf assisted by specialist officers from the various participating countries; this staff with which appropriate officers from SHAPE will work, is to be charged with:

(*a*) Working out technical solutions required to complete drafting of mil sections of treaty;

(*b*) Planning system for carrying out functions of community during transitional period;

(*c*) Preparing documents such as code of mil justice, agreement on status of forces, etc., which are either to be attached to treaty or to be placed in effect soon after it comes into force; and

(*d*) Making studies of problems of standardization of armament, equipment, doctrine, training methods, uniforms, etc., as basis for permitting commissioners take rapid decisions these problems as soon as appointed most important, this staff will form nucleus for future Eur general staff under commissioner, and serve useful purpose in establishing common staff procedures and accustoming officers of various countries to operation of integrated gen staff. Fr Govt plans to make

available office space for combined staff in single building so that mil dels can work closely together. Fr have also assigned number of subordinate staff officers to their del. Ger subordinate officers are also arriving in Paris, and Gen Speidel expected arrive early next week as head of Ger mil del. It is hoped that combined staff may be established and start work within very short time.

8. As reported Embtel 1029, Aug 15,[4] international staff and Amer element of SHAPE, respectively, have been working on two most immediate mil problems—size and composition of basic unit and orgn of Eur higher echelons and gen staff. Papers on these subjs expected be ready at end of this week and will probably be presented to conf early next week. These studies should enable conf to reach quick agreement these questions.

9. Work on structure of community and allocation of functions during transition period is less far advanced. Fr JCS now making study of services which could be created to carry out def functions in Ger and of closely related question of how Fr def services are to be transformed into Eur organization. Fr feel these questions can be usefully discussed in conf only when outline of organization of Commissioner's services has been agreed upon. They agree that when this outline is available, work must be pushed on transitional questions.

C. *Financial Questions.*

10. At its last meeting, Fin Comite decided to establish three subcomites to deal with standardization of troop pay, drafting of "fin regulation," and criteria for determination national contribution to Eur budget. National govts have been requested supply necessary statistical data prior to next mtg of Fin Comite now scheduled Sept 5. At that mtg, comite will begin consideration of outstanding questions.

11. Determination national contributions to Eur budget has been subj lengthy discussions at several mtgs of Fin Comite since issuance interim report. Has been agreed that statistics on national income, population, tax burden and other relevant data will be submitted by govt and worked over by sub-comite of experts to insure comparability of figures. Fin Comite can then settle down to work out percentage contributions to be included in treaty. However, dels will certainly be reluctant commit selves to definitive formula until they have some idea of what initial program will cost.

12. Germans have presented to conf a draft for "fin regulation" which will regulate manner in which budget is prepared, executed and audited. This draft now being translated by secretariat and will be distributed to dels this week. It will form basis of work for subcomite, which will be charged with preparing a final version.

D. *Other Work.*

13. Juridical Comite, assisted by other Tech Comites, has drawn up a proposed draft treaty and transitional convention based on interim

[4] Not printed.

report. These drafts have been distributed to dels on secretariat's responsibility as working documents. Emb is working on analysis of powers of community based on secretariat draft, which will be forwarded to you.

BRUCE

740.5/8–2051

Paper Prepared by William T. Nunley of the Office of European Regional Affairs [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, August 24, 1951.]

MAJOR POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT IN INTERIM REPORT OF PARIS CONFERENCE ON ORGANIZATION OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE FORCES [2]

Agreed	*Unresolved*
A. OBJECTIVES AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES	
Fundamental aims and broad consequences of the EDC (European Defense Community) including:	
(1) Purpose of fusing Western European armed forces under joint super-national institutions.	
(2) Defensive and peaceful character of such institutions.	
(3) Most complete integration of armed forces possible in view of political circumstances and consistent with combat efficiency.	
(4) No discrimination among member states.	
(5) Close liaison with NATO institutions.	
(6) Common financial base, supply system and armament program for integrated armies.	
(7) Necessity of transitional period before assumption of full responsibilities by EDC.	

[1] The text of this paper, which was prepared at the request of Ridgway B. Knight, was also circulated in the Department of State as document WFM T–4, August 29, 1951, one of a series of briefing and position papers prepared in connection with the forthcoming meetings of the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers in September 1951 (CFM files, lot M–88, WFM–tripartite).

[2] For extracts from the Interim Report, July 24, see p. 843.

Agreed	*Unresolved*
B. INSTITUTIONS	
(1) Independent juridical personality for EDC, with retention of institutional procedures of Schuman Plan, including: (*a*) a European Authority; (*b*) a Council of Ministers; (*c*) an Assembly; (*d*) a Court of Justice.	
(2) European Authority would have powers like those exercised by any national defense minister over national forces. Would consist of Commission or Commissioner named by unanimous agreement of participating states. Would be subject to both Council of Ministers and Assembly. Could be suspended by unanimous Council decision. Could be removed by Court of Justice on petition by Council, or on vote of censure by Assembly.	(2) Some nations favor single Commissioner; others a plural Commission.
(3) Council, composed of ministers of participating states, would issue general directives to Authority on subjects and under conditions to be specified. Certain unspecified actions of Authority would require Council concurrence. Council would have exclusive power over changes in statutory texts of EDC and constitution of forces. Would require periodic reports from Authority and conduct special studies.	(3) Subject matter and conditions for Council directives, acts of Authority requiring prior concurrence by Council, number of votes to be possessed by each member state within Council and circumstances requiring more than bare majority vote for decision.
(4) Assembly, with same general composition as Schuman Plan Assembly, would have functions of debating, study, observation, and supervision, including power to obtain information from Authority.	(4) Specific distribution of Assembly seats among participating nations, and extent of participation by Assembly in budgetary process.

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Agreed	*Unresolved*
B. INSTITUTIONS—continued	
(5) Court of Justice would have essentially same status as Schuman Plan Court. Competence, appeal, procedure, and conditions for interpretation of Treaty agreed in general terms.	(5) Need for lower courts to handle expected large number of military offenses and civil suits.
C. MILITARY QUESTIONS	
EDC will have air, land, and naval forces. Forces will consist of major units containing elements of different national origins. Major units will be "European" with integrated command, supply, general reserves, etc. Military doctrines would be standardized, "European" schools and research institutes established, and other standardization measures, such as common uniforms, adopted.	Level of integration of national units, French believe largest national land unit should consist of combat team with approximately 6000 men; Germans propose national operative unit of 10,000 questions, such as ratio of tactical air power to ground forces, also unresolved.
D. FINANCIAL QUESTIONS	
EDC would have common budget, made up of contributions from member states on basis of agreed formula. Estimates would be prepared by Commissioner and approved by Council. Execution, control, and audit of expenditures would follow traditional national practices.	(1) Majority required for Council approval of estimates. (2) Extent of participation by Assembly in approval of estimates. (3) Formula for sharing burden among member states. (4) Practicability of advance formula not subject to annual revision.
E. TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS	
Major EDC institutions would be created immediately after Treaty signature but would temporarily delegate responsibilities to national authorities and gradually reassume same. All existing	(1) Matters which should be settled at time of treaty signature, rather than worked out during transitional period, such as status of forces, financial regulations, etc.

Agreed	*Unresolved*
E. TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS—continued	
forces placed at disposal of SHAPE by member countries would be declared European as of a fixed date, as well as forces recruited for NATO after that date. Forces retained for internal security purposes excluded. During interim period actual recruiting and training would be carried on by national authorities under broad NATO directives. During transitional period, Authority and Council would cooperate in development of standard regulations and procedures, etc. Preparatory work would be performed in close liaison with SHAPE.	(2) Procedure for liaison with SHAPE during transition. (3) Length of transitional period.
F. GENERAL PROVISIONS	
Duration of Treaty would be fifty years.	(1) Procedure for ratification and amendment of Treaty and its entry into force. (2) Conditions under which other nations may adhere. (3) Site of EDC Headquarters.

740.5/8–2551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, August 25, 1951—5 p. m.

1216. Personal for Secretary. Re Deptels 1031 and 1066.[2] This is fifth and last in series of msgs responsive reftels. First two have gone forward as Embtels 1184 and 1185 and intermediate msgs will follow.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London for Gifford and Spofford and to Frankfurt for McCloy. The text was subsequently included as an annex to document WFM T–4/2*a*, September 8, 1951, a briefing paper entitled "European Defense Force and the Question of a German Contribution to Defense," prepared in the Department of State in connection with the forthcoming meetings of the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers in Washington in September. (CFM files, lot M–88, WFM papers)

[2] Neither printed, but see footnotes 2 and 3, p. 856.

This contains my recommendations on best approach to Schuman in Sept, subj to possible further comments after receipt his reply your msg Aug 9 (Deptel 905 [3]).

The most effective approach to French FonMin to obtain desired Fr Govt action on three major questions, namely, Eur def forces, contractual arrangements with Ger and an adequate Fr def effort wld be to eliminate possible uncertainties in his mind and in those of his colleagues as to US policy on these questions.

A. In order to encourage progress in Eur def forces conf US shld make clear that its policy is as fols:

1. That US is convinced that Eur def community is most practicable means:

(*a*) To create and maintain effective Eur def with the minimum drain on Eurs econ resources for this purpose;
(*b*) To obtain Ger contribution needed for Eur def with minimum risk of revival of Ger militarism.

2. That accordingly US is actively supporting creation of Eur def community on the fol assumptions:

(*a*) That present Fr Govt is determined to create Eur def forces as rapidly as possible;
(*b*) That since decisions facing the Eur countries are very fundamental and hence require reasonable time to obtain firm acceptance by both Parliaments and public opinion—even if this requires modification of existing deadlines—pressure will be maintained by all participating govts for rapid settlement of outstanding questions;
(*c*) That treaty will be rapidly signed and ratified;
(*d*) That oustanding questions will have been settled in manner to create an effective def force;
(*e*) That Ger recruitment will begin immed after treaty has been ratified and in any case without waiting for commissioner to be able to exercise his full functions.

3. That US will actively support all realistic steps toward Eur integration as best means for effective def, econ progress and pol stability. In particular the US:

(*a*) Will work to strengthen Eur institutions (such as Schuman Plan High Auth and EDF commissioner) as they are created;
(*b*) Will as appropriate act thru Eur agencies, rather than with the member states, in the areas of their competence;
(*c*) Will strongly urge active Brit cooperation and support of integration on continent even if they do not wish to join.

B. In order to obtain French cooperation in working out new pol status for Ger consistent with role as freely participating member in common def, US shld ask Fr Govt to conduct negots on contractual arrangements on premise of establishment of Eur def forces. It wld

[3] The telegram under reference is not printed. Regarding Secretary Acheson's letter of August 9 to Schuman (and to Morrison) and Schuman's two replies of August 25, see the editorial note, p. 853.

be understood that French position is conditional on Ger ratification of Eur def forces treaty. In this way the nonrestrictive sitn permitted by creation of EDF cld reduce controls established under contractual arrangements to minimum. It is preferable to give generous arrangements immed in order to strengthen democratic forces in Ger sincerely committed to Eur community rather than have concessions extorted later by extremists in detriment to status of Adenauer and his supporters.

In pressing this policy on FonMin Schuman it should be made clear that US will take account of extra risks assumed by France and other countries in forming def community with Ger and will urge Brit to do the same. In particular, this will mean:

(*a*) That US, France and, we hope, Great Brit will assure in some way continuance in Ger of a stable democratic order which will live up to its engagements, and

(*b*) That the US intends to continue its support and assistance on which the success of the Eur community depends;

(*c*) That US hopes Schuman will be successful in obtaining rapid ratification of coal-steel community treaty;

(*d*) That, if Schuman raises problems of Saar and developing Eur coal crisis, US hopes he will propose Eur solutions for their settlement.

C. The French rearmament program as it presently exists is a subj of grave concern to Fr Govt. Competent officials and certain mins sense substantial revision and postponement may be inevitable for fol reasons:

1. In their view, additional substantial increase which wld be required in calendar 1952 def appropriations to carry out present program is out of question because econ assistance from US and other countries will not be large enough to provide flow of supplemental resources into French economy adequate to justify risk of substantial new inflationary financing and to prevent serious depreciation internatl value of French franc. Rightly or wrongly there is considerable dissatisfaction with admin of US assistance since bilateral talks last Oct. Revelation that $290 million was ECA figure allocated to French for US fiscal 1952 in light of French plans came as surprise. Assuming additional cuts by Congress will reduce this figure to little more than equivalent of amount necessary to cover their dollar debt servicing, they do not see how US Admin can commit itself to additional help even if it shld wish to do so.

2. In their view French forces have real significance for security of France and for NATO only in conjunction with collective Allied forces and it is questionable whether present French rearmament program provides for creation of type of forces and equipment adequately related to those of France's allies. Opinion is increasing that substantial revisions in French program are required if French build-up is to proceed in a balanced way and to be fully consistent with Eur def force and collective NATO forces.

3. In their minds there is an increasing political and mil urgency for France to make its full contribution to Eur def in view of necessity for quick solution Ger problem. This will require a new

assessment of the French effort in Indochina. The question is very acutely raised as to how France can carry Indochina and Eur def tasks at same time. This relates not only to financial capabilities but also to capabilities in terms of officers, technicians, men and resources as well.

Maximum encouragement will be given France to continue its def efforts both in Eur and in Indochina and to take lead in committing member nations to undertake a maximum feasible goal in EDF treaty if the Secretary can declare that US policy will be along fol lines.

(*a*) To continue to provide such margin of financial assistance thru ECA as wld enable France and other countries to carry out level of def substantially in excess of amounts which wld be possible if plans had to be based only on their own resources. If Congressional action shld not make it possible to realize this policy fully, to be prepared to consider maximum flexibility in use of US funds, for example, by utilizing US def appropriations for off-shore procurement to assist in meeting payments problem, or by accepting broader definition of end-items in mil assistance program. If this is still not adequate, to seek a supplemental appropriation;

(*b*) To assist the EDF conf, and later the institutions of the EDF, in working out a balanced def program to develop in an orderly way over three years;

(*c*) To provide a single program of mil equip and supplies in specific quantities for EDF to complement a single production program to be provided by EDF.

René Mayer, as well as Schuman,[4] will probably wish to raise these questions while in Wash. In view of delay and difficulties being encountered with respect to enactment of aid legis for FY 1952 they realize that it may not be possible to obtain any positive commitments from US in immed future. However, they feel they must begin to seek your views on these questions in connection with preparation of their 1952 budget, which is scheduled for submission to French Parliament during autumn months. In this connection, they may indicate that if it shld appear that an agreed balanced program and an understanding with US will be long delayed, they may have to present mil budget on an interim basis on assumption of no US econ assistance with understanding that voting of supplementary program wld be requested later in line with agreed allocation of tasks and with amount of assistance forthcoming.

Obvious that French Govt feels great concern at repercussions both at home and abroad which wld result from announcement of downward revision or postponement of French defense program.

BRUCE

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[4] French Finance Minister Mayer was in Washington for the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Boards of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, September 10–14. Foreign Minister Schuman was in Washington for the meetings of American, British, and French Foreign Ministers, September 10–14; see the editorial note, p. 882.

Bonn Embassy files, lot 311, McCloy project

Memorandum by the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic (Adenauer)[1]

SECRET [BONN?] August 25, 1951.
D(51)1256

PRELIMINARY SOLUTIONS OF A EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY

1) The Federal Government is fully aware that it is necessary to build up a European Defense Community, and is willing to cooperate with all its powers. A number of essential questions have already been the subject of the negotiations within the framework of the Paris Conference for the creation of a European Defense Community and has to a great extent resulted in a jointly accepted clarification as may be seen from the Interim Report of that Conference.[2] It will, however, take considerably longer time to create the Defense Community itself and its instrument the European Army. For this purpose such a great number of political, military, legal, and other questions must be clarified and settled that the aim may only be reached by careful, detailed, and therefore protracted joint work.

2) Time is short. The Federal Government, therefore, believes that it is necessary and possible to come to an agreement on a number of basic questions in a relatively short time. It would then be possible for the governments to reach an agreement which, as a precursor to the Treaty for the Establishment of a European Defense Community, would permit to make a start with the legal and military measures necessary for the creation of European armed forces without delay. This agreement could be concluded after the signing of the general Treaty being discussed now, and without waiting for the completion of the Treaty for the Establishment of a European Defense Community. Participation in this agreement shall be open to all European members of the Atlantic Treaty and to the USA.

3) The Federal Government proposes that provision should be made in this agreement for certain general and specific items which, in a sense, constitute elements anticipated from the future Treaty for the Establishment of a European Defense Community. Generally speaking this would refer to items with respect to which considerable clarification of opinions has been reached in the Paris discussions. These items would be:

a) to create a provisional European Defense Council as a trusteeship organ for the future European Defense Community. This Council

[1] The source text is on stationery of the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany. The memorandum was presumably translated by HICOG. The manner of transmission of this memorandum to High Commissioner McCloy has not been determined.

[2] See p. 843.

is to be composed of the defense ministers of the participating European countries and the United States. It is to be charged with, and entitled to, coordinating the measures to be taken in the individual countries in the spirit of the European Defense Community. It is to be able to give factual directives within limits to be defined. The execution of these directives is incumbent upon the competent agencies of the participating countries.

The provisional European Defense Council furthermore prepares the transfer of the armed forces of the individual States into the European Defense Community pending the date of ratification of the Treaty or the Establishment of the European Defense Community;

b) to safeguard that all armed forces of the participating countries, with the exception of overseas troops and police forces, are of a European character from the very beginning, instilled with a European spirit, and trained on a European level;

c) to charge the appropriate agencies in the individual States with carrying through the tasks which according to the Treaty will later devolve upon the European Defense Community;

d) to fix the total extent of the German contribution within the framework of the European army.

The Federal Government is of the opinion that this contribution could consist of 250,000 men out of whom 12 divisions with the army troops, tactical air forces and coastguard forces belonging thereto should be formed;

e) to fix the size and organization of the formations of the European Army including air forces and coast guards. The German proposal envisages an armored or mechanized division composed of 11,000–13,000 men;

f) to define the German political and military authorities. As regards this item, the Federal Government is of the opinion that a German Defense Ministry and a superior German Military Authority should be established which would carry out in Germany the measures necessary for the German contribution according to the directives of the provisional European Defense Council;

g) to safeguard equal participation by all participating States in all common political and military institutions concerned with planning and directing European defense;

h) to elucidate the possibilities existing for the equipment with matériel of the formations to be set up for the European Army, as regards time and extent.

4) Measures must be taken from the very beginning to insure that the armed forces of the members of the projected European Defense Community be subordinated to SHAPE.

740.5/8–2751 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, August 27, 1951—5 p. m.

1073. Re Deptel 1010 Aug 17, Paris 1031, rptd Frankfort 1206.[2] Fol is Embassy assessment of probable Brit attitude towards EDF and Ger defense contribution during Sept talks and suggested approach to Morrison.

1. Brit no longer regard EDF as visionary and unreal Fr scheme. Spurt of activity which produced interim report,[3] realization that US favors EDF, and recent press accounts that Eisenhower will support it have had cumulative effect of dispelling some of Brit's original fears about EDF, and positively, of awakening interest in it, at least to point of seeking precise info as to what it will entail. FonOff rep has said Brit still tend to be of two minds about EDF (Embtel 969 Aug 21[4]) and we believe that this will be reflected in Morrison's approach to subj in Washington talks. It is likely that he will come with a reserved and faintly skeptical attitude, but willing to be convinced.

2. To this end we believe it essential that US support for EDF buttressed by statement from Eisenhower be presented to him in forthright terms. He will probably desire assurance that support for EDF will not weaken close US–UK relationship or detract from build-up NATO forces. It will be helpful to assure him that we are not thinking in terms of Brit participation in EDF, and that our commitments in Eur are such as practically to preclude development of Eur, with forces united in EDF, into any kind of "third force" or pressure bloc against UK or other non-participating WE members of NATO.

3. Frank Roberts told EmbOff's Aug 27 Brit consider it essential to have mil talks by SG reps on mil aspects EDF and Ger contribution prior to ministerial talks. Mil talks cld use Petersberg report for technical purposes.

4. Brit mil experts generally tend to be more conservative in their approach to EDF than civilian officials. This is due in great part to historical Brit distaste for continental mil combines. It can be overcome by forceful presentation of arguments listed above (statement By Eisenhower and/or Montgomery wld have particularly persuasive effect on Brit mil) and detailed explanation why we now con-

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris and Frankfurt. The text was subsequently included as a supplement to document WFM T–4, August 29, 1951, a briefing paper identified in footnote 1 to the paper prepared by Nunley, August 24, p. 862.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 856.

[3] For the Interim Report of the European Defense Community Conference, July 24, see p. 843.

[4] Not printed.

vinced EDF most practical method of obtaining Ger troops for west def, since Brit mil have solid appreciation of Ger soldierly qualities and value of significant Ger contribution.

HOLMES

740.5/8–3151 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 31, 1951—9 p. m.

1303. Pass info to Spofford. FYI question as to whether Standing Group reps shld study Report of EDF Conf Paris from practical milit point view, making use of HICOM Report or Bonn Discussions as raised by recent lett Morrison to Sec and referred to Lon 1128 and Paris 1358,[2] discussed with rep Brit Emb today. Regret delay in clarifying this issue.

We had hoped avoid this procedure and thought our proposal for a suspension of consideration of Bonn Report and context of Sec's lett to Schuman and Morrison wld have had that effect. We consider it a mistake that there shld be formal assignment this problem to Standing Group proper at this time which we feel wld not only produce delay in continued progress at Paris but wld also introduce matter in untimely manner into NATO. It has seemed best to us that advice and assistance of SHAPE shld be used at present juncture to make milit aspects of EDF practicable and that, pending further developments at Paris on milit aspects of EDF, there was little of substance for Standing Group to consider. We of course hope that milit Annex to Paris Report will reflect advice provided by SHAPE. Until this is received here there seems little of substance on milit side to consider.

Principal point made by Brit rep was that Fon Mins wld be discussing EDF here and they felt any guidance that cld be furnished them on milit side for these talks wld be useful. Brit stated that they did not consider problem need be referred to Standing Group as formal matter but that national reps on Standing Group shld consider problem on purely informal basis. Request on this basis is of course difficult to refuse. They were unsure as to whether Lon desired tripartite report to Mins.

Question as to whether national reps on Standing Group (as distinct from Standing Group proper) shld jointly and informally consider Paris and Bonn Reports with a view towards providing guidance to

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[1] This telegram, which was also sent to Paris and was repeated to Frankfurt, was drafted by Byroade.

[2] Neither of the telegrams under reference here is printed. Regarding Secretary Acheson's letter of August 9 to Foreign Secretary Morrison and Morrison's reply thereto, see the editorial note, p. 853. For the Interim Report of the European Army Conference, July 24, see p. 843. For the Report of the Allied High Commissioners for Germany of June 8 (the "Bonn Report"), see p. 1044.

their respective Secs of Def and Fon Mins on unilateral basis now under consideration at Def. Do not expect Def answer prior to Tues. In meantime, we are asking Brit here locally to provide Def with more concrete view of what Brit have in mind as result such conference.

Situation further complicated by fact that Fr rep of Standing Group has apparently not received guidance from his Govt.

WEBB

740.5/8–3151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1951.

Following his return from an extended vacation in Europe, Ambassador van Roijen called on me this afternoon at his request. He left with me the attached memorandum [1] containing the views of the Dutch Government on the European Defense Force problem and its relationship to the North Atlantic Treaty. He stressed orally that his government was still far from convinced that the EDF concept is a practical one or that it can be brought into being without extended delays. However, the Dutch are willing to give it a try if the proposals worked out at Paris can be modified in several respects designed primarily to simplify the EDF structure and to avoid the relinquishment of certain sovereign powers in the degree contemplated. Specifically, he said his Prime Minister felt strongly that rather than a single European defense minister with extended powers the latter should be vested in a three or five man executive board in turn responsible to a Council of Ministers on which should be represented all the member states. A second problem which worries the Dutch is the extent of budgetary control turned over to the EDF organization which he said would mean an abdication of its authority by the Dutch Parliament of any control over what might amount to 30% or 40% of defense expenditures.

Basically, however, his government feared that the proposal merely meant a strong revival of French hegemony over continental European problems and a corresponding dilution of the NAT concept. His government felt that everything should be done to build up the North Atlantic community idea which is in keeping with Dutch economic and political traditions rather than the narrower continental concept. He did not wish to convey the impression that his government was against a closer integration of Europe, but it felt this was something that must

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[1] The 12-page Netherlands memorandum of August 31 under reference here is not printed (740.5/8–3151). It apparently was also delivered to the United Kingdom, French, and Italian Governments. Regarding the memorandum, see also telegram 1858, October 5, to London, p. 885.

evolve slowly and in the right direction and his government had doubts that the French plan was soundly based.[2]

I explained to the Ambassador our reasons for coming to the conclusion that the EDF concept is both sound and practicable and offers the best prospect of getting ahead with German contribution to European defense. I talked along the lines of the Secretary's memorandum to the President of July 30[3] and read excerpts therefrom without, however, identifying the document. I told the Ambassador we would, of course, give careful study to the proposal outlined in his memorandum, copies of which he indicated had likewise been given to the French and British and possibly others. He asked that a reply be given him.

Turning to general conditions, van Roijen said he found quite a strong feeling in Holland that the Americans are trying to push the country too fast in defense matters and a lack of the sense of urgency which exists over here. He said that contemplated defense expenditures will mean postponement of the government's much needed housing program and that people are saying "the Americans took Indonesia away from us and now they are taking our houses". I said I hoped some of these people would stop to recall that America had likewise made substantial contributions to the Netherlands, both militarily and financially, which he readily acknowledged. I said I thought the Dutch should realize that the defense of Holland perhaps concerned them as much as the United States. This was true, he said, but repeated that the Dutch have less belief that the danger is imminent and therefore favor a slower and less dislocating military buildup.

H. Freeman Matthews

[2] In a conversation reported upon by Spofford in his telegram Depto 246, August 22, from London, not printed, Netherlands NATO Deputy Representative Starkenborgh reviewed his government's attitude toward a European Defense Community in much the same terms as expressed by Ambassador van Roijen (740.5/8–2251). Telegram 277, September 1, to The Hague, not printed, instructed the Embassy to utilize every opportunity to urge on key Netherlands officials the utmost importance which the Department of State attached to the creation of an effective European Defense Community and suggested that the Embassy underline General Eisenhower's support for the EDC and the impetus that such support gave in transforming the concept into practicality (740.5/9–151).

[3] *Ante*, p. 849.

Bonn Embassy files, lot 311, McCloy project

Memorandum by the United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy)

SECRET [Bonn?] September 1, 1951.

The course proposed in the Memorandum of 25 August 1951 entitled "Preliminary Solutions of a European Defense Community"[1]

[1] *Ante*, p. 869.

seems to me open to objections in respects which I feel are most important. In order to make clear what I feel should be our course I would like to restate briefly: (1) what is our goal; (2) how can it be reached most quickly and effectively.

I

1. The objective is to create effective defense of Western Europe promptly in such a way—

(*a*) that the European countries can maintain and support over a long period the essential defense forces without undermining their economic stability;
(*b*) that it will foster rapid development of a federated European Community;
(*c*) that Germany car participate in such defense without recreating the fears of German militarism which have plagued Europe for generations.

2. By creating a single integrated force under its direction, the European Defense Community will meet these basic tests in the most direct and acceptable form:

(*a*) it will enable Europe to provide the maximum defense with its men and resources by eliminating duplication and waste;
(*b*) it will overcome, by uniformity of training and equipment and unity of command and use, the weakness and confusion inherent in separate national forces in Europe;
(*c*) it will create an acceptance of German participation without distrust;
(*d*) it will be a major, and probably decisive, step toward European political federation.

These benefits depend on the transfer to common European institutions of full power and responsibility for creating and maintaining the single integrated defense force.

II

3. Accordingly, the most expeditious course to the basic goal of effective defense and a German contribution is, in my opinion, as follows:

(*a*) The Treaty establishing the European Defense Community and the Transitional Convention should be negotiated, signed and ratified as rapidly as possible. The Treaty should establish the institutions, and confer on them the necessary powers to create, maintain and use the defense force. The Treaty need not contain all the detailed provisions, but like a constitution, should authorize the institutions to work out and put into effect such provisions by legislation and regulations of the Community. In this way, it should be feasible to complete and sign the Treaty within three months. In my opinion, it is essential to execute first the document of greatest dignity which embodies the

definitive act creating the Community and provides the foundation for its implementation.

(*b*) A Transitional Convention should provide, as the Conference has already agreed, that recruiting can begin in Germany as soon as the Treaty is ratified without waiting for the Commissioner and other institutions to be fully organized and ready to exercise all their functions directly. During this interim period, all of the forces would be European at once, but certain of the functions of the Community have to be delegated to suitable agencies in each country, and training would be handled by SHAPE. The Commissioner would have full authority to supervise and take over the exercise of these delegated functions as rapidly as he was prepared to do so. The Transitional Convention should contain the basic decisions necessary to carry out this program, such as the number and size of units of the European Forces, the number of men to be provided by each participating country, the powers to be exercised during the interim period for the Community by SHAPE, and those to be delegated to agencies in each country.

(*c*) Meanwhile the Conference should *at once* create a military planning staff to begin work on military problems which will have to be solved for the Transitional Convention or by the Commissioner in establishing the EDF, such as regulations regarding organization, equipment, training, discipline and administration. This staff should be fully integrated, should include Germans, and could be the nucleus of the future European General Staff.

(*d*) As soon as the basic structure has been settled, and before the Treaty has been ratified, the Germans would be authorized to begin preparatory work to enable action under the Treaty to begin as soon as ratified. This work might include preparing legislation to create national agencies for performing agreed functions, and to provide the basis for recruiting under the Treaty; selection of people for whatever posts are to be filled; planning and acquiring of necessary facilities, etc.

In my opinion these various measures, taken together, should permit the Treaty to be put into force promptly and the Germans to be recruited on the basis of the ratified Treaty as quickly as could be done in any other way. To accomplish this, however, the French and Germans in particular, will have to devote themselves wholeheartedly to working out the Treaty and solving the basic problems as quickly as possible.

III

In my judgment efforts to find short-cuts outside the Treaty, except as outlined in II above, will only divert energy from the main job, create doubts and suspicions, and delay the accomplishment of the final objectives.

The proposals in your Memorandum of August 25, as I read them, cause me concern. Under these proposals, it appears that German national forces would be created under a German Defense Minister

and a "superior German Military Authority". The only European body would be the "Defense Council" composed of Defense Ministers of the participating countries, with authority merely to "coordinate" the activities of the national agencies and to issue "factual directives" to a limited extent.

The basic objections to this proposal are as follows:

(*a*) It would not save time. Drafting of an Interim Treaty and its ratification would take about as long as a final Treaty in the terms outlined above. The work on an Interim Treaty would only delay the completion of the final Treaty.

(*b*) It would not attain the advantages of the European Defense Community. There would be a German national force and its merger into European defense forces would depend on an European Defense Community Treaty being negotiated and ratified by the Bundestag. The economic advantages of integration would also not be achieved as the experience with NATO has shown.

(*c*) The proposal would endanger the creation of the European Defense Community. If separate German forces were created and a new political status were granted, this would strengthen the hands of all those opposed to a European Defense Community. Having obtained the political concessions, the opposition could freely oppose the European Defense Community. Likewise, with a national force started, many of the military men, who are now neutral or mildly favor a separate force, would be inclined to oppose the "experiment" of the European force, and be better able to stir up nationalist sentiment against it. The nationalists of all types would certainly respond to this type of appeal.

(*d*) In view of these objections, the proposal is hardly calculated to induce the Allies to make the basic change in political status envisaged as essential for Bundestag approval of a German defense contribution.

Moreover, unless safeguards are provided by the integration from the beginning of German forces within the European Army, other safeguards would need to be established to prevent the recreation of a German national army. The latter safeguards would in all probability be less acceptable to Germany from both a military and political standpoint than European integration.

IV

For all these reasons, and they appear to me to be most weighty, I strongly urge that the Federal Government concentrate on the early solution of the limited number of basic issues required to complete a general Treaty for the European Defense Forces, and on the prompt drafting, signing, and ratification of the Treaty itself.

J. J. McCloy

740.5/9–351 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, September 3, 1951—8 p. m.

1420. Subject is European Defense Force. Steering comite EDF conference met this afternoon. Present were Fr, Ger, Belg and Luxembourg dels and an Ital rep.

Alphand opened mtg with statement that Fr Govt considered EDF best road to effective defense and had instructed Fr del to continue work on basis of interim report.[2] Govt had approved inclusion all European forces assigned to NATO in EDF from beginning and has agreed that size and composition of basic unit shld be settled as military question in cooperation with SHAPE. In defining forces Fr Govt expected that conference wld take account of problems created by need to rotate forces in Indochina.

Ger, Belg and Lux dels also stated respective govts had instructed them to proceed on basis interim report. Belgs however reserved position on forces to be included in EDF from beginning, took position that EDF shld include "forces placed at disposal community be member states."

Ital rep said his govt wld not be ready with definitive decision and instrs till Sept 10; also had problem of naming new head of del to replace Taviani. Position to be considered by Ital Cabinet Sept 4. Ital Govt "faithful to basic conception of ED community," and presence of rep at today's mtg demonstrated Ital desire continue work at conference "in spirit wholehearted participation".

Alphand then stressed that in view Rome mtg end Oct,[3] conf shld have plan for political, military, and economic aspects of EDF as well worked out as possible at that time. To this end, he proposed program of work for conference comites during coming month. Dels went over this program today and will meet tomorrow to discuss directives to be given to comites.

Translation proposed program of work fols:

a. Military comite.

1. Size and composition of basic units, taking account of SHAPE recommendations.

2. Application of principle of integration in higher echelons, services and tactical support units, and agencies and organizations of community, taking account of SHAPE recommendations.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Rome, Brussels, Frankfurt, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

[2] For extracts from the Interim Report of the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community, July 24, see p. 843.

[3] The reference here is to the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council, eventually held in Rome, November 24–28; for documentation on that session, see pp. 693 ff.

3. Organization of community, particularly of commissioners' services. This study to be undertaken in conjunction with other technical comites (especially financial) as concerns financial and supply problems.

4. Total size and composition European services on basis SHAPE recommendations (in particular number of units, effectives, armament and cost) and time-phased program for creation these forces.

5. Decisions concerning functions of commissioner during transitional period: Functions assumed immed by commissioner; functions temporarily delegated by commissioner to appropriate services in each country; functions remaining natl; role of SHAPE during transitional period. This study to be carried out with assistance financial comite concerning problems within its competence.

To carry out these tasks military comite will have support of integrated planning group constituting nucleus European general staff, to which each delegation requested delegate qualified reps. This group will have special offices provided by Fr Govt.

b. Juridical comite.

1. Keeping draft treaty up to date on basis progress realized by other technical comites.

2. Preparation of annexed agreement concerning status of EDF.

c. Financial comite.

1. Evaluation of cost of formation of European forces and of annual appropriations for first budget (in cooperation with military comite).

2. Distribution of burden among participating countries.

3. Budgetary and financial system during transitional period: Functions immed assumed by European defense community; functions delegated by community to appropriate services in each country; services remaining natl (in cooperation with military comite).

4. Financial regulations.

d. Further task to be assigned to a new comite: Everything concerning establishment of armament and equipment program and its execution by community, as well as role to be assigned during transitional period to existing services which will carry out these functions.

BONSAL

740.5/9–551: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET ROME, September 5, 1951—10 p. m.

1097. In my conversation yesterday with Prime Min I stressed again interest of our government in rapid conclusion of arrangements with respect to European army. Signor de Gasperi said that Italy was represented in present meeting in Paris and Ital Govt was firmly dedicated to principle integration of Europe, both along lines of defense ar-

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris, London, and Frankfurt.

536-688 PT 1--81---58

rangements, as well as political unification. He said comprehensive plan for integration and equalization of European armed forces at present before European army conference in Paris raised difficult constitutional questions in Italy. The derogation of power and control over Ital armed forces would not be welcomed by Ital Parliament nor in fact was he at all sure that any such derogation could be achieved under the constitution.

Another phase which would be difficult to have accepted by Parliament here was appropriation of funds by Ital Govt for expenditure by some other authority. He said Ital Govt accepted the principle of all of these ideas but that he did not feel it was practicable to attempt to have them approved by Parliament here as he was sure a prolonged discussion would take place and there would be interminable delays largely based upon constitutional issues. He said, and I am not at all sure this has been proposed (apparently only recently has this matter come up to him personally), that Itals want to have a solution to this problem found promptly and one way of achieving this might be to separate what might be called the political administration of the European army from military command headquarters. Headquarters could then be set up providing for international general staff on an equality of status and pay according to their respective ranks. General Eisenhower or his designate put in supreme command, the necessary schools and training arrangements centralized under this general staff, and forces of each country in their present respective national status as far as concerns rank and pay be placed entirely under military jurisdiction of this general staff and whole matter of integrating of European forces be proceeded with immediately. He said he thought this was one way of advancing progress toward unification of forces and command and matter of what might be called political administration of defense forces left for continued discussion and development subsequently.[2]

Signor de Gasperi said that one of the most important elements in obtaining prompt solution of this matter was to bring about an assurance that Germans would make their maximum contribution to defense of Europe. He said in his opinion it was tremendously important to do everything possible to support Adenauer in Germany, that Adenauer was losing in his position as the strongest political leader in Germany today, and that it would be fatal for the whole future of Western Europe to lose Adenauer.

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[2] Telegram 1598, September 12, from Paris, not printed, reported that the Embassy had been informed that the Italian Delegation to the Conference on a European Defense Community had received new instructions from its government which were based on a "strong European approach" and authorized the Italian Delegation to go beyond the Conference Interim Report of July 24 (p. 843) in seeking solutions to Italian problems, especially in the financial field, in the organization of a European Defense Community (740.5/9–1251).

He said probable successors to Adenauer, the Socialists, would make same portentous mistake of building on a nationalist platform which he felt might easily develop into inevitable German strong-arm govt. He said he appreciated that United States particularly was working along lines of freeing German Govt from restrictions and putting them more on their own. He said from his own experience in Italy he felt that that was the only way in which Adenauer's position could be maintained as a real democratic leader of Germany.

I said that we were very much in favor of removing restrictions from Germany and setting up its govt in authority and control, but that of course it was essential that some arrangement be arrived at for not only the defense of Germany but the mutual defense of Germany and other Western European countries.

He said he felt sure that Adenauer would be able to bring about full cooperation of Germans in such a defense arrangement, but to do so he must have authority to act as a German Government and not be continually accused of not standing up sufficiently in defense of German national interests in the face of allied controls.

DUNN

Secretary's memoranda, lot 53 D 444

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen)[1]

TOP SECRET [SAN FRANCISCO,] September 6, 1951.

Subject: European Army and French Military Budget

Participants: Mr. Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister
Mr. Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador
The Secretary of State
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen

European Army

After dinner on September 6, MR. SCHUMAN, in discussing the question of the European Army stated that it was his intention to work for a simplification of immediate procedures in order to reduce any delay in beginning the actual steps for a German military contribution. Specifically what he had in mind was to shortcut the long and involved process of establishing a common Ministry of Defense and the institutions necessary for the political framework of the European Army by perhaps recommending that in the interim period SHAPE should assume the responsibility for recruiting Germans into a European

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[1] Secretary Acheson and Foreign Minister Schuman and their advisers were in San Francisco in connection with the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan on September 8, 1951. For documentation on the treaty, see vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.

Army without waiting for the entire structure to be completed. He felt that if SHAPE was in charge this would prevent the danger of the beginning of a German national army by getting on with the work without waiting for all the involved matters of a political and an administrative nature to be settled. He emphasized several times that the chief French pre-occupation was to prevent the beginning of German armed forces without some direct international supervision and control since they were convinced that once a German armed force began to come into being, if it was on purely national lines, it would continue along those lines and end in a German national army.

Mr. Schuman was particularly appreciative of the support which General Eisenhower had given to the European Army concept, which he said made a great impression upon the British.

THE SECRETARY outlined to Mr. Schuman how vitally important it was from the point of view of Congressional approval of future aid to be able next winter and spring to demonstrate to the Congress that a serious beginning had been made in bringing in a German contribution. Without that he said it was increasingly difficult to convince the Congress that the appropriations for aid to Europe for its own defense would really be able to achieve its objective since it was visible to all that a German contribution was essential to success.

French Military Budget

Both Mr. Schuman and Ambassador Bonnet emphasized the very serious budgetary problem the French would have in next year's military appropriations which would be almost doubled compared to this year—from about 840 billion francs to 1500 billion. They said there was no serious deficit this year but that there would be a very wide gap in the 1952 budget because of this great expansion of military expenditures under the agreed programs.[2]

[CHARLES E. BOHLEN]

[2] For additional materials regarding the concern of the United States with France's economic problems, see volume IV.

Editorial Notes

Secretary of State Acheson, Foreign Secretary Morrison, and Foreign Minister Schuman and their advisers held a series of bilateral and trilateral meetings in Washington, September 10–14, to discuss a wide range of world problems. The progress and prospects of the negotiations at Paris at the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community were considered at the first meeting between Acheson and Morrison on September 10; at the small meeting between Acheson and Schuman on September 12; at the third tripartite

meeting of the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers on September 12; and at the fourth tripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers on September 13. In a declaration made public on September 14, the three Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their support for the establishment of a European Defense Community including Western Germany. In a meeting held in Ottawa on September 16, Secretary Acheson, Foreign Secretary Morrison, and Foreign Minister Schuman apprised the Belgian and Netherlands Foreign Ministers and the Luxembourg Prime Minister of their discussions in Washington and their views relative to the European Defense Community and the problems of regulating German participation in Western defense. For records of the meetings under reference here and the text of the declaration of September 14, see pages 1228, 1256, 1268, 1272, and 1306.

At its Seventh Session, held at Ottawa, September 15–20, the North Atlantic Council was informed of the discussions held in Washington by the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers relative to the European Defense Community. For documentation on this council session, see pages 616 ff.

Prime Minister De Gasperi of Italy and a party of advisers visited Washington on September 24 and 25 and held a series of conversations with Secretary of State Acheson and principal officers of the Department of State on aspects of American-Italian relations and related topics. At their first conversation on September 24, De Gasperi spoke briefly of the problems of organizing a European Defense Force, but he stressed Italian support for such a force. Acheson agreed with De Gasperi's analysis and expressed his own belief that it would prove possible to solve the organizational problems and bring about such a force. For the record of this conversation, see volume IV.

740.5/10–351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, October 3, 1951—3 p. m.

1987. Subject is European Defense Force. First mtg EDF Conference since Alphand's return from Wash [2] was held yesterday. Main purpose of mtg was to review accomplishments during past month and plan work of Conference from now until treaty written.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Rome, Brussels, Frankfurt, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

[2] Ambassador Alphand was part of the French Delegations at the meetings of American, British, and French Foreign Ministers in Washington, September 10–14, and of the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Treaty Council, held in Ottawa, September 15–20. Regarding those meetings, see the editorial note, *supra*.

After welcoming Brit observers and new German military delegate, General Speidel, and reporting briefly on Wash and Ottawa Conferences, Alphand gave brief résumé of work accomplished since last steering comite mtg. Called attention to SHAPE recommendations on basic unit and level of integration, which were acceptable to Fr Govt with minor changes. It was agreed that these questions as well as organization of Eur General staff cld and shld be settled without delay. Mil Com today set Oct 8 as date for staff to submit final studies. Question of total forces to be built up by EDF in first three years depended on outcome work of "wise men",[3] however, French Del wld propose an initial figure to be used by Conf as a working hypothesis. In Alphand's view, transitional problem was most difficult mil question remaining, and help wld certainly be needed from SHAPE in solving it.

Fin Comite had been meeting steadily for past two weeks, Alphand reported, and had discussed org of Fin Directorate under Commissioner, problem of currencies and transfers, principles of financial regulation and standardization of troop pay. No serious discussion had yet been held on distribution of burden because of lack of info re total cost.

In the light of this balance sheet, Alphand proposed that these two comites be given one more week in which to finish work if possible on outstanding questions already under discussion and to draw up a list of questions remaining to be solved before treaty and transitional convention cld be finalized. It was agreed that steering comite wld meet Oct 9 and remain in constant session to over see the work of the technical comites until this agenda concluded.

Highlight of session was speech by Ital Del setting forth new Ital position on EDF (see Embtel 1598 Sept 12 [4]). After profound study he said, Ital Govt was now prepared to accept interim report as basis of discussion on most questions, and to drop a number of its previous reservations. Specifically, Itals prepared to abandon concept of a commission of several members in place of single Commissioner for European Defense, provided commissioner is given several deputies in his major fields of responsibility, qualified to act in their own name under the authority of the defense commissioner. Italians also abandoning insistence on unanimous action by council on all major questions, and wish instead to increase powers and responsibilities of assembly.

On the budgetary problem which they have always considered most serious, Italians are now ready to seek solution through formal surrender by natl parliaments to European Assembly of sovereignty over military budget. They hope to get around problem of what wld happen

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[3] The reference here is to the Temporary Council Committee (TCC) established at the Ottawa session of the North Atlantic Treaty Council. For documentation on the Committee's work, see pp. 1 ff.

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 880.

if a Natl parliament refused to vote its contribution to the common budget by depriving natl parliaments of discretion in this matter. Their views on the detailed solution are fluid within this general framework.[5]

BRUCE

[5] Telegram 2106, October 10, from Paris, not printed, transmitted the translated text of a lengthy *aide-mémoire* by the Italian Delegation to the Conference, distributed to other delegations on October 9, describing in detail the Italian comments and proposals on political institutions and budgetary procedures reported on here. (740.5/10–1051)

740.5/10–351 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 5, 1951—6 : 14 p. m.

1858. London for Spofford, Paris for MacArthur. Re Depto 399, Oct 3, from London.[2] Dutch memo Aug 31 states Neth Gov "prepared support idea linking Eur armies together, although on basis different from that proposed during Paris Conf". Bulk of memo devoted to criticisms important points in interim report Paris Conf and to Dutch counterproposals. Our view however is that note does represent perceptible shift in direction of more favorable Dutch attitude toward EDF.

Dutch apparently came to decision to participate, under certain conditions in EDF with great reluctance. Initial Dutch attitude had been marked by skepticism and, until quite recently, this attitude had been maintained both publicly and privately. Privately Neth Emb officers here explained in detail Hague's strong preference for bringing Ger into Western defense system through NATO rather than through org of continental states. They expressed Hague's fear that with presently contemplated composition, org of Eur army wld ultimately be dominated by Gers or by Fr, either one of which undesirable from Dutch viewpoint. With respect possibility Fr domination, they argued Fr commitments Indochina and North Africa plus commie strength metropolitan France wld make for weak mil outfit. They thus initially saw no reason join in development such org when they were already member in good standing of NATO. This connection shld be noted

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris and The Hague. It was drafted by Joseph W. Scott, Officer in Charge of Swiss and Benelux Affairs, and was approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bonbright.

[2] Not printed; in it Spofford asked for Department of State comment on the Netherlands memorandum of August 31 regarding the European Defense Force problem (740.5/10–3151). Regarding the Netherlands memorandum and its delivery to the Department, see the memorandum of August 31 by Deputy Under Secretary Matthews, p. 873.

memo Aug 31 emphasizes that NATO "remains best safeguard against aggression and more safety shld therefore be sought in first place by strengthening link between members this org, thereby increasing its power and efficiency".

Neth objections to Paris Conf proposals center not on integration concept itself, which they specifically favor at above division level and under direction SHAPE, but on impracticability of three organizational aspects of Paris proposals which they describe as "unified administration of Eur Army, common budget and common armament program". Dutch consider that on these three points Paris proposals go "beyond limits of what is necessary, useful and realisable under present circumstances". Their objections to Paris proposals these three points are followed by counterproposals which they believe wld simplify EDF structure.

Our view is that shift in Dutch attitude toward EDF primarily due economic considerations. This spelled out in Starkenborgh conversation Spofford reported Depto 246, rptd info Paris 385, The Hague 39, Aug 22.[3]

You may wish inform Brit colleagues our view is that Neth can be persuaded ultimately support EDF consonant with basic US approach to EDF and question Ger contribution set forth WFM paper T–4/2*a*, Sept 8. Think this will be slow and tedious process, however.

Copies Aug 31 memo pouched London for Spofford, Paris for MacArthur, Oct 4.

WEBB

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 874.

740.5/10–1451 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, October 14, 1951—7 p. m.

2184. Subject: European Def Forces. Mil Comite of conf has reached substantial agreement on size and composition of basic land units. Report to Steering Comite has been held up to permit working out of certain details, particularly concerning corps troops, and will probably be made next week. Basic air unit under consideration by air working group in combined planning staff; report this subj expected soon.

Approximate strengths of basic land units now agreed in principle are as fols:

1. Infantry—14,300 men peacetime, 16,300 wartime.

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Frankfurt, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

2. Armored—12,500 men peacetime, 14,250 wartime.
3. Mechanized infantry (to accompany armored division) 13,000 men. Need for this unit is still under discussion.

On basis informal request from TCC,[2] conf planning staff now working up list of equipment required by each of these basic units and by corps and army support troops. These lists will probably be approved next week.[3]

BONSAL

[2] At its Seventh Session in Ottawa, September 15–20, the North Atlantic Council established a Temporary Council Committee (TCC) to prepare a plan of action for integrating the defensive strength of the member countries. Contact was soon established between the TCC and the European Defense Community Conference. For documentation on the Temporary Council Committee, see pp. 1 ff.

[3] Telegram 2268, October 18, from Paris, not printed, reported that the Military Committee of the Conference had reported to the Steering Committee on October 16 a paper on the size and composition of the basic land units of the proposed European Defense Force. West German representative Blank congratulated the Military Committee on the "excellent work" in reaching a solution to a problem which had created so much difficulty in the early stages of the Conference (740.5/10–1851). A preliminary translation of the Military Committee paper was transmitted in telegram 2269, October 18, from Paris, not printed. (740.5/10–1851)

740.5/10–1451 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, October 14, 1951—7 p. m.

2185. Subject: Eur Defense Forces. Steering Comite EDF conf adopted Oct 10 tentative paper prepared by mil comite on size of active Eur forces to be built up from now to 1954. In introducing 58S paper to Steering Comite, Alphand stressed that determination of final program was task of TCC; mil comite paper represented an assumption required to permit financial and armament comites of conf to pursue their work.

Figures in mil comite paper are only for active ground force units to be ready on D Day; divisional slice estimated at 30,000 men based on new basic units under consideration by conf. Breakdown of forces by national origin follows:

Country	*Units*	*Men*
Germany	12	360,000
Belg and Lux	3	90,000
France	14	420,000
Italy	12	360,000
Total	41	1,230,000

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Frankfurt, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

Netherlands joined conf too recently to permit inclusion of figure, which will presumably be added later.[2]

BONSAL

[2] Telegram 2098, October 9, from Paris, not printed, reported that at the meeting that afternoon of the Steering Committee of the European Defense Community Conference, Chairman Alphand announced the decision of the Netherlands Government to participate as a full member of the Conference. Netherlands representative Van Vredenburch attended the Steering Committee meeting with a full staff and made a brief speech commending the progress made by the Conference and expressing hope for a speedy completion of the tasks of the Conference. (740.5/10–951)

740.5/10–1751 : Despatch

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL THE HAGUE, October 17, 1951.

No. 721

On October 9 it was announced officially that the Netherlands Government had decided to join the European Defense Force as an active participant and that the Dutch delegation at the Paris Conference would be headed by Jonkheer van Vredenburch, ex-Administrator to the free territory of Tangiers.

The Embassy Counselor was informed by Netherlands Defense Minister Staf that this announcement had followed a Cabinet meeting of October 8, when a final decision was taken to participate. Until this Cabinet meeting and final decision was taken, no information could be released. Minister Staf indicated that the decision had been somewhat conditional and until the French answers had been obtained, it was necessary to keep the entire subject secret. In spite of Dutch participation in the Pleven Plan, it is well-known that the Cabinet and many high-ranking Dutch officials, including General Hasselman, Chief of the Army General Staff, are most skeptical of the usefulness of a European Defense Force as envisaged by the French.

Why the Dutch Finally Decided to Join.

In short, the Dutch did not want to stand alone. Their neighbors had signed up, and economically, as well as politically, they felt themselves obliged to follow suit. Another important factor was General Eisenhower's active support of the Plan, for when this became known, many Netherlanders concerned with the subject, including Defense Minister Staf, believed that his support was reason enough. It is difficult to over-estimate Eisenhower's influence in the Dutch Government and among the people. Furthermore, as mentioned above, within the Cabinet, Defense Minister Staf had been urging participation and

[1] Copies of this despatch were sent to the Embassies in London and Paris.

on lower levels, such highly regarded and energetic officials as Ernst van der Beugel, Commissioner for the Government's Bureau for ERP, as well as others who had worked on the Schuman Plan, all supported joining.

The Embassy understands that when the Cabinet finally decided to participate, it was only after having received some sort of agreement by French that the member nations would look into the Dutch request that there be a clearly understood link between the EDF as a subordinate unit and the NATO as a higher authority. In addition, the Dutch wished assurance that the EDF would not mushroom into another unwieldy bureaucracy.

Why the Dutch are Skeptical about the EDF.

The Netherlands Embassy in Washington submitted a Memorandum of August 31 to the Department specifying a number of questions and doubts in the minds of the Dutch.

Behind these doubts lie many years of traditional Dutch neutrality and abstention from international affairs. In addition, through the years, Dutch diplomatic and economic ties have been close with Great Britain and Scandinavia. Therefore, what Foreign Minister Stikker has described as only "platonic" British interest in the European Army had its effect in the Netherlands.

Some Foreign Office officials are highly dubious of the basic French motives behind the Plan. More specifically the views of the officials responsible for European Army affairs are something along the following lines:

The Plan is brilliant, they say, but only so far as France is concerned. French economy, her government, and her army are all weak and only in her fear of the Germans is she really united. Resentful of the need for economic aid from America, she strives, above all, to tie Germany to some sort of an organization where, militarily speaking, the Germans will not outstrip the French. French nationalism and her desire to develop a "Third Force" in Europe, with France as the leader, have not been thoroughly understood and have, so the argument goes, been underestimated in Washington. This Third Force is not to be confused with the neutrality concept, for it is, these Dutch officials point out, the conviction that Western Europe must become militarily and economically strong under French leadership and entirely independent of any large power.

As to the Plan itself, it is pointed out that in France, De Gaulle is opposed to it and so are the French Communists. West Germany, under the decreasing power of Adenauer is for it, but not Schumacher. Furthermore who can tell if the Socialists will not be in power when it comes time to submit any EDF ratification bill before the Bundestag at Bonn? Italians are so bent on obtaining American economic and

military aid that they will support the EDF just to placate the Americans. And the British are only lukewarm. In brief, they ask, has anyone really thought the Plan through?

As evidence of the questionable practicability of this Plan, these officials direct attention to the Council on Europe, where, it is stated, in discussing generalities, there was reasonable accord among the various deputies. But as soon as specific proposals and resolutions were made, "sparks flew", particularly between the French and Germans. The disillusionment which they allege has resulted from Strasbourg has, therefore, in some circles, a direct relation to the disbelief in the realism of the European Army concept. (See section below on this "disillusion".)

Netherlands States General.

In contrast with the above doubts and arguments, a sizeable segment of the Dutch Parliament supports the Plan. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, by tradition, Dutch Parliamentarians, many of whom are lawyers by profession, have great regard for erecting legal structures and devices as the solution for a given problem. The Netherlands-Indonesian Union Charter is an example. Therefore, the deputies see the European Army, with its higher authority and representative council, as a neatly arranged mechanism to manage a European defense force. Secondly, ever since the war, the deputies have been more and more conscious of a shift in power from the States General to the executive. Sensitive to this gradual loss of power to the Government, they look upon the supra-national authority as an opportunity for Parliamentarians, not only in the Netherlands, but throughout Western Europe, to regain that lost power.

At this writing, any draft legislation favoring the EDF will in all probability be sustained by a Parliamentary majority. The Catholics favor it. The conservative Anti-Revolutionaries and Christian Historics also support, as do the Liberals, the Party of Foreign Minister Stikker. One factor which is largely responsible for the pro-European Army views of the normally ultra-nationalistic Christian Historic and Anti-Revolutionary deputies is the educational effect of the Council of Europe and the influence which those sessions have had among formerly provincial Dutch Parliamentarians. Mr. Schmal, leader of the right-wing of the CHU is an example. At this writing, the Party of Labor is divided but will probably fall in line too. Opposition elements in that Party can be traced to those of neutralist or pacifist tendencies.

Press and the People.

The average Dutchman has little interest and less understanding of a European Army. The press has covered it from time to time, but its lack of enthusiasm has reflected the attitude of many Dutch officials.

Today, what the press needs and is requesting is a clear explanation of the problem and the contribution of a European Defense Force. If the Plan fails, it will be regarded by those practical minded Dutchmen who give it any thought as another good theory which collapsed when put to the test.

For the Ambassador:
PHILIP CLOCK
Secretary of Embassy

740.5/10–1851 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 18, 1951—7 p. m.

473. If decisions are to be taken at Rome [2] on Ger participation in West defense thru EDC, considerable preparatory work will be necessary in NATO as well as that going on in Paris conf and contemplated for big three mtgs.[3] We know contemplated schedule from Byroade and Reinstein.

Byroade's suggestion that Fr keep CD fully and currently informed of developments at Paris EDC conf has been given Burin in Alphand's absence. Understand Alphand will present full report in CD on Monday.[4]

Wld appreciate early indication Wash thinking (and SHAPE's if it wishes) on timing and nature of other preparatory work, including that on question of how Eur Def Force is to be integrated into NATO. This is question which will obviously require NATO attention before Rome and one to which Brit as well as Dutch and others attach much importance. They, like we, are concerned not merely that EDF achieve stated "European" objectives of Paris conf but also that it be so developed as to fulfill less clearly stated objective of assuring that EDC both in short term and long term, will serve common interest of NAT nations rather than becoming possible divisive element or more serious long-range problem. Effective integration of EDC into wider North Atlantic framework on firm basis of common interests appears to be key to situation.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris and Frankfurt.

[2] The reference here is to the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council held in Rome November 24–28; see pp. 693 ff.

[3] The American, British, and French Foreign Ministers planned to meet in Paris and Rome during November.

[4] Regarding Alphand's report to the Council Deputies on Monday, October 22, see telegram 496, October 23, from London, p. 897.

We accordingly welcome indications both in interim report [5] and in Paris 2182 to Dept [6] early discussions on EDC–NATO relations are contemplated. Question however, Alphand's use of word "agreement" between EDC and NATO. Situation of fact appears to be not one of two separate groups but of small tightly-knit unit within larger loosely-knit one and relationship cld presumably be spelled out in EDC treaty and in Rome council decision. (In this connection see Brussels agreement, C6–D/1,[7] paras 10, 12, and 15 (3)).

Fol is our preliminary thinking on problem of EDC integration into NATO. As we see it, problem has two aspects. First is to assure effective control over EDF. Second is to serve best interest of both EDC and NATO.

First aspect is apparently being developed along sound organizational lines with respect to EDF (as distinct from EDC) in that "all command functions and other functions relating to employment of European forces" will be under SACEUR from outset (first para of para 3, chapter I, interim report). SACEUR is subject to higher strategic direction from SG and SC subject to polit guidance from NAC and CD. This aspect organizationally therefore seems to present problem only of further developing NAC and CD along lines already charted into effective instruments for extending coordinated polit guidance. NATO control cld be effective counterpoise to exercise of undue dominance by any one nation in EDC. How effective its control wld be in event, for example, of De Gaulle or a similarly-minded German acquiring leadership of EDC wld depend upon degree and effectiveness of NAT integration.

On second aspect, we believe objective of serving best interests of both EDC and Atlantic community can best be achieved thru development of some form of "osmosis". While EDC will be more tightly integrated than NATO, both, while based on separate formal treaties, are living and developing structures with substantially similar objectives and many common functions. Relationship of smaller to larger shld avoid rigidity as far as possible. There shld be maximum meshing of procedures, free two-way flow of ideas and results, and absorption by each body of practical and beneficial developments in other.

We note that second para of para 3, chap I, interim report, states "establishment and functioning of EDC shld be assured in close liaison with appropriate organs of NATO" and lists fields in which liaison considered specially necessary. Do not believe "liaison" enough sub-

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[5] The reference here is to the Interim Report of the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community, July 24, p. 843.

[6] Not printed.

[7] Regarding the NATO Council document under reference here, see document Pleven D–2/1*a*, January 26, p. 755.

stantively. Furthermore, this may cloak possible Fr desire to keep Ger out of NATO indefinitely. Believe best answer neither liaison nor representation of EDC bodies as such in NATO bodies but rather use to maximum extent of same individuals in comparable positions in both.

This wld appear both to provide maximum effectiveness and to avoid problem of natl vs. corporate representation. To extent greater corporate entity of some EDC bodies might require, some form of supplemental corporate liaison cld be considered.

SPOFFORD

740.5/10–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, October 19, 1951—8 p. m.

2300. Re Deptel 2270 [2] and ref cables from London rptd Paris for info have caused me concern for several reasons:

1. As Dept knows, as US observer I and my staff have been fol EDF conf in detail for some months. We sit in on mtgs of steering comite and sub-comites and keep close contact with French and other dels. I had assumed US del London was aware of this situation and wld make use of this Emb to obtain info or arrange any desired mtgs regarding relation of EDF to London talks. As US del London conducts separate discussions with EDF conference, this is bound to create confusion and cross wires just as individual discussions between US del London and Germans wld compromise HICOM position in contractual negots. In view of current TCC study, HICOM contractual negots and EDF conf, it is obvious that US del London must work closely with officials handling these related matters to avoid misunderstanding and duplication of work.

2. Some misunderstanding already seems to have arisen. As requested your Deptel 2270, Oct 18, Emb asked FonOff about reported unwillingness of French to agree to an informal mtg in Paris on EDF with experts of London dels. FonOff had not heard of any requests for mtgs and stated it wld, of course, cooperate in arranging any informal mtgs the US and UK observers to EDF conf thought

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Frankfurt for McCloy, to London for Reinstein, and to OSR for Harriman.

[2] Dated October 17, not printed. It explained that the U.S. approach to the London tripartite conversations regarding the German financial contribution to Western defense was based upon assurances given by French Foreign Minister Schuman to the effect that the final working out of economic and administrative details of a European Defense Force would not hold up agreement on German contractual relations or the recruitment of Germans into the European Defense Force. The telegram observed that the French Delegation to the tripartite talks in London was nevertheless unwilling to agree to an informal meeting in Paris of experts to discuss the relationship of the European Defense Force with the financial planning for German contractual relations and the financing of Germany's contribution to Western defense. (740.5/10–1451)

useful in connection with London talks. Alphand believes such informal mtg here wld be helpful.[3]

3. Ref cables from London have implied that Schuman agreed in Washington that EDF wld be started without settling basis financial provisions. I did not understand this to be the case. French did state they were prepared to launch EDF and permit recruiting of Germans as soon as treaty establishing basis EDF institutions and conferring necessary powers had become effective, leaving to institutions working out of details without waiting for institutions to exercise full functions. French have always considered the common budget for EDF as one of its essential features.

Your Deptel 2270 appears to be consistent with my understanding as stated above.

BRUCE

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[3] Telegram 1994, October 23, from London, not printed, commented that the first two paragraphs of the telegram printed here involved a misunderstanding. It observed that the U.S. Delegation to the tripartite conversations regarding the German financial contribution to Western defense had made no suggestion that the London negotiators have any discussions with the European Defense Community Conference in Paris. The American proposal had simply been for tripartite conversations in Paris that could include those officials concerned with the European Defense Community Conference. (740.5/10–2351)

Alphand discussed French views regarding a German financial contribution to a European Defense Force and support of Allied forces in Germany with American Embassy representatives in Paris on October 20 and with American, British and French negotiators in London on October 22; see telegram 2329, October 21, from Paris, p. 1656, and footnote 2 thereto.

740.5/10–1851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 20, 1951—6 : 17 p. m.

Todep 256. Re Depto 473, Oct 18,[2] Dept concurs necessity preparatory work in NATO on EDC NATO integration. Suggest full CD consideration this problem *soonest*. Probably after Mon Alphand report [3] wld be too soon, but leave this your discretion.

Our prelim thinking this subject in gen agreement your approach. Fol specific comments are offered.

1. Ref NATO control over EDF as counterforce to undue dominance any one nation in EDC, agree value this concept which shld be useful in controlling Fr fears re Militarized Ger. Suggest possible pitfalls here are that NATO only recommends and does not control; also inherent here is concept full Ger participation NATO.

2. Agree liaison only between EDC and NATO inadequate. On question EDC individuals being also NATO reps our thinking is tenta-

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[1] This telegram was drafted by John L. Barnard of the Office of European Regional Affairs and cleared by John A. Calhoun, Deputy Director of the Office of German Political Affairs, and by Assistant Secretary of State Perkins.

[2] *Ante*, p. 891.

[3] For a report on Alphand's statement to the NATO Council Deputies on Monday, October 22, see telegram Depto 496, October 23, from London, p. 897.

tively that this may be necessity in view of lack of qualified personnel, but that subj requires further study. Wld appreciate expansion your views this matter.

ACHESON

740.5/10-2251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, October 22, 1951—8 p. m.

2358. Subject is Eur Defense Forces. October 19 meeting of steering comite largely devoted to statement by newly appointed chairman of conference armament and mobilization comite on problems which this comite wld have to face. Chairman is Hirsch who had primary responsibility under Monnet for negotiations for Schuman Plan.[2]

According to Hirsch's statement, new comite will be responsible for dealing with all questions raised by economic role of commissioner—in particular preparation and execution of armament program, exercise of control over production and trade necessary to assure carrying out of this program—and problem of industrial mobilization.

Comite's proposals will serve as a basis for drafting such provisions as may be necessary on these subjects for treaty transitional convention and other attached documents.

In introducing Hirsch, Alphand stressed conference's agreement recorded in Art 10 of interim report [3] that common armament and equipment program for Eur forces wld be established and executed by commissioner, as well as provision in interim report that end-item aid received on basis mutual aid program wld be received and allocated by commissioner. In his report Hirsch noted number and complexity of problems which fell within competence of his comite and stated that as general principle comite shld deal first with those problems whose solution wld be embodied in treaty, transitional convention or attached protocol. He dealt at some length with fol points:

1. Establishment of armament program. In Hirsch's view, financial comite recommendation (Embtel 2245, October 17 [4]) that Eur budget

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Frankfurt, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

[2] For documentation regarding the attitude of the United States with respect to the establishment of a European Coal and Steel Community (Schuman Plan), see volume IV.

[3] See p. 843.

[4] Not printed. It reported that the Financial Committee of the European Defense Community Conference would present three papers to the Steering Committee of the Conference shortly: (1) a paper on the financial regulations outlining the principles of preparation, presentation, execution, and auditing of the common defense budget; (2) a paper that dealt with the "transfer problem" that would probably arise from the fact that the EDC would be required to effect in certain countries expenditures greater than the amount of such countries' contributions to the EDC; (3) a paper on the Organization of a financial directorate operating under the Defense Commissioner. (740.5/10-1751)

shld be broken down in some detail meant that broad armament program wld in effect accompany budget and discussion of it by various institutions of community, in particular council and assembly, wld take place at that time. Hirsch did not believe any particular provisions wld be necessary in treaty on this subject.

Execution of armament program. Major preoccupation of armament wld in Hirsch's opinion be to work out powers required by the commissioner for effective execution of armament program and conditions under which such powers wld be exercised. In his preliminary view fol questions in particular wld come up:

(*a*) Because execution of armament program wld have important effects on economies of member states, commissioner wld have to work closely with council representing member govts. To assure effectiveness of execution, however, no formal limitations shld be placed upon commissioner except perhaps as concerns financial questions such as transfer problems (see Embtel 2245). Commissioner shld also be required consult on certain questions with consultative comite representing producers, workers and interested groups.

(*b*) Commissioner wld need power to obtain and verify info to the extent required for execution of armament program. This cld be done somewhat on same basis as Art. 47 of Schuman plan treaty.

(*c*) Comite shld also make clear that procurement contracts wld be placed directly by commissioner and that commissioner wld have full power to supervise their execution.

(*d*) In order to do his job, commissioner wld need extensive knowledge of total production and imports of armaments in member states. Provision shld therefore be made that any manufacture or import destined for non-EDF forces of member states shld be reported to commissioner by member govt in question. To the extent that such manufactures or imports might affect execution of comite's armament program, commissioner shld explore with respective govt what practical measures cld be taken to prevent programs from being in conflict. Manufactures in member states of mil goods for export shld be subject to prior authorization by the commissioner.

(*e*) Commissioner shld have certain special powers during a period of heavy rearmament and hence of shortages in mil goods and raw materials; these powers might resemble those described in Article 59 of Schuman plan treaty. Such powers shld include compulsory orders, priorities and requisitions.

3. Mil research. Commissioner shld have right to fix research programs and to centralize and use info resulting therefrom.

4. Relations with outside organizations as concerns armament and mutual aid programs. Commissioner shld be the normal intermediary between the community and the technical organizations of NATO, as well as between community and non-member countries, on questions of armament which affect community. He shld also, as Alphand had said, allocate matériel received under mutual aid programs on the basis of the community's armament program, as well as assure necessary liaison with international organizations such as Eur coal and steel community.

In Hirsch's view, certain other provisions of the treaty wld also be necessary to assure proper execution of common armament program. These might include exemption for material and supplies of the community from all tariffs within territories of member states, an exemption which might be extended to semi-finished products and raw materials essential for manufacture of such matériel; and some form of special tax regime for these same materials and supplies.

In answer to a question of Dutch delegate, Hirsch added that committee wld of course have to study transitional problems in connection with armament program and particularly question of how soon a common armament program could be established.

In conclusion, Alphand proposed armament comite hold first meeting on fol Monday, Oct 22. On request of Ger delegate who argued necessity of giving further study to these questions, first meeting finally set for next Thursday, Oct 25.

BRUCE

740.5/10–2351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 23, 1951—2 p. m.

Depto 496. In CD yesterday Alphand summarized progress and remaining ques Ger EDF conf. He pointed up problem of EDF link with NATO and considered it especially delicate since "Ger not NATO member". He hoped Paris conf wld be able to submit draft treaty to NAC at Rome [2] although some details wld probably still be unsolved. Port suggested that main point of Rome mtg is ques of Ger and that mtg might well be postponed until final Paris report available. US dep argued strongly that experience had demonstrated disadvantages of trying to wait until all problems ripe for final decision, that Rome mtg might facilitate final decision on Ger and Nov 24 date shld be maintained. UK grumbled and said TCC report wld also be available if mtg postponed to mid December but did not at this mtg press postponement.

Neth dep was worried about tripartite negots with Ger which might affect NATO. Alphand assured him no decision affecting NATO wld be made without NATO discussions and said that Bonn discussions included ques of guarantees beyond NATO Art 6 demanded from occ powers by Ger and Ger reciprocal obligations. Belg asked if was imposing conditions on participation in west def. Neth and Italy requested occ powers report on contractual arrangements negots which Fr and US believe cld be made. Fr argued that Rome agenda item

[1] Repeated to Paris, Frankfurt, and Bonn for information.

[2] The reference here is to the forthcoming Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council held in Rome November 24–28; see pp. 693 ff.

shld be "report of Paris conf on Ger participation in west def". Fr stated and US agreed that occ powers report called for in Brussels decision was given at Ottawa and that principal basis of Rome discussions wld be EDF report. US with support of Neth and Can obtained agreement to retain broader title of "Ger participation in West def".

Chairman said that if Ger participation is to be treated fruitfully at Rome, deps must soon begin to pull together from NATO point of view loose ends involved in present multiplicity of discussions on Ger and particularly to consider ques of EDC link with NATO. Neth commented timing tricky because nec to avoid present NATO with take-it-or-leave-it proposal but also to permit present negots to solve as many problems as possible.

Chairman read para 15 of C–6–D/1,[3] particularly 15(3) in which NAC requested CD to consider recommendations of Paris conf from point of view of NATO requirements.

CD accepted Chairman's statements deps wld be kept as fully and currently advised as possible of all developments on Ger of concern to NATO that subj wld be kept currently on CD agenda and specific problems dealt with as soon as possible, and that necessity time wise might have to be criterion rather than readiness any specific topic.

SPOFFORD

[3] Not printed, but see Department of State paper Pleven D–2/1*a*, January 26, p. 755.

740.5/10–2351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 23, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 502. Re Todep 256 [2] and 250.[3] At lunch yesterday I urged on Alphand necessity of mtg Nov 24 target date for council. While he

[1] Repeated for information to Paris, Frankfurt, and Bonn.

[2] Dated October 20 p. 894.

[3] Dated October 20, to London, not printed. In it the Department of State reviewed arguments against postponement of the Rome session of the North Atlantic Council. It also observed, *inter alia*, that it was becoming daily more clear that the question of German membership in NATO would soon have to be faced. It observed that the French view that a German relationship to NATO be exclusively through the EDC was unacceptable to Germany as it would give Germany a status inferior to other EDC members. It was suggested that the least Germany could accept was a firm tripartite assurance, at the signing of the contractual relations agreement and European Defense Force treaty, that the allies would support German candidacy in NATO. Ambassador Spofford was asked to consider whether Alphand's visit to London would provide Spofford an opportunity "to edge into this problem with him in private conversations in which you would be speaking in a private capacity." It was also suggested that Ambassador Bruce might also wish to take up the matter with Foreign Minister Schuman and other key French officials when the opportunity offered. (740.5/10–1851)

considered time very short, was uncertain how loose threads might best be pulled together and was not sure EDF treaty cld be completed by then, he appeared to agree desirability of mtg target date if possible.

Alphand and Burin des Rosier themselves brought up question of Ger membership in NATO, several times using phrase that Ger was not a member of NATO "for time being". They spoke of it as being responsible for many complications in EDF and its relations to NATO "which wld otherwise be simple" and in general their attitude on subj was much softer than in previous conversations. They nevertheless expressed view that obtaining Fr ratification of EDF treaty wld be difficult in any event and that prior raising of Ger membership might swing balance against ratification. Alphand volunteered, however, that Ger wld undoubtedly raise it before that time and stated frankly he saw no logical answer to Ger demand for NAT representation. We expressed understanding of Fr polit problem and said we wld welcome any Fr ideas as to how Ger membership question might be treated. They had none to offer.

Alphand was thinking of EDC–NATO relations primarily in terms of who decided when what forces shld be committed. While he had obviously given much thought to problem of duality in this field, he stated it was probably "temporary" complication due to Ger absence from NATO. They both seemed to react favorably to suggestion that problem might be met provisionally by concurrent (and adjoining) mtgs of NAT and EDC Council of Mins shld emergency arise, with all members of Council of Mins other than Ger also representing their govts in NAC. They were initially casual about other aspects of EDC–NAT relationships. However, with a view to securing decision at Rome, avoiding adverse repercussions from other 9 NATO members and of avoiding repetition of complications similar to those we are still having over MEC, they appeared to agree that it wld be desirable to work out in CD as well as Paris conference prior to Rome, principles, where necessary in some detail, which shld govern relationship.

It did not appear possible either in conversation with them or in subsequent discussion in CD to fix timetable for deps discussions on Ger and EDC but, as reported separately, it was agreed by CD that subj shld be kept concurrently on our agenda, that Fr and other occupying powers wld keep deps as fully and currently informed as possible on developments with respect to Ger and that we wld deal with specific problems whenever adequate material was available.

Incidentally, Alphand believed NATO shld give prompt attention to Ger unity problem, primarily from informational point of view. Cabling separately on this.

SPOFFORD

740.5/10–2751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, October 27, 1951—8 p. m.

2485. Deptel 2343, Oct 20 (rptd London Todep 250, Frankfurt 2533, Bonn 150).[2] Whatever the substantive merits might be of having Ger in NATO, as far as Parliament and public opinion here are concerned such merits are relatively unimportant and question is primarily emotional and political in nature. National Assembly will in near future consider Schuman Plan, EDF and other items bearing on Ger more or less as single package, and whether or not Ger accession to NAT is understood to be implied on that occasion may make crucial difference in the voting. We believe that if govt is unable to side-step question and if impression gains ground in Assembly that Ger accession to NAT is implied, entire succession of these important measures wld fail of acceptance here, involving disastrous setback to our policy objectives and very substantial loss in time.

The parliamentary picture is this: While Gaullists may conceivably abstain in voting on Schuman Plan, there is every evidence that they plan to make major issues of EDF, so that one must count with Gaullist plus Commie opposition block of over one-third of votes to start with. Of the four remaining groups (the Socialists) is virtually certain to vote en bloc against project that implies Ger admission to NATO, since even now their acceptance of EDF is shaky and they have certainly not yet fully faced up to implications of fact that France and Ger wld be equals in EDF. Given the symbolic value of NATO membership (which Socialists have furiously denied to Spain, for instance), raising it in connection with EDF wld in our view almost certainly drive them into arms of opposition. Even assuming that MRP, as the most disciplined of the remaining parties, might vote solidly for govt in such contingency, which is not certain, substantial portion of RGR and independents are sure to oppose plans whose acceptance in their view involved acceptance also of Ger accession to NAT. Our estimate therefore is that if Ger NATO membership is thought by Parliament to be included in package, govt wld go down to defeat by heavy adverse vote in Assembly.

Govt is aware of this, but it is also becoming more and more aware of compelling necessity of including Ger in NAT as soon as may be possible. Question keeps presenting itself with insistence at EDF conf

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Frankfurt, and Bonn. Secretary of State Acheson departed by ship from the United States on October 25 for Europe where he and a party of advisers participated in the opening meetings of the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on November 6; regarding the Secretary's activities in Paris, see the editorial note, p. 1312.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 3, *supra*.

in connection with use of EDC Forces and with relationship between EDC and NATO, and it is obviously also troublesome in connection with security guarantee in contractual negots. The logic of the basic French European initiative, the complexity of the above problems if Ger is not admitted to NATO, and of course the exigencies of the political situation in Ger which France realizes cld jeopardize acceptance of EDF treaty there, all suggest that question cannot be dodged in the long run.

We ourselves have let no opportunity pass to do missionary work in persuading French officials of inevitability of Ger NATO membership, and feel that we are mtg with increased receptivity. In addition to arguments implied in the above, we have pointed out that it is only means whereby Ger can accept full obligations of NATO without establishing direct military arrangements with non-EDF countries, and that from US point of view it is formula that allows us best to support French initiative for irrevocable incorporation of western Ger into Europe.

We agree with Dept's view in reftel that it is best not to attempt to force issue at this time since that might merely crystallize French opposition, whereas need for simple solution is bound to reveal itself more insistently as discussions proceed. We also agree with McCloy's view in Bonn's 238 to Dept (rptd London 85)[3] where, speaking of security guarantee, he envisages that Sept guarantee shld be left in force until Ger enters EDC "at which time" we cld undertake to support its admission to NATO. We note that this implies not attempting to obtain French commitment on this prior to Ger accession to EDC, but we fully realize that it will not be possible to leave matters simply in suspense until that time.

It seems to us that there is in effect only one way of mtg this situation and that is by gradual approach. We believe Pleven's and Schuman's statements on European Federation were designed to create atmosphere in which question of relationship of one individual European country to NATO cld become submerged in larger question of continental unity. It is true that federation idea will not move ahead quickly enough to solve the problem of Ger NATO membership for us, but we believe in any event it is preferable to work with Schuman and his pro-European-minded subordinates in this matter, helping them to ease [illegible]unce into posit where Ger NATO membership will be accepted, rather than to exert high-level pressure that may find French individually receptive enough, but unable to give way because of the hard facts of the internal polit situation.

What has to be found, then, is formula that can bridge gap between time of EDF ratification and time afterwards when full attention can

[3] Not printed.

be focussed on admitting Ger to NATO without danger of upsetting entire train of agreements that must pass through Assembly here during months immediately ahead.

BRUCE

740.5/10–2751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, October 27, 1951—8 p. m.

2484. Belg Amb Guillaume called secret mtg of heads of del to EDF conf Thursday evening.[2] He apparently indicated that his govt was concerned about recent developments in EDF conf leading to broad grants of polit authority to supra-national org. Belg Cab tended to view that France was pushing European countries into federation through back door. He asked that his comments not be interpreted as Belgium having negative attitude towards federation but only that, if federation was objective, it shld be faced directly. Heads of Ger and French dels were very firm that discussions of EDF conf were within framework of interim report which had been accepted by all dels as a basis for deliberations of conf and that they cld not accept view expressed by Amb Guillaume. We understand that after discussion it was agreed Beg del wld continue in conf on basis of interim report.

Dutch sources indicate that question was discussed by Belg Cab but concern was not nearly as strong as that indicated by Guillaume. It originates in their view with Van Zeeland who claims to be worried about internal polit complications that wld be involved in necessary changes in Belg constitution. Van Zeeland is reported to wish to call an informal mtg of interested ministers in Paris around Nov 5 to consider progress of EDF conf. I have only third hand reports on this subj.

BRUCE

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Frankfurt, The Hague, Brussels, and Rome.

[2] Telegram 409, October 26, from The Hague, not printed, reported that the Embassy had been informed that the Benelux meeting at Brussels on October 25 was called to organize a united front against the European Defense Force. The Embassy was further informed that the Netherlands cabinet was split regarding the EDF but the Socialist and Catholic deputies in the Netherlands parliament supported the plan. (740.5/10–2651) Telegram 595, October 29, from Brussels, not printed, reported that the Embassy had been informed that the Benelux meeting in Brussels on October 25 had discussed the European Defense Force but no decision had been reached. The Embassy was further informed that Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland appeared to favor the EDF in principle, but the Dutch and Luxembourg officials appeared to be cool to the plan. (740.5/10–2951) See also telegram 419, October 30, from The Hague, p. 905.

Paris Embassy files, 400 European Defense Forces : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, October 28, 1951—9 p. m.

2489. Restrict distribution on need-to-know basis. Subject: European Defense Forces. Re Embtel 2330, Oct 21.[2] Alphand transmitted to chairman TCC last night EDF Conference Report in reply to questions asked by TCC and reported reftel. Conference's Military Committee and its combined planning staff have been in almost continuous session since last week to complete report.

Following is a brief summary:

1. *Basic Units*

Agreement was reached on basic units for both ground and air forces, along general lines described paragraph 3–*a* reftel:

Infantry *groupement*—peacetime strength about 13,000 men, wartime strength about 15,600;

Armored *groupement*—peacetime strength about 12,700 men, wartime strength about 14,600;

For air forces, "demi-brigade" (roughly equivalent to an American wing) with 75 combat aircraft in most cases and 48 in a few special cases.

Steering Committee's agreement to these units subject to reservation that "definitive form" of units may later be modified within the framework of general manpower and matériel requirements stated, and in particular (on insistence of the German delegation) that "mechanized" division could later be reestablished by the Commissioner.

2. *Divisional Slice*

Agreement reached in Military Committee and approved by Steering Committee on corps and army troops required to support a hypothetical field army of three corps and 12 *groupements* of which eight infantry and four armored. (This is equivalent to D–day and D plus 7 strength of German contribution.) On this basis, *groupement* slice was worked out at 31,200 men; this includes only *groupement*, corps and army troops and excludes troops in communication zone, which according to SHAPE estimates would raise size average slice by about 5,000 men. Essential elements of wing slice for air forces have been

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London and Frankfurt.

[2] Not printed. It reported that at the meeting of the Steering Committee of the European Defense Community Conference on October 19, Chairman Alphand announced that the Executive Bureau of the Temporary Council Committee of NATO had asked the Conference to supply information on the size and composition of the West German contribution to the projected European Defense Forces. The Steering Committee accepted the task and instructed the Military Committee to present the necessary data by the end of the month. (740.5/10–2151)

worked out by Air Working Group of combined planning staff and will be transmitted to TCC Monday.

3. *Volume of German Contribution*

Agreement reached for planning purposes on total German contribution to ground forces of 18 *groupement* slices, of which eight to be ready for use on D–day, four on D plus seven, and six on D plus 30.

No agreement could be reached on air contribution. French delegation presented figures based on Paris Plan and approved by SHAPE, involving contribution of 1,158 planes; these figures acceptable to all dels except Germans. Latter insisted that to support ground forces of German origin already agreed to, a total of 1,746 planes would be required. As no agreement could be reached within deadline set, Conference Steering Committee decided to forward both sets of figures to TCC and let latter choose. This agreement was subject to German reservation that if lower figure should be chosen, a redistribution of each type of plane among various members of EDF should be negotiated.

4. *Phasing of Build-up of German Forces*

Agreement was reached for planning purposes on a general time-phased program for build-up of European forces in Germany, assuming coming into force of Treaty April 1, 1952.

The French on Monday presented their ideas on phasing along general lines reported Embtel 2328, Oct 21; after studying this plan, Germans presented in Military Committee their own proposal, under which recruiting would start somewhat later than French had envisaged but ready dates of units would be approximately same. Germans claimed this proposal was based upon estimate of when it would be politically possible to obtain approval of recruiting law in Germany and physically possible to establish necessary machinery in view of destruction of records, etc. Plan finally adopted was based on German proposal.

This plan may be summarized as follows: 18 German *groupements* would be formed in three waves of six *groupements* each. Approximately six months following entry into force of Treaty would be necessary for selection of cadres, issuing of necessary legislation and regulations for recruiting, establishing recruiting organization, taking census of population of military age, etc. At end of first six months, cadres previously selected, consisting of approximately 60,000 former officers and non-coms, would be inducted, given three months' retraining, and organized into skeleton units to receive first recruits. These would be inducted during ninth month. Subsequent waves would be formed around cadres obtained from trained soldiers of first wave.

On this basis, first six *groupement* slices would be ready for use November 1, 1953; second six *groupement* slices would be ready for use

March 1, 1954; third six *groupements* would be at full strength on July 1, 1954, would already have received five months' training and could be used on this date if necessary.

5. Equipment needs for *groupements* and *groupement* slices will be worked out for TCC by SHAPE.

BRUCE

740.5/10–3051 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Gaspard) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL THE HAGUE, October 30, 1951—1 p. m.

419. ReEmbtel 409 to Dept.[2] Stuyt, Chief West Coop Section Neth FonOff, says Min has again instructed Amb Van Roijen to review Neth Govt views on EDF with Dept.

If he not already done so Van Roijen will make following points which continue disturb Dutch about Pleven Plan:

(1) Dutch oppose post of Eur Def Min. Prefers some form EDF Comm. Dutch believe even if post created scope auth too broad and lacks sufficient definition.

(2) Common EDF budget wld necessitate revision Neth Constitution. Neth prefers natl Parl reps advise on expenditures common budget.

(3) Believe shld be specific link between EDF and NATO. Also that NATO reps should be sitting in on Paris talks.

Stuyt stresses his govt favors EDF as mil plan or wld not have joined but Neth and Belg fear EDF being expanded into political and econ fields far beyond original concept. Says FonOff does not believe sufficient checks and balances exist in provisions estab EDF Min and common def budget.

Adds Neth Govt now informing Parl deps of plan and implied once MP's aware full significance EDF States Gen will not be as receptive as it is today. This connection in yesterday's *De Volkskrant*, Romme, Catholic Second Chamber leader, urged caution against "heavy risks" of going to work "too quickly" in EDF. This may indicate Romme working on his deps and leaders to examine EDF carefully.

Stuyt contends Benelux mins mtg Brussels Oct 25 was "only exchange views." He confirms purpose mtg called by Belg Amb Guillaume Oct 24 as described Paris tel 2484 to Dept Oct. 27.[3]

GASPARD

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Brussels, London, and Paris.
[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 902.
[3] *Ante*, p. 902.

740.5/10–3051 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 30, 1951—6:50 p. m.

578. Paris tel 2483 Oct 27.[2] Van Roijen called on Perkins Oct 30 to discuss Schuman remarks about Eur federation before Fon Press Assoc last Thurs. He said that The Hague thought than an effort to create an Eur polit assoc at this time was going too far too fast and that Schuman's newest idea gave Hague some cause to review whole idea of EDF. He said that Hague had come a long way in resolving its original misgivings about EDF essentially down to two points, namely, question of common defense budget and question whether there shld be a single high commissioner for defense or a defense comite of three. He argued strongly for Dutch view that estab of a common Eur defense budget wld raise so many polit and constitutional problems as to make it difficult to see how Neth Parliament cld accept it. As for Dutch idea that there shld be a comite of three instead of a high commissioner for defense, he argued vigorously that members of a comite wld be more representative of the several interests involved and two members of such a comite cld be expected to have a realistic, sound and moderating influence on its chairman.

With respect Schuman's remarks of last Thurs, Perkins read extracts from Bruce's tel 2483. Van Roijen appeared somewhat less worried when he heard that neither Pleven's nor Schuman's recent speeches shld be considered as constituting new Fr initiative. He seemed particularly relieved to hear that Fr govt is still undecided how and when federation plan is to be formally launched.

With respect van Roijen's remarks re EDF, Perkins replied along lines US has been fol since Ottawa and spelled out in some detail why, from US point of view, we considered it desirable that participants get on with job of bringing EDF into being.

In light of reports contained Hague's 409, Oct 26, Paris' 2484 Oct 27, and Brussels 595, Oct 29,[3] gen tenor of van Roijen's remarks gave some reason believe Dutch may be looking for some excuse back out of EDF, pulling Benelux partners with them, unless their views in opposition to common budget and high commissioner can be met. Embs Paris, Hague and Brussels requested continue report fully any further developments this direction.

WEBB

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[1] This telegram, which was repeated for information to Brussels and Paris, was drafted by Scott and approved by Perkins.

[2] In a speech to foreign correspondents in Paris on October 25, Foreign Minister Schuman proposed that the question of European political federation be taken up at the November session of the Council of Europe. Prime Minister Pleven had made similar remarks in a speech at Marseille several days earlier. The telegram under reference here reported Schuman's explanation of his speech to Ambassador Bruce.

[3] Telegrams 409, October 26, from The Hague and 595, October 29, from Brussels, not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 902.

740.5/10–3151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Millard) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET BRUSSELS, October 31, 1951—7 p. m.

616. Re Eur army—in reply to my questions Van Zeeland, who had been unable to receive me until today, gave me fol info: Benelux talk on Eur army was only an exchange of views and no decisions reached. He described these views as "parallel."

He said for several weeks he had been urging, thus far without success, that the Mins of EDF countries shld meet to exchange views. Technical comites had been discussing details based on working paper on which, as he had explained at Ottawa, he reserved his position. Some of the recommendations arrived at in technical comites met with his approval; others did not.

He insisted that his position vis-à-vis EDF was not changed either one way or another. He is in favor EDF. He fully agrees on basic force units but wld not accept a Eur Def Min since this implied powers equal to that of Mins of EDF countries. He did not like the idea of an assembly as he considered that this wld waste time but if the others insisted he wld reluctantly consent.

He wants an EDF org analogous to NATO and Council of Eur, controlled by Mins. These Mins in turn cld appoint commissioners but there need not necessarily be one for each country.

He had instructed Belg reps on technical commissions to withhold further expression of views until he cld obtain consent of EDF Mins to an exchange of views between them.

Asked how Schuman felt on such exchange of views, he said he did not know as he had as yet recd no reply. He did not think there was necessarily any wide divergence of opinion between the various Mins but was most positive he wld not move further until such exchange of views cld take place. He did not foresee difficulty in arriving at mutually agreeable conclusions at such mtg, after which directives cld be sent to technical comites and the work cld proceed.

He said several times it is the method, not the objective, which he is against. Technical comites had proceeded too far without directives and he regarded this as putting cart before horse and running the danger of arriving at a point where govts wld be confronted with a take it or leave it situation with injury to whole scheme and embarrassment to all govts concerned not only to Belg.

Van Zeeland expects to proceed to Paris afternoon Nov 5 and hoped mtg cld be held that evening or on Nov 6; adding that mtg cld be informal if the Mins so prefer.

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[1] Repeated for information to London, Paris, and The Hague.

Asked re effect the Dutch position wld have on Belg, he said it wld be very difficult for Belg to go along without Dutch. He wld like to see Brit and Scandinavian countries included.

Except as stated above that in gen Belg and Dutch views were "parallel," I was unable to draw out of him any specific statement regarding reported Belg fear that EDF might be expanded into polit and econ fields far beyond the original concept as mentioned in The Hague's tel 28 October 30.[2]

Asked re chances of approval by Belg Parl of EDF, he said provided his major thesis of control by Mins wld be agreed upon, he regarded chances of passage in Parl as 6 or 7 to 10.

Asked reviews on whether the Belg constitution wld have to be amended, Van Zeeland said in his opinion, and it wld be position of his govt, EDF is neither provided for nor prohibited by the constitution and that Parl cld properly approve Belg participation in EDF. It wld be "hopeless" he added, to attempt amendment of constitution before passage of necessary legislation, but advocated such amendment later to clear up any doubts as to constitutionality of EDF and Schuman plan (latter reported separate tel).

MILLARD

[2] Same as telegram 419, October 30, from The Hague, p. 905.

740.5/11–151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, November 1, 1951—2 p. m.

2585. Subject: European Defense Forces. Re Embtel 2489 rptd London 631, Frankfort 314.[2] French authorities, particularly defense authorities, have been in disagreement with acceptance by EDF conf of 18 *groupements* for proposed German contribution to EDF. Their position is that French delegation exceeded its instructions in agreeing to number of *groupements* greater than that proposed by Germans in Petersberg report and in Paris conference. French position arises in part because French authorities, in face of serious balance of payments crisis and increasing demands for Indochina, are convinced that size of their own defense program in Europe will have to be reduced even more than reduction that was inevitable when previous requests of French Defense Minister were confronted by French financial capabilities in TCC analysis.

After advance notification to SHAPE that French could not proceed unless figures for German contribution were reduced, Alphand

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London and Frankfurt with a request that distribution be restricted.

[2] Dated October 28, p. 903.

made following statement to Steering Committee EDF Conference Oct 31; he had recd, he said indication from TCC on cost of German contribution, based on the 12 *groupement* and the 18 *groupement* figures. TCC estimated 12 *groupements* plus corresponding Naval and Air Forces would cost around 11 billion dollars, and 18 *groupements*, with naval and air support, around 16 billion dollars. In light these facts, he believed that conference would have to take a more realistic view of what was possible; otherwise, in projecting planning from now until 1954, total cost of German contribution would be so great as to create discouragement re possibility of building European forces at all.

Alphand therefore proposed that conference agree, both for its own and for TCC planning purposes, to return to original figure of 12 *groupements* for initial German contribution to be built between now and 1954, a figure which was within capabilities of European community. He asked Steering Comite to agree to this proposal.

In reply, Blank recalled that 12 *groupement* figure had been proposed by Germans, both at Petersberg and in Military Committee of Paris conf. He was of firm opinion that as a matter of principle all member countries should make maximum effort and maximum contribution within their means. But in his opinion, it would not be possible to build more than 12 *groupements* of German origin during period from now until 1954, if only because necessary manpower in classes of military age would not be available. He agreed that conference must take realistic view and therefore approved Alphand's proposal.

Alphand replied that he entirely agreed that every member country should make maximum effort and added that if European community could build more forces than provided under present conference plans, it would do so. But he feared that if, taking into account political, financial and social situation in member countries, they tried to do too much, result might only be to disappoint all concerned, and particularly their American friends whose help was so essential for the defense of Europe.

In reply to Alphand's request for comment, SHAPE observer stated that SHAPE was fully aware of the problem which Alphand had raised. SHAPE could not modify its estimate or military requirements, which was based upon overall strategy and upon SHAPE estimate of what was needed to support that strategy. However, SHAPE would have to accept conference's decision as to financial capabilities of member states.

As other delegations raised no objection, Steering Committee decision was referred to Military Committee with instructions to modify agreed phasing plan accordingly. Conference decision and this modified plan will be reported by Alphand to TCC without delay.

BRUCE

740.5/10–2751 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 1, 1951—8:50 p. m.

2613. For Bruce and MacArthur. Ref: Paris 2485, rptd London 629, Frankfort 312, Bonn 43,[2] and Depto 508, rptd Paris 839, Bonn 38, Frankfort 270.[3]

Dept most appreciative Embtel 2485 with its excellent analysis of probable Fr reaction to Ger membership in NATO and is requesting similar analysis Ger polit scene to determine extent Ger can be pushed on accepting now something less than full equality including NATO membership.[4]

Since Dept understands possibility exists Ger might accept EDF membership only on basis positive tripartite assurance to support Ger's NATO candidacy, if not prior to Ger EDF commitment almost immediately thereafter, and since apparently even implication Ger membership in NATO might cause fall of Fr Govt which therefore may not give NATO assurance desired by Gers, it seems we are reaching impasse.

Dept has considered UK suggestion (Depto 508) for tripartite discussion EDC–NATO relationship but believes little can be accomplished talking to Alphand as he already fully cognizant problem. Re full dress CD discussion EDC–NATO relationship, wld appreciate ur views whether this wld embarrass Alphand with Fr Govt at this time owing to inevitability whole Ger–NATO question arising this outside forum. Dept believes next step toward resolving this issue and thereby

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by European Regional Affairs Director Martin and John L. Bernard of the Office of European Regional Affairs, was concurred in by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bonbright and German Political Affairs Director Laukhuff, and was approved for transmission by Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews, was repeated for information to London, Bonn, and Frankfurt.

[2] Of October 27, p. 900.

[3] Dated October 25, from London, not printed. It reported that the British preferred an early tripartite discussion of the EDC–NATO relationship prior to consideration of the question by the NATO Council Deputies. British thinking on the question generally paralleled the views set forth in telegram Depto 473, October 18, from London, p. 891. (740.5/10–2551)

Telegram 2738, November 6, to Paris, repeated to London, informed that the British Embassy in Washington had proposed in an *aide-mémoire* of October 31 that informal official talks be held in London and Paris on the relationship between EDC and NATO and on the procedure for handling at the forthcoming Rome session of the North Atlantic Council the expected report from the European Defense Community Conference (740.5/11–651).

[4] Telegram 2789, November 2, to Frankfurt, requested the best estimate by the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany of the possibility (1) of persuading Chancellor Adenauer to accept an arrangement providing for German entry into the European Defense Community on the understanding that the question of German membership in NATO would be held in abeyance until the relationship of the European Defense Force to NATO could be worked out and (2) of obtaining German Bundestag approval of such an arrangement if Adenauer accepted it (740.5/10–2651). For the reply to this request see telegram 351, November 9, from Bonn, p. 1576.

preparing for useful NATO consideration of EDF–NATO problem, in view of Sec's presence Paris, wld be *personal* talk Sec–Schuman on basis Sec's letter to Schuman and Morrison giving our support to EDF within NATO framework. (Deptel Paris 905 Aug 9 [5])

Suggest this talk with Schuman cover following: (*a*) What is Schuman's understanding concerning timing in creation of EDF and extent agreement on terms of essential treaty that could provide basis NATO consideration and also could cover this area in Ger contractual talks? (*b*) How does he intend to handle Fr parliamentary opposition to probable Ger insistence on NATO equality, either as prerequisite to Ger participation in EDF and Contractual Arrangements, or in near future assuming Ger acceptance of these on basis assurance of tripartite support eventual Ger candidacy NATO? Dept believes point shld be stressed to Schuman that whole concept EDF in jeopardy on this issue and that US urgently desires help him overcome difficulties.[6]

London and Bonn please comment to Paris for Sec and rpt to Dept.

WEBB

[5] See footnote 1, p. 1164. Regarding the Secretary of State's letter of August 9 under reference here, see also the editorial note, p. 853.

[6] Secretary Acheson does not appear to have held a private conversation with Foreign Minister Schuman regarding the European Defense Community. The topic was discussed at Acheson's meeting with Schuman and Eden in Paris on November 22, regarding which see the editorial note, p. 932.

740.5/11–251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, November 2, 1951—1 p. m.

2602. Subj is Eur Def Forces. In confidential conversation, member Ger del EDC conf told us that at another secret mtg of del chiefs, Belg Amb had renewed in stronger terms line of argument described Embtel 2484, Oct 27 [2] (rptd London 628, Frankfurt 311, Brussels 62) expressing doubt that his govt cld permit him to continue to work on basis of such broad grants of authority to supranational institutions. Belg del took exception to a number of points on which until now conf believed agreement had been reached.

In particular, Belgs reported to object to establishment any form of real common budget or burden-sharing, preferring a "defense fund" composed of contributions volunteered by member states to cover certain common expenditures, with each member continuing to pay and supply its own troops. Belg Amb also seems to have insisted that full responsibility for procurement should remain with national govts and

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Frankfurt, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, and Luxembourg.

[2] *Ante*, p. 902.

that commissioner shld be required to work through natl govts in the performance of his responsibilities. In short, as our informant put it, "anything which is necessary to create a real Eur Army, the Belgs do not want".

Fol this mtg, Belg del expected to play relatively passive role in conf and take a general reservation on all past and future conf decisions. (This report was confirmed in gen terms by member of conf secretariat, who added that Belg Govt position against granting sovereignty to supranational bodies because of Belg constitutional question may be extended to Schuman Plan.)

Our informant stated that while members of German delegation to conf continue to support concept of a real Eur def community with all necessary powers, they are having considerable difficulties with various admin in Bonn, who as our informant put it "have not been subj to Paris atmosphere". Number of Ger officials seem to be taking a position not very different from that of Belg; in particular, they are insisting that commissioner shld be required to work exclusively through natl govts of member states. Some of these officials even seem to favor a system whereby all contacts of European commissioner with natl govts wld be channeled through natl Def Ministers, who wld sit on council and also be responsible for transmitting gen directives of commissioner to the financial, econ, procurement and other agencies of natl govts. Members of Ger del have returned to Bonn this weekend to thrash out these questions, and may have a definite decision before their return Nov 6.

During same conversation, our informant indicated that Ger counter-proposal on initial period (in reply to French proposal described Embtel 2328, Oct 21 rptd London 585, Frankfurt 282 [3]) will be presented to conference next week. He indicated that Gers cld not accept French idea that first echelon of Ger-origin units shld be created and trained by existing Eur and NATO units in Ger, and that for polit reasons they wld like to start putting volunteers in uniform prior to Ger ratification. Proposal appears to involve creation, during period fol signature and before ratification EDC treaty, of some types of defense agencies in Ger under gen supervision of an interim committee representing member states, which wld act as "trustee" for future community. Within this framework, cadres necessary for raising first echelon of Ger forces wld engaged on volunteer basis and given necessary training. Recruiting by compulsory service cld not, however, start until some time after treaty came into effect, as recruiting law and

[3] Not printed. It reported that the French Delegation to the European Defense Community Conference had shown Embassy representatives a preliminary study on the handling of problems envisaged during the initial period of building up European Defense Forces including the buildup of German forces. (740.5/10–2151)

regulations cld not be put through Bundestag until treaty had been ratified. This is confirmed by Speidel's statement in mil committee. (Section 4 Embtel 2489, Oct 28 [4]) that recruiting cld not begin until six or eight months after effective date of treaty because of time required to pass law, issue regulations, set up machinery and take census of men of mil age.

Details of proposed agencies and method of training, paying and equipping first recruits were not clear from discussion, as our informant either did not know or wld not discuss them. However, he indicated that proposal had been discussed with unspecified Americans in Bonn, and had recd certain support.

BRUCE

[4] *Ante*, p. 903.

740.5/11–751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, November 7, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 580. Re Depto 508. Hoyer-Millar and Hood yesterday amplified to us UK thinking on EDC–NATO relationship in fol terms:

Basic criteria for EDC must be that it strengthen rather than weaken def of West Eur. This was stated in Brussels decision and was at least as important for EDC nations as for UK and US. EDC–NATO relations must be such as to insure immed and effective use of EDF under SACEUR in event of aggression in Eur since otherwise US and UK forces wld be only substantial ones immediately available. Situation wld be satis if chain of auth were clear and unbroken with EDF under SACEUR, SACEUR under higher strategic guidance of SG, and SG subj of polit guidance of NAC. It wld not be satis if chain of auth were complicated by necessity for other action by EDC on basis unanimity since this wld permit Ger or any other one nation to immobilize at least temporarily all available NATO forces on the continent except US and UK.[2]

SPOFFORD

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris, Bonn, and Frankfurt.

[2] In telegram Secto 22, November 8, from Paris, Assistant Secretary of State Perkins, who was serving as an adviser to Secretary Acheson in his talks with the French and British Foreign Ministers in Paris, reported that during a conversation that morning, Sir Pierson Dixon confirmed that the British Government had not changed its opinion regarding Germany's eventual admission into NATO, but he indicated clearly the British feeling that such admission would have to be postponed for some time. Dixon in particular expressed great concern that a dramatic entrance into NATO by Germany would cause "serious trouble" with the Soviet Union. (740.5/11–851)

740.5/11-851 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, November 8, 1951—5 p. m.

2727. Subj is Eur def forces.

1. At November 6 mtg EDC conf armaments comite,[2] Belg del stated with some apparent embarrassment that since it was for the present, at least, the position of the Belg del that NAT force contributions to EDF wld be nationally trained and nationally equipped, he must enter a general reservation concerning all efforts of comite to determine commissioner's powers to establish and execute a common armament program. He added that he was quite aware that this position was completely inconsistent with the whole tenor of the discussions, and consequently that he did not intend to adhere to it in detail as the discussions progressed. The French chairman, Hirsch, immed replied that, as the Belg del had stated, the Belg position was so completely at variance with discussion of common program that the comite wld merely have to take note of the Belg reservation. Since this exchange Belg del has taken comparatively little part in the discussions.

The Dutch del stated that at a later time Dutch del might wish to enter certain reservations but for present wld not do so. Dutch del has been extremely active and constructive in suggestions concerning estab and execution of armament program; on the whole his position has not varied greatly from that of the French chairman.

Ital del has in general supported French chairman's position.

Position of Ger del not altogether clear.

2. At November 8 mtg, Dutch del declared that whole del wld meet next week in Hague to arrive at agreed position on major issues now being discussed in armaments and financial comite; and therefore requested that there be no meeting of comite during forthcoming week. Ger del added that his del also wld like to use coming week to reach agreed positions on a number of outstanding issues. Belg del said that he hoped his del cld make a statement on its position next week or week after.

BRUCE

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London and Frankfurt.

[2] Regarding the establishment of the Armament and Mobilization Committee of the European Defense Community Conference, see telegram 2358, October 22, from Paris, p. 895.

740.5/11–951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, November 9, 1951—noon.

2750. Subj is EDF. At meetings on November 6 and 7, EDF conf Steering Comite adopted texts of 14 articles of prospective EDF treaty. This in addition to a preamble and two articles previously agreed to. Comite also set schedules for resolution by heads of delegations, assisted as may be appropriate by legal or mil advisers of remaining issues before conf.

Articles adopted deal with. Creation of supra-national community; principle of non-discrimination; juridical personality of the Assembly; creation of a high court of the community; time limits for appeals to the court; enforcement of a judgment of the court nullifying an action taken by the executive; giving the court interlocutory equity powers; giving the court jurisdiction to hear disputes between member states arising under the treaty; providing for an annexed protocol to contain a code of the court; extending necessary privileges and immunities to the institutions of the community; providing for a convention on transitional provisions; procedure for amending the treaty; procedure for adherence of other states to EDC; providing the treaty is to be in the French language; providing that original text is to be deposited in Paris.

Steering Comite also explored several other matters. In discussion of protection to be extended by EDF to member-states against internal threats to their security, it was agreed that national components might be released upon request of a member-state to meet such threats and that EDF as such wld be available in case of natural catastrophe, but not necessarily, according to Alphand, in case of political troubles.

German delegate (Blank) thereupon said that his country wld play host to large number of troops of many nationalities and that threats, whether or not political, to security of FedRep wld at same time be threats to security of troops stationed in Western Germany. For that reason he favored using EDF troops as such is adopted each member-state shld be required to give its opproval before troops of its nationality cld be used to quell an internal disturbance in another state.

Comite was also asked whether in stating that protection of territory of member-states wld be a mission of EDF it shld be mentioned that this measure wld be carried out in coordination with NATO.

Steering Comite also discussed at length question of whether community executive arm shld be a single commissioner or a cabinet-like group. Blank proposed appointing a group of at least 3 persons, one of

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg.

whom wld take precedence as a sort of Prime Minister (Blank mentioned example of German Chancellor who has authority to issue policy directives but under whom Ministers within the limits of those directives exercise individual responsibilities). The other two members of the group wld be charged one with mil matters and the other with econ and finan. Blank emphasized very strongly that in his view the man responsible for mil matters shld be a civilian. Finally, he stated that he was not set on any of the details of his proposals; not even on the principle of "cabinet" rather than Prime Minister responsibility. His only essential point was that he thought the community's executive body shld contain in positions of real dignity and authority nationals of at least three of the member-states. He added that terms of office cld be set at something like three years so that nationality of members of executive cld be rotated. This proposal received very sympathetic hearing from Ital and Dutch delegates. Belgs seemed opposed and Alphand suites strongly stated French preference for a single responsible commissioner, able to act with speed in time of emergency. It was decided to discuss the matter again at end of this week on basis of papers to be prepared by several delegations.

BRUCE

740.5/11–1351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET ROME, November 13, 1951—7 p. m.

243. Taviani, Under Secy for Fon Affairs, informed me today he is leaving for Paris tomorrow to attend the next meeting of the comite on the European Defense Force. He stated he did not think the EDF could be brought into being unless the US took an active role in forcing agreement on the outstanding issues. He pointed out that failure to create the EDF would probably mean no German mil contribution to NATO.

According to Taviani there are three proposals under consideration. The first amounts to European federation. The second which is advocated by Alphand would have national parliaments voting funds to be spent by a European organization. He believes that Schuman realizes that this plan is not practicable. The third proposal would be for national govts to provide units up to divisions with a command structure provided by national govts allocating funds to a central comite. In Taviani's opinion only the first or third proposals are workable. The Ital Govt is committed to the first and will continue to press for federation, he considers that if this is not possible and he seems to

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to the Department of State as 2127.

believe that it is not now feasible, the US should actively support the last alternative. It is requested that every caution be taken to protect the source of this info.

DUNN

740.5/11–1351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, November 13, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 609. Re Depto 584.[2] Met with Alphand and Hoyer-Millar Nov 10 EDC–NATO problems and relationships and extent to which NAC might act at Rome on EDC and Ger problems. Mtg included representation from three FonOffs (Perkins, Byroade and Knight for US) and from three dels to EDC conf.

Much of mtg devoted to juridical aspect of reciprocal guarantees between EDC and NATO to cover Ger. Alphand envisaged dealing with this through provision in EDC treaty that attack on one wld be considered attack on all, plus two reciprocal statements, one by all EDC members and other by all NATO members, that attack on any member of other wld be considered attack on all.

Hoyer-Millar emphasized EDC must strengthen NATO and must not by any unanimity requirement or otherwise impede its action in event of attack. Obligation in Art 5 NAT [3] was on each. In view corporate nature EDC he feared unwillingness one member to act might immobilize whole body. Alphand stated Fr view was that SHAPE, acting under NAC and not subj to decision by EDC, shld engage EDF and that this wld in practice be automatic although inability of US and probably UK and others to accept obligation for "automatic" action wld make it impossible to include specific provision for this in EDC treaty. US and UK confirmed they cld not accept any form of obligation for automatic action.

US also stated any commitment covering attack on Ger wld presumably require formal or informal Senate approval and cld not

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris, Bonn, and Frankfurt.

[2] Dated November 8, from London, not printed; it transmitted a preliminary draft outline of a paper defining the American position on the relationship between the European Defense Community and NATO (740.5/11–851). The comments of the Department of State, later confirmed and supplemented by Defense Department officials, were sent in telegrams Todep 317, November 8, and Todep 320, November 9, both to London, neither printed (740.5/11–851). Todep 317 observed that the proposed paper would be highly valuable in informal consultations on the problem but pointed out that any American suggestions would require very careful working out in the light of the political situations in France and West Germany. For the text of the proposed paper as later revised in the light of comments from Washington, see telegram 1067, November 16, from London, p. 921.

[3] For the text of the North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, see *Decade of American Foreign Policy*, p. 1328 or *Basic Documents*, p. 812.

go beyond Art 5. Alphand contemplated statement by NATO members wld use Bonn formula [4] which was itself merely restatement of tripartite NY communiqué of Sept 1950.[5] UK suggested that formula, preferably for inclusion in EDC treaty, might be "armed attack on any member EDC shall be considered attack on all and shall automatically engage EDF on recommendation of NAC to employ armed force". Alphand agreed SHAPE must get its instrs from one single source, NAT through SG, but cited presumable Ger insistence on voice in decision. He requested further indication Wash and London thinking on this whole problem soonest so that he might take it up in EDC conf.

Discussion on other aspects EDC–NATO relationships brief. US did not submit paper in view Todep 317 [6] (it had been decided previously to omit any ref to special relationship covering Ger). Alphand suggested leaving all organizational matters other than those between EDF and SHAPE to Eur def commissioner who wld be charged with working out relations with other orgs including NATO. He thought that EDC shld be represented in NATO at least initially by natl reps, with possibly some corporate representation eventually.

US assumed agrmt on gen concept of relationship designed enable each most effectively assist in attaining common objective and believed details cld be worked out later.

On question of action to be sought at Rome mtg, US suggested council pick up where it left off at Brussels by (1) disposing of Petersberg phase, (2) receiving Fr report on EDC conf and noting principle with approval and (3) taking action under para 10 (*a*), (*b*), and (*c*) on C 6–D/1 [7] on such aspects of EDC report, particularly milit, as were sufficiently advanced. This wld require prior or concurrent SG and MC consideration. Fr and UK pessimistic as to action. Alphand said Schuman cld present full progress report, but council, in absence of whole EDC agrmt, cld do little beyond extending encouragement even on milit aspects. UK emphatic that action at Rome on milit aspects wld be premature in absence complete picture, especially financing of Ger contribution. US cited adverse public reaction if council achieved no progress year after Brussels and importance NATO consideration EDC problems and relations to NATO before EDC treaty finalized. UK and Fr agreed early consideration of milit aspects by SG or MC and of other aspects by CD wld be useful but felt too little time before Rome to contemplate really concrete action.

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[4] A version of the formula presumably under reference here is set forth in telegram 2528, October 19, to Frankfurt, p. 1555.

[5] For the text of the communiqué on Allied policy toward Germany issued at Washington by the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers, September 19, 1950, see *Basic Documents*, p. 1711.

[6] Regarding the paper under reference here and Todep 317, see footnote 2, above.

[7] Regarding the paper under reference here, see Department of State paper, Pleven D–2/1*a*, January 26, p. 755.

It was agreed Schuman's report wld be circulated to all 12 just before Rome (Nov 23) as wld report on contractual negots which US, as current chairman HICOM, requested to prepare. Three dels will further explore nature and extent of possible council action.

After mtg Spofford again stressed to Alphand importance from Congressional and other points of view of taking maximum action at Rome and also desirability of bringing other nine into discussions on matters of NATO concern before EDF finalized. He seemed to recognize validity of point, but said they cld not do anything which implied taking of decisions pending Fr parliamentary consideration. He has apparently changed emphasis on this since first brush on EDC with Fr Assembly comite which he says did not go well.

SPOFFORD

Editorial Note

Telegram 2868, November 14, from Paris, page 1664, reported that at a meeting of the tripartite working group on Germany's financial contribution to Western defense, attended by American and British observers to the Conference on a European Defense Community, Alphand outlined a proposal for an interim European Defense Community common budget which the French intended to introduce at the Conference.

740.5/11–1451 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, November 14, 1951—9 p. m.

2883. Subj is Eur def forces. Mins of six countries participating EDF conf will meet tomorrow in Paris to exchange views on progress of treaty. Mtg apparently called on request Van Zeeland, and discussion will probably center around Belg position in conf.

In addition to opposing common budget and common armament program as reported in Embtels 2484, October 27; [2] 2602, November 1 [*2*]; [3] and 2727, November 7 [*3*] [4] Belgs have now made clear that they consider EDF as special force added to rather than replacing national armies. They have proposed specifically that any member state should have right to maintain national forces outside EDF without limits.

We are informed that French and Italian Mins intend to oppose Belg position firmly, and expect to be supported by Hallstein. Alphand

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, Frankfurt, and Luxembourg.

[2] *Ante*, p. 902.

[3] *Ante*, p. 911.

[4] *Ante*, p. 914.

said to have told Belg del at recent private meeting that if certain countries participating in conf would not accept basic principle of common force, he saw no alternative for them but to withdraw. Luxembourg Min expected to support Belg. Dutch position not clear, but statements by Dutch del in conf give impression that Dutch are veering to support of Belg position.

BRUCE

740.5/11–1451 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, November 15, 1951—7 : 16 p. m.

341. Following-up comments in Todep 317 [2] and having in mind in particular discussion in Depto 618,[3] wish to suggest following points.

1. Agree wld be desirable from many standpoints to take decisions in Rome mtg on EDF or EDC matters of concern to NATO. Have felt desirable to keep pressure on Fr to reach conclusion in Paris conference to permit this. However seems to us time has now come to take stock of where we now are and to make our decisions accordingly. Use of Rome mtg as further pressure device seems to us to have lost value as time too short.

2. Continue to see serious objections to taking definitive NATO action on some aspects EDC proposal without having clearly before NAC proposal as whole in its broad outlines. In particular, still foresee great difficulties in resolving EDC–NATO relationship with respect to Ger without facing up to Ger membership in NATO problem. Forcing issue prematurely in NAC wld probably have harmful rather than helpful effect particularly re Fr position in EDC and Contractual negots. Unless there shld be quite major changes of view between now and Rome mtg, seems quite unlikely we can be in position by Rome mtg to take clear position one way or another on question Ger membership in NATO shld this become necessary precondition to satisfactory contractual arrangements or EDC.

3. Agree fully in necessity keeping all NATO members informed on progress of discussion and assume reports now planned will do so. See no objection to gen discussion of problems raised by NAC as guide to further negots. Agree also important to have NAC action before

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Edwin M. Martin, cleared by Calhoun, and approved for transmission by Parsons, was repeated to Paris for Perkins and Byroade.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 917.

[3] Not printed. In it Ambassador Spofford emphasized the importance from the congressional and other points of view that maximum action be taken at the forthcoming Rome session of the North Atlantic Council on European Defense Community problems and the relationship to NATO. Spofford considered it important that the matters receive NATO consideration before the EDC treaty was completed and that other NATO members be brought into the discussion. (740.5/11–1451)

EDC treaty finalized. Assume here that for this and other purposes Jan Council mtg will be necessary and will be quite in time for final EDC action.

4. As practical matter seems to us unwise to be in position of pressing countries relatively uninformed about EDC developments to take action during Rome mtg on any part of report received by them as late as Nov 23.[4]

5. Assuming as we do there will be Jan mtg at which this matter can be dealt with, do not feel there is any need for action at Rome from standpoint US Congressional attitude. Present tentative thinking here is that MSP hearings cannot at earliest begin before February and if past experience any guide may well be later. Do not think problem will arise in acute form prior to these hearings.

6. While we agree that action by NATO shld be in form of gen statement of principles, believe these principles must be founded on carefully worked out understanding of how in fact the relationship will work on all major points in the political-mil field. By "how it will work" mean what the authority and responsibility relationships will be and not organizational details.

In summary, believe we are in agreement on everything except desirability and possibility of formal NAC action at Rome. Agree further that situation may develop rapidly in course of next ten days and final decision must be made by NAC but believe it shld be made in light considerations outlined above.

WEBB

[4] Telegram Depto 618 (see footnote 3, above) reported that Foreign Minister Schuman's report on the progress of the European Defense Community Conference would not be presented to the NATO Deputies until November 23 in Rome, making it difficult to plan definitive NATO action in the absence of the report.

740.5/11–1651 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET LONDON, November 16, 1951—3 p. m.

1067. For Secretary and Byroade. We have revised paper ref EDC–NATO relationships [2] which we feel shld serve as guide for adoption US position for consideration by NAC Rome.

We have endeavored to incorporate suggestions made in Todep 317.[3] In light of recent discussions in Paris (Depto 609 [4]). Ref special relationship covering Ger (para 5*a* Depto 584 [3]) has been omitted but

[1] The source text telegram was sent as Depto 625 to the Department of State and was repeated for information to Frankfurt and Bonn.

[2] Regarding the paper under reference here, see footnote 2, p. 917.

[3] Not printed, but see *ibid.*

[4] Dated November 13, *ibid.*

statement that "attack on forces, vessels or aircraft of any of parties includes attack on EDF" remains as originally drafted. We believe that since this refers to no geographic area but only to forces under the exclusive command of SACEUR it does not raise question of congressional sanction. Security guarantee problem (pending definitive solution of Ger membership NATO might be met by Fr suggestion for statement by NATO members using Bonn formula which merely restate tripartite New York communiqué of Sept '50.[5] We question whether such statement, which presumably wld be unilateral on part of US although made in conjunction with similar statements by other NAT parties and therefore not an agrmt, wld need any greater sanction than we had contemplated for Bonn formula and that it wld be covered by sanction for latter.

Re section dealing with obligations under NAT 3, 3*a*, 3*b*, we believe these questions shld be spelled out to provide for any possible contingency. While paper may, as dep suggests, reflect assumption EDF membership contemplates greater break with NATO than may be warranted, we believe strongly that it wld be equally unwise to assume that EDC–NATO relationships will develop along lines desired unless firm agrmt is reached prior to finalization EDC treaty.

Revised paper tells: In joint report of Council deps and mil. Comite dated Dec 13, 1950, which was approved in Brussels at 6th session of NAC[6] it was agreed that any EDF, if and when created, must: (*a*) strengthen NAC and integrated def of NA area; (*b*) Be integrated into NATO framework, and (*c*) promote closer association of countries of West Eur and tie West Ger more firmly to West. This same report also expressed opinion that final test any arrangements for EDF must be whether, in judgment NATO, they were militarily effective and served to strengthen NAC. It is therefore duty of NAT organs, particularly Council Deps and Council itself, to estab certain principles which shld govern relationship of ED community to NAT org. It important to reach agrmt upon such principles while the ED community treaty is still being finalized in order that they may be appropriately reflected in its provisions.

These principles shld be directed at two sets of problems arising out of creation ED community: (1) correlating obligations of ED community treaty with North Atlantic treaty; (2) organizational arrangements.

In defining these principles account must be taken of fact that relationships will probably change as concept of ED community develops.

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[5] Regarding the "Bonn formula" and the communiqué under reference here, see telegram 2528, October 19, to Frankfurt, p. 1555, and *Basic Documents*, p. 1711.

[6] The reference here is to NATO document C 6–D/1 regarding which, see the Department of State paper, Pleven D–2/1*a*, January 26, p. 755.

There will be initial period in which EDF will come into being but development of ED community institutions, particularly those at polit level, will not have been completed. The principles governing EDC–NATO relationships therefore shld be subj to modification as both organizations evolve.

1. Objective. ED community and NAT org have one basic identical objective—to strengthen collective def West Eur.

2. Gen concept. Relationship between them in all fields shld be one which will permit this common objective to be most effectively attained. To this end relationship shld be not one of two separate bodies, but of one group within another, in such manner as to enable each to benefit from operations and developments in either and to promote closer association of all NAT members.

3. Obligations under NAT. Under art 8 of NAT each party undertakes not to enter into internal obligations in conflict therewith. Accordingly, obligations undertaken by these parties to NAT who are also parties to ED community must be in conformity with their obligations under NAT. It is therefore, understood that:

a. Obligation ED community members under art 3 of NAT to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack may in part be performed through ED community. This in no way limits their obligation under art 3 nor obligation under NATO as whole to seek development of all necessary collective strength of parties to NAT to resist aggression.

b. Obligation of each party under art 5 of NAT to regard an armed attack on any one of them as attack upon all and to take such action as it deems necessary is in no way modified by creation of ED community. Insofar as ED community members are concerned, use of armed force under art 5 may be effected through EDF.

c. Ref in revised art 6 as contained in Gr–Turk protocol to attack on forces, vessels or aircraft of "any" of parties includes an attack upon forces, vessels or aircraft of EDF as part of integrated NATO forces.

4. Organizational arrangements. Relationship between two organizations shld maintain maximum flexibility and shld seek to avoid duplication of responsibilities and functions. For this purpose, maximum practicable use of same personnel for corresponding positions in both agencies is desirable. Consistent with foregoing, fol arrangements shld be applied:

a. ED community will contribute forces to command of SACEUR to extent of agreed contributions under approved NATO plans.

b. SACEUR will continue to receive his higher strategic direction exclusively from standard group with respect to all sources under his command, including EDF. Standard group will continue to receive its polit guidance from NAC and Council Deps.

c. During initial period representation of ED community in other NATO agencies will be by representatives of ED community countries in these agencies. [7]

SPOFFORD

[7] Telegram Todep 356, November 17, to London, repeated to Paris, not printed, observed that in general the paper presented here provided a useful basis for an American position at the Rome session of NATO. The Department of State believed that it would be useful to convey the general character of the points in the paper to those participating in drawing up the EDC treaty, provided their work had gone far enough to justify as specific a discussion as the paper would involve. The Department nevertheless felt strongly that final action on the question ought not be taken at the Rome NATO session and that it also ought to be delayed until at least a draft text of the EDC treaty was available. The Department also offered specific drafting suggestions on the paper. (740.5/11–1651) The text of the paper presented here, as revised in the light of the Department's comments offered in Todep 356, was circulated to the United States Delegation to the Rome session of NATO as document Rome D–18*a*, November 21, not printed (CFM files, lot M 88, Rome).

740.5/11–1651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, November 16, 1951—4 p. m.

2924. Subject is European Defense Forces.

1. Proposed financial articles of draft treaty approved by Steering Comite Nov 14 subject to blanket reservation of Belgian and Dutch delegates to entire financial section. Following is summary of financial articles to be inserted in treaty:

a. Council is to approve common budget by November 1 each year by two-thirds majority. Benelux countries desire unanimous vote. Assembly would have until December 15 to modify budget by suppressing, reducing, increasing or creating expenditures or receipts other than contributions of member states. However, Assembly could not increase total of expenditures proposed by Council except in case where it re-establishes an expenditure proposed by commissioner but reduced or rejected by Council. Council may override any changes made by Assembly by unanimous vote.

b. If budget has not been voted by beginning of calendar year, institutions of community are authorized to utilize three monthly appropriations equal to one-quarter budget of previous year.

c. Budget will include all expenditures of common armament, supply, and infrastructure program and will be established in single currency unit to be selected by Council. Benelux countries have formulated specific reservations on content of common budget and fact that it will go into effect day treaty enters into force.

d. Commissioner will be responsible for execution of budget and will have sufficient flexibility to shift credits between budgetary chapters as well as to open credits for new expenditures with approval of Council.

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg.

e. Role of financial comptroller will be to follow execution of budget for Council and to certify proposed expenditures as conforming to purposes set forth in common budget. Community's acounts will be subject to post audit by independent comite on accounts which will report both to Council and Assembly on execution of common budget by commissioner's service.

f. Contributions are to be paid quarterly and in advance on basis exchange rate in effect day contributions are due. Dutch have reserved this point specifically.

g. Each member state is required to furnish over and above original contribution further amount up to 10 percent of contribution against receipt of currencies of other EDC members at going rate of exchange. EDC currencies thus received in exchange will be freely utilizable in territories of all other member states. Member states also agree generally to soften present restrictions on capital movements and to aid community as much as possible in obtaining currency of non-EDC members. Germans have provisionally reserved position on this article, while Dutch again have formulated specific reservation.

2. Italian delegate Lombardo stated that although financial section of treaty did not correspond to Italian ideas (Embtel 2106, Oct 10 [2]), he engaged himself personally to accept all these articles in spirit of conciliation and in order not to delay conference by joining ranks of "reservistes". However, he reserved right to re-open this question if other delegations formulated reserves on right of first Assembly to consider during initial period definitive manner in which Assembly might be elected on basis of universal suffrage with power to legislate European taxes.

BRUCE

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 885.

740.5/11–1351 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, November 16, 1951—7 : 26 p. m.

2979. For Perkins, Byroade and MacArthur from State.

1. With respect to discussion of automatic nature NATO action in para 3 of Depto 609 [2] Alphand assumptions not accurate with respect to SHAPE recommendations now being considered by SG. Separate message this subj being sent Spofford and Perkins. Under SHAPE procedure clearly might be deliberate polit decisions which wld control action of NATO forces including EDF. Germany wld have no voice in these decisions until full member NATO, as Ger veto through EDC impossible, as was apparently recognized.

[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Martin and cleared by Calhoun, was repeated to London for Ambassador Spofford.

[2] Dated November 13, p. 917.

2. Though of course tighter than NATO arrangement, formula proposed by UK for inclusion in EDC (Depto 609) seems suitable language to prevent use of EDF without NAT approval but does not insure that Gers committed if attack is on non-EDF NATO country. Alphand reply is unresponsive, referring to SHAPE getting instrs from "one source" but not to EDF doing so. With respect to request for Wash views, in this as so many these issues we are involved in exploring tortuous Rube Goldberg devices as substitute for simple solution of immed NAT membership for Germany. Cannot go much beyond message brought by Laukhoff to Perkins and pouched Nov 16 in revised form [3] to reflect S/P and Ger views.

3. We have just received Depto 631, rptd Paris 1076,[4] which seems to represent an advance over UK suggestion in Depto 609, rptd Paris 1032, in that it meets our objection cited above. It, however, still does not get around our comment that Ger wld have no voice in the decision.

WEBB

[3] Not further identified.

[4] Dated November 16, from London, not printed. It reported that the British had advised the French of their thinking on the question raised by Alphand as to the possible EDC–NATO guarantees. Although generally reserving their position pending further information on the European Defense Community, the British expressed a preference for an EDC treaty commitment to regard any attack on any NATO member as an attack on the EDC and a reciprocal NATO commitment, perhaps in additional treaty protocol, including the German Federal Republic in the area covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. (740.5/11–1651)

740.5/11–1651 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, November 16, 1951—7 : 52 p. m.

2980. For Perkins, Byroade and MacArthur from State.

1. Realize under current circumstances most decisions respect NATO–EDF–German complex of problems must be made in Europe. However think certain observations from here on recent developments may be useful from this more distant vantage-point.

2. Assume in fol comments that US position continues to be that agreed on in preparation for Sept Tripartite talks [2] and conveyed during those talks, namely full support for Ger contribution to Western defense through EDF provided practical EDF arrangement within NATO framework can be worked out in reasonable period of time.

[1] This telegram, which was drafted by European Regional Affairs Director Martin, was cleared by German Political Affairs Deputy Director Calhoun and was repeated to London for Ambassador Spofford.

[2] Regarding the meetings of the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers in Washington in September, see the editorial note, p. 882.

3. There appears to be mounting area of disagreement as Fr raise crucial issues involved in full development their EDC concept which from here appears to follow middle line described in Rome 2127 (rptd Paris 243 [3]) by Itals as impractical. Belgs have had serious second thoughts (see esp Paris 2602, rptd London 658; [4] Paris 2883 rptd London 767 [5]) as have at least some of Dutch. Have some doubts whether Itals prepared stay in den alone with Fr and Gers. Moreover these developments along with Fr spell-out of proposed transitional arrangements have created new difficulties for Gers, partly attributable to violation of their, on the whole not unreasonable, definition of "equality". Suspect Alphand's reported difficulties with Chamber comite may also arise from Fr "middle" course. (See last para Depto 609, rptd Paris 1032.[6]) Thus appear to be facing serious delays if not possible breakdown of proposal. We have no good alternative salable to Fr and Gers.

4. While action at Rome appears to us difficult if not impossible (see Todep 317 rptd Paris 2799 [7]), would for many reasons be bad if action not possible at suggested Jan mtg. By then Ger talks generally shld be well along and further delay for EDF undesirable. Also important have some kind of decision on Germany for US MSP presentation. Suggest therefore that time may have come to pursue with Schuman question of how EDF agreement can be reached meet this new delayed time sched. So far as basic issues are with EDC aspects, rather than EDF, it may be time indicate, along lines which do not seem to us to be inconsistent with Schuman–Acheson conversations in Sept, that choice looks to us as likely to be between EDF with only general reference to future development of EDC (alternative three of Rome 2127) or necessity, as understood all along, of getting German contribution made through other means than EDF in order meet time table for Western rearmament.

5. Realize this approach does not cover EDF–NATO problem which we still think must be approached within framework of considerations contained in separate airgram this subj, revising draft carried to Paris by Laukhuff.[8]

WEBB

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[3] Of November 13, p. 916.
[4] Of November 2, p. 911.
[5] Dated November 14, p. 919.
[6] Dated November 13, p. 917.
[7] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *ibid.*
[8] Draft under reference here is not further identified.

536-688 PT 1—80——61

740.5/11–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL THE HAGUE, November 19, 1951—5 p. m.

503. During evening Nov 17 Spierenberg, chairman OEEC, discussed with Emb officer certain aspects EDF. Stated privately that within few days Dutch will present alternate "plan for common budget" which they have just completed. Declined reveal any details. Besides himself, said draftsmen were Kohnstamm, Van der Beugel, and Blaisse, that they now "have FonOff SecGen Boon in full support EDF", and that FonOff gradually swinging over to same view. Stikker still hesitant, however. Spierenberg claimed FonOff tried some time ago drag him into EDF negots (presumably this refers to Paris discussions) but that he "refused categorically" arguing subject matter was FonOff responsibility. Also claimed have "argued with his friends in Fr Fin Ministry" to amend their views re EDF financing so as make EDF more acceptable to Neth Cabinet.

Spierenberg wld not state specifically that Cabinet had approved his "plan" but indicated he had no doubt re its approval. Said "plan" had not been completed at time Stikker talked with Secretary in Paris (Paris tel 58, November 16[2]), therefore no mention made of it.

Spierenberg described his conversation Nov 17 with PriMin Drees wherein Spierenberg argued strongly and apparently convinced Drees that his "common budget proposal" must be submitted now order demonstrate that Neth Govt not endeavoring hamper EDF talks and order disassociate Neth from what he described as "Van Zeeland attitude". Said Van Zeeland more opposed to EDF than ever before for which Spierenberg bitterly critical. Said Van Zeeland simply "playing politics" because latter certain Belgian constitution wld have to be amended in order adopt draft EDF legislation, that Belgian Govt cld not obtain two-thirds votes thereby resulting in fall Van Zeeland Govt.

He repeated what is common knowledge here, namely that Neth states generally more sympathetic to EDF than is Cabinet, but latter "coming around". Acknowledged that most deps not well informed on subject but added that govt now explaining its provisions and significance to (second chamber) comite members. When asked if he believed draft EDF legislation wld require constitutional revision, said he did not believe so, but not sure. Apparently this an open question until EDF talks progress further. Regardless, he believed Neth

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Brussels and London.

[2] Telegram 2920, November 16, from Paris, repeated to The Hague as 58, not printed, but, for a paraphrase, see the circular information telegram, November 21, p. 930.

Govt could muster two-thirds vote for EDF legislation including his "common budget proposal," whatever latter is.

In reading above shld be kept in mind that Spierenberg ardent Schuman Plan and EDF supporter, and possibility exists he may be overly optimistic in his description Neth Cabinet attitude.

He concluded by stating he convinced Stikker will not be in Cabinet after 1952 elections and FonMin will begin shopping around for "good international job".

CHAPIN

740.5/11-951 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 20, 1951—5 : 30 p. m.

3053. For Perkins, Byroade, MacArthur and Bruce.[2] Ital rep EDF Lombardo in talk with Martin Mon stressed anxiety over recent Benelux reaction to EDF conf and asked what US intended doing. Martin pointed out that principal US reps concerned were now in Paris where understood sit moving fairly rapidly; US of course was deeply interested and considered EDC most practical way achievement Ger contribution to West def; EDC had better prospects of success if Benelux countries members, but only if they were willing members, fully understanding nature of enterprise on which embarked and committed to working out problems necessary to make it work. Indicated thought this was attitude we would convey if opportunity arose. Also indicated solution perhaps required compromises in degree to which full EDC concept worked out now and applied from start but that was matter which EDC members wld have to resolve in terms of desire for Ben membership vs need for full-blown scheme at start.

Lombardo made clear thought Belgian attitude much more adverse to real EDC than Dutch. When asked whether this at all due to gradual development of proposal from simple EDF to all now involved in EDC concept, replied in negative citing number minor issues in mil field on which Belgians had been reluctant give Def Commissioner any authority except with unanimous approval Council of Ministers.

When asked what Ital wld do in event Ben countries withdrew EDF, Lombardo said that wld be unfortunate but main thing was to get on with Eur integration, implication clearly being that Ital wld continue

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by John L. Barnard of the Office of European Regional Affairs and approved by Office Director Edwin M. Martin, was repeated for information to London for Ambassadors Gifford and Spofford, to Frankfurt for High Commissioner McCloy, and to Rome, The Hague, and Brussels.

[2] All four named officers served as advisers to the Secretary of State during his meetings with other Foreign Ministers in Paris coincident with the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

with Ger and Fr. Saw no alternative solution to Ger problem. Lombardo eloquent re integration idea for which youth of Eur old fight, cited Marshal plan progress which if not interrupted by rearmament effort wld itself have gone far towards accomplishing Eur integration.

On matter Ger membership NATO, Lombardo did not consider this pressing issue at this time; Blank at Paris had raised question, but Lombardo thought he was satisfied with step by step return of Ger to equality status. In Lombardo's view Adenauer was not too concerned although he might be forced into raising issue by Schumacher. Note disparity our thinking. (See Bonn 348, rpt Paris 143, London 124, Frankfurt 465.[3])

WEBB

[3] Not printed.

700.00(S)/11-2151 : Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 21, 1951—5:44 p. m.

Infotel. During conversation with Secy in Paris Dutch FonMin Stikker stated that he and his Benelux colleagues were very much confused and worried as result of developments in Paris Conference on Eur Defense Force. He said that subject to overcoming certain constitutional limitations, Dutch Govt favors some form Eur Defense Force, and added that other Benelux countries do too. Stikker said he is principally worried about two points: first, that matter had progressed so slowly, with consequent increasing difficulty in bringing about Ger defense participation; and second, that various proposals advanced by national reps do not seem be grounded in firm govt positions. He said that while discussions are developing plans which seem to be militarily sound, he doubted that they are politically feasible. He said he felt that ultimate solution would have to be full Ger participation in NATO and that sooner this was brought about the better. He left impression that Dutch were not backing out, but were becoming increasingly pessimistic. In outlining to Stikker our reasons for continuing strong support of Eur Defense Force concept, Secy said he felt there was good chance that Conference would work out something politically feasible. He added that while there was little chance that NATO Council meeting this month would have before it firm Eur Defense Force plan, he felt it essential that next meeting in Jan should have such plan. This would give govts opportunity to consider firm proposition and to move forward.

WEBB

[1] This message was sent to Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Moscow, Oslo, Reykjavik, and Rome. It is a paraphrase of telegram 2920, November 16, from Paris.

740.5/11–2351 : Telegram

The Chargé in Belgium (Millard) to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

SECRET BRUSSELS, November 23, 1951—8 p. m.

719. Re EDF. In brief talk with Van Zeeland just prior leaving for Rome,[2] questioned him to elicit confirmation of Stikker's statement to Secretary, reported Dept intel Nov 21, 2 a. m.[3] Found him in complete agreement with Stikker except that when asked re German participation NATO, Van Zeeland said that though he assumed Germany might eventually participate fully in NATO, he was strongly opposed such participation for long time to come.

Asked re yesterday's debate Senate, principally on EDF and whether he thought odds of passage Parliament remained 7 or 8 to 10 in favor (see Embtel 616, Oct 31, 1951),[4] Van Zeeland said opposition in Belgium to EDF growing and he wld now reduce such odds to 5 or 6 to 10.

Asked his impression talks Paris with other EDF ministers, Van Zeeland said of ten points on agenda, eight were fairly easy of solution by minor adjustments and compromises but that he remained adamant European defense authority be under and not superior to ministers of EDF countries. Also strongly insisted that terms on which various countries wld contribute forces shld be precisely stated and that these terms shld not be discriminatory. Asked to elaborate, he explained that Belgium willing contribute six divisions and air force but wld leave out security forces within Belgium navy and Congo Force Publique. Under proposed terms, other countries might hold out of EDF more or less indefinite military contribution owing vagueness present proposals. Re other minor objections alluded to above, he said Belgium could not accept units in EDF being divided on grounds language since though Belgian units are based on French and Flemish speaking troops, officers are bi-lingual and it is cardinal political policy not to permit a division of Belgian army on linguistic grounds. He admitted that Flemish were more strongly opposed to EDF than Walloons. Flemish fear that though now majority in Belgium their position wld be weakened shld Walloon troops be linked with French and Flemish with Dutch. He also confirmed that Flemish feel more strongly than Walloons that Belgiums' traditional safety depends on Anglo-French alliance and absence British participation EDF makes Flemish most reluctant join. Van Zeeland also mentioned that Flemish being Catholic and more conservative, fear their young men wld be

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris, The Hague, and Rome.

[2] Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland headed his government's delegation at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Rome, November 24–28; see pp. 693 ff.

[3] *Supra.*

[4] *Ante*, p. 907.

"contaminated" by association European army with French troops because prevalence communism and lack of religion.

Van Zeeland mentioned he had lengthy talk with General Eisenhower in which he set forth his views on "impracticability" EDF as now conceived. Embassy wld be grateful for memo this conversation if available.

MILLARD

Editorial Note

During the period of their presence in Paris as delegates to the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, November 6, 1951–February 5, 1952, Secretary of State Acheson, Foreign Minister Schuman, and Foreign Secretary Eden held several informal discussions on various international problems, particularly questions relating to Germany. Regarding these meetings of the Foreign Ministers, see the editorial note, page 1312. Of particular importance to the development of a European Defense Community was the meeting on November 22 in Paris of the three Foreign Ministers and Chancellor Adenauer (reported upon in telegram 3086, November 22, from Paris, page 1605) to review the general political situation of the Federal Republic and the progress of negotiations for the establishment of a new contractual relationship between the three occupying powers and the Federal Republic. Agreement was reached with Chancellor Adenauer at that meeting on a range of problems discussed, and a communiqué was issued to the press. One of the agreements reached stipulated that entry into effect of the contractual relationships between West Germany and the occupying powers would be dependent upon the successful completion of arrangements for German participation in a European Defense Community.

The North Atlantic Council held its Eighth Session in Rome, November 24 to 28. The United States was represented by Acheson, Snyder, Lovett, and a delegation of advisers. For comprehensive documentation on the Council session, see pages 693 ff. The work of the European Defense Community Conference was an item on the agenda of the Council. At the fourth meeting of the Council session on November 27, Foreign Minister Schuman presented a summary report on the progress to date of the Conference (see *infra*). At meetings on November 27 and the morning of November 28 the Council Deputies considered various compromise draft resolutions on the European Defense Community and subsequently agreed upon a version which was approved by the North Atlantic Council at its meeting on November 28 (see telegram Secto 105, November 29, from Rome, page 737).

During and after the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council, Secretary Acheson, Foreign Minister Schuman, and Foreign Secretary

Eden continued their informal discussions on various international problems, including the European Defense Community. On November 26, they held a meeting with the Belgian, Netherlands, and Luxembourg Foreign Ministers (reported upon in telegram Secto 114, November 29, from Rome, page 1611) who indicated their concern with the contents of the communiqué on the meeting in Paris on November 22 between the three Western Foreign Ministers and Chancellor Adenauer. The Benelux Foreign Ministers were assured that recent decisions with respect to the timing of the completion of contractual relationships with the Federal Republic were not intended to give West Germany any advantage within the European Defense Community. Secretary Acheson emphasized to the Benelux Foreign Ministers the urgency of completing arrangements for the EDC. In a meeting on November 27, Acheson, Schuman, and Eden continued their Paris consideration of the question of the German contribution to Western defense and reached agreement on several important considerations bearing on a German contribution to a European Defense Community budget. At a private luncheon meeting on November 29 (see the Secretary's memorandum of conversation of November 29, page 746) Acheson and Eden discussed urgent measures to be taken to assure the successful completion of the negotiations for a European Defense Community.

740.5/12-751

Report by the French Foreign Minister (Schuman) to the North Atlantic Council [1]

TOP SECRET [ROME, November 27, 1951.]

THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF A EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY

1. The Council will remember that, by their Brussels Resolution of 18 December 1950,[2] they had taken note of the French Government's intention to convene a meeting in Paris with a view to creating a European Army. As was agreed, the Council Deputies have been kept informed regularly of the work of the Paris Conference; today I wish,

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[1] This report was presented by Foreign Minister Schuman at the Fourth Meeting of the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council, held in Rome, November 27. This report was there circulated as document C 8-D/5. For the United States record of that meeting, see Secto 93, November 27, p. 735. The source text was transmitted as one of several enclosures to a letter of December 7 from Ambassador Bruce to Assistant Secretary of State Perkins, not printed.

[2] Regarding the Brussels Resolution under reference here, see the Briefing Paper prepared by the Department of State, Pleven D-2/1*a*, January 26, p. 755.

on behalf of my Delegation, to give you an overall report on the progress of the work.

In this report, I shall endeavor to bring out as fully as possible all the points on which agreement has already been reached, as well as the differences still existing on important questions which it has not yet been possible to settle and the solution of which will call for further efforts by all participants.

The Conference, aware of the necessity of creating forthwith a European force sufficiently strong to deter any intended aggression, had throughout their work two main ideas in mind; on the one hand, the creation of a European Defense Community must meet the dictates of effectiveness of the forces contemplated for Europe; on the other, it must, at the same time, provide the Western world with the necessary guarantees against a revival of German militarism; and that in the interest both of Germany and of peace.

Bearing in mind these two principles, I shall give you a report on the results obtained in order to enable the Governments represented here to judge, when the time comes, whether these two main aims have been achieved.

2. I would first of all remind you of the procedure approved in Brussels on 18 December 1950 for studying the question of German contribution to defense. At the same time that they noted the intention of the French Government to put forward a plan for a European Army, the Atlantic Council instructed the three Occupying Powers in Germany to make a joint study with the Federal Republic of conditions for German participation.

Thus it was that two studies were initiated almost simultaneously at Bonn and in Paris at the beginning of this year. The object of the first was to work out conditions for German participation on the basis laid down in Brussels, that is to say, within the strict limits of the unilateral guarantees imposed on Germany by the Atlantic Council. The second was intended to lay down the principles which would govern the building up and the functioning of a European Army within which German forces would not be subjected to any restrictions other than those to which all the participating countries freely agreed.

The work of the so-called Petersberg Conference was continued until 4 June 1951. The results were recorded in a report by the High Commissioners in which note was taken of the comments of the Federal Government.[3] It can be seen in this report that the German Delegation at the Petersberg Conference made a certain number of provisos to the formation of a new national army, such as the setting up of a "general command" at an intermediate level between the Supreme Atlantic Command and the Divisional Staffs, the setting up

[3] See p. 1044.

of divisional military zones under military authorities with both territorial powers and the command of troops. These provisions meant in fact the building up again of the pre-war German Army Corps. On the other hand, the Federal Office responsible for dealing with questions of the German contribution should, for this solution, have taken the form of a Federal Ministry with seven departments, for implementing ministerial decisions, and an "inspectorate generale" of the German contingent also sub-divided into seven sections. This inspecter general would have been the supreme Commander of all German troops.

This standpoint adopted by the German negotiating authorities met the requirements both for military effectiveness and for political equality. It was in pursuance of this principle of equality that the German Delegation rejected the idea of an allied control which would not be common to all participants.

The outcome of these Petersberg talks was therefore negative.

While these talks were going on in Germany, invitations were sent out by the French Government, on 26 January 1951, for a Conference on the formation of the European Army, based on the draft submitted by the Head of the French Government in his statement on 24 October 1950. They were sent to all the signatory European countries of the North Atlantic Treaty, and to the German Federal Republic. The two non-European signatory Governments, the U.S.A. and Canada, were requested to send observers.

Four of the countries invited, Germany, Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg decided to unite immediately with France in active participation in the work, whilst the other countries preferred to attend the Conference as observers, some of them reserving their decision as to full participation.

Thus the Conference opened in Paris on 15 February 1951. As you know, a preliminary stage in the work was marked by the submission of an Interim Report by the Delegations to their Governments on 24 July 1951.[4] The submission of this report did not interrupt the work of the Conference. It simply enabled Delegations to ask their Governments for further instructions while the technical committees continued to prepare the texts required for starting the organization. At the same time, at the unanimous wish of the Conference, the Supreme Atlantic Commander agreed to send an observer, who would be responsible for maintaining close liaison and providing technical assistance whenever required.

On 8 October, the Netherlands Government decided to unite with the participating countries.

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[4] See p. 843.

3. All the participating Delegations expressed complete agreement on the principles on which the creation of a European Defense Community was based.

Its object is to contribute, in conjunction with the free nations, and in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, to the maintenance of pace against all aggression, in close cooperation with other agencies with the same aim. For this purpose, the Community will have to ensure without discrimination the fullest possible integration, as far as is compatible with military requirements, of human and material elements which will be obtained by the Defense Forces of the member countries within a supra-national European organization. Such integration will cover not only the High Command, but also the creation, the training and the whole organization of the armed forces. It should also result in the most rational and most economic use of the resources of the member countries, in particular thanks to the elaboration of a joint armament program.

4. I will deal first of all with the military aspects of the organization of the European Defense Community.

In the first place, the Conference never lost sight of the fact that the European Defense Forces were intended to form an integral part of the NATO Defense Forces. That is why the Delegations taking part in the Paris Conference made a study of the military questions which were submitted to them in close and constant liaison with SHAPE. They also kept the military observers of member countries not taking part in the Conference informed of the progress of their discussions. The military observers of the United States and the United Kingdom took an active part in the work of the Military Committee set up by the Conference.

Furthermore, the Governments represented at the Paris Conference were aware of the necessity of speedy results so as not to delay unduly the effective contribution of the German Federal Republic to Western Defense. With this in mind, the Military Committee of the Paris Conference endeavored in the first place to settle the military questions which had to be solved before agreement could be reached on a treaty, a military protocol, and an Agreement covering an interim period.

On the other hand, no attempt has been made to develop in detail the technical arrangements involved in setting up the Defense Community. Such technical arrangements will be worked out at a later date, either in the interval between the signature of the basic texts mentioned above and their ratification by the Parliaments of the countries concerned, or even, in certain cases, after the date on which the Treaty comes into force.

A—*Methods of integration and basic units*

The European Defense Forces will be composed of both conscripted and regular troops contributed by the various Member States. They will probably wear a common uniform.

In the case of the land forces, integration will take place in the Army Corps composed of basic units of different nationalities, except in special cases arising out of tactical or organizational requirements. In the Army Corps the media of command, the supporting units and the logistical support formations will all be of an integrated type.

Only the European Army Corps will be able to carry out independent missions and give combat with its own resources for any length of time. For this purpose, it will comprise, in addition to the basic units, supporting elements belonging to the different arms (artillery, armored units, Engineering Corps, etc.), as well as a complete group of logistical formations for the maintenance of the forces composing it.

Under its orders, the basic unit of "Groupement" will only include a sufficient variety of arms to enable it to go into general action; it cannot continue to exist without the assistance of the Army Corps, which will provide it with the necessary reinforcements and in particular its daily maintenance.

The normal establishment of an Army Corps will be about 80,000 men. The establishment of the *Groupement* will vary between 12,600 (armored *Groupements* and mechanized *Groupements*) and 13,000 (infantry *Groupements*). The latter figures represent the peace-time establishment under constant training which ensures that the unit is ready for combat: in time of war, these figures will be increased by the addition of approximately 2,000 non-specialized and untrained men (reservists, trainees).

In the case of the Air Forces, it has been agreed that the basic unit will be the "demi-brigade" including 75 machines for the majority of specialized branches; it would correspond to the "Wing" of the American Air Forces.

In peace-time, the average strength of the demi-brigade would be 1,200 men. It would form part of the major Commands, known as Tactical Air Forces, and would be grouped in Tactical Air Commands.

The supporting and maintenance services would be grouped on the level corresponding to the "Tactical Air Forces."

B—*Definition of the European Defense Forces*

The European Defense Forces will include all the land and air forces of the member countries, with the following exceptions:

(1) national forces for the defense of the overseas territories of the Member States, and the units required for the maintenance and relief of such forces;

(2) national forces which the Member States will have to recruit and maintain in order to carry out the international missions which they have undertaken (for example, forces stationed in Berlin and Austria, and forces operating in Korea);

(3) the police forces which Member States will maintain to preserve internal order.

The Conference agreed that in the case of a serious emergency affecting an overseas territory of a Member State, the fraction of the contingents contributed by that State to the European Defense Forces required to deal with the emergency would be made available to that State by the European Authority, at the State's request and with the approval of the Supreme Command (NATO). The military, economic and financial implications of such withdrawal of contingents would be studied and adjusted in each case individually by the Community.

The Member States would be free to carry out individual exchanges of personnel between the contingents which they make available to the European Defense Forces and the forces which are not part of the European Defense Forces, provided that such exchanges were not likely to result in a reduction of the European Defense Forces.

The Conference also agreed that in the event of disturbances or threatened disturbances within the territory of a Member State, the European Defense Forces might be used, in certain circumstances, to provide the assistance required to deal with the situation.

The question of the composition of the European Maritime Forces is still under study.

C—*Size of the European Defense Forces and Contribution of the Federal Republic*

The Paris Conference agreed, in consultation with SHAPE, on certain working assumptions regarding the size of the land and air forces which the European Defense Community should have at its disposal by 1 July 1954. These assumptions should, of course, be adapted to the results of the discussions also in progress in the military bodies of the Atlantic Treaty and the Temporary Council Committee (TCC).

According to these working assumptions, the land forces on 1 July 1954 should have reached the approximate figure of 43 Groups. Germany's contribution was estimated at 12 Groups, as follows:

8 infantry Groups and
4 mechanized Groups

Eight of these Groups, comprising the covering troops, would be ready immediately, and the others would be available after a very short interval for mobilization.

In addition, the Federal German Republic would make tactical air forces and Naval Coastal Defense Forces available to the European Defense Committee. The size and type of such forces is at present under study.

D—*Time-table for bringing the Forces into being*

The Paris Conference is studying the conditions in which the forces of the European Defense Community would in fact be brought into being. In the case of already existing forces, the question at issue is how they will be incorporated into the framework envisaged for the organization of European defense. This problem is at present under study. In the case of the contribution expected from the German Federal Republic, the problem consists in planning the successive operations whereby that contribution will become effective in the shortest possible time. A detailed time-table has been drawn up to meet this point. The time-table is governed by the following principles: in the

first place, it is understood that personnel of German origin will be recruited on the basis of compulsory military service. It is also agreed that the proportion of regular personnel should not exceed the proportion which applies to the European Defense Forces as a whole. Once these principles have been laid down, it goes without saying that the time-table of implementing measures will in practice depend on the dates on which the instruments instituting the European Defense Community come into force, and the dates on which the basic texts laying down regulations for the census and call-up of National Service Men have been drawn up by the German legislative authorities. On the assumption that the instruments instituting the European Defense Community would come into force on 1 July 1952, a time-table was drawn up by the Paris Conference for the raising of the German contribution. It emerges from this time-table that the 12 Groups of German origin would be ready for service on 1 April 1954.

E—*Subjects now under discussion*

Several types of problems have also been the subject of detailed study in the Military Committee of the Paris Conference. I quote them here as a reminder, for I propose to return to them below in connection with the institutional questions with which they are directly connected.

The major issues are the arrangements to be made in the initial period, the territorial organization, the status of forces, the administration of personnel and lastly, the relations to be established between the forces of the European Defense Community and the media of command of the Atlantic Organization. With regard to the last point, I think it important to stress that the aim of the surveys in progress is, of course, the adaptation of future arrangements in the European Defense Community to the command structure already in force within the Atlantic Organization.

In addition, the Conference is studying the problems arising out of setting up and running command training and instruction schools as early as in the initial period.

5. Since the final purpose to be achieved by our work is the fusion of the armed forces of participating countries in order to ensure the permanent defense of Europe, these armed forces must be attached to political institutions of a supra-national character. In trying to define these institutions, the draft submitted by France to Delegations was based on the precedent formed by the Coal and Steel Pool. Of course, account had to be taken of the obvious differences between the two cases. But the Conference considered that, with the appropriate adaptations, similar institutional provisions should be laid down, since the European Defense Community will one day have to become part of the general political framework of an integrated Europe, of which the Coal and Steel Pool will form the first concrete achievement.

A—*The European Authority*

In general, all Delegations agreed that a European Authority would be created, whose powers with regard to the European Forces would be

comparable, to the greatest possible extent, with those of a Minister of Defense in relation to national Armed Forces.

However, the Conference has not yet decided on the form to be given to this Authority. Two formulas, one based on the idea of a Board and the other on that of an Individual Commissioner are at present contemplated.

The question of the powers of the Authority is more difficult, since it touches more deeply on the very problem of the creation of a supranational Authority responsible for the organization of the Defense Forces. In the draft Treaty, which is at present in course of preparation by the Conference though not yet unanimously agreed by the Delegations, the Commissioner would have large powers of execution and control over the European Defense Forces:

—it will watch over the recruitment carried out, at least in the first period which will follow the entry into force of the Treaty, by the Member States;
—it will be responsible for training the Forces, following uniform methods;
—it will direct the Military Colleges;
—it will inspect and review the troops;
—it will decide the territorial location of units of the forces on the basis of the recommendations of the Supreme Atlantic Command;
—it will exercise judicial and disciplinary functions;
—it will administer staff and equipment;
—it will have important financial duties which will be described below;
—it will ensure liaison with States and international organizations;
—it will deal with questions of foreign aid.

Two other important duties are also contemplated for the European Authority with regard to which no agreed formula has yet been found. The first is the appointment by the Authority to ranks and posts in the armed forces and civil services. Three Delegations expressed the view that the national authorities should alone be authorized to appoint officers. We believe that a compromise solution can be found.

The second question still the subject of controversy concerns the establishment and execution by the Authority of the armament program of the European Defense Community. I will refer later to the problems raised by this very important question.

The solutions that we propose seem to us capable of ensuring the system that best adapted to our goal, that is, the creation of a European, and not a coalition army. I have grounds for believing that all Delegations reject the idea of a simple coalition, and this leads me to hope that if we are agreed on the purpose to be achieved, we shall succeed in agreeing on the methods of achieving it.

B—*Council of Ministers*

As in the case of the Coal and Steel Pool, the council of Ministers would be composed of representatives of the participating States, each State nominating a member of its government or a deputy.

The Council would harmonize the action of the Commissioner with the policy of the governments of Member States. It could issue general directives in cases provided for in the Treaty: liaison with other international defense bodies and, where necessary, with other states, safeguarding the economic and social equilibrium of Member States and, perhaps, questions relating to foreign aid.

The Council would decide on modifications to the basic texts and the make-up of the European Defense Forces. In certain cases provided for in the Treaty, the Commissioner is obliged, before taking a decision or making a recommendation, to obtain the views or the approval of the Council. These cases cover in particular territorial location of units, the establishment of the armaments, equipment, and supply programs, appointments to ranks and posts, and liaison with Member States.

However, while certain Delegations consider that this advance approval should be given either by a simple majority or by a two-thirds majority, other Delegations insist that in most cases unanimous approval of the Council must be obtained.

I would make it clear that the whole question of the powers of the Council is obviously linked with that of the powers of the Authority, and is the object of the same general reservation as was the case with the powers of the Authority.

C—*The Assembly*

The Assembly is composed of representatives of the peoples of the States joined together in the Community. Its composition and method of election will be determined at the end of the work of the Conference, but a formula is contemplated which will make it possible to nominate, for the First Assembly, representatives of the Parliaments of the various Member States, with the possibility of transforming it subsequently into an Assembly specially elected on the basis of universal suffrage. It is for this reason that it will be provided that the First Assembly nominated will be charged, in addition to its normal duties which we will examine later, with the task of examining during the transitional period the conditions under which an Assembly elected under universal suffrage can be created, the powers which would devolve on it, and the modifications which might have to be made in consequence in the other institutions of the Community.

Agreement has already been reached on the way in which the Assembly will operate. It is provided that it will hold an ordinary annual Session, and extraordinary Sessions at the request of the Commissioner, the Council, or the majority of the members of the latter.

Apart from the budgetary duties which will be examined later, the powers of the Assembly have also been worked out. It will be its duty, in particular, to pronounce on motions of censure on the administration of the Commissioner. If such a motion is carried, the Commissioner must resign.

D—*The Court*

In view of the conflicts which may arise between Member States and the Community, a Court of Justice will be organized to ensure respect for law in the interpretation and application of the Treaty.

Delegations agreed on the provisions relating to competence, appeals, cancellation of the decisions and recommendations of the Com-

missioner, cancellation of the deliberations of the Assembly or the Council, legal effects of appeals, and conditions for interpreting the Treaty.

The Court could be the same as that provided under the Coal and Steel Pool.

6. The financial questions raised by the creation and operation of the European Defense Community will be settled according to principles to be laid down in the future Treaty, its annexes, or its financial regulations.

From the beginning a common budget would cover, in the draft at present being studied by Delegations, all the expenditures necessary for the maintenance and creation of European forces. To meet this volume of expenditure, the European Community would dispose of the contributions of Member States. Further, owing to the great volume of expenditure, the Paris Conference hoped to benefit from foreign aid for the Community.

The preparation of the budget of revenue and expenditure would be the duty of the Commissioner. The draft prepared by him would be submitted to the Council and the Assembly, in conformity with the procedure which I shall indicate later.

Questions relating to the composition, establishment, voting and execution of the budget give rise to serious preoccupations in the minds of several Delegations.

Some Delegations consider that, contrary to what is provided in the draft at present under examination, the common budget should only cover the operational expenditure of the Authority bodies and the headquarters, together with the integrated services. In the opinion of these Delegations, units of the same national origin should remain at the charge of national budgets.

Several Delegations also expressed the view that a distinction should be drawn between an interim period and a final stage. In the interim period, since the supra-national Authority would not be in a position to exercise its full powers, there could in any case be only a limited common budget at the beginning.

The budget establishment procedure is at present envisaged as follows: the draft budget drawn up by chapters by the Commissioner would first be approved by the Council of Ministers, then submitted to the Assembly which could amend it, without however increasing expenditures beyond the initial proposals of the Commissioner. The budget as thus revised would be submitted again to the Council of Ministers for final decision.

The Conference reserved for the end of its discussions the whole of the important question of the contributions to be paid by the Member States in accordance with rules to be defined. This problem is con-

nected to a great extent with the decisions to be reached by the Temporary Council Committee (TCC) presided over by Mr. Harriman.

The Conference has also drawn up draft financial regulations for the guidance of the Commissioner and prepared a report on the question of the monetary problems.

7. The Conference is also studying the question of Armament Programs for the European Forces. The first problem is that of the establishment of Armament Programs. I have said that the Common Defense Budget, in the project under current discussion by the Conference, was established under headings. As a result the different organisms of the Community, each within its respective terms of reference, will discuss simultaneously and under the same conditions Armament Programs and the Budget. In this way, it would not be necessary to introduce into the Treaty particular arrangements for setting up the Programs.

On the other hand, the execution of the Programs poses numerous problems which will have to be taken care of by provisions in the Treaty. From the beginning of its work, the Conference thought that it would be wise to investigate a common system of supply and a common Program of Armaments in order to lighten the burdens which the organization of a common defense would lay upon Member States. The standardization of weapons and the specialization of armament production would make possible a better and more economical use of the resources of the member countries.

Further, the execution of the program has a direct bearing upon the economy and the social life of each of the member countries. It is consequently necessary that, in their execution, the Commissioner acts in close liaison with the Council.

The Armament Board came to a certain number of preliminary conclusions, with the general reservation formulated by one of the Delegations:

(*a*) The Commissioner will establish a Program of requirements for the whole of the Community. This program will be incorporated in the provisional Annual Statement of Expenditure, and approved as such. For the establishment of this Program, the Commissioner will get in close liaison with governments. The Council will determine by means of directives to the Commissioner the distribution into more or less detailed sections.

(*b*) The Commissioner will ensure the execution of the Program, taking into account, so far as monetary transfers are concerned, the dispositions of the Treaty. He will get in close liaison with the Council, the Advisory Committee and governments, as much in order to be in a position to appreciate the economic and social consequences of the execution of the Program as to avoid, as far as possible, the difficulties which might delay or hinder execution.

The Commissioner will place orders in such a way that these will be realized in the best conditions both as far as prices, delays, and

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the rhythm of production are concerned, and so as to ensure the best standardization and the greatest possible specialization of military production within the interior of the Community.

The placing of orders will be made freely, in particular on the basis of tenders to the Commissioner.

The Commissioner will be free to determine in which cases centralization or decentralization of the placing of orders will be necessary. The Purchasing Commissions to be set up for the Commissioner will be consulted by him for the placing of orders exceeding a certain sum, the sum in question to be fixed and reviewed in consultation with the Council. The Commissioner will account to the Council for orders placed in execution of the Program.

(*c*) If the execution of the Program encounters difficulties because of an insufficiency in the supply of raw materials, of a lack of equipment or of installed capacity, the Commissioner will be empowered to address to governments the appropriate recommendations.

(*d*) An Advisory Committee will be set up for the Commissioner. It will comprise representatives of producers and of labor and its role will be to assist the Commissioner in the execution of Programs by means of an exchange of information and reciprocal consultations.

The following questions have not yet been discussed by the Committee:

—Conditions in which the Commissioner obtains the information necessary to him on those firms which manufacture war material.

—Control by the Commissioner of military production in the Community as well as the import and export of military material.

—The role of the Commissioner in the matter of scientific and technical research in the military field.

—The role of the Commissioner in respect of relations with the technical bodies of NATO.

—The customs and fiscal regulations for products necessary to the Community.

8. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE FORCES

Finally, the Conference is studying the legal status of the European Forces. A special committee has been charged with elaborating drafts of texts dealing with juridical, fiscal and customs questions, with public security and the utilization of public services by the Community.

9. CONCLUSIONS

The Council will have seen that considerable progress has been made by the Conference, particularly during the last few months, when, as I mentioned earlier, it had the benefit of valuable technical assistance from SHAPE experts.

At military level, the Conference has succeeded in laying down the principles for the integration of forces of different nationalities; it has laid down in detail the basic unit of homogeneous nationality and

the integrated European Army Corps; it has worked out a definite time-phasing for the building up of German units. In the institutional field, the technical Committees of the Conference have thoroughly investigated the problems of the structure and the powers of the various bodies between which a working equilibrium must be established.

All questions connected with the composition, the preparation, the voting and the implementation of a European Defense Budget have been discussed in detail. In all, a draft Treaty, a draft interim Agreement, draft military and financial protocols and a draft agreement on juridical status have been drawn up. There are still considerable gaps in these drafts owing to differences of opinion between the Delegations on certain major points which I mentioned just now. I would stress that these points are chiefly connected with the budget, the structure and the powers of European Authority, the appointment of officers, and the drawing up and the implementation of armament programs.

There are certain other points which it has not yet been possible for the Conference to consider, owing to lack of time. There are in particular problems presented, when the Community is first established, by the raising of German troops when there is no territorial organization in Germany to make this initial operation possible and when the troops which are to be brought into being must immediately be of a European character.

Another question which has not yet been dealt with concerns international provisions for the use of Defense Forces and the relationship of the European Community with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The draft Treaty already stresses the principle of close cooperation between the two organizations. Further, it stipulates that the Commissioner act in close liaison with NATO, and above all it was specifically decided that, from the outset, the command and use of the European Forces are to be entrusted to the Supreme Atlantic Command. Nevertheless, the fact that the structure of the two organizations is not identical makes it necessary to find a method of ensuring that the decisions of each with regard to going into action are in agreement, and which provide the various member countries with guarantees of mutual aid.

The Conference has not yet laid down in detail the geographical area covered by the Treaty and has left a few political questions, such as the weighting of voices in the votes of the Council of Ministers, until the end.

Some of the difficulties which I have mentioned briefly may be capable of solution by compromise. Others call for modification in the positions adopted by certain Delegations.

At the beginning of this report I stated that the main concern of the Conference was to ensure both military effectiveness and a guarantee against a revival of German militarism.

As regards military effectiveness, all the Delegations consider that the Group chosen as basic unit is a flexible and maneuverable active unit which is the best suited to modern combat, whilst being the smallest possible homogeneous unit in an integrated army. It is released as far as possible from logistic tasks. It has only the essential services and therefore depends, for maintenance, on the higher integrated echelons. We hope that, when the time comes, all the military aspects of the plan will be put before the military bodies of the Council and that the latter will give their view as to its effectiveness.

We also think that, thanks in particular to the existence of a joint armament program and a joint budget, this organization will provide the required guarantee against a revival of German militarism.

It now appears clear that no valid guarantee could be obtained in the event of a national German army being formed.

Even those guarantees to which Germany might agree under a discriminatory system would become illusory; in fact, numerical restrictions alone would only be of a precarious nature. Further, the assignment to the Atlantic Command of operational duties would not prevent the reappearance of a General Staff since the German Petersberg plan revives a centralized military framework open to autonomous expansion.

On the other hand, the merging within a Community of the interests of peoples who a short time ago were in opposition will be for everyone a guarantee that national considerations and the dangers which these involve will disappear to make way for the will of the Community.

In this way, a sound solution would be found to the problem of relations between Germany and Europe. Neither the revival of a Wehrmacht, nor the neutralization of Germany meet the requirements of the present international situation. Only the integration of Germany in Europe, in the conditions which we envisaged in Washington last September, offers a valid solution.

For this reason, despite the great difficulties with which we are faced in an unfamiliar field, I reaffirm the conviction that with the goodwill of all parties and with the collaboration of our Atlantic partners, we shall be able to draw up a complete draft Treaty within a few weeks.

740.5/11–2851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 28, 1951—11:28 a. m.

2467. For Perkins, Bruce, Spofford, and MacArthur. Re: Deptel Rome 2434, rpt Paris 3177, London 2679.[2] Neth Emb has furnished us translation report by Chief Neth Del on 2nd part of Ministerial Conf re EDF held Paris Nov 15.[3] According Neth report, Schuman summing up results mtg, stated *inter alia* "that before NAC mtg end of Jan it shld be clear whether EDC cld be achieved or not. At that time it wld be better to acknowledge, if necessary, that an EDC was not feasible than to leave this matter further in suspense". Neth report ends "all the other Ministers present concurred in Schuman's statement".

Neth Emb tends view EDC crisis may be developing due first time realization on part Fon Mins real sovereignty issues involved. Schuman all or nothing statement (double checked translation), while possible mere exasperation with Benelux position, strikes us as serious recognition our position time running out on EDC solution.

WEBB

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris and London. It was drafted by John L. Barnard of the Office of European Regional Affairs and was approved by Office Director Edwin M. Martin.

[2] Not printed; it stated that there was an impression in Washington that an important European Defense Community Conference at the ministerial level had been held in Paris prior to the Rome session of the North Atlantic Council, and it asked for information (740.5/11–2651). In telegram Secto 113, November 29, from Rome, not printed, Assistant Secretary Perkins replied he knew of no EDC Conference at the ministerial level other than that held 10 days earlier in Paris and reported upon in the press (740.5/11–2951).

[3] Regarding the meeting under reference here, see also telegram 2883, November 14, from Paris, p. 919.

740.5/11–2951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET ROME, November 29, 1951—1 p. m.

Secto 109. Dept pass Defense, Treasury, Executive Office of the President and ECA. All agencies requested restrict internal distribution.

Following was decided re EDC at top-level delegation meeting November 26, including Secretary, Lovett, Snyder, Harriman, Bradley and Gruenther.[2] Summary of their position was:

1. US must know whether or not EDC will be successfully organized.

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London for Spofford, to Paris for MacArthur, to Brussels, and to The Hague.

[2] Officers present for the meeting were principal advisers to the Secretary of State for the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, November 24–28. Regarding the Council session, see the editorial note, p. 1312.

2. While we would prefer December 31, as we must know by January 15 deadline.

3. It is up to Schuman to handle Benelux countries and problem related to their current position.

4. Indicated if Benelux not satisfied in time, would approve EDF composed of France, Italy, and Germany.

5. Benelux problem re financial aspects is EDC problem and not US problem.

6. US reserves right to withdraw support of EDC if no result by January 15.

ACHESON

740.5/11–3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, November 30, 1951—1 p. m.

3233. In conversation with PriMin Pleven last night I stressed the tremendous importance of getting ahead rapidly with European defense force conference in Paris and bringing its deliberations to a conclusion by Dec. 31. I told him I thought chief difficulty at present was that officials representing the various participating nations needed governmental decisions on outstanding items of disagreement in order to complete their work. He agreed with this and said that as soon as Schuman Plan was out of the way he wld personally take charge of the affair from the French side and press it vigorously to settlement.

BRUCE

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London for Ambassador Gifford, to Rome for the Secretary of State, and to Bonn for High Commissioner McCloy.

Paris Embassy files, 400 European Defense Forces : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Embassy in Italy

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 3, 1951—3 p. m.

272. Eyes only for Acheson from Byroade. Since learning of your private conversation with Eden on the subj of the EDF,[1] I have been wondering whether a short personal message from you to him might be desirable to retain greater flexibility of action in the future when a move by the UK in this field might be extremely beneficial. An added factor is that position taken by Sir Maxwell-Fyfe at Strasbourg last week[2] and several editorials are beginning to indicate that position

[1] This is presumably a reference to the private luncheon conversation of November 29; see the Secretary's memorandum of conversation, p. 746.

[2] In a declaration to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on November 28, British Home Secretary Maxwell Fyfe defined British policy toward Western Europe including the possibility that Britain would associate itself with the European Defense Force in some practical way. For documentation on the interest of the United States in the activities of the Council of Europe, see volume IV.

of new British Govt, after giving pre-election impression of more liberal attitude towards moves toward unity on the continent, is going to revert to traditional position of past govt. My fear is that Eden, in key role of formulation of policies for new govt, may give broader interpretation to your remarks than was intended as I understand you were speaking merely on question as to whether UK should at this late date formally enter in EDF negotiations. Should not think message need be specific in nature.

Suggested draft follows which may of course need considerable revision to reflect your actual conversations:

[Here follows the draft text of a message from Secretary Acheson to Foreign Secretary Eden which, with the exception of paragraph 6, is identical with the message subsequently delivered to Eden on December 8, page 955. For Byroade's version of paragraph 6, see footnote 3, page 956.]

This message has been discussed with Bruce who agrees. Although Eisenhower has not seen message, substance has been discussed with him and he is in general agreement. As this will reach you shortly before you embark you may wish to consider matter until your arrival Gibralter. If you consider idea has merit, arrangements can be made there for dispatch via Madrid.[3] [Byroade.]

BRUCE

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[3] In telegram 367, December 4, from Rome, not printed, Secretary Acheson replied as follows:

"I shall send final reply to Byroade's message (Paris 272) from Gibraltar. My first impression is adverse because first—any leak would be fatal, and, second, the 6th paragraph indicates an almost lethal weakness." (Paris Embassy files, 400 European Defense Forces.)

Secretary Acheson and a party of advisers departed from Naples for New York aboard the SS *Independence* on December 4. Byroade flew from Paris to Gibraltar late on December 6 or early December 7 to join the Secretary's party, and the agreed text of the message to Eden was then sent to Paris for subsequent delivery in London.

Paris Embassy files, 400 European Defense Forces: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State, at Rome

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 3, 1951—5 p. m.

273. Personal for Secretary from Bruce. Have discussed with Byroade message he is sending you today as regards the British position on the EDF [1] and am in complete agreement with its contents. Since returning to Paris I have been weighing in my mind a closely related problem.

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[1] Telegram 272, December 3, from Paris to Rome, *supra*.

You will recall that when the Paris Conference on the EDF started the US and UK designated their Ambassadors here as their official observers. This was probably a good solution for the long pull, but I believe in the remaining few weeks a different approach might be helpful. My reasons for this are as follows:

(1) The British Ambassador here is quite ineffective on this problem. I feel it most desirable that the British have a really qualified man, with political stature and imagination, during the remaining phases of the Conference. I do not see how we would approach the British with the suggestion that they nominate a new individual to this mission unless we both change the procedure of using our Ambassadors as observers.

(2) Believe we should find some way of publicly impressing Europe of great importance we and the UK attach to successful and early completion of plans for the European Defense Force. One method of accomplishing this would be for US and the UK each to send a well known and highly placed individual to Paris in the immediate future as our official representatives. I would of course continue to devote myself almost exclusively to project.

Have discussed this only with Doug and Hank [2] who agree that on our side John Foster Dulles would be a possibility, particularly in view of his recent success on the Japanese peace treaty. Do not of course know whether his services could be obtained but task should be only of few weeks duration if we are to succeed with our present time schedule.

If you consider idea has merit, we should have to determine whether British would follow suit (and whether qualified individual could be found as US observer). While direct message from you to British would be best approach, I could, if you desire, discuss matter with Gifford and British in London in view of your imminent departure.

As time schedule we have fixed is pressing, it would be desirable if you approve for you to start some wheels in motion on our side so that US observer could be prepared to depart at least shortly after your arrival in Washington.

Sorry to complicate your last day in Rome. If you wish, perhaps your views could be forwarded to us from Gibraltar as suggested in message from Byroade.[3]

You have undoubtedly heard that prospects of passage of the Schuman Plan by the French Parliament were unfavorable. The corner has however in my opinion been successfully turned and Pleven, his colleagues and prominent parliamentarians expect its ratification after debates this week end.

BRUCE

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[2] Presumably the references here are to MacArthur and Byroade.

[3] In telegram 367, December 4, from Rome to Paris, not printed, Secretary Acheson replied to this message as follows:

"As to Bruce's suggestion (Paris 273) re Dulles, this seems wholly impossible. He is either in Japan or on his way on a major assignment. To change him now would confuse everything. I believe on our side that you should continue. Perhaps you can discuss with Lloyd or otherwise [seek?] an improvement in British situation." (Paris Embassy files, 400 EDF)

740.5/12-651 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Trimble) to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

SECRET THE HAGUE, December 6, 1951—3 p. m.

573. During call Stikker yesterday afternoon I inquired to his impression Rome mtg NATO FonMins. He replied that as he had told Chapin and me two weeks ago (Embtel 507 Nov 20 rptd Brussels 37 Paris for Usdel 89[2]) had not expected much and therefore not been disappointed. Mtg he continued had not only been far too large but also there been inadequate preparation with consequence that relatively little constructive been achieved.

Stikker said continued support EDC concept primarily I gathered because it backed US. However Fr overloading it with polit stipulations to detriment in his opinion early estab effective Eur Def which wld naturally necessitate active Ger participation. These requirements present serious constitutional problems for several countries in particular Belg. It wld be nec amend Belg constitution action which wld require new elections and present Belg Govt opposed holding them for time being. Sitn not as difficult case Neth as elections scheduled next year which time constitutional amendment required for EDC cld also be voted on. Stikker said seriously questioned whether Fr Parl wld ratify EDC Treaty basing his observations on remark that effect which Maurice Schumann recently made to him. He stated that in talks Rome on EDF between Benelux FonMins on one hand and Secs Schuman and Eden on other he had adopted what might be considered as obstructive attitude but had done so not only preserve Benelux unity but also and more important to point up difficulties reaching agrmt re EDF basis provisions which Fr insisting be included plan. Stikker recalled he been among first to propose inclusion Ger contingents in West Def Force. He continued be firmly that opinion and also had made it clear Neth considered FedRep shld be admitted NATO on status-full equality with other members. This in

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris, London, Bonn, and Brussels.

[2] Not printed. It reported that Dutch Foreign Minister Stikker had told Ambassador Chapin that he felt that the forthcoming Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Rome and the session scheduled for Lisbon in early 1952 would probably accomplish little that was constructive. With respect to the projected European Defense Force Stikker observed that there was no general meeting of the minds and little likelihood of reaching one in the near future. Stikker noted that France and Belgium were at extreme ends with the Italians and Dutch in the middle. He pointed out that the Netherlands, which had joined the European Defense Community conference primarily because of Belgium's urgings, found itself in a position of attempting to moderate the Belgian position and to persuade Belgium to remain in the conference. (740.5/11-2051)

his view was only logical way in which West cld gain useful Ger coop def Eur. Moreover believed all other members with single exception Fr wld be agreeable such step. For example Lange had told him few days ago Nor wld support move and he also ascertained it wld be acceptable Dan.

Turning to current sitn Ger Stikker expressed regret contractual arrangements been presented Benelux as *fait accompli*. Likewise critical phraseology UN Res FedRep GDR plebiscite characterizing it as negative in that it merely calls for inquiry into possibility of holding elections. Indicated certain concern Sov wld agree to holding elections on condition West Powers in turn wld agree Gers shld same time vote neutrality issue and in this connection asserted neutrality sentiment appears be growing alarming rate FedRep.

Stikker concluded conversation with remark effect he did not see how much real progress cld be made estab West Def Force next few months despite obvious necessity this be done soon as possible.

TRIMBLE

740.5/12-651 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, December 6, 1951—5 p. m.

3377. Subject is Eur Def Conference. At mtg of conf steering comite yesterday, Alphand extended invitation from Schuman to participating states for mtg of EDC Mins at Strasbourg on 11 and 12 Dec.[2] Mins wld discuss and attempt settle major outstanding issues, in particular re common budget and common procurement, use of EDC forces and perhaps composition of executive.[3] Conf wld continue meeting in meanwhile and Mins wld meet again either before or just after Christmas to discuss rest of outstanding issues.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

[2] At the meeting of the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on November 27, the decision was reached for the six fully participating governments in the European Defense Community Conference to hold ministerial-level meetings on EDC problems; see the editorial note, p. 932.

[3] Telegram 3396, December 7, from Paris, not printed, reported that a draft agenda for the EDC ministerial conference at Strasbourg was presented by Alphand and approved by the Steering Committee at its meeting on December 6. Items on the agenda were: 1. common budget; 2. armament and supply of Community; 3. composition and use of forces; 4. structure of the commissariat; 5. relative powers of the Commissioner, Council, and Assembly; and 6. method of designation of officers. (740.5/12-751)

All dels indicated acceptance of invitation, although one or two wished first to consult govts concerning availability of Mins on dates named.[4]

BRUCE

[4] Telegram 3353, December 5, to Paris, not printed, stated that the Department of State attached the greatest importance to the NATO decision to transfer EDC negotiations to the ministerial level and counted heavily on the active personal participation and interest of the ministers as a means of reaching an agreed EDC formula prior to January 15, 1952 (740.5/12-951). Telegram 2545, December 6, from Rome, not printed, reported having learned that Italian authorities would attempt in private at the Strasbourg ministerial conference to reconcile at the highest political level the outstanding differences on the constitution of the European Defense Community and would devote particular attention to the Benelux officials (740.5/12-651).

740.5/12-651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Elwood Williams III of the Office of German Political Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 6, 1951.

Participants: Mr. Gontran de Juniac, Counselor of French Embassy
Mr. Perry-Laukhuff, GPA
Mr. Elwood Williams, GPA

Calling at the Department regarding another matter, Mr. de Juniac raised the subject of the EDC.

Mr. de Juniac referred to several recent articles in the press including, specifically, articles by Baldwin, Sulzberger and the military correspondent of the Baltimore *Sun*. In varying ways they referred to difficulties allegedly appearing around EDC and suggested various alternatives that might have to be adopted if the EDC scheme failed. Mr. de Juniac felt that the effect of these articles might be unduly upsetting as indicating that the U.S. has given up the EDC as a lost cause. He referred to his recent advices on the subject, particularly regarding the Socialist Party in France which occupies a key position regarding this matter in French politics and said that, as far as he could see, the EDC would be acceptable to the French Parliament.[1] He wondered where the American news stories came from and what substance they might contain.

Mr. Laukhuff replied that he was not familiar with all the articles mentioned but that he had read the Sulzberger article. He also understood that things were going well within France, but he pointed out

[1] Telegram 3302, December 3, from Paris, not printed, reported on Ambassador Bruce's discussion with French Socialist leader Guy Mollet regarding the Socialist attitude toward a possible European Defense Community. Mollet favored such a plan provided sufficient powers were given to the central authority to prevent German domination. Mollet felt the ideal solution would be for Britain to be a member of the EDC from the outset. At least the British would have to in some way associate themselves with the EDC. (740.5/12-351)

that there were other and grave problems connected with EDC and mentioned particularly the matters of a defense contribution by the Germans, the need for NATO progress and the need for the American Government to have something substantial in the way of accomplishment in this area to report to the Congress early next year.

Mr. Laukhuff said that the Sulzberger article, at least, had obviously originated in Paris and undoubtedly reflected, in some degree, the discussions between Mr. Acheson and Mr. Schuman, in which Mr. Acheson made very strongly (among others) the points that time was running out on the question of Germany's contribution to western defense and on Congressional willingness to wait for evidence of progress on the integrated European contribution to NATO. Mr. Acheson had made it quite clear that, while we were still putting our entire support behind the EDC idea, we considered it imperative that the treaty take final form very rapidly so that by the middle of January the basis of German participation in defense and the future role of the European forces in NATO plans would be clear. Mr. Laukhuff recalled, however, that the U.S. Government has made plain from the beginning that it would seek another means of bringing about a German contribution to the NATO forces if, in spite of all its hopes and support, the EDC could not be brought to effective life.

740.5/12–851

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, Aboard the SS "Independence" [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 8, 1951—1:15 p. m.

Since Rome NAC spate of editorials and news stories has appeared in US press to effect that Paris Conf re EDC has failed for all intents and purposes and that question is now posed as to what form Ger participation in def west will take.

While we believe effect of above on Paris conferees can be useful to some extent as prod for agreeing some form of draft EDC treaty, there wld appear also to be danger that rash these press stories cld be interpreted as indication US Govt has given up all hope any kind EDC this time.

Therefore, we wonder if it might not be useful for you at press conf upon your landing to strike two notes re EDC negots: 1) urgency reach agreement and that NATO cannot wait indefinitely; 2) confidence that agreement will be reached.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Ridgway B. Knight, Adviser on NATO Affairs. Secretary of State Acheson departed from Naples for New York aboard the SS *Independence* on December 4.

French Emb indicated yesterday Fr Govt fears that US wavering in its support and that this wld handicap negots about to start at min level. We reaffirmed our position of full support along lines your conversation Schuman Plan but think above public statement by you wld be helpful.[2]

WEBB

[2] See Williams' memorandum of conversation, December 6, *supra*.

740.5/12–751

The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)[1]

SECRET [DECEMBER 8, 1951.]

MY DEAR MR. EDEN: Since your departure from Rome, I have been thinking of the conversation we had on the Eur def force when you and I lunched last Thurs.[2] You will recall that you asked my view as to whether your country cld make a useful contribution at this point to assist in a solution to what we both agreed was a very confused sitn. My offhand reaction was that any new initiative at this particular moment might serve to complicate negotiations.

While I retain this view as to any immediate action on your part, I have been wondering whether the time may not shortly arrive when some positive move by the UK cld provide the catalyst that seems so necessary to move this effort along to fruition on the continent. I am thinking here primarily in terms of the polit and Parliamentary aspects of the prob rather than the mechanics of securing and agreed draft treaty by experts.

I know you share my concern over the French sitn. We are skating on thin ice on the question as to whether the French Parl will in the end support its govt's initiative for the creation of a common force in

[1] The source text was sent in telegram 891, December 7, from Paris to the Embassy in London, eyes only for Ambassador Gifford, with instructions that it be delivered to Foreign Secretary Eden, and repeated for information as telegram 3398, from Paris to the Department of State, eyes only for Acting Secretary of State Webb and Deputy Under Secretary Matthews. This message appears to have been delivered in London on December 8.

With the exception of paragraph 6, this message is identical with the draft proposed by Byroade in telegram 272, December 3, from Paris to Rome, p. 948. The text of paragraph 6 in Byroade's draft is indicated in footnote 3, below. The copy of this message signed by the Secretary of State and indicating his personal corrections to a revised version of paragraph 6 (see footnote 3, below) was apparently delivered to the Embassy in Paris by the pilot who had flown Byroade to Gibraltar to join the Secretary of State and his party aboard the SS *Independence*. (Paris Embassy files, 400 EDF)

[2] The reference here is presumably to the private luncheon between Secretary Acheson and Foreign Secretary Eden reported upon in the Secretary's memorandum of conversation of November 29, p. 746.

Eur. This concern has, I believe, diverted our attention somewhat from Adenauer's position with the Bundestag, where again the outcome cannot be forecast with any comfortable degree of certainty. You are closer to the Benelux sitn than I, but here also there will undoubtedly be severe strains prior to the governmental and Parliamentary approval of the concept of a single Eur force involving any degree of common polit and financial control.

While the above may sound pessimistic, I still believe the task can be accomplished if we all do everything we can to insure a realistic draft treaty at an early date and if we address ourselves to aiding the various govts with their Parliamentary problems.

I know you have these problems very much in mind, but I shld take great comfort if you wld continue to weigh your position, particularly as regards the latter problems above. If, for instance, we come to foresee Parliamentary disapproval in France, or even Ger, or a possible withdrawal by the Benelux nations, it is quite possible that the position of your govt might be the factor which cld make success out of failure. The consequences of failure wld indeed be tragic, as there seems, at least to me, no satisfactory alternative approach at this late date to the problems of securing the assistance of Ger in the def effort.

I do not suggest that you make any move at this time. Furthermore, I do not believe that it is possible to make a helpful move until matters have progressed a little farther in Paris and it is clearer than it is at present and we find what the sticking points are. Perhaps the most useful area to explore is what form of association by the UK with the Eur Army wld be possible for you.[3]

I have communicated with Gen Eisenhower on the substance of this message and find him in gen agrmt with the views expressed herein.

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[3] In Byroade's original draft of this message (see telegram 272, December 3, from Paris to Rome, p. 948), this paragraph read as follows:

"I have no definite suggestion at this point as to what you might do in the above eventuality, nor the complications for you in announcing your willingness to some type of institutional association with the defense community, some association of your troops in Europe with the Force, or perhaps some formal declaration of a warmer UK support for the concept of the European Defense Community. I shall continue to think of this problem and send you such thoughts as I may have. I think you can see that what I am groping for is a possible boost of a psychological nature rather than legalisms."

In the copy of this message carried from Gibraltar to Paris and amended by the Secretary (see footnote 1, above), paragraph 6 initially read as follows:

"I do not suggest that you make any statement at this time. Indeed it still seems to me, as it did when you and I talked, that even the slightest suspicion that you might be about to make some suggestion would end any chance of the six nations working out some solution for themselves. Furthermore, I do not believe that it is possible to make a helpful suggestion until matters have progressed a little farther in Paris and it is clearer than it is to me at this moment what the sticking points are. Perhaps the most useful area to explore is what form of association by the UK with the European Army would be possible for you."

The Secretary of State himself initialed the excisions and correction resulting in the version of the paragraph as printed here.

I was greatly encouraged by our association in the recent mtgs and the frankness and clarity of your views. I look forward to our mtgs next month with a certainty that we shall move even farther forward to a similarity of view on many of the issues that confront us both.[4]

Sincerely, DEAN ACHESON

[4] In a reply of December 19 (transmitted to the Department of State by the British Embassy on December 20), not printed, Eden stated that he had given the Secretary's message much thought and had had it with him during his visit with Prime Minister Churchill to Paris on December 17 and 18. Regarding that visit and Eden's evaluation thereof, see telegram 2813, December 19, from London, and footnote 3, thereto, p. 971.

740.5/12–1051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, December 10, 1951—1 p. m.

3446. Personal from Bruce to the Secretary. Ref Embtel 3442 Dec 9.[2] Subject is end-item assistance to European defense community.

1. As presently drafted, EDC treaty provides that its executive shall handle questions regarding financial or material external aid furnished to the community. French paper on common armament and supply program, recently submitted to conference, contained similar provision, that "executive will have charge of directing and administering outside aid to the community, under general direction of Council of Ministers". In discussion, Alphand, for French, stressed importance of this provision in relation to preparation and execution of common budget and supply program. Blank, for German delegation, stated that FedRep wld fight for this approach. Other delegates, by implication or silence, appeared to approve.

2. Later Alphand, at suggestion of German and Belgian delegates, asked on behalf of conference that I obtain official US Govt position on whether US wld accept administration of military end-item assistance by executive of EDC in place of member states. Alphand asked for assurance that US wld arrange for US military authorities and SHAPE to deal directly in these questions with executive and military authorities of community instead of member govts.

3. I suggest US reply that it wld handle end-item assistance through community as proposed. Mandate under Mutual Security Act to use aid "to further encourage the economic unification and political federation of Europe" and our support of creation effective forces under EDC concept seem clearly to require this position. Any other attitude

[1] This telegram was repeated to Bonn for the eyes only of McCloy.

[2] Not printed; it reported that at the meeting of the Steering Committee of the European Defense Community conference on December 6, there was a discussion of a French draft paper on the armament and procurement problems of the EDC (740.5/12–1051).

wld obviously undermine common armament program, which both French and Germans stated to be indispensable for agreement on EDC treaty and wld indeed by inconsistent with whole EDC concept of single integrated force equipped by community. Any bilateral agreements necessary under act shld reflect this arrangement.

4. Question may also arise about our attitude on external aid to Belgium or Netherlands, if they shld fail to join an EDC created by remaining countries. It wld probably be inappropriate to state that US military assistance to these countries wld be conditional on participation in common defense and procurement program. However, I suggest reply shld state (*a*) that US views creation of single force as increasing effective military strength; (*b*) that US in allocating military assistance wld continue its present policy of giving priority where defense build-up is most useful and effective; and (*c*) this policy might affect allocation of equipment between forces within community and continental forces remaining outside community. De Staercke, new Belgian delegate, implied that such statement by US might be useful in securing support of Belgium for larger degree of a central authority in production, finance and planning.

5. Our reply shld also be drafted with a view to aiding the various govts with their Parliamentary problems. It wld be very helpful for French Govt in assembly debate on EDC, scheduled for late Dec or Jan, to be in position to refer to this concrete support by US of system of common supply with its inherent safeguards against creation of separate German national military forces.

6. Request of conference on this proposal provides opportunity to help speed action on draft treaty. A prompt response, giving vigorous support to the common armament program of EDC, shld materially assist in resolving some of present differences by posing issue in sharper terms for Benelux countries. Moreover, such action cld not be misrepresented as improper pressure or inteference since conference has asked for expression of US position.

7. This subject was discussed with Byroade in Paris before his departure. I think matter of sufficient importance for you to discuss with Lovett. I will explore further with Harriman here.[3]

[BRUCE]

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[3] In a telegram of December 9 from the SS *Independence*, Secretary Acheson stated the following:

"EDF conf proceeding on assumption community will be recipient mil assistance. Bruce feels would be helpful if US cld soon announce our acceptance this procedure provided EDF becomes workable institution. Pls check present legislative flexibility and attitude other depts prior my return." (740.5/12–951)

In his telegram 688, December 11, from Bonn, not printed, High Commissioner McCloy heartily endorsed Ambassador Bruce's position and urged a prompt reply along the lines he suggested. McCloy concluded:

"It would seem that at just this time it would be particularly eloquent of our serious intent in regard to the economic and political federation of Europe." (740.5/12–1151)

740.5/12–851 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 10, 1951—6:27 p. m.

3423. Subj is Paris tel 3439.[2] Dept fully concurs Gers entitled to detailed info concerning SHAPE's terms of reference as these will govern use great bulk EDC forces. Dept believes, however, it wld be more appropriate for Fr Govt as member and in chair Paris Conf take initative with NAC Deps instead US which is observer. Dept desirous provide max help bring EDC negots successful conclusion but thinks preferable continue operate through members Paris Conf and bi-laterally back-stage with those members as complications arise rather than openly giving impression assuming leadership and initiative.

WEBB

[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Ridgway Knight and cleared by Parsons, was repeated for information to London for Spofford.

[2] Dated December 8, not printed. It suggested that West German authorities be provided with the SHAPE terms of reference before they were obliged to agree to definite provisions on the use of European Defense Community forces. (740.5/12–851)

740.5/12–1151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, December 11, 1951—6 p. m.

2684. In conversation with Eden this morning I raised question of EDF. He said Brit position was unchanged, so far as putting troops in EDF was concerned and that he had discussed matter with Montgomery who had urged him to keep to this position. He added that he appreciated very much Acheson's message to him of December 7 (Paris tel to Dept 3398, December 7 [2]) and that he and Churchill expect to do everything they can to help support EDF, short of agreeing to actual Brit participation, when they are in France on 17th and 18th of this month. He said that if in spite of all efforts EDF did not materialize, he was considering what new approach to problem might be proposed.

GIFFORD

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris.

[2] Not printed; it transmitted the text of Secretary Acheson's personal message of December 8 to Foreign Secretary Eden, p. 955. (740.5/12–751)

536-688 PT 1--81---63

740.5/12–1151 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Acting Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, December 11, 1951—6 p. m.

Depto 697. At CD mtg yesterday Chairman [2] cited Rome resolution on EDC–NATO relationships and suggested Deps might send representation of one or more members to Paris to establish contact with conf (we contemplate group of three representing respectively non-European govts) Wilgress (non-EDC European Govt) Bryn (and EDC govt) Benelux or Ital rep (EDC dels have indicated strong preference for establishing group liaison rather than leaving it to two chairmen) also requested Deps particularly from EDC countries to ascertain their govt's views on relationships. Suggested possibility joint mtg of EDC delegates and CD at some point.

Lindsay reported SG acting on Rome resolution has asked SHAPE to prepare a study of military relationships. Neth and UK showed some concern at initative being taken from SG.

Sir Ernest Wood of DPB cited importance of linking production work of EDC and DPB.

Fr called attention to important aspects to be discussed by Mins at Strasbourg today (agenda as in Paris Embtel 3396 [3]) and noted difficulties of pursuing parallel negotiations simultaneously in both Paris and London under time pressure. Suggested Chairman Paris conf and chairman CD cld work out liaison arrangements.

Burin then made lengthy statement on (*a*) compatibility of obligations under NAT and EDC treaties and (*b*) mechanics of correlation between two communities. EDC treaty cld contain article declaring attack on one attack on all. On signature of EDC treaty two declarations cld be made; EDC members wld consider attack on any NAT member attack on EDC and NATO govts wld consider attack on any members of EDC an attack on all of NATO. He raised question of whether use of EDF shld be decided by unanimous or majority consent of ministerial council and expressed belief both methods impractical and best solution was to keep silent as in NAT Article V.

As to link, draft treaty contained article making commissioner responsible for liaison with all international organizations whose aims related to EDC. Relationship must not assume Ger membership in NATO, since that wld constitute recognition of Ger as sovereign state, remove basis for residual rights, provoke Russia and change basic character of NAT. Single representation of EDC council in NAC wld

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris and Bonn.

[2] Ambassador Spofford.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 952. Regarding the EDC ministerial meeting under reference here, see telegram 3533, December 13, from Paris, p. 963.

have minority status; therefore preferable maintain present national representation NAC and CD and arrange for EDC commissioner to deal with those bodies directly on matters of common concern. EDC wld be represented collectively in DPB and FEB. SG wld continue as at present but with EDC representative on M.C. officers of EDC countries on SHAPE staff wld become EDC officers: (Text of Fr statement being forwarded separately).

Belg Dep said if EDC is created it wld be NATO's role to establish link and saw no difficulty if EDF were fairly simple military organization. On compatibility of obligations he saw no difficulty, noting obligation of Brussels pact states under both that pact and NAT.

Deps then agreed to consult govts and discuss tomorrow establishment of relations with EDC conf and begin substantive consideration of relationship.

SPOFFORD

740.5/12–1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, December 12, 1951—6 p. m.

3510. Personal from Bruce to the Secretary. Ref Embtel 3446, Dec 9 [*10*], 1951.[2]

1. In addition to request for US views on end-item assistance, Alphand on behalf of steering comite asked that US Govt study question of transferring to EDC common budget local currency counterpart of financial or econ assistance provided by US to participating nations for support of their def efforts. He envisaged that present arrangements whereby US and each govt separately determine amount and conditions of US assistance for dollar needs wld remain unchanged but each govt wld agree to contribute counterpart to common budget under control of community's executive. A participating govt wld not be able to credit such counterpart against its agreed financial contribution to EDC. I informed steering comite that I wld ask my govt to explore this proposal and I wld communicate any comments to conf. (If any aid is allocated for nondef purposes counterpart generated thereby might, if desired, be separately treated.)

2. In my opinion proposal wld be an effective method of furthering purposes of Mutual Security Act in strengthening def and in encouraging econ unification and political federation.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Bonn for the eyes only of High Commissioner McCloy.

[2] *Ante*, p. 957.

(*a*) Each participating country wld take treaty obligation to make an equitable net contribution to def from its own resources. Net contribution cld not be reduced by receiving US aid because counterpart of US assistance wld be automatically over and above total contributions. Thus financial availabilities for def of Eur wld tend to be increased.

(*b*) Substantial funds cld be made available to community independent of contributions and actions of national parliaments. Independent resources cld greatly enhance authority of common executive and, if desirable, powers of common assembly. In crucial initial period independent funds shld offer even more possibilities of benefit from standardization and savings which wld result from production for community-wide use.

(*c*) Direct negots with authorities of community shld improve position of US Govt or of SHAPE, if we wished, to use influence to obtain most effective results from US assistance. In particular participation in utilization of counterpart wld give US and NATO greater leverage in influencing community's decisions on placement of production orders in Germany and in influencing community to cooperate with DPB in overcoming national barriers and sentiments which are preventing a sound basis of def production in Europe.

3. Use of counterpart in this way is not, of course, *sine qua non* for EDC as is community's administration of common end-item program but an encouraging response to conf request wld also be of considerable assistance in obtaining governmental and parliamentary approval of concept of single European force involving common political and financial control.

BRUCE

Editorial Note

Secretary of State Acheson held a press and radio news conference aboard the SS *Independence* in New York harbor on his return to the United States on the afternoon of December 12. The Secretary reviewed in general terms the course of his discussions in Paris and Rome during his 6-week visit in Western Europe. In the course of his review of the discussions at the Rome session of the North Atlantic Council, the Secretary commented as follows about the prospects for the European Defense Community:

"We have been dealing chiefly with the matters of the European Defense Force. You know that after the meeting in Rome there was convened a meeting of the six Foreign Ministers in Strasbourg where decisions were made, and I am not familiar with the details of those decisions, since I have been on this ship. But, from the talks which I had with all of those Ministers before they met, and from the very meager reports which I have been able to get on the ship, I feel certain that important and helpful decisions have been made, and that when they meet again on the 27th of December we will be much further

along with the European Defense Force, which includes in it a fair and important contribution by Germany to its own defense and to the defense of Western Europe."

Later, in answer to a question as to when the first German soldier would become a part of NATO forces under General Eisenhower, the Secretary commented as follows:

"Well, I can't answer that question. That all depends on the progress which is going to be made this month in the discussions on the European Defense Force. As I said, the Ministers had their meeting two or three days ago. They are having another meeting on the 27th. We should hope that the whole matter could be worked out in time for NATO to put its approval on it, on the 2nd, 3rd or 4th [of February 1952] during our meeting [at Lisbon], and that we can then get to work. I wouldn't want to predict when the first German will be in the European Army, but we hope it will be soon. We believe it is vitally important. We believe it can succeed, and we believe it is going to succeed."

Still later in the conference, the Secretary expressed his conviction of the importance of the Rome session of the NATO Council in resolving problems of the European Defense Community:

"I think also in regard to the European Defense Force that the meeting in Rome gave the Foreign Ministers a chance to express problems which they had in their mind, raised the principal unsettled questions, aired different views, and gave a general line on the path which can be taken to solve these questions. In that way it was absolutely essential. If it had not been for that meeting, we could have not been about to make the progress which I am sure we are going to make. In that sense I meant it was productive."

The full text of the Secretary's press conference is included in file 110.11/12–1251.

740.5/12–1351 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, December 13, 1951—5 p. m.

3533. Attn Ridgway Knight. Subj is Eur Def Force. Re Deptel 3412, Dec. 8.[2]

1. Fol is a summary of Mins discussions at Strasbourg on EDC based on preliminary conversations with Alphand and conf Secretariat who returned to Paris late yesterday. Other heads of delegations re-

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

[2] Not printed.

turning Paris only today for steering comit meeting this afternoon. We hope to obtain a clearer picture after we have had a chance to canvass various delegates.

2. Discussion ranged over most of outstanding questions during all-day session which lasted until 1:30 Wednesday morning. Few definite decisions were taken, altho conf Secretariat tells us that points of view of Mins on several important questions were brought considerably closer together. Next meeting will open Dec 27 (earliest date on which all Mins cld be present); Mins then plan to continue meeting until questions requiring their decision have been cleared up. Present schedule calls for four days.

3. Despite sharp exchanges, notably between Adenauer and Van Zeeland on Belgians desire to maintain natl forces, atmosphere of this meeting appears to have been much better than at previous mtgs at Paris and Rome. Mins apparently showed real desire to solve issues and reach conclusion by end of year. Alphand was particularly impressed with conduct of Adenauer, which he described as "wise and calm". Benelux Mins appeared somewhat more conciliatory than at past mtgs, altho they made few of necessary concessions on common financing and common procurement.

Conf Secretariat claims to be encouraged by results and particularly by general atmosphere of this mtg. They say Schuman shares their view. Schuman was very moved by announcement of remarkable vote of French Assembly on Schuman Plan late Tuesday and by ovation he recd from other Mins who realized full favorable implication of this vote. Blank, Lombardo, and Alphand are, however, discouraged because results did not include clear instructions on particular points at issue before EDC conf.

4. Alphand thought that Spaak resignation from Presidency of Council of Eur[3] might be significant and useful move. He was also very pleased with Spaak's article in *Paris-Presse* yesterday (Embtel 3527).[4] He interpreted these actions as Spaak taking issue with attitude of Van Zeeland.

5. No definite conclusions were reached on common budget. Alphand claims there was no change in Van Zeeland's insistence on natl armies financed by natl budgets and equipped by natl programs. Conf Secretariat, however, states Van Zeeland gave indications he wld abandon his objections to common budget in definitive period. Stikker continued to object to any modification of medium-term defense program already approved by Parliaments of member states. Dutch Finance Min also is apparently reluctant to agree to community control over admins of external aid. Adenauer, supported by Schuman, was very

[3] Paul-Henri Spaak resigned as President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe on December 10.

[4] The telegram under reference is not printed.

firm on present French-German position for common financing in initial period and common budget in permanent period. This question will be taken up again on Dec 27, possibly with participation of Finance Mins.

6. Main problem on composition of forces was Van Zeeland's insistence on maintenance as natl forces of two regiments of Belgium regular army in addition to *Gendarmerie* and Royal Guard. Apparently Blank in Paris had said he might agree to this. Accordingly Van Zeeland was surprised and hard-pressed for explanation when Adenauer bluntly asked him why this was necessary. Van Zeeland made vague argument that Belg was in exception because of "two communities" in Belg state and that these bilingual regiments were symbolic of Flemish-Walloon unity. Adenauer refused categorically to accept this proposal and said he could not defend EDC his own Parliament if all other members except Germans were to find reasons to maintain natl forces.

7. At insistence of De Gasperi, Mins agreed that during transitional period Assembly shld study:

(*a*) Means of constituting directly-elected Assembly for EDC,
(*b*) Powers to be given such an Assembly and,
(*c*) Any modifications necessary in other institutions to bring system in line. They also agreed that final organization of EDC shld have "federal or confederal structure" characterized by "bicameral assembly and executive powers." Stikker was very irritated with De Gasperi for insisting on this commitment but finally gave in after both Van Zeeland and Bech had agreed.

8. Mins agreed that recruiting shld remain a natl function but shld be carried out under common rules set out in protocol annexed to treaty. Common rules wld include uniform length of service for recruits in each branch of service from all member states.

9. *Ad referendum* agreement was reached on French compromise formula on designation of officers. It provides that officers of German, French and Italian origin wld be designated by Commissioner but officers of Belg, Luxembourg and Dutch origin could maintain monarchical tradition by having respective sovereigns make appointments on binding recommendations of commissioner. Apparently both natl auths and commissioner have a right of veto. Corps commanders and higher generals wld be appointed by commissioner with unanimous concurrence of Council.

(Texts of papers approved by Mins on role of Assembly, recruiting, and designation of officers are being cabled separately.[5])

10. In absence of instructions from Mins, we have pressed Alphand to have conf draft treaty on basis of broad French-German-Ital agree-

[5] Reference here is to telegram 3551, December 13, from Paris, not printed (740.5/12–1351).

ment permitting Benelux countries to make reservations or to submit counter-draft articles as they wish, draft treaty with reservations wld then be ready for decisions at Mins level on Dec 27. Alphand agreed and is seeking agreement of Blank and Lombardo before this afternoon's steering comite session. It may be desirable for this approach to be pressed in Rome and in Bonn. Only major obstacle to broad agreement between French, Germans and Itals may be Ital position on French-German proposal for common financing in transitional period. However, Ital objection has been largely based on fact that adequate commitment did not exist for common Assembly to have power of taxation in permanent period. Ital delegation here has always supported French-German proposal even without this commitment. Alphand hopes that concession obtained by De Gasperi in para 7 above will enable Lombardo to obtain agreement from his govt to go ahead on transitional arrangements.

BRUCE

740.5/12–1551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, December 15, 1951—5 p. m.

3582. From MacArthur. Re Embtel 3527, rptd Brussels 102, London 945.[2] Spaak called on General Eisenhower yesterday. He went over ground covered reptel and said Eur must reach agreement on EDC and EDF before Lisbon NAT mtg Feb. He had resigned from Council of Eur because he wished to be free to conduct campaign looking to early agreement on EDF which with Schuman plan was most important step in Eur unification. He regretted very much UK refusal to participate in EDF, but said WE continental countries shld recognize this decision as final at this time and proceed without UK. He expressed strong hope Churchill might make some positive declaration of support of EDC and couple with it offer of some concrete action such as some form of political association.

Re Belg he said Van Zeeland was in very difficult position. Neither Belg people nor Parliament had been kept informed of EDC–EDF developments. They did not understand what it was all about and there was very little time to conduct campaign to obtain understanding and support for EDC. He said that at present moment Van Zeeland was not only ahead of Belg Govt and Parliament opinion but

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Brussels and London.
[2] Not printed.

Van Zeeland had very difficult problem with his own Catholic Party not only on common budget but also since it was largely Flemish, it was oriented toward UK, and therefore was reluctant to participate in any Eur move toward integration in which UK wld not also participate.

He said for last fifty years smaller Eur countries had fol Eur policy based on UK-Fr axis. Absence of UK from EDC meant in effect that small countries wld base their Eur policy on Fr-Ger axis. They were naturally reluctant to change almost overnight as it were.

Re US Spaak said US internatl policy in past fifteen years had been nothing short of "revolutionary." He felt US Govt, Cong, and people were showing much greater international political maturity than was case in either UK or Fr. He felt, with respect these two countries in particular, there had been lack of enlightened leadership to make general public understand "what world is all about" and why they must do certain things if they wished to survive.

De Staercke (newly appointed Belg rep to Paris EDF conf) joined General Eisenhower and Spaak for luncheon. He said Dec 11 EDF Ministerial mtg at Strasbourg [3] had marked definite step forward particularly with respect to Belg Govt. At this mtg Belg fully accepted principle of integrated rather than coalition EDF. Although no agreement had been reached on key problems of common budget and common procurement he was hopeful agreement wld be reached by Mins in their mtg at Paris Dec 27–28. He did not think technical committees cld make any further real progress before Min mtg other than to prepare different positions and possible areas of compromise thoroughly so that Mins cld reach agreement. He said there was growing realization among WE continental countries that if they fail to reach agreement on EDF in time for Lisbon mtg grave repercussions in terms of US policy toward Eur might result. He and Spaak both felt that in final analysis Eur wld reach agreement because of their fear of US reaction shld they fail. This wld not make US popular with Eur allies and indeed was not best basis upon which Eur shld enter EDF (i.e., they shld enter by conviction not pressure). Nonetheless this cld not be helped since he feared there was not sufficient time to develop full understanding and support in different Eur countries before Lisbon.[4]

[MacArthur]

Bruce

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[3] Regarding the meeting under reference here, see telegram 3533, December 13, from Paris, *supra*.

[4] The reference here is to the forthcoming Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council scheduled to be held in Lisbon in February 1952.

740.5/12–1751 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET ROME, December 17, 1951—3 p. m.

2682. Zoppi informs us Itals believe there is a good possibility of completing treaty on EDC at next meeting or at least to make real progress before NATO meeting in Lisbon. He outlined situation as follows: Benelux countries wish to do the absolute minimum necessary to satisfy Eisenhower and the US. They are not prepared for real European federation but, on the other hand, are not greatly concerned over Ger in contrast to Fr whose chief preoccupation is to prevent any possibility of creation of Ger army and Defense Ministry. Differences center chiefly on problem of common budget on which Germans and Fr agree, but for quite different reasons. Itals, who really want European unity, are opposed to any in-between solution which wld mean derogation of a large measure of sovereignty without compensating advantages for them, since they are neither concerned over possibility of creation of Ger army nor with enabling Ger quickly to re-establish herself on basis of equality, with other European powers.

Meeting at Strasbourg nearly broke up in failure, but De Gasperi was able at last moment to bring about sufficient reconciliation of views to give hope of solution at next meeting in Paris. Chief point was his insistence that if national Parliaments were to be asked to give up such large measure of sovereignty, could not delegate it to a commissioner, who wld in effect be a dictator, but wld only transfer basic powers to a central democratic body. Since small states fear they wld have little influence in an Assembly chosen on basis population, solution appears to be an organization resembling US Congress with states having equal representation in one of its two parts. Delegates to assembly wld probably be chosen by national Parliaments which wld mean they wld represent the governmental majority, and the problem of having Communist representation could be avoided. Although the problem is chiefly political, it was agreed that Finance Ministers wld attend the Paris meeting in effort to work out budgetary question.[2]

DUNN

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris, London, The Hague, Brussels, and Frankfurt.

[2] Telegram 3680, December 20, from Paris, not printed, reported that Lombardo, the Italian representative to the European Defense Community Conference, had called on General Eisenhower and reviewed recent developments relating to the EDC. He indicated that the Italian Government believed it imperative that a treaty be concluded by mid-January 1952. (740.5/12–2051)

740.5/12–1151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford)[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 17, 1951—7 : 19 p. m.

Todep 413. Fol are preliminary State views on Depto 697 Dec 11, rptd Paris 1235, Bonn 107.[2]

1. See no objection to some such procedure set forth para 1 for contact with Paris Conf but doubt value joint mtg EDC delegates and CD. Real work of conf has gone to Min level and outcome still not known, also wonder if joint mtg might not militate for certain parity between EDC and NATO whereas we wish relationship where NATO alone gives polit direction to EDF.

2. Agree also importance point made by Sir Ernest Wood re linking production work EDC and DPB.

3. Declarations envisaged by Burin wld probably require us to obtain Senate approval because to agree that attack on territory of Ger (as a member of EDC) wld be attack on NATO wld be an extension of area of NATO territory. (Art VI as it is to be revised by the Gr-Turk protocol includes only forces in Ger, not territory.) While need for Senate action wld complicate and delay extension of US commitment, it of course does not confront us with an insuperable difficulty to this course of action. However, we shld not overlook that reciprocal declarations wld give Ger benefit of Art V guarantee without obtaining from Ger commitments in other arts of NAT. We are sending separate tel giving our current thinking on question Burin raised re how to decide upon use of EDF.

Further statements Burin re status Ger, provocation to Russia, etc., seem directed towards freezing Ger's return to Eur community of nations at halfway point and are unrealistic. Furthermore, they are irrelevant as no one is pressing Fr now on Ger membership in NATO.

Although not unsympathetic to Burin's views on EDC representation in NATO bodies, we believe until EDC organization and powers of Commissioner clarified, it wld be premature attempt to deal with how this shld be handled. May wish to comment further when text Fr statement arrives.

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted and approved for transmission by Parsons and cleared in substance with Perkins, Laukhuff, and Alfred Vigderman of L/E, was repeated for information to Paris and Bonn.

[2] *Ante*, p. 960.

News Division files

Memorandum of the Secretary of State's Press and Radio News Conference, December 19, 1951 [1]

[Extract]

No. 31 [WASHINGTON, undated.]

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European Army

Secretary Acheson, when asked if it was his view that British participation was essential for the conclusion of the European Army scheme, replied that we had been talking about the scheme for exactly one year on the basis that the British were not going to be members of it, and therefore it had been accepted that that would not be essential. He went on to say that everybody had hoped that another decision might be reached and that we still hoped that if the scheme went forward the British might find ways of participating in some way and perhaps eventually of joining it.

When asked what reasons the British had advanced for their unwillingness to be unified and for their unwillingness to join fully in the Schuman Plan, Mr. Acheson answered that there were many reasons but he declined to be the spokesman on this matter.

Secretary Acheson was asked if he had any comment on Senator Green's statement that he would remind the Administration that Britain was ineligible for foreign aid the way the bill [2] was written unless she did join the Strasbourg Plan and the European Army.[3] Mr. Acheson replied that he did not know the provision the Senator was referring to. The correspondent explained that Senator Green had said that the British would have to have self-help and mutual aid and join in and that they were ineligible. The Secretary said he was not familiar with this.

When he was asked if he thought it was possible for Western European Continental political and military integration to take place without British participation, the Secretary replied that of course there would be British participation of some sort. He said he was sure that there would be a most sympathetic attitude on the part of the British toward this thing, adding that it would be very greatly helped by anything the British could do to move closer to it.

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[1] This memorandum was prepared by Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations.

[2] Presumably the reference here is to the Mutual Security Act of 1951, approved October 10, 1951.

[3] Senator Theodore Green of Rhode Island was one of 14 American Senators and Representatives who attended a joint session with European parliamentarians in Strasbourg, November 19–23. During the session, Senator Green criticized the United Kingdom's reluctance to associate itself more closely with Europe. For materials on the joint session, see volume IV.

When asked if he felt this would be enough to allow the integration to come about, the Secretary replied in the affirmative.

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740.5/12–1951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, December 19, 1951—6 p. m.

2813. Makins, who accompanied PriMin and Eden on Paris visit, gave us today brief fill-in. He said that Churchill had made it quite clear to Fr that EDF is not the kind of a Eur army he had in mind in his early speeches. It wld not be possible for any Brit Govt to join a supra-natl authority on the continent. Nevertheless, the UK wld do all in its power to encourage and assist in the success of both the Schuman Plan and EDC; it wld cooperate to the maximum degree possible short of becoming an actual member of these orgs. Makins said that the communiqué was fully expressive of the PriMin's attitude which was well understood by the Fr. He added that Schuman had told Eden, just before their train departed from Paris Tuesday night, that he Schuman, had been in touch with several influential Fr journalists and that their reaction to communiqué had been very satisfactory.[2]

Makins said that PriMin did not discuss with Fr subjs which he wld take up in Wash[3] and the Fr asked no questions on this score. Makins described PriMin, Eden *et al* as being pleased with visit.

GIFFORD

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris.

[2] Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden visited Paris on December 17 and 18 and had a number of conversations with Prime Minister Pleven, Foreign Minister Schuman, and other French ministers. For the text of the communiqué issued in Paris on December 18 on the conclusion of the talks, see Folliot, *Documents on International Affairs, 1951*, p. 141.

In his message of December 19 to Secretary Acheson (see footnote 4, p. 957), Eden observed that the French and General Eisenhower were well pleased with the communiqué. Eden felt that this step covered the immediate need of helping to make the EDC more acceptable to European opinion. (740.5/12–2051)

[3] Prime Minister Churchill was scheduled to visit Washington in January 1952.

740.5/12–1951 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, December 19, 1951—8 p. m.

Depto 724. Off-record CD mtg yesterday on EDC–NATO relationship revealed consensus: [2]

1) No problems under Articles 3 or 4 of NAT;

2) Best solution on Articles 5 and 6 wld be article in EDC treaty declaring attack on any NATO member attack on all EDC plus some reciprocal NATO undertaking covering Germany. (Consensus favored ratification of NAT reciprocal guarantee but US cautioned Senate wld express strong disapproval any attempt to deal with German problem other than through full NAT membership.)

3) All forces under SACEUR whether EDF or others must be subject exclusively to NATO strategic direction and political guidance;

4) The EDC shld not interpose new political layer where minority might prevent all from acting.

During discussion Norway stressed vagueness Article 5 being compensated by experience in cooperation and consultation which shld bring sound, generally acceptable decisions in emergency. He stressed fact Germany wld have proportionately far greater influence in EDC than in NATO where it cld be kept in proper perspective. Netherlands stressed relationship shld be based on concept of inner and outer circles, that German NAT membership essential, and that EDC representation in NATO must be national rather than collective.

Deputies requested EDC reps to advise their Ministers of substance of discussion.

[SPOFFORD]

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, Heidelberg, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Oslo, Rome, Reykjavik, Wiesbaden, and Ottawa.

[2] The private, off-the-record meeting of the Council Deputies under reference here was reported upon in much greater detail in telegram Depto 722, December 19, from London, not printed. At that meeting it was agreed that the discussion of EDC–NATO relationships should be based upon the articles of the North Atlantic Treaty rather than the French proposal summarized in telegram Depto 697, December 11, from London (p. 960) or the American proposal set forth in telegram 1067, November 16, from London (p. 921). It was also agreed that the Council Deputies send observers to the Paris EDC conference. (740.5/12–1951)

740.5/12–2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

SECRET LONDON, December 20, 1951—4 p. m.

2823. Personal for the Secretary. Eden at lunch today said he was upset at report in London *Times* of your press conference December 19,[1] from their Washington correspondent. Item referred to said:

"The Secy of State, in answer to a question, said that the European Army had been discussed for a year without any idea that the Brit were going to join it, and it must therefore be accepted that their participation was not essential. Everybody might, however, have hoped for a different answer, and still hoped that the British would find it possible to participate later.

"It is not quite clear who 'everybody' is in this context. Those who have been to Paris recently and seen General Eisenhower have come back with the impression that he wants a European Army, a British Army, an Amer Army, and a Canadian Army, and has never hoped for a different answer ffom Britain. If the Dept of Defense wants Britain in the European Army it has hidden its wishes better than it usually does, and there has not previously been any evidence that Mr. Acheson himself, or any significant number of people in the State Dept, were very eager.

"It is true that everybody concerned here has wanted for some time a warmer tone in the Brit statement of welcome, and more signs of intimate cooperation with the European Army when it exists. But the communiqué issued yesterday in Paris should surely have been satisfactory, and Mr. Acheson made no reference to it today. Instead he gave the impression that the US was dissatisfied with the Brit attitude.

"As the Congressional delegation which went to Strasbourg[2] came back and made public statements about what shld be done to the Brit if they did not join the European Army, this statement has the air of having been designed to give Congress the impression that the State Dept was pushing and prodding the Brit. Or perhaps it was the first sign that the Dept is actually trimming its policy to suit Congress."

Eden expressed view, in which he said Churchill concurred, that Eden had thought he and you were in complete agreement on this matter and that Paris communiqué was consistent with that agreement. Both he and Churchill were disturbed about it and Eden hoped I might feel like mentioning their concern to you. My own belief is that they were particularly upset as they consider that this account of your press conference detracts from what they consider to have been a successful mission to Paris.

GIFFORD

[1] For the memorandum of the Secretary of State's press conference of December 19, see p. 970.

[2] The reference here is to the Third Session (Second Part) of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, held in Strasbourg, November–December. For documentation on the interest of the United States in the Council of Europe, see volume IV.

740.5/12–2051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 20, 1951—5 p. m.

3685. Eyes only from MacArthur, for Secretary Acheson, Secretaries Lovett, Harriman, rptd London for Ambassador Gifford. Fol is résumé of Gen Eisenhower's and Gen Gruenther's conversation with Churchill and Eden Dec 18:[1]

After usual amenities, Churchill opened conversation by discussing EDF. He reviewed briefly his Strasbourg talk in 1950 stating he was in favor of Eur army then and he still is. However EDF now being advocated is not what he had in mind. He said "I want a fagot of staves bound by a ring of steel and not a soft putty affair such as is now contemplated". He added "UK wld never put troops in such an army nor wld US". Churchill criticized present EDF concept as inefficient and lacking effectiveness and made it clear that in his view EDF shld have been coalition force (consisting of natl contributions of certain number of divisions including Ger) rather than truly integrated force. He was vague as to how to avoid dangers of Ger natl army. He also complained about huge admin and polit org envisaged in connection with EDC as impractical and going too far. He said however, that even tho he did not think present EDF concept wld be effective enough, he wld not stand in way or hinder it since continental nations seem to want it. (He reiterated on several occasions he wld not hinder or throw cold water on EDF.) He added he favors strong Fr army and believes without this Eur cannot defend itself. Therefore he will do everything he can to help Fr build up their forces. He said Fr are concentrating cream of their army in defense of their "colonial empire" and thus do not have sufficient forces for defense WE. He does not blame Fr for this and wishes UK Govt had taken similar step vis-à-vis its empire.

Thru foregoing conversation Gen Eisenhower pounded Churchill vigorously emphasizing vital importance of UK support for EDF, emphasizing UK prestige in Eur particularly in Benelux and Scandinavia. Gen Eisenhower added: "You can do a great deal in this field because you have great prestige on continent." Churchill replied, "You must remember we have been in office only eight weeks. Pls give us a chance. The task is more complicated than I ever imagined."

While foregoing discussions in full swing, draft UK-Fr communiqué on Churchill visit[2] was brought in. Eden said they had "rather

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[1] Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden were in Paris on December 17 and 18 for a series of conversations with French leaders; see telegram 2813, December 19, from London, p. 971.

[2] Regarding the communiqué under reference here, see footnote 2, *ibid.*

tough time with Fr this morning" and that "young Schuman was more difficult than older one". Churchill thought communiqué went too far and suggested that in beginning para "the Brit Govt wld welcome the conclusion of an agreement between those countries participating in the Paris conf", all be deleted after [garble] sentence as being unnecessary. Gen Eisenhower thought it much better without this deletion. Eden said "I knew you wld think so since it was written chiefly from your point of view". After further discussion and few minor modifications by Churchill, latter agreed to communiqué unenthusiastically. (Later Eden said privately he had anticipated much difficulty with PM over communiqué and attributed Churchill's acceptance largely to Gen Eisenhower.)

Eden then commented that UK was somewhat confused over Gen Eisenhower's exhortation that Eur be unified. Gen Eisenhower replied he had tried to make his own personal views clear in his July 3 London speech. He felt UK shld support EDC project constructively and soft pedal decision not to join; UK shld emphasize its positive support.

[Here follows the portion of the telegram describing the discussion of Indochina, the defense of the British Empire, the British need for steel, the importance of American-British unity, and the last volume of Churchill's wartime memoirs.]

During conversation Churchill became quite emotional when telling Gen Eisenhower UK will always support SHAPE. Both in this connection and in his talk to SHAPE staff he paid highest possible tributes to Gen Eisenhower's inspirational leadership and magnificent job he is doing under most trying conditions. He complimented Gen Eisenhower for his public statements showing confidence and said he wld support this stand.

In the talks it appeared on numerous occasions that Churchill did not understand very clearly proposed org of EDF and questioned its effectiveness. He appeared wedded to coalition concept of individual natl contributions of specific number of divisions. Eden on other hand seemed sympathetic to EDF and not too worried about its organizational and effectiveness aspects. He seems convinced UK must give EDF real support. [MacArthur.]

BRUCE

536-688 PT 1--81---64

740.5/12-2051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 20, 1951—1 : 09 p. m.

3595. For Bruce and MacArthur. Ref Paris 3446 rptd Bonn 134 [2] you may if you think advisable state to Alphand as Chairman EDC Conference the fol in manner you consider most suitable:

"US Govt has not yet been fully informed of draft treaty proposing a Eur Def Force and in particular technical details by which a common armament and supply program wld be constituted. US has supported creation of Eur Def Force and is fully aware of necessity for reorganizing certain national armament and supply functions under broader concept of the Force. Under present legislation US can legally make deliveries of US end items to directing or executive head of any Eur Def organization shld that be the body authorized to receive outside aid on behalf of organization and is body responsible for efficiency of its use within EDC in manner similar to aid received by national govts at present time. Furthermore, shld EDC become something more than an aggregation of member states (e.g., assume more than role of central executive agency for participants, which might cast doubt on present legal authority to provide aid to EDC commissioner) we anticipate no difficulty in securing appropriate amendments from Congress.

"It is not feasible for US discuss this aspect in detail until such time as proposed EDC has come into being and its details are both understood and agreed to. It wld be our hope that by coordination of national armament and supply programs suitable basis wld be created for more efficient and economical administration of outside aid. Conditions under which US Govt furnishes such aid wld not be changed by such adjustment but channels and administrative details under which such aid is furnished wld be re-examined with view to supporting concept outlined in draft treaty for EDC and in particular its proposal for common armament and supply program. Insofar as creation of EDF does increase effectiveness of mil contribution of member nations administration US end item aid will take account thereof.

"US wishes to make clear it wld retain its present policy of US giving priority on delivery of US equipment where creation of defense is most useful and effective. It must be understood that views of responsible mil commanders are fundamental in determining priority in allocating available resources. Position of SACEUR in this matter is of highest importance. Development of EDF details under which US aid wld be distributed to receiving mil units must take this factor into account.

"On its part US in recognizing effectiveness of a comprehensive EDF wld seek to promote through coordinated policies increased efficiency in armament and supply so as to be mutually beneficial to both US and proposed community."

FYI we do not consider it appropriate at this time to distinguish between members and non-members of EDC in amount or manner of

[1] This telegram, which was drafted by European Regional Affairs Director Martin, was cleared by telephone with ODMS, ECA, GER, and Defense.

[2] Dated December 10, p. 957.

receiving US aid. It is not considered advisable to suggest that Benelux countries may be penalized for not joining EDF. Believe essential that delivery priorities be maintained on mil basis determined by SHAPE and that any priorities received by units composing EDF be based on their performance only. Believe this consistent with decision reached at Rome and contained in Secto 109 [3] that we will accept EDF without Benelux and that problem of dealing with Benelux is up to Schuman. Believe it also essential in dealing with NATO countries generally that from political standpoint they may be treated alike.

Tel on economic aid following.

ACHESON

[3] Of November 29, p. 947.

740.5/12–2151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 21, 1951—4 : 58 p. m.

3012. Personal for Amb. I believe Eden's concern at press report of my remarks [2] must be due to fact they were reported out of context. I was asked whether Brit participation essential for conclusion of EDF. My reply intended convey surprise that after year's discussion anyone shld have assumed Brit participation essential. "Everybody's hope for another decision" meant hope Paris EDC conference would succeed thus permitting Brit to find means of associating themselves.

At time of press conference if I had recd report of Churchill Paris talks [3] and hence been able to refer to them, I wld have expressed satisfaction with results. Omission was unintentional. There is no intended conflict between my remarks and Paris communiqué.

Dept attempting clarify situation with local press.

Pls convey sense of above to Eden.

ACHESON

[1] This telegram was signed personally by the Secretary of State.

[2] See telegram 2823, December 20, from London, p. 973.

[3] Regarding the Churchill talks under reference, see telegram 2813, December 19, from London, p. 971.

740.5/12–1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, December 21, 1951—noon.

3720. Subject: Eur Defense Force. Ger del EDF Conf has introduced proposal for creation "Eur community for scientific research".

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Bonn, London, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

Purpose of community would be to "pool" scientific research in member states in fol fields:

a. Nuclear physics.
b. Telecommunications.
c. Chemical and biological warfare.
d. Submarines and submersible craft of any type designed for mil purposes.
e. Any aircraft for mil purposes and
f. Guided missiles of any type. List of fields could be extended by Council.

Ger proposal would establish a Eur research commission independent of EDC Exec but subject to other EDC institutions. Commission would have task in cooperation with EDC. Schuman Plan high authority and other internatl institutions concerned, to stimulate research and establish cooperation among states as well as to expend funds for research as allocated in EDC budget.

Significantly Ger proposal would also give the commission power to make all research in enumerated fields within member states subject to license from commission or prior notification to commission. Commission would also have right forbid research in certain cases or require that certain types of research be undertaken only under its direct authority. Exercise of these mandatory powers would apparently require agreement of EDC Exec and commissioner and of "a rep of NATO".

Translation of Ger proposal and report of Steering Committee discussion will be cabled soonest.[2]

BRUCE

[2] The text of the German proposal was transmitted in telegram 3725, December 21, from Paris, not printed (740.5/12–2151).

740.5/12–2251 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Trimble) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET THE HAGUE, December 22, 1951—5 p. m.

631. I called on Stikker by appointment this morning. He said that he was greatly disturbed by what he described as Fr efforts to tie into EDC matters not immediately related to rapid build-up Western European defense. Reasons for his concern were well known to us and there was no need to repeat them now (he presumably was referring to his statements at Rome meeting of NATO FonMins and views expressed by Neth del in EDC discussions Paris). However, he wished me to

[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris, London, Brussels, and Bonn.

know that Neth cabinet divided on EDC issue and while he himself would continue to support concept, he must constantly bear in mind three important considerations:

In first place Stikker said he realized that from short-range viewpoint EDC offered best possibility for early creation effective Eur defense establishment, since Fr would not agree at this time to preferable solution involving admission Ger FedRep to NATO. Secondly he was concerned about possible cooperation with Benelux partners as basic objective Neth foreign policy. Therefore, if one of them such as Belg should refuse to take part in EDC, then Neth would also be forced to abstain. Equally, if Dutch should be unwilling to associate themselves with EDC, then Belg would probably take same position.

Finally Stikker said he was particularly concerned that progress development Atlantic Community was not keeping pace with that in proposed EDC. He had wholeheartedly subscribed to statement in Ottawa last Sept on Atlantic Community. He was worried, however, that developments in Paris re EDC seemed to be proceeding along somewhat different channels. EDC should definitely be subordinate to NATO, but Paris discussions have tended to place NATO in background and concomitantly to bring continental as opposed to Atlantic concept more and more to foreground. Continuation of this development would ultimately have effect of destroying balance of power relationship between Fr on one hand and smaller nations of Eur on the other.

In this connection Stikker said he was also worried about changes in status Ger FedRep which would result from contractual arrangements and abolition IAR. These changes in relationship between three occupying powers and FedRep would necessarily mean that former would have far less control over FedRep than in past, in particular industries essential to Ger rearmament, without compensatory increase in overall authority Atlantic Community. At same time by joining EDC Benelux powers would commit themselves to consider attack on FedRep as an attack on themselves. In other words Benelux would in effect be required to subscribe to the tripartite declaration re FedRep and Berlin on Sept 19, 1950 in a continental as opposed to Atlantic Community sense. Under circumstances Stikker considered it essential that progress in developing EDC should be accompanied by further strengthening of North Atlantic Community which would make it entirely clear that former was not only integral part of but also subordinate to latter.

At conclusion conversation Stikker asked me to convey his views my govt, adding in this connection that he had also discussed them at some length with Eden when he saw him yesterday.

Seems obvious from foregoing that notwithstanding assurances US has given and actions it has taken past five years, Dutch still have

qualms re possibility recrudescence US isolationism with consequence that they might be thrown to Fr or Ger wolves. Illogicality their attitude as illustrated Stikker's attempt to differentiate between tripartite commitment FedRep and their own as prospective members EDC attributable to their neutrality tradition, which despite lesson of 1940, has not entirely disappeared, and to insular psychology of small power. Stikker, however, who is more internationally minded than his colleagues and more aware of facts of life, is in position to exercise considerable influence in determination of Dutch policy. In circumstances, therefore, suggest advisability personal message to Stikker from Secy reassuring him of our full support North Atlantic Community concept and of our view that EDC, far from being inconsistent with it, is regarded by US as necessary adjunct to NATO and indirect interest all its members.[2] Believe similar assurances by Eden would also be helpful.

TRIMBLE

[2] Telegram 3734, December 29, to Paris, not printed, transmitted a personal message from Assistant Secretary Perkins to Ambassador Bruce observing that Trimble's suggestion for a personal message from the Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Stikker might be useful. Perkins asked Bruce for his views on what might be included in such a letter. (740.5/12–2251)

Editorial Note

The Foreign, Finance, and Defense Ministers of the six nations actively participating in the Paris Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community (France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and their principal advisers met in Paris from December 27 through 30 for a series of meetings to pursue the discussions begun in Strasbourg on December 11 (see telegram 3533, December 13, from Paris, page 963). On the basis of a previously agreed upon agenda, the Ministers discussed institutional questions including the structure of the executive and the respective role and powers of the institutions of the community, the use of armed forces, common budgets, armament programs, the composition and organization of military forces, and the duration of the treaty and its transitional period. Although the meetings were closed, detailed information on them was made available to American officials on a personal and confidential basis. The Embassy in Paris reported in some detail by telegram to the Department of State and interested Chiefs of Mission in Europe on the seven meetings of the Ministers, two separate meetings of the Finance Ministers, and a single separate meeting of the Defense Ministers. All these telegraphic reports are included in the 740.5 segment of the central files of the Department of State. For a summary review and analysis of the results of the meetings, see telegram 3957, January 3, 1952, from Paris, page

985. For the communiqué issued by the Ministers at the conclusion of their meetings on December 30, see Folliot, *Documents on International Affairs, 1951*, page 255, or *L'Année politique, 1951*, page 692.

740.5/12–2951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, December 29, 1951—5 p. m.

3868. This morning I had breakfast with Chancellor Adenauer and Blankenhorn and Hallstein at Chancellor's invitation.

1. The Chancellor said that conversations yesterday and before on EDF [2] had at least served to define sharply differences in various member states views on subj. He feels necessity for pressing forward vigorously to agreed draft of treaty, but does not think his sense of urgency is sufficiently shared by his colleagues. Instead of departing tonight as he had expected, he will probably remain through tomorrow so that there can be further mtgs. He will attempt to secure a written statement from the Mins defining areas of agmt and disagmt.

2. Adenauer believes that French, Gers and Itals shld be able to reach a substantial accord at this mtg except for security controls and Ger financial contribution mentioned below. Such an accord wld then isolate the Benelux countries. Adenauer then believes that US and UK shld attempt to induce the Benelux countries to moderate their position and reach a compromise acceptable to all concerned. However, no such compromise shld be at expense of cardinal points which Gers and French consider essential to creation of a real EDC.

3. One of matters which cannot be concluded at this mtg is security controls although Adenauer hopes to discuss this privately with Schuman and possibly also with Pleven while he is in Paris. To my surprise he did not appear to think that this shld prove too difficult. He said that a good deal of confusion had arisen in relation to it because of many places and comites where it had been dealt with.

4. A second and much more important matter which cannot be settled at this mtg is Ger financial contribution. Adenauer said that he felt very strongly that Ger's econ and fin capabilities shld be examined by the Wise Men [3] so that same criteria wld be applied to Ger as had been case with the NATO countries. In addition, such findings by Wise Men wld make his own sitn vis-à-vis his Parl and people much more understandable to them. He continues to maintain position that

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London and Bonn.

[2] Chancellor Adenauer and his advisers were in Paris for the meetings of the EDC Ministers described in the editorial note, *supra*.

[3] The reference here is to the Temporary Council Committee; for documentation on the Committee, see pp. 1 ff.

any arrangement which wld be regarded by the Ger people as a continuation of occupying costs of foreign armies wld be completely unacceptable to them. That is why he wld prefer that support for US and UK forces shld be made from the EDC common budget.

Adenauer said that he must tell me quite frankly that present procedures for handling this question were not adequate and wld cause a long delay. He wants to bring this matter to Mr. Harriman's attention and to that of the other Wise Men, but does not know procedurally how to do so. Unless something of the sort proposed by him were done, he thought our negotiations wld bog down.

5. Adenauer said that time might come when Ger, Italy and France wld have to have a showdown with the Benelux countries, and if so, he trusted that US wld back stand of former group on EDC. However, if the Benelux countries persisted in being obdurate and the other three countries shld decide to go ahead regardless of them, it wld pose difficulties in the Ger, French and Ital Parliaments which cld make ratification very difficult.

He was uncertain how much of Belg position was bluff and how much was confusion. He wondered if the Belgs were hoping to receive some sort of special treatment, such as they had in connection with the Schuman Plan. He thought it likely that the Dutch might be to some degree influenced by supposed Brit hostility to the EDC, and perhaps in this respect the Brit shld be induced to aid in matter.

6. If present FonMins mtg fails to make all decisions of principle nec for implementation of the conf's work, he expects to ask for another ministerial mtg in Jan.

He does not believe that it will be possible to get a draft treaty signed by the govts by Feb 1, but considers that it is possible, if Benelux nations prove more reasonable than they have to date, to show such progress toward agmt by Feb 1, as to make creation of EDC a certainty, subj, of course, to final ratification by the various Parliaments.

As to timing, his estimate was same for contractual arrangements.

7. Adenauer has been very impressed by Pleven and thinks it extremely important that all of these negotiations be terminated if possible while Pleven is in office.

He believes that as quickly as possible French Govt shld take the initiative in a serious proposal for a polit federation in Eur.

He said that he had no doubts about ratification of the Schuman Plan by the Bundestag and expected a majority of 40 to 50 votes.

8. The entire conversation was marked by the Chancellor's strong conviction of necessity to tie FedRep to Western world irrevocably through media of Schuman Plan, EDC and a Eur fed polit structure. As to a def contribution from Ger, he does not contemplate any alterna-

tive to the EDF which he said must be constituted. It was clear that he saw no other way to solve such probs as security restrictions, support of US and UK forces and an adequate financial contribution to def, and the demand for equality of treatment. He clearly feels he must carry the EDC through in view of his domestic polit sitn, fear of many Gers of revival of natl militarism, and his own settled policy to build a Eur community.

BRUCE

740.5/12–2951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, December 29, 1951—5 p. m.

3870. From MacArthur. Gens Eisenhower and Gruenther lunched yesterday with De Gasperi, Zoppi, and Amb Quaroni at Ital Emb. Fol is résumé of conversation:

Gen Eisenhower inquired as to progress being made in EDC conf [2] stressing vital importance of reaching agreement prior to Lisbon NAT mtg. De Gasperi said he fully appreciated necessity of agreement but unfortunately cld not point thus far to substantial progress in this direction in present EDC mtg. Unfortunately there was still not agreement on certain fundamental issues and Benelux countries were being very difficult. De Gasperi hopes and believes it will be possible to get agreement on fundamental principles of EDC by Lisbon which wld insure early action thereafter but seemed to doubt as things now stand that completely agreed draft treaty will be ready by Lisbon. He urged that US encourage and press Benelux to go along and also hoped US cld get UK to take similar action vis-à-vis Benelux.

De Gasperi then stressed need for eventual polit and econ unification of WE continental countries. Gen Eisenhower made ref to his July London speech [3] and agreed eventual unification is essential if security and well-being of WE peoples is to be assured. He said it seemed clear that on an individual and separate natl basis the WE countries do not have capability of sustaining necessary def effort over coming years while at same time holding out hope for better way of life. Only by making maximum collective use of their individual capabilities—econ, finan, production, and manpower, etc.—can WE goal of security with econ and social stability be achieved. While such unification is a not possible overnight and will take time it shld be

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Rome and London.

[2] See the editorial note, p. 980.

[3] The reference here is to General Eisenhower's speech on the unity of Western Europe made before the English-Speaking Union at London on July 3, 1951; for the text of the notes for the address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 30, 1951, p. 163.

primary objective. In his view both Schuman plan and EDC are practical steps in this direction. De Gasperi mentioned difficulties of obtaining adequate public and Parl understanding and support for what we are all trying to do. Eisenhower agreed but expressed view that there were not enough leadership in enlightening public and Parl opinion. Gen Eisenhower said if it would be helpful or useful, he wld be delighted to have a group of 20 to 30 Italian Parliamentarians visit SHAPE. Furthermore, he wished De Gasperi to know that if ever latter has any questions or thoughts about matters within scope of Gen Eisenhower's activity he shld not hesitate to bring them to his attention. Furthermore, if De Gasperi ever wished discuss problems related to SHAPE's mission with him, Gen Eisenhower or Gen Gruenther wld arrange to come to Rome to see him.

De Gasperi expressed appreciation and seemed genuinely touched by Gen Eisenhower's offer and his understanding of De Gasperi's problems.

At Gen Eisenhower's invitation, De Gasperi, Pacciardi, and Pella visited SHAPE this morning where De Gasperi gave good informal talk to staff. [MacArthur.]

BRUCE

740.5/12–3051 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, December 30, 1951—1 p. m.

3886. From MacArthur. As host at EDC conf[1] Schuman invited Gens Eisenhower and Gruenther to meet with the six EDC FonMins and DefMins at 6:30 last evening during a break in the conf.

Gen Eisenhower gave the mins a good and inspirational pep talk stressing urgency and vital importance to Eur and NATO to reach agreement on EDC prior to Lisbon. He suggested that if mins cld not reach final agreement at this mtg they not adjourn but rather simply recess till after New Year and then rapidly reconvene and finish their work.

The mins then told Gen Eisenhower they had reached agreement to call a Eur constitutional convention. They did not say where or when it wld be called but emphasized they were all in agreement. Gen Eisenhower congratulated them warmly on this initiative.

In the course of the discussion Schuman again lamented UK failure to make unequivocably clear that it really favored and wld warmly support EDF concept.

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[1] Regarding this conference, see the editorial note, p. 980.

Stikker felt EDC must fit integrally into a much more closely knit Atlantic community and asked if Gen Eisenhower cld support some form of Atlantic federation. Gen Eisenhower said that he cld not speak to this question since it was beyond the scope of his activity. He wld like to observe, however, that he believed in first things first. In this case the first thing was the EDF which is essential if there is to be any adequate def for WE. Therefore WE countries shld now concentrate all their energies on reaching agreement on EDC.

[MacArthur]
Bruce

740.5/1–352 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY Paris, January 3, 1952—5 p. m.

3957. Personal attention of Secretary. Distribution as determined by Secretary's office. Subject is European defense forces. Ministerial meeting concluded Sunday made considerable progress.[2]

Over and above other progress, a highlight of meeting was agreement on federal structure for EDC, as well as on desirability of eventual overall federation of six countries. Ministers reaffirmed their agreement that initial assembly should study federal reorganization of EDC, placed deadline on completion of such study, and undertook as well to recommend to their governments an immediate study at governmental level. Split between French, Germans and Italians on one hand and Benelux on other, which characterized meeting otherwise, was not evident in regard to federation.[3]

Balance this message sets out summary of accomplishments in seven major areas in which unresolved EDF issues can be grouped. Immediately following message sums up positions of each country and suggests action to move conference forward as rapidly as possible.

1. *Composition of EDC forces.*

Ministers agreed on all but two issues concerning forces to be included in, and units to [be] excluded from, EDF. (Among excluded units are those in Indochina and Korea.) Status of internal defense forces and deep-seas navy left uncertain. All but Belgians agreed on European status of internal defense forces—that is, their inclusion in

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg, for the eyes only of the Chiefs of Mission.

[2] Regarding the meetings of the Foreign, Finance, and Defense Ministers of the six nations participating in the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community, held in Paris, December 27–30, see the editorial note, p. 980.

[3] The agreement on a federal structure for the EDC and an eventual overall federation of the participants was emphasized in the conference communiqué cited in the editorial note, *ibid.*

EDF. Question of who shld exercise operational control over such of these forces as SHAPE does not take command of, raised more difficulty. French, Germans and Italians favored European control no different from that exercised over any other part of EDF. Belgians and Dutch wanted operational control over internal defense forces to remain wholly national. On deep-seas navy, ministers noted that tendency was to exclude it from EDF, but did not formalize an agreement. Both questions were remanded for further study by experts. On first, advice of SHAPE is to be solicited.

2. *Use of forces and relations NATO.*

Germans and French agreed that Council should have power to direct use of EDF. But majority by which Council might do so not settled. Benelux position not clear. Matter remanded for further study by experts. Relations with NATO not discussed, altho fact that forces wld come under SHAPE clearly accepted.

3. *Institutional questions.*

Ministers agreed that EDC will have four institutions: Executive, Council of Ministers, Assembly and Court.

(*a*) Executive and Council: On basis of French concession, it was agreed that Executive was to consist of number of commissioners and a president. Everyone agreed also on supranational allegiance (rather than allegiance to govts) of president and commissioners. Unresolved issues:

(i) Number of commissioners. Dutch and Belgians favored six: French, Germans and Italians thought fewer, perhaps three, would work with greater efficacy.

(ii) Powers of president. Dutch and Belgians thought these should be restricted pretty much to formal ones, and that Executive should act by majority vote. Germans, French and Italians favored giving president preponderant voice thru power to coordinate work of commissioners and give policy guidance.

(iii) Distribution of powers between Executive and Council. Belgians proposed, with Dutch concurrency, to limit role of president and commissioners practically to that of an executive secretariat of Council, and charge latter, acting by unanimity in all matters of importance, with directing EDC activities. French, Germans and Italians felt Council should have role of taking major political decisions and acting as a check, but president and commissioners should be responsible for day to day operations. This effort to meet Belgian-Dutch position was as far as French, Germans and Italians thought they could go, since,

—binding Council by rule of unanimity in all matters of importance would make meaningless any grant of powers to EDC, as each govt could at every step decide that EDC is not to exercise a given power and net effect would therefore be a coalition relying on coincidence of policies of several govts rather than a community capable of independent action, and

—vesting all or substantially all power in a six-man body acting thru another multiple-member body would—even in absence of rule of unanimity—render EDC operations so cumbersome as to make EDC in fact weak and ineffective combination no matter what powers are nominally given to it. Belgians showed some willingness to compromise by giving a measure of leeway to Executive. Experts are to study these matters further.

(*b*) Assembly: Constituent role in studying federal structure, which was given to Assembly in Strasbourg, was confirmed by ministers in Paris. French, Germans and Italians pressed for larger role, argued Assembly should at very least have power to approve budget and require resignation of president and commissioners. Belgians at first opposed giving any powers at all to Assembly, but again indicated some willingness to compromise, agreed Assembly might have power to dismiss Executive. French, Germans and Italians further met Belgians by dropping insistence on any further Assembly power except share in approval of budget. This matter remanded to experts.

(*c*) Court: No serious issue under this head.

4. *Duration of treaty.*

Everyone was agreed that in fact end of this treaty in form in which now drafted would come with federation, which ministers undertook to hasten thru study assigned to Assembly at Strasbourg, as well as thru simultaneous governmental study. In order not to give EDF appearance of temporary expedient in comparison with Schuman Plan, the Germans, French and Italians insisted on treaty of fifty-year duration and opposed Dutch-Belgian proposal to make EDF treaty coincide in duration with NAT.

No decision, as discussion of this matter, like that on distribution of power between Executive and Council, brought out fundamental conflict between Dutch view of EDF as loosely knit coalition under larger coalition of NATO, and French Ger and Ital view of it as entity of great value, both immed and long-range, both to Eur and to NATO, which it can truly strengthen only if it is itself strong.

5. *Fin Arrangements.*

Fin problems were discussed at considerable length but few agreements reached because of hasty recommendations from Fin Mins which were rejected by Schuman and Adenauer because they involved discrimination against Ger in initial period by having all mil budgets of NATO members remain national while Ger's contrib wld be under Eur control; and they gave nearly all real authority to Council acting by unanimity.

All dels agreed that fol establishment directly-elected bicameral assembly capable of levying taxes, existence of federal budget approved and executed by community institutions wld create no further difficulties of principle.

Disagreement persisted on period prior to creation of such an assembly. Gers and French agree on fol program:

(*a*) There shld be common financing from first day. Gers and French consider it essential that Eur institutions have responsibility for determining and carrying out expenditures from the beginning. Until EDC services ready to undertake all fin functions directly, treaty itself for EDC executive cld delegate their actual exercise to appropriate existing agencies. However, community institutions wld have latitude to makeshifts and modifications in existing programs where necessary to improve rapidity and effectiveness of buildup pre-community wld be required to respect contracts already let any member states.

(*b*) Contributions of member states for first year shld be set forth in transitional convention of treaty. Contributions of NATO members shld be based on TCC exercise; Ger contribution to be fixed on same criteria. Gers wld like TCC to make recommendation on Ger contribution. (French wld probably not object but at present feel bound by commitments to settle this matter in Bonn; they are also worried that TCC might confuse principle of common financing from first day by getting into issue of use of Ger fin contribution and limiting it to cost of Ger-origin forces and to expenditures in Ger.)

(*c*) Member states should be able to deduct non-EDC def costs (such as Indochina and support costs of US and UK forces in Ger) from total contribution before paying into common fund. First year's deductions to be stated in transitional convention of treaty; new deductions for subsequent years to be approved by council. (Gers wld like support costs to be taken over by EDC as common responsibility. French will not consider this because of agreement with US and UK concerning Bonn contractual negots.)

(*d*) For second and any subsequent years of transitional period contributions shld be fixed by individual countries negotiating individually in new TCC or similar NATO exercise. Transitional convention of treaty shld state that these contributions cannot be less than those of first year plus a 5 percentage of any increase in national income. This provision designed to prevent failure of one parliament to vote funds from paralyzing effective action on budget.

(*e*) From end of transitional period full-fledged common budget shld be in effect. (Gers hope it will be end 1953.) Budget should be prepared by executive and approved by qualified majority of council and of assembly. Contributions by member states to be based on fixed percentage scale agreed by unanimous vote of council during transitional period; states should be obligated to make these payments.

(*f*) External assistance in end-items shld be negotiated by, and go directly to, community for distribution. Position not yet clear on counterpart of military-support aid of offshore procurement, which are to some extent determined by balance of payments needs and other non-def considerations and negotiated by individual govts.

Ital del in general supported above principles. Pella, like other Fin Mins, does not like prospect of disclosing full details of his mil budget

to Eur auth and does not like obligation to account to someone else for actual expenditure of funds.

Benelux position differs from above proposals on 2 essential points:

(*a*) Benelux oppose common financing from first day for any expenditures necessary to fulfill national programs within framework MTDP. For this reason, they propose that from now until end of medium-term def program, national programs of NATO countries shld continue to be executed on national basis without substantial modification. Common arrangements wld apply only to Ger, which has no NATO program and to unsubstantial expenditures for headquarters buildings, etc.

(*b*) In absence of a directly-elected Eur assembly capable of levying taxes, Benelux insisted final say on any common budget arrangements must be national. For this reason they proposed that unanimous approval of council be required for both contributions and expenditures, even after end of medium-Ger plan, at which time they accept existence of a common budget to be administered by executive.

French-Ger proposal for TCC–NATO determination of contributions in transitional period goes considerable distance in mtg Benelux position.

6. *Common armament and procurement program.*

Existence of a common armament and procurement program depends on community having power to administer and spend funds. Other issues (such as extent of attempt at standardization, duty to consult national govts in placing orders, power to ensure that priority is given by manufacturers to filling EDC orders) do not arise before power to spend is established. Except as possibility of common procurement program implicit in common budget question, former was not discussed at this mtg since common budget issue still unsettled.

7. *Territorial org of EDF.*

This question was discussed by Def Mins. It was agreed that EDF mil district commands shld exist at local levels and consist largely of personnel of nationality of country in which district located. It was further agreed that these commands wld exercise certain local supply, procurement and other housekeeping functions and perform training and recruiting and admin of reserves. Issue arose over whether these mil districts shld be responsible to EDC exec directly or through an intermediate command at national level, as Gers and others wish. This intermediate level wld be a command encompassing each member state headed by an officer of the nationality of the state in question. French strongly opposed existence of this intermediate command level. No decision reached.

BRUCE

B. MEETINGS AT BONN BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND THE ALLIED DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONERS TO DISCUSS CERTAIN ASPECTS OF A GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE, JANUARY 9–JUNE 4, 1951

Editorial Note

On December 18 the NATO Council at its sixth session in Brussels approved a decision to begin talks at Bonn between the Allied High Commission and representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning certain aspects of a German contribution to Western defense. On the following day the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France agreed to begin discussions with the Federal Republic on a new contractual relationship to replace the Occupation Statute for Germany and the Charter of the Allied High Commission. These decisions, together with the approval given to the projected talks at Paris for a European Army, became known as the "Brussels decisions" or "Brussels formula."

The documentation that follows indicates the main lines of the Bonn talks (sometimes referred to as the Petersberg talks) on a possible German military contribution to Western defense. For documentation on contractual relations and the European Army talks, see pages 1446 ff. and 755 ff.

740.5/1–1051 : Telegram

The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany (Hays) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BONN, January 10, 1951—9 a. m.

449. First meeting took place today between representatives of HICOM and FedRep on German military contribution to defense of Europe.[2] Present Ward (chairman), General Wansbrough-Jones, UK; Bérard, General Ganeval, France; Hays, Buttenwieser, US; Blank, Generals Speidel and Heusinger, Germany. Meeting was informal with no secretariat, record or minutes, and confined to verbal discussion with no written documents exchanged. Brief opening statement by chairman contained the general principle that any military contribution of Germany must be within the framework of NATO. This was accepted by Blank as the only method by which Germany would be willing to contribute. Chairman then passed ball to Germans asking their proposals.

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[1] Repeated to Frankfurt and Heidelberg eyes only for McCloy and Handy.

[2] The meeting took place January 9 at Petersberg in the Allied High Commission building.

Blank asked first the general extent of the military contribution to be expected of Germany; said Chancellor would have to be able to inform the Bundestag of the defense forces provided by other NATO countries for European defense in support of German contribution.

HICOM deputies stated size and composition of contingents to be provided by each country was in planning stage and would be firmed up only after Eisenhower had made his defense plan and secured firm commitments from each country concerned. Moreover, necessity for secrecy would prevent disclosures except of very general nature. Blank acquiesced that only general nature of contribution could be made known but stated that some idea of the numerical extent of German military contribution must be made known to the Bundestag. HICOM deputies stated that view of NATO was that maximum German land contribution should be 20 percent of total land forces under command SHAPE. Note: British state they interpreted paragraph 24–*f* of C 6–D/1 [3] to mean that German land forces could be one-fifth of other NATO forces which would result in German land forces comprising maximum of one-sixth of the total land forces available to SHAPE, this interpretation was not commented on by French or US.

In order to give the Germans some idea of extent of military contribution which might be expected by them by end of 1951, HICOM deputies agreed to seek advice from their governments of a numerical total to include sum of combat and service personnel to be given Germans for planning purposes. (Request advice.)

German representatives agreed to formulate their proposals for administrative machinery for recruitment and training and assistance they contemplated should be furnished by Allies in equipment and military instructors for presentation at next meeting.

Blank stated FedRep did not wish to produce armament as they wanted to convince the world that Germany will not again become a threat to peace of the world. He states, however, there were many items needed by soldiers other than armament which Germany could produce. Chairman pointed out NATO view was that to considerable extent Germany should produce armament for her own needs as capacities of armament industries of NATO countries needed by them selves. Blank agreed to explore this subject further.

Meeting held in cordial atmosphere. German representatives seemed sincere and displayed no evasiveness. Date of next meeting agreed 10:30 a. m., Tuesday January 16.

[HAYS]

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[3] For text of Document C6–D/1, December 13, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 531–547; in particular footnote 1, p. 538.

536-688 PT 1—80——65

762A.5/1–1751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany (Hays) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BONN, January 17, 1951—10 a. m.

463. Personal for Byroade from Hays eyes only. Technical committee met with German representatives in their second meeting in regard to German contribution to the defense of Western Europe.[2] Chairman (Ward UK) opened the meeting with following remarks:

"At our last meeting Herr Blank was particularly interested to know the size of the German land forces which the North Atlantic Treaty powers considered that the Federal Republic should contribute to the common defense of Western Europe. As explained at the last meeting it is not possible to give precise details as to the future strength of the forces which will come under General Eisenhower's integrated command, and as then indicated much will necessarily depend on General Eisenhower's own recommendations. However, the matter has been considered by the Allied High Commissioners and I am instructed on their behalf to tell Herr Blank that the Federal Government is authorized to prepare plans for the raising of a total of 100,000 ground troops between now and the end of 1951.[3] I must emphasize that this figure relates exclusively to the German land forces which the Federal Government would contribute to General Eisenhower's command and does not include such service organizations composed of German citizens as the allied forces in Germany need to maintain their own administrative support.

I should also emphasize that the figure of 100,000 for land forces up to the end of 1951 relates to the immediate transitional period and is without prejudice to longer term arrangements which will have to be worked out in connection with both the French proposal for a European Army and possible later developments on the NATO structure and plans after General Eisenhower has had time to develop his own plans.

The Allied High Commissioners hope that, having received this information, Herr Blank will now be able, as requested at the last meeting, to give an idea of the Federal Government's proposals for recruitment, accommodation, equipment and training of the German land forces.

After we discuss the German proposals for these administrative arrangements we might discuss the size, organization and composition of the combat elements to be contributed by Germany.

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[1] Repeated to Frankfurt eyes only for McCloy and to Heidelberg eyes only for Handy.

[2] The meeting took place on January 16 at Petersberg.

[3] McCloy had reported in telegram 256 from Bonn, January 11, not printed, that the Council of the Allied High Commission had agreed to inform the West Germans that they "could make provisions as an interim measure for FedRep contingents up to 100,000 men in uniform." (762A.5/1–1151) The Department of State had noted this figure in telegram 4899, January 15, to Frankfurt; not printed, but had proposed a figure of 195,000 men instead (762A.5/10–1561). Apparently McCloy was unable to obtain High Commission agreement on the higher figure.

In discussing the size, organization and composition of the combat elements to be contributed by Germany, the view of our governments is that we should be guided by the consideration that an interim arrangement should permit immediate recruitment, organization and training of units of a size which is useful for combat without prejudicing the later agreements which may result from the conference on the European Army.[4] We are now in a position to discuss with you the form, character and size of the units to be created during this interim period.

During this interim period we are authorized to agree on a size of combat unit which is so organized and equipped with appropriate arms and services as to be self-sustaining in combat.

Such units would correspond to the British reinforced brigades or US reinforced combat teams, containing in balanced proportions infantry, armor, artillery, with accompanying communications, engineer and service troops.

However, when these regimental combat teams or brigade groups are formed and trained, the question of the manner in which they should be used must be determined in the light of conditions at the time, due weight being given to the views of the Supreme Commander."

Further comments follow in another cable.[5]

[HAYS]

[4] For documentation on the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community, sometimes referred to as the European Army Conference, which opened in Paris on February 14, see pp. 755 ff.

[5] Telegram 464, *infra*.

762A.5/1–1751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany (Hays) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BONN, January 17, 1951—11 a. m.

464. Eyes only for Byroade from Hays. Reference Bonn 463 today's date,[2] further discussion was as follows:

Bérard, France, stated that Schuman and Pleven were now consulting in regard to their choice of a chairman for the Conference on European Army, and hoped that the date of the European Army Conference could be announced in the very near future.

Blank, Germany, stressed psychological problems which confront Germany. Stated he assumed that German military contribution should be effective and useful contribution; therefore, the pre-conditions as

[1] Repeated to Frankfurt eyes only for McCloy and to EUCOM Heidelberg eyes only for Handy.

[2] *Supra*.

set forth by the Chancellor in his statement last Sunday,[3] some of which was of a political nature, should be pointed out first. It was agreed that Germans would furnish the Allies with an accurate copy of this statement which consisted of the following points:

1. Adequate Allied land troops and air forces must be stationed in the Federal Republic to give protection to German rearmament.
2. The Occupation Powers must be transformed into contractual agreements.
3. The Allied High Commission must be turned into a "Conference of Ambassadors".
4. German units must be given military equality as regards their organization, armament and command structures.
5. Adequate financial assistance would be required by the Federal Republic.

Blank then stated that a study was being made as to whether or not German contingents would be afforded protection under international law in the Hague convention. It might wish to raise this question later.

Blank said that only under assumption that the above pre-conditions would be created would he be able to outline to the High Commission the German plan for participation in the defense of Europe.

The allied representatives pointed out to the German delegation that it was beyond their competence to give any assurance in regard to the above pre-conditions, and made it clear that by participating in further discussions the Allied representatives were not committing their governments to satisfaction of the pre-conditions as listed above.

Blank then stated that after agreement has been reached by the Bundestag to participate in the European defense a minimum delay of three or four months will be required to set up the appropriate Federal office and to pass the necessary legislation. (It appeared from the discussion that the Germans are unwilling to take preparatory steps such as drafting of legislation, conscription laws, et cetera, prior to the agreement by the Bundestag on the issue as a whole.)

General Speidel then made the following comments: Demilitarization has been so effectively carried out that there is no basis in Germany for the organization and equipment of German troops. The first step would be to create a Federal office in charge of administration and personnel. The Federal Republic have no statistical records so they must gather from old Wehrmacht records or from German organizations such information as they can, in regard to Germans with prior service which would be suitable as cadres. Initial nuclei and cadres

[3] In his address to a meeting of the CDU at Bielefeld on January 14, Adenauer had stated that the German people adhered to the West, that the Occupation Statute must be replaced by a contractual relationship, that German participation in Western defense must be on equal footing with other powers, that the Federal Republic needed financial aid from the West, and that the Four-Power conference must avoid decisions which would injure Germany. HICOG reported on the speech in telegram 5850, January 16 (962A.61/1-1651).

would be obtained from volunteers except where it might be necessary to conscript certain skilled specialists. The ethical standards and training of the cadres would have a great influence on the combat efficiency of the units created. Therefore, they would plan to make a special effort to secure cadres of best qualified personnel.

If a general conscription law is introduced, it should be based on the model of the conscription law now in effect in the US.

When queried in regard to the Federal office in charge of German military contribution, Speidel stated that the head of this office must be a civilian; Blank stated that the Federal Republic was a democratic government and therefore, the military must be under full control of Parliament, and that the Bundestag must decide the nature and character of the Federal office, but in his opinion it should approach that of Ministry.

German plans regarding conscription are that it will be resorted to only if necessary; that is, if there is a shortage of qualified volunteers—but that all laws, both for forced conscription or for volunteers, should be passed at the outset.

General Speidel and Heusinger presented the following plans for the creation of new units:

First phase. Approximately of four months' duration. In case of certain specialists, a longer time may be necessary. 15 percent of the final strength of each unit would be selected as a nuclei. During this period, the nuclei consisting of officers and key non-commissioned officers would be trained by Allied experts and indoctrinated in the principles of the leadership of the Western Allies.

The selected Germans should be sent to schools and military academies in the Western countries. Joint schools should be established for officers of all NATO powers. Language courses should be instituted especially for liaison officers. Translations of training manuals in the German language should be available at the beginning of the first phase.

Second phase. The nuclei of the first phase would be expanded into cadres. The cadres would consist of 40 percent of the final strength of the unit and would consist of all the officers and non-commissioned officers and specialists for the unit (that is, the 15 percent of the first phase would be increased to 40 percent of the final strength in the second phase).

During the second phase the cadres should have 50 percent of the armament requirements for the final units. Only a few instructors of the Allied Powers would be necessary, but training in Allied schools and academies would continue. The training period for the second phase would amount to three months.

Third phase. The cadres would be brought up to full strength. It is difficult to set the exact time necessary for the final training in the

third phase, but in any event a minimum of four months should be allowed.

During the third phase the Western Powers should provide training institutions, instructors and arms in sufficient quantities.

Under the program envisioned above, if a final decision were taken by the Bundestag on May 1, the training of the nuclei would start in September or by October 1. The training of the cadres would start in January 1952. The third phase, training of the entire unit, would start in April 1952, and the unit would be available for combat in the fall of 1952.

Discussion centered around the need for information in regard to the total contribution to be expected from Germany in 1952. It was recognized that under the training plans envisioned by the German representatives that in order to determine the strength of the nuclei and the cadres to be created in 1951, it would be necessary to know the size of the German forces to be arrived at in 1952. The Allied representatives took note of this and stated it [*they*] would seek to get as soon as possible the size of the German contribution in 1952.

It was agreed that the next meeting would be held at 1030 hours Friday, January 26, and at that meeting the Germans would submit their proposals in regard to equipment and accommodations for the German contingents, and their proposals in regard to the size, organization and armament of German units under the combat team or brigade troop formula.

[HAYS]

762A.5/1–2751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany (Hays) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET BONN, January 27, 1951—11 a.m.

484. Personal and eyes only for Byroade from Hays. The third meeting was held by the deputies and German representatives today January 26 re German military contribution to the defense of Europe.[2]

The same German delegates were present as announced for the meeting held on January 16. US, French and British delegations were the same except for the addition of Colonel Gerhardt on the US side.

Meeting opened with an exposition by Minister Franken (Ger) on the legal aspects of the German contribution as it is affected under international law.

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[1] Repeated to Frankfurt personal and eyes only for McCloy and to Heidelberg personal and eyes only for Handy.

[2] On January 29 Butterworth sent Byroade two copies of his notes on this third meeting as a supplement to telegram 484; one of these two copies is in file 740.5/1–2951.

The first point that Franken made was that, under international law, a country that does not have sufficient sovereignty to negotiate with other countries is not recognized under international law as a power which can wage war. He developed this theme on the basis that FedRep was operating under an Occupation Statute rather than on a treaty. While the FedRep was controlled by the Occupation Statute, it was not a country that was subject to international law. He stated that, under the Occupation Statute, the FedRep was not directly or indirectly under international law able to conduct its own affairs, and that the right to wage war either directly or indirectly depended upon the independence of the country concerned.

Franken then turned to that part of The Hague Convention that provided for levies in mass in the face of approaching enemy, and quoted certain provisions which must be fulfilled to permit Germany to legally wage war under this formula, which were:

1. FedRep could only wage war if its units control part of the territory occupied by the enemy;
2. That military units of that country must be under the organized command of a government such as a government in exile;
3. Military units must adhere to the rules of war.

He stressed that, if these conditions were not fulfilled, the troops of the FedRep would be considered to be guerillas. He summed up his analysis by stating that in his mind 3 conditions must be fulfilled in order that the FedRep would be entitled to wage war, which were:

1. The cessation of the Occupation regime;
2. Far-reaching return to the FedRep of sovereignty over their foreign affairs;
3. The establishment of armed forces after the laws in regard to the demilitarization of Germany had been taken care of.

As regards the latter point, Franken quoted the Allied Control Council proclamation Number 2 dated September 20, 1945, and Laws Numbers 8, 2, 23, 25, 34 and 43 passed by the Control Council in regard to demilitarization of Germany, which provide penalties including the penalty of death for violation of these laws by any German.[3]

Franken stated that the 3 Western powers can deprive of effect these laws in the territory of Germany which they control, but that the 3 Western powers cannot abrogate these quadripartite laws without seeking the agreement of the Soviets.

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[3] For the texts of the first five documents enumerated here, see *Occupation of Germany, 1945–1946*, pp. 89–90, 120–122, 94–96, 96–98, and 98–101, respectively; the proclamation and Laws Nos. 8, 2, 25, and 34 are printed in Ruhm von Oppen, *Documents on Germany*, pp. 68–81, 90–92, 131–135, and 151–152; copies of all the documents referred to are also printed in the Control Council *Official Gazette* and in the *Military Government Gazette Germany, British Zone of Occupation* in various issues.

He pointed out that in this situation the German soldiers in a military contingent which might be captured by the Russians could be legally tried and given punishment up to death for violating the provisions of the quadripartitely-agreed Control Council laws regarding demilitarization.

Upon the conclusion of Franken's statement, Blank said that the Germans wished to point out that in their view under the present situation any member of a German contingent who fell into the hands of the Russians could be tried legally for violating Allied Control Council legislation and that this also applied to all civilians who fell into the hands of the Russians who had likewise participated in rearmament. Blank wished to point out this problem and asked it be studied as he was concerned not so much from its application during war but from the psychological effect it may have on recruitment if the opponents of rearmament for propaganda purposes announce that any member of a German contingent can be legally hanged if they fall into the hands of the enemy.

The deputies agreed to have legal advice in regard to the above matters and discuss this subject further with the Germans at a later meeting.

The next subject was with regard to accommodations for the German contingent. Blank stated that it was their plan to construct new camps of inexpensive temporary construction to last for a period of 20 years. These camps would be designed to accommodate the men, equipment and transportation for each of the combat units which might be decided upon. Camps were not to be located in or near cities but be located where they could have access to suitable training areas. The construction of the camps would take from 4 to 6 months. The reason they must resort to new construction is because the present military barracks are all occupied either by the Allied forces or by DP's or German civilians and, in the event that they evacuated the DP's or Germans, they would have to build accommodations for them anyway. Blank stated that an inner-ministerial building committee had been appointed to take care of construction needs and he would like to be able to inform this committee of the construction material which would be needed at an early date.

The next subject aired German proposals on the size, organization and composition of the German units under the combat team or brigade group formula. Blank stated that the German proposals were based on 5 years of warfare in all types of country but were especially based on the experience the German armies had gained in combat against

Russia and the country and climate they had encountered during the Russian campaigns. Therefore their proposals took into account both the experience the Germans had during the last war and also the situation which confronts Germany and Europe at the present time. He then called on General Speidel, who gave the following views:

In German opinion, based on their experience, the decisive arm in land warfare is the tank accompanied by appropriate infantry, artillery and engineer, and supported by tactical air force. He stated that the Soviets, who initially had a different concept, had now also adopted the armored and mechanized divisions, each of which has 250 to 300 tanks as its decisive weapon. He stated that of the Soviet 26 divisions present in Eastern Germany, at least 18 of them are of this type. Speidel said it was obvious that Soviet armored units can best be met by Allied armored units. He stated that there might be difference of opinion in regard to the proportion of armor, but that on broad terms there should be no difference of opinions in regard to the fact that the most effective unit now is not an infantry division to which is attached a certain number of tanks but that it is a division with a competent allotment of armor which is given appropriate infantry and artillery support. He stated that NATO forces in Europe will be fighting with a numerical disadvantage of numbers over relatively open country and that the best way to counter the numerical disadvantage of numbers would be by mobility and equality, and stated that the above consideration would determine the size, organization and composition of the units which Germany would wish to create.

Speidel then quoted at some length the US *Field Manual* on the passages which describe an infantry and armored division and a combat team and developed that in the US army the only unit that was organized to act independently was a division. Speidel also quoted General Eisenhower's statement that he could not function as Commander-in-Chief of units if units are forced into an organization and are discontented. His comments were very general but in the aggregate indicated that the German delegation considered that any organization of a unit smaller than that able to act independently should not be practical value to organize.

General Heusinger then stated that since the northern swing of the NATO forces would be based on the Baltic, some coastal protection would be necessary, particularly against amphibious landings or to carry out such landings themselves, and some provision must be made to counter the Soviet submarines stationed in the Baltic.

Heusinger then stated that in such an important issue as the defense of freedom against Soviet aggression only the best organization is good

enough, and then described the type of combat unit which the German delegation recommends as the smallest force capable of independent action, to be a unit whose decisive weapon rested on armor with balance supporting units therefor. Such an organization would consist of the following:

A commander and staff with appropriate communications.
One armored regiment consisting of 3 battalions of 80 tanks each.
Two battalions to be equipped with medium tanks, and one battalion with heavy tanks.
Two motorized infantry regiments, each consisting of two battalions.
Half of the infantry would travel on the armored vehicles, the other half in their own transportation. The infantry would be armed with all light and heavy infantry arms and anti-tank and anti-aircraft armament.
One motorized artillery regiment of 3 battalions, one of which would be heavy (exactly what calibre was meant by heavy was not disclosed).
One reconnaissance battalion.
One engineer battalion.

The above force would consist of 12 units of battalion strength with a staff and signal unit and would approximate a strength of 10,000 fighting troops.

Heusinger then compared the above German proposal with the Soviet armored or motorized divisions now present in the Soviet Zone and stated that the Soviet division consists of 4 armored regiments each of which approximated the size of the German armored battalion, but that each Soviet armored regiment has attached to it a machine pistol battalion, one infantry regiment with 3 motorized battalions; one artillery regiment with 3 battalions, one heavy mortars regiment of 2 battalions, one anti-aircraft battalion, one rocket battalion, one engineer battalion. He concluded that the Russian division contained 20 units at battalion strength as compared with the German proposals of 12 units at battalion strength, and that the Russian division strength was approximately 11,500 fighting men. From this proposal Heusinger stated that he thought the German division was the minimum-sized unit which should be expected to oppose a Russian division.

Heusinger then discussed tactical air support for the German units and stated that in their opinion it would be necessary to have a superior command to be created for each 2 German divisions in order to have sufficient territory in width and depth to appropriately utilize tactical air force. He made a point of the necessity for the 4 elements of the tactical air force, which he listed as reconnaissance, fighter, ground attack and liaison, to work not only closely with one another but also with the ground troops, and stated that it was essential for air and ground troops cooperating together to speak the same language.

The gist of Heusinger's comments with regard to the tactical air support seemed to be that it would be impractical to give independent divisions tactical air support and that higher headquarters such as corps or army would be necessary for this purpose.

Heusinger then commented on the chain of command and stated that the NATO troops must be so organized and controlled as to be able to comply with the intentions of the commander and, in view of the Russian numerical superiority, it would be essential for NATO troops to be mobile and trained in mobile warfare. This condition would only exist if the Allied troops are organized to meet rapidly any threat which might develop. Therefore, the chain of command must be perfectly clear and easily understood, and that the problems of leading Allied forces could only be overcome in the framework of the proper organization.

Upon conclusion of the above remarks the deputies decided to withhold any question or comments until the next meeting, which will take place Friday February 2.

Blank asked the deputies to announced at the next meeting the comments on the Allied side in regard to the German proposals that have been made at the first 3 meetings. It was pointed out by the deputies that, as they were only agents of the High Commission in regard to these matters, the deputies could not give any definite statements but would be prepared to announce at the next meeting those points in the proposals which have been made by the Germans so far which may or may not give difficulty within the Brussels formula.[4] In addition to the above comments, at the next meeting Allied deputies may ask certain questions in regard to the German proposals on the size and organization of the combat units and will hear the German proposals in regard to the equipment and armament of the German contingents.

In the light of the German proposals, advice would be appreciated as to the position to be taken by the US deputy. If it is proposed that we tell the Germans that their proposal on the size and composition of their combat units is not acceptable under the Brussels formula, it is anticipated the Germans will then say: "Well, these are our proposals. What alternate type of organization do the Allies propose within the Brussels formula?"

[HAYS]

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[4] For documentation concerning the NATO Council and Defense Committee meetings at Brussels, December 18, 1950, and the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States on December 19, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 585 ff., and volume IV.

762A.5/1–2751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, February 1, 1951—7 p. m.

5301. Eyes only McCloy. Deliver by 9 a. m. Feb 2. Have discussed with Defense the point raised in your Bonn 484 [2] whether or not HICOM negots shld include judgment on Ger mil proposals, including expressing HICOM views on compatibility with proposals of Brussels agreement. It is our gen view that HICOM shld not be the determining body on mil proposals or acceptability of Ger proposals from the NATO viewpoint. It seems to us that mil discussions so far fall into three categories: first, internal Ger administrative problems, including housing; second, over-all troop strengths; and third, matters of higher mil org. We believe that Gers are entitled to fullest info on categories one and two to the extent necessary to achieve a realistic estimation of the Ger over-all effort involved. However, we do not believe that category three can be decided at this time, nor even tentative answers attempted by HICOM. Initial purpose of discussions is to obtain Ger viewpoint.

Several considerations lead to this conclusion. Obvious that no agreement may result from discussion of first two categories alone altho this wld be desirable as Brussels agreement indicates. Gers may not take action to start recruitment or training in absence of decisions on third category and until polit discussions between HICOM and Gers have advanced much further. In attempting to find answers to category 3, Eisenhower's recommendations will be very pertinent factor, and Mil Chiefs of Occ Powers must be consulted and NATO must be brought in somehow.

For your Feb 2 mtg, believe you shld take line that HICOM cannot pass judgment on Ger proposals at this time since this is matter for later determination when mil chiefs of Occ Powers and NATO have studied all facts and recommendations. FedRep shld be informed their recommendations will be given most careful consideration and be basis for occ powers recommendations to NATO. Meanwhile you cld inform FedRep that answers will be obtained as soon as possible to their inquiries re over-all strengths and internal Ger mil administrative problems. We in turn wld wish to have more specific proposals from Gers re their plans to finance and procure equipment. We believe rather protracted delay must be expected pending resolution of polit problems in discussions with Gers. Present negots must be considered

[1] This telegram, drafted by Lewis and Laukhuff and cleared with the Bureau of European Affairs and the Department of Defense, was repeated to Bonn eyes only for Hays for delivery by 9 a. m., February 2, and to Heidelberg eyes only for Handy.

[2] *Supra.*

first basic step and when all possible problems have been raised it might be advisable to recess mil talks for some time. Recess period cld be profitably used by Gers to work out recruitment and administrative problems while we seeking answers to problems of mil organization. Realize this may be disappointing to Gers but we see no other basis for handling negots.

FYI only, difficulties may be expected to arise with Fr during early stages their conference on Eur army. Meanwhile problems of higher formations of Ger units will continue under study by Defense and additional thinking by Ger reps wld be helpful.

Dept considering legal points raised by Franken and will comment later.

ACHESON

740.5/2–251 : Telegram

The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany (Hays) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET BONN, February 2, 1951—11 a. m.

500. Eyes only for Byroade from Hays. It has been tripartitely agreed that I, as chairman, would start off our meeting tomorrow with this statement:

"At our last meeting, held January 26, the representatives of HICOM agreed to inform the German representatives in regard to the matters that have been discussed up to this time, which items we considered would be acceptable, where there might be difficulties, under the terms of our instructions.

"The principle—that the military contribution of Germany must be within the framework of the military establishment created under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been accepted by the German delegation and therefore provides no difficulties.

"The German proposals in regard to their general plans for recruitment and conscription we consider would also not involve any difficulties.

"As regards the equipment and armament of the German contingents, we have as yet to hear a detailed discussion on this problem, but it should be kept in mind that to a large extent the capacities of the armament industries of the NATO countries will be needed for equipping their own troops.

"At the second meeting, held January 16, Mr. Blank outlined five pre-conditions which he stated should be met before the Germans could agree to a military contribution. As most of these pre-conditions are of a political nature and beyond the competence of our committee, I am not in a position to comment on whether or not difficulties will be encountered in meeting these pre-conditions.

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[1] Repeated to Frankfurt eyes only for McCloy and to Heidelberg eyes only for Handy.

"As regards the German proposal for the creation of a federal office under civilian control in charge of administration and personnel, we have not received the German proposals in detail, but from what has been discussed on this subject so far we do not foresee any major difficulties.

"As regards the German plan to recruit and train nuclei and cadres, establish schools, et cetera, we see no difficulties which will arise in regard to the German proposals with respect to training, and we will explore, with our military commanders, the extent to which they are able to give Allied assistance in conformity with this plan.

"As regards the selection and appointment of officers, we welcome the German statement that appropriate measures will be taken to ensure the appointment of officers who will maintain democratic ideals.

"Regarding the availability of armament, we shall first have to have further discussions on what equipment can be produced in Germany, and then determine how the equipment that cannot be produced in Germany can be supplied.

"As regards the legal aspects of the German contribution under international law, I should like to defer comment on this matter until we have received advice from our experts.

"Regarding the German plan for accommodations for German contingents, we foresee no difficulties. We should like, however, to be kept informed of the location of any camps to be constructed and the training areas, in order that we can ensure the coordination of the needs of the German forces with those of other NATO forces in the same general area.

"Regarding the German proposals on the size, organization and composition of the German units under the combat team or brigade group formula, I should like to say that we find the German proposals of great interest and have forwarded them to our respective governments. In this connection I would like to repeat the instructions we have been issued in regard to this matter, which are as follows:

> 'The size of German formations to be constituted should not under present conditions exceed that of regimental combat-teams or brigade groups. However, when these regimental combat-teams or brigade groups are formed and trained, the question of the manner in which they should be used must be determined in the light of conditions at the time; due weight being given to the views of the Supreme Commander.
>
> 'The aim is to obtain with the utmost dispatch formations capable of fighting effectively. To this end, the formation of small units should be started in the immediate future, and these gradually built up to units of the required size and so contribute to the ability of the Allies to ensure the defense of Western Europe. This requirement is a primary concern, and any solution which prejudices it should not be accepted.'

"In view of these instructions, it would be useful if the German delegation would consider what measures can be taken to prevent any delay in the formation and training of German units.

"As regards the comments by the German delegation on the necessity for intermediate commands, these comments were also referred to our governments. Our instructions do not authorize the establishment of

such headquarters. The decision in regard to the type and kinds of intermediate higher headquarters between the Supreme Command and the divisions is a matter that will be influenced by the decisions taken at the Paris Conference on the European Army and by the views of the Supreme Commander. From the discussions we have heard to date of the German proposals in regard to tactical air forces, we foresee no difficulty provided it is understood that the German tactical air forces would also be a part of the integrated air forces under the Supreme Commander.

"Regarding the need for naval contingents for harbor defense and coastal protection, we see no difficulties in connection with the German proposals which have been made."

[HAYS]

740.5/2–351 : Telegram

The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany (Hays) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET BONN, February 3, 1951—11 a. m.

507. Department eyes only for Byroade. The fourth meeting between the Deputy High Commissioners and the German representatives in regard to German contribution to Western defense was held February 2nd.[2] Personnel attending on the German, French and British side was the same as that present at the third meeting. Personnel on the US side was the same, except that Lieutenant Colonel B. F. Taylor of the OPOT [3] Division, EUCOM, also attended.

The tripartite statement as forwarded by Bonn's cable 500, dated February 2nd,[4] was presented to the Germans with some minor inconsequential deletions desired by Bérard (French). In the first sentence of the statement in unnumbered paragraph 12, a period was placed after the word "units," and the words "under the combat team or brigade group formula" deleted.

In the third from last paragraph of the statement, in the second sentence, the words "between the Supreme Command and the divisions" were deleted.

The statement was read with these deletions except that after unnumbered paragraph 12 the chairman, having then received Department's cable 5301 to Frankfort, repeated Heidelberg 198, Niact Bonn 57,[5] secured agreement from his colleagues to state: "I should like to interrupt here to ask that further discussions on the German

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[1] Repeated to Frankfurt eyes only for McCloy and to Heidelberg eyes only for Handy.

[2] A copy of Buttenwieser's notes on the fourth meeting, sent to Byroade on February 7, is in file 740.5/2–751.

[3] Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training.

[4] *Supra.*

[5] Dated February 1, p. 1002.

proposals in regard to the size, organization and composition of the German units be postponed until we, on the Allied side, have received advice from our governments." Then the remainder of the prepared statement was presented.

In commenting on the prepared statement, Blank asked whether he interpreted the remarks in regard to the German proposals on the size, organization and composition of the German units to be unacceptable, and whether he should so state to the Chancellor. He was told that he should not make such interpretation but that he should inform the Chancellor that the representatives of the High Commission wished to have more time to study the German proposals and to hear from their governments in regard thereto, and therefore the question would remain opened until further discussions took place.

Blank then commented on unnumbered paragraph 13 and stated that it would be impossible for the Germans to undertake any recruitment or training of small units until the broader issue as to the size, organization and composition of the German units was decided.

The chairman asked the German delegation whether there were not a number of administrative problems which should be studied and prepared, such as laws on recruitment and conscription, the selection of areas for accommodations and training, et cetera., in order to prevent zation and composition of the German units was decided.

Blank made it clear that they were not in position to undertake any detailed work on these problems until the broader issue was settled. (As chairman, I considered that Blank was carrying out instructions he had received from the Chancellor in regard to this point. I therefore queried that in order that we might have a clear understanding on this point, was it the German position that they would be unable to undertake any further detail work until the question of the size, organization and composition of the German units was settled. Blank stated that was the position of the German delegation.)

Blank made other brief comments on the matters covered in the prepared statement, but these comments were of no importance except to clear up errors in translation.

It was finally agreed that we would postpone any further discussions on the size, organization and composition of German units until a further meeting.

The German delegation then discussed the armament and equipment of the German contingents. Blank stated that the production of equipment in Germany for the German contingents would not provide any difficulties. He then repeated that the production of armament was another matter; that a cardinal point of the program of the Federal Government was to achieve good relations with France and avoid taking any action which might cause difficulties with France. That the

German Government believed that the renunciation on their part of the re-creation of an armament industry would promote good relations with France because, he stated, it would be well-known that if German units were not backed up by their own armament industry they could never become an aggressive threat to France. Therefore Blank said, that before they engaged in the production [of] armament they would wish to have a specific request from France for them to do so. He further stated that should the combined armament industries of the NATO countries prove to be insufficient to provide equipment for an effective force in the defense of Western Europe, and depended upon the recreation of a German armament industry for this, then Germany would be prepared to recreate their armament industry on the specific request of the French Government.

Blank stated that he had been requested by the Federal Minister of Economics [6] to ask that the High Commission establish one office which would be able to deal with questions of procurement and items in short supply. He stated that at the present time many individuals were contacting German firms in the attempt to place orders for equipment for Western countries, and that orders were also being placed to satisfy the military requirements of the Allied troops stationed in Germany. He stated it would be necessary to have all such orders channeled through one central office in order to satisfy the Allied requirements and the requirements of the German contingents. The Allied deputies agreed to bring this matter to the attention of their High Commissioners.

Blank then stated that the Germans had examined the capacity of their industries and were prepared to make proposals [in] regard to the equipment which could be produced for both the NATO forces and the German contingents. He stated that the following branches of industry are not at present operating at full capacity: steel construction, machine construction, vehicle construction (both trucks and cars), ship construction, engineering, fine mechanics, optical industry, iron, steel and sheet iron industry, metal goods industry.

Blank stated that the following industries have a limited capacity available: chemical industry, timber, rubber and rubber goods, leather and leather goods, textiles and clothing.

Blank was asked whether any of the industries mentioned might not be able to provide the equipment needed for the German contingents. He stated that that depended of course upon the size of the German contingents, and the demands made on German industries by other NATO powers; but insofar as he could see at present, no difficulties would arise except for the provision of raw materials. Blank stated that he would explore this question further, and give additional information in regard thereto.

[6] Dr. Ludwig Erhard.

Blank was asked whether or not the government's position in regard to the production of armament extended only to complete end products or whether it also extended to parts of arms. He replied that his position extended only to the complete end product; that certainly a tank without a gun was only a tractor, and that the Germans could produce tractors; there would be no difficulty in producing parts of arms in Germany if other parts of the assembled whole were produced in some other NATO country.

In the light of the above discussions it was decided to hold the next meeting on Friday, February 16th, in order to have the time, on the Allied side, to receive instructions in regard to the question of the size, organization and composition of German units. It is noted in Department cable 5301 that extensive discussions may be necessary between the occupying powers and NATO in regard to this subject. Therefore, two weeks may be insufficient time to permit an answer to be given to this problem. Nevertheless, because of the interest of the press in these negotiations, we do not think it wise at this time to postpone negotiations for a period longer than two weeks.

In the event an answer cannot be given by February 16th on this question, the chairman will propose that the legal points raised by Franken be commented upon at our next meeting. I would appreciate advice by February 16th as to how much longer a delay will be necessary in order to give an answer to the German proposals on the size of their units.

Ward (British) prepared a tripartite statement for dispatch to the deputies of NATO on the results of the conferences which have taken place during the month of January. This statement will be forwarded when received in corrected text.[7]

[HAYS]

[7] No copy of this statement has been found in Department of State files.

762A.5/2-851: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET BONN, February 8, 1951.

Unnumbered. Last fortnight or so has produced considerable speculation, both among Allied and German observers, that SPD opposition on issue of German defense contribution has eased somewhat, at least in comparison with essentially negative views evidently held at year's end and outlined Frankfort's 5443 to Department January 5.[2]

[1] Repeated to Frankfurt, Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow unnumbered.
[2] *Post*, p. 1317.

Main recent SPD pronouncements of importance in this connection would appear to be: Schumacher's January 26 Heidelberg election speech and statement (Bonn's Unnumbered telegram to Department January 30, 4 p. m.,[3] Stuttgart Consulate's despatch 420 January 20 [3] and OLC W/B's repeated 7 January 31 [3]); Schumacher's January 29 Bonn press statement (Bonn's 2 unnumbered telegrams to Department, January 30 [3]); and Carlo Schmid's January 15 Tuebingen speech (Stuttgart's despatch 405 January 24 [3]). In addition to statements made on these occasions, attention might be drawn to following: apparent willingness of SPD to participate in Paris Conference re European Army (Bonn's 512 to Department February 6 [3]); party's negative attitude toward Zentrum's draft bill vs conscription (Bonn's 501 to Department February 2 [3]); SPD's opposition to both Nauheimer Kreis and Wiesbaden (Niemoeller–Gereke–Noack) Peace Proclamation (Bonn's Unnumbered telegram to Department January 23 [3]); Adenauer's claim that SPD's views on defense issue are now practically identical with those of Government and Schumacher's apparent willingness to at least discuss defense issue with Chancellor with relation to possible development of "common front" for negotiations with HICOM.

With regard to latest SPD pronouncements, observers have commented particularly on Schumacher's evident attempt to disassociate SPD from "Ohne mich!" (Without me) state of mind. In this connection, KRO Heidelberg reports that Schumacher both mentioned this briefly in his January 26 election speech and again when queried during subsequent press conference.

Those who believe that SPD "line" on rearmament issue has in fact changed in last few weeks suggest as possible reasons: effect of growing opposition within party to "ohne mich" and generally negative defense attitude, particularly as result of election defeat suffered in Berlin; favorable impression made on party and leaders by Eisenhower's visit and statements,[4] including his remarks to Congress upon return re Germany's defense role; increasing concern by party leaders over possible effect on both public and party opinion of mounting GDR–SED–KPD propaganda and tactics re unity, peace and anti-rearmament (encouraging development of psychology characterized by apathy, indecision and neutrality, which SPD leaders increasingly realize is at present both impractical and dangerous for Germany); and concern over growing isolationist sentiment in USA, plus perhaps doubt in minds of SPD leaders over continuing validity of party's basic thesis that US and Western powers "must" defend western

[3] Not printed.

[4] Regarding General Eisenhower's visit to Germany, January 20–23, see telegram 6080, January 24, p. 445.

Germany regardless of FedRep's participation. Though Schumacher reacted very bitterly to Kirkpatrick's recent Hamburg speech,[5] there is some reason to believe it may have helped jar party's complacency in this connection.

Study of above developments and statements, particularly against background of well-established SPD views on issues involved, leads Bonn Liaison to believe that though there has been some change in party's emphasis on defense issue, there is as yet not sufficient evidence to indicate any real change in basic position. Most that can be said at present is that party is now stressing conditional acceptance approach and seems to have eased up somewhat in its "ohne mich" appeal, and has taken pains to disassociate itself from renewed efforts of KPD to form a common anti-rearmament front and from pacifist, neutralization school of Nauheimer Kreis and Niemoeller–Gereke–Noack group. During heat of last autumn's election campaign, SPD position got fairly close to latter for a time, at least in popular presentation. Ollenhauer's recent remark to Bonn Liaison re adoption of measures to correct "misinterpretation" of SPD policy in US (Bonn's unnumbered telegram to Department January 24 [6]) may well indicate major reason for this shift away from "ohne mich" and pacificism, i.e. concern over veering US opinon, though other reasons indicated above may also have affected party leadership.

At same time, SPD does not, at least as yet, show sign of having dropped any of its basic demands for *Gleichberechtigung* (Equality), both military and political, and necessity for prior build-up in Allied military strength in Germany. In fact, several press articles which have appeared in last few days, which are presumably SPD-inspired, have emphasized this viewpoint (see particularly separate telegram [6] re February 6 "Franfurter Rundschau" article). Schumacher's political ambition and hope of undermining present Adenauer coalition have presumably not diminished, and if anything have probably increased as result of obvious differences within Cabinet over co-determination, tax reform and Lastenausgleich issues. Though Adenauer's problems with his coalition partners (EDP and DP) may have tended to force him to seek *rapprochement* with SPD on other basic issues, Schumacher may be expected to endeavor to exploit this situation to Chancellor's disadvantage. Likewise, SPD may be expected to continue to press demands for new elections as long as Schumacher believes his

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[5] In his speech at Hamburg on January 12 Kirkpatrick had stated that it was time for Germany to drop international intrigue and irresponsible nationalism and stand up and be counted in the fight against international Communism. The Germans must choose, he said, full association with the West without equivocation. For a more extensive account of the speech, see the *New York Times*, January 13, 1951, p. 3.

[6] Not printed.

party is likely to gain therefrom, and rearmament issue still provides him with convenient pretext to do so.

However, in view of slight shift in emphasis which has evidently occurred, question of SPD's policy on defense will merit careful scrutiny in coming weeks, particularly as Lower Saxony and French Zone elections and Petersberg negotiations re contractual relationship get under way,[7] and also in view of Adenauer's current efforts to develop common front with Schumacher re defense and basic occupation problems.

McCLOY

[7] For documentation on the negotiations for a new contractual relationship with the Federal Republic, see pp. 1446 ff.

762A.00/2-951 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET BONN, February 9, 1951—2 a. m.

524. AGSec from Slater. Following is brief summary report of executive session HICOM Council held 8 February on implementation of Brussels decisions:

1. *Contractual Relations.*

[Here follows Part 1 of this telegram; see page 1461.]

2. *Defense Contribution.*

In lengthy discussion on status of HICOM talks on Federal Republic's participation in Western defense, following views were expressed.

(*a*) Poncet, who appeared to be in no hurry to terminate talks at HICOM level, made following points:

(i) That in next meeting with Blank scheduled for 16 February, fuller and more informal exchanges of views should take place between HICOM and Federal Republic;

(ii) That Federal Republic should be asked to make additional proposals within framework of Brussels decisions which could be discussed by defense committee;

(iii) That, for an alternative, Federal Republic might be asked to put aside further discussion of combat groups and lack of equality until after forthcoming Paris discussions and also asked whether they would be prepared at once to commence general program of planning, recruitment, supply, et cetera. (In Poncet's opinion, Federal Republic will not want to commit themselves before Paris and Chancellor in the meanwhile will attempt to

[1] Repeated to Frankfurt eyes only for King, to Paris eyes only for Bruce, and to London eyes only for Gifford.

extract political concessions from HICOM in advance of Federal Republic military contribution);

(iv) That Federal Republic be told Brussels decisions provided that German lack of equality (restricted to combat groups) would only last until European or NATO force was established. Federal Republic should be given opportunity to state whether they would accept non-equality in certain matters in this interim period or whether they believed that there was no room for agreement on such basis;

(v) That defense committee must in any event submit its report to Council which will decide what further action can be taken and what type report should be made to NATO.

(*b*) Kirkpatrick, who portrayed present HICOM–Federal Republic discussions as being in state of complete deadlock, made the following points:

(i) That although he believed Federal Republic had already rejected concept of less than full equality for Federal Republic forces (i.e., combat groups) in the interim period and that HICOM, in accordance with Stikker's instructions at Brussels Conference, should refer the entire matter back to NATO. In view of this deadlock, he was prepared to have Federal Republic informed at next meeting of defense committee that HICOM must report at once to NATO substantial divergence of opinion which now exists and to ask Federal Republic whether they had anything more to say before such report was submitted. (Kirkpatrick went on to say that he did not think that a Wehrgesetz could pass Bundestag at this time);

(ii) That HICOM should be honest in admitting that NA forces under discussion were not composed of *Germans*, allies would ask for all the troops which could be supplied and would agree that they could be organized in the strongest and most efficient force possible. (In this connection, he stated that in his opinion Federal Republic in discussions of combat groups and concept of equality could logically ask whether French, for example, were going to organize their forces into such combat groups.)

(*c*) General Hays and I, after giving résumé of present Federal Republic position, made following points:

(i) That in our opinion Federal Republic delegation headed by Blank, was acting on direct instructions from Adenauer when it opposed concept of Federal Republic combat groups;

(ii) That US element has no instructions which would permit it to inform Federal Republic of greater details concerning size, composition, et cetera, of combat groups contemplated for interim period or to decide on various alternatives with Federal Republic;

(iii) That it was not within HICOM's competence to pass one way or another on Federal Republic's proposals and that HICOM must not tell Federal Republic whether their proposals are either acceptable or unacceptable but merely tell them they will be reported to NATO.

After considerable discussion, Council agreed that Deputy High Commissioners would draft carefully worded statement which could be

presented at next meeting to Federal Republic experts and which would indicate:

(i) That HICOM is merely exploratory and reporting body and it is not within its competence to make decisions on such questions as form of German defense participation in interim period, and

(ii) That before HICOM refers any Federal Republic proposals for Federal Republic defense contribution in interim period or reports Federal Republic position to higher authorities, it wishes to have further opportunity to explore with Federal Republic military experts latter's proposals for Federal Republic defense participation during interim period.

(Text of draft tripartite statement will be forwarded Department soonest.) [Slater.]

McCloy

740.5/2–1051 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL FRANKFURT, February 10, 1951—6 p. m.

6650. Byroade [2] met with Blank and his assistant, former Colonel Count Kielmannsegg, and discussed course of current technical military negotiations. Blank complained rather vigorously that he had been let down by Allies since he had not been told what had been agreed to at Brussels. Consequently he had set forth in great detail plans for a German contribution which apparently went far beyond what Allies had agreed at Brussels. Thus he was left in awkward position of having frankly stated his case only to be confronted with negative silence by Allies. The political opposition could make great capital out of this development should it become known. Blank reiterated that he fully shared American objectives but did not apparently enjoy our support.

Byroade took exception to these allegations by Blank. He explained that our chief aim at Brussels and elsewhere had been to maintain flexibility in NATO plans so that the subject could be developed with full consideration of German views. Subsequent to the Brussels decisions we could have presented them to the Germans as a fixed proposition for their acceptance or rejection. We had intentionally avoided such a procedure as we believed a better end product for all concerned would come from full and open discussions with German authorities.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, London, and Paris.

[2] Byroade was in Europe for the meeting of U.S. Ambassadors to Western Europe, held at Frankfurt, February 5–7; for documentation on this meeting, see volume IV.

It was obvious that Blank, as well as many other Germans, consider that the Brussels decisions were in the nature of detailed plan covering all aspects of creation of the German force. Byroade attempted to correct this impression, and indicated that the primary aspects of the Brussels decisions had been presented to the Chancellor by the High Commissioner immediately following Brussels.

The necessary delay in formulating tripartite answers to various questions raised by the Germans was also explained. It was precisely because there is not on the Allied side a detailed plan that causes delay in answers to their questions. He explained that the process would undoubtedly be somewhat simplified when the Supreme Commander and his staff were in a position to function, and that it was his hope that the views of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Germans themselves would be given great weight in determining an exact manner in which the Brussels decisions were to be implemented.

Byroade stated that he considered it to be in the best interests of all concerned for Blank to continue the military discussions in such a manner as to make general progress over the whole range of problems involved rather than take the attitude that the Germans must know the eventual end product in detail now before being able to proceed further. In the meantime it would be helpful since no publicity need be involved, for Blank and his staff to do all possible preliminary planning, including drafting of legislation, which need not be materially affected by final decisions on such matters as size and armor of German units.

Blank seemed receptive to this advice and departed professing agreement with and understanding of our position.

McCloy

740.5/2–1051 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, February 14, 1951—7 p. m.

5599. Eyes only for McCloy. Since receipt Bonn's tel 507 Feb 3, rptd Fkft 594, Heidelberg 20,[2] State and Defense have been analyzing carefully info exchanged and questions raised in course of four mtgs betw HICOM Mil Comite and Fed Rep Delegation. We have also read urtel 6650 Feb 10 [3] and Bonn's tel 524 Feb 9.[4] Re part 2 Bonn's 524 we do not

[1] This telegram, drafted by Calhoun and cleared by Lewis, Knight, and the Department of Defense, was repeated to Bonn and Heidelberg, eyes only for Hays and Handy.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1005.

[3] *Ante*, p. 1013.

[4] *Ante*, p. 1011.

agree with Kirkpatrick's statement HICOM–Fed Rep discussions in complete deadlock and believe discussion of certain subjects can profitably be continued. General lines of proposed statement for Feb 16 mtg seem consistent with views Deptel 5301 Feb 1 [5] and this tel (we have not yet received full text of tripartite statement).

In gen we consider comments contained Deptel 5301 Feb 1 shld govern our actions for present. It is apparent Mil discussions cannot proceed much further until specific answers to some major questions are forthcoming. We believe Fed Rep is entitled to this info which shld be provided through Occ Powers. You are therefore authorized to inform Ger del that we view present talks as exploratory and upon their conclusion Occ Powers will wish to consult betw themselves and, as appropriate, with NATO before making certain specific replies or concluding any agreements with Fed Rep. You shld therefore request Ger del to proceed with current discussions on points not yet covered having an important bearing on broad Allied decisions, e.g. financing, production, sources of Mil equipment. Upon conclusion of discussion these subjects HICOM shld compile an agreed report on Ger proposals for consideration by three govts. Three govts shld arrive at joint answer in a manner to be determined and shld inform NATO at an appropriate time of the status of negots together with any necessary requests for additional guidance required to reach agreement with Fed Rep. Fol such consideration HICOM shld inform Fed govt of agreed conclusions.

This procedure wld necessitate a rather lengthy recess of present discussions. This delay cld be explained publicly by pointing out fact that initial mtgs were purely exploratory in nature and Occ Powers on one side and Gers on other are now considering info exchanged. Despite Ger statements in fourth mtg, we wld hope they might be working out certain internal Ger recruitment and administrative problems (urtel 6650 Feb 10 encouraging in this respect). As pointed out paras 2 and 3 Deptel 5301 we believe polit discussions with Gers shld go ahead as rapidly as possible and shld in fact be considered to have priority over mil talks. It is apparent Gers are not prepared to reach any definitive agreement on mil subjects pending receipt info on matters of higher mil org and indications new polit relationship will be generally acceptable to them.

Although some public speculation has arisen both here and in Ger whether Eisenhower's report [6] represented a fundamental change in our policy on Ger participation in western defense, we do not consider this to be the case. Eisenhower's comments are clearly in line with our

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[5] *Ante*, p. 1002.

[6] For the text of General Eisenhower's report to members of Congress on February 1 concerning his tour of Western Europe, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 12, 1951, pp. 245–251.

policy in this field. He has in effect highlighted publicly certain conclusions re the tactics of implementing this policy which had become apparent even before the Brussels mtg and which were generally accepted there, although not publicly stated. His statements underline the necessity for a "package" arrangement with Gers covering broadly both political and mil relationships.

For your info Brit Emb has shown State copy of HICOM report transmitted by UK High Commissioner (addressed to Standing Group) raising certain questions brought out by Gers in mil comite mtgs. We discussed briefly possible procedures for handling such reports and agreed to consult further. State and Defense are exploring this problem and will keep you informed. Believe procedure suggested para 2 above will assure adequate govtal consideration of such questions and also offer opportunity to iron out answers tripartitely before pushing them into more cumbersome NATO machinery. Appreciate your comments.

ACHESON

762A.5/2–1751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany (Hays) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BONN, February 17, 1951—noon.

548. Eyes only for Byroade. Report of the fifth meeting held February 16 between the Deputy High Commissioners and German representatives re German contribution to Western defense.[2] Present: same personnel on the German side, omitting Mr. Franken. On the French side the same personnel, omitting General Ganeval; on the British side the same personnel, omitting General Wansbrough-Jones, and adding Mr. Melville (legal adviser). Present on the US side the same personnel as at the fourth meeting.

The Chairman (Hays) opened the meeting with the reminder that these meetings were exploratory and must develop insofar as possible all information on the subjects; that when sufficient information had been obtained, the Allied representatives would submit a report to the High Commissioners, who in turn would submit a report, with their comments, to their governments; that the Allied representatives did not feel they have sufficient information yet to prepare their reports and wish to get further information on some of the subjects already covered, and in addition to discuss financial matters which have not

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[1] Repeated to Frankfurt eyes only for McCloy and to Heidelberg eyes only for Handy.

[2] A copy of Buttenwieser's notes on this fifth meeting, sent to Byroade on February 19, is in file 740.5/2–1951.

as yet been discussed. He then read the following prepared statement which had been agreed upon tripartitely prior to the meeting:

"At our last meeting, we drew your attention to the conditions attached by the Brussels decisions to the organization of the German Participation to Western Defense during the transitional period. The proposals for the creation of an European Army, also adopt the combat team as the size of the envisaged national units.

We should like to know how you envisage the proposals you made on January 26 can be adapted so as to make progress during the transitional period."

Following the above quotation, Ward (UK) stated there were many other matters upon which he would like information, such as the general location of the training areas, the location of the depots, et cetera. Blank (Germany) stated that his task was to deal with the requirements of the Allied forces stationed in West Germany; that he was now busy making arrangements for the US reinforcements which were to arrive, and was also busy making arrangements for the UK reinforcements which were to arrive; that it was plain to him that in the course of this work he must plan from the beginning where German contingents would be accommodated. Because of the shortage of barracks, as they had told us previously, the German contingents would be housed in wartime camps.

The German experts had worked out the general location for the German forces based on certain assumptions re their strength which they would be prepared to discuss now.

General Heusinger then presented the following: the peacetime accommodation for German troops must be based upon the final goal and when the size of the final total German contingency [*contingent?*] is known the individual units would be fitted into an overall framework. He had made a plan on assumed final strength of a German contribution of 250,000 men, and had broken down this total figure as follows:

Twelve combat units of 10,000 men which total 120,000 men:
Service units totaling 30,000 men;
Tactical airforce and coastal force units totaling 65,000 men;
Reinforcing troops such as artiliery, armor, engineers, et centera, 20,000 men;
The remainder of 15,000 men would be taken up by staffs, territorial units, and administrative personnel.

Heusinger then discussed the location of the twelve combat units. Their location depended upon three guiding principles. First, their location adapted to the general vicinity from which the personnel was recruited. Second, the location in proximity to appropriate training facilities. And third, the location should take into account operational plans in case of war. Unless the units were located in an area which

facilitated operations, favorable time would be lost in regrouping or redeployment. Therefore, it was essential that the troops be located in areas which would facilitate their prompt employment in the event of a sudden attack without warning. As regards point three, the location to facilitate operations, Heusinger analyzed the terrain of the FedRep and divided it into three main sectors. The southern sector consisted of the territory south of the Main River, which would be the group to cover Italy, Switzerland and the valleys and gateways to Burgundy in France. He stated that this was the decisive southern pillar of the defense of middle Europe, and a group of forces stationed in this area would be in a position to make an attack against the southern flank of any Soviet penetration. The central sector, including the area between the Main River and the mouth of the Weser River was the area in which any Russian advance must be brought to a halt, and this area includes the vital area of the Ruhr. The area north of the mouth of the Weser River and the Lubeck Bight was the northern pillar of central European defense. If this area and Denmark could be held, Russia could be prevented from breaking out of the Baltic—and, like the southern pillar, would provide a base for a flank attack on the northern flank of the Russian penetration.

In conclusion Heusinger stated that in their opinion a Russian advance must be held on the southern and northern flanks so that it would be channelled into the central sector and that this would be a decisive pre-condition for the success of the defense of Western Europe. This operational plan in their opinion plays an important part in the consideration of the location of German units.

General Speidel then stated that with the above explanation, they had planned in each of the three sectors the location of four of the twelve German divisions. He agreed, at our next meeting, to furnish the Allied representatives with maps showing the general locations that they had selected.

The chairman then asked how the 30,000 supply troops would be organized and would function. Heusinger replied that for reasons of mobility and economy they had planned to create service troops for each two combat units, that they found considerable saving in personnel to create a service agency for each two units rather than for each unit, and that in movement the combat units had far more mobility if they did not have supply units to worry about. On this basis they plan a service organization of about 4500 men strength for each two combat units, and stated that this type of organization gave them a higher percentage of fighting men to total strength than the percentage they had had during the war where each division had its own service unit. The German plan was to have the service organizations which supply each two divisions, commanded by an intermediate commander, and

division commander would be relieved of all responsibility and worries about supplies and service. Under the German plan it would be a decisive advantage when combat units were moved by rail, as without service units they could be moved by only 35 trains, whereas with service units they would need approximately 70 trains.

The chairman then stated that there had been considerable discussion among the NATO powers of the establishment during the interim period of combat teams or brigade groups which would be considered a component part of a division, and for combat operations would be combined together with other like units as a division. He asked Herr Blank, under the hypothesis that equality of treatment would be given to any German units organized under this formula, whether the Germans would have any proposals to make.

Blank stated that under the hypothesis that the other participating nations would form their units on the same basis, the Germans would make such proposals. In view of the reaction in the press re such proposals, he would like it understood that the German proposals would be proposals that would apply to all participating units including German units. In other words, his proposals were not proposals for a German contribution under this formula if other participating units were not similarly organized. Blank then stated that in order to make intelligent comments it would be helpful if the Germans knew how, under this formula, the other NATO units would be organized. He stated that in the German view it would be unwise to propose an organization which would not produce effective fighting units compatible with the desires of the Supreme Commander.

Bérard (France) stated that the French proposals in regard to combat teams had been given to the German delegates in Paris and were being discussed there, and therefore the German delegation would have the French ideas on the composition of combat teams for the formation of infantry divisions and combat commands for the formation of armored divisions.

Blank made a point, with which the Allied representatives agreed, that we should not in our conversations enter into a discussion of the same matters which were being discussed in Paris.

Ward stated that in the British Army they do not have combat teams, but they do have a number of brigade groups which do not have fixed tables of organization, but number between 6,000 and 8,000 men—the armored brigade groups being somewhat higher in strength than the infantry brigade groups.

Blank finally agreed that at our next meeting the German delegation would present its ideas on how a division could be formed from two or more national combat units, again under the assumption that these proposals would only be set forth on the basis of equality.

Ward again pressed the German delegation to come up with plans which would contemplate proceeding with the formation and training of small units while awaiting the final answer to the size, composition and armament of the basic combat unit. Blank replied that even disregarding the political problems involved, his experts felt that for technical reasons it was necessary to know the end product before small units were formed and trained. But, he stated, if the British experts had any proposals to make in regard to how training could commence without knowledge of the final units to be created, they would be very pleased to consider these proposals.

It was agreed that the next meeting would be held Friday, March 2, at which time further German proposals would be made in regard to the composition of combat teams, and discussion would take place regarding the legal aspects of a German contribution under international law.

[HAYS]

762A.5/2–2151

Memorandum by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 21, 1951.

Subject: British Statement left by Sir Oliver Franks on "German Defense Contribution".[1]

1. British paper which was left with you by Sir Oliver Franks seems to summarize the facts of the situation as regards possible German rearmament. We do not disagree with the British view that German reactions to date mean there is very little likelihood of any immediate creation of German armed units. But we do not exclude the possibility that as the situation develops, and if we actively push our discussions, the Germans may agree to participate even before all of their present demands are fully met. We agree with the British conclusion that "it would be tactically a great mistake to appear to be running after the Germans for a contribution or to allow the military discussions in Bonn to take the limelight and to get ahead of the larger questions of establishing the political background and building up the Allied forces". We should emphasize our agreement with the conclusion that "it is naturally essential to avoid giving the impression that there is any drawing back in the desire of the NATO powers to obtain a German contribution". If the Germans get the impression (as they already have from statements by Mr. Attlee, General Eisenhower and others) that there is a change of policy on our part,

[1] Not printed (762A.5/2–1251).

they will seek a motive for that change. They appear already to be speculating that the motive is not to commit ourselves too deeply before a CFM in which we might possibly reach an agreement at their expense. In these circumstances, they will tend on their side to avoid commiting themselves. Any hint of a change of policy will therefore be very damaging to our objective.

2. We are somewhat concerned by the flavor of paragraph 8 of the British paper and particularly the last sentence of paragraph 9. Both these formulations seem to indicate a tendency to hold off on the matter of German rearmament until the outcome of a possible Four Power Meeting is known.

3. We are bound to consider this statement in the light of Mr. Attlee's statement in the House of Commons on February 12. The formulation and spirit of the two statements are not altogether consistent. Mr. Attlee made four points:

(1) rearmament of NATO countries must precede that of Germany.
(2) building up of forces in democratic states should precede creation of German forces.
(3) German units must be so integrated as to preclude the emergence of a German military menace.
(4) there must be agreement with the Germans themselves.

4. The distinction between Mr. Attlee's first and second points is unclear. It has always been agreed, however, that insofar as shortages in equipment may exist, priority goes to NATO countries and Germany comes second. The Brussels decisions did *not* include a decision that German rearmament must be postponed until some indefinite stage of strength is reached in the armament of NATO countries. With Mr. Attlee's third and fourth points we find no disagreement.

5. The difference between the British statement and Mr. Attlee's statement seems to be that the former recognizes certain political facts and draws certain conclusions as to the probable sequence of events from those facts, while Mr. Attlee's statement, on the other hand, sets up new conditions precedent, which must be achieved before we can turn to German rearmament.

6. We have noted also that Mr. Attlee repeated that the British "have agreed in principle" to German rearmament. We are somewhat disturbed by the use of this phrase, as it implies that the Brussels decision to proceed with German rearmament was one taken in principle only, and not seriously to be implemented as soon as possible.

7. There is one imprecision in the British statement. In paragraph 4 there is reference to "the NATO decision that (the Germans) be limited to brigade groups." In fact, it was agreed that this limitation is only temporary and the final decision was postponed.

Recommendations: It is recommended (1) that you express our agreement with the political analysis of the decision in the British paper; (2) that you express our concern over the differences between the British statement and Mr. Attlee's statement of February 12; (3) that you express our concern about the tendency of the British statement to suggest that nothing should be done before a four-power meeting; and (4) that you impress upon Sir Oliver our continuing sense of urgency, our belief that we must continue energetically to seek ways and means of overcoming German hesitations, and that we must on no account permit Soviet maneuvers for a CFM to delay our plans for building strength.[2]

[2] Apparently Secretary Acheson saw Ambassador Franks at 6 p. m. and discussed the British paper along these lines since at the top of the source text is the handwritten notation "6:00 Appointment"; however no record of a conversation between Acheson and Franks on this subject has been found in Department of State files.

740.5/3-251 : Telegram

The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany (Hays) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET BONN, March 2, 1951—7 p. m.

581. Eyes only for Byroade. The sixth meeting on German contribution to European defense was held today, March 2,[2] at which were present: on the US side, General Hays, Mr. Buttenwieser, Colonel Gerhardt, Colonel Taylor and Mr. Sultan. On the French side, Mr. Bérard General Ganeval, Mr. Jacomet and Mr. Kleinman. On the British side, Mr. Ward, Mr. Bathhurst, Colonel Craddock and Mr. Calpin [*McAlpine?*]. On the German side, Mr. Blank, Generals Speidel and Heusinger; Colonel Kielmannsegg, and Mr. Ostermann.

The opening statement by Bérard (chairman) is going forward under separate cable (sent Department 582, repeated Frankfort 706, Heidelberg 27, London 165[3]). After opening statement by Bérard,

[1] Repeated to Frankfurt eyes only for McCloy, to Heidelberg eyes only for Handy, and to London eyes only for Spofford.

[2] A copy of Buttenwieser's notes on this sixth meeting, sent to Byroade on March 7, is in file 740.5/3-751.

[3] Not printed; the statement transmitted in this telegram was the agreed tripartite reply to the legal questions raised by the German representatives at the third meeting on January 26 concerning German participation in European defense, and read in part:

"(*a*) Under international law, a state need not possess all attributes of sovereignty in order to enjoy, in an armed contest, belligerent status and the benefits of the rules of land warfare. . . .

(*b*) Even should the USSR not recognize the Federal Republic's belligerent status, it may nevertheless either be legally required to, or otherwise find it practically appropriate to, accord the latter the treatment owing to such status. . . .

(*c*) There is some legal and substantial practical reason to believe that nationals of the Federal Republic would not be penalized under various Control Council measures prohibiting remilitarization." (740.5/3-251)

Blank gave the German views on integrated divisions consisting of combat teams of several nationalities, and discussed this from a military viewpoint. He re-stated briefly that the question of equality was of great importance to the Germans and that the question of German contribution could only be put to Parliament if full equality is granted. Re the military aspects of the multi-national divisions, Blank stated that any force they created must be one which could meet Russian forces with a reasonable chance of success. Therefore, the Allies must create quality in order to overcome quantity.

The Germans feel that their moral responsibility vis-à-vis the force as a whole and each soldier as an individual, was that the important task of the defense of freedom makes the best possible military formations only good enough. The decision to create multi-national divisions should be considered under four points:

First, the necessity for the rapid build-up of the European defense force.

Second, the necessity to create a highly effective defense force which is the equal of any Russian forces.

Third, the necessity to create a force that was simply organized and easily and rapidly employed with great flexibility.

And fourth, that we should consider that faults contained in the original structure would be difficult to eliminate later.

Blank stressed that they hoped to find a solution which would be acceptable both to the French and the Germans, and would make every effort to view the problem not only from the standpoint of the German opinion, but of the opinion of the other NATO countries as well.

Blank also stressed that they had explained before the reasons why they think the armored division is the best; and the second best would be a mechanized infantry division supported by armor.

General Speidel discussed the formation of a division consisting of combat teams of several nationalities. He stated that it could be done on paper but did not think it would be possible in practice because great difficulties would be bound to occur. He cited the difficulties in chain of command, in the field of mutual tactical support and fire support; the difficulty with tactical air support and supply. He stated that these difficulties were so great that this composite division might not operate effectively in battle and therefore might become an easy prey to the enemy.

He cited examples. The division must issue operational orders to about twelve subordinate units. In case there were three nationalities, this would require three translations and would be very time-consuming. He stated it was common practice for an infantry combat unit to be given armored support, artillery support, and transport support. If the infantry were French, and the armored were German, artillery Italian, and the transport were British, it would be impossible to

secure proper coordination without interminable delays. Regarding communication, he stated each telephone man or signal man would have to be tri-lingual, or they would have to have a triplicate strength to pass down orders. There would be difficulties over food as Bavarians would want sauerkraut and beer, French troops white bread and red wine, and Italians spaghetti and chianti. To satisfy the troops would require a complicated supply organization and many more supply troops than would be normally justified. Speidel further stated that difficulties would apply to weapons until such time as standardization of weapons takes place throughout the command. However, in the beginning—that is, for the time being—troops would have to be armed with such arms and ammunition as is presently available, which in the case of three nationalities would create a difficult problem for ammunition supply. He stated the German view was that for an effective fighting unit, all the constituent parts of that unit and the tactical air support should consist of persons of the same nationality and under the command of a person of that nationality. He further stated that for economy of forces on the battlefield, it was constantly necessary to create special forces for a particular job. This was particularly important for reinforcing artillery. If these forces are of different nationalities, they would create difficulties. He stated, finally that the German view was that the division is the lowest level where the line of demarcation of nationality can be drawn. Any division composed of mixed nationalities would be more expensive, more complicated and more difficult to handle without producing as great fighting ability.

He stated if for reasons other than military it was desired to constitute a division of several nationalities then in the German view, the following must prevail: (1) The national unit (the combat team) must itself reflect a vest-pocket edition of a division. That is, it must have all the arms that a division has. (2) That they would propose two types of combat units so constructed that they could be coupled together, or coupled with another unit exactly similar. Each one of these combat units could be so equipped that it would be able to carry out a combat task independently. The size of the combat units must not be so great that when they are put together in a division, the division is too great and difficult to move.

The German view is that because of the large number of vehicles presently required for a division, that a division should consist of a total strength of 10,000 men. When a division gets to 15,000 or 20,000 strength, the command and movement become so difficult that it takes too much time to move all the components of divisions into battle positions and for these reasons the advantage gained by superior strength is lost through difficulty of employment.

The German view was that as a result of their war experience, it is not necessary to have a division in three component parts. Under the

German proposal three combat units, each with all the armament of a division, would when put together create too large a division, and therefore they would propose a division consisting of two combat units as follows:

A division commander of nationality of one of the units with staff; communication; artillery; engineer; and reconnaissance; an infantry combat unit consisting of: a commander, staff, communications company; engineering company; and reconnaissance company. One mechanized infantry regiment consisting of three batallions; one of the battalions to have armored troop carriers, anti-tank and anti-aircraft units. One armored battalion of four companies, one artillery regiment of one light battalion, and one heavy battalion. Such supply and medical units as are necessary for the immediate needs of the troops. The other unit would be an armored combat unit consisting of a commander; staff; communications company; engineering company and reconnaissance company. One tank regiment of two battalions (a total of eight tank companies). One infantry battalion equipped with armored troop carriers with anti-tank and anti-aircraft. One battalion light artillery of three batteries. Supply and medical units as are necessary for the immediate requirements of the troops. The strength of the infantry unit would be about 6,500. The strength of the armored unit about 4,500. In putting these units together, they could put the armored unit with the infantry unit, and have a light armored division; or they could put the two infantry units together and have an infantry division; or they could put the two armored units together, and have a heavy armored division.

Speidel closed with the statement that the Germans were moved by the same ideas regarding security and protection of freedom as the other NATO powers. They are convinced of the necessity of the German contribution to the defense, and are prepared to proceed along any path that is politically acceptable to Germany. Bérard then stated to Blank that from what he could understand of the presentation, the German view was that from political and military considerations the solution previously proposed by the German delegates is the only one that is feasible. Blank corrected this statement by saying that their discussions with us only presented the military views and the political aspects of the German contribution should be worked out by the political representations.

It was agreed that the next meeting would be held on Friday, March 16, at which time the Germans would discuss the financial aspects under the same assumptions that had been made for their previous proposal—that is, nuclei training to start in September, cadre training in January, and divisional training in April. Total assumed force 250,000 men.

[HAYS]

762A.5/3–1651 : Telegram

The Liaison and Political Reporting Division of HICOG to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BONN, March 16, 1951—10 p. m.

760. From Liaison Bonn. During course of off-the-record discussion with Joseph Alsop in presence of Liaison Bonn, Adenauer today bluntly blamed British as well as French for postponement of German defense contribution. Only by strongest and continued pressure could US hope to force through integration of Germany into Western defense.

Discussing forthcoming FonMin conference, Adenauer stated all too few Europeans seem to understand that dictators can only be handled from a position of strength. Many Frenchmen and even British, some of them influential in their govts, seem to think a Russian attack on their countries could be bought off at the cost of Germany. The chief Soviet objective today is to delay the rebuilding of Western defense and to split the Western Powers. Both France and England were susceptible to Russian blandishments. At forthcoming conference Russians wld probably "play on every available flute" to appeal to every soft element in the West in an effort to block Western defense.

In fact Soviets had already won partial victory by British reluctance to join in a joint declaration on intentions to grant Germany limited sovereignty which was a prerequisite of a German defense contribution. He explained such declaration had been drafted, agreed and was ready for issuance when Kirkpatrick sent word through his subordinate that the UK was not ready at this time to join in such a declaration. Thereupon, all real progress on both pol and mil matters ceased and discussions undertaken on a series of minor points of no individual importance. Thus Russians had achieved a considerable measure of success. Concerning the mil conscription and the size of units, Adenauer stated that these matters shld be left for decision by commander-in-chief and his mil experts. Pol considerations shld not be allowed to influence purely technical mil matters. He ascribed French fear of German divisions partly to fact they were concerned that German and American generals might conspire to place the line of Western Defense too far to the east for French tastes.

Adenauer stated his mil experts believed the danger of a Russian invasion this year could be largely avoided if the British and Americans concentrated ten divisions each in Schleswig-Holstein and Bavaria respectively. Basing themselves on the traditional German concept of the pincers maneuver, such forces, the German generals

[1] Repeated to Washington, Paris, and London. The source text is the copy in the Department of State files.

said that light forces between these two bastions would be sufficient to complete the defense and intimated this task cld be left to the French. Pointing out that the US was already committed to six and one-half divisions, an additional three and one-half wld be necessary to mount American share of this defense force. However, he added the British had already indicated through requisitioning of barracks etc. that they intended to station their forces on an east-west line between Lower Saxony and the Dutch coast. This he said, gave rise to disturbing suspicions in the minds of himself and his mil experts.

Asked why British policy had swung away from the advanced American position until it was scarcely discernible from the French position on Germany, Adenauer took exception to the question stating that Bevin's policy, though not Robertson's, had always been weak in Germany. After reminiscing on his bitter experiences with the British during the early period of occupation, he expressed the view that the only good thing the British had done was to fire him from his post of lord mayor of Cologne for incompetence.

While expressing both respect for and confidence in US policy, Adenauer pleaded for the strongest possible American support to hasten Europe's defense. Throughout the conversation, Adenauer candidly expressed distrust and disappointment at the British and contempt for France and her fighting spirit. Illustrative of his attitude, when the new Allied occupation cost budget was handed to him during the course of the conversation he examined it briefly and commented only "as usual the French soldiers seem to be the most expensive."

As has been explained also, German officials are sometimes not above sowing a little dissension between Allies. It might therefore be wise to take Chancellor's praise of US with a pinch of salt.

McCloy

762A.5/3–1751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany (Hays) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BONN, March 17, 1951—1 p. m.

633. Eyes only for Byroade. The seventh conference on German contribution to European defense was held today March 16.[2]

The same German delegation was present as at the previous conference, and the same personnel present for the US, British and French.

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[1] Repeated to Frankfurt eyes only for McCloy, to Heidelberg eyes only for Handy, to London eyes only for Spofford, and to SHAPE Paris eyes only for MacArthur.

[2] A copy of Buttenwieser's notes of the seventh meeting, sent to Byroade on March 20, is in file 740.5/3–2051.

The item previously agreed upon for discussion at this meeting was the estimated cost of German military contribution in accordance with the assumed German plan for European recruitment and training, and the assumed numerical figure of 25,000 [*250,000*] strength for the year 1952.

The German delegation stated there were two aspects to this problem. One was the cost of the German military contingents; the other was the question of how this problem would be related to the total amount that Germany could contribute in the light of the social situation within Germany, and the payments now made by Germany for occupation costs and mandatory expenses.

The statement made by Blank that he had been informed by the Federal Ministry of Finance that no more than six billion Deutsch marks could be contributed for defense purposes, under present social conditions in Germany. This amount was already used for the requirements of Allied forces under occupation costs and mandatory expense, and left no funds available for the financing of German contingents.

Blank further stated that in their view the German military contribution must not be permitted to be stopped because of fiscal reasons and therefore other methods to raise revenue must be discussed, including the question of loans.

The Allied representatives stated it was not their intention to discuss the problem of what Germany could contribute, and the relationship between the cost of the support of NATO troops and the cost of support of German contingents to this total contribution, that this was a matter to be left to the financial advisors. The Allied representatives did want to know, however, insofar as could be ascertained, the estimated cost of the German military contribution without discussing now how those costs would be met.

The German delegation stated they were handicapped by lack of any records of the Wehrmacht and Reichwehr which could be used in the preparation of estimate of costs. Moreover, they would require a large part of their armament and equipment to be furnished by the West Allies, and they would have to secure the costs of such items from the government of source.

The German delegation also stated that the lack of knowledge of firm plans regarding the kind and type of units to be organized, and the total strength, handicapped their efforts to procure cost estimates. They were not prepared to give any estimated sums at this meeting. After discussion it was agreed that at later meeting, they would provide estimates under the following headings:

(1) Non-recurrent items of initial armament and equipment for their troops.

(2) Non-recurrent items of troop-handling housing, training areas, ranges and stores.

(3) Current expenses to include pay, hospitalization, spare parts, et cetera, on an annual basis.

(4) Current expenses to include maintenance, housing accommodations, stores, and training areas, included in item 2 above.

(5) Current expenses involved in training exercises to include maneuvers, ammunition, et cetera.

The German delegation stated they could compute fairly accurately items (2) and (5). In connection with item (1) however, certain assumptions would have to be made with regard to what armament would be produced in Germany and what armament would be provided by the Western Allies.

It was agreed to hold the next meeting on Friday April sixth at which time the German representatives would explain in detail the establishment of the office for national defense; their views on the composition and organization of the German tactical air force; and their concept and proposals regarding the air defense of critical areas, including an air-warning system. At this meeting they would also set forth their views in regard to the composition, organization and equipment of German naval and coastal defense forces.

[HAYS]

762A.5/3-1751 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET FRANKFURT, March 17, 1951—2 p. m.

7481. Subject: Ger defense contingent. Bérard yesterday informally advised me that predicated on his own recent visit to Paris and subsequent discussion with Theodor Blank he has distinct impression mutually satis solution will be evolved for present divergent Ger Fr views re Ger defense contingent and particularly differences concerning unit size and command. Stated Blank had indicated his hopeful view was based on report which Adenauer and he had recd from De Maiziere that definite progress is being made at Paris mtgs.[2] Bérard stressed importance which Fr and Adenauer and Blank attach to creation true Eur army as real step toward Fr–Ger *rapprochement*. Further indicated Fr prepared and believes Ger similarly ready make concessions in view political importance achieving Eur army concept rather than adhering to rigid proposals their respective mil experts. Also indicated chief Fr concern is not so primarily with regard to actual unit size or other technical factors but rather to safeguard

[1] Repeated to Paris for Bruce and MacArthur and to London for Spofford.

[2] For further documentation on the meetings at Paris concerning the European Defense Community, see pp. 755 ff.

against any possible recreation of a Ger army. Fear of latter possibility is apparently chief Fr objection to NATO concept. Particularly emphasized that as time is important requisite for obtaining Fr–Ger agreement on major broad aspects of matter US shld refrain from urging haste or exerting pressure either here or in Paris or via NATO. Stressed that Fr consider Eur army is most far-reaching factor for genuine Eur integration and development better Fr–Ger relationship far surpassing Schuman Plan toward achieving this all important end. Further urged that since creation Eur army realistically depends on Fr and Gers it shld so far as feasible be left to these two elements to work out satis solution. Bérard conceded US cld probably force a solution on Fr but was certain Fr people wld ultimately recognize and resent such pressure thereby long range purpose of better Fr–Ger relationship wld be defeated.

Expressed hope I wld therefore counsel against haste or pressure on US part in this matter and in favor of giving Fr further opportunity play major role in working out satis solution with Gers. Bérard thought this would be facilitated through discussion being handled primarily by non-mil reps with political considerations playing import role rather than sole emphasis on technical mil aspects. Have not checked with Blank correctness of Bérard's report of Adenauer–Blank attitude. I stated that US position had consistently been to permit full opportunity for Paris negots to produce results and provided negots are not too protracted and results are militarily practicable this wld presumably continue to be our attitude. I naturally made no commitment which wld preclude our resuming active role any time we consider Fr–Ger efforts not producing desired results and in meantime to do nothing here which cld appear to be putting pressure on Fr, particularly in regard to units which issue can be better settled in Paris. I feel this is practicable as a number of issues remain which can be explored here without any deliberate dragging of feet.

McCloy

740.5/3–2351 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT FRANKFURT, March 23, 1951—7 p. m.

7632. Personal eyes only for Acheson and Byroade (no distribution in or outside Department). At my suggestion Hays and Gerhardt saw Eisenhower 22 March to discuss negotiations by military experts at Bonn on German contribution to Western defense.[1] I felt it necessary to determine Eisenhower's views on essentiality and urgency of Ger-

[1] A memorandum of conversation on this meeting at Paris, prepared by Gerhardt on March 23, is in Bonn Embassy files, lot 57 F 24, McCloy Project, TS(51)51A.

man contribution for adequate defense Western Europe. At present rate of progress it would seem possible to conclude discussions with Germans and submit report from commission to governments by end of April or beginning of May. Probability is that agreement could be reached on a factual report, but practically no possibility on submitting agreed recommendations, particularly on issue of size of units and type of organization. It would be possible for us to extend negotiations over longer period if advisable.

Hays and Gerhardt saw Eisenhower, Gruenther and members his staff at private conference at which US personnel only present. Hays outlined my desire to get Eisenhower's view as to timing so that our position could be consistent with his thinking. In summary Eisenhower stated that his position outlined to me last January remained the same.[2] He felt it necessary that Germany attain a political status which wld permit vast majority support by German people themselves, and not mere government support for provision of German contribution. Only with such popular support basis would there be the necessary will. He did not want in his command hired mercenaries or "Hessian soldiers". He was, of course, anxious to have all the German units he could get if there was the proper spirit behind them. After long discussion which reviewed negotiations on European Army in Paris and relative merits and demerits of German small division organization versus Allied heavy division, Eisenhower expressed view that he was opposed to having report of disagreement go from commission to governments and NATO, which would raise major issues between French and Germans or between French and Allies. He felt before such event SHAPE could play strong influencing role, particularly on French. He understood though issues were primarily military that they had strong political implications. He felt that SHAPE staff as an international body could prepare for him an objective study, which could develop a compromise which was militarily and politically acceptable, and which he could recommend to participating countries. He instructed Gruenther to set up such a study group and suggested that Charpentier be named to head it. I understand that Gruenther has already spoken to Charpentier.

At start of conference Gruenther indicated that though no other Allies of SHAPE staff had been invited, they had been informed that meeting with Hays was to take place. Since Charpentier has been informed, feel you may receive inquiries from French and British in Washington. I have informed French here of Hays' visit, taking line that I felt Eisenhower might benefit from review of Petersberg negotiations and his thoughts might be helpful. I did not indicate to them

[2] For documentation on General Eisenhower's tour of Western Europe during January of 1951, including his talks with McCloy, see pp. 392 ff.

Eisenhower's decision to initiate a study, since I consider this to be matter within his discretion, and did not wish to give appearance that we had pressed him into such a decision, which, of course, we did not. However, French may feel that Hays' visit designed to exert pressure to bring Paris and Bonn negotiations to head. In talking to French I learned that they were already aware of Hays' visit and felt my conversation had put his visit in proper light. Eisenhower's undertaking study of this problem does not, of course, commit him to any action on this problem, but is in nature of development of possible future lines of action if necessary. Feel Eisenhower decision should be closely held, although realize that once study group is formed, it will be difficult to keep the lid on.

McCloy

762A.5/4–751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany (Hays) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY Bonn, April 7, 1951—11 a. m.

705. Eyes only for Byroade. Eighth conference in regard to the Ger contribution to defense was held Apr 6, 1951. Present were personnel who attended previous meetings plus Col. Richardson, Air Force, on the US side.

The Ger rep, Blank, commenced the discussion with the Ger proposals in regard to the Defense Ministry. He stated this Min would have to deal with Parliament and the public; must prepare and implement legislation in regard to mil matters and must be the supreme authority acting under the control of the Bundestag. The cardinal point in the Gers proposals is that any Ger mil contingent must be subject to the control of the Ger Parliament. The Min of Def, who is a civilian, must be appointed, and wld be under the same control of Parliament as other members of the Cabinet. The Min of Def wld establish a definite [*defense*] dept under the fol main headings—political, personnel, budget, admin, econ, legal and welfare. Under the Min of Def, there wld be a mil dept which wld be called the Inspectorate General, headed by an officer of the rank of Gen, who wld be the supreme commander of all Ger soldiers and wld be charged with carrying out the instructions and orders of the Min of Def. The Inspectorate Gen wld not establish separate divisions for the army, navy or air force, but as one dept, wld administer the three branches of the service. The Inspectorate Gen wld have three main divisions—one for organization, one for personnel, and one for discipline, legal problems,

[1] Repeated to Frankfurt eyes only for McCloy, to Heidelberg eyes only for Handy, to London eyes only for Spofford, and to SHAPE Paris eyes only for MacArthur.

education, etc., and wld also have depts for training, admin, supply and for gen affairs and liaison with the Supreme Commander of NATO.

It was stressed that these proposals are a departure for [*from?*] the former Ger mil org and wld create a defense org that wld remain responsible to a democratic govt. That these proposals wld be submitted to the Ger Parliament and what the final shape of the Ger def dept wld be, wld be determined by the Ger Parliament.

Bérard commented that the Ger proposals were rather far from those agreed upon in the Brussels agreement because for political reasons, the Council of Fon Mins wished to avoid the re-establishment of a defense dept in Germany. Allied reps agreed to take note of the Ger proposals and defer further comment until a later meeting. Upon query from UK rep, Herr Blank stated that the supply of mil equipment from Ger industry wld be controlled by the Min of Def, but that the Fed Rep wld create a comite of the Mins of Def, Econ and Finance to coordinate the requirements for mil equipment and to maintain close contact with similar NATO agencies. The Ger rep also stated that under the Ministry of Def, there wld be only one supply system which wld serve all three branches, that is, army, navy and air force.

Gen Heusinger then outlined the Ger proposals regarding the organization of the tactical air force. He first outlined the tasks to be undertaken; reconnaissance in areas where the ground troops cld not penetrate. Attacks against ground targets, particularly in those regions beyond the reach of friendly artillery. Such attacks to be carried out by both low level and high altitude aircraft. The task of protection of friendly ground troops against hostile aircraft by assisting the anti-aircraft defenses in this protection.

For the above tasks wld need fighters—fighter bombers, light bombers and reconnaissance aircraft and light anti-aircraft protection for air installations. Of the above aircraft, in the Ger view, the need for fighters was of paramount importance because if fighters cld obtain air superiority, it made the tasks of the reconnaissance and bombers much easier. Without such air superiority, the use of reconnaissance and bomber was made much more difficult. Concluded that the tactical fighter arm must be as strong as possible and equipped with most modern equipment. The need for a common language between ground units and the supporting air forces was emphasized.

The policy of the Sovs during the late war to concentrate very large numbers of planes against one objective was emphasized and in the Ger view, allied air forces shld be so organized so as to be able to mass quickly a large number of planes against any such concentration.

Ger propose to adopt the same org as the US Air Force, which they outlined as fols: A reconnaissance squadron of 18 aircraft; a reconnaissance group of three squadrons of 58 aircraft, a fighter or fighter

bomber squadron of 25 aircraft; a fighter or fighter bomber group of three squadrons totaling of 80 aircraft; a light bomber squadron of 16 aircraft and a light bomber group of three squadrons totaling 52 aircraft. Ger proposal in adopting US organization is greatly influenced by the need for US assistance in planes, fuel supplies, etc. Ger views re how a tactical aircraft shld be employed was discussed from two standpoints. First, that the NATO forces wld be divided into army corps of three divisions each, each corps being of one nationality. Under this assumption, the tactical air force cld be attached to support an army corps and in the Ger view, each army corps shld have for its support the fol: Five reconnaissance squadrons totaling 90 reconnaissance aircraft; three fighter groups totaling 240 aircraft; one fighter bomber group totaling 80 aircraft and one light bomber group containing 52 aircraft. On the hypothesis that the Ger contingent wld consist of four such army corps of three divisions each, in Ger view they should have approximately 1,900 tactical aircraft for the support of these corps.

In Ger view, it wld not be advisable to attach a tactical aircraft to the support of army corps because this wld not permit a rapid concentration of all available aircraft against hostile formations. They, therefore, propose that except for reconnaissance aircraft, all tactical aircraft be allocated in support of armies assuming that there wld be several armies each consisting of three corps of three divisions each. As regards reconnaissance aircraft, they recommended that each division have a reconnaissance squadron in support of it of the same nationality as the ground troops of the division. They calculated that this wld require nine reconnaissance squadrons to be attached to divisions plus two reconnaissance squadrons for each corps headquarters. Under this assumption, the Ger share of reconnaissance aircraft for 12 Ger divisions wld number approximately 360 aircraft. As regards fighter aircraft, each army shld have nine fighter groups and three fighter bomber groups. As regards light bomber groups, each army shld have three. In Ger view, if aircraft were provided to armies in the above proportion, Ger share of such tactical aircraft wld be approximately 1,960 aircraft. In addition to the aircraft, light antiaircraft batteries wld be needed in defense of the airfields and ground staffs and air warning units wld be needed. Statement was made that there were insufficient airfields present in West Germany to take care of the needs of the large number of aircraft and in the Ger view, the establishment of air bases was one that cld only be undertaken under joint planning for the defense of Western Europe as a whole in which the German tactical air forces shld participate. In summation, Gers wish to stress the fol points: That except for reconnaissance aircraft all tactical aircraft shld be concentrated in the army; that they wish to

adopt US type organizations; that the greatest emphasis shld be placed on fighter aircraft; that in the Ger view to support 12 divisions, the Ger tactical air force shld consist of approximately the fol: 1,000 fighters; 360 reconnaissance; 320 fighter bombers; 210 light bombers and 100 light anti-aircraft batteries of caliber less than 75 millimeters for the protection of airfields. For the above, they estimate their personnel requirements as flying personnel 3,000; ground personnel 30,000, anti-aircraft personnel 6,000; air warning and air control personnel 6,000 for a total of 45,000 personnel. It was stressed that this personnel wld not include any personnel for troop losses or replacements and that a number of additional civilians wld be needed.

As regards air defense of West Germany, Ger view is air defense of West Germany must be a part of the plan for air defense of West Europe as a whole. They stressed the need of a close knit air warning and radar system and stated it was not known whether the allies desire for Germany to participate in such a system, but were prepared to do so and felt that they shld be permitted to participate in the air warning system.

In conclusion, comment was made that the proposal for tactical air may seem extravagant, but supported their proposals by the fol arguments. Since 1945 the Russians have placed all their emphasis on creation of a tactical air force and on a strong air defense system and in case of war, the Russians wld have a very strong tactical air force. Second, that success of allied ground operations largely depend on the mastery of the air, and, therefore, the allies must not be saving as regards tactical air forces.

Allied reps took note of the Ger proposals and agreed to defer comment until a later meeting. It was then decided to hold the next conference on Fri, 20 Apr at which time Ger reps wld present their views on coastal defense and light naval forces; on the financial estimates of the Ger contribution and on the selection and training of the personnel of the tactical air forces.

[HAYS]

762A.5/4–751 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 1, 1951—7 p. m.

7329. Eyes only McCloy. Ger proposals for org of Def Admin in Ger as outlined Bonn 705 Apr 7 [2] appear to us to be logical and reason-

[1] This telegram, drafted by Byroade, Hays, and Nunley and cleared by the Department of Defense, was repeated to Bonn, London, Heidelberg, and Paris, eyes only for Hays, Spofford, Handy, and MacArthur.

[2] *Supra.*

able. They seem to provide a method of insuring civilian and parliamentary control which we consider most important and therefore cld be accepted by this Govt without serious reservation.

Considerations supporting single responsible ministry seem compelling. Such admin obviously far more efficient and more capable of handling relations with NATO and SHAPE. Most important is fact that single ministry shld actually be more cautious and prudent and more likely to avoid revival of uncontrolled Ger militarism. To bury vital defense functions in other ministries wld render defense policies less sensitive to parliamentary control and wld make effective supervision by occupation authorities more difficult. Also hiding defense functions in two or more non-defense ministries might encourage assumption military planning activities by informal committee-type groups and possibly stimulate growth of *sub-rosa* general staff. Combining defense functions with important domestic functions might inject military influence unnecessarily in important areas of domestic life. For instance, we wld not wish see portions defense function deposited in Interior Ministry in manner which wld combine mil and police responsibilities. Nor do we believe it desirable to have office set up in chancellery, which might result in less parliamentary control than in separate ministry.

Chief difficulty involved Ger proposals is whether or not they violate ltr or spirit Brussels Agreement. We think not, but Allies may not agree. Para 7(*f*) of C–6–D/1[3] clearly envisages possibility that Allies, after discussions with Ger authorites, may determine establish defense functions in single agency. At same time, para 7(*f*) is equally clear in rejecting assignment to the Ger admin any functions which might permit redevelopment of Ger Defense Ministry. Most reasonable explanation of apparent ambiguity is that NAC desires prevent redevelopment of complete Defense Ministry as normal in nations that have national forces under their own complete control, including full operational and intelligence staffing. We do not interpret current Ger proposals as suggesting this type of organization, to which of course we cld not agree. In other words we wld consider unacceptable the redevelopment of a Def Min which wld permit either secret Mil operational planning or the rebirth of a Ger Gen Staff in the traditional sense.

If, as wld seem likely, Fr and Brit reps cannot readily agree that Ger proposals do not violate intent of Brussels Agreement, believe best alternative may be to persuade them to leave this question open pending final report of High Comm so that this question wld be one of those to be considered by Govts.

ACHESON

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[3] For text of C6–D/1, December 13, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 531–547; in particular footnote 1, p. 538.

762A.5/5–951 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, May 9, 1951—noon.

6803. De La Grandville, French Secretary of European Army Conference, in course of discussion with Embassy officer indicated French disapproving proposed organization of German defense administration. He also showed in confidence copy of telegram which Foreign Office recently sent to François-Poncet quoting substance of memorandum from Moch. Memorandum vigorously dissented from recommendation (apparently from Poncet) re-establishment of a single German ministry or administration (to be called other than Ministry of Defense) in Bonn to coordinate German Defense functions.

Following is substance of message to Poncet:

French Defense Minister disapproves proposal to allow Germany to form organizations similar to Defense Ministry. Moch wants German defense functions to be split up among various civilian ministries without creation of any new ministry or organization. It is premature for NATO or European nations to take over control of German Defense under a plan which provides for gradual transfer of control powers. Modification or ending of controls on German defense should be an end and not a beginning. Moch also opposed specifically creation of post of inspector general. In his view this would of necessity place centralized control in hands of a German general and would be prelude to re-establishment of German general staff. He considers present a particularly unfavorable moment to contemplate any of foregoing steps.

Foreign Office official commented on message to effect Foreign Office disagrees with Moch's view and hopes these matters will appear in new light after forthcoming elections.[2] He called attention to "continuity" of Foreign Office thinking these subjects which he described as "consistently occupying middle position between views of Moch and Americans".

Foregoing confirms views other French position prior to elections now slated for June.

BRUCE

[1] Repeated to Bonn, London, Frankfurt, and Heidelberg.

[2] For documentation on the French national elections, June 17, see volume IV.

740.5/5–1751 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, May 17, 1951—7 p. m.

Depto 943. Depto 914.[2] Mtg on problems of Ger def contribution held May 15 with reps of HICOG, SHAPE, Paris and London Embassies, OSR, EUCOM, CINCAFE, ISAC, State, Defense, ISG, JAMAG, SUSRep, Munitions Board and USDep attending.

Fol comments in summary form set forth areas where discussion indicated action can be taken now to implement US policy towards Ger def participation.

1. In order accelerate Ger action, effort shld be made to present more realistic and specific picture to Gers in current tripartite talks as to what is expected of them as a mil contribution. In this connection, standing group has been asked by HICOM for data which has not been forthcoming altho considerable time has elapsed.

2. US shld urge that HICOM report on the mil discussions with the Gers, which shld shortly be transmitted to the govts, be submitted by them to NATO, probably CD, as promptly as possible.

3. Franco-Ger disagreement on basic unit size and level of integration may at some time have to be referred to SACEUR by NATO. Obviously there is no possibility of a change in Fr position before Fr elections, and US shld therefore avoid having SACEUR brought formally into question until after that time and then only at request interested govts and at carefully chosen time.

4. US shld continue to press for early implementation of system of contractual relations [3] and suggest utilization of declaration of intent formula if latter feasible and offers better opportunity for initiating prompt action toward def contribution.

5. Question of Ger's association with NATO will arise in near future in the first instances in connection with DPB and FEB. An over-all US position including specific steps and timetable contemplated leading towards full NATO membership shld be readied. It is anticipated that matter will reach the deputies for discussion at time contact between the Gers and FEB and DPB is desired. This cld presumably take place in near future and shld initially be through HICOM although different formula may be adopted towards association with the FEB and DPB. After the initial contacts, stages of auxiliary Ger membership leading to full membership in various NATO bodies cld be evolved when Ger mil contribution has been determined and requisite Pol safeguards established. Question of possible Fr attitude toward foregoing and other specific steps to associate Ger with NATO shld be discreetly explored.

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[1] Repeated to Frankfurt, Heidelberg for Handy, Wiesbaden for Norstad, and Paris for MacArthur and Riddleberger.

[2] Not printed; it transmitted a "suggested agenda for discussion on Germany May 15." (740.5/5–1051)

[3] For documentation on the negotiation and implementation of a new system of contractual relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, see pp. 1446 ff.

6. US shld be prepared for further revision of Law 24 [4] upon Ger agreement to a def contribution, especially in view of effect of this law on NATO mil production problem.

7. Utilization of Ger production capacity when available unused capacity exists in NAT countries is a difficult concept for DPB to sell. However, DPB shld proceed to integrate Ger production picture into scheme of NATO planning and US shld push hard to get NAT countries to place orders in Ger including West Berlin. Fr and UK with EPU surpluses shld be specially encouraged to place orders in Ger. Utilization of a pooled approach through establishment of some type of NATO purchasing commission under DPB shld be explored. SUSRep and HICOG will maintain continuing contact on these problems and seek to develop DPB–HICOM contact in due course.

8. Re def orders priorities plan, HICOG shld submit to SUSRep soonest regulations under revision of Law 24, type of priority order form required, procedures for placing orders in Ger, Ger agency to be dealt with, and a list of Ger availabilities. SUSRep will then table paper in DPB and press to get machinery into operation.

9. Essential element to providing technical assistance to Gers in production matters is prompt establishment of adequate security system by FedRep.

10. Size of gap between cost of mil program as currently outlined in Ger discussions and funds expected to be available to meet that cost accentuates necessity for Ger association with FEB burden-sharing exercise.

SPOFFORD

[4] For the text of Allied High Commission Law No. 24, "Control of Certain Articles, Products, Installations and Equipment," of March 30, 1950, see *Laws, Regulations, Directives and Decisions*, vol. I, pp. 74–153.

762A.5/5–1951 : Telegram

The United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany (Hays) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 19, 1951—11 a. m.

870. Eyes only for Byroade. The eleventh meeting [2] with Ger delegates on Ger contribution to European defense was held Friday May 18. Attendance the same as at previous meeting.

The chairman opened the meeting with a reminder to all present for the continued need for secrecy in regard to the meetings, and mentioned leaks to the press which had taken place and shld be avoided in the future.

The chairman then read a tripartitely agreed statement as follows:

[1] Repeated to Frankfurt, Heidelberg, London, and Paris, eyes only for McCloy, Handy, Spofford, and MacArthur.

[2] At the 9th and 10th meetings on April 20 and May 4 air force and naval personnel and the financing of their training and equipment were discussed. Hays reported on these meetings in telegrams 761 and 827 from Bonn, April 21 and May 5 (762A.5/4–2151 and 5–551). Copies of Buttenwieser's notes on the two meetings are in files 740.5/4–2351 and 5–751.

"At our last meeting we agreed that at this meeting the allied reps wld comment on the Ger proposals for the administration of defense. We have instructions from NATO on the question of the administration of Ger defense. These instructions do not enable us to approve your proposals. We have in any case sent your proposals to our govts.

We feel that we shld now inform you that our instructions provide that the defense administration in Germany shld be subject to some system of allied control. Also, our instructions provide that the functions of a general staff which are appropriate to the plans, operations and intelligence sections of military staffs, above the level of authorized tactical units, shld be discharged only by an international staff under the Supreme Commander, and shld not be permitted in any German agency.

We examined the list of questions previously raised by the Ger delegation which had not yet been answered and find that until we have the views of NATO we are in position to give a reply only to questions 7, 8, 9 and 10, as follows:

> 7. With respect to training facilities and training personnel made available by the Allies in Germany we agree in principle with you that facilities and personnel will be made available subject, of course, to a solution of the practical problems involved.
>
> 8. Insofar as we understand the Ger proposals for accommodations, we hope to be able to adjust such accommodations to the Allied projects without serious difficulty.
>
> 9. Regarding the type and quantity of arms and equipment which can be supplied by the Allies for the Ger contingent, we will give you information on this matter as soon as we have received it from our govts.
>
> 10. With regard to the price of arms, when we have determined what arms and equipment can be supplied, we will then be in a position to tell you the cost of these.

The other questions will be incorporated in our report to our govts as items which shld be brought to the attention of NATO for reply."

(The Ger questions referred to in the above statement are as follows:

1. What are the views of the Allies regarding the overall strategic situation?
2. What is the strategic planning in Europe?
3. What will be the overall strength of the European forces?
4. How large shall be the Ger contribution?
5. What shall be the tasks assigned to us within the framework of the European overall defense?
6. Shall the Ger units have the same type of organization, training and command as the other units?
7. What training facilities and training personnel can be made available by the Allies?
8. To what extent do the Ger proposals for accommodation overlap Allied projects?
9. What kind of arms and equipment can be supplied?
10. What [are] the prices of the arms?

11. What are the Allied views on the detailed work requested by them, which is to be done even before a decision has been made regarding the size of the Ger contingent?
12. What are the Allied views on the extent of the contribution of the Ger industry towards armament?).

In commenting on the statement of the chairman, Blank asked: "What wld be the nature of Allied control over the Ger administration?" The Chairman replied: "We do not know the nature of such control; it may be in the framework of the European Army or in the framework of NATO, but our instructions provide for some form of Allied controls."

Blank then stated that if the form of Allied control over Germany were the same as over other NATO or European countries, it wld be acceptable—otherwise it wld not be acceptable, as such control wld not give Gers full equality. The chairman noted the Ger viewpoint and stated this information wld be forwarded to our govts.

Blank then inquired as to whether or not Germany wld be represented on the Supreme Commander's staff in those functions of the general staff that are appropriate to the plans, operations and intelligence sections of military staffs, above the level of authorized tactical units. The Ger delegation was informed that our instructions provided that Gers may be represented in the international staffs, but that the Allied reps did not know what form and what degree of Ger representation wld be agreed upon.

Blank replied that if Germany had the same representation as other NATO countries on international staffs in functions of plans, operations and intelligence of higher units, it wld be acceptable. If not it wld not be acceptable as this action wld deny Germany full equality.

The Allied reps stated the German viewpoint on this matter wld be referred to their govts.

Blank then outlined the Ger views on the territorial organization for the administration of defense. The Gers proposed to adopt the French pattern of establishing territorial command over an area which wld contain two to four divisions, grouped together in a corps. Each such territory wld be under the command of a military commander of the rank of general, who wld command all the troops in his area and be responsible for territorial problems and administration. The territorial commander wld have a military staff for command of the units, and a territorial staff for administration. He wld be responsible not only for the Ger troops within his territory, but also for Allied troops in his territory, when the Occupation Statute is replaced by contractual agreements.

Blank stated it was necessary to create these territorial commands because the Central Federal Administration of Defense cld not adequately handle local problems, and if attempted to do so wld become

too large. The territorial commander wld be guided and coordinated by the Ministry of Defense and wld have the following responsibilities:

1. Organization and maintenance of all local installations within the command, both Ger and Allied.
2. Control of depots, work shops, airfields, maintenance depots, etc.
3. Recruitment of Ger contingents to include statistical research, medical examination, decisions on selections made, and final induction.
4. Execution of all measures necessary for mobilization of Ger troops, and any assistance that may be needed for mobilization of allied Troops.
5. Administrative functions under the direction of the Ministry of Defense which wld be largely carried out by civilian personnel.
6. Procurement procedure as applied within this territory.

From the above responsibilities it was clear that each territorial commander wld need a military staff for command, an administrative office, and a recruitment office. Each agency with appropriate sections.

In deciding on the delimitations of the territorial commands, civilian territorial delimitations wld be adhered to as far as possible, but the delimitation of the territorial command must not be impeded by *land* boundaries as defense matters shld be the responsibility of the Federal Republic—and not delegated to *laender* authorities.

The Gers decided on the establishment of four such territorial commands as follows:

1. Southern Command consisting of *laender* Bavaria; Wuerttemberg–Baden; Wuerttemberg–Hohenzollern; and Baden. Estimated population: Fifteen (15) million.
2. Central Command consisting of *laender* Rhineland Palatinate; and Hesse. Estimated population: seven and a half (7.5) million.
3. Western Command consisting of *land* North Rhine Westphalia. Estimated population: Thirteen and a half (13.5) million.
4. Northern Command consisting of Lower Saxony; Schleswig-Holstein; Hamburg; and Bremen. Estimated population: Twelve (12) million.

Blank in conclusion stated the problem of territorial commands required a more detailed study, and that these views were only very general.

Bérard (French) asked what responsibility the territorial commander wld have for the maintenance of international law and order. Blank replied that under the Basic Law the maintenance of law and order is a police matter for *laender* authorities, and not a matter for the military.

Ganeval (French) asked what authority the territorial commander wld have over the Ger troops stationed in his territory. Blank replied that he, as commander of all Ger troops stationed in his territory, wld be an intermediate commander, corresponding to a corps commander. The Ger delegates were informed that the Allied reps had commented

previously on the question of intermediate commands above division level, and those comments wld also apply to the territorial commander as outlined by the Ger reps.

Blank also stated that the territorial commander wld be responsible for the recruitment of tactical air force and naval personnel, as well as army. In the event of war, the territorial commander wld leave his deputy to carry on territorial administrative functions and wld take charge of his corps as corps commander in active operations.

Discussion then centered on the preparation of the final report. It was agreed that the final report shld be completed and agreed upon in order that the Allied reps might forward it to their High Commissioners by June 3 at the latest.

Three copies of Ger translation of a tripartitely agreed draft which covered the first part of the report were given to the Ger delegation.[3] After reading the report Blank stated that he was unwilling to have the Deputies confer on comments or changes, as he felt this was a matter of sufficient importance which he shld handle personally.

It was finally agreed that the Ger comments on that part of the report which has now been furnished them, wld be forwarded by the Gers in writing within a week. When the Ger comments were received, the Chairman wld meet with his allied colleagues to see if the Ger comments or changes were acceptable. Questions arising wld be handled on an interim basis between the chairman, for the allies, and Herr Blank. As the remainder of the report is drafted and agreed upon tripartitely, it will be forwarded to the Ger delegates for their comments under a similar procedure, the object being that at the next meeting a final report will be prepared with agreed or disagreed items, upon which the four reps wld take final action.

The date of the next meeting was set for 10:30 a. m., Friday, June 1.[4]

[HAYS]

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[3] No copy of this draft has been found in Department of State files.

[4] At the 12th meeting on June 1 the first nine paragraphs of the final report were agreed, and the reconciliation of the remainder delegated to a committee of deputies (telegram 904 from Bonn, June 2, not printed (762A.5/6–251)). Regarding the final report of the technical committee, see the letter from the High Commissioners to their Governments, *infra*, and footnote 2 thereto.

740.5/6–2251

The Allied High Commissioners for Germany to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France [1]

TOP SECRET

On 20th December 1950, at the Brussels Conference, the Occupying Powers were invited by the Powers signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty to discuss with the German Federal Government the question of German participation in the defense of Western Europe, on the basis set forth in the reports of the Military Committee and of the Council of Deputies.

On 21st December, the Allied High Commissioners and the Federal Chancellor agreed to instruct the Deputy High Commissioners and, on the German side, Herr Blank, to make a first study, both sides being assisted by military experts. This report is the result of that study.

The study was essentially of an exploratory nature.

It is, indeed, important to note that, although the substance of the NATO paper was fairly indicated to the Chancellor on 21st December by a statement of the duty Chairman of the High Commission and subsequently to the German delegation, neither the complete text of the document nor every detail of all its stipulations were communicated to the German delegation. It was desired moreover that the German delegation should be able to express their point of view freely. They have thus not considered themselves bound by the requirements of the NATO paper.

It appears that the main concern of the German delegation was to make known the form which, in their opinion, the German contribution should take in order to achieve for the common cause the greatest effectiveness in the face of the Soviet menace. They worked from an essentially technical military standpoint and presented their proposals clearly and firmly.

In doing this, the German Delegation stressed the fact that a German contribution to Western defense could only be envisaged after the realization of a certain number of political conditions. It was understood that the discussion of these conditions was reserved for meetings between the High Commissioners and the Chancellor.

The following tables show the principles incorporated in the NATO proposals which (*a*) the German Delegation accept, (*b*) those which they did not accept in these discussions, and (*c*) those which they may accept with certain qualifications. It will be seen that while the German

[1] The source text was attached to a memorandum by John F. Hickman, Secretary of the International Security Affairs Committee, not printed, and was circulated to members of the committee as ISAC D–16, dated June 22.

proposals in certain important particulars are within the framework laid down by NATO, in a number of others they depart considerably from the conditions set forth in the document approved by the Brussels conference.

A. The following safeguards (of those set forth in the Brussels Agreement) are acceptable to the German Delegation:

(1) Any system of German participation must be within the NATO structure.

(2) A European rather than a nationalistic spirit will be instilled in German military personnel.

(3) Although the German Delegation rejected a control which would apply only to the German contingent (see lists B and C), it agreed that any system of control that is applicable to all participating NATO forces would be accepted by the Germans.

(4) Appropriate German air units for the defense of Western Germany in support of German ground units will be a part of the integrated air forces under the Supreme Commander.

(5) Military personnel would be secured initially through voluntary enlistment followed by conscription (selective service) and it appeared that a satisfactory formula could be worked out with the German authorities.

(6) An armament industry will not be established in Germany except to the extent specifically requested by France.

(7) Although the German Delegation insisted on the creation of a Defense Ministry (see list B), it agreed that the German administration of defense would be of civilian character and under the control of the Bundestag.

(8) The Germans will create such naval forces and accept such naval tasks as may be determined by NATO.

(9) The number of German land formations should not at any time exceed one-fifth of the total of like allied land formations allocated to and ear-marked for SHAPE.

B. The following safeguards (of those set forth in the Brussels Agreement) were not acceptable to the German Delegation:

(1) The Germans do not consider in principle that the brigade groups or regimental combat teams fulfill the requirement that any units formed must be militarily acceptable and effective.

(2) The Germans do not accept a transitional period during which they form and train units before the decision is made with regard to the division.

(3) The Germans insist that the size of the German ground formations to be constituted should be a division of 10,000 fighting men, and preferably in the form of an armored division.

(4) The Germans insist that the administration of defense should be in a defense ministry and do not accept an administrative office or offices in one or more other ministries.

(5) The Germans do not accept the provision that German units should not be permitted to contribute complete heavy

armored formations, as they consider the armored division the most efficient and insist on being equipped on a basis of equality.

C. The German Delegation declared that the following safeguards (of those set forth in the Brussels Agreement) were not acceptable unless some procedure can be worked out on the basis of equality; that is, they would be acceptable only if they apply to the forces of the other powers participating in the defense of Europe, or if an agreed procedure is worked out that will satisfy German public opinion.

(1) Defense administration must be subject to some system of allied control.

(2) The functions appropriate to the plans, operations and intelligence sections of military staffs, above the level of authorized tactical units, should be only discharged by international staffs under the Supreme Commander and should not be permitted in any German Agency.

(3) The German land contribution to any NATO defense force should, from the point of view of safeguards alone, under no circumstances, be organized into solely German formations which exceed the ceiling of division strength.

(4) The occupying powers should retain general supervision over officer recruitment and should rely as far as practicable upon recruiting and training of new officers. Similarly, supervision should be exercised over the training of non-commissioned officers.

N.B. The following safeguard provided in the NATO agreement was not discussed with the German delegation, as it seemed premature to discuss this point before an agreement is reached on the German contribution.

(1) The rotation of individuals from the regular forces to any reserve should be controlled so as to insure that no unforeseen or undesired expansion of German forces is possible at any time.

It will be seen from the above tables that, except on a certain number of points which they regard as fundamental, it does not appear that the German Delegation will be hostile to some compromise. It should be noted that these first negotiations took place in a particularly confident atmosphere and, on the German side, showed a definite desire to achieve something.

Although the German Delegation did, on the other hand, point out on several occasions the importance in Germany of the movement in favor of abstention from military matters and the necessity of fulfilling certain conditions to overcome this, they did not hide their belief that, in due course, if satisfactory political conditions were created, a majority which, moreover, they hoped would be large could be found in the Bundestag to pass the Laws which would be presented by the Federal Government.

It will be for the Governments concerned to determine what relative importance they attach to the points on which the German proposals respectively fall in with or diverge from the Brussels proposals. The three Governments will doubtless exchange views to the end that instructions be sent to the High Commission to enable further discussions to be held with the Germans.[2]

A. FRANÇOIS-PONCET
French High Commissioner for Germany

IVONE KIRKPATRICK
U.K. High Commissioner for Germany

JOHN J. MCCLOY
U.S. High Commissioner for Germany

FRANKFURT AM MAIN, June 8, 1951.

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[2] Attached to the source text was the *Report of the Technical Discussions Conducted at the Petersberg concerning the Question of a German Defense Contribution (9 January–4 June 1951)*, dated June 6, not printed. This report summarized in 16 numbered sections the discussions between the Deputy High Commissioners and the West German Representatives and indicated the positions taken by both sides on the various questions considered during the 12 meetings at Petersberg.

DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING POSSIBLE CONVENING OF A SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

A. EXCHANGES OF NOTES AMONG THE FOUR POWERS, AND RELATED ACTIVITIES, NOVEMBER 1950–MARCH 1951

Editorial Note

On November 3, 1950, the Soviet Government presented notes to the American, British, and French Embassies in Moscow proposing a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider the question of fulfillment of the clauses of the Potsdam Agreement regarding the demilitarization of Germany. In their replies of December 22, the three Western powers proposed instead a meeting of representatives of the four Governments to discuss a wider range of questions as a basis for a subsequent meeting of the Foreign Ministers. The texts of the notes exchanged by the Soviet Union and the United States are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, volume IV, pages 902 ff., as well as in the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1, 1951, pages 11–12. The note of December 22 is also printed in *American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents*, volume II, pages 1784–1786.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 157, volume I ETS

Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff [1]

TOP SECRET
ETS D–2

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1950.

EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS

PROBLEM

To determine the most useful tactics in exploratory talks with the Soviets if they accept the suggestion of the three Governments.

DISCUSSION

The attitude of the French and British in the preliminary talks in Paris before the Brussels meeting indicated that they both were willing to attend a CFM even though there were no prior indication of

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[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which indicated that this paper had been approved by Secretary Acheson on December 27.

Soviet willingness to agree upon any acceptable solution of any outstanding problem.

The U.S. refused to commit itself to a CFM unless exploratory talks indicated some Soviet willingness to enter upon talks which would justify the participation of the Foreign Ministers.

At Brussels, Mr. Schuman and Mr. Bevin agreed with the Secretary upon the U.S. thesis. However, it can be anticipated that they will tend to accept rather readily any arrangement which will make a CFM possible. The U.K. is reluctant to accept the idea that talks at the "official" level can consider important questions of substance. The French seem ready to make the gesture of starting ministerial talks to satisfy their public opinion even though no satisfactory basis is laid. They both may be expected to take in the exploratory talks what we would consider a "soft" attitude.

The standard Soviet technique is to enter upon negotiations with a rigid insistence upon their own position and a refusal to consider even a compromise with their adversaries' position. They seem to count upon the Western tendencies to be "fair"; to be impatient; to yield to the pressure of public opinion which demands "results" from such negotiations.

The Soviets would have strong reason to believe that the Western powers themselves consider that they are leading from weakness and that they are prepared to make concessions to avoid war. They would expect to enhance such tendencies by prosecuting the "war of nerves".

Actually the Western position, in terms of basic Soviet estimates, is one of strength. The Soviets are fully cognizant of the productive power of the United States and admire it. They are impressed by the results of our effort in World War II and have not forgotten the recovery we made after Pearl Harbor. If they do not launch World War III now it may be because they realize better than we admit the basic strength of our position and because they believe our allies can be split and our position softened by the war of nerves.

There are two contrasting tactics which could be used in the exploratory talks with the Soviets.

I. We could start with a clear understanding among the British, French and ourselves of the subjects which we would be willing to have on the agenda of a CFM. For illustrative purposes we might assume these would be Germany and Austria. We could argue with the Soviets against taking the Prague declaration as a basis and insist on including merely such items as "The German Problem" and "The Austrian Problem". In accordance with precedent, we might agree on a statement that "The Agenda will include such other items as the Ministers agree upon when they meet."

Such an approach would probably be satisfactory to the British and French. It would not involve any real advance probing of Soviet intentions and would probably lead to the holding of a CFM at an early date upon terms which would give the Soviets substantially what they

asked for in their original proposal. Such a development would not be in accord with the essence of the position taken by the Secretary at Brussels. It would still leave open the possibility of endeavoring at the CFM to build a record for possible propaganda exploitation of Soviet unwillingness to discuss many causes of tension.

II. We could as an alternative begin the exploratory talks with the tactics commonly employed by the Soviets. This would imply appearance of rigidity and the immediate airing of a list of questions in regard to which Soviet conduct or positions have been unacceptable to us. By way of illustration it might be suggested that we insist that an agenda item on the German question must include such matters as the eastern frontiers, a land corridor to Berlin, return of German POWs, etc. We might also insist that the agenda include items such as the violation of the Bulgarian and Rumanian Peace Treaties with respect to human rights and the limitation of the armaments of those countries. We could bring up such clearly non-negotiable subjects as the international subversive activities of the Cominform or the restoration of the democratic government of Czechoslovakia. We would take the offensive and raise one after the other a long series of issues, many of which have previously been argued with the Soviets and on which we have received no satisfaction.

Such tactics would presumably involve some discussion of substance and might well lead to prolonged argument with the Soviets. They would require long drawn-out exploratory talks requiring the kind of patience we have not usually displayed in such negotiations. They would probably meet with French and British resistance which would have to be overcome as it was when the Security Council "neutrals" endeavored to solve the Berlin case at Paris.[2] Such tactics might or might not lead to a CFM which would have some chance of being productive of results. Even if it eventually resulted in agreement on a CFM agenda which included only such items as "The Problem of Germany" and "The Problem of Austria", it might give the Soviets the idea that we were not in a mood to capitulate or that we felt we were in a weak position. It might lay the groundwork for strong positions in the CFM itself.

If there has been preliminary discussion of substance in the exploratory talks, we would be in a better propaganda position to break off the CFM when it was apparent that the Soviets were unwilling to reach a settlement. A "White Paper" or other publication could reveal the Soviet intransigeance.

If the Soviets are willing to reach agreement on any issue on a basis acceptable to us, we are more likely to reach such agreement through aggressive than through soft tactics.

It would be possible while the four-power exploratory talks are in progress to attempt private conversations with the Soviets to feel out

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[2] For documentation on consideration by the Security Council's "Neutral Commission" of the Berlin question in 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 643 ff.

any possible basis of agreement on any specific questions or on any general issues. Opportunities for such private conversations should not be disregarded because of fear of French or British susceptibilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We should approach the exploratory talks and, if it eventuates, a CFM, with the belief that their value lies in *a*) gaining time; *b*) propaganda advantage; and *c*) convincing the Soviets that we are determined and confident. We should not be sanguine of reaching any real settlements although we should always seek them.

2. We should adopt as tactics the line indicated under II above on the ground that such tactics would best contribute to *a*), *b*) and *c*) under paragraph 1.

3. We should try to persuade the British and French of the soundness of this approach and should not give in to any evidence of "softness" on their part.

4. If necessary we should insist on following our approach in the exploratory talks with the Soviets, laying plans in advance to meet adverse public opinion reaction perhaps stimulated by French and British lines to the press.

396.1/1–351

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union to the Embassy of the United States [1]

[Translation]

No. 79

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics confirms receipt of the note of the Government of the United States of America of December 22 which is in answer to the note of the Soviet Government of November 3 of this year on the question of calling a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and on the instructions of the Soviet Government, has the honor to state the following.

1. The Soviet Government in its note of November 3 proposed calling a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and the USSR for consideration of the question of fulfillment of the decisions of the Potsdam Conference regarding demilitarization of Germany. Introducing such a proposal the Soviet Government proceeded, thus, from the necessity of holding not simply a meeting of the four ministers for the purpose only of

[1] The source text and a copy of the Russian text of this note were transmitted as enclosures to despatch 341 from Moscow, January 3 (396.1/1–351). The note was delivered to the U.S. Embassy at 11:50 p. m. Moscow time on December 31.

consultations on these or those questions, but from the necessity of calling an actual Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs for consideration of questions related to the competence of the Council of Ministers as constituted. In this connection the Soviet Government considered it necessary to discuss first of all the question of the demilitarization of Germany as the most acute question for Europe. Continuing to consider that the question of demilitarization of Germany is most important in the cause of insuring international peace and security and touches upon the basic interests of the peoples of Europe and, primarily, of the peoples who have suffered from Hitlerite aggression, the Soviet Government expresses its agreement to the discussion also of other questions regarding Germany, which corresponds to the position of the Soviet Government set forth in its note of November 3 and to the Prague Declaration of eight countries.[2]

The Soviet Government does not object to the proposal for calling a preliminary meeting of representatives of the USA, Great Britain, France and the USSR with the purpose that the meeting work out the agenda for a session of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It goes without saying that in the tasks of such a preliminary discussion the consideration of questions which should be considered at the meeting itself of the four Ministers of Foreign Affairs will not be included.

As for the place of calling the preliminary meeting, the Soviet Government proposes that such meeting be called not in New York but in Moscow, Paris or London in view of the fact that the holding of such a meeting in one of the capitals mentioned presents undoubted practical conveniences for the majority of its participants.

2. The assertion of the Government of the United States that the proposals set forth in the Prague Declaration cannot serve as a basis for a favorable solution of the German problem calls forth legitimate doubt, since this assertion was made before the proposals mentioned were subjected to consideration of the four powers. The assertions also of the American note that these proposals were allegedly rejected by the majority of the German people are at least baseless and do not at all conform to the real situation. In any event, it is not difficult to be convinced that in broad circles of the German population, including the population of West Germany as well, the proposals of the Prague meeting have met with great interest.

As far as the remarks contained in the note of the Government of the United States of America with respect to the letters of the High Commissioners to the President of the Soviet Control Commission on the question of conducting all German elections,[3] which are simply an evasion of a question having great significance for the German people, are concerned, this question was the subject of repeated discussion among the Governments of the four powers and the position of the Soviet Union on this question is well known.

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[2] For the text of the Prague Declaration, issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria and the Albanian Minister in Moscow on October 21, 1950, see Ruhm von Oppen, *Documents on Germany*, pp. 522–527, or *Documents on German Unity*, vol. I, pp. 158–161.

[3] For documentation on the question of all-German elections, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. IV, pp. 590 ff.

3. From published data it is seen that the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France are creating in Western Germany a regular German army, forming not just some police detachments, as has been officially stated by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the three Western powers, but whole divisions. It is known also that recently representatives of the Governments of the USA, Great Britain and France have been carrying on negotiations with the government of Adenauer concerning the number of German divisions being formed and their armament even with tanks and heavy artillery and concerning inclusion of these divisions in the so-called "united armed forces".[4] attempts to camouflage these measures with references to the necessity of strengthening the security of the USA, Great Britain, France and other states of Europe are clearly untenable since no one has threatened or is threatening these states. All the more untenable are the attempts in the note of the Government of the USA to justify plans for the remilitarization of Western Germany by reference to the rearmament allegedly taking place in Eastern Germany. Everything said in the note of the Government of the USA on this matter is fabricated from beginning to end and does not conform to reality in the slightest degree. In the note of the Soviet Government of October 19, it was already pointed out that such assertions of the governments of the three powers were without any foundation.[5]

4. The note of the Government of the USA of December 22, furnishes a basis for considering that it is agreeable to the proposal of the Soviet Government with respect to the joint consideration by the four powers of the question of demilitarization of Germany. The Soviet Government attaches important significance to this since the realization of the demilitarization of Germany is not only provided for by the Potsdam Agreement between the USA, the USSR, Great Britain and France, but remains a most important condition for securing peace and security in Europe, corresponding also to the national interest of the German people itself.

Furthermore it is known to the whole world that it is in fact the Governments of the USA, Great Britain and France which have recently been taking every kind of measure for the revival of a regular German army and for the restoration of war industry in Western Germany and are already carrying on official negotiations on these questions with the government of Adenauer, which is an expression of the desire of certain aggressive circles to confront the peoples of Europe with accomplished facts. There is no necessity to prove that such actions by the Governments of the USA, Great Britain and France clearly contravene the obligations undertaken by these governments concerning the necessity for carrying out the demilitarization of Germany and also that they cannot but create serious difficulties in the solution of those questions which should be considered by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the calling of which is being delayed further and further for some reason or other.

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[4] For documentation on the talks at Bonn concerning a German contribution to Western defense, see pp. 990 ff.

[5] For the text of the Soviet note of October 19, 1950, concerning the remilitarization of the Eastern Zone of Germany, see Ruhm von Oppen, *Documents on Germany*, pp. 520–521; for further documentation on the question, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. IV, pp. 942 ff.

Similar notes are being sent by the Soviet Government simultaneously to the governments of France and Great Britain.

Moscow, December 30, 1950.

396.1/1–151 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Barbour) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY Moscow, January 1, 1951—8 p. m.

1277. Embtel 1275, January 1.[2] Soviet note on CFM [3] obviously designed leave general impression it constitutes agreement on exploratory talks as suggested by Western Powers leading to actual calling CFM. Wording seems deliberately ambiguous and calculated less toward immediate propaganda gain, as far as argumentation concerned, than toward maintaining flexibility for propaganda successes during course of talks themselves.

Note on whole contains no indication any change in Soviet position that question of demilitarization of Germany is most important for CFM discussion and that it considers Prague declaration as proper basis for discussion German problems in general. Note worded as to suggest demilitarization already accepted as first agenda item, regardless of others.

Intimations that scope of discussions might be broadened obscurely reflected in second sentence section one concerning competence of CFM. Implication here that problems having world-wide and perhaps particularly Asiatic significance can only be appropriately considered if fifth world power, China, is included in composition of CFM. Another indication of willingness to broaden field of discussion at proposed session, perhaps to include Austrian question and others of European significance, is statement in section four that remilitarization of Western Germany creates serious difficulties for those questions CFM should consider, leaving presumption that price for settlement these questions would be discontinuance such remilitarization.

Proposal that talks be held Europe instead of New York can be interpreted as attempt to remove them from under aura UN, where USSR outweighed in votes and sentiment and where also Communist China not so attractive, eastward to area in which World Peace Council has more influence.

Although Soviet Government makes plain it takes for granted that exploratory talks will be procedural dealing only with fixing agenda, it cannot be ruled out that this reservation may only be intended to

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Frankfurt.

[2] Not printed; it transmitted a preliminary translation of the Russian note of December 30, 1950 (396.1/1–151).

[3] *Supra.*

disarm Western Powers of careful advance preparation of substantive and propaganda positions in order obtain advantage from outset.[4]

BARBOUR

[4] On January 2 Embassy London reported that the initial British Foreign Office reaction to the Soviet note corresponded "in general" with these views, while Embassy Paris reported on the same day that the initial French reaction was that the note "was mild in tone and . . . appeared to insist upon narrow base of discussions proposed in original Soviet note of November 3." (Telegrams 3700 from London and 3752 from Paris, neither printed (396.1/1–251))

396.1/1–251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, January 2, 1951—3 p. m.

3688. Deptel 3185 December 28, repeated Paris 3469, Moscow 439, Frankfort 4587.[2] Foreign Office has only just started to prepare position papers for proposed Four-Power meeting and as consequence its thinking with respect to German issues which may come up has not yet crystallized at working level much less at official level. Therefore, while our following estimates believed to reflect fairly closely current Foreign Office views, they are subject to modification and possible revision as further study is given to matter and in light of discussion on governmental level. It should also be borne in mind that Foreign Office from Bevin on down is not sanguine as to results of CFM. Accordingly, British tend to concentrate on developing ways and means to checkmate Soviet propaganda moves rather than to formulation positive proposals for settlement German problem.

(*a*) Unification of Germany and all-German elections. Foreign Office continues to feel that program set forth May 25 letter to Chuikov [3] provides satisfactory basis for reunification and would be willing to proceed along such lines should Soviet indicate willingness to accept these proposals. Thinking in Foreign Office is that West should not agree to standstill on German rearmament while program was being implemented. To do so in its view would seriously jeopardize attainment goal adequate defense of Western Europe without sufficient compensatory advantages to Western Powers. Similarly, Foreign Office officials would probably favor rejection any suggestion for "permanent neutralization" of Germany, for they feel that demilitarized Germany would sooner or later fall under Soviet domination. They might, however, be willing to take this risk if Soviet should show willingness to settle other outstanding differences between East and West.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Moscow, and Frankfurt.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Transmitted in telegram 121 from Bonn, May 25, 1950; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. IV, p. 641.

(*b*) Preparation and terms of peace settlement. Foreign Office does not believe Soviet seriously desirous peace settlement with Germany at this time on terms which would be acceptable to West. However, as matter of tactics British would probably agree in principle to initiate further negotiations looking towards a settlement if Germany were reunified and all-German Government formed on basis program envisaged letter to Chuikov. Indeed they do not see how it would be possible from standpoint public opinion in West to reject such an offer if phrased in such manner as to give impression of sincerity. Foreign Office has given little thought to terms of German peace settlement in past several years, and we doubt whether it is devoting much attention to subject at present. UK objectives with respect to Germany have, however, changed in past year. Where British once considered their interests would best be served by creation relatively weak, demilitarized Germany, they now desire formation strong anti-Communist German state which would serve to bulwark Western defense. Change in attitude has been primarily occasioned by realization that Western Europe, including UK could not adequately defend itself against Soviet without German manpower and, secondarily, because of continuing concern re French will to fight, a view which is strengthened by what they regard as French tendency to inaction. As stated in previous message (Embtel 3417 December 12, 1950, repeated Frankfort 617, Paris 1150[4]), however, British are not at this time thinking in terms of Anglo-US-German axis.

(*c*) Withdrawal occupation troops. British consider withdrawal occupation forces in Germany in advance peace settlement would be disastrous. But would, they feel, make far more difficult maintenance substantial US forces in Europe which they consider vital European defense. Moreover, British believe Western Powers have convincing argument from standpoint public opinion to counter any Soviet proposal for withdrawal occupation forces; namely, that such step could not be taken as regards former enemy until after peace settlement, and as mentioned above, latter development in their opinion is quite remote.

(*d*) Demilitarization of Germany. As stated paragraph (*b*) above, Foreign Office opposed to demilitarization of Germany. Now that NAT powers have agreed for good and sufficient reasons to German rearmament it feels that it would be calamitous to take retrograde step. This view is not as widely shared by British public whose memories of German aggression are still fresh. Nevertheless, we believe government could swing public opinion to this way of thinking depending of course, on final outcome CFM.

(*e*) Quadripartite investigation of German remilitarization. Foreign Office, and it is felt Cabinet, would strenuously object to any proposal for Four-Power investigation remilitarization activities in Germany. They consider Soviet would seize upon existence industrial police corps in UK and US Zones to becloud *Bereitschaften* issue and, further, that any assurance which Soviet might give to dissolve that body in return for corresponding action with respect to industrial police groups by US and UK would not be honored. Foreign Office, therefore, concerned that Eden and other Conservatives have suggested

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[4] Not printed.

Four-Power investigation and is doing its best to make him aware of pitfalls involved in such proposal before it strikes public imagination.

(*f*) Divisive tactics. Foreign Office keenly aware divisive aspirations of Soviet and fully appreciative opportunities which CFM would furnish in this regard. They are particularly concerned about French whom they feel tend to rise to Soviet bait.

To sum up, British objectives with respect to Germany have undergone material change in past year as result developments in international scene. These changes will, we believe, be reflected in position they take in tripartite talks. British positions will not, however, be rigid and inflexible. On contrary, they would be prepared to modify their views to ensure common front by three Western Powers, situation which they consider indispensable prerequisite any talks with Soviet on Germany.

Foregoing drafted before receipt Soviet reply (Moscow's 1274 January 1 to Department [5]). We are seeking Foreign Office reaction to latter later today.[6]

GIFFORD

[5] Not printed. For the text of the Soviet reply, see p. 1051.
[6] Regarding the British reaction, see footnote 4, *supra*.

396.1/1–851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 8, 1951—8 p. m.

3593. 1. Our next tel [2] transmits our draft of proposed reply to Sov note Dec 30 re CFM.[3] Pls hand copy to FonOff and discuss with them fol points. We will also give copies to Brit and Fr Embs. (FYI only, substance of draft has been discussed on a personal informal basis with Franks and Chauvel, whose suggestions have been taken into account, and we therefore hope that it will meet with Fr and Brit concurrence without substantial change. Under no circumstances should fact that Chauvel commented on draft be divulged.[4])

2. On Jan 6 Fr Emb left with Dept *Aide-Mémoire* indicating

(*a*) Council of Mins of Jan 3 indicated preference for Paris as site for "quadripartite conference on agenda of four-power conference".

(*b*) If this agreeable, logical that Paris also be site for tripartite exchange of views for purpose drafting reply to Sov. note.

[1] This telegram was drafted by Bonbright and sent also for action to London and repeated to Moscow and Frankfurt.
[2] Telegram 3594, *infra*.
[3] *Ante*, p. 1051.
[4] Memoranda of Jessup's conversations with Chauvel and Franks on January 2, with Franks on January 5, and with Chauvel again on January 6 are in files 396.1/1–251, 1–551, and 1–851.

(*c*) Choice of Paris for preliminary conversations wld not prejudice designation of city where CFM wld eventually be held.[5]

3. Our draft holds to position that ultimate CFM shld be in US on principle of rotation so far followed, and that N.Y. wld therefore be most convenient site for quadripartite exploratory talks. If agreed by Brit and Fr this will dispose of points 2(*a*) and (*c*) of Fr *Aide-Mémoire*. Re point (*b*) we hope that, on basis of our draft, agreement on reply to Sov note can be obtained through diplomatic channels without reconstituting Paris working group.[6] (FYI Chauvel supports New York as locus.)

4. There remains important question of time, place and personnel for reaching tripartite agreement on positions to be taken in exploratory talks with Sovs.

(*a*) As to time, we think that we shld aim at initiating tripartite discussions as soon as possible, preferably next week, even if agreement has not then been reached with Sovs on holding exploratory talks.

(*b*) As to place we still prefer US (preferably NY) as stated above.

(*c*) As you know Jessup has been designated to represent US. Problem has been complicated by Bonnet's hurt feelings resulting from original meeting with Franks and Chauvel in Washington. We gather that Chauvel has been instructed to keep out of it but we are not clear whether this means only such discussions as may take place in Wash or only question of reply to Sov note. We wld appreciate clarification. One solution wld be for talks to take place in NY, the Brit switch from Franks to Jebb and Fr redesignate Chauvel. Another wld be for Parodi to rep Fr (FYI we understand from Bohlen Parodi was thinking of doing this). Second alternative wld straighten out Bonnet–Chauvel tangle regardless of whether talks took place in Wash or NY. In this case Brit cld use either Franks or Jebb, as they prefer.

ACHESON

[5] A copy of the French *aide-mémoire* and an English translation are in file 396.1/1–651.

[6] The Paris working group, established in November 1950 to coordinate a reply to the Soviet note of November 3, had consisted of representatives from the French Foreign Ministry and the Embassies of the United States and United Kingdom.

396.1/1–851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 8, 1951—8 p. m.

3594. Following is text of US drft of proposed rep to Sov note Dec 30 re CFM referred to in immed preceding telegram : [2]

[1] This telegram, drafted by Jessup and cleared by Matthews, was sent also for action to London and repeated to Frankfurt and Moscow.

[2] Telegram 3593, *supra*.

"(Usual acknowledgment)

"The US Govt, after a careful study of the note of the Sov Govt of Dec 30, asks for clarification in order to determine whether that Govt is in agreement with the proposals set forth in the US Govt's note of Dec 22 and in notes of the Govt of the UK and of the Fr Rep of the same date.

"Since it is the purpose of the US Govt and of the Govts of UK and Fr Rep to find a basis for beginning discussions between their reps and the rep of the Govt of the Sov Union in order that the cause of international peace and security may be furthered, the Govt of US now confines itself to comments relating to its previous proposals. It refrains at this time from refuting the false allegations on a number of points in the Sov Govt's note of Dec 30.

"The note of the Sov Govt does not refer to a desire, corresponding to that of the other three Govts, to bring about a real and lasting improvement in its relations with the other three Govts or to eliminate the causes of present international tensions throughout the world.

"The note of the Sov Govt seems to suggest that solutions of outstanding problems in regard to which the Sov attitude has created a sense of insecurity in the minds of peace-loving nations cannot even be explored unless the Govts of the US, UK and France accept in advance the unfounded Sov statements re the state of affairs in Ger which were set forth in the notes of the Sov Govt of Nov 3 and Dec 30 and also in the so-called Prague declaration.

"The US Govt explained in its note of Dec 22 that these totally false allegations offered no hope for the firm establishment of peace for which, together with the Govts of UK and Fr, it has consistently striven.

"The US Govt in its note of Dec 22 stated that the Sov proposal for a mtg of the CFM confined to considering the demilitarization of Ger in the context of the so-called Prague declaration was not acceptable for the reasons stated. The note proposed specifically:

> "1. That a mtg of the ForMins should include in its discussion not only questions related to Aust and Ger but also the principal problems whose solution would permit a real and lasting improvement in the rels between the Sov Union and US, Great Brit and Fr and the elimination of the causes of present international tensions throughout the world.
>
> "2. That reps of the four Govts be designated to meet and examine the problems referred to in the preceding para with a view to finding a mutually acceptable basis for a mtg of the ForMins of the four countries and recommend to their Govts a suitable agenda.
>
> "3. That the reps meet for this purpose in NY.

"The note of the Sov Govt leaves it open to doubt whether that Govt will participate in a mtg of the ForMins of the four powers unless questions related to Ger are the sole items on the agenda.

"It was precisely because the Sov Govt's note of Nov 3 did not manifest a willingness to arrive at real solutions inspired by a desire to promote international peace and security, that the three Govts, unwilling to omit any effort which might contribute to that result, suggested, in their notes of Dec 22, a prelim discussion to explore the possibility

of 'finding a mutually acceptable basis for a mtg of the ForMins of the four countries,' which could fruitfully address itself to the lessening of the international tensions.

"The note of the Sov Govt states that it does not object to a prelim conference of reps of the four Govts but, in view of other statements in the note, does not make clear whether the Sov Govt agrees that the function of such a preliminary conference should be as stated in para numbered two above. The necessity of exploratory conversations designed to find a mutually acceptable basis for a mtg of the four ForMins appears all the more important in view of the uncertainties regarding the Sov attitude to which attention has just been called. The Govt of the US obviously cannot agree upon the order of items on an agenda until the exploratory conversations have considered what items would be included.

"As for the place of mtg, the three Govts suggested NY because it is the seat of the UN where all four Govts are represented and where discussion of several important issues is currently in progress. In addition, the US is designated by the accepted principle of rotation as the country in which the next mtg of CFM will take place. Therefore, it would be particularly convenient to arrange the prelim and exploratory mtg of reps of the four Govts in the same country. Since, as the US Govt is informed, this is also the view of the Govts of Great Brit and Fr, NY is practically convenient for a majority of the Govts concerned.

"The Govt of US renews its proposal made on Dec 22 and hopes that the Sov Govt will not take the position that it is unwilling to discuss the causes of present international tensions throughout the world. If the Sov Govt is willing to accept the proposal, the US Govt for its part is prepared to arrange, in agreement with the Govts of the UK Fr and Sov Union, the exact time of the exploratory mtg of representatives."

ACHESON

396.1/1–951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy), at Frankfurt

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 9, 1951—1 p. m.

4745. For McCloy from Byroade. In considering various aspects possible CFM, we have become increasingly concerned about problem of consultation with Ger leaders. Fol are certain tentative ideas on which wld like your comments earliest.

With development our policy on Ger in past few months and particularly on Ger participation western defense, we are convinced time has passed when we can negot on Ger in four-power CFM without prior and continuing consultation with responsible Ger auths. Such consultation all more important now as Gers in increasingly strong position, particularly re possibility carrying on talks or other negots

themselves with East Ger auths. Therefore seems important obtain early UK-Fr acceptance principle of consulting with Gers on these matters so we wld be able initiate such consultation without undue delay when time seems appropriate. Provided you concur, we prepd take question up with UK and Fr FonOffs.

At present moment we are holding firmly to position of refusing accept commitment for CFM until preliminary conversations with Sovs reveal acceptable basis. To consult formally with Gers at this stage wld therefore be inappropriate and might prejudice position vis-à-vis UK and Fr that we are not yet committed to CFM. Assuming there might be agreement on opening exploratory talks fol further exchange of notes between Western Powers and USSR, we might consider broaching subj with Ger auths when such agreement reached. This wld seem best done by HICOM, perhaps at time it informs Ger auths re substance further exchange with Sovs. In doing so, wld be important to avoid discussion of possible positions with Gers since tripartite positions wld probably not be sufficiently advanced. Initial approach to Gers shld probably be limited to request for their ideas re whether acceptable basis for agreement with Sovs on Ger exists and if so what they wld consider to be its principal elements. In eliciting Ger views, wld also be important that views shld be, so far as possible, broadly rep of Fed Rep (as opposed to Adenauer or govt coalition parties only). Realize this raises very delicate problem and involves certain risks but believe we cannot afford at this juncture to base our info on Ger views too narrowly.

Fear Fr may oppose this proposal but consider it sufficient importance to warrant pressing it in Paris (and London) if you concur and consider main lines practicable.[1] [Byroade.]

ACHESON

[1] On January 11 McCloy reported his concurrence with the idea of consulting the Germans through the High Commission and with the idea that the German views should be broadly representative of the Federal Republic. (Telegram 454, from Bonn (396.1/1–1151))

396.1/1–1451 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Barbour) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET Moscow, January 14, 1951—2 p. m.

1356. Deptel to London 3185, December 28, repeated Paris as 3469, Frankfort as 4587, and Moscow as 439.[2] Following is our estimate position on Germany which Soviets may adopt at possible four-power meeting:

[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Frankfurt.
[2] Not printed.

1. We assume that Soviet motives in seeking CFM are compounded of two main elements. Main purpose almost certainly is slowing down or even suspension of NATO rearmament, and removal present prospect of creation of military force capable of withstanding armed onslaught from Soviet orbit. To achieve this objective we believe Soviets may be prepared to go further in the way of making "concessions" to west than would be apparent from study of Praha declaration. At same time, we consider Kremlin has in mind fullest use of another CFM for propaganda purposes, and in that sense will attempt to pose its case in manner sufficiently attractive to make refusal by west unpalatable and possibly unpopular.

2. Both with respect to its general propaganda, and in connection with attempt to bring about some form of *modus vivendi* along lines favorable to it, Soviets probably are counting on:

(*a*) Real or imagined divergencies of opinion among NATO powers over Far East policy and German rearmament;
(*b*) Belief, shared by many Europeans, that any CFM held in near future would reflect relatively unfavorable bargaining position of west (expressed in terms realities of power);
(*c*) West European fears, bolstered by recent speeches Hoover, Taft and Kennedy, that US is not prepared to underwrite rearmament European partners over indefinite period;
(*d*) Conclusion that substantial body of opinion in West Europe will not contemplate with equanimity an indefinite deferment of long anticipated economic and material gains;
(*e*) Fears of many West Europeans, based on awareness of currently indefensible military situation of west, that Soviets may react militarily to implementation plans to rearm West Germany;
(*f*) Reluctance of West Germans themselves to participate in military effort;
(*g*) Reluctance of French to have such West German participation; and
(*h*) Present instability of French Government and resultant limitations placed upon French ability to take forceful action on international questions.

3. Comparison inevitably is invited between general world situation obtaining now and that which preceded last CFM held at Paris from May 23 to June 20, 1949.[3] In spring of 1949 steady and spectacular gains were being made by Chinese Communists, and when CFM met it was obvious that Communist control would be extended over whole of China. While this represented gain for Soviet cause, there were several debit items. Perhaps most important of these included (*a*) signing of NA Pact of April 4, 1949;[4] (*b*) failure of Soviet

[3] For documentation on the sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held at Paris, May 23–June 20, 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 856 ff.

[4] For documentation on the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty at Washington on April 4, 1949, see *ibid.*, vol. IV, pp. 1 ff.

blockade of Berlin, which was raised May 12, 1949;[5] (*c*) Tito defection and resultant crippling Soviet designs on Greece; and (*d*) visible anti-Soviet development of German opinion. These European developments deprived USSR of initiative insofar as Germany was concerned. They are paralleled by current developments in Europe, most important of these obviously being steps now underway to implement NATO through creation of viable European army under US command. On other hand, in Far East Soviet star continues to be in ascendancy, notably in Korea, Indochina and in China itself (where hopes of those who had anticipated development Titoist tendencies thus far have received no support).

4. Soviet position at Paris CFM in retrospective seems to have been based on three main premises, briefly summarized below:

(*a*) Fundamental determination not to be drawn into any agreement on Germany which would involve weakening of their absolute and unilateral control over GDR;
(*b*) Desire not to see complete collapse of quadripartite association, no matter how tenuous and imperfect that association might prove to be in practice; and
(*c*) Dogmatic belief in imminence of shattering economic crisis in west, implying that time on side of USSR.

5. Another interesting parallel between 1949 CFM and one which might be held in near future lies in fact that both were preceded by orbital policy declarations with respect to Germany, in second of which GDR itself was associated. Warsaw communiqué of June, 1948,[6] set forth position from which, in the event, Soviet negotiators at Paris did not substantially recede. If same pattern is followed, logic would expect Praha communiqué of November [*October*] 1950 to constitute Soviet "asking price" in new CFM.

6. These parallels, attractive as they may superficially be, may not, however, prove to be a reliable guide to Soviet intentions. In intervening period there has been greatly accelerated development east-west tension. This has been accompanied by concrete steps in direction effective NATO rearmament, steps which may actually alarm Kremlin and in any case run counter to its own designs. To reverse this trend probably is focal point current Soviet policy, since continuation of politico-military *status quo* in Europe still would permit Soviets to make territorial and other gains in more remote sections of world, particularly in vulnerable Middle East and South Asian areas.

7. In short, possibly in part by miscalculation force of western desire

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[5] For documentation on the raising of the Berlin blockade, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 751 ff.

[6] For the text of the Warsaw declaration by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, and Hungary, dated June 24, 1948, see Ruhm von Oppen, *Documents on Germany*, pp. 300–307.

for some form of agreement to ease present tension, Soviets might be willing at CFM to agree to:

(*a*) Immediate establishment of German Constituent Assembly drawn from existing Parliaments of GDR and GFR, not on basis simple parity but in accordance with relation populations;
(*b*) Creation by that assembly of all-German government in which Communists would be represented;
(*c*) Negotiation with that government of definitive peace treaty, in which provision would be made for return of Ruhr to permanently demilitarized German state;
(*d*) Early withdrawal from Germany of all foreign troops;
(*e*) "Ratification" of foregoing steps by plebiscite, possibly supervised by four allied powers or even conceivably by UN.

8. If Soviets do make these proposals, they probably could count on some measure of favorable response both from Germans and from West Europeans generally. While on face of it they would represent concessions, and could be cited as evidence of more moderate Soviet policy, in point of fact they would not run counter to basic Soviet aims. From military standpoint, Soviet army would merely need to be drawn back few hundred miles into protective satellite belt, from which it could emerge at short notice. Allied forces, on other hand, necessarily would not only lose Germany as base and forfeit utilization German manpower but necessarily would be scattered to more distant points. Politically Communists would find themselves one of strongest political parties in United Germany, and able to take full advantage of factional differences between democratic parties. Into such new Germany would be drawn body of well indoctrinated and highly skilled propagandists, secret agents, trained youth groups, and militarists, all formed over past several years in GDR. These instrumentalities of Soviet power might with reason be considered by Kremlin as fully capable of (*a*) prolonging neutralization Germany for indefinite period and (*b*) working towards ultimate transformation Germany into another Soviet satellite.

9. To peoples of Europe, if not to their governments, creation of neutralized Germany might well be received with satisfaction, or so the Kremlin may calculate. Especially to those groups in France and elsewhere theoretically oriented towards non-alignment and genuinely hostile to resurrection German military power, such solution might appear highly desirable, especially if weighed against alternative of drift towards World War III.

10. It seems clear that establishment of neutralized Germany along lines indicated above would not be a satisfactory objective for US and its European allies (we expect to offer our comments in this regard in a subsequent telegram). While elimination West Germany as a positive factor in the struggle against Soviet imperialism (Germany as such of

course would continue to be a focal point of struggle), it would simultaneously leave USSR as preponderant military power in Europe, and would establish a power vacuum likely in the final analysis to lead to even more serious causes for east-west tension.

BARBOUR

396.1/1–2051 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET PRIORITY NIACT

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1951—4 p. m.

407. FYI fol is agreed text tripartite reply to latest Sov note re four-power mtg of FonMins. Instr fol in separate tel.[2]

"1. The Chargé d'Affaires of the United States of America has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the note of Dec 30, 1950 of the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs and under instructions, from his Govt, to reply as follows:

"2. The purpose of the United States Government is to seek to allay existing international tensions by discussing all problems likely to threaten world peace with a view to resolving the fundamental differences between nations. It therefore confines itself in this reply to a further examination of the question of the basis on which such negotiations might take place and refrains from refuting in detail the allegations on a number of points, especially in regard to Germany, which are made in the Soviet Government's note. As the United States Government has repeatedly pointed out, particularly in its note of December 22, 1950, these allegations are competely without foundation.

"3. With regard to the substance of the Soviet Government's note, the United States Government observes that the Soviet Government does not object to a preliminary conference of representatives of the four governments but, in view of other statements in the note, the United States Government feels it necessary to ask for clarification

[1] This telegram was drafted by Bonbright, cleared by Jessup and Matthews, and sent to Moscow, London, Paris, Brussels, Luxembourg, The Hague, Vienna, and Frankfurt.

[2] Circular telegram 408, January 20, not printed (396.1/1–2051). It instructed Embassy Moscow to concert with the British and French for early delivery of the note to the Foreign Ministry, if possible on January 23, and instructed Embassies Paris and London that agreement on Paris as the site for the exploratory talks was conditioned on a firm commitment to holding the subsequent Foreign Ministers talks in the United States.

Following the transmission of telegram 3594, January 8 (p. 1058), the Department of State had received the comments of the British and French and its own Missions on the text of the draft reply. While the U.S. Missions had suggested various minor revisions, the British had expressed agreement with the general line taken but had wanted a more legalistic approach. The French had suggested a shorter reply, had considered the refutation of the Soviet allegations to be useless, and had preferred London or Paris as the site of the exploratory meetings. Coordination of the several views was begun in Washington by Jessup, Ambassador Bonnet, and Chargé Steel. The revised draft reply resulting from their discussions had been transmitted to U.S. Missions in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on January 16. This second draft was largely the same as that of the final text transmitted here. A copy of the second draft and documentation reflecting the views of the various governments and U.S. Missions are in file 396.1.

in order to avoid any misunderstanding and to make it possible that such a preliminary conference should serve a useful purpose.

"4. The United States Government in its note of December 22 stated that the Soviet proposal for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers confined to considering the demilitarization of Germany in the context of the so-called Prague Declaration was not acceptable for the reasons therein given. The note proposed specifically that a meeting of the Foreign Ministers should include in its discussions not only questions related to Austria and Germany but also the principal problems whose solution would permit a real and lasting improvement in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, Great Britain and France and the elimination of the causes of present international tensions throughout the world.

"5. In its reply the Soviet Government limited itself to an indication that it is willing to discuss questions concerning Germany. In this connection, the note of the Soviet Government refers again to the so-called Prague Declaration which the United States Government as well as the Governments of France and the United Kingdom have made clear they could in no circumstances accept as a limitation on or as a basis for discussions.

"6. The note of the Soviet Government thus does not reveal whether that government agrees that a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the four countries would deal with the other questions indicated in the note of the United States Government. The United States Government wishes to emphasize, as was stated in its note of December 22nd, that the tension which exists in the world today does not arise from the German problem. A discussion limited to the questions proposed by the Soviet Government would therefore be inadequate and unreal.

"7. Consequently, the United States Government would be glad to know whether the Soviet Government does agree that those further questions and problems referred to above will be among those which the Foreign Ministers may discuss.

"8. In its note of December 22 the United States Government further proposed that representatives of the four governments be designated to meet and examine the problems just referred to with a view to finding a mutually acceptable basis for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the four countries and recommend [3] to their governments a suitable agenda.

"9. In the view of the United States Government, these representatives would need to give some consideration to the questions and problems involved in order to determine their formulation for inclusion in the agenda as well as the order in which they would appear so that the mutually acceptable basis referred to could be established. It would not be the function of the representatives to attempt to arrive at solutions of the problems, this function being reserved for the Ministers themselves.

"10. While the note of the Soviet Government states that it does not object to a preliminary conference of representatives of the four governments, it is not clear in view of other statements in the note whether the Soviet Government agrees that the function of such a preliminary

[3] In telegram 1395 from Moscow, January 23, Barbour reported that the final text of the note would have the word "recommending" instead of "recommend." (396.1/1-2351)

conference should be as stated above. Consequently, the United States Government would be glad to know whether the view of the Soviet Government in this matter is the same as its own.

"11. As for the meeting place of the preliminary conference the United States Government is prepared to agree on Paris.

"12. The Government of the United States renews its proposal made on December 22 and hopes that the Soviet Government is prepared to discuss the elimination of the principal causes of present international tensions and that it will accordingly agree on the points mentioned above. If the Soviet Government does agree, the United States Government for its part is ready to set, in agreement with the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union, the date of the exploratory meeting of representatives." [4]

ACHESON

[4] The U.S. note was delivered to Vyshinsky at 3 p. m. GMT on January 23 (telegram 1400 from Moscow, January 23 (396.1/1–2351)).

396.1/1–2551 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, January 25, 1951—8 p. m.

4371. Deptel 3834, January 19 (sent London 3966, repeated Frankfort 5027)[2] and Embtel 4338, January 24 (repeated London 1051, Frankfort 501).[3] FonOff in accord on desirability consultation with FedRep authorities when and if agreement obtained on exploratory quadripartite talks re CFM. Envisage such consultation on continuing basis "from time to time," i.e., without obligation on our part or formalization of procedures, involving merely exchanges of views and information. FonOff agrees that this best done by HICOMs and that Adenauer is logical opposite number, particularly as long as Germany has no Foreign Minister. Re necessity eliciting views also of elements other than government proper and coalition parties, FonOff agrees but understands this would not be done by HICOMs themselves but informally and perhaps on individual basis rather than tripartitely, on somewhat lower level. Above is definitive FonOff reply, cleared by Parodi and consistent with what La Tournelle told us yesterday. In communicating views, Sauvagnargues pointed out however that practical problem will arise during first contacts with Chancellor on subject CFM, since HICOMs will find it difficult to confine themselves to eliciting German views, without themselves entering upon discussion of such views. French want "discussion" with Adenauer in initial stage to be limited, although they realize this will be difficult.

BRUCE

[1] Repeated to Frankfurt and London.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Not printed; it reported a preliminary discussion with De la Tournelle on the question of consultations with the Germans [illegible] 1951)

762A.5/1-2951 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY FRANKFURT, January 29, 1951—8 p. m.

6261. Eyes only for Byroade. Regret delay in commenting your letter January 6 with enclosures.[2] We have been giving much thought to basic problem which must be answered in any discussions with Soviets at this time as they will undoubtedly attempt force us choose between an unarmed, unified Germany, which stands between East and West, or West Germany in West camp. If this unity could be obtained on reasonable conditions and at same time united Germany be permitted to align itself with West, there would be no problem, but this is undoubtedly impossible of realization, and certainly not negotiable at present time. We are inclined to feel that consolidation of Europe which must include at least West Germany and creation of strong Western defense are today conditions which must precede unification of Germany which can now probably be only achieved on basis of neutralization. We recognize, however, that there will be considerable pressure to bring about unification and only through its achievement can continuing source of friction and problem of Berlin be liquidated. We must also recognize Soviet tactics are intended to capture that opinion in Germany which is more concerned with unification than with providing defense contingents for West and that there is in Europe a body of opinion which regards neutralization of Germany as a means of reducing Soviet pressure. We are continuing to give study to this aspect of problem and hope further to discuss this question with you soonest.

In meantime, however, I have following comments with regard to approach outlined in your letter and enclosures. We are fully in agreement that German problem can no longer be considered in isolation with Soviets and that we must open any conference with them on broader lines. For this purpose we need a concrete plan of wider scope and of nature which every reasonable individual can recognize as constituting a program for relaxation of principal points of tension at least in Europe. These are as you have in general outlined in your letter. Into such a plan, specific proposals re Germany can be fitted thus reducing danger of dealing with Germany as an isolated issue. The question posed therefore is what wider scheme can be put forward.

[1] Repeated to London and Paris, eyes only for Gifford and Bruce.

[2] Not found in Department of State files; according to a memorandum by Gerhardt dated January 22, not printed, however, Byroade had asked that HICOG consider a paper called "Exploratory Talks with the Soviets." A copy of the paper, not printed, is attached to Gerhardt's memorandum (Bonn Mission files, lot 311, TS(51)13). On January 27 Gerhardt had sent Byroade his own draft reply to the letter of January 16, the substance of which was the same as that presented in this telegram. A copy of the draft is in file 396.1/1-2751.

We have reached conclusion that time has come to present proposal looking toward stabilization of armed forces of East and West which could create a balance of forces facing each other so that neither constitutes a threat to other. In this way it might be possible to set a ceiling for creation of Western defense forces which need not, however, necessarily be reached if Soviet Union is prepared sincerely to talk disarmament and to effect reductions in its own forces. In my opinion it is unwise merely to consider limiting proposals to creation of parity of forces in Germany as such would merely create illusion that progress had been made and probably slow rate of European rearmament.

I recognize that at time when we are making every effort to increase defense possibilities of Western world, which would necessarily involve atomic question, careful consideration must be given to full implications of such proposal and that its danger and disadvantages are obvious. On the other hand, it would represent positive step toward restoring peace and in addition would enable us to take necessary initiative and alter our approach to forthcoming meeting. It would also give opportunity to rehabilitate position of US leadership which has been wavering in Europe in face of current uncertainties re US intentions. It will likewise give us possibility of placing Soviet demands for demilitarization of Germany in their proper perspective. Such proposal would further give us opportunity of insisting upon reduction of satellite forces as prior condition to any limits on German strength. If Soviets should refuse even to consider such proposal or argue that it cannot be handled through meeting of ministers, it will then be possible for us to reply that in that case the obligations and undertakings of Potsdam must be re-examined in broader context and in light of existing conditions today. We shall, of course, make it clear that we have no intention whatsoever to create a German national army, but in present state of international anarchy and world rearmament, it can be demonstrated that it is unreasonable to deny Germany any right to provide for its own defense through adherence to collective security system dedicated to support of UN.

If an initiative of this sort is taken at outset, it will provide better frame for our own proposals re Germany which are preferable to series of counter-proposals brought forth only as rejoinder to Soviets. I think, therefore, an adoption of program you outline should be presented on our own initiative without waiting to find out nature of Soviet proposals. It may be that taking initiative on our own is dangerous in that it would inevitably run into questions of unification and neutralization of Germany. This issue must, however, be faced and any counter-proposals which would have to be made in answer to Soviets would run same risk without compensating advantage.

Further, I do not believe we can afford merely to assume Soviet proposals will be limited to reiteration of Prague Declaration which have

already been rejected, both by Allies and Federal Republic, as an acceptable solution, but they may wish to embarrass US, particularly in Germany, by moving toward acceptance of some of our proposals on German unification, coupling this with insistence upon demilitarization. Even if they are not sincere in such an offer and have no intention of implementing it, they could still make an offer hoping to create embarrassment or prolong discussions, as they have done in case Austria, thereby further delaying decision on German defense contribution.

I am sending my comments on specific points of program outlined your letter in separate telegram.

McCloy

396.1/2–551

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union to the Embassy of the United States [1]

[Translation]

No. 4

In connection with the note of the Government of the United States of America of January 23, 1951,[2] the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR has the honor to state the following:

1. The fulfillment of the decisions of the Potsdam Agreement on the question of the demilitarization of Germany and the elimination of differences in the positions of the four powers on this question have the most important significance for the relaxation of the presently existing tension in the international situation and, without a doubt, would considerably promote the improvement of relations between the US, France, Great Britain and the USSR. However, the New York conference of the foreign ministers of the USA, France and Great Britain in September 1950 [3] and the subsequent measures of the governments of the three powers are definitely aimed at the re-creation in West Germany of a regular German army and at that huge increase of armaments in Europe and in the US which is creating more and more alarm among the peoples who very recently experienced the shocks and calamities of the Second World War. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet Government took upon itself on November 3 of last year the initiative in convoking the Council of Foreign Ministers for the discussion of the question of the demilitarization of Germany. Since the Government of the US, as well as the Govern-

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[1] The source text is the translation of the Soviet note prepared by Embassy Moscow and transmitted in telegram 1466, February 5 (396.1/2–551).

[2] For the text of this note, see telegram 407, January 20, p. 1065, and footnote 3 thereto.

[3] For documentation on these meetings, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1108 ff.

ments of France and Great Britain, likewise set forth their striving for a lasting improvement in relations between the US, France, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and also for the elimination of the grounds for the international tension existing at the present time, the Soviet Government considers that in such a case there should not be any basis whatever for further delaying the convocation of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

2. The Soviet Government cannot ignore that which has been going on before the eyes of everyone in recent months. While the New York conference of the ministers of the three foreign powers only raised the question of the revival of the German armed forces and of the restoration of war industry in West Germany, since that time the real significance of this decision of the three powers has been revealed in many ways. It is well-known to the whole world that between the governments of the USA, France and Great Britain, on the one hand, and the Bonn Government of Adenauer, on the other hand, there have been going on for already more than a month far reaching negotiations, the dangerous purpose of which is comprehended by all peace loving peoples of Europe. In this connection there must also be noted the fact of the negotiations of General Eisenhower with the Government of the revanchist Adenauer regarding the inclusion of the restored German army in the composition of the so-called "integrated armed forces" and the appointment itself at the present time of General Eisenhower as commander-in-chief of these armed forces, a fact which does not at all tally with the official statements about striving for peace. There is nothing surprising in the fact that it is precisely in view of such a situation in West Europe that extreme militarists and revanchists are raising their heads and the Hitlerite lackeys of yesterday from among the most aggressive elements are acquiring great influence. The existing intentions to utilize the revived German armed forces as an obedient tool of a certain grouping of powers are built upon unstable ground since under the protection of the Government of revanchists like Adenauer and Schumacher, militarists, from among the Hitlerite diehard adherents, who are embittered by failures, are now in West Germany more and more strengthening their influence and direct domination; they themselves want to utilize the situation which has been created for their own aggressive goals. The circumstances that, moreover, in a number of states in Europe and in the USA the increase of the army and the armaments race have assumed unprecedented proportions, of course intensifies in many respects the tense international situation and the disquiet among the people.

There has been created a situation where the meeting of the foreign ministers, for one reason or another, is being postponed even further, and along with this the demilitarization of Germany is not only not

being carried out, but on the contrary, measures are being conducted for the reestablishment of a regular German army and war industry in West Germany, as well as numerous other measures which are directed towards speeding up preparations for a new war. If such a situation is continued further, then the conference of foreign ministers, obviously, will be confronted with *faits accomplis*. The Soviet Government has already declared its negative attitude towards such a policy of *faits accomplis*. It is possible that such a policy answers the desires of these or those aggressive circles, but the Soviet Government cannot but call attention to the inadmissability of the situation which has been created.

3. In its note, the Government of the US states that it considers it necessary to request a clarification on certain matters brought up in the previous note of the Soviet Government. In particular, the Government of the US inquires whether the Soviet Government agrees to discuss, in addition to the question of the demilitarization of Germany, other questions also, although the Government of the US at this time says nothing about precisely what questions are concerned.

The Soviet Government considers as possible the discussion at the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of other questions also, having in view that these questions will be considered by the Council of Ministers in the composition and in the manner provided for by the Potsdam Agreement between the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France.

As for the remarks of the Government of the US to the effect that the Prague declaration cannot be adopted as the basis for the discussion, on this question the position of the Soviet Government already has been set forth in its note of December 30, 1950. It goes without saying that the Soviet Government is proceeding in this from the equal right of all members of the Council of Foreign Ministers to introduce for the discussion of the Council any proposals on questions which will be adopted for consideration.

4. The Government of the US in its note of January 23 raises the question of the tasks of a preliminary conference of representatives of the four powers. The position of the Soviet Government on this question was also set forth in its note of December 30, 1950. The Soviet Government considers that a preliminary meeting of representatives of the USA, France, Great Britain and the USSR should be confined to drafting an agenda, including the establishment of the order of the consideration of questions. Thus the consideration of the substance of questions included on the agenda should not enter into the tasks of the preliminary meeting.

5. The Soviet Government does not oppose the convening of a preliminary meeting of representatives of the four powers in Paris.

The Soviet Government is sending analogous notes at the same time to the Governments of France and Great Britain.

Moscow, February 5, 1951.[4]

[4] A copy of the Russian text of this note was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 433 from Moscow, February 8 (396.1/2-851).

396.1/2-751 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT FRANKFURT, February 7, 1951—3 a. m.

6518. Text of Soviet reply discussed today by conference of Ambassadors.[2]

Following represents general sense of their discussions and recommendations.

Attack in the Soviet note on general build up of western defense as contrasted to German rearmament alone, affords excellent opportunity for vigorous response from western allies placing matter in proper perspective and turning attention to general aggressive attitude of Soviets and excessive military strength in being. This fact can, in our opinion, be effectively utilized in counterpropaganda in reply and should be borne in mind in press conference dealing with Soviet note.

We believe the time has arrived when we should adopt in our reply, and in any future conference with the Soviet Union, a positive approach which clearly identifies the basic causes of tension and full Soviet responsibility. Therefore, such an approach based on the need to protect our position and our interest, which we believe to be likewise the interests of Western Europe, will be defensible before public opinion. Hence, we must point out in our reply that the question of German disarmament or any other question involving Germany must be dealt with in its relation to these broader issues which have created the specific problems to which the Soviet Union now wishes to limit the discussion. It is for this reason there should be no agreement that discussions be limited to the Potsdam CFM arrangements. Since we believe that it would be difficult for the man in the street to distinguish between a CFM and meeting of Foreign Ministers, we should make this point in such a manner to avoid impression of wrangling over technicalities.

[1] Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] For further documentation on the meeting of Western European Ambassadors at Frankfurt, February 5–7, see volume IV; a translation of the Soviet note is printed *supra*.

Inasmuch as Soviets have pointed out that allies have not stated precisely what they consider to be those causes of international tension we believe it important now to list these principle causes with ample details and examples. Such a list might include:

1. Existence of huge Soviet military forces far in excess of legitimate needs of defense.
2. An aggressive imperialist policy which is conducted through satellite and extra-governmental agencies. (Itemize—particularly Czechoslovakia for general European consumption—Indochina for French.)
3. Soviet domination of satellite countries and Soviet inspired violations of peace settlements. (Itemize—particularly armaments and human rights.)
4. The division of the world by iron curtain tactics which has sealed off the areas under Soviet domination to the free exchange of goods, persons and ideas.
5. Utilization of international Communist organizations as instrument of political warfare and subversive activities.
6. Obstructionist tactics of Soviets in UN (itemize).
7. Refusal of the Soviet Union to support the efforts of the UN to resist aggression in Korea as well as failure to use their unquestioned influence on the aggressor towards that end.
8. Failure to abide by agreement of the Foreign Ministers in September 1949 for the conclusion of a treaty with Austria and thereby continuation of Soviet forces in Austria, Rumania, Hungary.[3]
9. Failure to abide by agreements for the economic and political unification of Germany, the retention of excessive and heavily armored forces in the Soviet Zone of that country and the remilitarization of the east Germans.
10. Denial of individual and human rights with particular emphasis on secret police, concentration camps, slave labor, retention of prisoners of war, et cetera.

The Soviets accuse us of creating a situation of *faits accomplis*. It should be pointed out that examples as above are the *faits accomplis* which accompanied by continual threats have made it necessary for the free nations of the world to take measures for their own common defense.

If the Soviets indicate their willingness to discuss the above fundamental security issues, we are inclined to believe that continued insistence upon our present position of the nature of exploratory talks would have little substance. Furthermore, Soviet acceptance of the type of reply envisaged in this message would in world opinion logically necessitate prompt meeting of the four Ministers. If the Soviets accept this basis, we therefore conclude that we should forego our position requiring prior exploratory, substantive talks and agree to prompt meeting of representatives in Paris to determine agenda which would presumably be fairly well fixed in the exchange of notes.

[3] For documentation on the discussion of the proposed treaty on Austria at New York in September 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1066 ff.

Our reply should also include rejection of charges that Adenauer and Schumacher are militarists and among the Hitlerite die-hard adherents. Both were in fact victims of Nazi persecution and their defense in note will have strong effect here in gaining German support and bringing CDU and SPD closer together.

We urge early tripartite reply to the Soviets. This should be accompanied or preceded by vigorous and continuing propaganda campaign to recall to and reimpress on the peoples of the western world the basic Soviet responsibility for aggression and tension throughout the world.

McCloy

396.1/2–951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 9, 1951—8 p. m.

3744. At tripartite mtg this morning re proposed talks with USSR,[2] we informally submitted draft possible reply Sov note Feb 5 as tentative basis for discussion. Text draft as submitted and still being considered in Dept follows in next tel.[3]

We emphasized our present draft merely tentative but embodied our understanding of informal opinions reps of three govts expressed last tripartite mtg Feb 6.

Both Brit and Fr Ambs also emphasized they cld comment only informally and wld refer text their govts. Brit Amb took line that first seven paras draft went beyond previously agreed policy in fixing responsibility on Sov Union for aggressive actions its satellites especially aggression in Korea and presented too monolithic picture of Sov aggressive tactics throughout world. For example he questioned whether Chi Govt, while pursuing policies parallel Sovs, was under domination of latter to extent implied in our recital. He expressed doubts although agreeing with accuracy of picture so presented, that Brit Govt cld accept this in its entirety as proper counter blast at this juncture to Sov propaganda in last Sov note since it was important for Brit opinion that we do not appear in our reply to be entering negots in a totally negative manner.

Fr Amb thought that material in first seven paras cld be compressed and shortened to make counter blast sharp and concise with

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[1] This telegram, drafted by Davis and cleared by Bonbright and Jessup, was repeated to Frankfurt, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] On January 31 the first of a series of informal meetings among representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and France had been held at Washington to discuss questions relating to a Four-Power meeting. The representatives met nine times in all with the last meeting taking place on February 27. A set of the records of decisions for all the meetings and a set of summary records of the last eight meetings are in the CFM files, lot M–88, box 157, tripartite discussions, Washington, February 1951.

[3] Telegram 3745, *infra*.

chief emphasis on disparity in existing level armaments and aggressive policies Sov Govt. He also doubted wisdom mentioning Korea.

Both Brit and Fr were in general agreement with us on subjs suggested for broadening agenda and on desirability seeking Sov agreement inclusion such topics on agenda before prelim mtg Paris. Suggested date of mtg considered satis.

Above for your background info only.

ACHESON

396.1/2-951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 9, 1951—8 p. m.

3745. Fol is text draft note possible reply Sov note Feb 5:

"Govt of USA has honor ack receipt Sov Govts note Feb 5, 1951, relative proposed mtg FonMins USSR, France, UK and US.

US Govt regrets Sov Govt in its reply rpts and further exaggerates inaccurate statements about policies Western democracies. Sov allegations totally without foundation.

US and free nations Eur are bldg up their defenses. Reason why is clear. Free nations, confronted with vast armed forces Sov Union and states under its control, had no alternative to reducing great disparity mil force in world. This inequality between armed forces Sov bloc and free world forced US and free nations Eur increase their defense programs.

Sov bloc has maintained its armed forces at level far above any conceivable defense needs. This has been accompanied not only by Sov Govts constant use menace and threat but also by invasion ROK last June. These actions demonstrate Sov bloc armies are not intended solely for defense.

Sov Govt refuses respect independence nations outside Sov Union. It tries dominate other nations by threatening use its armed forces, by undermining other nations' polit institutions, and using its agents other countries.

Sov controlled Eastern Eur countries have violated peace treaties by denying human rights and increasing mil forces and armaments above treaty limitations. Sov control certain Eastern Eur countries has made possible its attacks internal security of Greece. In area it controls, Sov Union has restricted movements people and flow normal intercourse. It has sealed off legitimate commerce and usual exchange persons and info between nations. Through internatl Commie orgs, it has conducted polit warfare against democratic countries, and carried on subversive activities aimed at destroying these govts.

Continuing efforts Sov Govt control even larger areas outside its borders and conditions it has imposed in areas it now controls gives free govts an indication future intentions Sov Govt. Existence excessive armed forces Sov bloc regarded by free govts and peoples as

[1] Repeated to Paris, Moscow, and Frankfurt.

evidence Sov Govts desire for further expansion its control. Sincere attempts free govts and peoples reduce armaments have been blocked by Sov Union.

For these reasons among others, all free govts and peoples recognize that Ger problem, including a Ger contribution defense Western Eur, is not cause present tension in Eur. In this connection, US Govt notes with reprobation that Sov Govt has slandered duly elected leaders of Fed Ger Republic, whose records opposition Nazi regime are well known to Sov Govt.

US Govt considers that any mtg four FonMins USSR, France, UK and US cannot confine their discussions single topic Ger and ignore real causes of tension.

US Govt interested only in assuring discussion at any mtg four Mins shall include these real causes tension and that suitable agenda that end be drawn up their consideration. Govt US accordingly proposes that reps four govts in prelim conversations which have been agreed to shld take as basis their task prep agenda which wld include at least fol gen subjs: causes existing tension in Eur, including level existing armaments, situation Southeastern Eur and other factors; completion and sig treaty for re-establishment an independent and democratic Austria; problems affecting Ger; and elimination barriers to friendly official and unofficial contacts between govts and peoples.

The exact formulation topics under these gen headings which might be placed on agenda mtg four Mins, as well as their order on agenda, can be considered and agreed to by reps four powers at prelim conferences Paris. But it essential that there be in advance an understanding among four govts that foregoing subjs in whatever form or whatever order agreed upon in prelim conference, shall form part agenda mtg four Mins. Other subjs which may be agreed upon wld also be included.

If Sov Govt agrees with basis outlined above for prelim conference Paris, US Govt suggests that reps four powers meet there Mar 5. If prelim conference reps finds mutually acceptable basis for mtg Mins, Govt US suggests that FonMins US, France, UK and Sov Union meet in Washington on date to be recommended by reps. Govt US is informed that these arrangements wld be convenient to Govts France and UK."

ACHESON

396.1/2-1051 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET FRANKFURT, February 10, 1951—6 p. m.

6646. In Thursday's meeting between Perkins, Byroade,[2] myself and Adenauer, Chancellor emphasized his concern about forthcoming four-power conference. He felt that French insistence upon this meeting

[1] Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] Byroade and Perkins were at Frankfurt for the meeting of U.S. Ambassadors to Western Europe, February 5–7; for documentation on this meeting, see volume IV.

combined with other information he possessed clearly indicated that French, being well aware of the increased tension should conference fail, must envisage a certain success (from their point of view) at conference. He repeated reports he had of French-Soviet talks though admitting these had not taken place at Ministerial level. He cited as example of French willingness to push conference, Pleven's recent statement to French Chamber that President had assured Pleven he would do everything possible to bring about conference.[3] Byroade informed Chancellor that, having been present at Truman–Pleven talks, no assurance in such terms had been given Pleven. Chancellor stated that in view of this French attitude and uncertainty of British position, due to confusion in FonOff since Bevin's absence, he fearful of US position at conference being isolated as only one to take strong stand against Soviets. Chancellor's view was that since French were hopeful of some positive result emanating from conference it could bode nothing favorable for Germany and that he was expecting its outcome with heart in mouth. If conference should fail situation, in his opinion, would be worse than if no conference had taken place. He was very appreciative of Perkins' and Byroade's assurance that US policy re German defense contribution had not changed and also praised Secretary's recent strong, resolute statement.[4] Furthermore he applauded our firm position on Korea and China and, though it may have cost us some sympathies, he personally could only praise such attitude. Chancellor regards any agreement resulting in German neutralization and disarmament as extremely dangerous. He views unification under those terms as the beginning of unified Germany coming into the Russian orbit to be followed by all of Western Europe. Germany and Europe can be only saved by Germany's firm integration into the West with the military contribution as planned and he trusts that allies, particularly US, will continue to back him fully in this policy.

Byroade replied that he believed Chancellor was taking too pessimistic view of British–French position on neutrality. Re French attitude, judging from his presence Truman–Pleven talks, he was able to inform Chancellor that Pleven had given satisfactory reassurances to President. Adenauer is embarking on a campaign along the lines of his Tuesday's speech on Bavarian radio to enlighten Germans on danger of neutrality. He is confident that if issue intelligently explained without emotion, average German will understand pitfalls of neutrality and can be persuaded to follow him in his policy of

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[3] Prime Minister Pleven had visited Washington at the end of January for talks with President Truman and his advisers. For records of his discussion with the President, see volume IV.

[4] Presumably a reference to Secretary Acheson's remarks at a news conference on December 22, 1950; for the text of these remarks, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1, 1951, pp. 3–6.

Western integration and contribution to Western defense. He emphasized that in this campaign a political declaration of principle by allies to relinquish Occupation Statute[5] before details of present Petersberg discussions[6] are worked out would aid him considerably and be of greatest political value in his fight against neutrality and disarmament.

After our talk with Adenauer, Byroade and I met with Schumacher who described pitfalls he foresaw at a four-power conference:

(*a*) He thought Soviets might possibly offer free elections only in East Zone with participation of SED and existing East LDP and CDU but without SPD which is officially banned in East Zone. Since East LDP and CDU are complete captives of Soviets such a solution would be fatal despite its attraction for Western bourgeois parties.

(*b*) Another gambit Russians might try would be all German elections with SED and new single non-Communist bourgeois party composed of all Western bourgeois parties and various mass organizations such as FDJ, Democratic Women's League, Independent Peasants' Party, etc. The exclusion of SPD and plethora of these minor Soviet controlled mass organizations would inevitably result in swamping out new bourgeois party.

(*c*) Third alternative might be a roof government by appointment in which Soviets would be prepared to exclude prominent Communists in return for West excluding prominent democrats. Such shadow government, though powerless, would have great propaganda possibilities and would be at mercy of Soviet stooges in it, e.g., Nuschke, et al.

None of these solutions, Schumacher reiterated, could possibly be accepted. Only type of free elections we could accept are those which would:

(*a*) Cover all four zones simultaneously.

(*b*) Be truly free with full SPD participation.

(*c*) Body elected should not be confined to Constituent Assembly but should have immediate power to act legislatively so as to protect voters, elect government, etc.

If Soviets did offer or accept genuine free elections on condition that Germany remain disarmed and be denied right to associate in regional defense groups, Schumacher felt we would have to accept such a solution and trust to strength of German democracy to protect itself against inevitable Communist infiltration by which Soviets would endeavor to capture government. If Communists failed and democratic elements succeeded in consolidating power worst Soviets could do would be to lower Iron Curtain again, re-establish present status but with great loss of prestige both in Germany and in satellites. If we refused such an offer German public opinion would despair at our

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[5] For documentation concerning the revision of the Occupation Statute for Germany, see pp. 1410 ff.

[6] For documentation on the talks at Bonn concerning a German contribution to Western defense, see pp. 990 ff.

lack of courage and would turn to fellow traveller solutions. Schumacher clearly intimated that disarmament and isolation conditions would only be temporary and that once democrats were firmly established politically Germany would rearm and associate herself with West.

Should question of withdrawal of troops arise, Schumacher stated that he himself was not interested whether Germany were completely evacuated provided greater equilibrium between forces was achieved. A withdrawal of US troops to America and Soviet troops to Russia would merely increase present disparity of strength. To decrease this disparity he even suggested we could agree to mix occupation troops in 4 zones provided we took such reasonable precautions as not to allow Soviet troops to occupy Ruhr.

Concerning Oder–Neisse line Schumacher strongly urged us not to raise question, since for time being, it was a lost cause, support of which would only dissipate any hopes we had of positive achievements at conference. Soviets could never concede here unless they were willing to sacrifice established loyalty of satellites for questionable loyalty of Germany. If Soviets, on other hand, raised issue we should support German claims with greatest vigor for not to do so would inevitably drive Germans to East in fear or despair. Schumacher maintained that if Soviets do raise this issue it will be a sure sign that they are prepared to break up conference without results.

Turning to Pleven Plan,[7] Schumacher said we were putting cart of functional integration before horse of political integration just as in Schuman Plan.[8] For this reason Schumacher confidently predicted that both Pleven and Schuman Plans would fail. Byroade explained our support of Pleven Plan provided it was workable and gave all participants the equality essential to fighting forces. Schumacher stated that despite official French protestations to the contrary, his unofficial and perhaps more reliable sources were unanimously of the opinion France was not acting in good faith and was really attempting to reestablish French hegemony throughout Western Europe to detriment not only of Germany but perhaps of US interests. After 1100 years French should be made to realize empire of Charlemagne was defunct. Schumacher once more outlined SPD's 3 prerequisites for German defense contribution: (*a*) adequate Anglo-Saxon forces in Europe; (*b*) political equality; (*c*) equality among participating military units and at command level with share in decision of disposition of troops and no "black rearmament". In this connection Schumacher spoke of our industrial police, stating he did not object to Germans performing

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[7] For documentation on the Conference for the Establishment of a European Defense Community (Pleven Plan) that opened in Paris on February 14, see pp. 755 ff.

[8] For documentation on Foreign Minister Schuman's plan for a European coal and steel community, see volume IV.

services which relieved our troops for combat training but deplored the military manner in which Germans were organized and disciplined. In conclusion, I pointed out that we hoped we could establish adequate procedures before and during possible 4-power conference to keep Germans informed and to obtain their counsel. I was fearful however that the counsels of Adenauer and Schumacher might be conflicting. Schumacher stated that current negotiations between himself and Chancellor gave some hope for a more united German front on the issues that will confront us at conference. Diametrical approach by Schumacher and Adenauer to problems such as neutralization as reported in foregoing makes hope for real agreement between these two appear rather dim though both seem to accept the impracticability of a neutral Germany at least in the long run.

McCLOY

396.1/2–1251 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET Moscow, February 12, 1951—5 p. m.

1495. Soviet note of February 5 concerning calling CFM seeks to leave impression that current increased international tension is due entirely to "remilitarization" of Western Germany and stepped up military preparations in US and other countries, that Western Powers are temporizing on matter of discussion with USSR in order to present it with accomplished facts and that if agreement were obtained on demilitarization Germany, other obstacles to relaxation of tension could be readily overcome. It is important that this erroneous impression not gain currency in public mind to point where popular opinion might regard settlement on this issue as most urgent need and hence give the Soviets an advantage in any discussions that may take place. Therefore, we feel that clear presentation of specific Soviet bloc actions basically responsible for this tension as elaborated in the Department's draft reply to the Soviet note of February 5 (Deptel 507, February 9 [2]) is of major importance.

Since Soviets lay stress on charge that Western Powers intend to present them with accomplished facts, a charge that may have superficial appeal to popular judgement in free world, it might be well to rephrase some points in Department's draft and show clearly that it is Western Powers who have long been victims of such maneuvers, i.e. that accomplished facts are maintenance of huge Soviet army while rest of world demobilized, seizure of power in EE countries by Communist minorities, expansion of satellite armies beyond treaty limits,

[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Frankfurt.
[2] Same as telegram 3745, p. 1076.

remilitarization of Eastern Germany, Polish-GDR agreement on Oder–Neisse line, et cetera. It might be pointed out that Soviet point of view on all issues has been freely available in Soviet's own words to peoples of countries charged by Soviet Government with malicious intentions whereas such has not been case throughout entire Soviet orbit where people unaware of true reasons why free world countries have been obliged to build up their defenses.

Although it is clear in Department's draft that we regard question of German remilitarization as only one and not the most important factor responsible for present strained situation, so much attention has been focused on this problem that regardless of where it may be placed on agenda, if one is agreed upon, it is essential that Soviets neither achieve an agreement for demilitarization nor gain major propaganda victory from relative rearmament efforts being made in two parts of Germany. Some doubts appear to have arisen over actual size of remilitarization of Eastern Zone and our own efforts may be overshadowing them. In addition, Soviets have stirred up both Poles and Czechs against revanchist aspect of Germany's rearmament based on desire to recover lost territory east of Oder–Neisse line which tends decrease the extent of their dependence upon military efforts of East Germany. Thus we should be prepared to explain bigger force in Western Germany (apart from its relation to NATO in collective security sense), as defense against Korea type operation from east in which East Germans would be joined by Polish and Czech "volunteers". It could be pointed out this connection that it is the Soviet and satellite press that has made most of alleged similarity between German and Korean situation.

As to text of draft itself, it is our feeling that beginning paragraphs are somewhat diffuse and could be improved by revision along lines suggested by French Ambassador (Deptel 506, February 9 [3]). Mention of Korea might be retained by elimination of direct reference to Soviet Government in paragraph 4. We suggest following reviewed [*revised?*] wording that paragraph: "Soviet bloc has maintained its armed forces at level far above any conceivable defense needs. Invasion ROK last June demonstrates Soviet bloc armies are not intended solely for defense".

Reference to Soviet Government "using its agents other countries" in paragraph 5 as phrased might apply as well to free world countries.

We concur in desirability of insisting on advance agreement on a minimum of questions to be discussed by Four Ministers as indicated in Department's draft since it is procedure which leaves our hands free to reject others that the USSR might wish to impose on the meeting.

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[3] Same as telegram 3744, p. 1075.

We agree with Frankfort's No. 96, February 10,[4] that discussion of the Austrian question would provide the best opportunity for the Soviets to bring up Trieste[5] and that therefore there seems to be no reason for omitting mention of the satellite problems.

KIRK

[4] Not printed.
[5] For further documentation on Trieste, see volume IV.

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs[1]

Moscow, February 19, 1951.

The Ambassador of the United States of America has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Soviet Government's note of February 5, 1951, and under instructions from his Government, to reply as follows:

The United States Government regrets that the Soviet Government in its reply repeats and further exaggerates inaccurate statements about the policies and motives of the United States, France and the United Kingdom as well as the German Federal Republic. The Soviet allegations are totally without foundation.

The attempt to eliminate the causes of international tension is a subject which so deeply touches the interests of all peoples that it demands the most serious and honest consideration. Clearly, if these causes are to be eliminated, they must first be correctly identified.

It is obvious that it is not the German problem or the consideration of a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe which lies at the root of the present tension. The United States Government wishes to emphasize, moreover, that in Western Germany there do not exist any German military forces, or any German war industry and that the only *fait accompli* in this field in Europe is the existence of the huge armaments maintained by the Soviet bloc which include forces raised in East Germany. In short as the United States Government stated in its note of December 22, the serious tension which exists at present arises in the first instance from the general attitude adopted by the Government of the U.S.S.R. since the end of the war.

[1] The source text is the copy printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 5, 1951, p. 366. It was drafted at Washington by a tripartite working group consisting of Bohlen, de Juniac, and Steel and approved by the representatives of the three Western powers at their informal meeting on February 16. The text was then transmitted to Moscow on February 17 together with instructions to concert with the British and French for its delivery. (Circular telegrams 484 and 485, 396.1/2–1751.) On February 23 Ambassador Kirk reported that on February 19 he had delivered the note, numbered No. 33, as instructed and that Vyshinsky had stated upon reading it that the last sentence of paragraph four did not correspond with realities. (Telegram 1533 from Moscow, 396.1/2–1951.) Copies of the note were released to the press by the Department of State on February 20.

The Soviet Government has referred to the defense program undertaken by the United States and the free nations of Europe. It must be as apparent to the Soviet Government, as it is to world public opinion, that the free nations of the world, confronted with the vast armed forces maintained by the Soviet Union and the nations under its control and in the face of the frustration by the Soviet Government of the sincere efforts of a large majority of the members of the United Nations to obtain effective international control and reduction of armaments, have had no course except to move to redress for their own security the great disparity in armed forces existing in the world.

The United States Government wishes to insure that the discussion at any meeting of the four Ministers shall include these real causes of tension and that a suitable agenda to that end be drawn up. Since the Soviet Government has admitted the possibility of discussing questions other than Germany, and has itself drawn attention to that of armaments, the Government of the United States, which desires to raise this question, assumes that the Soviet Government does not object to the representatives of the four Governments in the preliminary conversations preparing an agenda which will cover the causes of tension in Europe, including the existing level of armaments; problems affecting Germany; the Austrian treaty. The formulation of these and other subjects which may be agreed upon, as well as their order on the agenda, will naturally be considered at the preliminary conference.

If the Soviet Government agrees with the basis outlined above for a preliminary conference in Paris, the United States Government suggests that the representatives of the Four Powers meet there on March 5. If, as the Government of the United States hopes, the preliminary conference of representatives finds a mutually acceptable basis for a meeting of the ministers, the Government of the United States suggests that the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union meet in Washington on a date to be recommended by the representatives. The Government of the United States is informed that these arrangements would be convenient to the Governments of France and the United Kingdom.

386.1/3–151 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY Moscow, March 1, 1951—3 p. m.

1591. I was requested by Gromyko at 11:00 a. m. today to call on him at 1:40 p. m. The French and British Ambassadors had received similar requests for 1:00 and 1:20 p. m. respectively.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Frankfurt.

Upon receiving me Gromyko presented a very brief note indicating that the Soviet Government considered US note of February 19 [2] as rejection without foundation of facts in Soviet note of February 5, and that Soviet Government affirms its position as set forth in that note. Note concludes with expression of agreement for proposed preliminary meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers on March 5 in Paris (text contained in preceding telegram [3]).

I pointed out to Gromyko that note did not indicate whether Soviet Government accepted broader agenda proposed in our note of February 19 and he replied that this was subject for discussion at Paris. When I pressed him further on this point, he replied that all he could say at this time. In accordance with Deptel 537 of February 27 [4] I stressed that US Government took proposed Paris talks seriously and he replied that Soviet Government did likewise as indicated all their notes on subject. After my informing him that Jessup and Bohlen would represent US, Gromyko replied to my query about Soviet representative by stating that he would go to Paris for this purpose. On a question from me Gromyko said there did not seem to be any objection to Washington as place for Minister's meeting but that this could be discussed at Paris. (Question of terminology i.e. CFM not posed by Gromyko.)

I asked him if note would be released to press and while he said that the Soviet Government did not intend to do so, I did not feel he was being categoric on this point. In brief closing chat, I asked if Vyshinski were away or ill. Apparently somewhat discomfited, Gromyko replied that Vyshinski was not feeling well and perhaps had influenza.

This being one of the rare Moscow sunny days, I remarked upon it and Gromyko countered amiably that such weather should not bring merely light but warmth. I expressed the pious wish that this feeling would pervade the Paris talks and Gromyko came out with the interesting Marxist observation that there should always be a relation between natural and social phenomena.

KIRK

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[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed. The note, dated March 1, read:

"Soviet Government considers that note of Government USA of February 19, 1951 is rejection without foundation of facts cited in Soviet note of February 5 and contains no elements whatever which would require new answer on part Government USSR. Soviet Government affirms its position set forth in its note of February 5.

"As to question of preliminary meeting in Paris, Soviet Government expresses agreement with proposal for fixing of preliminary meeting of Deputies of Foreign Ministers USA, USSR, Great Britain and France for March 5 in Paris." (396.1/3–151)

[4] Not printed.

B. THE FOUR-POWER EXPLORATORY TALKS (THE CONFERENCE AT THE PALAIS ROSE), PARIS, MARCH 5–JUNE 21, 1951

Editorial Note

The Four-Power Exploratory Talks, sometimes referred to as the conference at the Palais Rose or Palais Marble (Marbre) Rose, began at Paris on March 5 and continued until June 21. The United States Representative was Philip C. Jessup, and his principal advisers were Charles E. Bohlen (Alternate Representative), Perry Laukhuff, Bromley K. Smith, and William R. Tyler. The British Representative was Ernest Davies, whose principal advisers were William I. Mallet and Geoffrey W. Harrison. The French Representative was Alexandre Parodi, and his principal advisers were Guy Le Roy de la Tournelle, François Seydoux, and Jacques de Bourbon-Busset. The Soviet Representative was Andrei A. Gromyko, whose principal adviser was Vladimir S. Semenov. The four Representatives were also referred to frequently as Deputies to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The chairmanship for the meetings rotated with each session starting with Parodi for the host Government. No official quadripartite minutes were kept of 74 meetings that were held, but the United States Delegation kept its own record of the various sessions in a series of summaries indicated by the prefix ETUS SM. An official secretariat, consisting of one member from each delegation, handled the documents submitted by the delegations. Its papers are designated by the series indicator SUP/P/51/D.

In reporting on the talks, the United States Delegation filed four series of telegrams: (*a*) a report on each meeting giving a factual account of what had taken place, (*b*) a press guidance noting points to be stressed in the press releases of the Department of State, (*c*) messages transmitting Jessup's personal insights and responses to the course of the talks, and (*d*) messages about the talks which dealt with tripartite preparations, generally at a meeting in the morning before each session and with other events not within the province of the first three series.

In preparation for the talks the Department of State drafted two sets of papers. The first, designated ETS (Exploratory Talks with the Soviets), consisted of eight series of papers dealing with the following topics: General Issues; Economic Issues; Europe; Germany; the Near East and Africa; the Far East; the United Nations; and various background issues. One of these papers is printed on page 1048. The second series of papers, designated by the indicator RPTS (Policy Review for Possible Talks with the Soviets), considered only problems that were possible of resolution directly with the Soviet Union. None of these is printed.

The most comprehensive collection of materials dealing with the talks is in the Executive Secretariat files, lot 59D95, CF 54–87. It contains sets of the United States Delegation summaries, the ETS and RPTS papers, memoranda on various tripartite and quadripartite meetings, telegrams to and from the delegation and other posts concerning the meetings, and other miscellaneous papers relating to the talks. Two other repositories, the CFM files (lot M–88, boxes 156, 157, and 253) and file 396.1–PA, contain respectively the summaries, secretariat documents, sets of ETS and RPTS papers, and various memoranda and telegrams to and from Paris and other posts and the transcripts of the telecons (teletype conferences) held between the United States Delegation and the Department of State.

For additional information about the Four-Power Exploratory Talks, see *Participation of the United States Government in International Conferences, July 1, 1950–June 30, 1951*, publication 4571, pages 7–9.

Because of the great volume of documentation on the talks, the editors are presenting here only a small part of the papers available, documentation that illustrates the main points of United States policy, and the salient features of the more important meetings of the deputies.

396.1–PA/3–551 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, March 5, 1951—midnight.

5182. From Jessup. First session quadripartite exploratory talks convened March 5 with Parodi chairman. In discussion conference procedures Jessup proposed and UK supported suggestion that Parodi serve as permanent chairman. Gromyko countered with request for rotation of chairmanship each meeting. Three powers did not press point and agreed. Agreed have one meeting daily at outset and oftener if necessary. Re press relations, agreed each delegate free decide own relationships with press but should use discretion. After meeting Soviets promptly released unofficial translation of its agenda proposal, whereupon we released ours.

UK Deputy Davies led off substantive discussions stressing that objective of western powers since war was to preserve peace and solve international differences through peaceful negotiations. Nevertheless, relations among big powers had deteriorated but this cannot be attributed to aggressive intentions on part west. He said Soviets had no cause fear aggression from west but deterioration of situation had

[1] Repeated to London, Moscow, Frankfurt, and Vienna.

caused UK to enter defensive alliances with like-minded nations. UK has never abandoned principle peaceful negotiations therefore desire that Foreign Ministers meet, discuss and resolve basic causes of tension, such discussions being based on sincerity of the parties and agenda broad enough provide for discussion basic causes of tensions in Europe. He cited as symptoms of tension: (1) fear that war is imminent; (2) building up of armaments; (3) fear on part western peoples of aggression by Soviet armies and possible loss of national independence; (4) stronger nations imposing their will on weaker nations; and (5) internal subversion of governments. Therefore, German problem was not solely responsible for tensions. Stated that to confine agenda to discussion German problem would be futile. He stated that Germany was merely one of many problems and not most vexing European question as the Soviets had indicated. He stressed that German problem must be discussed within the broader context of the causes of tensions in Europe. He emphasized that any agenda for ministerial talks must be so drawn that the Foreign Ministers can discuss basic causes of tension. Therefore item providing such latitude must be included as the first item on agenda. At this point he introduced the tripartite agenda proposal (Embtel 5142 [2]). After comment on each item he added that Soviet acceptance of last tripartite note created presumption that Soviet prepared accept these items as basis for discussion.

Gromyko replied that since UK deputy in addition to expressing opinions concerning possible agenda items had commented on international situation Soviet delegate would do likewise and that Soviet views proceeded from point that German demilitarization has vital significance for Europe and the world in terms of relaxing tensions. Said UK has given no facts substantiate claim of peaceful intent of UK. Arguments advanced by UK concerning fear of war and threat of aggression on part Soviets is unmasked in recent UK-Soviet notes on violation of Anglo-Soviet treaty.[3] Use by UK of this argument can be considered only as camouflage for arms race in other countries particularly US. He charged that three powers have

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[2] Not printed; the agenda under reference, which had been agreed at a tripartite meeting on March 4, read:

"1. Examination of cause of present international tensions in Europe and of means to secure a real and lasting improvement in relations between Soviet Union and US UK and France.

2. Completion of treaty for re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria.

3. Problems relating to re-establishment of German unity and to preparation of a peace treaty." (396.1–PA/3–451)

The U.S. Delegation had reported on the tripartite meeting in telegram 5143 from Paris, March 4, not printed (396.1–PA/3–451).

[3] For the texts of the notes of December 15, 1950 and January 5, 1951, exchanged between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, see Folliot, *Documents on International Affairs, 1949–50*, pp. 179–182, and *ibid., 1951*, pp. 321–323, respectively.

launched arms race which cannot be denied nor reconciled with west profession of peaceful intent. Soviets preferred not rest on UK statement of intent but on facts. Not only was there threat of aggression on part states embarked on this course but acts of aggression had actually occurred. Gromyko said Soviet Government already stressed importance German question, that is, importance of demilitarization Germany and prohibition remilitarization Germany, since cognizant that implementation of quadripartite agreement this question would contribute greatly amelioration present situation.

Gromyko then introduced Soviet agenda proposal:

"1. On fulfillment by four powers of Potsdam Agreement regarding demilitarization of Germany and prohibition of remilitarization of Germany.

"2. On acceleration of conclusion of peace treaty with Germany and in accordance with this withdrawal of occupation forces.

"3. On improvement of situation in Europe and immediate passing over to reduction of armed forces of four powers—USSR, US, UK and France."

In connection with item 1, Gromyko pointed out four powers already assumed certain obligations re Germany and solution German question of interest all European powers. Re item 2, cited that five years elapsed since four powers assumed obligations concerning this question but obligations not carried out. Re item 3, stressed that Soviets had put forward proposals this question in UN but they had been systematically rejected by other powers and if three powers really serious concerning peaceful intent their position on this item would be criterion. In summary he stressed that main question is demilitarization of Germany and that it should merit a place on the agenda in conformity with its significance.

Prior to adjournment Jessup inquired whether there was any significance in fact that Soviet proposal did not include subject of Austria. Gromyko said Soviets believed three questions advanced suitable for agenda but have no objection to discussing question of including Austria on agenda at the next meeting or following meetings.

Next meeting scheduled 3 p. m., March 6.

[JESSUP]

396.1–PA/3–751 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, March 7, 1951—4 p. m.

5218. From Jessup. While it is too soon to reach any definite conclusion as to ultimate Soviet position at this meeting, Gromyko's propaganda blast yesterday may indicate that Soviet Union is primarily interested in exploiting this preliminary conference for propagation of their chief lines on German rearmament and reduction of armed forces of four powers.[1]

We have been making suitable impromptu answers to Gromyko's charges during the meetings but are basically in accordance with instructions still endeavoring to confine this meeting to the preparation of agenda without going into substance. We propose to continue this line at today's meeting but if Gromyko continues to go into substance for propaganda purposes, we will clearly be confronted with a situation which might require a change in our present agreed tactics.

We would obviously be at considerable disadvantage propaganda-wise if we were avoiding substantive discussion as to real causes of present tension while Russians were exploiting to the full their charges that present tension is primarily caused by question of German remilitarization and Western rearmament. In order to enter into substance, however, we would have to be prepared to give a full exposition of our view as to the real causes of the existing tension (or possibly even to propose agenda items expressing our view) i.e., Soviet aggressive attitude, use of intimidation and threat, paralysis of UN by abuse of veto, maintenance and direction of fifth columns (Cominform) and similar questions which under existing instructions and tripartite agreement we have refrained from putting forward.

One serious difficulty in shifting our tactics is that the three Western powers have as yet no agreed tripartite position or firm individual position on substantive questions nor agreed material or details re satellite or Soviet armament.

Present Soviet propaganda line is to contrast "vague, unspecific nature of Western agenda with concrete, positive identification of true causes of tension in Soviet agenda proposal".

If considered undesirable for reasons given above to attempt to transform this preliminary meeting into substantive conference, we might take positive line that Soviets are expressly violating basis on

[1] In telegram 5207, March 7, from Paris, the U.S. Delegation had reported that Gromyko at the second meeting of the Deputies had launched into a long propaganda argument, asserting that the future of Germany had been decided at Potsdam and charging the three Western Powers with violating the Potsdam Agreement. (396.1–PA/3–751)

which preliminary conference at their insistence was called and that West is unwilling to have preliminary meeting substitute for discussions which should properly be dealt with by Foreign Ministers. This would immediately raise question of breaking off conference.

We will know more after today's meeting as to which course Soviet delegation intends to pursue and, therefore, this cable should be regarded as preliminary in order to acquaint Department with situation we may be confronted with in next few days.

[JESSUP]

396.1-PA/3-751

The Director of the Office of German Political Affairs (Laukhuff)[1] *to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade)*

SECRET [PARIS,] March 7, 1951.

Letter No. 4

DEAR HANK: Somewhat to our surprise, Gromyko chose not to pursue yesterday's line but devoted himself to the Austrian treaty and tied it in with the question of Trieste. The atmosphere was less tense today since Gromyko's tone was more moderate. You know the course of the arguments from the telegram.[2] When all is said and done, however, our business was not advanced in the slightest by today's Russian tack. We had the impression that they had decided their omission of the Austrian item was going to be disadvantageous to them from a propaganda point of view and so they sought to recover lost ground. Gromyko seemed not altogether facile or happy in his discussion of the Austrian item although he was more at ease when he got on to Trieste. The British professed to feel that today's discussion gives a little more room for hope that the Russians really want to draw up an agenda. To us, however, again, the main Soviet motivation seemed to be propagandistic, though on a relatively minor point.

On the basis of the first three days, it is still not certain that we will not be pushed into a discussion of the substance of various items though I judge the three are in a mood to try to continue their insistence upon a procedural and businesslike discussion of the agenda for another day or so.

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[1] Laukhuff was in Paris as a member of the U.S. Delegation at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks.

[2] The U.S. Delegation characterized the third session on March 7 as follows:

"Third quadripartite session exploratory talks March 7 brought forth Soviet declaration that they have no objection to placing Austrian question on agenda if 3 powers agree inclusion 'fulfillment of peace treaty with Italy in the part concerning Trieste.' Meeting characterized by Soviet insistence 2 questions inseparably linked and Western position no connection questions. Throughout sessions Soviets took basically propaganda approach to discussions, attempted reverse Western arguments, and paid little attention to logic their position." Telegram 5237 from Paris, March 7 (396.1-PA/3-751).

There was not very much mention of Germany today except by Gromyko toward the end when he addressed himself to Parodi and insisted that if, as the French claimed, it was important to deal with the Austrian treaty as a means of lessening tension in Europe, it was all the more important to deal with the problem of German demilitarization which was the central problem in Europe. Parodi's reply was quite in the spirit of the position agreed among the three but was perhaps carelessly formulated and may give us some trouble. What he said in effect was that the Western powers were quite prepared to examine the problem of German armament as one of the causes of tension and in the context of all of the causes of tension. That is to say, the Russians would be perfectly free to expound their ideas on this subject under our item 1, "Examination of the causes of tension, etc.". He actually said that we were willing to discuss "German demilitarization" under item 1 and may have laid himself open to a Russian assertion that he agreed to accept their first item under our item 1. This was not the case and I feel sure Jessup and the others will clarify this as time goes on.

Sincerely yours, PERRY

396.1–PA/3–1051 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, March 10, 1951—11 a. m.

5291. From Jessup. Ourtel 5290.[1] Two hour tripartite discussion last night of revised agenda item revealed basic divergence between our position and approach which British and French think we should take toward Soviet's present position on agenda.

First indication of British and French desire to make things easier for Gromyko came out when both Parodi and Davies argued strongly against specification "D" concerning Iron Curtain.[2] Both favored

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[1] Not printed; it transmitted the following revision of the proposed agenda which would be introduced at the Four-Power Talks by the French:

"Examination of causes of present international tensions in Europe and of means to secure real and lasting improvement in relations between USSR, the US, the UK and France such as: measures to eliminate fear of aggression; fulfillment of present treaty obligations; examination of existing level of armaments and of questions concerning Germany in this sphere." (396.1–PA/3–1051)

[2] At their tripartite meeting on March 4 the Western powers had agreed that the following four specifications might be added to Item I of their original agenda (see footnote 2, p. 1088) if the tactical situation required:

"A. The fear of aggression.

B. Existing level of armaments (and its effect on the problem of German demilitarization).

C. Non-fulfillment of treaty obligations.

D. Barriers to official and unofficial intercourse between government and peoples." (Telegram 5142 from Paris, March 4, 396.1–PA/3–451)

dropping subject from agenda proposal because they said it would be difficult to raise with the Soviet at this time since no prior mention of it had been made.

Second indication was British and French insistence on using words "demilitarization of Germany" in revised agenda proposal. Davies asked whether in last resort we would not have to use this phrase if Soviets insisted. He said that if Soviets insisted on including it he did not think we could break on this question but would have to give in. He said what he wanted to do was to make it easier for Gromyko to ask for revised instructions and easier for Moscow to accept our agenda proposal.

At later point in meeting Davies made strongly worded appeal for doing everything possible excluding appeasement or acceptance Soviet agenda to ensure that conference would be held. He referred to British public opinion which he said favored Ministers meeting if only for sake of meeting and even though chance of accomplishing anything was very remote. He said representatives here had obligation to do what they can to make possible Four Power conference in attempt to buy time and to seek to avert war.

Parodi echoes most of Davies views. He also believes our revised agenda proposal should be worded in such a way as to make it easier for Moscow to alter Gromyko's instructions.

Jessup insisted our immediate objective was to convince Gromyko that if the Soviets want an agreed agenda he would have to get new instructions. By standing firm here on the agenda we would not only force the Soviets to decide whether they wanted a conference but if they did accept our agenda we would have greatly facilitated work of Ministers meeting by providing real basis for this meeting. He reviewed ABC of negotiating with Soviets and pointed out that partial concessions did not produce reciprocal concessions on Soviet part. He insisted that unless we remain firm now we might endanger our present diplomatic position as well as destroy any chance of successful Ministers meeting.[3]

[JESSUP]

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[3] The revised tripartite agenda item was introduced by Parodi at the sixth session on March 10 and rejected by Gromyko at the seventh session on March 11 as offering no solution to major problems. The U.S. Delegation reported on these two sessions in telegrams 5306 and 5337, March 10 and 13, neither printed (396.1–PA/3–1051 and 3–1351). At the seventh session Gromyko had also introduced a new proposal for Item 2 in the Soviet proposed agenda (telegram 5182, p. 1087) which read "Reestablishment of German unity and conclusion of peace treaty with Germany."

396.1–PA/3–1351

The Director of the Office of German Political Affairs (Laukhuff) to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade)

SECRET [PARIS,] March 13, 1951.

Letter No. 7

DEAR HANK: One thing stands out more and more clearly from the talks. The Russians are hammering over and over again on their point that the two really important things which "the peoples of the world" want the Ministers to discuss are "fulfillment of the Potsdam Agreement providing for the demilitarization of Germany and the prohibition of the remilitarization of Germany" and "immediate reduction of the armed forces of the four powers". These points are repeated over and over and over. My own impression is that the Russians want a Conference—if it is held on those two items. If not, they are indifferent to a Conference but will conduct a world-wide propaganda campaign on the basis of those two propositions, and accusing us of being against them.

To counter this Soviet line, we are able to produce nothing except generalities both in our agenda text and in our arguments. It is easy to have hindsight but I think we made our usual mistake of starting with a reasonable, moderate, "neutral" position which allows of no compromise and which does not really illustrate our case against the Russians. What we should have done was to put up an agenda which stated our views on the real causes of tension. The way it is we have neither a good propaganda position nor a good base for maneuver.

What really is disturbing is the attitude of the French and British, especially the latter. We had a long tripartite session last night which was a repetition of the one described in Letter No. 6.[1] It was, if anything, worse. Davies went so far as to say he really couldn't see why we couldn't eventually accept that part of the Russian wording dealing with the prevention of German remilitarization, too, providing it was in a "harmless" context. This may have been only his personal feeling since Mallet, in a meeting with Chip[2] and me this morning, insisted that the British instructions reject the phrase "fulfillment of the Potsdam Agreement", the phrase "prevention of the remilitarization of Germany" and also reject the idea of discussing German demilitarization in any connection save that of the existing level of armaments.

What is clear, however, is that the British have a different evaluation of Soviet motives than we do. They believe the Soviet Government

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[1] Letter No. 6, not printed; for a report on the tripartite meeting under reference, see telegram 5291, *supra*. The U.S. Delegation had reported on the tripartite meeting of March 12, along lines similar to Laukhuff's, in telegram 5350 from Paris, March 13, not printed. (396.1–PA/3–1351)

[2] Charles E. Bohlen.

wants a conference, wants to stop our plans for German defense by some agreement with us and consequently is willing to pay a stiff price for our agreement. We also think the Soviets want to stop our plans but we see no signs that they want to do it by an agreement costly to them. Rather they seek a basis for inhibiting and confusing western action and playing upon western fears of Germany. For this purpose, a conference is immaterial, unless held strictly on their terms.

I do believe the British think of themselves as quite firmly committed to the Brussels decision and as intending to push right on with attempts to work out German participation, regardless of any agenda item. (Though Harrison did say, "would delay really matter, since it would only be a question of a month or six weeks"?) But they do not seem fully to appreciate the scope for maneuver which adoption of some or all of the Soviet wording would give to the Soviet Union, and the inhibiting pressures which would easily be build [*built*] up against us. Besides, it seems to me public opinion would jump to the conclusion that we had all agreed to review the Brussels decisions with the Russians.

Our feeling is that the British attitude (the French attitude has been less expressly put) has revealed a very slippery path leading down in front of us.

Sincerely yours, PERRY

396.1-PA/3-1751

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PARIS, March 17, 1951.

DEAR DEAN: Just a few lines at the end of our second week to give you a few personal impressions of the way things are going—or not going.

It is of course always impossible to be sure what the Russians are up to but personally, I do not yet see any signs which lead me to believe that they are going to break off. Although I think Chip [1] is not convinced of it, I still think they want a meeting of the Ministers and, if this is true, we will get one on terms satisfactory to us if we wait long enough and if the French and British stay in line.

As far as the French are concerned, I think on the whole their basic attitude is not too bad. As you know, Parodi is a very sincere and honest person and I am convinced that he simply cannot see why we object to including on the agenda a simple unqualified reference to "the demilitarization of Germany" as a separate item. Curiously

[1] Charles E. Bohlen.

enough, he thinks that a simple reference to the question of German armament would be very bad. Apparently, that question has overtones and connotations which he feels would be upsetting to French opinion, whereas I tried to point out that the unqualified use of the word "demilitarization" has similar overtones and connotations for American opinion. It is true that, as he indicated during the Pleven visit in Washington,[2] he has vague hopes of eventually reaching some kind of interim agreement with the Soviets about Germany which would lessen the tension, although we have never been able to find out from any of the French just what they have in mind. From his point of view, it would be very bad indeed if we do not get a meeting of the Four Ministers. I do think, however, that he is pretty well convinced that we are right in insisting that the best way to get such a meeting is to continue plugging along firmly on our lines. Nevertheless, the point may very well come when Gromyko makes further gestures in the direction of our phrasing and where the issue will be sharply drawn on whether or not the phrase "demilitarization of Germany" can be used alone.

The British attitude is more puzzling. As far as Davies is concerned, I am sure that a great deal of the difficulty is due to his ineptness and lack of experience in dealing with the Russians. He made another speech yesterday afternoon which was put in just the wrong way and led to Gromyko's outbursts against what he called the British ultimatum.[3] I am afraid that this morning Davies will try to explain this away and in doing so will blunder into statements suggesting to Gromyko that instead of an ultimatum he meant we would make some more concessions to them.[4] Morrison has made no gesture in the direction of seeing me and Dave Bruce agrees that I cannot very well press him. We have an impression that although Davies is one of Morrison's protégés, Morrison is not very happy about the way Davies has been handling his job here. No one seems to have any authoritative information as to how Morrison really feels about the question of German participation in western defense.

Gromyko is about the same as ever. He has been rather dumb in some of his presentations. He has said just the things which were

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[2] For documentation on Prime Minister Pleven's visit to Washington at the end of January, see volume IV.

[3] The U.S. Delegation had reported on the 11th session on March 16 in telegram 5486 from Paris, March 16 (396.1–PA/3–1651) which indicated that Davies, *inter alia*, had questioned whether the Soviet Union really desired a meeting of the Foreign Ministers.

[4] Jessup's fears proved to be unfounded. The U.S. Delegation reported that at the 12th session on March 17 Gromyko took up most of the meeting with a long propaganda statement that repeated in general previous Soviet arguments. (Telegram 5502, March 17, from Paris, 396.1–PA/3–1751)

needed to convince the British and French that he was unreasonable and he has lost opportunities to play them up against us. During the tea intermission the Russians join in socially in a very affable way. By and large, Gromyko's statements in the meetings have not been vitriolic and, in terms of the usual Russian operation could even be described as somewhat restrained.

I do hope that you and Alice had a good time in Bermuda. It was extremely comforting to see your name appearing on the list of conferees on the telecon [5] the other night and I appreciate your reference to the work here in your press conference yesterday as reported in today's papers. Just to prove that nothing changes, I can report that the same doves to which you called Vishinsky's attention in 1949 still perch on the tree outside the Palais de Marbre Rose. They offer an interesting bit of variety when one gets tired of looking at the ladies and gentlemen sitting on the clouds over our heads.

Sincerely yours, PHIL

P.S. Morrison has just called asking Dave Bruce and me to come see him this afternoon.[6]

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[5] A transcript of the teletype conference of March 14 between Paris and Washington, not printed, in which the U.S. Delegation was told not to accept any wording in the agenda which might imply suspension of the December 1950 Brussels decisions for the integration of the Federal Republic into Western Europe, is in file 396.1–PA/3–1451.

[6] For a report on this meeting, see telegram 5507, *infra*.

396.1–PA/3–1751 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, March 17, 1951—9 p. m.

5507. From Jessup. At Morrison's invitation Bruce, Bohlen and I met with him at Brit Emb this afternoon. Among other Britons, Davies and Dixon were present. In response Morrison's question I gave him our analysis situation stressing obvious Sov design interfere with execution Brussels decisions through adoption slanted agenda or propaganda based on it. Morrison responded with very firm statement that their parliamentary position fully supported Brussels decisions and that he personally firmly supported that policy. Morrison reviewed difficulties Ger situation but only in terms of problems confronting the west and not vis-à-vis Sovs. Morrison restressed their strong desire for Mins mtg.

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[1] Repeated to London, Moscow, and Frankfurt.

Bohlen and I emphasized our belief best way secure Sov agreement is by convincing them of tripartite solidarity. Argued if Sovs really want mtg will eventually agree on agenda acceptable to US. I pointed out we started with neutral agenda and therefore any moves on our part are not towards compromise position but towards acceptance slanted Russ position. Suggested possible advantage going back now to our original agenda as only possible neutral formulation since Sovs rejected our amendments. Davies interposed objection Gromyko wld refuse and insist upon demilitarization of Ger as separate item. Morrison contradicted Davies saying he thought my suggestion which he developed might be good move. Bohlen talking privately with Dixon fully satisfied soundness Dixon's position.

[JESSUP]

396.1-PA/3-2151: Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT PARIS, March 21, 1951—1 a. m.

5575. From Jessup. In fourteenth session quad talks today Sov del tabled new proposal contained in Embtel 5574 to Dept, rptd London 1359, Moscow 263, Frankfort 683, Vienna 170.[2] Three powers took proposal under consideration. Initial reactions to Gromyko's statements and new proposal best demonstration tripartite solidarity to date.

Gromyko led off with two-hour "balance sheet" on work to date which was essentially restatement Sov positions. Stated agreement reached on agenda item re Ger unity and preparation Ger peace treaty altho Sov del still cld not understand how three powers cld object to original Sov proposal if they sincerely desired conclusion peace treaty and withdrawal occupation forces. Western objections "compelled" Sov del agree to less clear wording now contained in agenda, but agreed in hope FonMin consideration result in speedy conclusion peace treaty and withdrawal occupation forces.

Gromyko said Sov del advanced other proposals with clear purpose maintenance peace and improvement situation in Eur. However, fail-

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[1] Repeated to London, Moscow, Vienna, and Frankfurt.

[2] Not printed; the text of the Soviet draft, presumably of Item I, read:

"Examination of causes of present international tensions in Eur and of means necessary to secure a real and lasting improvement in relations between Sov Union, US, Britain, and France, including questions of reduction of armed forces of USA, USSR, UK and France and of establishment of international control over implementation of reduction of armed forces, as well as of other measures for elimination of threat of war and fear of aggression, and question of fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreement of four powers." (396.1-PA/3-2051)

ure of three powers "pay attention" to these proposals indicates lack desire on their part find common solutions to agenda items. While this West attitude apparent from beginning talks, it became more evident after Sov del presented new proposals on Mar 14.[3] He then analyzed these proposals in detail emphasizing (1) Ger demilit most important question; (2) Sov agenda includes main questions put forward by Sov del and by three powers. Felt Sov del had every grounds expect favorable West response to these proposals for above reasons and because they are logical and consistent. Claimed tripartite proposals illogical and inconsistent, and cannot be considered otherwise if assume three powers motivated by sincere desire discuss important issues in FonMin meeting.

Gromyko said Sov Mar 14 proposal aimed at providing framework within which each FonMin cld discuss questions he considered most important. Furthermore, Sov del cannot agree to replacing Sov wording re reduction armed forces of four powers by tripartite wording which full of double meanings. Claimed West assurances that differences in wording not great and that Sov FonMin cld express his views on Ger demilit designed mislead Sov since tripartite phrasing on "existing level of armaments" had nothing in common with Sov proposals on Ger demilit and reduction of armaments. Repeated charge that tripartite wording might mean a considerable increase of armaments and "be tantamount to increasing arms race" which not in interest maintenance peace. Said three powers insistence on their wording compels Sov del be more attentive to wording of this item.

Gromyko elaborated at some length on familiar Sov arguments that tripartite wording drowned significance of issues and that West guilty gross violations Potsdam. Stressed that Sov objections arise from fact tripartite wording "does not assure observation of obligations assumed by three powers under Potsdam" and wld leave West "free hand" to rearm Ger and increase pace of armaments race. Stressed that CFM to be convened for purpose discussing burning issues and maintenance peace and this purpose incompatible with Ger remilit or further increase arms race.

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[3] The Soviet proposal for a draft agenda, presented at the ninth session on March 14, read:

"1. Regarding fulfillment by four powers of Potsdam Agreement on demilitarization of Germany.

2. Problems relating to reestablishment of German unity and preparation of treaty of peace.

3. Examination of causes of present international tensions in Europe and of means to securing a real and lasting improvement in relations between the USSR, US, UK and France, including question of reduction of armed forces of four powers—USSR, US, UK, and France." (Telegram 5389 from Paris, March 14, 396.1–PA/3–1451)

Gromyko said Sovs hold no convincing arguments can be advanced against acceptance Sov proposals Ger demilit and reduction armaments and in latter case three powers arguing against own item since Sov formulation merged with original tripartite item one.

Re tripartite objections to Sov failure mention fear of aggression and fulfillment present treaty obligations, Gromyko explained Sov del had considered it undesirable to have major questions covered up by secondary issues. Claimed that fear of aggression arose from present armaments race and demilit of Ger and since latter questions included in Sov proposals no need to mention former.

At this point Gromyko introduced Sov proposal contained in reftel, making fol observations:

(*a*) Cannot isolate treaty obligations from those arising from agreements; therefore Sov proposal provides for able consideration both; and

(*b*) Sov proposal takes into account four power desire for "control" over reduction armaments.

Parodi stated that Gromyko's early remarks not conciliatory but he would consider new Sov proposal. Reviewed Gromyko's remarks to point up fact Sov apparently desired him to accept agenda which wld condemn present def policies Fr Govt and inquired whether this Sov intention. After receiving an unintelligible reply from Gromyko, Parodi said Gromyko's position still unclear but assumed from reply it was Sov intention to seek in Deps meeting agreement to agenda condemning Fr policies.

After reserving right to comment later, Jessup made initial comments new Sov proposal, refusing this connection to spend time necess deal with numerous false statements by Gromyko. Jessup stated that stripped of false and derogatory verbiage Gromyko has stated in effect that

(*a*) US has certain policies, in particular its def policies, which Sovs do not like and desire to change,

(*b*) Sov desire US sign this piece of paper, which Sovs present as agenda proposal but which constitutes agreement that US will change its policies. Jessup noted Gromyko had made this point very clear and was very explicit that his proposal was made not for the purpose of leaving US Govt free hand to carry out this policy. Said Gromyko had illustrated this point in negative way as well by objecting to tripartite proposals for very reason that it left three govts free between time of preliminary meeting and of FonMin meeting to carry out their policies. Stated that Gromyko in effect proposed that Deps negotiate some substantive agreements designed to bind govts at least until FonMin meeting. Contrasted this position with Sov note Feb 5 stating Deps meeting shld be confined to agenda and that substance of questions shld not enter into meeting.

Jessup stressed that Gromyko addressing himself not to framing agenda for Mins but to substance of questions. Cited as examples:

(*a*) Gromyko's criticism tripartite Mar 16 formulation of item 1*a*,[4] as not assuring respect for obligations of three powers and wld permit them carry on their policies re Ger and engage in what Gromyko calls "arms race". Jessup stressed that US policy perfectly open and clear since adopted by true democratic process. Emphasized US had nothing conceal re its policies or reasons for its policies.

(*b*) Gromyko's statement that three powers objected to words "acceleration of conclusion of Ger peace treaty", whereas three powers did not discuss pro or con question of peace treaty, merely stating term "acceleration" was substantive conclusion to be left to Mins. Jessup noted Gromyko saw force our objection this instance.

(*c*) While possible provide numerous other examples by reviewing Gromyko's statements it wld be too repetitious and time consuming.

Jessup called attention to other Sov attitude which unacceptable to US; that is, Sovs decide what is most important question in world or most pressing problem in Eur and, having decided that this subj is matter of discussion, Sov word is final. Furthermore, when Gromyko considers some of West items he says Sov Govt did not consider it necessary to cover these. Jessup characterized this attitude as revealing arrogance not appropriate to negots with other three govts represented.

Jessup said Gromyko had not eliminated fear of Sov aggression, which is one of present causes of tension, merely by using false description policies of three powers. Expressed sincere hope US Govt that existing fear of aggression can be eliminated by concrete proposals and agreements arrived at by FonMins. Re Gromyko's contention that items which Sovs considered important are "drowned" in tripartite formulation, Jessup inquired how Gromyko wld apply this analysis to new Sov proposal. If Gromyko does not believe these questions are "drowned" in Sov proposal, then he shld withdraw this objection to tripartite proposal.

Jessup concluded by requesting Gromyko to review again various tripartite agenda drafts in order realize three powers attempted draft these items in completely neutral fashion. Stated three powers wld consider seriously any points Gromyko might raise re failure tripartite proposals achieve objectivity and neutrality. Cited agenda item "Ger and Aust questions" for 1946 CFM in NY under which FonMins considered wide range subjs. Stated that shld be possible for Deps agree

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[4] The tripartite draft, introduced by Jessup at the 10th session, read:

"Examination of the causes of present international tensions in Europe and of the means to secure a real and lasting improvement in the relations between the USSR, US, UK and France, such as: the existing level of armaments, its effect on the question of the demilitarization of Germany, and the means for the control and reduction of armaments; measures to eliminate the fear of aggression; fulfillment of present treaty obligations." (Telegram 5420, from Paris, March 15, 396.1–PA/3–1551)

on words having similar lack prejudicial quality and given cooperation Deps work cld be brought successful conclusion. He reminded Gromyko that he did not possess plenipotentiary auth and that three powers cld not use agenda, as Gromyko suggested, to reach substantive agreements.

Davies stressed that Gromyko's long and contentious speech made clear differing approaches to drawing up agenda and had confirmed West conviction that Sovs attempting to commit FonMins to policies in advance their consideration. Stated this made clear in Gromyko's objection to inclusion existing level of armaments in agenda for reason that no relationship exists between this subj and demilit of Ger or reduction of armaments. Inquired why Gromyko objected to including existing level of armament unless Sovs desire not to discuss this subj. Said Sov position this regard completely illogical.

Davies stated that exchange of notes made clear that West def policies dictated by disparity between West and Sov-satellite countries and certain policies Sovs have pursued. Expressed view Sovs objected to examination current situation because of fear what examination might reveal. Stressed that agenda shld neither "tie hands nor untie hands" but merely provide framework for FonMins discussion. Inquired whether Sov hands were tied concerning any policy or whether satellite hands were tied when they increased armaments beyond levels specified in peace treaties. Stated that Gromyko cld not use argument of peoples fear of arms race in support his proposals since people fear aggression more. Expressed view that if FonMins agreed reduce armaments without adequate security guarantees they wld be failing their duties. Concluded that while West will study new Sov proposals it will do so in light of Gromyko's statements which are totally unacceptable and will take into account fundamental difference in approach to drafting agenda.

[JESSUP]

396.1-PA/3-2151

The Director of the Office of German Political Affairs (Laukhuff) to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade)

SECRET

PARIS, March 21, 1951.

Letter No. 10

DEAR HANK: Yesterday Gromyko again proved that the Russians are sometimes our best allies. He made a very long speech (two hours, with translations) in the course of which he completely exposed the Soviet hand, so that even the French and British could see the game. The sentences which really leaped out of his discourse were these: (1)

"If [the Western] wording is accepted, it would untie the hands of those desiring to engage in an arms race"; and (2) "This [Western] formulation leaves a free hand to the three powers [to remilitarize Germany]." [1]

These phrases and their context gave the plainest intimation that the Soviets desire to have a wording accepted which *will* tie the hands of the three Powers. Parodi picked up the point immediately and said he of course cannot and will not accept an agenda which binds the French Government to condemn a policy which it has adopted. Jessup and Davies both took off in the same line. We were delighted because Gromyko succeeded, better than we had been able to, in showing what the Soviet Government seeks to do with this agenda. We thought it ought to make our discussions of tactics with the French and British much easier.

Today, however, in the tripartite talks we again got a very sharp conflict of view. Accepting all that we drew as conclusions from Gromyko's words of yesterday (though Parodi tended to accentuate their application to the question of arms reduction and play down their application to German demilitarization) the French and British were still very strong for trying still another concession to the Soviets. They want to put in "the question of the demilitarization of Germany" as a separate item under our first main heading, "Examination of the causes of tension, etc." Phil and Chip argued very strongly that this was bad tactics because it would lead the Russians to believe we are moving towards their position, and because it actually would produce an agenda dangerously close to being usable by the Russians for their purposes. That is, it would cast some doubt in the minds of the public on the firmness of the western governments' decisions taken at Brussels, and it would enable the Russians through propaganda, "peace" movements, and even diplomatic notes, to bring pressure to bear on the three of us to "cease and desist" in view of the "commitment" we had taken to discuss demilitarization of Germany and arms reduction with them at a Ministers' meeting.

Parodi and Davies remained unconvinced and made great play of the necessity of convincing their public opinions that we had "gone to the limit" to be reasonable and reach agreement. Davies has at various times come very close to saying, if indeed he has not said, that it would be more disastrous to break because of inability to agree on an agenda than it would be to cast doubt on the Brussels decisions.

This disagreement has become almost the central problem here, I would say. While both Parodi and Davies (especially the latter) are

[1] All brackets in this sentence are in the source text.

at pains to say that of course their governments' execution of the Brussels decisions will not be affected by anything on the agenda, there is more than a little reason to suppose that their hearts (especially the French) are not in it.[2]

I myself feel we should not give way another inch in the use of the phrase "demilitarization of Germany" in the direction of the Soviet thesis. Even the use we have made of it in our present draft is bad but we're stuck with that.

Sincerely yours, PERRY

[2] Next to this paragraph in the source text, Laukhuff had written "This is understatement, of course."

396.1–PA/3–2351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, March 23, 1951—1 p. m.

5664. From Jessup. At the tripartite meeting this morning I argued strongly present US position concerning phrasing agenda item on German demilitarization.

Davies and Parodi maintained their positions. Both said they could not understand US position and believed it necessary to arrive at formula on this subject which in their opinion would be more acceptable to Gromyko.

Davies revealed for first time that his government was prepared to accept as second item on agenda the demilitarization of Germany in relation to first item.

Both said it would not be possible to resolve our differences here. Parodi said he would talk to Premier Queuille in the absence of Schuman and stated frankly that he would not seek to obtain authority to accept our view. Davies said he would talk to Morrison when he returns to London this weekend.

Parodi indicated willingness to discuss completely new neutral agenda but Davies opposed such discussion saying he could contribute nothing since his government did not now favor this proposal.

We agreed that in restricted session this afternoon we would (1) present no new formulation but would continue yesterday's luncheon discussion [1] making clear to Gromyko we could not accept his item on

[1] At the luncheon on March 22, attended by the four Representatives with one adviser each, Gromyko had made plain that his instructions were definite on the need for a separate item on German demilitarization, while the three Western Deputies had made clear that such a proposal was unacceptable. Telegram 3561 from Paris, March 22 (396.1–PA/3–2251).

German demilitarization and (2) give Gromyko opportunity to make new proposal on German demilitarization.[2]

[JESSUP]

[2] At the restricted (16th) session in the afternoon of March 23, Gromyko offered to accept Item I of the March 4 Western agenda (see footnote 2, p. 1092) or the Soviet revision of it presented on March 14 (see footnote 3, p. 1099), in exchange for Western acceptance of the item on German demilitarization. The three Western Deputies informed Gromyko that the Soviet proposal for a separate demilitarization item was still unacceptable. (Telegram 5672 from Paris, March 23, 396.1–PA/3–2351)

396.1–PA/3–2351

The Director of the Office of German Political Affairs (Laukhuff) to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade)

SECRET PARIS, March 23, 1951.

Letter No. 11

DEAR HANK: I will enclose in the copies of this letter which go to Mr. McCloy, Sam Reber and Bill Trimble copies of last night's telecon,[1] so that they will be fully informed at least as to everything which is on paper.

A good deal has happened in the last two days, in the sense of meetings, arguments, discussions. I won't try to summarize in any detail but rather to give a general impression of the point at which we are. The atmosphere can only be described as thoroughly unhappy.

Phil gave to the French and British this morning a very direct hard-hitting account of our position, well fortified as it was by the Department's unmistakable instructions in last night's telecon.[2] In fact, he clearly implied that if there is any monkey-business in their remarks to Gromyko, he will have to break our unity openly before Gromyko. The other two had to accept the situation of course but most unhappily, and I can well imagine the remarks exchanged about us afterwards. It is quite clear that they don't (or don't want to) understand what our objections are to their various proposals to accept the phrase "demilitarization of Germany". They obviously regard us as stubborn, rigid, overly-suspicious, and probably averse to a Conference anyway.

In their eagerness to "compromise" with the Russians, they are arguing themselves into a frame of mind where they feel there is no harm in taking any Soviet phrasing so long as it does not in so many words commit us to abandon our Brussels policies—*and* so long as "we our-

[1] A transcript of the telecon between Washington and Paris on March 22, not printed, in which the U.S. Delegation was instructed to stand firm and to tell the British and French, if they insisted on compromise, to take the matter up with Washington through their Governments, is in file 396.1–PA/3–2251. Participating in the telecon for the Delegation were Jessup, Bohlen, Laukhuff, and Smith; for the Department of State Bonbright, Lewis, Calhoun, and others.

[2] For a report on this meeting, see telegram 5664, *supra*.

selves know that our governments are determined to carry on with those policies". Davies was most insistent on this, though after the way he flubbed the matter in the House of Commons some weeks ago, I should think he was a poor one to reassure anyone as to the UK's intentions. Naturally, these are things one can't say!

Parodi and Davies harp constantly on the impatience of public opinion and the demand that a conference be held at almost any price. We are unable to discern any great impatience or demand in the French press or in what we hear of the British press.

It becomes increasingly difficult for us here, I think, to distinguish the very fine line which separates us from dangerous acceptance of the Soviet thesis. We play all day with the phrases and formulas about German demilitarization until our own judgment is apt to become fuzzy. So I think the Department can play a very important role by sitting back at its more detached distance and examining all such proposals with a very fishy eye! As Phil put it to the others today, whatever was the case six months ago, the fact today is that the Soviets, through their notes, their propaganda and their arguments at this meeting, have come pretty close to establishing in the public mind that by "demilitarization of Germany" is meant the idea that the four Powers should seek to fulfill Potsdam and prevent the remilitarization of Germany. Indeed they may soon feel they have done this so successfully that they can "compromise" by dropping the reference to Potsdam as they have already dropped the reference to "remilitarization". We need to be ever more wary, not less.

More power to you.[3]

Sincerely yours, PERRY

[3] At the bottom of the source text Laukhuff had written "I do hope these letters are serving some useful purpose."

396.1–PA/3–2451 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, March 24, 1951—4 p. m.

5685. From Jessup. Seventeenth session quadripartite talks devoted discussion Austrian agenda item.[2] Sov del maintained previous position that: (1) Aust Trieste questions inseparably linked and (2) Sov del desired inclusion Trieste question as separate item on agenda.

Parodi led off with statement that although divergent Sov and tripartite positions had been developed in previous mtgs deps might

[1] Repeated to Moscow, London, Vienna, and Frankfurt.

[2] For the text of the Austrian agenda item proposed by the three Western Delegations, see footnote 2, p. 1088.

turn to question of agreed wording for agenda item relating to Austria. Davies fol then with query as to whether Sov del cld accept tripartite formulation. Gromyko replied he cld see no reason why deps shld discuss wording this item since question of principle still not agreed. He countered with question as to whether Sov formulation Trieste item acceptable to West. Jessup sought clarification Gromyko's remarks since he had not understood that Sov del had ever questioned that FonMins wld discuss Aust question. Again asked whether Sov del willing accept tripartite formulation Aust item. Gromyko replied that problem not one of wording but one of differing opinions. Said tripartite wording presented no real difficulties but Sov del first desired know whether three powers accept Soviet wording re Trieste.

Jessup recounted previous discussions in which three powers pointed out: (1) no connection between Austria and Ital peace treaty; (2) record of Sov obstruction re conclusion Austrian treaty culminating in introduction extraneous Trieste question at late date; (3) three powers not accept idea any connection between Trieste and fulfillment Moscow agreement 1943.[3] Jessup inquired whether, if Sov del feels FonMins shld discuss Sov allegations re Ital treaty, it shld be discussed under fulfillments treaty obligations, which occurs in both Sov and tripartite proposals, or whether Sov del thinks agenda shld specify every treaty or agreement concerning which any FonMin might raise questions. Pointed out if Gromyko taking position FonMins cannot discuss fulfillment obligations without specific mention of treaty or agreement on agenda, necessary for deps make complete catalogue. Jessup felt this wld load agenda with unnecessary detail.

Davies reviewed briefly Sov obstructions re conclusion Aust treaty, making fol points: (1) Gromyko's remarks raised doubts re seriousness Sov intent conclude Aust treaty and Trieste gambit merely pretext for further delay; (2) public opinion clear on fact Sovs attempting escape obligation, assumed under Moscow declaration; (3) no foundation for Sov allegation re Western use of Trieste or Austria as military bases; and (4) if Sovs desire discuss Trieste in FonMin mtg, they free do so but this desire no excuse for separate treatment Trieste question in agenda.

Gromyko developed familiar argument that Western powers responsible for violating agreements re Austria and for obstructing conclusion Aust treaty by their attitude in London deps mtg, citing Western attitude on specific articles draft Aust treaty as examples. After rejecting Davies' statement re non-fulfillment Moscow declaration by Sovs, Gromyko claimed that three powers object each time Sov del puts forth proposals aimed at heart of Potsdam and Moscow declaration.

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[3] For the text of the Moscow Declaration on Austria, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 761.

Sov del stated flatly that Trieste shld be included in agenda as separate item and it was "not sufficient" to consider this question under fulfillment treaty obligations. Re Jessup's query on listing of other treaties, Gromyko said he had never made such a proposal and could not see why deps shld go to extremes of not listing any treaties or of listing them all.

Gromyko said no grounds for doubt re seriousness Sov Govt intention conclude Aust treaty and that Sov Govt has more grounds for doubt this connection than West. In countering arguments re late introduction Trieste issue in Aust negotiations by Sovs, Gromyko traced UN consideration question Trieste contending that West responsible for frustration UN efforts.

Gromyko developed familiar argument that US–UK had turned Trieste into military base in violation Ital peace treaty and that Western assurances of no aggressive intent do not change actual state of affairs. After stressing necessity fulfillment treaty obligations, Gromyko claimed that policy of three powers re Trieste [not?] in keeping with consolidation of peace. Drew parallel between action three powers in Trieste and in West Germany.

After developing thesis that Western powers not judges their assurances re lack of aggressive intent, Gromyko applied this reasoning to tripartite proposals re existing levels of armaments. Stated that Western allusions to strength Sov armed forces incorrect and Sov answer given in its note to UK in connection with Anglo-Soviet agreement. Stressed again Sov view that acceptance tripartite proposals would untie hands Western powers re arms race and German demilitarization [*remilitarization?*], citing as evidence recent US announcement that 2.9 million men under arms and US armed forces will continue increase.

Deps agreed reconvene 4 p. m. Tuesday.

[JESSUP]

396.1–PA/3–2751 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, March 27, 1951—2 p. m.

5697. From Jessup. Davies requested this morning mtg restricted to Parodi, himself and me. I arrived for mtg early but Davies was already closeted with Parodi confirming our impression bipartite position to bring pressure on us. Davies reported conference with Morrison yesterday and then read tel from Morrison to Brit Emb Wash which he

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[1] Repeated to Moscow and London.

said had not yet been sent but which they were sending. Tel instructs Emb to take up with SecState Morrison's views as follows:

(1) Does not agree Sovs likely to concede to our view if we stand firm.

(2) Believes ref to "question of demilitarization of Ger" must be included in agenda.

(3) Proposes we suggest as first formula that advanced by Davies referred to in ourtel 5664,[2] para 3 and our telecon Mar 22[3] namely separate second item "question of demilitarization of Ger in relation to above". Second position wld be to substitute for "in relation to above" some such words as "taking above fully into account". Third position wld be to put in item referring simply to "question of demilitarization of Ger". Brit Emb to tell SecState also Morrison attaches great importance to ensuring mtg of four Mins.[4]

Parodi said similar approach to Dept wld be made by Fr Amb.

Davies answered my question by saying that if Gromyko turned down successively these three positions they wld then be willing to propose Parodi formula for combined agenda. UK still opposes idea of return to completely neutral agenda which after our original item one wld refer simply to "questions concerning Ger". Morrison calls this a "skeleton" agenda and says it wld still leave it up to Mins to decide what to talk about.

I said I had no new instructions but had had opportunity thorough discussion Webb[5] over weekend and that he had stressed effect on Amer opinion including Cong opinion if this mtg resulted in what was interpreted as capitulation to Sov thesis that "question demilitarization of Ger" was subj to debate with Sovs and that therefore implementation of Brussels decisions might be held in abeyance pending CFM. I touched on possible serious effects such a position on Cong action for appropriations for Eur aid. I pointed out to Davies that ticker already carried accurate summary of what he had just told me and noted Fr press has continued to play line of western split with US opposing Franco-Brit willingness reach agreement with Sovs. I told him important point in his statement was willingness to accept eventually demilitarization of Ger as separate item divorced from all other considerations thus repudiating statements three of us have frequently made in quadripartite mtgs. Parodi and Davies argued we wld first propose alternate formula indicating relation to other topics but I insisted they had given away their hand by admitting they wld agree to drop statement of this relationship. They then argued that

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[2] Dated March 23, p. 1104.

[3] A transcript of this telecon, not printed, is in file 396.1-PA/3-2251.

[4] On March 28 the U.S. Delegation was informed that Steel had seen Perkins on that day and left with him the substance of an instruction from Morrison along these lines. Steel was informed that the United States still opposed the inclusion of "demilitarization of Germany" and was determined not to accept an "unneutral or slanted agenda." Telegram 5082 to Paris (396.1-PA/3-2751).

[5] The discussion under reference has not been identified further.

having this as item 2 wld permit Mins to bring out relationship at CFM. I recalled previous discussion with them in which they admitted in last analysis cld not break on question of order of items. They insisted they would not agree to have this as first item but had no convincing answer to argument that if they wld move step by step as suggested towards Russian position final concessions wld not be forthcoming if Gromyko remained adamant.

I told them since they were taking it up in Wash I did not wish to argue matter further here but felt sure SecState wld be unable agree with their proposal.

All agreed nothing of this kind cld be done for several days pending Wash consultations. Agreed we wld at present attempt overcome newspaper reports by reemphasizing basic position of West, including ref Korea, change of conditions since 1945, fact current western policies adopted as result changed conditions and were fully justified, and finally that Brussels decisions stand until Sov reaches agmt which wld modify factual situation on which our policies are based. Only disagreement was Davies reluctance to mention Korea. Further agreed to table today 3 separate items on Hung, Bulg and Rum peace treaties reading substantially as in our 5694.[6] Davies still hesitant about mentioning human rights clauses but thought he cld. We will confer on this just before afternoon quadrapartite mtg. Parodi indicated they felt more strongly on Trieste question than on question demilitarization Ger. He said Fr much concerned effect on Ital and Yugo opinion of current publicity about Trieste discussion in deps mtgs. However, we all agreed listing satellite treaties items cld be coupled with Ital treaty item re Trieste cast in same form.

Only hopeful aspect of present tripartite situation is apparent decision Fr and Brit to make strong statements during next few days firming tripartite unity and fixed determination. They will evidently do this in hopes it will be prelude to accepting item on demilitarization of Germany. Next developments will necessarily await result of conversations in Wash.

Suggest Dept consider desirability telling Br-Fr Ambs since impossible accept Br proposal best procedure is to move at once to Parodi formula for combined agenda regarding which Webb took my ex-

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[6] In telegram 5694 on March 26, Jessup had transmitted the draft of a new six-point agenda which he hoped might get the meetings "off dead center." Item 3, Part II, of the proposed agenda read as follows:

"Treaty of peace with Hungary in regard to its provision on human rights, its military clauses and its final clauses on settlement of disputes."

Parts III and IV read the same for Bulgaria and Romania. (396.1–PA/3–2651) These items were tabled at the 18th session on March 27 as one proposal. Telegram 5721 from Paris, March 27 (396.1–PA/3–2751). For additional documentation on the efforts of the United States to secure implementation of the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, see volume IV.

planatory memo for Secty. Wld appreciate Dept's further views formulation Western position on Parodi formula as forecast telecon Mar 22.

[JESSUP]

396.1–PA/3–2851 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, March 28, 1951—9 p. m.

5754. For Matthews from Jessup. New proposals put in today by Gromyko represent first formal and serious break in Russian position on anything of major importance.[1] It shld be regarded in light of his introductory remarks which while largely purely propaganda, nevertheless contain interesting para on substantive discussion to effect that Sov del had been driven to such discussion by Western dels. While not conclusive, these remarks rather indicated desire to shy away from policy discussions possibly as result of our intervention on satellite treaties yesterday. It looks to us, therefore, as though Moscow had instructed Gromyko to make this concession based at least partly on desire to arrive at agreement within reasonable time.

Present draft obviously contains unacceptable portions in wording of phrases relating to armaments and fulfillment of treaties which in both cases are limited to four powers. Problem may also exist with respect to location of phrase re existing level of armaments. We think we can deal with these points, but essential question is acceptability present reference to demilitarization of Ger. We feel that Ger demilitarization formula having come as Sov move to West rather than further Western concession to their point of view is element of great importance in present public position of Western Powers. For same reason, we anticipate great difficulty with French and Brit in turning down out of hand Russia formula offer, which is now under our gen heading Item 1 with no specific reference to Potsdam. Furthermore, we have doubts whether our previous arguments wld be convincing if

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[1] The Soviet proposal for Item 1 of the agenda, tabled at the 19th session, read: "Examination of causes of present international tensions in Europe and of means necessary to secure a real and lasting improvement in relations between Soviet Union, the US, Great Britain and France, including the following questions: on demilitarization of Germany; on reduction of armed forces of USA, USSR, Great Britain and France and in connection with this discussion of existing level of armaments and question of establishment of international control over implementation of reduction of armed forces; on other measures for elimination of threat of war and fear of aggression; on fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements of four powers." Telegram 5742 from Paris, March 28 (396.1–PA/3–2851).

The U.S. Delegation reported on the 19th session in telegram 5755 from Paris, March 28 (396.1–PA/3–2851).

advanced against acceptance in its present form either for quadripartite presentation or explanation to press.

We have been so close for several weeks to drafting details of wording, et cetera, on these items that we wld appreciate Dept's opinion as to whether or not as presently formulated item on Ger appears to be dangerous or slanted in Sov direction, and as to probable reaction in US. Wld re-emphasize that since this draft came from Sovs and not from us, it affects line of thinking and arguments reflected in exchanges of tels and our tels. Assume Secretary will convey his view to Schuman and that you will instruct us accordingly for our guidance in tripartite and quadripartite tomorrow.[2]

[JESSUP]

[2] At 11 p. m., March 28, the Department of State cabled Paris that it was unable to forward authoritative guidance in time for the quadripartite meeting on March 29 but that its preliminary view was that the "Sov draft, while ostensibly constituting important concession, is full of bugs." (Telegram 5084, March 28, 396.1–PA/3–2851)

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 51

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 29, 1951.

Participants: The Secretary, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Bruce, Mr. Perkins, Mr. Bonbright, Mr. O'Shaughnessy, Mr. Schuman, Mr. Daridan, Mr. de Juniac, Sir Oliver Franks

After greeting Mr. Schuman, the Secretary inquired whether it would be agreeable to take up first the latest Soviet proposal tabled yesterday in Paris by Gromyko.[2] Mr. Schuman agreed and asked the Secretary if he would give his impressions.

The Secretary said that the views which he was about to express were tentative and he wished to advance them solely for the purpose of discussion. Frankly he thought that the Gromyko proposal was not very satisfactory and did not represent a great concession. It was true that the question of German demilitarization was now included in Item I of the agenda but it thereby came under the heading of "Causes of Tension" and was also placed as the first specific subject to be discussed under the Item. He asked whether there was any need for

[1] This meeting, which took place from 3:15 to 4:45, was the first of three between Schuman and Acheson held during the visit of President Auriol to Washington. For further documentation on Auriol's visit and the other conversations between Schuman and Acheson, see volume IV.

[2] For the text of this proposal, see footnote 1, *supra*.

hurry. If not, we should seek some method of improving our tactical position since if we take the Gromyko proposal as a basis for discussion and they refuse to make changes in it, we may be stuck with it. He thought this was bad bargaining tactics. He said that all of us were anxious to have an agenda which would not prejudice the outcome of a meeting of the four Ministers where our task will be difficult enough. (Mr. Schuman agreed.) Therefore, we were thinking of how best to negotiate an agenda in such a way as not to help the Soviets and not to limit action by the Western powers before the conference takes place. We must also avoid giving the Russians a propaganda advantage which they can exploit before the meeting of the Ministers.

The Secretary said that we thought the way to do this might be to put in a counter-proposal now. This would give us time to bargain back and forth. In our view the best counter proposal would be along the lines of the "Parodi formula".[3] The Secretary thought that it would be very hard for the Soviets to break on the Parodi proposal because this formula permits each side to present its view and it gives us a chance to be flexible. If we suggest changes in the Gromyko proposal and the latter does not accept them, he can go home and we would be in a bad position. This would not appear to be the case with the Parodi formula. Consequently, we felt that it would be disastrous to accept the Gromyko proposal as a basis for discussion.

Mr. Schuman said that when he first read the text of the Gromyko proposal last evening and again this morning his impression was that it was "not too bad". He thought it showed very considerable progress on the part of the Soviets because it accepted our proposition that all details would be discussed under our general heading "Causes of Tension". He thought the Gromyko proposals left freedom of action for both sides to advance their views and it did seem like an effort on the part of the Russians to move in our direction. Mr. Schuman said that Mr. Parodi had informed him that this was also his personal impression.

Mr. Schuman went on to say that he did not by any means rule out Mr. Acheson's proposal. He thought that if the Soviets did agree to the Parodi formula, it was probably the best way to write the agenda. He thought that the formula would also be helpful if we ran into trouble on the questions of Austria and Trieste which we could then handle in the same way. In fact, he had no trouble personally in accepting the idea. However, he said that Mr. Parodi did not believe the Soviets would accept it.

Mr. Schuman said that it was an important fact that the opening statement of the Gromyko proposal was the same as what we had

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[3] Under the "Parodi Formula" a split agenda would have been agreed with those items which had obtained quadripartite agreement placed first, followed by the unagreed items which each side wanted to submit.

tabled. He also thought that the question of German demilitarization need not necessarily be discussed first under the general heading. The order in which questions were listed under Item I did not in his opinion affect the order in which they might be discussed.

The Secretary interjected that in his opinion the Soviets would insist on discussing questions in the order that they appear on the agenda.

The Secretary referred again to the harmful propaganda to which we would be subjected if the Soviets were in a position to say that all four governments agree that German demilitarization was a cause of tension. They would also claim that the Ministers were to meet to decide how the demilitarization of Germany can go forward. This would be very discouraging to Germany and would adversely affect the present conference in Paris on the formation of the European army. The Soviets would probably say that this conference should stop. Unless we can keep our momentum, we will run into harmful delays and the chances for achieving a European army, which next to the Schuman Plan holds out the greatest hope for European unity, will be lost.

The Secretary also stressed that there are other objections to the Gromyko proposal. Among these he referred to the Soviet desire to limit the "reduction of armed forces" to the forces of the four powers. This would leave the satellites out. The Secretary found the next phrase of the Soviet proposal very obscure and thought that under it the Soviets would again bring out their proposal for a one-third reduction in the armed forces of the four powers.

With regard to the last point made by the Secretary, Mr. Schuman indicated that this would be unacceptable. He referred to the fact that we had already refused it at Lake Success and would continue to do so. However, he found some "extenuation" in the Gromyko draft. He pointed out that the first Soviet text spoke of the demilitarization of Germany and specifically referred to the Potsdam Agreement.[4] Their latest proposal dropped the reference to Potsdam and inserted the word "question" before the reference to the demilitarization of Germany. He thought this was an improvement and said that in discussing the subject he did feel very free to talk as he pleased on the German question. In other words, he would not be a prisoner of the Russian wording. However, Mr. Schuman agreed that Mr. Acheson's point regarding the propaganda dangers prior to a conference of the four Ministers was well taken.

Mr. Perkins remarked that by putting the German question under the causes of tension and listing it first, Europeans would wonder if we have changed our minds about the Brussels' decisions.

Mr. Harriman interjected that this would cause confusion in this country too.

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[4] For the text of the first Soviet draft agenda, see telegram 5182, March 5, p. 1087.

Mr. Perkins also referred to the other difficulties connected with the Russian wording and thought that if we took the German subheading we would no longer have a major issue on which to stand firm and which the public would understand.

In reply to a question from Ambassador Bruce, Mr. Schuman admitted that under the Gromyko draft the question of German demilitarization is a cause of tension. He certainly did not think that we could deny that it was a cause of anxiety. However we have already accepted on a tripartite basis the idea of talking about it under Item I and we could not go back on this without great difficulty.

The Secretary then said that what faces us is the decision of what we do tactically at this time. He repeated that he saw no harm in putting forth the Parodi formula.

Mr. Schuman again agreed that the Parodi formula was a good one but he was still fearful of anything which might cause the negotiations to be broken off. In reply to a question from the Secretary as to whether he thought the Soviets really would break off, Mr. Schuman said that he did not have sufficient information. He agreed, however, that for them to break on the Parodi formula would not be reasonable.

Mr. Harriman observed that if the Soviets did break, it would at least show the world that a conference of the four Ministers would have had no chance of success.

Mr. Schuman said that the Parodi proposal had originally been suggested to Mr. Davies and Mr. Jessup with his (Mr. Schuman's) personal approval. He also again expressed anxiety about the Trieste question. He then asked how the discussion in the Ministers' meeting would proceed after they had got beyond the general causes of tension. He thought the fact that the Soviet proposals and our proposals were different and in a different order would create an extremely confused situation and the Russians would certainly point this out. It was admitted that this problem would create difficulties.

Ambassador Bruce observed that if we believe that the Soviets would break on the Parodi formula, we must conclude that we have no alternative to accepting the Soviet text.

The Secretary then outlined the points which he suggested might be embodied in a message from him and Mr. Schuman to Messrs. Jessup and Parodi. Mr. Schuman agreed with the Secretary's outline as a result of which the following message was approved:

"We have discussed the latest Soviet proposal and are agreed that while it represents an advance on the part of the Soviet Government, the text is not yet satisfactory. We have been considering what the best tactic would be to obtain an improvement in the Soviet draft. We fear that if we accept Gromyko's latest proposal as a basis for discussion and Gromyko subsequently refuses to agree to such further changes as we all feel will be necessary, we will be trapped. We would, therefore,

like the Deputies to consider the wisdom of introducing the 'Parodi' formula as a tactical move. Our hope would be that in order to avoid the 'Parodi' formula Gromyko may agree to improve his present draft."

It was then decided to call in the British Ambassador and get his views on the preceding discussions. The Secretary explained to Sir Oliver what had transpired before his arrival and acquainted him with the text of the telecon message which he and Mr. Schuman had agreed to send to the Deputies in Paris.[5]

Sir Oliver said that when the British Government was corresponding with the Russians and exchanging notes with them they believed that the two points on which the Russians would insist would be: 1) that the Potsdam Agreements must be used as a basis for discussion; and 2) that the demilitarization of Germany must be the main topic of the CFM. Therefore, he supposed that the first thought in London was that a substantial advance had been made by not having Potsdam as a basis and having the demilitarization of Germany in the wider context of causes of tension. He said that he believed that the judgment in London on the broad issue would be that the Russian move was to bring the CFM nearer, and that the Government would, therefore, approve the use of the "Parodi" formula in terms of tactical discussion within the broad framework. So far as the precise suggestion went, he believed that London would be quite willing to put it up to the Paris Deputies but would probably tend to estimate the degree of advance more highly than the U.S. and French did. He said that so far as the tactics were concerned, he could see no reason not to try to see what more could be gotten from the Russians. He added that this might get rid of one or two of the difficulties of the last weeks but not all of them.

The Secretary said that we were concerned about the considerable period which would elapse before the CFM, perhaps as much as 60 days. In the meantime we must live with the agenda set up and consider its effect on Germany, its effect on the Paris negotiations for a European Army, and its effect here on the Congress in terms of its decisions on foreign assistance and the sending of troops to Europe. The reaction of public opinion would be very important and if public opinion felt that we had accepted the demilitarization of Germany, it would have a very bad effect.

Mr. Harriman said that many people here would think that we had conceded the demilitarization of Germany and gone back on the Brussels Agreement.

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[5] At 3 p. m. the Department of State had begun a teletype conference with the U.S. Delegation, during the course of which the agreed message was transmitted as well as the substance of Ambassador Frank's remarks. A transcript of the telecon is in file 396.1–PA/3–2951).

The Secretary added that if we had the wrong agenda, the people in this country would think that we are considering the demilitarization of Germany and, therefore, Congress will tend to wait for the question of demilitarization to be settled before taking any action. Mr. Schuman said that no such interpretation would arise in France, and that we must have an agreed tactical position.

Mr. Schuman then asked how many weeks we thought would be necessary to prepare for a CFM after the Deputies' work was over. He said it was very important to present a strong common front on the question of Germany, Austria, Trieste and the level of armaments. He believed that it would take at least two months as we were now quite insufficiently prepared and our Deputies in Paris were not even prepared to think about it.

Mr. Schuman mentioned one other difficulty, namely, the date of the CFM. The French Government, he said, desires to hold elections on June 10, and that it will be necessary to have several weeks for the campaign and, therefore, it would be difficult for the French Government to participate in an international conference after the 20th of May. (Mr. Schuman subsequently said that he personally did not consider it likely that elections would be held before the fall.)

In answer to Ambassador Bruce's question as to the likelihood of elections being held in June Mr. Schuman replied that Premier Queuille had called President Auriol and will propose next week that the date be fixed for June 10. It is not possible, he said, to hold elections after June 10 because of the Feast of Ramadan which lasts for four weeks during which it is impossible to hold elections in the Mohammedan areas. Moreover, Vishinsky must not be given the impression that the conference must be finished in three or four weeks as this would be distinctly to his advantage. Mr. Schuman said that he had to be home for the election period. The suggestion was made that it might be possible to recess the conference during the election period. Mr. Schuman made the suggestion that the conference might be held after June 15 if Washington was not too hot. Mr. Harriman cautioned against holding a CFM without ample time. He asked Mr. Schuman what effect the holding of a conference would have on French elections and Mr. Schuman replied that it would have very little if any.

396.1–PA/3–3151 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, March 31, 1951—2 p. m.

5835. From Jessup. Ourtel 5824.[2] Introduction yesterday by Sov del of agenda item on Atlantic treaty has given West opportunity to demonstrate again that it wants to get on with drafting agenda rather than engage in propaganda exchanges or substantive discussions with Sovs here.

At tripartite mtg this morning Davies, Parodi and I agreed to recommend to our secretaries that fol proposal be tabled at quadripartite session Monday.

"I. Examination of causes and effects of present internatl tensions in Europe and of means to secure real and lasting improvement in relations between USSR, US, UK and France, including fol questions:

A. Existing level of armaments and armed forces, and measures for internatl control and reduction of armaments and armed forces, including those of USSR, US, UK and France, (subj to minor drafting changes),

B. Demilitarization of Ger,

C. Fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements,

D. Measures for elimination of threat of war and fear of aggression.

II. Completion of treaty for re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria.

III. Problems relating to re-establishment of Ger unity and preparation of treaty of peace."

. This "common sense" approach wld be presented to Sovs as a serious draft in spirit of real negot, aimed at eliminating differences separating us.

All here agree that this approach shld be made Monday.

(1) Tactically it gives us an opportunity to get talks here moving in our direction.

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[1] Repeated to London, Moscow, and Frankfurt.

[2] Not printed. At the tripartite meeting on March 30 the Western Deputies agreed that the introduction of the "Parodi formula" would not be good tactics and decided to ask Gromyko to explain the differences between his draft and that of the Western Deputies. This was done at the 20th session on March 30 at the end of which Gromyko introduced the two following new agenda items:

"1. Atlantic Treaty and creation of American military bases in England, Norway, Iceland and in other countries of Europe and Near East.

2. Treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary including their provisions on human rights, their military clauses and their final clauses on settlements of disputes; arguments of four powers concerning Germany and Austria, including questions of de-nazification and democratization and of war criminals." (396.1–PA/3–3051)

(2) From propaganda point of view it presents us in excellent light and reasserts our unchanged attitude toward agreed task of reps to draft agenda.

(3) In view of tels from London (to Dept as 5155) and Moscow (to Dept as 1738)[3] as well as reaction of Reber who arrived here this morning, addition of "and effects" in introductory sentence of item 1 we consider removes chief remaining disadvantage of phrase "demilitarization of Ger."

If Dept approves above text, we wld appreciate views on whether we must under all circumstances, even to breaking point, insist on "Ger demilitarization" being second point under item 1.

It might develop that we wld have to decide whether it was more important to get Sovs to accept "and effects" in introductory sentence, with "Ger demilitarization" as first sub-point, or yield to Sovs if they refused "and effects" while insisting that "Ger demilitarization" cannot be listed first. Obviously we will seek to obtain both points but my question is whether Dept considers we must irrevocably stick by both, if choice develops.

This recommended approach for Monday reflects situation as it existed at tripartite mtg this morning but may of course be affected by private discussion at lunch today of four reps or by quadripartite mtg this afternoon, if Gromyko insists on holding one despite preference of three not to meet until Monday.[4]

If situation remains tactically unchanged this afternoon, I strongly urge Department approve recommended course as calculated protect our substantive interests as well as our tactical and propaganda position.[5]

[JESSUP]

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[3] Neither printed; they both expressed support of Jessup's view that the new Soviet proposal should be taken seriously and accepted as a basis for discussion (396.1-PA/3-3051).

[4] At the luncheon Gromyko agreed to postpone the 21st session until April 2 and gave the impression that he was "very anxious to have some Western draft which he could submit to Moscow." Jessup concluded that further meetings would make no progress and "little sense" until the three Western Deputies agreed on a written proposal. (Telegram 5839 from Paris, March 31, 396.1-PA/3-3151)

[5] At 5 p. m. Washington time the U.S. Delegation was informed that the draft was approved subject to the understanding that this was the limit of U.S. concessions. The draft was tabled at the 21st session on April 2 with Item I of the agenda revised, at the suggestion of Schuman, to read:

"I. Examination of causes and effects of present international tensions in Eur and of means to secure real and lasting improvement in relations between Sov Union and US, UK and France, including fol questions relating to: existing level of armaments and armed forces, and measures for internatl control and reduction of armaments and armed forces, including those of USSR, US, UK and France; demilitarization of Ger; fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements; elimination of threat of war and fear of aggression." Telegrams 5160 to Paris and 5851 from Paris, March 31 and April 2 (396.1-PA/3-3151 and 4-251).

396.1–PA/4–351 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, April 3, 1951—2 p. m.

5881. From Jessup. At tripartite mtg this morning Parodi and Davies indicated initially willingness accept mention on agenda of Atlantic Pact and American mil bases in foreign countries.

Jessup said his personal view was that West cld not accept this subject for agenda. He pointed out Gromyko's ref to "decision" to be taken on this subject by Foreign Mins. He noted essentiality of differentiating between discussion of present international situation and decision by four Foreign Mins on NAT Treaty which was permanent part of peace machinery. He called attention to fact that other than three Western powers involved in NATO and USSR not member.

Parodi promptly saw the light, but Davies continued point to difficulty of refusing mention subject on agenda. Davies opposed Jessup's tentative suggestion that Gromyko might be told privately today to tell his govt that West wld not accept NAT base item on agenda. Davies said he wld have to consult London.

Alternative methods handling Sov item were discussed. It was agreed: (1) West wld ask today for further reply from Gromyko on new complete agenda presented yesterday; (2) Consideration wld be given to future moves including proposal to counter-balance Sov item with one referring to Sov support of armed aggression or something of same type; (3) To obtain our govt's position on whether we were ready to face deadlock here if Sovs insisted on NAT and bases item.

Ref Deptel 5194,[2] cancellation of this afternoon's quadripartite meeting seemed quite impracticable. Mtg will be used to find out if possible Sov purpose in introducing NAT and bases item and Sov reaction to new Western agenda. If Gromyko renews propaganda attack on NAT and bases, appropriate replies will be made.[3]

[JESSUP]

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[1] Repeated to Moscow, London, and Frankfurt.

[2] Not printed; it stated that, if the meeting on April 3 could not be postponed, the United States should continue to challenge Gromyko's willingness to reach agreement and should attack the Soviet military alliance system and its stationing of troops outside the USSR (396.1–PA/4–251).

[3] At the 22d session Gromyko said that the April 2 tripartite proposal was unsatisfactory since it did not list the Soviet proposals on Trieste and NATO. Telegram 5911, from Paris, April 3 (396.1–PA/4–351).

396.1-PA/4-651

The Director of the Office of German Political Affairs (Laukhuff) to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade)

SECRET

PARIS, April 6, 1951.

Letter No. 12

DEAR HANK: There has been a considerable lapse in my correspondence but for some time it seemed to me either that the regular messages going out gave you a pretty clear picture, or that moves were being made too rapidly for a letter to be timely and useful. Now we have reached a moment of stabilization again and perhaps another expression from me will not be amiss.

We have gone a long way from our starting point, especially on the question of the "demilitarization of Germany". I realize how very hard it was for you in the Department to come around to the present position of accepting those words by themselves, even when the idea that they are the result instead of the cause has been gotten in by adding the words "and effects". It was very hard for us here, too, and certainly our draft of April 2 is not the agenda we would *like* to put before the Ministers. However, it seems to me that it is important to be able to "give" at the proper time; important for the sake of our relations with the French and British, as well as for the impression created on world opinion, and also in order to feel out the real intentions of the Russians. I think we did the right thing by moving as we did in our April 2 draft, and I believe we have maintained the essentials of our position and can demonstrate that it's the Russians who have really had to come down off their mountain top.

But so far as the German demilitarization item is concerned, I think we've come absolutely to the end of our road and we should refuse adamantly to accept it as the *first* sub-point in Item One. I've written my first memo of this conference to express this view (a copy has gone forward under separate cover to Arch [1] and you) and am glad Schumacher has so promptly backed me up! [2] But we'll have lots of trouble with the British and French on this, because they're both willing and even eager to accept the Soviet desire to put German demilitarization first, in order to get our way on something else.

We have the increasing impression that Soviet policy and aims with regard to this meeting and a CFM, as well as the situation in general, have undergone quite a change since November, and indeed even since the beginning of our talks here. They seem to display no interest

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[1] John Archibald Calhoun, Deputy Director of the Office of German Political Affairs.

[2] On April 5 McCloy had reported that Schumacher was not at all happy about the latest Soviet proposal, feeling that demilitarization of Germany as the first item was "very dangerous." (Telegram 696 from Bonn, April 5, 396.1-PA/4-551)

whatever in German unity, a peace treaty, etc., and their emphasis on German demilitarization and Potsdam has slackened way off. What increasingly comes to the fore is "the arms race" and their emphasis on a reduction of armaments. They seem—and I emphasize that we can only get an impression, of course, from a lot of little things—but they seem to be really worried by the U.S. rearmament effort, and to a lesser extent that of the other NAT countries. These things are dangerous to prophesy about but I incline to think we're not in for anything startling as far as Germany is concerned but that every Soviet effort will be directed towards frustrating what they now recognize as the main threat—the rearmament effort of the U.S. I think we must be extremely careful here not to give them any handle in the agenda to implant doubts in the minds of the Congressional opposition as to the firmness of the Administration's intention to get on with a very pressing job—nor as to the firmness of British and French intentions. Parodi seems more alive to the danger than Davies, who is really most extraordinary in his willingness to take anything, almost, in order to reach agreement. Chip feels, perhaps rightly, that there is personal ambition behind this attitude; you know, the thing which bites so many newcomers, "the man who reached an agreement with the Russians".

Sincerely yours, PERRY

396.1–PA/4–951 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, April 9, 1951— 11 p. m.

6048. From Jessup. At tripartite meeting today Davies said he believed West had very largely achieved its objective and that deps were relatively near agreement. He argued strongly for submission his compromise on agenda (ourtel 5954 [2]). He said that unless West made further attempt to meet Sov we wld be in danger of losing propaganda battle with public losing interest or becoming pessimistic about our reaching agreemnt. His second fear was that Gromyko wld get fed up and Sov wld break conference after saying we not seriously interested in agreeing on agenda or on holding FonMins conference. When

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[1] Repeated to London, Moscow, Frankfurt, and Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it reported on the tripartite meeting on April 5 during which Davies had indicated that he would be prepared (*a*) to accept German demilitarization at the first agenda subitem; (*b*) to accept level, reduction, and control as the order of phrases dealing with armaments; and (*c*) to accept a separate item on Trieste in return for dropping the NATO and Balkan treaty items; and that he could make no commitment to break off the talks over accepting NATO and bases as an agenda item. (396.1–PA/4–551)

I pointed out danger of ending up here with Soviet-slanted agenda, Davies contended that bargain he proposed wld make possible mins meeting without danger to West. He said greater damage to West wld come from break here over agenda than from having less satisfactory agenda for mins.

I suggested we might give Gromyko choice of (1) continuing discussions on basis our April 2 draft (ourtel 5851 [3]); (2) confining item one to fol agreed wording based on Mar 5 draft as amended: "examination of causes and effects of present international tensions in Eur and of means to secure real and lasting improvement in relations between USSR, US, UK and Fr" (ourtel 5851); (3) splitting agenda along lines Parodi formula (second Fr proposal given ourtel 5546 [4]) as amended to take account of extent of present agreement on treaty fulfillment and fear of aggression points.

Parodi supported split as last resort if Sov remained adamant but Davies strongly opposed adding that his latest instructions London supported his belief that tripartite discussion of split agenda was premature. Davies said that agreement here on split agenda wld be admission of political failure. I disagreed with him and with Mallet who said that among ourselves we cld admit Sov thesis that our original agenda item one was not a neutral statement but West's analysis of present situation. I pointed out that UK apparently wanted to give in to Gromyko here even if result was acceptance of heavily Sov-slanted agenda. I said US favored standing firm here even if agreement cld be reached only on basis of split agenda with result that FonMins wld have to deal with remaining agenda differences when they met. I noted final agreement cld not be limited to item one but must also cover Sov Trieste and NAT items.

Parodi restated his belief that West shld find minor concession to include in revised Western agenda proposal to be tabled shortly before resorting to split agenda. He proposed fol revision arms sub-item: "Existing level of armaments and armed forces; reduction and control of armaments and armed forces of US, UK, USSR and Fr."

Parodi called attention to fol concessions included in revision. (1) Phrase "existing level of armaments and armed forces" is separated from remainder of armaments sub-item in order to answer Gromyko's criticism that West is trying to "drown" Sov arms reduction proposal in words. (2) Specific reference to armaments of four powers. Davies reported he cld support (1) and eventually (2) but for time being he wanted to continue to press Sov to yield on limiting armaments sub-item to four powers. I said I was unable to accept any changes this sub-item without specific approval Wash.

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[3] Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 1119.
[4] Not printed. Regarding the "Parodi formula," see footnote 3, p. 1113.

Parodi and Davies disliked Dept revised phrasing armaments sub-item (Deptel 5292 [5]) reading "existing level of armaments and armed forces and measures for establishment of international control over limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces including those of USSR, UK, US and Fr." Both said it wld be considered backward step by Gromyko since it included new word "limitation." Both were prepared to accept "control over reduction" but only as part of Fr revision. Item wld read "existing level of armaments and armed forces; reduction and control over armaments and armed forces of US, UK, USSR and Fr."

It was agreed to continue general debate today to give Gromyko full opportunity to present any new concessions.

[JESSUP]

[5] Not printed.

396.1–PA/4–1351 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup), at Paris [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1951—6 p. m.

5430. For Jessup from the Secretary. Following represents US position on the agenda points under discussion in Paris and unless further instructed, should serve as your basic guidance. Within the limits of the positions outlined below we will leave to your discretion the tactical handling of the discussion and timing in submission of new items, with, however, prior notification to the Department before adopting the new approach authorized in Section III of this message:

I. With reference to the three points in disagreement under Agenda item one, our position is (*a*) we are not prepared at this stage to accept the change in the position of the sub-item on German demilitarization, but as previously indicated (para 3 Deptel 5377 [2]) if this point is the only remaining obstacle to complete and satisfactory agenda, you would be authorized to accept; (*b*) we are not prepared to accept in any circumstances the mention of control and reduction of armaments and armed forces ahead of level of armaments and we understand this is an agreed position with other delegations; (*c*) we are not prepared to accept the limitation of control and reduction of armaments and armed forces of the Four Powers alone. We consider that such limitation might cause serious difficulties at actual CFM discussion and in any case it is misleading and dangerous to convey impression in agenda

[1] This telegram was drafted by Bohlen, who had returned to Washington for consultations. Secretary Acheson had discussed it with President Truman at the Cabinet meeting on the morning of April 13, and the President had approved it. Memorandum by Battle, April 13, not printed (396.1–PA/4–1351).

[2] Not printed.

item that control and reduction could be applicable only to the Four Powers. The arguments which you and the French and the British representatives have developed on this point seem to us entirely convincing and should be continued if the Soviets continue to stress it.

II. Other outstanding items on agenda.

A. We will not accept the inclusion on any agreed Four Power agenda of the North Atlantic Treaty and US bases items. We understand both British and French in agreement with us in this position. We will endeavor to obtain Defense concurrence in your use, in your discretion, of Soviet military alliances and stationing of Soviet troops abroad, as debating point.

B. Trieste–Balkan items. We consider, in following order of preference, positions which you might take on Trieste and Balkan items:

(1) Drop Trieste and other items which specifically name existing treaties on ground that general treaty sub-head in item I affords complete opportunity for ministers to raise any treaty points.
(2) Amend tripartite Balkan treaty item to include "Italy (including provisions on Trieste)".
(3) Include both Trieste and tripartite Balkan treaty item as separate items.
(4) As final position, you are authorized to suggest acceptance of Soviet amended Italian-Balkan treaty item so long as no separate Trieste item appears on agenda.

We will leave to your discretion the tactical handling of these related subjects within the limits set forth above, but before submitting (4) make prior reference to Department.

C. We must insist upon inclusion of Austrian item.

D. No problem is presented by German unity and peace treaty item since this is an agreed item.

III. In the event that you come to the conclusion there is no possibility of obtaining an agreed agenda in accordance with the positions set forth in I and II above, you would be authorized, in agreement with British and French colleagues, to submit as one proposal the following three alternatives to the Soviet delegation (para 2 urtel 6048 [3]) as a means of breaking the impasse:

A. Resubmission of our April 2 complete agenda proposal [4] as maximum to which West could go in attempting to list specific points in order to meet Soviet views.

B. Return to March 5 completely general and non-specific agenda.[5]

C. A split agenda on Parodi formula containing notification by Soviet and Western delegations of points they intend to raise in

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[3] *Supra.*

[4] For the text of this proposal, see telegram 5835, March 31, p. 1118, and footnote 5 thereto.

[5] For the text of this agenda, see footnote 2, p. 1088.

discussions at CFM. We will furnish you with suggested points for inclusion and hope you will give us any points you wish to suggest.[6]

FYI you will note this message is not being sent to any other addressees for time being.

ACHESON

[6] The proposal for submitting these three alternatives to the Soviet Delegation became known as the "triple play."

396.1–PA/4–1551 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup), at Paris [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 15, 1951—12 midnight.

5463. For Jessup. Franks came to see Sec'y late this afternoon with long message from Morrison along following lines. Message apparently drafted before receipt of Davies account of luncheon with Gromyko Saturday (which closely paralleled your account).[2]

Brit believe that we have reached period of serious negotiation and next week will reveal whether agreement is possible or break may occur. Morrison made clear that Brit cannot for internal political reasons contemplate break at Deputies level. Reason given was that agenda language is so technical and vague that public would not understand that more than words are involved. It wld appear that in Brit view only two points of real importance exist: (1) order of subitem on German demilitarization and (2) wording of armament subitem.

Message made it clear that Brit are ready to yield on (1).

Re (2) they stress need for finding compromise formula. They put forward following draft:

"Questions relating to measures for the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the USSR, the US, the UK, and France, in the light of the existing level of armaments and armed forces and with a view to international agreement on the reduction and control of armaments."

Morrison also indicated strong dislike for "split agenda" but Franks said that if everything else failed they would accept it.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Bonbright.

[2] Jessup summarized the luncheon with Gromyko on April 14 as follows:

"Informal quadripartite conversation after Parodi's lunch today produced nothing decisive but seemed to shed some light on Sov idea of priorities. Impression is absolute rigidity on armaments item, probable insistence on position of Ger demilitarization, possible elimination NAT item and possible deal on Trieste." Telegram 6227, from Paris, April 14 (396.1–PA/4–1451).

Brit were apparently under impression we were pressing for split agenda now, that we were adamant re order of subitem on German demilitarization, and in general were too rigid.[3]

Sec'y took following line in reply.

He agreed that next week might be crucial.

He still believed that Sovs wanted mtg of Mins.

He thought that tactics were important element and that if we were to give in now on German subitem Russians wld merely move on and concentrate on armaments item and so on down the line. This was why we had been trying in recent days to get Gromyko to discuss agenda as whole. He made it plain that if we were successful in knocking out Sov item on NAT (which we wld not accept) and saw prospect of agreement on other items (notably Trieste and Balkan treaties) question cld be viewed in different light. In that event we might consider agreeing to German subitem as first subject under item one if Sovs accepted our wording of armaments subitem. We wld not however accept wording of armaments subitem which wld leave us open to charge, between now and conclusion of Mins mtg, that western powers had agreed to forego rearmament. Rearmament was policy which three western govts were determined to carry out to correct present balance in favor of USSR. Brit draft proposal quoted above did not appear to meet western requirements in this respect but we were still open to suggestion.

In conclusion and without going into detail Sec'y gave indication of our present thinking along lines para Roman III Deptel 5430.[4] We were not pressing now for split agenda, but failing agreement with Sovs he thought that if we put up three alternative choices to Sov Govt western opinion wld understand and if break occurred wld feel that our position was reasonable. To meet Morrison's point that break shld not occur on Deputies level Sec'y suggested that ultimate presentation of three point proposal might be made by governmental note or by Deputies in name of FonMins.[5]

ACHESON

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[3] In a subsequent telegram Jessup was informed further about the message from Morrison:

"Morrison's msg to Franks suggested that our attitude toward Brit might be influenced by our fear that their desire to move toward accepting Russian wording armament item and order of German demilitarization item might be preview of Brit action at CFM. Franks was instructed to stress that this was not true and that once Mins met Brit wld be just as firm as Fr and ourselves. Franks added personal comment that Brit cld not forget disastrous consequences of Strang's experience with Sovs in 1939. He thought this was real basis for Brit unwillingness to contemplate break at lower than Ministerial level." (Telegram 5476 to Paris, April 16, 396.1–PA/4–1651)

[4] *Supra.*

[5] On April 16 the U.S. Delegation reported that Allen had made a similar approach to Bohlen and De la Tournelle. Bohlen took the same line that Secretary Acheson had, and De la Tournelle rejected the proposals for the same reasons. (Telegram 6240, April 16, from Paris, 396.1–PA/4–1651)

762A.00/4–1851

The Director of the Office of German Political Affairs (Laukhuff) to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade)

TOP SECRET PERSONAL

PARIS, April 18, 1951.

DEAR HANK: I do not know whether my letters have been of any usefulness to you or not. However, in any event there would seem to be very little reason left for my writing any more letters, except if some special point arises, since the Department has made its decision to give way on the last remaining point concerning Germany. I regret this decision to give way at the last if necessary on the question of putting German demilitarization first. I think it will cause us no end of trouble on the propaganda front as well as put us in a disadvantageous position at a CFM itself. All this in addition to the bad effect of our already having accepted the item in any form. I confess I am almost sorry I ever thought of adding the words "and effects", which enabled us to get this demilitarization point into item 1. (Delete "almost"!)

Incidentally, I understood the Department's position to be that we would give way on this point only *after* all other points are settled satisfactorily. I detect signs here of a disposition to offer this lamb on the altar in an attempt to buy Soviet acceptance of our point of view on other items. I doubt that this would ever work, since the Russians would just gobble it up and move on to wear us out on the other points.

Besides, the only real justification which could be advanced for giving way on German demilitarization is that it would meet the British and keep the tripartite front intact. But it is all too clear that this will not placate the British any more than it will the Russians. The British will just grunt, and move on to attack us next for being too rigid on the armaments point, on Trieste, or indeed on NATO. For it seems clear that the British will stop at no concession whatever to "meet the Russians" in order to ensure a CFM. And it must be a CFM with an agreed agenda. They are more adamant in opposing the desire of the French and ourselves to try the "split agenda" (the so-called Parodi formula) than they are in opposing the Soviets.

The British attitude here can leave one with only the following conclusions: that they regard the Brussels decisions on Germany as an agreement in principle only, not to be carried forward seriously before a CFM; and that they will not even put their hearts into their own rearmament or try to convince their allegedly unwilling public that it is absolutely necessary to re-arm, until they have had a CFM discussion. These are not their words, but this is increasingly the sense of what they are saying in our tripartite meetings. This is frightening, and it

would blow our NATO program sky-high if any intimation of such an attitude got out.

It does seem to me that we ought to confront the British now, without any further delay, with a completely firm end position and with a frank warning that their position seems to us to add up to what I said in the paragraph above. The more so since the French are now increasingly on our side. In other words I should think the time has come for a show-down, though I sense a cautious disposition here to avoid facing that.[1] We haven't much time to fiddle-faddle around at this point if we want to keep the public with us, and the only alternative to a showdown is a slow but steady surrender to the British and then to the Russians, point by point. That would make me *really* sorry I ever had to get connected with this enterprise.

I hope you don't mind my unburdening myself like this. Some of this is not my particular business and I don't expect you to do anything about it. I am sending a copy of this to Arch and to no one else.

I hope the load is not too heavy on you these days. I'm sure neither of us anticipated that I would be away so long. If I ever get back I may have to take a week's leave right off the bat to recover! My best to every one.

Sincerely yours, PERRY

[1] At this point in the source text, Laukhuff had inserted an asterisk, and had written below "April 19. — *There have been two new developments. First, the Davies letter which we've telegraphed and which just confirms my diagnosis. Second, a tripartite meeting this morning at which the atmosphere got a little strained when Phil clearly characterized the British position as one of 'capitulation', without a stopping point." A copy of Davies' letter was transmitted in telegram 6328 from Paris, not printed, while the U.S. Delegation reported on the tripartite meeting in telegram 6337 from Paris, April 19 (396.1–PA/4–1951 and 4–1951).

Above these remarks Laukhuff had also written "Am I getting too steamed up? It's hard to keep perspective when one runs around the same squirrel cage day after day."

396.1–PA/4–2151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup), at Paris[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 21, 1951—3 p. m.

5606. For Jessup from Perkins. ReDeptel 5597[2] I told Franks personally of our concern over position which had been adopted in Paris by Davies in recent days with particular reference to the letter which Davies had addressed on April 19 to you and Parodi (urtel 6328[3]). I said that while letter seemed to be based fundamentally on

[1] This telegram, drafted by Bonbright, was repeated to London and Moscow.

[2] Not printed; it reported that Perkins had spoken to Franks on the afternoon of April 20 (396.1–PA/4–2051).

[3] Not printed.

Morrison's views as expressed to the Secretary by Franks, it seemed to us to go beyond Morrison's message and showed a degree of inflexibility which worried us.[4] As Secy told Franks last Sunday we were not pressing for use of "triple play" formula [5] at this precise moment but we felt that it might have possibilities if we continued to be faced with continuation of present Soviet tactics. We thought it shld be thoroughly and rapidly explored and drafts prepared by our three delegates in Paris so that they wld be ready for use on short notice when and if three govts decided this was best move. However, Davies had shown complete unwillingness to even discuss it and was still urging his package proposal, which we cld not accept. Moreover, both we and Fr thought it was tactically wrong now to present Sovs with our ultimate concessions. We were reinforced in this view by brief account we had just received of Friday's quadripartite meeting where Gromyko's attitude did not indicate a move towards a break.[6]

Franks, who had just received a copy of Davies letter, agreed that Davies seemed to have "poured cement around Morrison's ideas". He agreed to send message to Morrison.

We have just received urtel 6399 [7] and will work on possible message from Secy to Morrison. Will endeavor discuss with Secy tomorrow fol his return from Vandenberg's funeral.[8] [Perkins.]

ACHESON

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[4] Regarding Franks' conversation with Secretary Acheson on April 15, see telegram 5463, April 15, p. 1126.

[5] Under reference here is the choice of agenda proposed by Jessup in telegram 6048, April 9, p. 1122.

[6] The U.S. Delegation had reported on the 35th session, April 20, in telegram 6409 from Paris, April 21, stating that no change in position was made on either side (396.1–PA/4–2151).

[7] Not printed; in it Jessup indicated that the U.S. Delegation was faced with two alternatives: to continue the minor give-and-take with Gromyko which might in 2 more weeks work out the Trieste, Balkan, and Austrian items or to initiate the "triple play" formula at once. Jessup favored the latter and hoped that Secretary Acheson would press Morrison to permit it. (396.1–PA/4–2151)

[8] Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg had died at his home in Grand Rapids, Michigan on April 18.

396.1–PA/4–2251 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, April 22, 1951—noon.

6415. From Jessup. At buffet fol showing of Russian film by Sovs last night Gromyko opened upon how we cld finish our work. He said we already had some agreed parts of item 1 and then we cld have the item on Ger unity and peace treaty; the Trieste item; and the Austrian

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[1] Repeated to London, Moscow, Bonn, and Frankfurt.

item. I added the item on the Balkan treaties to which he agreed if it included the Ital treaty. He brushed aside order these items as matter for later consideration.

He then mentioned the NAT–Amer bases item and I told him we simply cld not agree that three parties to this twelve-power treaty cld agree with Sov Union that it was even a basis for discussion by four. He seemed to accept my statement and made no ref to including this item. In connection with Balkan item he made no ref to Aust and Ger agreements but I am not sure whether he meant to drop these. Returning to Item 1 he devoted himself to question of reduction of armaments and said if we cld not accept their draft on this, prospect of agreement was very dark. He made no ref to position of Ger demilitarization item. At this point we were joined by De La Tournelle and soon afterward by Mallet. We continued a prolonged discussion of reduction item. In course of this he agreed that standard Sov position in UN had been to press for agreement on reduction first and then to take up an agreement on controls. He said that their agenda proposal did not state this position. He kept emphasizing that controls and also level cld be considered by Mins simultaneously. He agreed that Mins may not be able to make any decision on reduction until they had agreed on system of controls. De La Tournelle suggested that a proper wording on controls cld include question of level of armaments and that it might not be necessary to mention level at all. I reserved on this but Gromyko stressed his view that mention of level before reduction was the chief difficulty. We three pressed Gromyko on statements he had made about his agenda item which indicated clearly he thought acceptance of his draft wld bind us to policy of reduction before Mins met. He reiterated that our draft wld "untie our hands" but that his draft wld not "tie our hands". He asserted that we had a "political and moral obligation" to abandon armaments race. He then dropped word "political" and insisted that a moral obligation arose from charter irrespective of agenda. He said they wld continue to speak and oppose in every possible way our rearmament program but kept emphasizing that he was not asking us to make an agreement now. Implication of his remarks seemed to be that he cld accept some wording which suggested simultaneous consideration by Mins of reduction and control provided reduction was mentioned first. Throughout entire conversation he made no ref to limiting reduction to four powers.

Allen UK reports other members Sov del at party took line suggesting why not finish this week. These conversations indicate Sov readiness reach agreement rather than preparing break.[2]

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[2] On April 23 the U.S. Delegation reported that Bohlen had had a similar conversation with Semenov following the film. Semenov had stated strongly that the armaments point was the chief Soviet preoccupation, and Bohlen had replied that, in his opinion, Soviet policy at the conference was to ascertain whether or not it could force abandonment of current Western policies. (Telegram 6426 from Paris, April 23, 396.1–PA/4–2351)

In discussion with Mallet and Allen this morning, I said my tentative thinking was that we shld have regular mtg tomorrow since Gromyko indicated yesterday he had not finished his statement.[3] We might tell him before mtg we wld like private conversation perhaps at lunch Tues.[4] At such private mtg we might show him paper not labeled as proposal but designed to indicate where we stand. Such a paper wld take advantage of explicit and implied agreements by Gromyko last night putting in parallel columns as unagreed items perhaps only armaments point and perhaps Balkan item. I suggested leaving Ger demilitarization in second place with possibility of shift on this if necessary to reach full agreement. I agreed if we cld find by Tues mutually satisfactory re-draft armaments item we cld put that on paper opposite his present formulation. In alternative positions on Balkan item we might start with II B 2 (Deptel 5430[5]) or use at some point alternative proposed in ourtel 6401,[6] if this is approved by Sec.

Practical acceptance by Gromyko of Aust item and omission of NAT bases item makes negotiating position easier but difficulty with Brit may still turn on armaments item and tactics of presentation to Gromyko. Inclined to believe both Fr and Brit wld ultimately accept above positions concerning possible mention Ital treaty item.

We may send additional comments later today.

[JESSUP]

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[3] The U.S. Delegation reported that the 36th session on April 23 "brought no change in position on either side, and propaganda blast from Gromyko on armament question, NATO, and American bases." (Telegram 6442 from Paris, April 23, 396.1–PA/4–2351)

[4] At the luncheon on April 24 "Gromyko proved absolutely adamant on all points of difference between Western and Sov positions on agenda items." (Telegram 6455 from Paris, April 24, 396.1–PA/4–2451)

[5] Dated April 13, p. 1124.

[6] Not printed; it suggested acceptance of the Soviet wording on the Balkan treaties and Trieste in exchange for Soviet acceptance of the Western position on an Austrian treaty. (396.1–PA/4–2151)

CFM files, lot M–88, box 157, Paris—official Secretariat documents

Revised Draft Agenda Proposed by the Delegations of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks [1]

SECRET [PARIS, May 2, 1951.]

ALTERNATIVE A

I. Examination of the causes and effects of present international tensions in Europe and of the means to secure a real and lasting improvement in the relations between the Soviet Union, the United States, United Kingdom and France, including the following questions relating to: the demilitarization of Germany; the existing level of armaments and armed forces and measures to be proposed jointly by the U.S.S.R., United States, United Kingdom and France for the international control and reduction of armaments and armed forces; fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements; the elimination of the threat of war and fear of aggression.

II. Completion of the treaty for the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria.

III. Problems relating to the re-establishment of German unity and the preparation of a Treaty of Peace.

IV. Fulfillment of the treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary and of agreements of the four powers concerning Germany and Austria.

V. Fulfillment of the treaty of peace with Italy in the part concerning Trieste.

ALTERNATIVE B

Examination of the causes and effects of present international tensions in Europe and of the means to secure a real and lasting improve-

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[1] The sessions at the end of April having brought no change in the Soviet position, the Western Representatives on April 28 agreed on the need for introducing the "triple play" (first proposed by Jessup in telegram 6048, April 9, p. 1122, and approved by the Department of State in telegram 5430, April 13, p. 1124). An initial draft was transmitted from Paris in telegram 6600, April 30 (396.1–PA/4–3051). The text presented here is the same as that draft except for minor textual differences.

Jessup introduced the agreed tripartite proposal on May 2 at the 42d meeting of the Representatives. The three alternatives, presented here as one document, were designated SUP/P/51 D/20(A), (B), and (C), respectively, in the records of the official Secretariat. In presenting the "triple play," Jessup traced the course of the Four-Power Exploratory Talks since March 5, indicated that the Soviet Delegation had not submitted a new proposal for a full agenda since that date, and stressed that the three Western Governments were prepared to hold a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers on the basis of any one of the three alternatives.

Documentation relating to the drafting of the "triple play," its presentation, and purpose is in file 396.1–PA. For the full text of Jessup's statement in presenting the "triple play," see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 21, 1951, pp. 803–805.

ment in the relations between the Soviet Union, the U.S., the U.K. and France, including the following questions relating to:

(U.S., U.K. AND FRANCE)	(U.S.S.R.)
the existing level of armaments and armed forces and measures to be proposed jointly by the USSR, U.S., U.K. and France for the international control and reduction of armaments and armed forces, the demilitarization of Germany;	the demilitarization of Germany; measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces of the U.S.S.R., the U.K., the U.S. and France, the existing level of armaments and armed forces and the establishment of an appropriate international control;

fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements; the elimination of the threat of war and fear of aggression.

Completion of the treaty for the reestablishment of an independent and democratic Austria.

Problems relating to the reestablishment of German unity and the preparation of a Treaty of Peace.

Fulfillment of the treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary and of agreements of the four powers concerning Germany and Austria.

Fulfillment of the treaty of peace with Italy in the part concerning Trieste.

ALTERNATIVE C

I. Examination of measures for the elimination of the present international tensions in Europe, of the threat of war and of the fear of aggression.

II. Questions concerning armaments and armed forces.

III. Questions concerning Austria.

IV. Questions concerning Germany.

V. Fulfillment of Treaties and Agreements.

396.1–PA/5–451 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT PARIS, May 4, 1951—8 p. m.

6733. From Jessup. In 43rd session Gromyko said SovDel prepared to agree to alternative A [1] on condition that West accept Sov "amendment" on armaments sub-item, which consisted of acceptance Sov

[1] Presumably a reference to Alternative A in the Revised Draft Agenda, *supra*.

wording of Apr 4 on this sub-item.[2] Despite repeated questions, Gromyko merely restated terms of his offer. He made no mention of his NAT and bases item.

Gromyko as chairman led off with statement that SovDel wld agree to adopt alternate A of tri proposal on condition that fol amendment be made. (At this point Gromyko read present tri item on armaments in item one which was to be replaced by Sov wording of Apr 4 on armaments. Gromyko said full agreement now depends on position of 3 powers reduction of armaments and armed forces of 4 powers. Re order of items on agenda, said he already pointed out that deps cld return this question after agreements had been reached on individual items. He suggested that West take 5 minutes recess study Sov proposal.)

Parodi asked Gromyko to explain difference between Sov proposed "amendment" of today and the main Sov proposal of Apr 4. Gromyko replied that this was reason he had suggested deps take 5 minutes to peruse text of Sov proposal.

Davies said that SovDel proposal was same as Sov proposal of Apr 4, which West had already said was unacceptable since it prejudged the question in advance of FonMins mtg. Davies pointed out that major difference among deps re item one of alternative A was over the formulation of armaments sub-item and that new Sov proposal did not facilitate deps work. Gromyko restated Sov proposal, commenting that it is impossible to consider this amendment out of context of Sov acceptance of other items contained in alternative A. Furthermore, tabling of Sov amendment was new factor and shld be considered in connection with all of alternative A.

Jessup said sitn was different from that stated by Gromyko. Sitn actually is that in May 2 proposal, 3 powers indicated they were prepared to accept Sov proposal on position of Ger demil providing SovDel wld agree to Western wording on armaments sub-item. Whereas SovDel suggested that full agreement depends on position of 3 powers re Sov "amendment", agreement on alternative A actually depends on SovDel agreement to wording on armaments acceptable to West. Noted that position of Ger demil was step by 3 powers to meet Sov viewpoint and that SovDel response does not meet Western posi-

[2] The proposal under reference, SUP/P/51 D/16, read:

"Examination of the causes and effects of the present international tensions in Europe and of the means necessary to secure a real and lasting improvement in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, United Kingdom and France, including the following questions relating to: the demilitarization of Germany; measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces of the USSR, United Kingdom, United States and France, the existing level of armaments and armed forces and the establishment of an appropriate international control; the fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements; the elimination of the threat of war and fear of aggression." (CFM files, lot M–88, box 157, Paris—official Secretariat documents)

tion re unacceptability Sov formula on armaments, since Sov amendment exactly same as their Apr 4 proposal. Therefore position of SovDel is that it accepts Western moves re Ger demil and Trieste, but agreement not reached on armaments item.

Parodi said he was tempted after Gromyko's explanation to agree that new Sov proposal is not likely to advance deps work. Noted that it was clear from previous meetings that West cld not accept Sov wording on armaments item. However, certain measure of agreement outside item one had been reached which deps shld preserve. Said deps cld assume that agreement had been reached on all items other than item one and that place of Ger demil and formulation of armaments were still unagreed. Recommended that deps note their agreement on items 2 thru 5 than concentrate efforts on item one.

Gromyko repeated that agreement depends on position of 3 reps re reduction of armaments and armed forces of 4 powers. Pointed out that SovDel as well as Western delegations had made positions clear on armaments question. Davies observed that it wld be helpful if Gromyko wld state whether agreement reached on all items other than item one; then deps cld turn full attention to item one. Gromyko replied that Davies question was unclear and that SovDel had made it clear that it was prepared to accept alternative A on condition that West adopt Sov amendment. Davies restated same question. Gromyko gave same reply, observing that question of order of items on agenda was separate question which cld be established by deps after agreement reached on individual items.

Davies restated his question, commenting in passing on Western concessions to Sov viewpoint and expressing surprise at Gromyko failure to answer his questions. Gromyko made same reply. Davies rephrased his question with greater emphasis this time on extent of Western concessions to Sov viewpoint. Gromyko observed that Davies was repeating the same question to which answers had already been given. Davies rephrased question in terms of specific questions as to whether SovDel agreed to item 2, item 3, etc. Gromyko replied that answers had already been given to these questions and that it was clear that "the matter did not stand on the wording" of these items.

Jessup summarized sitn as fols: SovDel had not accepted any of three alternate proposals introduced on May 2. In effect Gromyko, under guise of an amendment, says that if West accepts Sov proposal on item one agreement cld be reached on alternative A. Since SovDel knows West cannot accept Sov wording on armaments item, matter stands exactly as it did before introduction of amendment. Jessup suggested that if his analysis of sitn were correct, and if no dep desired to comment further, meeting might be adjourned until tomorrow.

Gromyko noted that SovDel replies to Davies question had been given and adjourned meeting until 1100 Saturday.[3]

[JESSUP]

[3] At the 44th session on May 5 the Western Deputies emphasized that the Soviet amendment was unacceptable since it merely restated a previous position, reiterated that the three Western alternatives were still open, and stated that Gromyko was attempting to obtain substantive decisions from the Deputies for the reduction of armaments of the Four Powers. Gromyko took the position that the Soviet view on the Western proposals had been fully stated on May 4 and that agreement now depended on the Western position on the reduction of armaments. Telegram 6744, from Paris, May 5 (396.1-PA/5-551). Gromyko continued these tactics at the 45th session on May 7. (Telegram 6765, from Paris, May 7, 396.1-PA/5-751)

396.1-PA/5-1151 : Telegram

The Minister in France (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, May 11, 1951—1 p. m.

6859. For Matthews from Bohlen. It might be helpful if I give you my personal views on status of conference following Sov move yesterday [1] since from last night's telecon [2] there appears to be some confusion.

The Sov move of yesterday represents another break from a consistently held Sov position: namely, the impossibility of sending any unagreed items to Ministers. There is a temporary fluidity in Sov position on which we shld capitalize and shld, therefore, make up our mind and move quickly. If we were playing the hand alone the preferred position wld obviously be to stand pat on alternate B as presented in triple play but we have real doubts whether we cld hold British and French to that position. My fear is that we will stand pat now on alternate B as presented in triple play and then after several meetings probably because of tripartite difficulties end by yielding on one of the outstanding points.

I assume you realize in Washington that longer meetings go on following triple play our public position which is now excellent will inevitably worsen and not get better. Our inquiry yesterday was to find out which of the two points of difference Dept regarded has greater importance—namely, position of demilitarization as agreed item or

[1] At the 48th session of the Representatives on May 10, after a "long propaganda harangue," Gromyko had offered to accept Alternative B of the "triple play" (see p. 1133) if the Western Representatives would accept German demilitarization as subitem 1 of item 1 and if they would accept the Soviet proposal on NATO and American bases as an unagreed item. The U.S. Delegation reported these events in telegram 6856 from Paris, May 11 (396.1-PA/5-1151).

[2] A transcript of the telecon between Washington and Paris on May 10 is in file 396.1-PA/5-1051.

inclusion of NAT as unagreed point. We had assumed from previous instructions that Dept was firm against yielding German demilitarization position as agreed item but that inclusion of NAT as unagreed item was a last ditch possibility. My personal view is very definitely along those lines since an agreed item is a definite and unjustified concession to Sovs and I do not think we shld pay any price to get them to accept a split agenda. On other hand, an unagreed item is not in my view a concession to Sovs by its very nature since as unagreed item it contains evidence of Western refusal to accept it. Proper publicity cld make this entirely clear in interval before meeting of the Ministers. At Ministers' mtg itself it wld seem to me very easy for three Western Ministers merely to continue to refuse to accept NAT as appropriate item on agenda and it is inconceivable that Vyshinsky wld walk out of conference on that basis. We will, of course, get a full-dress propaganda statement when point comes up, but as previously pointed out in our telegrams, Soviet Minister can do that anyway.

Main point I wish to emphasize is that we must make up our mind quickly and not let meetings drag on to detriment of our public position ending by an acceptance next week of something we refused to do now. I hope, therefore, you can speed up Dept's decision so we can act before weekend recess.

[BOHLEN]

396.1–PA/5–1451

Memorandum by Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 14, 1951.

FOR THE RECORD ONLY

The Secretary went over to see the President on Friday afternoon.[1] Mr. Harriman was also present at the meeting. The Secretary had requested the appointment to discuss with the President the action the United States takes with regard to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

On his return from the White House, the Secretary told a group of people from the Department that the President has very strong feelings about this matter. He believes that the sound course is to stick to the "triple play" and, if the British and French would do so, he would strongly prefer this course. The President is also inclined to believe we would win out on this stand. The President will authorize Mr. Jessup to make a package proposal if the British and French agree that this is the end. The President wanted it made very clear that Mr.

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[1] May 11.

Jessup should do this in an off-the-record meeting as something he would propose if the others would accept. He also wanted it made very clear that this was not a step from which Mr. Jessup would bargain. He should also make clear that there would be no other proposals and that this was the end.

The President expressed himself as feeling very strongly that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should not be on the agenda in any way. The President takes the attitude that this is not something for the CFM to discuss. He also felt it would be preferable to give on the German demilitarization item since from a negotiating point of view it was better to put forward the item which we had already given in on in Alternative A. He feared that any other course might end up in our giving in on both NATO and German demilitarization. In so far as order of items on the Agenda, the President does not care as long as the Austrian item precedes the item on Trieste.

The foregoing is merely for the record, as action has been taken on it.

L[UCIUS] D. B[ATTLE]

396.1-PA/5-1151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup), at Paris [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1951—10 p. m.

6043. For Jessup from the Secretary.

1. After careful consideration of ur recent tels and yesterday's telecon, I discussed with President this afternoon the problem with which you are presently faced in Paris.[2] In Pres' view the sound course for Western Govts to follow is to stick to triple play and he believes that if we do this we will win out.

2. As Brit FonOff indicated in its press release of May 2, Morrison said in his speech on May 6, and I said in my press conf on May 9, we have reached the limit of our concessions to the Soviet Union and have gone to the utmost bounds of reasonableness to make a meeting possible. If we begin the process of yielding on the triple play we will progressively diminish the strength of our position and make it more difficult not to make still further concessions.

3. The President has the deepest feeling against having NAT appear on agenda in any form.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Bonbright, signed by Secretary Acheson, and repeated to London eyes only for Gifford.

[2] A memorandum of Secretary Acheson's discussion with President Truman is *supra*.

4. It is his wish that you make strongest possible effort to persuade Fr and Brit reps of wisdom of this course and to early delivery of tripartite *aide-mémoire* in Moscow.[3]

5. (FYI Matthews and Nitze had conv with Franks this afternoon and urged same course. Franks expressed personal agreement and said that he would telegraph his govt this afternoon.)

6. If it shld prove impossible to persuade Fr and Brit govts to hold the line, the Pres has consented to the fol proposal:

Three Western Deps shld seek private meeting with Gromyko and put up to him as absolutely final a package deal agreeing to alternative B of triple play with Ger demilitarization as first item on both sides of split item I; no mention whatever of NAT; agreement on any order of items II through V provided Austria precedes Trieste.

7. You are only authorized to present this proposition to Gromyko if Brit and Fr reps give you commitment of their govts that this is final and that if Gromyko turns it down three Western Govts will immediately dispatch *aide-mémoire* to Moscow.

8. Reason for insisting on private meeting with Gromyko as opposed to quadripartite session is that this permits us to maintain our public position with respect to triple play.

9. Apart from substantive reason Pres feels that there is tactical advantage in this line of action rather than alternative 2 of telecon of last night[4] since Gromyko has indicated (by his conditional acceptance of alternative A without a NAT item) that he regards NATO as a bargaining item. Similarly, we have indicated corresponding weakness re position Ger demilitarization in Alternative A. He believes therefore that if any further concession is to be made it shld be made where our position is already undermined. If we start showing weakness in another direction, Gromyko will be encouraged to believe that he can get both.

ACHESON

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[3] Toward the end of April, the U.S. Delegation had suggested the possibility of sending an *aide-mémoire* to the Soviet Government, indicating the impasse that had been reached at Paris and asking that new instructions be sent to Gromyko. Various drafts of such an *aide-mémoire* were prepared by the three Western Delegations, but none was finalized pending further developments at Paris. Documentation relating to the drafting and discussion of the proposed *aide-mémoire* is in file 396.1–PA.

[4] Not printed; the second alternative was to add NATO and bases to Alternative B as an unagreed item, preferably as a footnote at the end of the agenda (396.1–PA/5–1051).

396.1–PA/5–1451 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, May 14, 1951—8 p. m.

6931. From Jessup. During tea interval this afternoon Semenov sought out Bohlen and stated as "personal opinion" that if Western Powers accepted NAT as disagreed item putting in Western column [1] such reasons as they desire for refusal of Sov proposal, position of Ger demil cld be worked out without "difficulty". Semenov stated Sov del was genuinely unable to understand strong Western objection to mentioning NAT as disagreed item since this merely reflected what had happened at conf namely, that a Sov proposal had been presented and had been rejected by three Western Powers, but not having been withdrawn was still therefore outstanding. He appeared to lay considerable emphasis on fact that Western Powers wld be entitled to put their explanation of their objection in parallel column.

Semenov also approached in identical vein Laloy of Fr del who also speaks Russian. He added, however, one detail in regard to settlement of position of Ger demil by saying that this might be arranged by inclusion of footnote circulated by Jessup this afternoon which explained that only difference this sub-item was on position and not on wording.[2]

Semenov's remarks were clearly offer under instruction for deal along these lines. Under our present instructions and those of Brit this is unacceptable,[3] but it might forecast a public Sov offer of a similar nature which wld then leave unagreed NAT item the only outstanding question. If such offer is made, strength of Sov position wld lie in fact they were prepared to submit all these items in disagreement to Mins. Since NAT item is disagreed and proposed manner of reference to it wld clearly reflect positions taken in this conf, situation resulting our rejection this offer wld not be easy to handle publicly especially if this were considered cause for not holding any CFM.

While we continue to doubt that Sovs will yield on total acceptance of both outstanding points there is, as always chance that they might

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[1] Presumably this is a reference to the Western (United States, United Kingdom, and France) column in Alternative B, p. 1134.

[2] At the 51st session, before the tea interval, the Western Representatives had introduced a written statement that the only disagreement on the question of German demilitarization concerned its place in item 1. Gromyko did not react specifically to the statement, but, in reiterating the Soviet position on the three alternatives, he was more insistent on referring NATO and American bases to the Foreign Ministers as an unagreed item. (Telegram 6932, from Paris, May 14, 396.1–PA/5–1451)

[3] At the tripartite meeting before the 51st session, Davies reported that Morrison felt the Western Representatives should stand fast on Alternative B and make no more concessions on German demilitarization. (Telegram 6917 from Paris, May 14, 396.1–PA/5–1451)

do so with some face-saving coloration. We wld doubt if even this outside chance wld materialize unless and until Sov Govt is convinced that there will be no conf unless our alternative B is accepted *in toto.* Shld we continue to stand firm on total acceptance and Russians remain adamant on at least one of the issues, breakdown wld occur in circumstances considerably less favorable to West than they were immediately after presentation triple play. In any event, we feel strongly that continuance of present fruitless mtgs are working to Sov advantage and deteriorating our position. We therefore feel we must either process as rapidly as possible to presentation tripartite note or indicate willingness to trade out one or other of two open questions in private session.

We still think there is vast difference between NAT as an agreed item and NAT as a disagreed item clearly reflecting positions taken.

We wonder if President had in mind all possible variations of statement on agenda explaining our rejection NAT item. For example, if NAT item is printed only in Sov column, we might insert opposite in our column "this item was rejected because it is not considered a subject for discussion by the four mins". We still do not understand why such a presentation wld be injurious to US or prejudicial to NAT.

We have gone into general situation here in light of Semenov's offer because we feel bound to reopen possibility of indicated ref to NAT instead of yielding on Ger demil. If this possibility is open for reconsideration, it wld be a variant to para numbered 2 ourtel 6923.[4]

Does Dept consider we can count on Brit standing firm up to breaking point if propaganda picture begins to turn against West as result of several more negative mtgs? Davies' personal views make it likely that in such circumstances he will strongly recommend yielding rather than breaking.

Suggest Dept keep Franks informed of any alteration in Dept's views already communicated to him. (Para 5 Deptel 6043.[5])

[JESSUP]

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[4] Not printed; in it Jessup suggested that there were two assumptions from which the Western Representatives could proceed if the Soviet Delegation stood firm: (1) plan each move with the knowledge that the Western Representatives would not change their position and proceed with the delivery of a note to Moscow and the ending of the meetings in Paris, or (2) try out a deal on German demilitarization in an effort to get full agreement at Paris (396.1-PA/5-1451).

[5] *Supra.*

396.1-PA/5-2151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1951.

Subject: Deputies' Meeting in Paris

Participants: M. Bonnet, French Ambassador
J. C. H. Bonbright, EUR

The French Ambassador came to see me at 3:45 this afternoon at his request. He said that he had been instructed to convey to the Secretary an expression of French concern about the way the Deputies meetings are progressing in Paris. He said that he realized how busy the Secretary was and did not wish to impose on his time but, if necessary, would have to ask to do so.

M. Bonnet said that the French were bothered about two things, the handling of the sub-item on German demilitarization and the question of a reference to NATO. He argued strongly for agreeing to the latest proposal by Gromyko to put the German demilitarization sub-item in two places on the agenda with a footnote making clear that the only difference with regard to this item was the order under which it was to be discussed.[1] The Ambassador apparently was not aware that the Western Deputies had already today indicated in the quadripartite meeting that the Gromyko proposal appears satisfactory. (This was based on my telephone conversation with Mr. Bohlen this morning shortly after the commencement of the quadripartite meeting. Mr. Bohlen indicated that it was too late to go back on this since the French representative had already spoken favorably about the Gromyko proposal.) I explained to M. Bonnet what I understood had happened today.

The Ambassador was equally strong in urging upon us acceptance of the Parodi proposal for dealing with the NATO problem as an annex to the agenda or in a covering letter from the Deputies to their Foreign Ministers. He made it perfectly clear, as we had already gathered from M. Daridan's visit on Saturday [2] and from cables from Paris, that the French cannot contemplate a break in the negotiations in view of the forthcoming French election.[3] He spoke in picturesque language of the harmful effects of Communist candidates in every village and hamlet in France exploiting the break as proof of Western war-like intentions.

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[1] Gromyko had made this proposal at the 56th session on May 19.

[2] A record of Daridan's conversation with Perkins on May 19 was transmitted to the U.S. Delegation in telegram 6229 to Paris, May 20 (396.1-PA/5-2051).

[3] The French national elections were scheduled for June 17.

I explained to M. Bonnet that we did not want a break either and frankly we did not think that the course we had been urging would lead to such a break. I told him of the depth of feeling here against any reference to NATO. I also spoke of our concern over the gradual erosion of our proposition. I indicated that the German demilitarization item now seemed to be over the dam; he was now urging us to give way on NATO; and I assumed that if we did this the Soviet delegate would then try to put Trieste ahead of Austria and the French would then come back to us and say that we should accept it because our public opinions would not countenance a break on such a flimsy issue. I expressed full appreciation of the French Government's anxiety in an electoral period and felt that the logical conclusion of his argument was that we should give in to the Soviets on every count. He replied that the question of order might be taken care of by making an acceptable order a condition for accepting some reference to NAT as an unagreed item.

In conclusion, the Ambassador said that Paris felt the talks there should not drag on and that we should try to wind them up. He hoped the Secretary would give sympathetic consideration to his representations. I told him I would be glad to bring his observations to the attention of the Secretary.[4]

J. C. H. B[ONBRIGHT]

[4] On May 24 Bonnet again asked to see Secretary Acheson, but since the Secretary was engaged he saw Webb instead and repeated the position that he and Daridan had previously stated. Webb told Bonnet that Secretary Acheson and President Truman were following the matter closely but still opposed any concession on NATO. The substance of the conversation was sent to Paris in telegram 6349, May 24 (396.1–PA/5–2451).

396.1–PA/5–2951 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 29, 1951—7 p. m.

NIACT

6447. For Ambassador and Jessup from Secy. Needless to say, I am much disturbed by the developments reported urtel 7321,[2] which are latest indication that in recent days Fr are becoming hypnotized by their electoral situation. I gather from what Parodi told you this morning there is even some doubt that Queuille and Schuman will recommend to Cabinet sending of note. It seems clear that unless they take strong initiative chances of Cabinet approval are extremely slim. In

[1] This telegram was drafted by Bonbright; cleared by Secretary Acheson, Perkins, Laukhuff, Ferguson, and Reinhardt; and repeated to London, Moscow, and Frankfurt.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *infra*.

your discretion and if you think it wld be helpful, you may therefore present the fol personal message from me to Schuman. This might at least ensure our view being adequately considered by Cabinet.

"Dear Mr. Schuman: I learned from Mr. Jessup today that you have been thinking of the possibility that the Deputies might recess the four-power conversations in Paris for a month in the hope that during this period the international situation might change in such a way as to make possible an agreement on an agenda for the Foreign Ministers meeting later in a better atmosphere. You know of course that I am deeply conscious of the problems and difficulties facing the Fr Govt at this time and want to avoid any action which wld add to them. But I think that a recess of the Deputies meeting wld be harmful to the Western position and wld increase rather than diminish any feeling of uncertainty which may exist. My own view is that if properly handled, the dispatch of notes to the Soviet Govt will not run a serious risk of causing a break and that on the contrary this procedure holds out the best hope of bringing about early agreement for a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. It seems to me that a note which contains a direct invitation for such a meeting, including a proposed date, wld be difficult for the Soviets to reject and wld appeal strongly to Western public opinion. I think that there are very real risks in the indefinite continuation of the present situation in the Deputies and that the best thing we cld do wld be to address the notes to the Soviet Govt immediately. I mention these factors in order that you may have them before you when you consider this problem with your colleagues tomorrow.

With warmest regards and best wishes."

If Fr Cabinet refuses to agree to dispatch of tripartite notes sug you consider possibility of getting Fr and Brit consent to our dispatching note unilaterally containing invitation from us as host govt. My thought wld be that Brit and Fr might reply on fol day accepting invitation. While this procedure has certain disadvantages it may be that it wld appeal somewhat more to Fr than tripartite notes.[3]

ACHESON

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[3] On May 30 Jessup reported that he had delivered Secretary Acheson's letter to Schuman that morning and that he had been told that the French Cabinet had agreed to the delivery of the notes on May 31. (Telegram 7357 from Paris, May 30, 396.1-PA/5-3051)

396.1-PA/5-3051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup)

SECRET [PARIS,] May 30, 1951.

Subject: Four-Power Exploratory Talks

Participants: M. Robert Schuman, French Minister of Foreign Affairs
M. Alexandre Parodi, Chairman, French Delegation
Mr. Ernest Davies, Chairman, UK Delegation
Mr. Philip C. Jessup, Chairman, US Delegation

In accordance with the arrangements made by Parodi, Mr. Davies and I met him in Schuman's office at 8:15 last evening. De Bourbon-Busset was also present

Schuman referred briefly to the situation in our meetings. He commented particularly on the changes which had taken place in regard to the notes since the idea was first advanced. He found particularly satisfactory the fact that the present draft [1] omitted all polemics and that we had in mind delivering it to Gromyko at the meeting. This procedure was important in avoiding the impression of an ultimatum. He then referred to the suggestion which Parodi had passed on to us that the Deputies might recess for a month. He said this was an idea which had occurred to him personally and he then referred to the objections which Davies and I had made in our morning tripartite meeting.[2] Parodi had evidently briefed M. Schuman fully and he seemed quite familiar with our point of view.

I repeated our view that the sending of the note was the only move remaining to us in a last effort to induce the Soviet Government to agree to the meeting. I emphasized that the sending of the note would not itself constitute a termination of the deputies' meeting and that the note would constitute a continuing open invitation. On the other hand, I did not wish to pass over the fact that if the Soviet reply to the note was a complete rejection then presumably we would have to tell Gromyko that while the invitation remained open there seemed to be no value in continuing the discussions at the Palais Rose. Mr. Schuman indicated that he accepted this point of view.

Davies then said that he had just received for delivery to M. Schuman a personal letter from Mr. Morrison, from which he read a few

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[1] Presumably a reference to the draft note referred to in footnotes 1, 2, and 7 to the May 31 note, *infra*.

[2] At the tripartite meeting on May 30, Jessup had argued that a long recess would give the Soviet Union a great propaganda advantage, while Davies had stressed the need for sending the note at once before the Soviet Delegation despatched a similar note inviting the Western Ministers to a conference and including NATO as an agenda item. (Telegram 7321 from Paris, May 29, 396.1-PA/5-2951)

extracts before handing it to Schuman. Morrison's line was that as an old political campaigner he was very sympathetic with M. Schuman's problems. He hoped M. Schuman would not mind his expressing his own point of view. In Morrison's opinion the idea of a month's recess for the deputies was not a good one. He suggested that the communists (and I think he said also the Gaullists) would seize upon this as a basis for attacking the French government on the ground that the French government was trying to avoid facing an important international question during the election period. Davies told me later that the rest of the letter contained in some detail the arguments for sending the notes immediately.

Schuman then said that his colleagues in the Cabinet had been consulted briefly about the idea of sending a note to the Soviets and that they were in full agreement with the idea of the note. The difficulty arose in connection with the timing. He said also that the note was somewhat different from the one which he had discussed with his colleagues previously. Schuman said that he was having his consultation with his colleagues tomorrow on this point; he emphasized that it was a *Conseil de Cabinet* and not a *Conseil des Ministres*. In talking about taking this question up with the Cabinet Schuman didn't flatly say that he would urge them to agree to sending the note on Thursday but both Davies and I had the impression that that was his attitude and he did indicate that he thought the Cabinet would agree. We went over together all of the various arguments for sending the note and against the indefinite continuation of the meetings and M. Schuman weighed and restated the various arguments from the point of view of evaluating their effectiveness when presented to the Cabinet.

Schuman began to discuss the problem of presenting this matter to French public opinion and asked Parodi to consider the preparation of a statement which would explain and fortify our position particularly with a view to making it clear that we were not responsible for a rupture. I said we had been giving some thought to this matter and had discussed among ourselves various alternatives. We had thought about a tripartite statement which might be issued by the deputies but we had felt that this would not be an advantageous plan since the note itself would be in the nature of a tripartite statement issued at the same time and from higher authority. We had also discussed but had not taken up with Washington the possibility of statements by the three Foreign Ministers separately. The third plan we had talked about was for each one of the deputies to have a press conference after the notes were delivered in order to give such explanation as he thought suitable. M. Schuman and Mr. Davies agreed that a tripartite statement by the deputies would not be the best method and both thought that the individual press conference would be the best, Davies emphasizing that each public opinion needed to be handled a

little differently, and Schuman supported this view. Parodi nodded agreement but did not seem very well satisfied about this public relations end of the problem. M. Schuman went on to say that we had to consider the presentation of the case to public opinion both at the time the notes were delivered and at the time when the Soviets replied, in case they rejected the invitation. He thought that perhaps at that time, which might be Monday or Tuesday of next week, it would be appropriate for Mr. Acheson, Mr. Morrison and him to issue individually some public statement.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

The Secretary of State to the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union (Vyshinsky)[1]

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the current Four Power negotiations in Paris.[2]

Since March 5 the representative of the United States together with the representatives of France and the United Kingdom, has been engaged in discussions with the representative of the Soviet Union in a preliminary conference in Paris. This preliminary conference was agreed upon as a result of an exchange of notes which ended with the note of the United States Government dated February 19, 1951,[3] and the reply of the Soviet Government dated March 1, 1951.[4] As indicated in that exchange of notes, the purpose of the conference was to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable agenda for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Such an agreement has not yet been reached.

In the course of the discussions, the views of the four delegations were brought out and clarified. Considering that the discussions had provided all the elements necessary for agreement on an agenda, the representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and France presented to the Soviet representative on May 2 a new proposal con-

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[1] The source text is that printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 11, 1951, p. 933. At the 64th session of the Representatives on May 31, Jessup handed a copy of the note to Gromyko. In Moscow copies were delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry by Representatives of the three Western Embassies, and on the same day, copies were released to the press. Jessup had previously transmitted an agreed draft on May 29, the text of which is indicated in footnotes 2 and 7, below, in telegram 7346, May 29, from Paris (396.1–PA/5–2951).

[2] This introductory paragraph was not present in the draft transmitted by Jessup on May 29.

[3] *Ante*, p. 1083.

[4] For the text of the Soviet note of March 1, see footnote 3, p. 1085.

taining three alternative agenda.[5] The purpose of these three alternatives was to assure the possibility of the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. It has been, and remains, the view of the United States Government that such a meeting is desirable in the interest of strengthening peace, which is the constant objective of the foreign policy of the United States.

In the course of the examination of these three alternatives the representatives in Paris were unable to reach full agreement. As regards the first alternative, the only difficulty was that the wording proposed by the three delegations for the sub-item concerning armaments was not acceptable to the Soviet delegation. The third alternative was not accepted by the Soviet delegation as a basis for agreement. In the second alternative, however, modifications were made in Item 1 and there is now agreement among the four delegations on the presentation of this item as well as on the inclusion of four other items in the agenda and on their wording. Apart from the final order of these four items which remains to be determined, but ought not to present major difficulties, agreement could have been reached on the second alternative if the Soviet delegation had not insisted on the acceptance of their proposal relating to the North Atlantic Treaty.

The United States Government for its part considers that the amount of agreement so far reached on the agenda makes possible a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers which would permit discussion among others of all topics proposed by the Soviet Government in the exchange of notes preceding the Paris conference and on the 5th and 7th of March at the outset of that conference.[6] Accordingly, the United States Government is pleased to invite the four Foreign Ministers to meet in Washington and suggests that the meeting begin on July 23.[7] The United States Government is prepared to participate in such a conference not only on the agenda (alternative B) described above, but also on either of the two other agenda (alternatives A and C). The texts of these three proposals are enclosed.[8]

The United States Government hopes to receive an early reply from the Soviet Government indicating its readiness to accept this invitation and stating which of the three agenda it finds acceptable for the purpose of holding a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. Any further arrangements for the meeting could be worked out on receipt of a favorable reply from the Soviet Government.

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1951.

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[5] *Ante*, p. 1133.

[6] Regarding these topics, see telegram 5182, March 5, p. 1087; and footnote 2, p. 1091.

[7] This sentence in the May 29 draft read "Accordingly, the US Govt is pleased to invite the four FonMins to meet in Wash beginning July 23."

[8] For the text of these three proposals which are not printed here, see p. 1133.

396.1–PA/6–451 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks to the Secretary of State [1]

RESTRICTED NIACT PARIS, June 4, 1951—5 p. m.

7473. The following text is free translation of Soviet reply handed in at conference by Mr. Gromyko this afternoon. Copies likewise delivered to three Embassies in Moscow.

"The Soviet Government considers necessary and desirable as it has previously considered, the earliest convocation of a CFM of the Four Powers for the consideration of the most important questions relating to the liquidation of the tense situation in Europe and the strengthening of peace.

However, the Soviet Govt considers that it would be inexpedient to break off the work of the Conference of the Deputies of the Ministers in Paris and that it shld be given the possibility of continuing its work for an agreement on an agenda for the CFM and the inclusion in the agenda of the question concerning the Atlantic Pact and military bases of the USA as an unagreed item.

The Soviet Govt considers that a frank consideration of the question of American bases and of the Atlantic Pact, which constitutes the chief cause of the worsening of relations between the USSR and the Three Powers wld appreciably relieve the atmosphere of tension in Eur and wld facilitate the work of the mtg of the CFM.

In conformity therewith, the Sov Govt will be prepared immediately to send its rep to a mtg of the CFM in Washington as soon as the mtg of the Deputy Foreign Ministers in Paris will have favorably decided the question of the inclusion in the agenda of the item concerning the Atlantic Pact of the military bases of the USA." [2]

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[1] Repeated to London, Frankfurt, and Bonn.

[2] A copy of the Russian text of this note is in file 396.1–PA/6–451. The text was also published in *Pravda* on June 5.

396.1–PA/6–451 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup), at Paris [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 4, 1951—8 p. m.

6570. For Jessup. Urtels 7473 and 7479.[2] We have had preliminary discussion with Sec based on text Sov reply [3] and ur account of mtg.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Bonbright; cleared in substance with Secretary Acheson, Perkins, Matthews, Ferguson, Laukhuff, Leverich, and Reinhardt; and repeated to London, Moscow, and Frankfurt.

[2] Telegram 7479 is not printed; it indicated that the main difficulty in formulating a reply to the Soviet note would be the coming French elections (396.1–PA/6–451).

[3] Translation in telegram 7473, *supra*.

We believe that if we are to avoid interminable continuation of Deps mtgs reply to Sovs shld be written, not oral, even though we recognize problem of coordination between Govts. In view of apparent Fr feeling that decision wld have to be taken by Cabinet which will not meet until Thursday, it may not be possible for us to reply to Gromyko on Wednesday although the sooner the better. If Western position not coordinated by Wednesday, Deps shld adjourn without discussion pending receipt of their Govts views.

We do not like the idea of referring to alternate reps of three Govts who might be reconvened if Sovs have new proposal.

Fol are preliminary views on main lines which we believe reply shld take:

1. We regret very much that Sov Govt did not see fit to accept the invitation which Western Govts extended on May 31.[4] Our alternative proposals included or took into account the many points of agreement reached after many weeks of discussion. If Sovs sincerely want mtg, a broad and generous avenue has been prepared.

2. Sov Govt now states question of "American bases" and Atlantic Pact constitute chief cause of worsening of relations between USSR and Three Powers. It is difficult to reconcile this statement with original proposal made by Sovs Nov 3 when they took position that mtg shld be on German demilitarization alone. Furthermore, in course of Paris mtgs Sov rep on different occasions expressed view that reduction of armed forces of Four Powers was crucial. On other occasions Sov rep stressed essentiality of discussing Trieste. Finally, as late as May 4 Sov rep expressed willingness to accept an agenda in which NATO and the "American bases" were not mentioned in any way and his one condition had to do with wording of armaments item.

3. These facts raise question in our minds what will be next pretext of Sov Govt for avoiding mtg of Foreign Ministers by prolonging Deps mtg and confirm our view that Sov Govt's enthusiasm for mtg of Foreign Ministers is less than they seek to imply.

4. In view of foregoing facts and nature of Sov reply of June 4, US Govt considers that Deps have reached limit of contribution which they can make. Needless to say, the invitation extended by the US Govt in its communication of May 31 stands and it again expresses the hope that the Foreign Ministers can meet on July 23 in Washington.

ACHESON

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[4] *Ante*, p. 1148.

536-688 PT 1--81---75

396.1–PA/6–551 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, June 5, 1951—10 a. m.

7508. From Jessup. At his request I saw Parodi last evening. He had talked with Queuille who feels strongly that Western Powers shld take no definite action to interrupt mtgs of deputies prior to Fr elections June 17. Parodi was sure that regardless of results of elections, it wld be possible immed thereafter to terminate deputies mtg.

Queuille's idea is that another identic note shld be sent by Three Govts answering Sov's reply. This note wld contain a full statement of reasons why we are unwilling to include NAT and base sites even as unagreed item. Fr were already working on text of such a note and Parodi hopes to let me see it this afternoon after it has been shown to Schuman. As a matter of timing, Parodi said that it wld probably be necessary to postpone next mtg until Thurs instead of tomorrow and that wld leave only ten days. He contemplated possibility of notes being sent on Thurs with a recess until Monday to await Sov reply. He was not quite clear what deputies wld talk about next week. I think he personally agrees that a series of inconclusive sessions in which Sovs wld have splendid opportunity for propaganda wld not be helpful for Fr electoral sitn. However, in defending Queuille's view he took line that Gromyko's propaganda was printed only in *Humanité*, readers of which already have their minds made up and that other papers wld give Gromyko's statements small circulation. He emphasized that Queuille was pleased with way election campaign was going and anticipates that Communists will lose large number of seats. He stressed point that Queuille's political judgment is very good and said that he personally was also convinced that it wld be undersirable to break off deputies sessions in next twelve days.

When I asked Parodi whether he was also going to inform UK del about his talk with Queuille he said "perhaps" and again revealed his lack of sympathy with operations of UK del. He seemed to think that UK position was relatively unimportant and was obviously hoping for US understanding and support. I did not undertake to argue with him about appraisal of Fr opinion and effect on elections of any break. I did stress that we also had political problems in US and I pointed out that we must keep in mind longer range view in terms of whole internatl sitn and Western position vis-à-vis Sov Union.[2]

[JESSUP]

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[1] Repeated to London, Moscow, and Frankfurt.

[2] On June 6 the U.S. Delegation reported that the British had moved to support the French position and that nothing could be done which would even suggest breaking off the conference before June 17. Telegram 7539 from Paris, June 6, 1951 (396.1–PA/6–651).

396.1-PA/6-751 : Telegram

The Minister in France (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, June 7, 1951—noon.

7577. Personal for Matthews from Bohlen. Distribution only as indicated by Matthews. At [*As*] last night's telecon [1] revealed that we are miles apart in our thinking on present status of conf and moves for next phase I am again bothering you with personal plea. I do not wish to go into any post-mortem of how we arrived at present awkward situation since our recommendations and estimates of probable developments were fully set forth in messages immediately fol Gromyko's move of May 10.[2] The fact is we are in very awkward situation for two reasons: (1) necessity of postponing termination until after French elections and (2) difficulty of making argument genuinely convincing to public opinion re our refusal accept NAT as unagreed item. In circumstances we envisaged note presently under consideration as interim measure which wld not contain any hint of finality or rupture but wld be drafted for maximum propaganda effect here in France. It is not only maneuver to gain time but to gain time with definite purpose. It is for these reasons we consider draft outline in Dept's 6570,[3] predicated entirely on termination of conf, no longer adequate or desirable.

We must recognize that only question in public mind in Eur and particularly in France is who is to blame for failure of CFM to materialize and this centers naturally on respective positions re only outstanding question. We do not see therefore how we cld duck this question as completely as Dept desires in this interim note. Tri draft was worked out with these considerations in mind and reps probably best we can get on agreed basis. Telecon objections related less to substantive criticism of note than to its departure from line previously agreed by Secy (Deptel 6570) on totally different basis. If tripartite draft is disregarded completely it is virtually certain there will be three distinct positions in three capitals with little prospect of coordinating on text without considerable and extremely damaging delay. Contents of tri draft contains nothing that has not been said over and over again at conf in support of West position and therefore unless

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[1] In the teletype conference on June 6, in which, *inter alia*, Jessup, Bohlen, and Smith participated in Paris and Matthews, Perkins, Bonbright, and Laukhuff participated in Washington, the U.S. Delegation had transmitted the text of a note drafted by the British Foreign Office which had been sent to Davies and the text of a tripartite note agreed by the three Delegations. The conferees in Washington told Jessup that it was "clearly impossible" for them "to agree at this stage with type of note exemplified by either UK or tripartite drafts particularly since they are so far removed from Secretary's views which were expressed in our 6570." (396.1-PA/6-651)

[2] See footnote 1, p. 1137.

[3] Dated June 4, p. 1150.

there is some substantive element which is regarded as genuinely damaging to West position, I hope very much that you will be able to amend it rather than to return to outdated line 6570. It seems to me perfectly apparent that all arguments concerning Sov unreasonableness, inconsistency, etc., which is chief theme of note are useful and necessary for final note terminating Paris conf but are not very valid arguments for refusal of unagreed NAT item since they wld apply with equal force to entire question of CFM in view demonstrated Sov bad faith.

I think it is better to keep this alive consistently in any written communication to Sov Govt. Therefore hope you will have new look with above considerations in mind at tri draft, recognizing that to start now with what wld amount to three divergent new governmental positions wld make it unlikely that reply cld be sent before weekend.

[BOHLEN]

396.1–PA/6–851 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup), at Paris [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 8, 1951—3 a. m.

PRIORITY

6655. For Jessup. Had long discussion with Secy tonight in which he went over various proposed drafts and the different points of view that have been expressed. The following represents his considered views:

1. We are convinced that tri-draft note is bad for all of us. We do not think the material in the note is convincing and we would anticipate a Soviet reply which would place us in worse position than we are in right now, since we do not see what answer we could give in the light of our position as stated in para 2 below. In fact, we would expect that Sov reply would merely result in enormously increased pressure from French to urge upon us one of the Parodi proposals [2] as the only means of extricating French Govt from a difficult situation in the elections.

2. We want to be as helpful as possible to French in their present situation and we want them to understand our concern. We think that for their part they should recognize that we have our own problems with American public opinion which is of vital importance to the

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Bonbright and repeated to Moscow, London, and Frankfurt.

[2] Presumably this is a reference to Parodi's suggestion that NATO and American bases be included as unagreed items in the agenda by means of an annex or covering letter or that the Foreign Ministers meet without an agenda.

west. We are therefore not willing to pay the price of helping French if this leads us into a situation where we must accept either a meeting "without an agenda" or any variation Parodi formula or outright acceptance of Soviet proposal.

3. Consequently, as we see it there are only two alternatives to continued postponements of Deps meeting which we would consider.

4. The first is to proceed now on basis of tactics we described in telecon June 6 and two draft notes sent to you June 7, involving withholding renewal of invitation until end of next week.[3]

5. The second, much as we dislike it, is to resume quadripartite discussion temporarily while seeking tripartite agreement on note to be sent sometime next week on which we would stand until French elections.

6. If second alternative is followed, you should speak along following lines, with addition of material from our June 8 draft note, at next quadripartite meeting:

We understand that Soviets are unwilling to accept our invitation to meeting in Washington on any one of three agenda proposed our note May 31 and we regret that is case. (This statement could be followed by propaganda speech emphasizing broad and generous avenue opened by our proposals.) We want Soviets to understand we are aware that their purpose is either to block a meeting of the four Ministers by injecting an issue which they know we would not accept or to create the false impression that we had in some way agreed to the inclusion of a NAT item when in fact we had not agreed.

This is our attitude and we want the Soviets to be under no misapprehension about it.

Apparently Soviets think further discussions among the Deputies in Paris would be helpful. We have always kept the door open for discussions and still do. We hope the Soviets may have something to say which will remove the obstacles which they have been placing in the way of a meeting of the four Ministers. We are certainly ready to listen to anything Soviets wish to say.

7. It is our view that statement along this line, with addition of material from our June 8 draft[4] at next quadripartite meeting would be used to provide opportunity to keep Deputies meetings going long enough to permit tripartite agreement on note which would be fired at Soviets sometime next week and on which we would stand until elections. We again want to emphasize that in such note we are neither

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[3] Transcripts of the telecons on June 6 and 7, neither printed, are in files 396.1–PA/6–651 and 6–751.

[4] Under reference here is a draft entitled "Suggested United States Draft of Tripartite Note for Delivery to Mr. Gromyko June 8," not printed. A copy of this draft is attached to the transcript of the June 7 telecon referred to in footnote 3, above.

prepared to accept any of the Parodi proposals nor any Russian proposals re NAT base item.[5]

ACHESON

[5] At the 66th session on June 8 each of the Western Representatives spoke from the text of the draft reply which reflected the "particular points of view important from angle of public opinion of each country." Jessup reported that the meeting went off very satisfactorily and that the session would continue into the following week. (Telegram 7635 from Paris, June 8, 396.1–PA/6–851)

396.1–PA/6–1151 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, June 11, 1951—4 p. m.

7671. From Jessup. Follows summary of personal letter just received from Parodi:

Parodi brings to Davies' and my attention his serious concern about future tactics here. He points out that last Friday's quadripartite session makes it possible for us to handle quadripartite session today and possibly tomorrow [2] without great difficulty but he foresees that Wed or Thurs we will find ourselves in a very embarrassing position. He points out that we must always keep in mind possibility of Sov maneuver which will upset Fr public opinion on eve of elections. He urges that three of us agree now on how we wld handle any Sov maneuver.

Parodi points out that he had presented last week three possible solutions. First, to accept NAT as unagreed but offset it with item concerning Sov policies. After saying that US had opposed this suggestion he adds it is too late to make such proposal now. Second, an annex or letter covering NAT item, was also opposed by US and Parodi says it now does not have same advantages as when he first suggested it. Only remaining formula wld be to offer Gromyko meeting without an agenda. Parodi points out that no agenda is little different from alternative C which we included in our May 31 note.[3] Formulation of item in C is so broad that it cld lead to all kinds of discussion and he does not believe Mins wld have greater difficulties if they meet without any agenda than if they meet on one like C.

It seems to Parodi very unlikely that Sov wld accept offer of meeting without an agenda and he foresees that if we propose it Gromyko wld say we are trying to avoid discussing concrete questions and attempting to prevent FonMin meeting.

[1] Repeated to London, Moscow, and Frankfurt.

[2] On June 11 and 12 the U.S. Delegation reported on the 67th and 68th meetings of the Representatives. At the former Gromyko insisted that there was no basis for a session of the Council of Foreign Ministers if the Soviet proposal on NATO and American bases was not accepted, while Jessup emphasized the inconsistency of the Soviet position on NATO and stressed Soviet utilization of a series of pretexts to obstruct the convening of a Foreign Ministers meeting. At the latter Davies made a strong statement emphasizing Western refusal to allow NATO on the agenda, Soviet noncooperation since the war, and obstruction of a Foreign Ministers meeting to which Gromyko responded with a 2-hour propaganda harangue. (Telegrams 7691 and 7718 from Paris, 396.1–PA/6–1151 and 6–1251)

[3] *Ante*, p. 1148.

Parodi, however, points out that proposing meeting without an agenda wld place us in excellent public position since it wld be irrefutable proof that we have neglected no opportunity to bring about meeting of Mins.

Parodi says that in presenting no agenda offer we cld say that Mins wld be guided by amount of agreement reached by deps here and in recent exchange of notes. Such a presentation wld change in no way discussion by Mins of their agenda since Sov FonMin will raise NAT under any circumstances. Parodi says that if we cld make this suggestion Friday we wld influence public opinion in simplest and most effective manner and at same time prepare ground for ending talks here next week in case Sov response is negative.

Parodi points out that any compromise which Gromyko wld propose such as an annex or even a conference with no agenda wld endanger our position if we rejected it flatly. If Gromyko proposes an annex of NAT and bases item, he believes we must accept it. He says he understands that my instructions do not permit acceptance and he asks that Wash re-examine this question. At very least he believes we wld have to reply with counter proposition such as no agenda offer. He adds that he does not think we cld refuse if Gromyko, as is highly unlikely, proposes meeting without agenda. However, in either case, he feels it is essential for us to reply at same meeting at which Gromyko makes any proposal and turn Sov maneuver against them.

Parodi then asks me to ask my govt to consider no agenda proposition again. He recalls that all suggestions put forward by Fr del in last few weeks have been turned down, either by US or UK and that present we are in an immobile situation which prevents any maneuver.

End summary.[4]

We think there is something in Parodi's arguments expressing similarity between alternative C and his proposal for no agenda. It might be possible to work out some text in note which wld suggest not that Sovs wld accept alternative C as such but that Mins cld take into account alternative C as indicating general range of subjects which they wld consider. They wld also have in mind discussions here and exchange of notes and with these as a guide they wld be able to organize their work.

At lunch today Davies told me they were working on somewhat similar idea before they receive Parodi's note. Their idea is very similar to what we argued in our tel 7587 [5] namely that Mins meet and take into consideration alternative B and notes as representing nature of agreement and disagreement which had resulted from Paris meetings.

[JESSUP]

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[4] On June 12 Ambassador Bonnet discussed the sessions in Paris with Secretary Acheson stressing the importance of some affirmative action by the Western Representatives and pressing Acheson to accept one of the three points raised by Parodi. Secretary Acheson expressed sympathy for the problem facing the French, but stated that Parodi's proposed solutions were unacceptable. (Telegram 6769, to Paris, 396.1–PA/6–1151)

[5] Not printed.

396.1–PA/6–1951

The Secretary of State to the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union (Vyshinsky) [1]

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the current Four-Power negotiations in Paris.

1. The United States Government communicated on May 31st to the Soviet Government a note designed to remove the Deputies Conference from the deadlock in which it has been for some weeks.[2] To this end the United States Government proposed, together with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, that a Conference of Ministers should meet on the basis of whichever one of the three agenda which had been submitted to it, the Soviet Government should prefer.

The negative reply of the Soviet Government [3] has put the Deputies Conference back to the point at which it was before May 31.

The Soviet Government stated in its note of June 4 that in its view it would be inexpedient to interrupt the work of the Conference. The United States Government took account of this recommendation. As a result, the Deputies have held further meetings. These meetings have shown again that it is impossible to make any progress. The Soviet Representative in fact continues to make the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs conditional on a demand which it knows to be unacceptable to the other Delegations, although the Soviet Delegation has obtained satisfaction in so far as concerns the inclusion in the agenda of all the questions which the Soviet Government stated that it wished to have discussed in its notes leading up to the Conference or in the proposals which it made for the agenda at the beginning of the Conference.

2. If the insistence of the Soviet Government on including in the agenda some mention of the "Atlantic Treaty and American military bases" is to be explained by its desire thus to secure, directly or indirectly, a decision of the Ministers calling into question a Treaty concluded by twelve powers for the purpose of insuring their common defense and to which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is not a

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[1] On June 12 the U.S. Delegation transmitted to Washington a translation of a French draft note to the Soviet Government. In the course of the next two days, the three Western Delegations to the Four-Power Talks, using the French draft as a basis for discussion and consulting with their respective Governments, succeeded in reaching agreement on the text of a tripartite note to be delivered to the Soviet Delegation at Paris and to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow on June 15. Identical notes were delivered by the British and French in Paris and Moscow. Documentation relating to the drafting of the note, including a copy of the initial French draft and comments thereon, is in file 396.1–PA/6–1251 through 6–1551.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1148.

[3] Presumably a reference to the Soviet note of June 4 transmitted in telegram 7473, June 4, p. 1150.

party, it is clear that this insistence is entirely unjustified, since such a decision does not come within the competence of the Meeting of Ministers.

If, on the other hand, the purpose of the Soviet Government is solely to reserve the right of the Soviet Foreign Minister fully to give his interpretation of the causes and effects of international tension, this insistence is unnecessary, since it has been agreed that the agenda should contain a general heading which would permit each Minister to express his point of view on these matters.

3. Considering that the further discussions between the Deputies on this question which the Soviet Government proposed in their note of June 4th have not advanced the prospect of agreement, the United States Government proposes that the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers, without further efforts by the Deputies to complete an agreement on the agenda, should meet on the basis of the large measure of agreement already reached by the Deputies in Paris. Taking into account Agenda B and the notes which have been exchanged between the Soviet Government and the other Governments in which their respective points of view are recorded, the four Foreign Ministers should be able to proceed without delay to their task of seeking to reduce the existing tensions in Europe.

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1951.

396.1-PA/6-2051

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the United States of America [1]

[Translation]

[PARIS,] June 20, 1951.

The Government of the USSR, having examined the note of the Government of the United States of America of June 15 [2] on the subject of the current negotiations of the four powers in Paris considers it necessary to state the following: In its note of June 4, 1951 [3] the Soviet Government stated that it is prepared to send without delay its representative to the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Washington as soon as the conference of the Deputy Foreign Ministers in Paris will favorably resolve the question of the inclusion in the agenda of the item regarding the Atlantic Treaty and military

[1] The source text was transmitted to Washington as preliminary material for a teletype conference held on June 20 (396.1-PA/6-2051). For another translation, see Folliot, *Documents on International Affairs, 1951*, pp. 262-263. The Russian text of the note, which was presented to the Western Representives at the 73d session of the Four-Power Talks on June 20, is in file 396.1-PA/6-1951.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Transmitted in telegram 7473, June 4, p. 1150.

bases of the US. The Soviet Government considers necessary the inclusion of this item in the agenda of the CFM in the form of a disagreed item proceeding from the fact that firstly the American military bases and Atlantic Treaty are the principal cause of the tense situation in Europe and secondly the Government of the US, as well as the Government of Great Britain and France also recognize the necessity of alleviating the tense situation in Europe.

The meeting of the preliminary session of the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs for the four powers in Paris has shown that the representatives of the US, Great Britain and France entirely groundlessly make the convocation of the CFM conditional upon the renunciation by the Soviet Government of its proposal to discuss the question of the Atlantic Treaty and military bases of the US. However, in refusing to accept the proposal made by the Soviet Government to include on the agenda the question regarding the Atlantic Treaty and American military bases when all the questions without exception, which were proposed for discussion for the meeting of the Ministers by the representatives of the three powers were included on the agenda with the full consent of the Soviet representative, the three powers thereby put the Soviet Union in a position of inequality. It is quite clear that the Soviet Government cannot reconcile itself to the position of inequality in which the representatives of the three powers want to place it. The Soviet Government is surprised that the representatives of the three powers are afraid to give their consent to a consideration of the question of the Atlantic Treaty at the CFM. As it is known the Soviet Government has pacts of mutual assistance with China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, and finally with France and England. The Soviet Government has no objections whatsoever to the consideration of any of these pacts at the CFM should the powers so desire.

Therefore the Soviet Government cannot understand why the three Western powers refuse to take the same path and do not wish to include on the agenda the question of the Atlantic Treaty and military bases, for this is not a matter of empty curiosity but one of alleviating the tense situation and facilitating the task of the preservation of peace.

The Soviet Government states again that it is seeking a frank consideration of all the causes which give rise to the tense situation in Europe. The Soviet Government considers it necessary for the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs to continue their meeting in Paris in order to reach agreement on the basis of equal rights of the participants on the agenda for the CFM, having in mind the inclusion (in the form of a disagreed item) of the question regarding the Atlantic Treaty and Military Bases of the US, since this question is the most important one of the liquidation of the tense situation in Europe.

396.1–PA/6–2251 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, June 22, 1951—1 p. m.

7987. From Jessup. Seventy-fourth and final session deps mtg went as planned. Western deps delivered prepared statements to which Gromyko replied with standard restatement Sov position on NAT item. After Davies read tri declaration (ourtel 7964 [2]) Gromyko said he wld reply at tomorrows mtg. Davies and Jessup informed Gromyko that there wld be no mtg tomorrow and that tri statement clear in this respect; whereupon Gromyko delivered two hour propaganda harangue from prepared text following short recess.

As first speaker Jessup delivered prepared statement contained ourtel 7952.[3] Davies followed with prepared statement which:

1. Deplored the negative attitude toward Western attempts to bring about FonMin mtg.
2. Developed Davies usual argument on unacceptability NAT item.
3. Rejected Sov contention that exclusion NAT item from agenda wld place Sovs in position inequality.
4. Stressed that treaties of mutual assistance concluded between countries represented here and other countries are unsuitable for "treatment and for decisions" by FonMins.
5. Emphasized futility further mtgs here and importance of FonMins mtg as means for reaching decision which may improve relations and reduce tension.

Parodi read short statement which:

1. Regretted Sovs unable accept Western invitation.
2. Contrasted Sov insistence on condition (which Sovs knew unacceptable to West) with Western invitation of June 15 which imposed no such condition on Sovs.

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[1] Repeated to London, Moscow, Vienna, Frankfurt, and Bonn.

[2] Not printed. The statement under reference read:

"1. On June 15 the Three Western Govts communicated a renewed invitation to the Soviet Govt to attend a meeting of the Four Foreign Ministers on the basis of the large measure of agreement reached at the Paris Conf on an agenda and taking into account the views of the Sov Govt and the Three Western Govts concerning the chief point in disagreement.

2. As has been fully explained by the three reps today, the Sov Govt's reply of June 19 constitutes a rejection of this invitation since it is a reaffirmation of the position previously taken up by the Sov Govt. The experience of the deputies in resuming their meetings in accordance with the proposal made in the Sov note of June 4 shows that the continuation of this discussion has no practical utility.

3. The invitation to the Sov Govt for a meeting of the Four Foreign Ministers, in accordance either with the notes of the Three Western Govts of May 31 or those of June 15, 1951, remains open and the Three Govts express the hope that the Sov Govt, after further consideration, will find it possible to transmit through the diplomatic channel its acceptance of this invitation. In this case, if necessary, reps of the Four Govts could meet immediately in order to settle the date and other detailed arrangements for the meeting of Ministers." (396.1–PA/6–2151)

[3] Not printed. For the text of Jessup's statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 2, 1951, pp. 14–16.

3. Noted impossibility further progress of mtgs here.
4. Stressed that discussion mutual assistance treaties were not within competence of Mins, although Mins cld, on basis of complete equality, express their own interpretation of causes and effects of tension under general clauses in Item I.
5. Stressed that agenda was not an end in itself but merely means to an end and more important task was establishment of mutual goodwill at Mins mtg.
6. Expressed view that large measure agreement reached here wld facilitate work of Mins.

Apparently without full understanding of what had been said, Gromyko delivered standard restatement of Sov position on NAT item. At conclusion Gromyko's remarks Davies, as chairman read tri declaration (ourtel 7964) on behalf three dels. Gromyko responded that he reserved right to make statement at tomorrows mtg on tri declaration and on individual statements of three deps. Davies replied that Gromyko had heard declaration and that it was self-explanatory. He said that if Gromyko had any statement to make he cld do so through diplomatic channels as stated in declaration. Gromyko repeated his previous statement and added that if three reps did not agree to meet tomorrow they shld say so directly. After two further exchanges in same vein Davies inquired if anyone else desired to speak. Jessup seconded Davies statement and emphasized finality of Western position by reading third para tri declaration and sentence immediately preceding. After further confirmation that Western deps did not agree to meet tomorrow, Gromyko said he had a statement to make at current mtg and suggested an intermission. After brief intermission Gromyko launched on two hour propaganda harangue reading from prepared text. In laying blame of deadlock here on Western powers, Gromyko went through various Western and Sov agenda proposals from beginning of conference, restating Sov position thereon in detail. He devoted majority of his remarks to usual Sov charges on aggressive nature of NAT and US bases, citing all recent developments to substantiate his thesis.

Regarding the tri statement Gromyko said it cld not be considered as anything but an act by West to prevent convocation of CFM and that responsibility for situation as developed here wld be born by West, whose obstructionist tactics did not permit agreement on an agenda.

At conclusion of Gromyko's remarks Davies said if no one else desired to speak, the mtg was adjourned.

(Verbatim text of statements by Davies, Parodi and Gromyko being air pouched Dept.)

[JESSUP]

MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE, AT WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 10–14, 1951

A. PREPARATIONS, AUGUST–SEPTEMBER 1951

694.001/8–351

The Secretary of State to the French Foreign Minister (Schuman)[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 3, 1951.

In view of the crowded schedule of mtgs and conferences we all have ahead this autumn, I have been trying to work out plans for informal talks with you and Mr. Morrison on various of the important subjs on which we wish to make progress this fall. With this in mind, I shld be glad to have your views on the fol suggestion.

I hope that matters will develop so that you can be in San Francisco for the signing of the Jap Treaty.[2] Mr. Morrison expects to be there and I am suggesting that he stay over Sunday in San Francisco and lunch with me quietly that day. If you cld be with us too, I shld be very pleased. In any event, it wld be extremely useful if, during the week before the Ottawa mtg of the NATO Council,[3] we cld have several days in Wash, say beginning the 12th during which we cld talk together and with Mr. Morrison, not so much on NATO subjs which we will be discussing with all the member nations in Ottawa as on other matters which are of particular interest to the three of us. If this is agreeable to you we can exchange lists in advance of those subjs which any of us may wish to discuss. I hope to be able to send to you some time next week an indication of our views on some of these subjs. You may wish to defer your answer until you see this later msg.

ACHESON

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[1] This message was transmitted to Paris in telegram 809, August 3, for delivery to Schuman. A similar message was sent through Embassy London to Foreign Secretary Morrison. The telegram was drafted by Parsons; cleared with Acheson, Jessup, Cabot, Spofford, Matthews, Perkins, Byroade, and Ferguson; and signed by Acheson.

[2] For documentation on the San Francisco conference for the signing of a peace treaty with Japan, see vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.

[3] For documentation on the seventh session of the NATO Council at Ottawa, September 15–20, see pp. 616 ff.

751.13/8–951

The Secretary of State to the French Foreign Minister (Schuman)[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 9, 1951.

DEAR M. SCHUMAN: I have been thinking a good deal about the range of problems we face jointly in integrating a Ger contribution into the defense of Eur and in establishing a new contractual relationship with the Ger FedRep.[2] We clearly ought to reach a common understanding as to how satisfactory solutions to these problems can be reached as quickly as possible. Accordingly, I am writing to you personally with a view to agreement upon a working program which will enable us to reach decisions on the various questions involved. In view of this purpose, I shall not attempt here to discuss detailed solutions to these problems since I believe this can be handled more satisfactorily through appropriate channels after we have agreed upon the general approach.

The urgency of these matters arises from their inseparable connection with building the defense of Western Eur. We all agree that our common plans for Western European defense will not be complete without a Ger contribution. We also agree, and recognized at Brussels, that a Ger contribution depends upon simultaneous progress in adjusting relations between the Western Occ Powers and the German Fed Rep. Nor is the immediate problem of defense the only reason for urgency. Both of the above matters bear directly upon the development of an integrated Europe, which depends to a great extent upon decisions soon to be made—the ratification of Schuman Plan [3] and the success of the efforts now being made in Paris by European nations to establish a common defense community.[4]

Our approach to these problems has not been a static one. We have thought—and still think—that rapid progress toward European association within a developing Atlantic Community is essential to our common peace and prosperity, and to that of the whole free world. We have also thought—and still think—that urgent progress in realizing our common hopes for a concrete Ger contribution to Western defense is also essential. During the past year we have given full support to the development of a European defense force under the Atlantic umbrella

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[1] This message (in the form of a personal letter) was drafted by Secretary Acheson and Byroade: cleared also with Jessup, Matthews, and Bonbright; and transmitted to Paris in telegram 905, August 9, for delivery without delay to Schuman as an expression of Secretary Acheson's views referred to in his message of August 3, *supra*. A copy was also sent to McCloy.

[2] For documentation on the talks at Bonn concerning a new contractual relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany, see pp. 1446 ff.

[3] For documentation on the U.S. attitude toward the formation of a European Steel and Coal Community (Schuman Plan), see volume IV.

[4] For documentation on the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community (European Army Conference), which opened in Paris on February 14, see pp. 755 ff.

as a long range concept to which all of our efforts shld be devoted. At the same time we have thought that the urgency of securing a German contribution to defense required an interim solution which wld allow Ger preparations to get under way in such a way as to be compatible with the longer range goal of establishing a truly European defense force.

We now see a real hope that these two objectives can be combined. The recent and striking progress made in the Paris conference on the establishment of a European defense community makes it possible that a German contribution can be obtained quickly through the establishment of a European defense force. General Eisenhower believes this can be done. We are prepared to act on the basis of this hope and possibility. We will give the fullest support to a program which wld combine the short range necessity of obtaining the German contribution quickly and the fulfillment of the long range concept of the establishment of a common defense force in Europe. We will do this vigorously if the European nations themselves approve this course, if they will promptly work out the military aspects satisfactorily to the NATO Military Comite and to SACEUR, and if they will complete the process in time to allow Germany's contribution to become effective within the time schedule we have all agreed must be urgently met for the defense of Europe. For this reason we believe it essential that the full elaboration and final implementation of all the necessary administrative structures and political arrangements in connection with the European defense force would not be a condition precedent to the actual beginning of German defense preparations. We wld hope that agreement in the Paris conference, acceptable to NATO as a whole, could be reached this fall among the European nations participating at Paris which wld allow initial preparations in Germany to proceed pending the final and formal act of establishment of the European force. We believe such steps can be taken without prejudice to the security considerations, relative to Ger rearmament, which we all have in mind.

With these considerations in mind I turn to a plan for moving to rapid agreement on the new political relationship to be established between the Western Occupying Powers and the Ger FedRep. We agree, I think, that the progress made in this field must be equal to that made in the defense field. For a variety of reasons the three govts have been slow in this field and my present concern is that the completion of an agreement recording a basic change in our relations with the Fed Rep might in itself be a delaying factor in its entry into defense. The cumulative effect of recent world events and the present temper of German opinion make it not only necessary, but in our own interest, to put forward, simultaneously with the military solution, a political formula of a far-reaching nature. I also believe that we can-

not ignore the effect in Germany of the forthcoming Peace Treaty with Japan.[5]

I suggest that in general the Germans shld be given full power to conduct their own affairs and that the powers we retain shld be determined solely by the fact that Germany is a divided nation confronted with a menace to its security beyond its own control. Our mission there shld be changed from one of 'occupation' of the territory of a defeated enemy to one of assistance to a partner who is freely contributing to our mutual defense. This will involve, as we have already agreed, abolishing the Occ Stat and the High Commission. Supreme authority would be retained in four fields only: (*a*) the right to station troops in Germany and to protect their security; (*b*) Berlin; (*c*) unification of Germany and a subsequent peace settlement; and (*d*) territorial questions. I believe we shld also begin to give thought now to the admission of Germany to NATO as a full member after she has obtained this new political status and final decisions have been taken on Germany's defense contribution. By proceeding along these lines I believe there is a good chance of building a solid foundation for future German cooperation with Western Europe and the whole Atlantic community.

The High Commissioners are now working on a report to Governments on the results of their political conversations with the Germans.[6] We should receive this report within a few days. The High Commission has done a great deal of essential work in exploring the numerous complex problems to be dealt with. But I am told that they will be unable to reach agreement on a substantial number of fundamental questions regarding Germany's new status. Governmental agreement on these matters will clearly be necessary prior to final negotiations with the Federal Republic. So it seems to me that we should make this one of the primary subjects to be dealt with by the three Fon Mins when we meet here in Sept. I wld urge that we be prepared to reach tripartite agreement on these matters at that time. In view of the work schedule we all face this fall, the High Commission, after submitting their report, should continue to work together and with the Gers on certain matters which do not have to be reserved for our personal consideration in the conference in Wash.

In the light of what I have said, I suggest the following working program:

1. We shld each give urgent attention to the forthcoming High Commission report on their discussions with the Gers on contractual relations. We shld exchange views as soon as possible after study of

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[5] For documentation concerning the signing of the treaty of peace with Japan, see vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.

[6] Regarding the report of the High Commissioners to their Governments concerning their political talks with the West Germans during the spring and summer of 1951, see pp. 1446 ff.

their report, and do such other preparatory work as will enable us to reach tripartite agreement on all matters presented in their report when we meet in Sept.

2. Agreement reached in our tripartite discussions in Wash on Germany's new status shld be sufficiently complete so that the High Commissioners cld subsequently conduct and conclude final negots with reps of the Ger Fed Rep. We shld do our best to give them a text of a basic agreement with the FedRep along broad lines susceptible of public understanding. We wld also, of course, discuss progress on defense arrangements with special emphasis on the accomplishments at that time of the Paris conference.

3. The three Fon Mins shld meet in Eur in late Oct before the mtg of the North Atlantic Council to reach final agreement on contractual relations. Sufficient progress shld have been attained in Germany so that the Ger Fon Min cld join our mtg. We shld aim for final four-power agreement then. By that date also, I hope that a completed treaty on the establishment of the European Defense Community wld have been signed by govts and be ready for submission to Parliaments. This wld allow the simultaneous submission in the German Bundestag of the final arrangements on both the political and military aspects of Germany's association with the West. I am sure we all agree that this is essential. Both from our point of view and from the German point of view questions of political equality and military contribution must be finally considered and decided together.

4. At the mtg of the North Atlantic Council in late Oct in Rome, we shld endeavor to obtain final agreement on those aspects of the above arrangements which are within the competence of that body. At this mtg we wld make the appropriate formal disposition of the NATO action regarding a Ger contribution assigned to the three powers at Brussels and of the separate mission undertaken by European nations to plan for the formation of a European Defense Force. In other words, we shld aim for final agreement, acceptable to NATO as a whole, on the problem of the German Defense contribution at that time.

If some schedule along these lines seems possible to you, I suggest that we shld, for the present, postpone any formal action on the report recently received from the High Commission of their discussions with Ger representatives at Bonn on a Ger military contribution.

Such a schedule of work and accomplishment wld put us well on the road to a stabilization of the German problem and a major strengthening of our own defenses. In confining this letter to the subjects which I have discussed, I do not intend to limit the scope of our talks in Sept about which our reps will continue to consult.

I wld greatly appreciate receiving your views.

I am sending a similar letter to Mr. Morrison.[7]

ACHESON

[7] Transmitted to London in telegram 894, August 9 (740.5/8–951).

536-688 PT 1--81---76

762A.5/8–1051

The Minister in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PERSONAL LONDON, August 10, 1951.

DEAR DEAN: Having read your memo of July 13th on German rearmament and problems of the defense of Europe,[1] and having seen also your letter to Morrison [2] which I have delivered today, I am prompted to send you a few personal observations about British attitudes on this subject and to make a few suggestions that may be of some use in dealing with them. I feel that if we can get an understanding with them and an identical position, or at least a close one, that can be of real assistance in evolving a solution with the Germans and the French.

If we do not secure their cooperation, they may be a real obstacle to progress. As you know, they have set a leisurely pace regarding German rearmament. However, I believe their attitude is undergoing substantial change and that they are becoming more favorable to the European Army plan. I think we can get them in step with us and convince them that they should assume a more positive attitude in the coming negotiations.

The European Army scheme raises some major issues with the British in terms of their relations with us and with Western Europe. To anticipate possible misgivings, it would be useful to clear the air with them on the general question of Anglo-American relations and on our views on British relations with the Continent. I have in mind some explicit reassurances of our special relationship with them, and of the fact that we do not advocate their political merger with the Continent, along the lines set forth in the paper prepared for you on this subject (FM D B–16*b* [3]) for the meeting in London in May, 1950.[4] This got bogged down somewhat but I believe its conclusions were valid then and are valid now. On the other hand, I think we should make it clear to them that, while recognizing that their global commitments and other considerations are such that they will not join the Schuman and Pleven plans, we do expect them to play an active role on the Continent and to work with us in attempting to obtain the realization of those plans; that their interest here is identical with our own. We should tell the British that their negative attitude has had a deadening effect, and that a change in their approach is essential if we are to crack this problem with the French and Germans.

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[1] Presumably a reference to the memorandum of July 12 by the Secretary of State, p. 827.

[2] Not printed. This letter was the same in substance as that printed *supra*.

[3] For documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 869–881.

[4] For documentation on the Foreign Ministers meetings at London, May 11–13, 1950, see *ibid.*, pp. 828 ff.

Up to now, it has appeared to the British that we have been following two roads toward German rearmament—a direct contribution to NATO and support for the European Army. This impression should now be dispelled by your letter to Morrison.

We should make clear to the British our firm conviction that the European Army must be an integral part of NATO and within its command structure. This is basic. There are already indications of potential British fears that the Continental combination which may result from the Schuman plan, Pleven's proposal, etc. may threaten their interests. These fears should be mitigated if the European Army is fully integrated and bound up with NATO. Here again our interest and theirs is the same. In addition, the British will be wary of any situation which they feel might lead to a reduction of US force commitments in Europe. Therefore, we should make sure they understand that in our view the European Army would in no way diminish the commitments under or development of NATO but rather that it would provide a means for strengthening it on the Continent.

The fact that German rearmament has seemed to be pushed mainly by us, against the "better judgment" of others, has done us some damage in the UK. The Prime Minister, you will recall, had to back off somewhat last February under pressure from his back benchers. This damage may be hard to counteract and the same impression may be hard to avoid in the future. It might be useful to discuss this frankly with Morrison. More important, however, is the necessity for keeping the British fully informed of our thinking as it develops, and for letting them know well in advance prior to making major proposals in this field. Your letter to Morrison, a month prior to your meeting with him, is the kind of timing that should pay real dividends.

In the next few weeks we will do what we can here to explain to the Foreign Office the various factors motivating your letter and attempt to obtain as much agreement as possible before Morrison comes to Washington. His principal assistant will be Sir Pierson Dixon, one of the best in the Foreign Office, and I shall try to do as much missionary work with him as possible.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

JULIUS

J. C. HOLMES

740.5/8–1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 10, 1951.

Subject: Forthcoming Ministerial Talks

Participants: Mr. C. E. Steel, British Minister
Mr. J. C. H. Bonbright, Acting Assistant Secretary

I asked Mr. Steel, the British Chargé, to come in this afternoon and handed him copies of the following informal papers (copies attached).

1. Suggested timetable for bilateral and tripartite talks with Mr. Morrison and M. Schuman.
2. Proposed topics for tripartite discussion.
3. Proposed topics for US–UK discussion.

With regard to the timetable, Mr. Steel thought that this was about the best we could do, although he feared that the tripartite agenda was so heavily loaded with important topics that it would be difficult to get through the list in the time available to us.

With regard to Item 1 on the tripartite list, I pointed out that although the British had originally put this down for bilateral discussion with us we thought it was more appropriate as a subject for tripartite discussion. I indicated, however, that we had no objection to talking it over bilaterally with the British too if they so desired.

Mr. Steel was obviously unhappy about Items 2 and 3 on the tripartite list. He hoped that we would have reached agreement between us by September, but felt that things were going very badly and was not sure that they should not be dropped in the absence of US–UK agreement. I said that we too hoped that we would reach a meeting of minds, but that, in any event, since these topics were both to come up in Ottawa I thought we probably should discuss them tripartitely before the Council meeting. Mr. Steel agreed that they should at least be left on the agenda for the time being.

I told Mr. Steel orally that we might wish to discuss tripartitely considerations involved in accomplishing the MTDP, although we had not placed this subject specifically on the agenda.

With regard to Item 5 on the US–UK list, I told Mr. Steel that we would like to have word as rapidly as possible with respect to the specific topics which they plan to deal with. I said that we would also appreciate being informed whether the British thought these topics had to be dealt with on the Morrison–Acheson level or whether they were things which Mr Gaitskell could handle with our economic people, ECA, and possibly the Treasury.

J[AMES] C. H. B[ONBRIGHT]

[Attachment 1]

Suggested Timetable for Bilateral and Tripartite Talks With Mr. Morrison and Mr. Schuman

SECRET [WASHINGTON, August 10, 1951.]

In addition to the luncheon and informal discussion scheduled for San Francisco on September 9, we suggest an official US–UK meeting in Washington on Monday afternoon, September 10, and another on Tuesday morning, September 11. If M. Schuman reaches Washington in time, we hope there could be a US-French discussion on Tuesday afternoon with at least four tripartite sessions scheduled for Wednesday and Thursday morning and afternoon, September 12 and 13. Friday morning would be left open with departure for Ottawa that afternoon or evening. In the event that M. Schuman does not reach Washington until late September 11, it would be possible to hold another US–UK session that afternoon. In that event, Mr. Acheson would like to meet alone with M. Schuman the morning of September 12, with tripartite talks beginning that afternoon and running through Friday morning, September 14.

[Attachment 2]

List of Proposed Topics for Tripartite Discussion

SECRET [WASHINGTON, August 10, 1951.]

1. Survey of progress in the policy of containment of the Soviet Union and its satellites.
2. Atlantic and Mediterranean Commands.
3. Greece and Turkey and North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
4. European Defense Force and problem of early German contribution with particular reference to procedure and methods.
5. Contractual arrangements with Germany.
6. Italian Treaty revision, including Trieste.
7. Austria.
8. Spain.
9. Problems of protecting nationals in Eastern Europe.
10. Far Eastern questions
    a. Korea—next steps (with or without armistice)
    b. Policy toward China, including representation in the United Nations.

[Attachment 3]

List of Proposed Topics for American-British Discussion

SECRET [WASHINGTON, August 10, 1951.]

1. European Problems and the United Kingdom attitude toward European integration.
2. Alignment of US–UK policies in Middle East:
   a. Egypt
   b. Iran
   c. Kashmir
3. Alignment of US–UK policies in the Far East:
   a. Korea—next steps (with or without armistice)
   b. China, including representation in the United Nations.
4. East-West trade.
5. Economic questions.

740.5/8–1051

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 10, 1951.

Subject: Forthcoming Ministerial Talks

Participants: Mr. van Laethem, French Embassy
Mr. Bonbright, Acting Assistant Secretary

Since the French Chargé, Mr. Daridan, was tied up, he sent Mr. van Laethem of the Embassy staff to see me this afternoon. I handed him copies of the following informal papers.

1. Suggested timetable for bilateral and tripartite talks with Mr. Morrison and M. Schuman. (Copy attached)
2. Proposed topics for tripartite discussion. (See memo of conversation with Mr. Steel of today's date.[1])

In explanation of the first paper I said that the Secretary was very gratified to learn that M. Schuman could come to Washington for the tripartite talks beginning September 12. We understood, however, that he had not yet reached a decision on the question of attending the San Francisco conference.

With regard to the tripartite list I told him orally that we might wish to discuss considerations involved in accomplishing the MTDP,

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[1] The memorandum under reference here is printed *supra;* the list of topics is attachment 2 thereto.

although we did not wish at this time to place the subject definitely on the agenda.

I then said to Mr van Laethem that we had not attempted to draw up an agenda for the bilateral talks between Mr. Acheson and M. Schuman, but that as far as we were concerned the only broad questions we wished to discuss were those involving Germany and Indo-China. I said that we would welcome an indication of M. Schuman's wishes with regard to the bilateral talks as well as his comments on the proposed tripartite list. With regard to Indo-China, I referred to the fact that General de Lattre would be coming here shortly after the middle of September and wondered whether the French would want questions about Indo-China to be taken up with him or whether there were some topics which M. Schuman would wish to discuss. Mr. van Laethem expressed the view that they would probably want General de Lattre to stick pretty closely to military problems and that M. Schuman would probably wish to discuss political problems himself.

Mr. van Laethem had no particular comment regarding the papers I gave him except with respect to Item 9 on the tripartite list. He said that he had had quite a lot to do with this particular problem in the past and recognized that there were considerable difficulties in the way of synchronizing tripartite positions. He did feel it would be useful for our three governments to exchange information on the methods employed by satellite governments in terrorizing and extracting confessions from our citizens who fall in their hands.

He went on to say that he would pass the papers on and would let us know as soon as he received any word from Paris.

J[AMES] C. H. B[ONBRIGHT]

[Attachment]

Suggested Timetable for Bilateral and Tripartite Talks With Mr. Morrison and Mr. Schuman

SECRET [WASHINGTON, August 10, 1951.]

Depending on how M. Schuman's plans develop, it is hoped he will reach Washington in time for a bilateral US-French discussion on Tuesday afternoon, September 11. If this proves possible we would plan on at least four tripartite sessions, Wednesday and Thursday morning and afternoon, September 12 and 13. Friday morning would be left open, with departure of all principals for Ottawa Friday afternoon or evening. In the event that M. Schuman does not reach Washington until late September 11, Mr. Acheson would like to meet alone with M. Schuman Wednesday morning, with tripartite meetings beginning that afternoon and probably running through Friday morning.

762A.5/8–1751

The British Foreign Secretary (Morrison) to the Secretary of State[1]

LONDON, 17 August 1951.

MY DEAR ACHESON: I was very glad to have your personal message communicated by the United States Embassy about the problems which we face jointly in integrating a German contribution into the defence of Western Europe and in establishing a new contractual relationship with the German Federal Republic.[2] I have been giving much thought to these questions and I am happy to see that we are thinking on similar lines.

2. As regards the contractual arrangements, I have only just received the report which the High Commission has prepared and have not yet had time to study it. My first impression is, however, that the United States and British elements are in agreement on the most essential points. Our first objective must be to reach tripartite agreement and I hope this will be possible when we meet in Washington in September. You will already be aware that I have suggested to this end that our meeting in Washington should be preceded by tripartite official talks. Like you I hope that agreement in our tripartite discussions will enable the High Commissioners to conduct and conclude final negotiations with representatives of the German Federal Republic. I would attach importance to the production of a basic agreement with the Federal Republic along broad lines which will be readily understood by the general public.

3. The central problem in the contractual negotiations is that of the retention of supreme authority by the three allies. I agree that the fields in which supreme authority would be retained should be defined. While, however, I am in broad agreement with the four points mentioned in your message, the precise definition of these fields clearly requires further consideration prior to our meeting next month.

4. I agree with you on the urgency of pressing on towards a decision on these questions. The working programme which you suggest is a very tight one. We will do our best to adhere to it, but it is clear that the contractual relationship is not a question that can be considered by itself. As you say, both from our point of view and from the German point of view questions of political equality and military contribution should be finally considered and decided together.

5. As regards a German defence contribution, I agree that the establishment of a European defence force may well offer an acceptable solution. Before we give our full support to this project, however, I

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[1] This letter was transmitted to Secretary Acheson as an enclosure to a letter from Steel, dated August 17 (762A.5/8–1751).

[2] A reference to the letter indicated is at the end of Secretary Acheson's note to Foreign Minister Schuman, August 9, p. 1164.

think we must first be sure that it is a practicable proposition and can be satisfactorily organised for the efficient defence of Europe. I note your view that the recent and striking progress made in the Paris Conference makes it possible that a German contribution can be obtained quickly in this way. We have no information on this beyond the interim report of the Conference,[3] which is, as you know, vague and incomplete on many points of military detail. We are now looking at it and I am sure it would be valuable to discuss it with Monsieur Schuman in Washington. In the meantime, since the time factor is important, I think it would be useful if our national representative on the Standing Group could study it from a practical military point of view. At the same time, I think they should make use of the report from the High Commission on their discussions with the German representatives at Bonn, since it contains much useful practical material on the possibilities of a German defence contribution.

6. We shall of course have to consider the big issue of Germany's admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation at a later stage in the light of the progress achieved in regard to her new political status and her defence contribution.

7. I am bound to say that the final phases of your proposed timetable strike me as a bit ambitious, given the complexity of the subject. But you may be sure that my colleagues and I, for our part, will do our best.

Yours sincerely, HERBERT MORRISON

[3] For extracts from this report, see p. 843.

762.0221/8–1851

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET FRANKFURT, August 18, 1951.

DEAR DEAN: I have read with interest your letter to M. Schuman and Mr. Morrison.[2] Most of the matters it covers were discussed with Byroade on his recent visit here, as he doubtless reported to you. The letter raises several important points, however, on which I want you to have my views directly in preparation for the coming meetings.

1. *Emergency Powers.* One question to which I have devoted much thought is whether under the agreements the Allies should retain any ultimate right to intervene if the basic democratic order is threatened in Germany. With the contractual relations we must clearly

[1] Marginal handwritten note on the source text reads as follows: "No reply necessary as substance discussed with McCloy cleared with GER."

[2] Dated August 9, p. 1164.

and definitely renounce any right to interfere under normal conditions; but if basic political developments should later threaten the stability of the Federal Republic as a democratic state, this would affect the security of the Allies, and I feel that we must have some final authority to deal with the situation.

No one can say today how great the risk of such developments may be, but the German social and political structure is clearly not yet stable or firmly based. The social fabric is still torn by basic tensions and discontents resulting from the Nazi period, the refugees, the war and its aftermath, etc. The lack of civic courage to speak out against totalitarian groups is most noticeable and the gradual emergence of more intransigent attitudes is apparent. They will probably become more pronounced rather than less as the date for a German contribution approaches. If the steadying influence of Adenauer were withdrawn and economic conditions took a turn for the worse over the next few years, it is not inconceivable that we would see in Germany a strong nationalist development. I am not saying any such course is probable, but the risks inherent in this basic instability seem to me too serious to ignore. We have a tremendous investment in our victory and occupation in Germany and our future could be instantly and directly affected by any defection in Germany.

I have talked with a number of Germans about this question and the great majority recognize this risk and consider that the Allies should keep some ultimate power to protect the Federal Republic against major domestic subversion from the right or left. If such changes should occur, I feel we should step in, or at least have the right to step in, for our own protection, because a Germany so directed would certainly endanger the security of the West. Essentially, our policy aims to solve the German problem by firmly integrating her politically, economically, and socially into a European community, and while the institutions for this purpose are in the formative stage, some special safeguard seems to me necessary.

Furthermore, I feel that a reservation of such authority or a clear declaration has three positive advantages:

(1) By providing a legal basis for action, if the need should arise, it would avoid objections based on the lack of a right to intervene and might facilitate decisions to act in time.

(2) Our guarantee of support for the democratic order would strengthen the courage and will of the German democratic forces to combat the rise to power of anti-democratic forces while that would be effective. In view of their experience in the last twenty years, the civic courage of even well-intentioned Germans is likely to be low, if they are uncertain whether such elements will prevail. Moreover, it would act as a deterrent to those who might otherwise be tempted to adhere to such groups.

(3) Such a declaration might well lead the other European nations to a more ready acceptance of a full German partnership. The French,

the Belgians, and the Dutch all have good reason to be doubtful of German democratic tendencies, and of noncontinental attitudes toward Europe and Germany. British policy which, over the years, has tended to favor German strength as an offset to France, has tended to generate some distrust, and the European countries become very uneasy when the United States appears disposed to follow a somewhat similar attitude, or at least to disregard these dangers. The United States point of view is more imaginative and more constructive, but it can lead these European countries to a realistic and effective solution of the European problem only if it takes into account these attitudes. If these countries felt that the United States was as much interested in the political stability of Europe as in its military strength, and was determined that no new political adventure such as Nazism would be tolerated, I believe they would show more boldness in going forward toward European unity.

The formulation of such a provision is not easy. The power must be clear but must obviously be limited to extreme situations, and must avoid reflecting on the standing of the Federal Republic. It might take the form of a guarantee of the existence of the Bundes-republic, or a reserved power, or a declaration of our intention not to permit a totalitarian coup, if a contractual power were thought to be too great a political burden for the German Government to assume in the face of a strong opposition. Your letter speaks only of retained power to protect the security of our troops in Germany. That concept seems to me too ambiguous to meet what I have in mind. If taken literally, it would not justify action in the face of basic political changes which did not immediately affect their physical safety. What is needed is the express recognition that a serious breakdown in the political field would justify action if it endangered our general security.

I realize this is a fundamental point and seems to run counter to Department thinking but I have given much thought to it and have slowly come to the conclusion that we should reconsider our position in view of what I feel are the serious hazards we face if we do not do so. I may add that German individuals whose judgment I respect (and even some whose judgment I do not) have in impressive numbers conveyed to me their concern over the way things might go here if it were felt no intervention by the Allies was likely even if a totalitarian coup were effected.

2. *Timing of German Contribution.*

Your letter to M. Schuman (end of paragraph 4) expresses the hope that initial defense preparations in Germany can begin before "the final and formal act of establishment of the European force." This statement seems to me to be open to misunderstanding. For the reasons stated in detail in my earlier cables, and in my discussions with Byroade, I am convinced that any efforts to work out an interim basis to begin the German recruiting outside the provisions of the European

Defense Forces Treaty would defeat their end. In my opinion the German contribution must take place under the Treaty creating the European Defense Forces but need not await the ability of the Commissioner to assume the exercise of his functions for training, etc.

In other words, while the Commissioner and other institutions of the European Defense Community are being organized and preparing for their operations, the recruiting of Germans, and their training under the direction of SHAPE, can and should begin. It seems to me just as clear, however, that the German recruiting and training must await the signing of the Treaty and its ratification, at least in Germany. If other countries should be slow in ratifying, I believe we could insist on initial German recruiting without waiting for ratification in these other countries. I think, however, that it would be most unwise to attempt to start such recruiting of Germans until the Bundestag has ratified the European Defense Treaty in order to establish the basis on which the German contribution would take place.

Of course, the Germans could be permitted before that time to do any preparatory work preliminary to the raising of troops. Indeed the Paris conference will be doing some of the planning work in conjunction with the work on the Treaty.

For the reasons already explained in my cables, I do not believe that this course will result in any loss of time which could otherwise in fact be avoided. Indeed I believe that this will be the most expeditious way to bring about the German contribution. A piecemeal approach will only play into the hand of Schumacher and throw away our best cards.

3. *Time Schedule for Decisions.*

When Byroade was here we advised him that, in our best judgment, the contractual arrangements and the EDF Treaty could be completed for submission to the Bundestag by December 15. After our conversations he cabled you recommending that November 15 should be set as the date for the meeting of Ministers to arrive at the final decisions regarding contractual arrangements and the defense contribution. At that time I hope I made it clear to him that while this might be all right as a target, it might be optimistic in practice. The schedule proposed in your letter has set the meeting of Ministers for the last part of October and thus has further shortened time by about three weeks.

Frankly I think that this schedule is likely to prove too tight. Assuming that the three Ministers arrive at decisions on the outstanding points on contractual relations at the meeting on September 15, you must bear in mind that it will still be necessary to draft the various conventions and agreements with our Allies and to negotiate them with the Germans. According to the schedule in your letter, only three or

four weeks would be available for this process. In view of our experience in working out much simpler documents with the Germans, I think that this is much too short a period to expect to complete the actual drafts of these agreements. It would seem to me wiser to hold the meeting of Ministers in the middle of November or at least after the NATO meeting instead of before, in order to allow at least several more weeks to negotiate with the Germans as well as to let the new ideas "settle" in Germany with the ebullient nature of German public opinion. I consider this last to be most important.

I am fully aware of the need for expedition in completing the contractual arrangements and the EDF Treaty but I also believe that this is a situation, within limits, in which "the more haste, the less speed" may well apply. If we give the Germans the feeling that we are under extreme pressure to reach agreements, they are tempted to raise their demands to an unreasonable extent and thereby to retard the ultimate agreement.

I think we should keep the pressure constantly on the French and the Germans with respect both to contractual arrangements and the European Army, but if we attempt to force action so rapidly that they do not have adequate opportunity for orderly discussions within their governments and parliaments, I think we will not really hasten the final outcome but may create obstacles of our own making.

Above all it is essential not to let the Germans receive the impression that we must have agreement at all costs. To do so will only play into the hands of the opposition to Adenauer and force him to adopt unreasonable positions. We must make it clear that we do not seek German participation at any cost but only on the basis of reasonable principles to which they must adhere. All cards are not in their hands. Germany will greatly need our continued assistance in many forms before they reach a stable condition. To give them a contrary impression will prejudice both a sound political and a sound military solution of the German problem.

The above thoughts are not new. We have endeavored to put them before the Department in several different forms, but I cannot escape the feeling that they have not been given the weight or consideration at home which I feel they deserve.

I have just received the memorandum to the President on which the NSC decisions appear to be based and I see in it no evidence that these considerations, which I feel to be supremely important, were presented.[3]

Sincerely, JOHN J. MCCLOY

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[3] For text of the memorandum to President Truman from Secretary Acheson and Acting Secretary of Defense Lovett, dated July 30, see p. 849.

396.1–NE/8–2551 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, August 25, 1951—2 p. m.

1040. 1. For your background forthcoming talks with Morrison there is summarized below Brit pol situation and present attitudes toward US. These factors will have direct bearing on Morrison's probable attitude toward talks and his position on particular issues. We are sending in separate tels our estimate Brit preoccupations re and position on each agenda item as well as more detailed as [report on?] econ situation.[2]

2. Fol factors in polit situation here will make Morrison unusually anxious to bring home some bacon.

(*a*) Fall election possibility will influence Morrison's approach in talks. Govt's present majority in Commons has imposed real strain on mins and MP's and Labor's margin may be still further reduced in prospective by-elections. This wld make job of staying in office even more of a physical burden. Labor has been of two minds re election, but it seems generally agreed that it will be held by end Oct or not before next spring because of bleaker winter prospects in view of possible coal and power crises and diminution living standards as econ consequences def program bites deeper.[3] However, fall election is not a certainty. Labor leaders wld be reluctant to give up power, and many fear consequences Tory rule. Decision re election rests with PriMin alone and he has not revealed his intentions.

(*b*) Latest Gallup poll shows reversal of trend toward Labor which had developed early summer and Conservatives now lead Labor by 12.5 per cent, which wld mean substantial Conservative victory. Voters main dissatisfaction with govt is cost of living. Labor has been hoping that some internatl development wld turn up to boost its popularity. This desire will be intensified in view of latest poll result.

(*c*) Fight with Bevan within Labor party will come to head first week in Oct at Labor party conf—shortly after Morrison returns. No one, even those stung with Bevanity, believes that Labor rebels can capture the party. But party leaders are sensitive to their criticism and do not want to give them ammunition. They have shown this sensitiveness in number of important ways. For example, Gaitskell's proposal to US in June for internatl commodity price stabilization agreements was made partly so he cld tell his party and country that govt, with US, was "vigorously" tackling problem of raw materials and import prices.[4] This proposal had more form than substance, and when it got

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[1] Repeated to Frankfurt, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Embassy London reported its estimate of the British position on the various agenda items in telegrams 1073, 1074, 1076, 1077, 1078, 1080, 1081, 1082, and 1083, all dated August 27. For telegram 1080, see volume IV; the other telegrams under reference are not printed. For telegram 1047, August 27, which transmitted information on the British economic outlook, see *ibid.*

[3] For documentation on the British defense program, see *ibid.*

[4] For documentation on the discussions at Washington in July concerning raw materials, see *ibid.*

down to specifics Brit had nothing in mind. One of Bevan's chief complaints is that govt doesn't "stand up" to US; that it doesn't have courage of its convictions or use bargaining power it does possess with us. Morrison will be anxious to prove that this charge from left-wing is false.

(*d*) Morrison also has his troubles from the right. Conservatives claim they cld "do better" in fon policy than Labor and maintain they wld once again make Brit voice heard and heeded in world affairs. This criticism strikes home, especially when even Persians and Egyptians seem able to twist lion's tail with impunity. Sensitiveness to this criticism partially explains strong tone of Morrison's recent message to Secy on Egypt.[5] Churchill and Eden are constant threats on fon policy questions, alert to probe for soft spots in govt's actions, and Morrison has not shown up well against them in Commons. He has often resorted to charges of "Tory politics" and "reaction" which have not helped his standing. If Labor is to secure any marginal independent support, Morrison must try to recoup loss govt will suffer because of failure in Iran by demonstrating ability to present Brit case, secure acceptance Brit point of view, and safeguard Brit interests.

3. Although Morrison will want to come home with something in hand to wave at the voter, we doubt that he will have any new major proposals of his own. Govt lacks former toughness and initiative, and is sterile in ideas. In 1945 it knew what it wanted; now it doesn't know where it wants to go. There has been much talk about "new directions", but neither govt nor Labor party have produced ideas or programs. Govt leadership is not as strong as it was. Morrison and Gaitskell are not equal to Bevin and Cripps. Morrison can scarcely provide inspired leadership when he seems to have few well-developed convictions himself on fon policy (see my ltr to Secy of August 23 [6]). Gaitskell is competent, and friendly to us, but his recent decision on dividends has been widely regarded as a patent political maneouver and kind of action which Cripps wld not indulge in. (We suspect this decision may have been forced on Gaitskell.) Second-stringers, while promising, have not come up to replace old guard. In addition many govt mins are tired after ten years in office, and after particularly gruelling Parliament session this year. This was evident when House of Commons slowly came to halt early in August in atmosphere of bad tempers and frustration. While there are some factors off-setting this gloomy appraisal, result is nonetheless a lack of sharpness, vigor, and drive which has its effect throughout govt and on its fon policy. Morrison's response to Secy ltr re Ger and Eur def force is an example of a "we agree, maybe" attitude, with no prescription for alternative action encountered with discouraging frequency.[7]

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[5] For the text of Morrison's message, dated August 15, see volume v.
[6] Not printed.
[7] Dated August 9, p. 1164; for Morrison's reply of August 17, see p. 1174.

4. Precarious polit position of govt and signs of deterioration in econ situation will make Morrison anxious to avoid decisions which might have disagreeable polit connotations or upset balance at home. These polit forces on Morrison wld be brought directly into play, for example, in any discussion of NATO "gap" [8] and of need for immed increases Brit def effort. Within Labor party, govt is under attack from Bevan and his group because of magnitude present program. Apart from any influence Bevan may have, Labor's rank and file generally have expressed strongest dissatisfaction with rising cost of living and profits, and how to avoid further increases is major governmental preoccupation. Furthermore, increase in def program, in economy whose resources are now fully employed, wld produce econ issues of first magnitude. This is not kind of bacon Morrison will want, or perhaps cld afford, to bring home.

5. Public attitudes toward US compare favorably with those prevailing last Dec when PriMin visited Washington.[9] At that time widespread fear that US involvement in FE might touch off general war caused sharp criticism US on this and other issues and found dramatic expression in reaction to inaccurate reports of Pres's press conf remarks on use atomic bomb. In this setting, the Brit generally stood united behind PriMin, viewed his mission as one to relieve world crisis, and anxiously awaited his return and news of talks with Pres. Since then there has been considerable improvement here in general attitudes toward US. While Morrison will be conscious of important domestic pol and econ forces, he will not be under same pressure as Attlee so far as attitudes toward us are concerned. There are meany reasons for this improvement: There is realization following great debate that America has rejected isolationism; MacArthur's removal [10] confirmed civilians still control US Govt; heat was taken off Ger rearmament after Eisenhower's "unwilling hessians" remarks; [11] intl raw materials conf seems to be paying dividends; immediate danger bigger FE hostilities seems to have been removed; and Brit have appreciated Harriman's efforts in Iran.[12]

6. Altho apart from Spain and hold up in Aust of Brit youth bound for Berlin festival,[13] there are few specific aspects US policy which are agitating Brit public at moment, certain gen attitudes are

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[8] For documentation on the gap between NATO military plans and member states production, see pp. 1 ff.

[9] For documentation on Prime Minister Attlee's visit to Washington in December 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1698 ff.

[10] For documentation relating to General MacArthur's removal as Supreme Allied Commander in the Pacific on April 10, see volume VII.

[11] Regarding General Eisenhower's remarks to the Congress on his return from his tour of NATO capitals and Germany, see editorial note, p. 449.

[12] For documentation on Harriman's efforts to mediate the Iranian dispute with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), see volume V.

[13] For documentation on the Welt Jugend Spiel held at Berlin in August, see pp. 1987 ff.

disturbing. Both Labor's left and Conservative strongly criticize govt for not exerting its due influence in world affairs and for not carrying out role of equal partner with US. From Labor left this criticism has strong anti-American bias, while Conservatives blame govt mismanagement and inertia rather than US. However, there is widespread opinion, shared by members govt, that US forges ahead on sometimes reckless paths regardless of others views, that we too frequently obtain agreement by coercion, and that mil considerations seem too dominant in determining our policies. Incidents in Austria when Brit youths attempted to reach Berlin festival is example to Brit public of uninhibited behavior on our part which they fear will lead to trouble. Absence multilateral approach Spanish question was deprecated even by some Conservatives. Many of those who have long accepted necessity for Ger rearmament have believed our too-fast-a-pace hindered rather than helped attainment this objective. While Brit rearmament regarded by most as essential, magnitude of def program is viewed by many as result Amer initiative and pressure. Of course, these and other similar beliefs arise in part because HMG is not sufficiently forthright itself in taking leadership and explaining facts of life and its own views to public. Altho these preoccupations continue, they are not as sharply focussed as when Attlee went to Wash last December and as described Embtel 3241, Dec 3, 1950.[14]

7. Furthermore, there are some important policy differences between US and Brit which, if they spill into arena of public debate, cld have adverse effects on opinion here. We have in mind FE policy, pace we wish to set on Ger rearmament, east-west trade, ME situation, and adequacy present def effort. FE questions have been quiescent but differences may appear depending on developments Korea (Embtel 709, August 3 [15]) and perhaps because of Commonwealth differences arising out of Jap treaty. We doubt that past hesitations about Ger rearmament will be as great as they have been. However, on question east-west trade and ME, we feel Brit are taking firms stand and there will be little room for accommodation in their position. Besides Brit note re Kem amendment and Battle bill, Shawcross has made strong speech on necessity continuing trade with Sov bloc.[16] Shawcross speech was largely addressed to US, and constituted public notice that govt felt limit of restrictions had been reached (Embtel 913, August 16 [15]). It is significant that Eden promptly applauded Shawcross views. Brit have spent anxious summer over ME problems, and now feel entire Brit position that area is at stake. Failure in Iran will stiffen their determination not to be pushed out of Egypt. They are convinced of mil necessity of keeping Suez base, and intend to do so regardless of

[14] For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, p. 1698.
[15] Not printed.
[16] For documentation on East-West trade, see vol. I, pp. 993 ff.

Egypt's attitudes on def, Brit will doubtless resist efforts to increase program at this time altho their attitude will depend on many factors including way in which we meet gen problem outlined para 6 above.

8. Above analysis domestic pol forces and attitudes toward US has been devoted mainly to problems which exist and which may influence Morrison. There are, of course, many favorable elements in Brit situation but we believe it unnecessary to elaborate on them. We shld always remember, however, that basically Brit is orderly and politically mature country; that determination to resist Sov Commie aggression is unwavering; and that if chips go down Brit will fight as they did in 1940. Furthermore, there have been substantial accomplishments here in econ field and present def program is high relative to other Eur countries, compares favorably with ours, and will be efficiently carried out. In addition to these generalities, Brit positions on number of specifics to be discussed Washington have moved closer to our own. For example, there is growing support for Eur def force and for our view on contractual relations with Ger, and Brit are taking more positive attitude toward questions involving west Eur integration.

9. In many fields and on many issues Brit feel themselves on the razor's edge. They are tightly stretched possibly over-extended economically, politically, and militarily. But their will to carry out their commitments and responsibilities is strong. There is almost no evidence of any "little England" tendency. Resources and energies are being strained to maintain UK as center of empire, head of Commonwealth and controller of sterling area. And Brit generally and Morrison specifically recognize necessity closest possible Anglo-American cooperation. They are conscious of their weakness and extremely sensitive to any hint that we are not standing four-square with them. Both by conviction and circumstance they feel themselves committed to a shoulder-to-shoulder relationship with us.

HOLMES

London Embassy files, lot 59 F 59, 320 Western bloc (policy) : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, August 25, 1951—5 p. m.

1216. Personal for Secretary. Reference Deptels 1031 and 1066.[2] This is fifth and last in series of messages responsive reftels. First two

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[1] Repeated to London for Gifford and Spofford and to Frankfurt for McCloy. The text of this message was subsequently included as an annex to document WFM T–4/2*a*, dated September 8, a briefing paper for the Ministers meetings entitled "European Defense Force and the Question of a German Contribution to Defense," prepared in the Department of State, not printed.

[2] Neither printed; regarding these messages of August 17 and 18, see footnotes 2 and 3, p. 856.

have gone forward as Embtels 1184 and 1185 and intermediate messages will follow.[3]

This contains my recommendations on best approach to Schuman in September, subject to possible further comments after receipt his reply your message August 9 (Deptel 905 [4]).

The most effective approach to French Foreign Minister to obtain desired French Government action on three major questions, namely, European Defense Forces, contractual arrangements with Germany and an adequate French defense effort would be to eliminate possible uncertainties in his mind and in those of his colleagues as to US policy on these questions.

A. In order to encourage progress in European Defense Forces Conference US should make clear that its policy is as follows:

1. That US is convinced that European defense community is most practical means:

a. To create and maintain effective European defense with the minimum drain on Europe's economic resources for this purpose;

b. To obtain German contribution needed for European defense with minimum risk of revival of German militarism.

2. That accordingly US is actively supporting creation of European defense community on the following assumptions:

a. That present French Government is determined to create European Defense Forces as rapidly as possible;

b. That since decisions facing the European countries are very fundamental and hence require reasonable time to obtain firm acceptance by both parliaments and public opinion—even if this requires modification of existing deadlines—pressure will be maintained by all participating governments for rapid settlement of outstanding questions;

c. That treaty will be rapidly signed and ratified;

d. That outstanding questions will have been settled in manner to create an effective defense force;

e. That German recruitment will begin immediately after treaty has been ratified and in any case without waiting for commissioner to be able to exercise his full functions.

3. That US will actively support all realistic steps toward European integration as best means for effective defense, economic progress and political stability. In particular the US:

a. Will work to strengthen European institutions (such as Schuman Plan High Authority and EDF Commissioner) as they are created;

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[3] For telegrams 1184 and 1185, August 24, from Paris, see pp. 856 and 859. Telegrams 1265 and 1266, August 28, from Paris, neither printed, the third and fourth in the series of five telegrams under reference, contained detailed comment and analysis of certain major points in the Interim Report of the European Defense Conference (740.5/8–2851). For extracts from the Interim Report, see p. 843.

[4] Not printed; the text of the message under reference is printed, p. 1164.

b. Will as appropriate act through European agencies, rather than with the member states, in the areas of their competence;
c. Will strongly urge active British cooperation and support of integration on continent even if they do not wish to join.

B. In order to obtain French cooperation in working out new political status for Germany consistent with role as freely participating member in commen defense, US should ask French government to conduct negotiations on contractual arrangements on premise of establishment of European defense forces. It would be understood that French position is conditional on German ratification of European Defense Forces Treaty. In this way the non-restrictive situation permitted by creation of EDF could reduce controls established under contractual arrangements to minimum. It is preferable to give generous arrangements immediately in order to strengthen democratic forces in Germany sincerely committed to European community rather than have concessions extorted later by extremists in detriment to status of Adenauer and his supporters.

In pressing this policy on Foreign Minister Schuman it should be made clear that US will take account of extra risks assumed by France and other countries in forming defense community with Germany and will urge British to do the same. In particular, this will mean:

a. That US, France and, we hope, Great Britain will assure in some way continuance in Germany of a stable democratic order which will live up to its engagements, and
b. That the US intends to continue its support and assistance on which the success of the European community depends;
c. That US hopes Schuman will be successful in obtaining rapid ratification of coal-steel community treaty;
d. That, if Schuman raises problems of Saar [5] and development European coal crisis, US hopes he will propose European solutions for their settlement.

C. The French rearmament program as it presently exists is a subject of grave concern to French government. Competent officials and certain Ministers sense substantial revision and postponement may be inevitable for following reasons:

1. In their view, additional substantial increase which would be required in calendar 1952 defense appropriations to carry out present program is out of question because economic assistance from US and other countries will not be large enough to provide flow of supplemental resources into French economy adequate to justify risk of substantial new inflationary financing and to prevent serious depreciation international value of French franc. Rightly or wrongly there is considerable dissatisfaction with administration of US assistance since bilateral talks last October. Revelation that $290 million was ECA figure allocated to French for US fiscal 1952 in light of French plans came as surprise. Assuming additional cuts by Congress will reduce this figure to little more than equivalent of amount necessary to cover their dollar debt servicing, they do not see how US administration can commit itself to additional help even if it should wish to do so.

[5] For documentation on the question of the Saar, see pp. 1970 ff.

2. In their view French forces have real significance for security of France and for NATO only in conjunction with collective allied forces and it is questionable whether present French rearmament program provides for creation of type of forces and equipment adequately related to those of France's allies. Opinion is increasing that substantial revisions in French program are required if French build-up is to proceed in a balanced way and to be fully consistent with European defense forces and collective NATO forces.

3. In their minds there is an increasing political and military urgency for France to make its full contribution to European defense in view of necessity for quick solution German problem. This will require a new assessment of the French effort in Indo-China. The question is very acutely raised as to how France can carry Indo-China and European defense tasks at same time. This relates not only to financial capabilities but also to capabilities in terms of officers, technicians, men and resources as well.

Maximum encouragement will be given France to continue its defense efforts both in Europe and in Indo-China and to take lead in committing member nations to undertake a maximum feasible goal in EDF treaty if the Secretary can declare that US policy will be along following lines:

a. To continue to provide such margin of financial assistance through ECA as would enable France and other countries to carry out level of defense substantially in excess of amounts which would be possible if plans had to be based only on their own resources. If Congressional action should not make it possible to realize this policy fully, to be prepared to consider maximum flexibility in use of US funds, for example, by utilizing US defense appropriations for off-shore procurement to assist in meeting payments problem, or by accepting broader definition of end-items in military assistance program. If this is still not adequate, to seek a supplemental appropriation;

b. To assist the EDF Conference, and later the institutions of the EDF, in working out a balanced defense program to develop in an orderly way over 3 years;

c. To provide a single program of military equipment and supplies in specific quantities for EDF to complement a single production program to be provided by EDF.

René Mayer, as well as Schuman, will probably wish to raise these questions while in Washington. In view of delay and difficulties being encountered with respect to enactment of aid legislation for FY 1952 they realize that it may not be possible to obtain any positive commitments from US in immediate future. However, they feel they must begin to seek your views on these questions in connection with preparation of their 1952 budget, which is scheduled for submission to French Parliament during autumn months. In this connection, they may indicate that if it should appear that an agreed balanced program and an understanding with US will be long delayed, they may

have to present military budget on an interim basis on assumption of no US economic assistance with understanding that voting of supplementary program would be requested later in line with agreed allocation of tasks and with amount of assistance forthcoming.

Obvious that French government feels great concern at repercussions both at home and abroad which would result from announcement of downward revision or postponement of French defense program.

BRUCE

740.5/8–2651

The French Foreign Minister (Schuman) to the Secretary of State [1]

[Translation]

SECRET PARIS, August 26, 1951.

I wish to thank you for your kindness in making known to me on a personal basis, in your letter of August 9, your thoughts on the basic problems which will be the subject of our conversations in Washington in September.

My answer, while it is also of a personal nature, has been delayed by the need to consult the new govt on the manifold and serious problems which will be examined during the coming mtgs and which involve several ministerial depts.

May I say at the outset how happy I am to note the interest you take in the efforts France is making to create a Eur community, as well as the support which your govt is giving to our projects.

Concretely, this policy means the speedy ratifications and putting into effect of the plan for the coal and steel pool, now before the six interested Parliaments, and agreement on the treaty for the organization of a Eur def community, which we must complete in the shortest possible time. We will thus be involved in the preparation of a real polit community among the free states of West Eur, incl West Ger.

These initiatives have been inspired by one controlling idea, to which my govt remains firmly attached: To integrate West Ger on a basis of equality into a Eur community, which is itself included, as you have said, "within a developing Atlantic community"; thus to be able to abandon a system of control guaranteed by force, which—as our experience after the first world war proved—would not constitute a satis and lasting solution; but at the same time to avoid the risk, so serious for peace, and for the Gers themselves, of rebuilding a nation-

[1] This text, a translation prepared in Embassy Paris, was transmitted to Washington in telegram 1224 from Paris, August 26 (740.5/8–2651). The telegram was repeated to London for Gifford and Spofford and to Frankfurt for McCloy.

alist Ger which might be tempted to play the role of arbiter between East and West.

It is with this perspective, I believe, that you and Morrison and I should approach the examination of the Ger problem.

I need not dwell on the fact that France earnestly hopes that Great Britain can participate in these arrangements or be associated with them in a manner compatible with her interests. If, for reasons which are peculiar to her case and of which she is the sole judge, Great Britain could not agree to becoming an integral part of the Eur community, we would regret it, while resting assured that, in conformity with the gen objective of our common policy, she would bend every effort to facilitate our action and would cooperate closely with the US and the Eur community within the Atlantic framework as thus reinforced.

The policy of Eur union implies for all participants, and for France in particular, important sacrifices, a fundamental modification of traditional systems which have been in existence for centuries, and the surrender of sovereignty in favor of supra-national auths. This is a contribution which we feel we are making not only in our own interest but in that of the whole Atlantic community. If this Fr initiative makes possible the integration of Ger into West Eur, this is of benefit to all peaceful and democratic countries.

An all too recent past has taught us that Ger is likely to evolve in rapid and unpredictable ways. In our own interest and in that of the Gers themselves, we must secure the Atlantic community against such possible developments. If we want the integration of Ger into a solidly organized Eur to be and to remain an effective guarantee, during our forthcoming talks we will have to provide for the necessary safeguards. On the other hand, the Eur in which we wish to include Ger will not come into existence overnight. Its formation will require a certain time, a factor which we will have to reckon with.

I am happy to note our agreement with respect to the fundamental principles on which the new regime in Ger must rest. I feel that after a preliminary mtg of experts at the governmental level, we will be able to reach a speedy decision on all the essential points, taking as a basis the report of the HICOM and the recommendations of the London Working Group. I feel as you do that we will not have enough time to study these documents in detail and that our task will be above all to agree on general directives that will put our reps in a position to continue and complete their work. But it must be clearly understood that the new contractual status will not be put into effect before the treaty for the organization of the Eur def community is signed and ratified by the Parliaments, in particular by the Ger Parliament. You

will recall in this connection that we have felt that the international auth for the Ruhr could not be abolished before the entry into force of the coal-steel plan.

With regard to a Ger contribution to the common def, I understand perfectly your concern to have us get on quickly to the stage of implementation. You are justifiably desirous therefore of not awaiting the definitive establishment of all the admin and polit arrangements for the Eur force before adopting a certain number of measures in preparation of the organization of def in Ger. I am in agreement with you provided that this does not mean the beginning of implementation and provided that these measures do not include recruiting soldiers in Ger. It is absolutely indispensable in my view that the first man recruited in Ger be able to put on a Eur uniform, just as it is indispensable that the forces furnished by all the participants become Eur as soon as the community is established. If an embryo of a Ger army exists for a single moment, the whole idea underlying the Eur def community runs the risk of a fatal setback. We must therefore examine with the greatest care the nature of the preparatory measures which might be both necessary for and compatible with the realization of our project. Furthermore, I can assure you that with the help of SHAPE we will do everything within our power to draw up this treaty and get it functioning in the shortest possible time. Our target is to have an agreed text by the end of October. You will recall that as soon as the treaty is ratified the institutions it provides for will be established. Recruitment can then begin in Ger, even if the Eur organizations only start functioning gradually as for the admission of the Ger FedRep to NATO, I consider it most inopportune to raise the question under present circumstances. Our entire Eur policy and especially the integration of Ger forces would be compromised by the prospect of direct Ger accession to the Atlantic community. I consider it my duty to point this out to you at this time. At a later date and when the Eur community, econ, mil and polit, has been established, we shall be called upon to examine how this community can be adapted to other international organizations.

These are, my dear Mr. Acheson, the principal problems, all so significant for the future of our countries, which I have thought best to take up in this letter. We shall certainly have the occasion to discuss them at length in Washington and then in Ottawa and Rome. I wonder, however, if the timetable set can be adhered to in view of the importance of these questions added to others. We can talk further about this in the course of our forthcoming meeting.

PS: I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Morrison.

[SCHUMAN]

740.5/8-2651

The French Foreign Minister (Schuman) to the Secretary of State [1]

[Translation]

SECRET PARIS, August 26, 1951.

At the time that I acquaint you with my thoughts on the subject of the tripartite conversations that are to take place in Washington, I believe that I must also emphasize the importance of certain problems that especially concern either France-America relations or relations between the United States and the new European defense community. In regard to these I shld like to mention three considerations that appear to me essential.

First of all, the establishment of an effective European defense force within a time limit compatible with strategic necessities cannot be done without adequate American aid, both in equipment and in money. It is necessary that the amount of this aid be determined as soon as possible and that as a result the European armaments program be established with the double objective of achieving an effective defense and of avoiding a dislocation of our economies that wld make the continuation of the necessary effort impossible.

In the second place, American aid should be given to the European community and not separately to the nations which compose it. All plans concerning armament and employment of forces ought to be worked out directly with the European community.

Finally, with respect to France in particular, I feel that I must stress the fact that if our country is to be in a position to make its full contribution to the European Army—something which is essential both for the defense of Europe and for proper balance within the community—there must be a marked lightening of the special burdens arising out of the struggle in the common interest that we are carrying on almost alone in Indochina. All our plans would be seriously compromised if France were not to receive separate assistance because of the sacrifices she has been making for the past five years.

All these questions must be the subject of private conversations between you and the French representatives, in particular Messrs. Bidault and René Mayer, who will be in the United States at the same time as I.

[SCHUMAN]

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[1] The source text, a translation prepared by Embassy Paris, was transmitted to Washington in telegram 1225 from Paris, August 26 (740.5/8-2651). This second Schuman reply, according to telegram 1225, was not shown to the British, but Embassy Paris repeated it to London for Gifford and Spofford and to Frankfurt for McCloy.

396.1-WA/9-351

Memorandum by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 3, 1951.

In the past several months I have had a series of discussions with you concerning the general nature of the course which we must pursue in terminating the occupation in Germany. One of the fundamental problems which has repeatedly concerned us has been the question of retaining emergency power in order to preserve democracy if it is threatened in Germany. In view of the fact that a decision must now be made as to our position on this question, I feel I should formally summarize the factors involved and make a final recommendation.

This is perhaps the more desirable since Mr. McCloy in a personal letter to you dated August 18 [1] has particularly recorded his conviction that the emergency power referred to above must be kept. Speaking for myself, as well as for all the senior members of my staff, some of whom have seen long service in Germany, I wish to record my disagreement with the general philosophy and conclusions advanced by Mr. McCloy on this subject.

There can be no question but that the objectives sought by those who work on German problems, whether in Germany or here in Washington, are identical. Our goal is to obtain the type of German nation in the future which will not again cause the United States to be plunged into war, but will instead freely cooperate with the West. We are striving for a Germany in which the fundamentals of democracy as we see them will be retained and in which the freedom and protection of the individual in every sphere will be upheld. We hope for a government which will be able to withstand pressures from either the extreme Right or the extreme Left and which will not again allow the military to assume control.

In furtherance of these objectives, we have brought about in Germany, partly by order and partly by persuasion, the establishment of governmental and political forces which are democratic. From local levels to national level, the mechanics for safeguarding against totalitarianism are in being.

Mechanics are not enough, and we have therefore devoted an enormous effort to influencing the spirit and minds of the German people, to "reorienting" them, so that the machinery would be in safer hands. However, we dropped our reserve power based upon supreme authority in this field on the coming into being of the Occupation Statute in 1949,[2] as we felt the objectives to be achieved could be obtained more

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[1] *Ante*, p. 1175.

[2] For the text of the Occupation Statute for Germany, signed at Washington on April 8, 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, p. 179.

readily by cooperation than through a reservation of our sovereignty. The project has been successful in so far as such an approach can be successful in a short number of years. It is our desire to continue this type of activity in Germany to the extent funds are available. Foreseeing that appropriated funds for such a purpose will greatly diminish in future years, we have started to enlist the support of private organizations and private funds to carry on our work in the future. We are thus dedicated to continue through public and private funds our efforts with the German people to the extent of our capabilities and to the extent that positive results are being obtained.

Any attempt to "protect", by reservation of supreme authority derived from the unconditional surrender of Germany, the progress made in the establishment of democratic forms and the democratic spirit would, however, in my opinion be an error of historic proportions. I believe this would be true even if we were proposing to end the occupation under the most "normal" circumstances. It is especially true under the existing special circumstances.

Present tension in the world has led to a situation where we believe that Germany must be prepared for effective defense in our own interests. It has been generally agreed that the defense of Europe is not realistically possible without the addition of German strength, both economic and military. These facts have unavoidably stepped up the political time table which calls for a termination of the occupation of Germany. It is illogical for us to expect that Germany's strength will be added to our cause without her being accorded the greatest possible equality. In any event, military strength exacted by a suzerain is no strength at all. To be worth anything in a crisis, it must be the strength of an equal and a convinced ally. We should therefore plan to return full control over foreign and domestic affairs to the Germans, with only such exceptions as are made necessary by two results of Soviet policy: (1) The division of Germany and (2) the existence of a security menace outside the Federal Republic. We should pursue this plan as the one best designed to bring about wholehearted German cooperation with the West and to eliminate so far as possible all grounds for irritation and interference which can only lead in future to the rise of extremist nationalism in Germany.

The power in foreign hands to declare a state of emergency for any reason is a serious infringement of German sovereignty. It can be justified only as it relates to the two exceptions noted above. It should be severely limited so as to be applicable only in cases of external attacks, or of disorders likely to weaken our readiness to meet external attack. Thus limited, it can be justified to, and accepted by, an ally, whereas an ally cannot accept the power of foreigners to protect him against himself. Such a reservation of authority would stick out like a sore thumb among the arrangements which the military menace com-

pels us to make. However, because the Government of the Federal Republic has no constitutional power to declare an emergency, it may additionally be agreed that such authority be used by the Allies in the case of the overthrow of the constitutional (democratic) order, *but only at the request of the Germans.* To go beyond that would be a basic mistake, because (1) it would permit and possibly encourage interference in domestic affairs; (2) it would weaken the position of any German government agreeing to it; (3) it would be a prop which would appear to shore up, but would in reality weaken, German democratic elements by leading them into complacency, and (4) it would be a standing rallying point for German zenophobes and totalitarians.

I am well aware that there is risk in not retaining express power to protect democracy by declaring a state of emergency. This is a risk which will exist for many years. It is a risk to which some of Germany's European neighbors may be especially sensitive. But we must realize that the danger to German democracy will perhaps be greatest after five or ten years. I find it difficult to believe that we can keep our legal powers in Germany for that long a time, and the immediate adverse consequence of retaining a power of intervention would only be equalled by the ultimate adverse consequence of giving it up under the pressure of rising German nationalism. We cannot hope to retain such power and expect at the same time to convince the Germans that they are equals and should cooperate with us. This is particularly true of those Germans who yet remain to be won over to democracy and cooperation with the West. Our greatest guarantee in the immediate future will be the presence of our armies and the menace of Soviet imperalism, two prime political factors. In the long run, the best guarantee will be to bind Germany securely to the free world and to demonstrate to the Germans that their democratic regime has the world's confidence and friendship and has won strength and successes.

I understand that Mr. McCloy feels that perhaps 90 per cent of the German people would agree to our retention of this emergency power to intervene for the preservation of democracy. It may well be that large numbers of them will now say privately that the future would be safer under such an arrangement. I feel completely sure, however, that very few if any German leaders would publicly take such a position and that when this issue would be debated, the demagogues and nationalists would have no inhibitions and no difficulty in stirring up a profound public reaction. This would be the more easy as it could be pointed out that the Treaty with Japan contains no such provision and that the West apparently puts more trust in Orientals than in Germans.

I should also like to emphasize the danger of drift. Many things show signs of "going sour" in Germany now. This is natural in an in-

between period when the talk is of ending the occupation but the acts and powers are still those of the occupation. The present drift must be ended soon and decisively if it is not to generate so much acrimony and so much doubt of our good faith and good intentions as to put in jeopardy the alliance we seek. The break with the past must be clear and permanent.

There is much more at stake in this decision than the question of a few German divisions. We have publicly started on a course of adding German strength to the West and there is public expectation in Germany that this will be accompanied by equality. If, because of failure on our own part, or failure to obtain tripartite agreement, we are now to show our unwillingness to accept the Germans as equals, we risk starting on a course that could result in the loss of all Germany, and perhaps more. We cannot expect them freely to contribute to defense if we indicate publicly our distrust in their ability to handle their own affairs and retain the ultimate right to handle them ourselves. We cannot expect the Germans to be enthusiastic members of our club if we retain a "safety first" attitude which would continue to be a form of control over their domestic development. If we adopt such a course, I am firmly convinced either the Germans would resentfully comply, for a short time only, with our plans and policies or, what is much more likely, would reject the package we offer as politically impossible. In either case, we risk the danger of being turned against by the German people as a whole. The future prospect for democracy in Germany would surely be imperilled by such a development.

I am firmly of the opinion that the whole success or failure of our efforts to obtain our dual objectives of adding German strength securely to the West and obtaining a stable and lasting democratic system in Germany may rest on your decision on this one fundamental point.

I have discussed this matter at length with various senior officials of the Department who have indicated their general agreement with me on this subject.

HENRY A. BYROADE

Editorial Note

On August 13 the British suggested that representatives of the three Western Powers should meet in Washington for preliminary discussions on Germany before the Foreign Ministers met. This suggestion was accepted and the preliminary meetings began on September 6 and continued until September 11 with Byroade and Reinstein representing the United States, Allen representing the United Kingdom, and Seydoux and Sauvagnargues representing France. Apparently no

formal United States minutes of the discussions were kept, and the only records of the meetings found in the Department of State files are a handwritten set of notes taken by Reinstein and the summary of the sessions given to the Belgian, Netherlands, and Luxembourg representatives by Byroade on September 11. Reinstein's notes are in the CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, notes on WFM; regarding Byroade's summary, see memorandum of conversation, September 11, page 1214.

The preliminary meetings succeeded in narrowing the differences on various issues and eliminating a number of disagreed points from the High Commissioners' report. The resulting document, WFM T–5*a*, dated September 10, was transmitted to the Foreign Ministers for resolution of the remaining differences. For a copy of the High Commissioners' report, see page 1501; the text of WFM T–5*a* is printed *infra*.

In preparation for the Foreign Ministers meetings the Department of State drafted three sets of papers covering the topics to be discussed with the British, the French, and tripartitely. All documents and their subsequent revisions were drafted in the responsible offices and cleared within the Department of State and by the Department of Defense before being approved for use by the United States Delegation. Some of the documents were approved personally by Secretary Acheson.

The first set of papers, designated WFM B, was prepared for talks with the British and dealt with the following topics: European integration, the Middle East, Egypt, Iran, Kashmir, India, East-West trade, and economic assistance to the United Kingdom. The second set of papers, designated WFM F, was prepared for discussion with the French and consisted of papers on Indochina, Morocco, and economic assistance to France. The third set of papers was designated WFM T. Prepared for the tripartite talks, these papers considered the following topics: containment of the Soviet Union, Chinese aggression in Asia, NATO and related questions, the European Defense Force, Germany, the Italian Peace Treaty, Austria, Spain, Korea, Eastern Europe, the United Nations and related subjects, the Singapore Conference, Formosa, trade with Czechoslovakia, the Saar, and defense costs sharing.

Sets of these papers and additional materials relating to the Foreign Ministers meetings, including administrative memoranda, minutes, records of decisions, and documents, are in the CFM files, lot M–88, boxes 158–159.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite talks

Draft Instructions From the Three Foreign Ministers to the Allied High Commission [1]

SECRET
WFM T–5*a* [2]

[WASHINGTON,] September 10, 1951.

I

The Ministers have examined the "Report of the Allied High Commission Concerning a New Relationship to be Established Between the Allied Powers and Germany", dated August 9, 1951,[3] and, subject to the modifications contained in the present instructions have approved its main recommendations. They have been guided by the following principles which should govern the negotiations with the representatives of the Federal Republic and remain the basis for all solutions which will result from these negotiations.

1. The guiding principle of the policy of the Three Powers with regard to the Federal Republic continues to be the integration of Western Germany on a basis of equality within a European community itself included in a developing Atlantic community. This will make it possible to renounce a system of restrictive controls, and to establish, in a manner best calculated to prevent the resurgence of militarism or of a Nazi or other totalitarian movement, a new relationship with Germany based, not upon the occupation of a defeated country, but upon the cooperation of the Federal Republic with the free nations, including participation in the system of collective defense set up for the North Atlantic area. This requires granting to the German people a status of freedom and equality in a European framework and a feeling of partnership. The Ministers are convinced that the stage has now been reached at which the retention in the future of an occupation status or of power to interfere in Germany's domestic affairs will develop antagonisms, blunt Germany's sense of responsibility, and generally impair the achievement of the common objectives of the Three Powers.

2. The objective cannot be reached by according full sovereignty to the Federal Republic because Germany remains divided and because the Federal Republic is confronted by a security menace from beyond its borders and beyond its control. As long as this situation continues

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[1] The source text was attached to a cover sheet, not printed, which indicated that it had been revised during the tripartite preliminary talks and that the disagreed passages were indicated by brackets.

[2] An earlier draft of this paper, WFM T–5, dated August 29, not printed, had been prepared in GER and distributed within the Department of State and to the British and French. It was the basis of discussion for the tripartite preliminary talks. (CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite talks)

[3] *Post*, p. 1501.

and in order to deal with it, we must retain the right to exercise in certain fields the supreme authority assumed under the Declaration of June 5, 1945.[4] In the opinion of the Ministers, this is in the interest of the Germans as well as the Allies, since it offers the possibility of limiting Soviet initiative in Germany and constitutes the safeguard for the peaceful reestablishment of German unity. We should relinquish the right to exercise supreme authority in all other fields including that of German domestic developments. The special responsibilities of the Allies will require the continuation of tripartite action through a Council of Ambassadors. Furthermore, the three Foreign Ministers will continue to meet periodically to consider German questions.

3. It is the desire of the Foreign Ministers that the arrangements with the Federal Republic should establish a firm political basis for the association of the Federal Republic with the defense of the West and for its relations with the free nations which can be maintained until a peace settlement with a unified Germany becomes possible.

4. There is complete agreement that the formation of German military units will be permitted only as a part of an international defense force of such a character as to prevent the creation of a German national army or the utilization of German forces for solely German purposes in a way which could endanger the security or peace of the free world. [A basic assumption on which the Ministers have noted is that the fulfillment of these conditions will promptly be achieved through the proposed European Defense Force, which will form a part of the joint defense forces established under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. US/Fr] [5] This will make unnecessary the continuation of certain existing security controls which have in the past been exercised by virtue of supreme authority. Other such security controls should be replaced by contractual safeguards reduced to the minimum and compatible with the partnership status which we seek to create for the Federal Republic. The objective is to retain only such safeguards as are necessary and can be maintained effectively for an extended period of years.

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[4] For text of the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by the Allied Powers, signed at Berlin on June 5, 1945, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1520, or 60 Stat. 1649; or *Documents on Germany, 1944–1970*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1971, pp. 12–17.

[5] Brackets throughout this document appear in the source text. In the final draft of this paper, Tripartite D–3, approved by the Foreign Ministers on September 13, this sentence read:

"A basic assumption on which the Ministers have acted is that the fulfillment of these conditions will be achieved without delay through the proposed European Defense Force, which will form a part of the joint defense established under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." (CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents)

The other textual differences between WFM T–5*a* and Tripartite D–3 are indicated in subsequent footnotes.

5. The legal basis for maintaining Allied troops in Germany will continue to be the supreme authority of the Three Powers. However, in keeping with the new status of the Federal Republic described above, the mission of the forces of the Three Powers (as well as of other NAT powers) will no longer be that of the occupation of the territory of a defeated enemy, but that of cooperation in the common defense to which the Federal Republic will be contributing as a partner. The status of our forces should therefore be adapted to this new situation, and special rights or privileges should only be retained insofar as necessary for the accomplishment of the mission of these forces. Taking into account these considerations, the arrangements should be assimilated as closely as possible to the standards applicable to the stationing of friendly forces in other countries, except as necessitated by the fact that extraordinarily large number of troops will be stationed in the Federal Republic and that the latter is a forward area in the strategy of European defense.

II

6. Guided by the above principles, the Ministers have reviewed the areas of disagreement set forth in Section IV of the Report and desire that the outstanding issues be resolved by the High Commissioners as follows:

7. *Security Controls*

A. *Disarmament and Demilitarization, Scientific Research, and Industrial Production*

The maintenance of supreme authority to control these fields would be incompatible with the new relationship which the Allies wish to create with the Federal Republic. In addition to the safeguards which will be provided by the arrangements for associating Germany with Western Defense, the other limitations in these fields which are to be preserved should be placed in contractual arrangements and should be as follows:

(i) The Federal Republic should undertake not to create or permit the creation of forces which are in fact military or para-military beyond or other than those necessary to provide for its agreed contribution to the Western defense system. This undertaking applies equally to police forces.

[(ii) The Federal Government should undertake (*a*) not to produce, or permit the production of, the articles the prohibition of which was provided for in the Brussels Agreement and (in order to make effective the prohibition of military aircraft) civil aircraft, and (*b*) not to engage in or to permit scientific research relating to these prohibited articles; except as agreed in either case with the three Allied Powers in the interest of NATO. US/UK]

[(ii) The three Governments are in agreement that in fields not dealt with by the European defense community, certain activities of an

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industrial or scientific character should continue to be prohibited or limited.

The nature and scope of these prohibitions and limitations, which should be adapted to the situation created by the participation of Federal Germany in defense should be established before the Rome Conference by expert conversations at the Governmental level. Fr][6]

(iii) The Federal Republic should also undertake to maintain controls in the field of atomic energy, the character and scope of which will be determined later, and these should be specified in the contractual arrangements, and to adopt such additional measures as may be necessary to provide effective security checks on persons engaged in activities in the field of atomic energy.

(iv) The Federal Republic should undertake to provide such information as the Allies may require regarding the matters specified in (i), (ii) and (iii) above, and to permit its verification. There should be no Allied control agency in the security field. However, provision should be made for the establishment of an Allied body subordinate to the Council of Ambassadors which will be concerned with problems arising in regard to the undertakings of the Federal Republic. This body would have, on the basis of the contractual arrangements, the necessary authority to obtain and verify information and carry on such inspections as may be authorized by the Council of Ambassadors. It would report to the Council of Ambassadors any evidences of German violation of the security undertakings and recommend action with respect thereto.

If the High Commission and the Federal Republic, as a result of their negotiations, consider it desirable, there should be a formal relationship between the Allied body and the German authorities for the purpose of providing a means of dealing with problems arising between the Allies and the Germans in this field. This formal relationship might be accomplished by associating representatives of the Federal Republic with the Allied body in a mixed commission. The mixed commission would deal with matters relating to the execution of the contractual arrangements with respect to security safeguards, obtaining and verifying information, and possibly some inspections. The German representatives, however, would not be associated with the Allied body in its reports and recommendations to the Council of Ambassadors or other activities which relate to purported violations of the arrangements.

B. *Civil Aviation*

Allied controls over civil aviation should be abandoned but the contractual arrangements should ensure operating rights in the Federal Republic by flag carriers of the Three Powers operating to Berlin. The Federal Republic should be required to give assurances of nondiscriminatory treatment with respect to flying and landing rights for

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[6] In the final version of this paper, Tripartite D–3, approved by the Foreign Ministers on September 13, the US/UK draft of paragraph 7, subparagraph ii, was adopted with the addition of the following sentence:

"The above prohibitions should be clarified and defined as required as quickly as possible, and in any event before the Rome Conference, through discussion by experts at the governmental level." (CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents)

aircraft of non-Soviet orbit countries, to conform with internationally accepted standards in the field of civil aviation and to maintain existing rights of flag carriers of such countries for a reasonable period pending the conclusion of bilateral civil aviation agreements.* Provision should be made in appropriate agreements on security arrangements to insure that civil aviation does not become the basis for the creation of a German strategic air force.

C. *Soviet and Satellite Aircraft*

The Allies should continue control provided under existing quadripartite agreements over all overflights of the Federal Republic territory by Soviet civil and military planes. Assurances of cooperation in the implementation of Allied policies respecting civil aircraft of Soviet Satellite countries will be sought from the Federal Republic and will be apart from the contractual arrangements. The Federal Republic should undertake not to permit military aircraft of Soviet satellite countries to overfly its territory without the consent of the Allies.

These matters relating to Satellite Aircraft should be handled confidentially.

8. *Preservation of Democracy.*

[No rights of intervention in the constitutional system of the Federal Republic should be retained. However, it should be understood, that the arrangements as a whole are premised on the continued existence in the Federal Republic of a constitutional system guaranteeing democratic government and protecting individual liberties. The inclusion of appropriate language in the preamble to the General Convention would draw attention to this fact. U.S./U.K.]

[The Federal Republic should give an undertaking regarding the preservation of democracy which would permit the Allies to have recourse to the Arbitral Tribunal, without having to invoke a state of emergency. Proclamation of a state of emergency would be of too serious a character and would constitute too obvious a political failure on the part of the Allies to be a practical method for dealing with this problem. It is, moreover, possible that the Federal Government would not be opposed to the inclusion of a provision of this character in the contractual arrangements. Fr.] [7]

9. *Allied Emergency Powers.*

In the exercise of Allied powers in the event of emergencies the advice and, when employment of troops is involved, the agreement of the appropriate military authorities must be a prerequisite to action by the Council of Ambassadors to declare a state of emergency. The

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*Rights respecting Allied military aircraft will be dealt with under the heading of Logistical Support. [Footnote in the source text.]

[7] In Tripartite D-3, the Foreign Ministers approved the US/UK draft of paragraph 8 (CFM files, lot M-88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents).

text of provisions in the General Agreement regarding the exercise of Allied powers in the event of emergencies is to be included in the final contractual arrangements.[8]

10. *Retention of Allied Powers*

The supreme authority assumed by the Allies in the Declaration of June 5, 1945, will be exercised only in order: (*a*) to discharge their responsibilities regarding Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and the final peace settlement; (*b*) to deal with questions relating to Berlin; and (*c*) to station forces in Germany and to protect the security of these forces. It is understood and must be made clear to the Germans that the responsibilities referred to in (*a*) above include the obligations of the Allies expressed in international agreements relating to Germany as to which the Federal Republic does not assume responsibility by virtue of the contractual arrangements.

As the agreements are intended to define the new relationship between the Allied Powers and the Federal Republic the areas within which the exercise of supreme authority is retained should be specified in the agreements. Even though included in the agreement this specification should be made by Allied declaration and in such manner as to avoid the implication that supreme authority rests on a contractual basis. The determination of the scope of the powers retained by the Allies should not be subject to arbitration.

11. *Character of the Agreements*

While the agreements between the Three Powers on the one hand and the Federal Republic on the other will not constitute a treaty of peace, they should take the form of intergovernmental agreements which would enter into force as a whole immediately upon the entry into force of the agreement providing for German participation in Western defense. The agreements should be drawn in such form as to ensure these results and to indicate their binding character upon the four governments. Their legal status within each of the signatory countries will necessarily be determined by the constitutional arrangements within that country. In the case of Germany, they should be approved by the German legislature, as required by the Basic Law.

12. *Logistical and Financial Support of the Allied Forces*

1. These subjects should be covered by a contract to be worked out in the greatest detail possible before the conclusion of the contractual arrangements.

[2. The Federal Republic should undertake to make a total contribution to the costs of defense which will represent a use of German

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[8] In Tripartite D-3 the Foreign Ministers rejected paragraph 9 as agreed during the preliminary talks and substituted the following:

"9. *Allied Emergency Powers*

This is covered by Article VII of the annexed draft general agreement." (CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents)

resources for defense to an extent comparable to the use by the other principal Western countries of their resources for defense (including expenditures outside Europe). This contribution will consist of agreed costs borne by the Federal Government of raising and supporting forces contributed by Germany to the common defense (German costs); as well as of US/Fr] [agreed costs in Germany of supporting Allied forces stationed in that country (Allied costs). US] [lump sum to be determined for the support of Allied forces stationed in Germany.† Fr] [The Ministers believe that a contribution in both of these fields would be equitable in view of the fact that the Federal Republic does not have extra-European commitments and should take into account the provisions of the future treaty for the European Defense Community regarding the contribution of the Federal Republic. US/Fr] [9]

[3. The amount of the German contribution shall from time to time be determined by agreement between the Federal Republic and the three Allied Powers in accordance with the standard described in the preceding paragraph. To the extent that at any time these negotiations disclose that the total of agreed "Allied costs" and agreed "German costs" exceed the amount of the agreed German contribution, the balance will be borne by the Allied Powers concerned, and shall be shared among them on an equitable basis to be mutually agreed. US]

[In general terms, the contract should provide that Germany is required to make a total contribution to defense which is comparable in scale to that being made by other leading Western Powers and which will provide for essential Allied expenditure in Germany as well as that part of the cost of equipping and maintaining a German Military Force which will fall on the German Government. It should also provide that the proportions to be devoted to each of these two objects should be determined from time to time by the Four Governments concerned. UK] [10]

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†After the setting up of a European Defense Community the expression "Allied Forces" will apply also to European units contributed by those powers members of the community which have at the present time troops in Germany. [Footnote in the source text.]

[9] In Tripartite D–3 the Foreign Ministers approved the first sentence of the US/Fr draft of paragraph 12, subparagraph 2, for the whole text of the paragraph (CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents).

[10] In Tripartite D–3 the Foreign Ministers approved the following text for paragraph 12 subparagraph 3:

"3. Representatives of the three Governments should meet as soon as possible in order to prepare recommendations to the Governments for dealing with the aspects of these subjects on which agreement has not yet been reached. The recommendations should be prepared urgently with a view to permitting discussions with the Federal Government at the earliest possible date. The representatives of the three Governments may refer to the High Commission consideration of any aspects of these questions which they believe can be most effectively dealt with in Germany." (CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents)

13. *Security of the Allied Forces*

a. Offenses Against Allied Security

The Germans should undertake in the agreements to try in their courts offenses against Allied security by non-Allied persons other than those serving with the Allied forces and subject to their jurisdiction; and to enact or preserve appropriate legislation to protect Allied security. [Such offenses may be withdrawn in exceptional cases from German courts and tried by Allied military courts, regardless of the nationality of the offender. US/Fr] [11]

b. Expulsions

The German proposal should be accepted.

14. *Legal Status of Certain Allied Personnel*

Allied nationals attached to the three Ambassadors and their dependents should be accorded those privileges and immunities which they would enjoy under normal diplomatic practice.

15. *Allied Tribunals*

Occupation courts, except military courts, should be abolished as soon as pending cases have been completed.

16. *Reparation*

The reserved power on reparation should be terminated on condition that the Federal Government recognize themselves to be bound by such agreements on reparation, and to accept to maintain the Divesting Law and such other Allied legislation in this field, as may prove necessary to safeguard. The agreements and legislation in question shall be specified by the High Commission who in so doing shall take into account potential allied requirements in respect of Portugal, Switzerland and Austria. A clause should be included in the appropriate agreement maintaining the rights reserved in Article 2 B of the Paris Reparation Agreement [12] with respect to the reparation settlement.

While the Foreign Ministers appreciate the difficulty which this subject involves for the Federal Government, the Governments of the Three Allied Powers have assumed international commitments in this field which can only be given effect in Germany and which they must therefore insist be assumed by the Federal Government.

17. *Foreign Interests*

The reports of the Intergovernmental Study Group concerning foreign interests are approved with the following changes in IGG/P(51)41 Second Revise: [13]

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[11] In Tripartite D–3 the Foreign Ministers approved the US/Fr draft of this sentence (CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents).

[12] For text of the Paris Reparations Agreement, January 24, 1946, see TIAS No. 1635, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 3012.

[13] Not printed. For further documentation on the work of the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany, see pp. 1344 ff.

a) The first sentence of Recommendation 1(*a*) is amended by inserting "in its present condition" after ". . . United Nations and their nationals shall be enabled to secure the return of their property . . ."

b) The following language is added at the end of Recommendation 1(*a*):

> "The Federal Government shall be informed in the course of the negotiations on foreign interests that the undertaking is without prejudice to the right of the Allies to advance, at an appropriate time, claims for losses attributable to discriminatory treatment of the property, rights and interests involved and of property situated in territories purported to have been annexed by the Reich during the war."

c) Recommendation 1(*b*) is eliminated.

Appropriate clauses should be included in the contractual arrangement.

18. *Internal Restitution*

Action should immediately be taken by the appropriate Allied authorities in Germany to ensure the adoption of measures of compensation for victims of Nazi persecution in those *Laender* in which no such measures are presently in force, and this requirement should be confirmed in the contractual arrangements. The contractual arrangements should provide for the harmonization, the application, and the maintenance of such laws throughout the Federal territory on a basis no less favorable than that provided in the laws in effect at the present time. The High Commissioners should inform the Federal Chancellor and other appropriate German leaders that, in the view of the Three Foreign Ministers, the failure of the Federal Republic thus far to provide any significant measure of compensation to victims of Nazi persecution, including those resident abroad, constitutes a major obstacle to the acceptance of the German people by the free peoples of the world as equal partners in their activities. The Foreign Ministers regard the obligation to make compensation as a matter which should rest heavily on the conscience of the German people and they feel it should not be necessary for the Allied Governments to lay down requirements as to the measures which should be taken to discharge this obligation.

III

19. The High Commissioners should be guided by the following instructions in regard to the areas of particular disagreement with the German representatives listed in Section V of the Report and not dealt with above.

20. *Reaffirmation of Existing Commitments*

The Commitments specified by the Foreign Ministers in September 1950 [14] as a condition to the abandonment of the reserved power on Displaced Persons and Refugees (other than those relating to compensation for victims of Nazi persecution) should be included in the contractual arrangements. Commitments regarding strategic commodities control are not considered as appropriate subjects for submission to arbitration. The commitments regarding raw materials previously given by the Federal Republic need not be reaffirmed.

21. *Definition of Allied Personnel Benefiting from Immunities*

The Three Governments still have this subject under consideration. They will unilaterally instruct their High Commissioners at the earliest possible moment, so that a final tripartite position may be arrived at in the High Commission.

22. *Persons Sentenced by Allied Courts*

The High Commission's position should be maintained with respect to persons sentenced for offenses against Allied personnel or property or against the Allied administration. In all other cases, the German authorities should have the right to determine measures of clemency and parole. (This does not apply to war criminals, but the Three Ministers request the High Commissioners to examine and make recommendations urgently on the future handling of war criminals in Germany.)

23. *Jurisdiction over Allied Personnel in Civil Cases*

The position of the High Commission is approved, but withdrawal of civil cases should only be on certificate of the highest military and diplomatic authorities of the Allied Power concerned that the security interests of the Allied forces would be jeopardized by such trial, or that special conditions exist which, in their opinion, would prejudice a fair trial.

IV

24. In addition to their decisions on the points raised by the High Commission in its report, the Foreign Ministers have reached the following conclusions:

a. Information and Statistics

They have noted that the High Commission proposed to include in the general convention provisions regarding submission of information and statistics. In their view, these provisions should be included in the appropriate conventions, such as those on security, programs, and logistical support.

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[14] For documentation on the Foreign Ministers' decisions on refugees and displaced persons at their meeting in New York, September 12–19, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1108 ff.

b. Observance of Agreements

It is essential that these agreements be observed and carried out by the political sub-divisions of the Federal Republic as well as by the Federal Government. The High Commission in drafting the agreements should see to it that they are binding on the political subdivisions and that the Federal Government can ensure execution by them.

c. Berlin

Although the Three Powers will retain supreme authority with respect to questions relating to Berlin, and such authority will not be affected by the contractual agreements with the Federal Republic, the High Commissioners should, in consultation with the three Allied Commandants in Berlin, examine the conditions of Allied control in Berlin in the light of the arrangements contemplated with respect to the Federal Republic with a view to granting the Berlin governmental authorities the maximum possible authority consonant with such arrangements and with the conditions obtaining in Berlin. As recommended by the High Commission the suspension of Article 23 and 144 (2) of the Basic Law should be continued by legally effective methods.

d. Deconcentration

The Ministers approve the recommendation of the High Commission regarding the carrying out of Law 27.[15] They recognize that the implementation of Law 27 is an essential condition to the establishment of the steel and coal community and will not be affected by the entry into force of the Schuman Plan or the abolition of the Occupation Statute. The control groups will be continued under the contractual arrangements, but after the entry into force of the Schuman Plan will exercise only those functions which are strictly necessary to deconcentration and will terminate their activity as soon as the deconcentration program has reached a sufficiently advanced stage. It would be desirable that steps should be taken to insure that certain former Nazis will be effectively excluded from positions of ownership or management in the Ruhr industries. The High Commission should study the methods of accomplishing this result.

e. Enforcement of Contractual Arrangements

The Foreign Ministers approve the recommendations of the Allied High Commission for the setting up of an Arbitral Tribunal with the following modifications:—

(i) The composition proposed by the High Commission is likely in practice to throw too great a burden of responsibility upon the Presiding Officer. The proposal of the United States Element that the Tribunal should consist of nine members is therefore accepted.

(ii) In the event that a defaulting party should fail to carry out a decision of the Tribunal within the time specified by the Tribunal, the Tribunal could, at the request of the complainant

[15] For the text of Allied High Commission Law No. 27, "Reorganization of German Coal and Iron and Steel Industries," dated May 16, 1950, and the three regulations thereto, see *Laws, Regulations, Directives and Decisions*, vol. I, pp. 155–178.

party, authorize the latter to take specific steps to remedy the situation.

f. Possible Claims by Germans

The annexed conventions shall include undertakings from the Federal Republic along the lines proposed by the Intergovernmental Study Group in paragraphs 2 and 6 of IGG/P(51)91 Final.[16]

g. Soviet Missions

The High Commission should make clear to the Germans by appropriate means, but not in the contractual arrangements, that in the discharge of the responsibilities of the Three Powers concerning Germany as a whole, the representatives of the Three Powers may continue to receive Soviet missions, and that all immunities and facilities should be accorded by the Federal Republic to such missions.[17]

V

25. The Ministers consider that in general the recommendations of the Report as to the form of the contractual arrangements are satisfactory. They stress the importance of the general agreement which should reflect the new arrangements in such a way as clearly to impress upon the general public the nature of the new relationship being established with the Federal Republic. The Ministers have reached general agreement upon the form and content of a draft General Agreement which is annexed hereto and they desire that this draft be used in discussions with the German representatives. The High Commission will, if necessary, point out to the Germans the various respects in which the draft of a security treaty suggested by the Chancellor [18] is incompatible with the present instructions.

26. It is planned that a meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council will be held in Rome at the end of October. The Ministers are agreed

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[16] Not printed.

[17] In Tripartite D–3, the Foreign Ministers approved the text of a subparagraph *h* which read:

"*h. Security Guarantee*

The Ministers have considered the advisability of reaffirming the security declaration made at New York on September 19, 1950. A tentative suggestion was advanced by the U.S. Delegation that the following language might be used for this purpose:

'On 19 September 1950, the three Foreign Ministers declared that their Governments would treat any attack against the Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves. The change in the status of the Federal Republic and in the mission of the Allied forces there does not alter or diminish the effect of that declaration.'

It was agreed to leave open for the present the question of the advisability of placing such a statement in Article V of the General Convention, or of advancing it as part of a separate declaration by the Governments, or of handling it in some other manner. It was also agreed that the Governments would take this question urgently under consideration, but that meanwhile the High Commissioners could explore the problem with the Federal Chancellor in light of the Ministers discussion." (CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents)

[18] For the text of the draft security treaty proposed by Chancellor Adenauer on August 30, see telegram 2026 from Frankfurt, August 31, p. 1520.

that they will seek final decisions at that time on the question of German participation in defense and they are in accord that the participating Powers should be requested to complete the plans for a European Defense Force by that date, in order to permit German association in defense upon the safest and most European basis possible. It is in accord with our own interests and with German desires to reach a final solution of the question of the Federal Republic's political status concurrently with rather than separate from the making of defense arrangements. Therefore, the High Commissioners should make every effort to complete their negotiations on the questions covered in their Report well prior to the scheduled meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council. It is the intention of the Ministers to meet in Europe and to invite the German Chancellor to join them immediately prior to the North Atlantic Treaty Council meeting in order to arrive at a final understanding on both the contractual agreements and defense arrangements. [Last sentence reserved for the Ministers' decision] [19]

27. In view of this timetable, the High Commissioners are directed to report to their Governments without delay any disagreements which may arise regarding the contractual arrangements after receipt of the present instructions, and which are not covered by the present instructions.

Enclosure A

SECRET [WASHINGTON, September 10, 1951.]

AGREEMENT ON GENERAL RELATIONS WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

PREAMBLE

WHEREAS a peaceful and prosperous European community of nations firmly bound to the other free nations of the world through dedication to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, can be attained only through united support and defense of the common freedom and the common heritage;

WHEREAS the achievement of a fully free and unified Germany through peaceful means and in the framework of a peace settlement, though prevented for the present by measures beyond their control, remains a fundamental and common goal of the Federal Republic and of the United States, the United Kingdom and France;

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[19] In Tripartite D–3 the last sentence of this paragraph as approved by the Foreign Ministers read:

"It is the intention of the Ministers to meet in Europe and to invite the German Chancellor to join them in order to arrive at a final understanding on both the contractual agreements and defense arrangements." (CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents)

WHEREAS the four Governments, while determined to defend themselves against aggression, are moved by a common will to promote peace and harmony among nations, to eliminate war and foster justice for all men, and intend to follow common policies in pursuit of these aims;

WHEREAS the Federal Republic is determined and is, indeed, committed, under its Basic Law, to maintain a system of government which is democratic and federal in character and which guarantees the rights of the individual, and has developed free and responsible political institutions;

WHEREAS the Federal Republic shares with the United States, the United Kingdom and France a determination to abide by the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

WHEREAS the Federal Republic has manifested by practical steps, and in particular by adhering to the European Steel and Coal Community [as well as the European Defense Community, US/Fr] [20] its determination to establish with the other nations of Western Europe a free and peaceful community and to associate itself with the free nations of the world;

NOW THEREFORE, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and France, on the one hand, and the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other, have agreed on the following convention which will establish, pending the peaceful reunification of Germany, the basis for a new relationship between them:

ARTICLE I

The United States, the United Kingdom and France, hereinafter referred to as the Three Powers, hereby agree that, upon the coming into force of this Agreement, and with the exceptions hereinafter set forth, the Federal Republic will have full authority over its domestic and external affairs.

ARTICLE II

1. The Three Powers declare that, while retaining in the common interest, in view of the international situation, the right to exercise the authority assumed with respect to Germany in the Declaration of June 5, 1945 to the extent necessary to (*a*) discharge their responsibilities regarding Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement; (*b*) to deal with questions relating to Berlin; and (*c*) to station forces in Germany and to protect the security of these forces, they renounce the exercise of this authority in all other respects.

[20] In Tripartite D–3 the Foreign Ministers approved the US/Fr draft of this phrase (CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents).

2. The Three Powers declare that they will consult with the Federal Republic in regard to exercise of this authority with respect to questions relating to the discharge of their responsibilities regarding Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement, and with respect to questions relating to Berlin.

3. The Federal Republic and the *Laender* will refrain from any action prejudicial to the special authority of the Three Powers.

ARTICLE III

1. Upon the entry into force of this Agreement, the Three Powers will revoke the Occupation Statute and abolish the Allied High Commission.

2. Relations between each of the Three Powers and the Federal Republic will thenceforth be conducted through Ambassadors. The Ambassadors of the Three Powers accredited to the Federal Republic or, in their absence, their representatives, will sit as a Council of Ambassadors to deal with any matters affecting Germany which require tripartite consideration.

ARTICLE IV

1. The Federal Republic, in the conduct of its foreign relations, and, pending the peaceful reunification of Germany, in the conduct of its relations with other parts of Germany, agrees to abide by the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations which guide the community of free nations throughout the world, and by the aims defined in the Statute of the Council of Europe. The Federal Republic affirms its intention to associate itself fully with the community of free nations through membership in international organizations contributing to the common aims of the free world. The Three Powers will support applications for such membership by the Federal Republic in all appropriate cases.

2. At the request of the Government of the Federal Republic, the Governments of the Three Powers will arrange to represent the interests of the Federal Republic in relations with other states and in certain international organizations or conferences, whenever the Federal Republic is not in a position to do so itself.

ARTICLE V

(There will later be inserted here an appropriately worded article by which the Federal Republic undertakes to the Three Powers to contribute to Western defense.)

US Proposal—Reserved for Discussion by the Ministers. [The United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic mutually agree that for a period of ten years or longer, as may subsequently be agreed, an armed attack on the territory of the Federal Republic or of Berlin or on the defense forces stationed in such ter-

ritory will be considered as an attack against all the signatory powers.] [21]

ARTICLE VI

The Federal Republic will facilitate the task of the Three Powers in the discharge of their special responsibilities with regard to Berlin. To this end it agrees to continue to aid the political, cultural, economic and financial reconstruction of Berlin. In particular, it agrees to render, to the maximum extent possible, assistance required for the economic maintenance and development and the security of Berlin, to provide for coordination with Berlin on monetary and fiscal policies, and to assure the participation of Berlin in trade negotiations and trade relations.

ARTICLE VII

The Three Powers declare that they will exercise their special authority to protect the security of their forces referred to in Article II in order to proclaim a state of emergency in the whole or any part of the Federal territory and to act thereunder only in accordance with the following provisions:

1. In the event of an attack or threat of attack on the territory of the Federal Republic or Berlin, such authority of the Three Powers may be employed by the Council of Ambassadors to declare a state of emergency in all or in part of the territory of the Federal Republic. Such a state of emergency may be declared upon the request of the Supreme Commander, acting in the interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or upon the initiative of the Council itself.

2. In the event that the security of the forces of the Three Powers in Germany is deemed to be seriously endangered by a grave disruption of public or constitutional order or a grave threat of such disruption, the Council of Ambassadors may likewise employ such authority to declare a state of emergency in all or in part of the territory of the Federal Republic. They shall act in this case only if they find that the German authorities are unable to deal effectively with the situation.

3. This authority may also be employed in the circumstances specified in (1) or (2) above to declare a state of emergency on the request of the Federal Republic.[22]

4. Upon the declaration of a state of emergency, the authority retained by the Three Powers may be employed to take all measures which they deem necessary to deal with the emergency. They will terminate the state of emergency as soon as the situation permits.

5. The Council of Ambassadors, before declaring a state of emergency, will consult to the fullest extent possible with the Government of the Federal Republic and will utilize to the greatest possible extent

[21] In Tripartite D–3 the text of Article V was limited to the sentence within the parentheses and no mention was made of the US proposal (CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents).

[22] In Tripartite D–3 the Foreign Ministers approved the following wording for Article VII paragraph 3 "This authority may also be employed to declare a state of emergency on the request of the Federal Republic." (CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents)

the assistance of the Federal Government and the competent German authorities to deal with the emergency.

ARTICLE VII A

[The Federal Republic undertakes to maintain the democratic and federal character of its political institutions, to take all necessary measures to safeguard human rights, as they are defined in the Basic Law, by recourse to the courts, and not to allow the creation of a secret police organization, or to allow the police to exercise legislative or judicial powers, or to exercise political control, or to lose their decentralized structure.

Article 29 of the Basic Law will continue to be suspended until otherwise decided by the Council of Ambassadors. Fr] [23]

ARTICLE VIII

The Three Powers on the one hand and the Federal Republic on the other have signed certain Agreements listed in Annex A hereof which are to take effect upon the coming into force of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IX

1. There is hereby established an Arbitration Tribunal, which shall be constituted, shall have the powers, and shall exercise its functions, in accordance with the annexed Charter.

2. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (3) below, or in any of the Agreements listed in Annex A, the Arbitration Tribunal shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this Agreement or any such listed Agreement, which the parties fail to settle by negotiations.

3. No action taken under the provisions of Article II or Article VII of this Agreement shall be made the subject of any arbitration or other proceeding before the Arbitration Tribunal or before any other tribunal or court.

ARTICLE X

1. This Agreement shall be ratified by the States which sign it. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited by the signatory States with the Government of the _____. This Agreement shall come into force immediately upon:

a. the deposit by all parties of ratifications of this Agreement and of all the Agreements listed in Annex A, and

b. the coming into force of the treaty relating to German participation in Western Defense.

2. This Agreement shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the _____ which shall furnish each signatory State

[23] Article VII A was deleted by the Foreign Ministers from the text of Tripartite D–3 (CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents).

with a certified copy thereof and notify each such State of the date of the coming into force of this Agreement.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Agreement.

Done at _____ this _____ day of _____ 1951, in the English, French, and German languages, all being equally authentic.

Note: Annex A referred to in this document is not yet available and therefore is not included in this draft.

London Embassy files, lot 59 F 59, 350 Germany

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Bureau of German Affairs

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 11, 1951.

Subject: Contractual Arrangements with Germany

Participants: Netherlands—Dr. J. G. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary, Netherlands Embassy.
—Mr. M. Kohnstamm, Director of the German Department, Netherlands Foreign Office.
—Mr. C. Vreede, First Secretary, Netherlands Embassy.
Belgium—Mr. Scheyven, Director-General of the Political Office, Belgian Foreign Office.
—Mr. Carlier, Director of German Department, Belgian Foreign Office.
—Mr. Robert Rothschild, Counselor, Belgian Embassy.
France—Mr. Jean Sauvagnargues, Deputy Director of Central European Affairs at the Foreign Office.
—Mr. Christian d'Aumale, Officer of the Bureau of Central European Affairs at the Foreign Office.
United Kingdom—Mr. Denis Allen, Head of the German Political Department, British Foreign Office.
—Mr. C. D. W. O'Neill, Office of the British High Commissioner for Germany.
—Mr. I. F. Porter, First Secretary, British Embassy.

United States—Mr. Henry A. Byroade, Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State.
—Mr. Samuel Reber, Director of Political Affairs, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.
—Mr. J. J. Reinstein, Bureau of German Affairs.
—Mr. J. W. Auchincloss, Office of German Political Affairs.

A meeting was held at 11:30 a. m. on September 11, 1951, at the Department to hear the views of the Benelux representatives concerning the proposed contractual arrangements with the Federal Republic of Germany.

MR. BYROADE stated that the talks preliminary to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers had been profitable and useful and had resulted in a wide measure of agreement. He would give some account of what had been done in the last few days, before asking the Benelux representatives for their comments. What has been done will result, not in specific texts of agreements with the Germans, but rather in guidance to the High Commission for use in negotiations with the Germans.

There are certain general principles which, it has been agreed, should govern the new relationship with Germany. The first of these is that the Federal Republic will continue to be integrated on a basis of equality into the European community, which is in turn within the Atlantic community. This will make it possible for the three powers to renounce restrictive controls. A peace treaty cannot now be concluded, for Germany is a divided country with a security threat outside its borders and beyond its control. For these reasons the supreme authority of the occupying powers must be retained, to be exercised with respect to (1) the discharge of their responsibilities regarding Germany as a whole, including the unification of the country and a peace settlement; (2) questions relating to Berlin; and (3) the stationing of forces in Germany and the protection of the security of these forces. The Germans should be able to understand the maintenance of authority for these purposes, since it is in their interest as well as that of the Allies. It represents a basic change in the existing relationship between Germany and the three powers.

It is also agreed that there should be no German national army. In the recent conversations there has been no discussion of how Germany should be brought into a defense framework, because the group has been concerned with the proposed contractual arrangements. It is, however, the hope of all concerned that the European Defense Com-

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munity will supply the framework for a German participation in the common defense.

As a third principle, it is expected to modify the present security controls. The German participation in defense will cover many military safeguards. There will remain, however, the question of prohibited and limited industries and similar controls. It has been agreed that these will be put on a contractual basis, and that the controls will be of such a fundamental character as would be appropriate in a peace treaty. Any violations would be referred to the Arbitral Tribunal. There has been no final agreement on the specific areas to be controlled, and much more work will be required, even if the controls conform to the Brussels list (since the term "heavy weapons" in that list has never been defined). It is expected that the work will be done by experts at the earliest possible moment.

The question of an agency to administer these controls is one on which the Benelux views are particularly desired, in accordance with the 1948 agreement on consultation with respect to a possible successor to the Military Security Board. With a revised list of controls there should be a much less formal organization than the Military Security Board. There has been proposed a body that would collect and verify information, report violations of the controls to the Council of Ambassadors, and make recommendations as to what action should be taken. It would be up to the High Commission to consider whether the Germans should participate in such a body. [A paper describing this body was then circulated and copies of it are attached.] [1]

The fourth and last general principle concerns the status of Allied troops in Germany. The legal basis for the presence of troops in Germany is unchanged. The forces of the three powers will continue to be stationed in the Federal Republic by right, under the Declaration of June 5, 1945,[2] rather than by agreement with the Germans. There will, however, be a change in the relationship between the Germans and the three powers, for this relationship must be one of partnership in defense, rather than that of an occupation. The psychology of the troops, as well as their status, should be adapted to this new conception. The standards defining their position in Germany should conform to those applicable to friendly forces in a foreign country, except as modified by the fact that there are extraordinarily large numbers of troops in Germany and that the country is a forward area in the strategy of defense. There cannot be, therefore, an agreement on the exact terms of the standard NATO Agreement, but the High Commission would take into account the principles of that agreement.

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[1] Brackets throughout this document appear in the source text.

[2] For the text of the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by the Allied Powers, signed at Berlin on June 5, 1945, see TIAS No. 1520, or 60 Stat. 1649; or *Documents on Germany, 1944–1970*, pp. 12–17.

Civil Aviation—Relations in this field will be put on a contractual basis. The three powers will keep their rights of access and operation to Berlin, and the German Government will give assurances against discrimination. Questions of military aviation are not dealt with here. The three powers intend to keep authority to control all flights by aircraft of the Soviet Union.

Preservation of Democracy—The problem of guarding against the the appearance of another Hitler is one that affects the security of us all. We have considered the whole range of methods of dealing with the question. The entire contractual arrangements might be made to depend upon it, but, on the other hand, it might weaken the Germans to retain this power. It is a subject which the Ministers themselves must discuss, and we should be very glad to have the Benelux thoughts on the matter.

State of Emergency—The Federal Government has no power to declare a state of emergency. The three powers will retain the right, in case of an external attack or of internal disorder involving the security of troops, to declare an emergency in a civil sense, and to take the steps necessary to deal with the situation. They might also declare an emergency upon request of the German Government.

Form of Agreements—The contractual arrangements will take the form of international agreements to be formally approved as appropriate, depending on the constitutional processes of the different countries.

Logistical Support—This has proved a very difficult question. The Germans should contribute to the support of their own forces and those of other countries as well, since they have no extra-European commitments. The total share of German resources devoted to defense should be on a comparable scale with the share of other leading nations in the defense of the West (not only the defense of Europe), but at the same time Germany's capacity to pay must be taken into account. There is likely to be a gap between the German contribution and the total costs in Germany of support of Allied forces and forces contributed by Germany. How to fill such a gap is a problem which will have to be studied after the Ministers' meeeting. The Germans cannot be expected to agree on the arrangements as a whole before this question is settled, and the Bundestag will certainly want to know what arrangements are contemplated in this field.

Status of Forces—This includes such matters as offenses against Allied security and the status of Allied personnel in Germany. The question is a difficult one, because it is a matter of extra-territoriality. Questions such as whether dependents of military personnel should be subject to German criminal law and whether certain cases in German courts should be subject to withdrawal by the Allies have not been decided. The position is somewhat clearer with respect to civil cases.

where it is recognized that the German courts will have primary jurisdiction. It will not be possible to make all changes of this kind at once, and we shall have to go through a transition period between the atmosphere of the occupation and that of the new relationship.

Reparation—MR. REINSTEIN stated that the Germans would be required to recognize certain agreements and to maintain certain legislation, particularly the law on Divesting of Title [3] and Law No. 5.[4] The power over reparation will be given up, but it will be made clear to the Germans that the rights of other countries with regard to a final settlement which were reserved under the Paris Agreement [5] in connection with a peace treaty are maintained.

Foreign Interests—Since the reports on this subject by the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany have not been approved by Governments, this subject has not been discussed as yet with the Germans. A formula for dealing with the disagreed point pending before governments has been worked out, on which the views of the Benelux representatives were requested. [Copies of the proposal were distributed at the meeting, and a copy is also attached to this memorandum.] [6]

Internal Restitution—MR. BYROADE said that an effort will be made to obtain uniformity in the application of compensation laws throughout the Federal territory.

Berlin—The control arrangements with Berlin will be modified in the light of the contractual arrangements with the Federal Republic. It is not intended that Berlin should be a Twelfth *Land*.

Deconcentration—MR. BYROADE said that Law 27 [7] would be carried out, but that, after the entry into force of the Schuman Plan, the functions of the Control Groups would be restricted to those necessary to complete the deconcentration.

Arbitration Tribunal—The High Commission has already given the Benelux representatives a good idea of what the Tribunal will be like. The view has developed in the recent discussions that the composition of the Tribunal should be three German judges, one American, one British, and one French judge, and three judges of other nationality.

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[3] Presumably Reinstein was referring to U.S. Military Government Law No. 19, dated April 20, 1949, disposing of properties in the U.S. zone and U.S. sector of Berlin which belonged to the former German Reich, States, *Laender*, or Provinces. For the text of this Law, see *Military Government Gazette, Germany*, Office of the U.S. Military Government for Germany, Issue N, June 16, 1949, pp. 9–12.

[4] For the text of Control Council Law No. 5, "Vesting and Marshalling of German External Assets," dated October 30, 1945, see *Military Government Gazette, Germany, British Zone of Control*, No. 5, undated, pp. 40–42.

[5] For the text of the Paris Reparations Agreement, January, 24, 1946, see TIAS No. 1635 or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 3012.

[6] The paper on foreign interests is not printed.

[7] For the text of Allied High Commission Law No. 27, "Reorganization of German Coal and Iron and Steel Industries," dated May 16, 1950, and the three Regulations thereto, see *Laws, Regulations, Directives and Decisions*, vol. I, pp. 155–178.

Violations of the contractual arrangements would be submitted to the Tribunal for arbitration. The Tribunal could, if its judgments were not carried out, direct specific action to be taken by the defaulting party. This is a very important international aspect of the Tribunal. It is believed that most of the issues likely to arise under the contractual arrangements will not be suitable for the International Court of Justice at The Hague and should, therefore, be submitted to a body which will have a closer connection with the German problem.

MR. BYROADE said that it was hoped to meet all these issues this autumn and to solve them at the same time. Some way must be found—but not too blunt a way—of relating the new status of Germany to German entry into defense. The questions must all be submitted to the Bundestag, and the High Commission will attempt to conclude its negotiations with the Germans by the time the North Atlantic Council meets in Rome.

DR. DE BEUS said that he much appreciated the way the meeting had been organized. It is important for the Benelux countries to come in at a preparatory stage because the contractual arrangements will, for some time to come, take the place of a peace treaty. He noted the satisfaction of the Netherlands Government that the Divesting Law had been enacted.

The general line of approach comes very close to the feeling of the Netherlands Government on the subject. The arrangements will be as close to a peace treaty as will be possible for a long time. The Dutch have no deep love for the Germans, but consider that there is no choice in the matter of German rearmament. Since the Germans must rearm, they must be given a sense of equality in their participation, and the occupying powers should go as far as possible in dropping controls in order to enlist German cooperation. Certain safeguards must be kept, but there is no use in setting up elaborate legal provisions that would never be enforced. Such provisions were established after the first World War, and the Germans gradually nibbled away at them. There should be no guarantee on paper that would not be enforced in case of necessity. The best safeguard, however, would be to keep the Germans in the joint defense.

DR. DE BEUS then presented the views of the Netherlands Government on particular points contained in the information given to the Benelux representatives in Bonn by the High Commission.

State of Emergency—There must be a legitimate basis for any renewal of Allied authority, but the circumstances for such a renewal should not be specified in advance. A decision on the assumption of authority could be made only in the light of conditions existing at the time, so the general principle should be stated without any details.

Council of Ambassadors—DR. DE BEUS asked if there were any prac-

tical advantage to a Council of Ambassadors. It seemed to offer no substantive change from the existing High Commission, and would give the Germans a feeling of tutelage. There would be no practical difference between a Council and close consultation by the Ambassadors whenever that was needed. He also asked if it was necessary to prevent the Germans from taking up matters of tripartite concern in the Allied capitals.

Maintenance of Democracy—DR. DE BEUS asked what would be gained if the Germans were made to guarantee the maintenance of democracy. He thought that such a requirement might even have the reverse effect. A reference to democracy should be made in the preamble, rather than in the body of the agreement, and DR. DE BEUS suggested the following language for this purpose:

"In view of the fact that the Federal Government has for some time been operating a democratic system of Government on the basis of free general and secret elections, the three Allied Powers feel justified to suspend the exercise of their supreme authority in as far as compatible with the international obligations undertaken by the three powers."

This would provide a link with the Potsdam Agreement. Both the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements contemplated that Germany would return to the community of nations, so it would be in the spirit of these agreements to state that supreme authority would now be suspended.

Sovereignty—From the psychological point of view it would be advisable for the preamble to specify that the Federal Republic was resuming its place as a sovereign state, insofar as this was compatible with the obligations of the Allies.

Berlin—A specific reaffirmation of the special position of Berlin should be included in the agreement.

Military Arrangements—The contractual arrangements should not have clauses regarding a German military contribution, but these should be included in a separate, accompanying agreement. It should not be stated in so many words that the contractual arrangements and a defense contribution are related. There should be a clause, as there is in the Japanese Peace Treaty, to the effect that the Federal Republic has the right of individual or collective self-defense expressed in the Charter of the United Nations. The political agreement should also provide that the Allied forces are security troops, rather than occupation troops.

Foreign Relations—The Germans should conduct their foreign affairs, so far as compatible with the international responsibilities of the three powers, and in constant consultation with the three Ambassadors.

International Obligations—Such obligations undertaken by the Allies should be taken over by the German Government, except for

obligations such as those in the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements. The contractual arrangements should deal only with obligations undertaken in the past, and the Germans should not be required to accept agreements to be made by the Allies in the future.

Reparation—The provisions on this subject should cover only existing obligations, and anything regarding the future should be left for a peace treaty.

Decartelization—It should not be stipulated that the pending German law in this field can be abolished only with Allied authorization.

International Ruhr Authority—No controls should be retained with respect to the Ruhr after termination of the International Authority for the Ruhr.

Allied Tribunals—Article 11 of the Japanese Peace Treaty is better adapted to the problem of clemency and the handling of war criminals than the corresponding proposals of the High Commission. DR. DE BEUS believed that it might be easier for the Germans to maintain the Nuremberg judgments if a reference were made in the agreement to the International Criminal Court which has been proposed by the International Law Commission of the United Nations.

Debts—DR. DE BEUS suggested that it should be stated as a general principle that Germany is responsible for the damage done during the war. This would correspond to Article 14 of the Japanese Peace Treaty (except that the Dutch do not like the clause about the Governments waiving the claims of their nationals and would, therefore, omit it). The agreement to be reached in London with respect to German debts should be incorporated in the contractual arrangements.

Arbitration—DR. DE BEUS said that it was wise to establish a Tribunal for arbitration but that any delicate political questions involving the Soviet Union should be expressed, not in the agreement itself, but in the preamble, so that they would not arise in a form which would subject them to arbitration.

Military Agreement—The Federal Republic should be admitted to NATO in the not too distant future; it would then have a security guarantee and would be prevented from making any agreement contrary to the North Atlantic Treaty. The contractual arrangements should, accordingly, be conformed to the NATO arrangements. At present, Germany is protected by the provision in the Treaty which declares an attack on the occupation forces to be an attack on the signatory powers, and by the statement of the Foreign Ministers, made in September of 1950, that an attack on the Federal Republic would be treated as an attack on the three occupying powers.[8] These safeguards would be formalized by membership in NATO.

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[8] Regarding the statement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1248–1296 *passim*.

DR. DE BEUS said that the Netherlands Government believed that the restrictions on industry and scientific research would be impossible to enforce, and that no provision for them should be made.

MR. KOHNSTAMM said that the approach should be that of the psychologist rather than the jurist, and that he believed the High Commission had handled the problem with too legalistic an approach. The Germans do not accept things just because they are written down in black and white, but they do respect simple and forceful facts.

The present political opposition to the Federal Government is *mala fide*, and the present cooperation from the German authorities is the best we are likely to get for some time. The contractual arrangements should, therefore, be handled in such a way as to strengthen the Federal administration. The Allies should not write too much into the agreements. MR. KOHNSTAMM mentioned Law 27 as an example of excessive detail. Everything will be done by reason of the relationship existing between the Germans and the Allies. It is all a matter of the strength of the ties between them, even if the rights as expressed on paper are not very clear.

Any prohibition on the repeal of legislation without Allied comment will expose the Government to constant attempts by Schumacher and the opposition to change such laws in the Bundstag, and, whether the laws or the changes are wise, the Government will be in the position of having to say that it can do nothing in the matter without Allied approval.

MR. BYROADE stated that he was encouraged by these observations, and that he thought our position was very close to that of the Netherlands on matters of importance.

MR. SCHEYVEN associated himself with the general approach described by Dr. de Beus, and stated that his Government agreed the contractual arrangements were close to a peace treaty, but believed the High Commission's proposals amounted, in effect, to a further revision of the Occupation Statute. He said it had been difficult to consider the general approach, because only a résumé of the texts had been available. German opinion has been impressed by the Japanese Peace Treaty, and, in comparison, the new decisions do not really look as though they constituted a fundamental step. They do not go far enough to have the proper psychological effect on the Germans.

MR. KOHNSTAMM asked about the interpretation of the phrase "state of emergency". Would a state of emergency be declared at an early stage, or only at the last moment? Would a border attack or disorder somewhere in Germany be sufficient for a declaration of emergency?

MR. BYROADE said that the circumstances could not be specified in advance. However, the basis for a declaration of emergency would always be the security of Allied forces. It is contemplated that the agreement would provide that an emergency could be declared in part

or all of the Federal territory. A Soviet attack might result in a declaration of emergency for the entire country. While disorder in the Ruhr might result only in a local declaration.

MR. SCHEYVEN asked whether it was expected that the Germans would be allowed to conduct relations with the Soviet Union and the satellite countries, and whether any provision concerning this had been expressed in the documents.

MR. BYROADE replied that there would be no prohibition against German relations with the countries of Eastern Europe in the contractual arrangements.

MR. ALLEN stated that the emphasis would be on the ties to the West, rather than on prohibitions against dealing with the East.

MR. SCHEYVEN asked what were the future agreements which the Germans would undertake to recognize. He was told that the only agreements which the three powers had in mind were the Safehaven agreements.[9]

MR. SCHEYVEN asked whether the exemption from equalization of burdens legislation for Allied property and the debt settlement would be covered in the contractual arrangements.

MR. REINSTEIN stated that the first question would be covered in the agreement on foreign interests. In answer to the second question, he said there would be an international agreement on debts, but it would not be part of the contractual arrangements. It was likely that the debt negotiations would go on for some time, and, if the contractual arrangements were concluded first, they would have to contain an interim provision on debts.

MR. BYROADE spoke of the form of the contractual arrangements and explained that there would be a general agreement concerning the principles involved, with separate conventions on more specific matters.

MR. SCHEYVEN then asked how it was intended to associate the Benelux countries with the future work on contractual relations.

MR. BYROADE said that, when the Ministers had reached their decisions, further work would be referred to the High Commission. There would then be a period of considerable activity, and the only practical place for consultation would be Bonn. The representatives of the three powers there would take all possible steps to keep the Benelux missions informed.

MR. SCHEYVEN stated that it was important to receive the documents on the military forces. If Bonn is to be the place for consulation, and no group such as the Study Group will be established anywhere else, will it be possible for the Benelux to see the documents in a formative stage?

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[9] A reference to the several agreements between the United States, United Kingdom, and France and various other countries attempting to settle the disposition of German external assets and looted gold.

MR. BYROADE replied that the only expert group which was contemplated would be one to deal with the question of prohibitions and limitations on industry. It has not been decided where such a group would meet. He was not clear enough about the procedures of the High Commission to know just when documents are furnished to the Benelux representatives, but the High Commission would make every effort to see that this was done in matters of direct concern to them.

MR. BYROADE stated that he much appreciated the views which had been expressed in the meeting. They represented a broad approach, which was very fine in the light of past events.

MR. BYROADE then reviewed some of the specific questions in order to compare the views of the Benelux countries and the occupying powers. The two positions are very close with regard to declaring a state of emergency. As for the Council of Ambassadors, it is not intended merely to change the name of the High Commission and continue it in another form, but a three-power authority is still required because of Berlin and because of the necessity for joint action in case of emergency. The Council will be kept as informal in character as possible, and no charter has been prepared for it yet.

The proposed preamble to the general agreement is similar to the Netherlands' suggestion regarding preservation of democracy. With respect to stating that Germany is a sovereign state, MR. BYROADE observed that the three powers would declare that they keep the right to exericse supreme authority in certain fields, but renounce it in all others. At this point, MR. SAUVAGNARGUES observed that it was not possible to give sovereignty to Germans and keep the right to act in an emergency, but DR. DE BEUS said that he believed there were ways of combining the two.

With resepct to the connection between the contractual relationship and a German defense contribution, MR. BYROADE said this would require very careful handling, but there must be some link between them, for otherwise the Germans would be likely to accept the contractual arrangements and refuse the defense participation. The arrangements for bringing Germany into the common defense have not been discussed at the recent meetings.

The question of war criminals has not been dealt with in Washington, but will be studied by the High Commission.

It is not intended that political questions will be submitted to the Arbitral Tribunal. It seemed to MR. BYROADE that the Benelux representatives would go further in reducing security controls than the three powers were prepared to go, but that question had not been finally decided.

MR. ALLEN said that the general ideas expressed had been most useful and stimulating. He had been impressed by the emphasis placed by the Netherlands and Belgian representatives on going as far as

possible in the direction of a peace settlement. That is the spirit in which we have considered the High Commission report, and the ideal we have in mind. We do not, however, delude ourselves that everything has been settled or that the negotiations in Germany would be easy.

MR. BYROADE said that he believed we would arrive at a politically acceptable agreement which would be better than what the Benelux expected on the basis of the documents they had seen so far.

MR. KOHNSTAMM said that he believed the Netherlands could accept the paper on foreign interests which had been distributed at the meeting. MR. SCHEYVEN said that the Belgian representatives would study the paper further and give their views on it at a later time. [He subsequently informed the U.S. Delegation, for the information of the British and French, that the formula was acceptable to the Belgian Government.]

With respect to future meetings, MR. BYROADE pointed out that the situation was most unusual, since the Foreign Ministers would have no time in Washington after their talks were concluded. He suggested, therefore, that there should be another meeting with the Benelux representatives when the Ministers' discussions were over, in order to inform them of the decisions which had been reached. The Ministers would also look forward to meeting the Benelux Ministers in Ottawa. This would be an informal talk, and there would be no experts on German matters present.

It was agreed to plan for a further meeting on Friday morning, September 14, and to set the exact time later. The Ministers would probably meet in Ottawa on Sunday, September 16.[10]

[At the close of the meeting Dr. de Beus gave a copy of the notes from which he had spoken, and these are attached to the present memorandum. Copies are also attached of the papers which were circulated on security controls and foreign interests.] [11]

[Attachment]

Paper Prepared by the Tripartite Working Group

SECRET [WASHINGTON, September 10, 1951?]

SECURITY CONTROLS

The Federal Republic should undertake to provide such information as the Allies may require in connection with the contractual arrangements in the security field, and to permit its verification. There should

[10] For a report on the Foreign Ministers meeting on September 16 at Ottawa, see p. 1309; regarding the meeting on September 14, see footnote 2 thereto.

[11] Only the paper on security controls is printed.

be no Allied control agency in the security field. However, provision should be made for the establishment of an Allied body subordinate to the Council of Ambassadors which will be concerned with problems arising in regard to the undertakings of the Federal Republic. This body would have, on the basis of the contractual arrangements, the necessary authority to obtain and verify information and carry on such inspections as may be authorized by the Council of Ambassadors. It would report to the Council of Ambassadors any evidences of German violation of the security undertakings and recommend action with respect thereto.

If the High Commission and the Federal Republic, as a result of their negotiations, consider it desirable, there should be a formal relationship between the Allied body and the German authorities for the purpose of providing a means of dealing with problems arising between the Allies and the Germans in this field. This formal relationship might be accomplished by associating representatives of the Federal Republic with the Allied body in a mixed commission. The mixed commission would deal with matters relating to the execution of the contractual arrangements with respect to security safeguards, obtaining and verifying information, and possibly some inspections. The German representatives, however, would not be associated with the Allied body in its reports and recommendations to the Council of Ambassadors or other activities which relate to purported violations of the arrangements.

365.001/9–1151

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Byington)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 11, 1951.

Subject: Italian Peace Treaty

Participants: Mr. B. A. B. Burrows, Counselor
Mr. K. D. Jamieson, Second Secretary } British Embassy
Mr. P. Francfort—French Embassy
Mr. Homer M. Byington, Jr.
Mr. Howard J. Hilton } WE

In opening the meeting I suggested that the problem was to determine the areas of agreement and disagreement preparatory to the meetings of the Ministers on the question of the Italian Peace Treaty.[1] After I had reviewed our position, Mr. Burrows circulated a paper (copy of which is attached) setting forth the British suggestions for

[1] For further documentation on the U.S. position with regard to revision of the Italian Peace Treaty, see volume IV.

procedure and timing for the *de facto* revision of the Italian Treaty on a bilateral basis.

Mr. Burrows said that they preferred the position set forth in this paper to the position advanced by the United States since it afforded greater flexibility and best met the problems posed by differing public opinion in the United States, Italy and Yugoslavia. On the one hand, public opinion in the United States and Italy is demanding some action in the near future. In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, agreement with Italy on the future of Trieste has been set by Tito as a condition for Yugoslav support of revision of the other parts of the Italian Peace Treaty. Mr. Burrows said that the British suggestions had been drafted with the view of meeting these different demands. The issuance of the declaration is a step, which could be taken in the near future, to indicate the desire of the three Powers to achieve some action on the Italian Treaty. The delay between the declaration and the final notes accomplishing *de facto* revision would provide time for Italo-Yugoslav negotiations on the question of Trieste. Since the United States position contemplates the completion of formal action immediately after the Italian request, it does not provide the period for such negotiations. He recognized that there would be a period of some six weeks for diplomatic preparation for formal action, but felt that the exchange of notes might come at the most inopportune time in connection with the Italo-Yugoslav negotiations on Trieste.

In this connection I emphasized that the important point in the British procedure is that the formal notes are not conditional upon Italo-Yugoslav settlement of the Trieste question. I indicated that it was my interpretation of point 5–*a* that the final step, following about six weeks to two months after the declaration, would not be dependent upon an Italo-Yugoslav settlement of the Trieste question. I said I believed the United States Government would not be willing to accept any proposal which made solution of the Trieste problem a condition to revision of the Treaty. Mr. Burrows agreed in general with this interpretation but said that they would verify this point. I repeated that if this interpretation was incorrect a fundamental difference of opinion would exist since we did not contemplate delaying action on the Italian Treaty pending such a settlement.

The French position as expressed by Mr. Francfort remains unchanged. It contemplates first the issuance of a tripartite declaration, second, endorsement by the United Nations, and then formal notes to the Italian Government waiving the Italian obligations to the governments concerned and renouncing the moral stigma of the Treaty. The following dangers of this position were stressed in the discussion of Mr. Francfort's remarks: it would not provide the Italians with the initiative; and endorsement of this action by the United Nations would present serious obstacles. I pointed out that both the British

and ourselves were still uncertain about the desirability of going to the United Nations and that if we were to go to the United Nations it would not be for endorsement but merely for a resolution in which the United Nations would note with satisfaction the action taken. Moreover, unless we were assured of a big majority, it would be best not to submit the question at all.

Mr. Francfort also expressed concern about the juridical effect of our action revising the Italian Treaty. We commented that the action taken would not in legal terms constitute revision of the Italian Treaty but would rather consist of a renunciation of Italy's obligations to the governments concerned in connection with the specified articles of the Italian Treaty. We hoped, however, that the action would be considered by the public at large as revision and that the press would so term it, although in legal terms it would not, in fact, be revision. Mr. Francfort said that he did not know what Mr. Schuman's position would be on this, but that he would endeavor to present to him our views before the discussions on this question. I turned to Mr. Francfort and said that this subject would be discussed with them this afternoon at the meeting of Mr. Acheson and Mr. Schuman.[2]

I agreed to present the British suggestions [3] to the American delegation and give him an early reply.

HOMER M. BYINGTON, JR.

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[2] For a report on Schuman's meeting with Acheson, see U.S.–Fr. Min–1, p. 1249.
[3] Not printed; a summary of this paper is included in the minutes referred to in footnote 2, above.

B. PROCEEDINGS, SEPTEMBER 10–14, 1951

CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, Secretary's briefing book

United States Delegation Minutes of the First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States and United Kingdom Held at Washington, September 10, 1951, 3:30 p. m.

SECRET
U.S.–U.K. Min–1

MEMBERS

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)
Mr. Morrison (U.K.)

ALSO PRESENT

U.S.	U.K.
Mr. Harriman	Sir Oliver Franks
Mr. Gifford	Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Jessup	Sir F. Hoyer Millar

European Problems and U.K. Attitude Toward European Integration

1. Mr. Morrison led off the discussion by noting the unusually strong movement on the Continent in favor of European integration. All feared the Soviet menace and believed that close integration would mitigate the danger. Whether adequate thought had been put into these plans was another question. This movement was particularly strong in France, Italy and in the Christian Democratic Union in West Germany. The feeling for European integration was somewhat less strong in Holland, while in Belgium and Luxembourg some strength existed for such plans. The Scandinavian countries, however, were of the same mind as the U.K. Although having a sense of weakness, they did not allow a feeling of inferiority to involve them in other difficulties. The European countries are likely to think that by setting up some kind of federation they have solved the problem, instead of making a point of strengthening individual responsibility. Far from discouraging plans for integration, the U.K. encouraged them. The U.K. believed that further integration of Europe would be a good thing if handled in the right way. Whether the U.K. should join such a movement was a different question. There was not only the fact that the British Isles were separated from the Continent, but there was also a vast difference between the countries of the Continent, and the U.K. Britain, however, would not be prejudiced against joining such movements and would always be ready to consider each particular plan when presented.

2. In the case of the Schuman plan Mr. Morrison said that the British people and the British Government could not accept it. When questions were asked in Parliament about coal and steel, it would be embarrassing to state that it was impossible to answer because such matters were under the jurisdiction of a supra-national organization. At Strasbourg there has been criticism that the U.K. had been dragging its feet in the Council of Europe.[1] He said that this quasi-parliamentary body had the weaknesses that the agenda was not drawn up systematically and that no responsible persons presented documents to the Assembly. Committees were established for every problem without regard to the importance of the issues involved. There was no technical staff to help draft these papers nor did he think there should be. The U.K. was continually trying to think of ways to place well constructed documents before the Assembly to provide it with practical problems. The relations between the Assembly and the U.K. were now very much improved. Moreover, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would attend the next meeting in order to exchange views

[1] For documentation on U.S. interest in the European Coal and Steel Community (Schuman Plan) and the Council of Europe, see volume IV.

on fiscal and economic matters. There should be an increase in *ad hoc* cooperation with the Assembly, and the Assembly must make *ad hoc* arrangements, so that eventually a series of such arrangements would be possible. Mr. Morrison noted the criticism of the U.K. in such articles as the recent one by Clarence Streit, which stated that what Europe needed was a constitution like the U.S. constitution. While he was fully in favor of constitutions, he believed that languages and traditions made such plans very impractical. As to the relationship between the integration of Europe and NATO, he said that if economic and social problems could be taken up in NATO and could be helpful, so much the better. In any event the U.K. believed, like the Scandinavian countries, that before integration was possible, well thought out solutions to concrete problems must be forthcoming. It was impossible for the U.K. to join movements for European integration at this time.

3. Mr. Acheson believed that the U.S. and U.K. were not far apart in their thinking. He agreed that in the press and in the Congress there were some criticisms of the U.K. reticence about European integration, but it was not the attitude of the Executive Branch to force the U.K. into such schemes. The U.S. was sympathetic to plans for European integration, such as the Schuman plan and the European army, and the Administration had its difficulties with Congress which sometimes wanted to make British adherence to European integration plans a condition of certain matters of foreign policy. The Executive Branch was aware that there were differences between the U.K. and the countries of the Continent and believed that the U.S. and U.K. must work as closely as possible with regard to such plans. The importance of European integration in the U.S. view was based on the fact that Europe is in a precarious economic and military position and would be strengthened by further integration. Western Europe is a small area with the iron curtain on the other side, it would be helpful to have a unified front. The countries of the Continent since the war have arrived at the point of view that nationalism is not the main spring of all action. Perhaps a new loyalty, such as an integrated Europe, might be useful. The U.S. believed that everything in this field could be done under the canopy of NATO. It recognized the risks of the U.K. joining a federation with France, Italy and Germany, but under NATO it believed that these risks were not too great.

4. Mr. Acheson assured Mr. Morrison that the U.S. Government was not in favor of formulating theoretical constitutions, but in really working out practical problems. In this respect the U.S. believed that the Schuman Plan was very helpful, as would be a European army. The Continental countries were beginning to see this, and in the not too distant future some political institutions might be established which would be beneficial in solving European problems.

5. MR. MORRISON said that he agreed with this approach and he believed that something short of formal adherence to such plans by the U.K. might be worked out.

6. MR. ACHESON noted that the U.K. was close to the Continent and would want to have ways of working out the various problems it had with the Continental countries. If the iron curtain were broken, however, it might be easier for countries which were currently USSR satellites to join a European organization if the U.K. were not participating as a member.

7. MR. HARRIMAN agreed that the OEEC was most successful, but he was disturbed that this organization had been neglected. He expressed the hope that its work could be stimulated. It might work in with the NATO and the European Defense Force in some way.

8. MR. ACHESON noted that there had been some thought of merging the ECE and OEEC, but this the U.S. believed was a mistake particularly in view of the position that Germany should take in Western affairs. The OEEC was still useful in its present form.

ALIGNMENT OF U.S.–U.K. POLICIES IN MIDDLE EAST

(*a*) *Egypt*[2]

9. MR. MORRISON began this discussion by noting the long history of Egypt's relation with the U.K. and pointed out that the U.K. did not seek to hinder the independence of the Egyptians in any colonial way. The politics of Egypt were very bad and the social structure with its broad masses layered by a few on top was very backward. The U.K. did have the treaty of 1936 however, and there were no provisions to bring it to an end. Mr. Bevin had taken on the Egyptian problem and some progress had been made for a settlement. The situation had deteriorated again, however. The Egyptians now wanted the U.K. to move out in 12 months and stated that if war came, U.K. troops could come back to Egypt. It was obvious even to the Egyptians that they could not defend themselves, yet Egypt was important militarily since it affected the Southern perimeter defenses against the Soviet Union. The U.K. could not leave Egypt and there the matter rested. The U.K. had put forth propositions to the Egyptians that went further than the U.K. wanted to go, but these propositions were rejected and the problem of Sudan was taken up. The Egyptians had given the Sudanese a rough time during their control over the Sudan and the U.K. administration was a good one which the Sudanese liked. The U.K. was looking to a time when the Sudan could be given self-government. The Sudanese should decide this question and similar arrangements should be made to those in Libya, which had gone much further toward in-

[2] For further documentation on U.S. interest in Egypt's relations with the United Kingdom, see volume v.

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dependence. He did not know whether the Sudanese would want to control foreign affairs and their defense, but he believed the U.K. might still maintain control of those matters. In all of these matters the U.K. would have scrupulous respect for the self-determination of the Sudanese. The Egyptians, however, wanted more control of the foreign affairs, defense and fiscal matters of Sudan. In addition they wished to control the Nile, which was important both to the U.K. and the Sudan. The U.K. would like to see France, the U.S. and the U.K. cooperate in solving this problem.

10. Mr. Morrison said that perhaps a new approach in the form of an inter-allied defense command should be established in which Egypt could make its own contribution as a full partner. Under such an arrangement there could be no charge of a U.K. occupation. He thought that such a command would be in the interest of the free states, and in accord with the Egyptians' pride and prestige. He believed, as did the U.K. Chiefs of Staff, that this matter could be worked out in spite of the fact that it would tie up forces in Egypt which might be otherwise used for strictly U.K. purposes. It was important that agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. be obtained on this problem, since the Egyptians were currently attempting to play off the two countries against each other.

11. Mr. Acheson said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed with those of the U.K. that the British forces must stay in Egypt. The problem was to prescribe a medicine which would effect the desired cure; mere force would apparently not work. A plan must be devised in which the Egyptians would have a legitimate position to which they could adhere. The procedure of an inter-allied arrangement was such a method, but since the same troops would be in Egypt this procedure would take some dressing up to make it palatable to the Egyptians. The U.S. had endeavored to leave no doubt with the Egyptians regarding the U.S. support for maintenance by the U.K. of its strategic facilities in Egypt.

12. As to the Sudan the U.S. recognized that it is not possible for a union with Egypt under the crown. He made the following suggestions:

(*a*) A UN commission might be established which would have a general advisory position with regard to the Sudan. It would have no powers to interfere but only to report to the UN.

(*b*) The U.K. might renew the offer of the proposals which were rejected before.

(*c*) Thought should be given to the possibility of an international guarantee of an Egypto-Sudanese Nile waterway agreement. A Nile waterway authority might be established under the International Bank.

(*d*) There might be some advantage in fixing an early date for the attainment of self-government by the Sudan.

(*e*) Consideration might be given to the appointment of a neutral Governor General of the Sudan.

MR. ACHESON said that some means should be devised to place Egypt in an embarrassing situation with regard to international opinion, if it refused the proposals for solution of the problem. It was important both to have some place for the Egyptians to go and some means to prod them toward it. He stressed that this problem was so important that the U.S. was very desirous of working it out with the U.K.

13. MR. MORRISON agreed with the last point made by Mr. Acheson and pointed out that the question of the Suez Canal alarmed the Sudanese as much as it did the U.K. He noted, however, that he was not able to make favorable moves toward the Egyptians because of the thin majority his government held in Parliament. It was necessary to show strength at times and the U.K. must not be driven into the position of having to agree with whatever moves the Egyptians wanted. Not only was the position difficult because of Parliament, but Mr. Morrison said he was not the kind of man who wanted to diminish the prestige of the U.K. in the world.

14. With respect to the suggestions Mr. Acheson made regarding the Sudan, MR. MORRISON made the following comments:

(*a*) It was possible that a UN commission might be utilized if it were to merely observe elections in the Sudan, but such a commission would not be agreeable if it were to give a running commentary on events in that country since this might weaken the U.K. position there.

(*b*) Reiteration of U.K. readiness to consider a statement on the principles already offered might be a possibility.

(*c*) The proposal of a Nile waterway authority was a good possibility.

(*d*) The fixing of a date for attainment of self-government by the Sudan was also a good possibility.

(*e*) The suggestion of a neutral Governor General of the Sudan was probably not feasible, since the staff of the U.K. would probably not work under a foreign Governor General. There was also the problem of who would be appointed: the Belgians did not have a good reputation in the Sudan and the Scandinavians did not have the experience needed. This suggestion appeared too much as though the U.K. was trying to "scuttle" away from the area.

He warned against making proposals which would be impossible to live up to, since this would create a situation which would be worse than ever. The situation must not come about in which the U.K. was forced into a position of accepting the terms of the Egyptians. If the Egyptians became too unreasonable the U.K. would have to take a forceful position. Mr. Morrison said he did not know whether the Egyptians would insist that the Sudan problem be solved before the military question.

15. MR. ACHESON said that he was not forgetting the possible necessity of getting tough with the Egyptians, but the U.S. did not believe that taking forceful action merely for its own sake would solve the problem. In fact, the Egyptians could make it quite difficult for the U.K. The question was whether forceful action would get the desired results. MR. MORRISON replied that the U.K. Chiefs of Staff reported that the Egyptians would not take more than administrative measures against the U.K. and that, although riots might be engendered and might get out of hand, the position would not be untenable or worse than the one existing in Persia.

16. MR. MORRISON said that a timetable has been drawn up with regard to an approach to Turkey and Egypt on an inter-allied command which he believed was acceptable.[3] The sooner action was taken on this the better, since the Egyptian problem depended on the adherence of Turkey and the establishment of the command structure.

[Here follow paragraphs 17–38*b* dealing with Iran.]

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer

[3] For documentation on the problem of a Middle East Command within NATO see pp. 460 ff.



Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, Secretary of State Acheson, and Foreign Secretary Morrison meet at the Department of State September 10, 1951.

Henry A. Byroade

John J. McCloy

(c) *Kashmir*[4]

39. MR. ACHESON said that events were moving very rapidly toward a collision in this area. The question is whether to put forward any plan at this time. It appeared that the Pakistani would be willing to do anything to which India would agree to solve the problem. It was first necessary that the U.S. and U.K. should act together. In the UN it would be possible to muster an impressive vote against India. Outside of the UN attempts should be made to have the Asians take the initiative in intervening, especially such countries as Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon. Another possibility would be to postpone the disposition of Kashmir for an extended period such as ten years and make provision for UN administration of the area. The attempt should be made to remove the dispute from the political sphere and to concentrate on its technical aspects. If progress were made on water development, the whole economic basis for the dispute would disappear.

40. MR. MORRISON said that the more we could delay, the better the chances would be for a peaceful settlement. Perhaps this was wrong but at least there was no use to use force at this time. Both countries were in the British Commonwealth and the U.K. was trying to be impartial, but it made clear in the UN that the Indians were wrong. It was impossible for the U.K. or UN to intervene by force. Perhaps at the right time the British Commonwealth could collectively intervene. The Asian intervention which Mr. Acheson mentioned might be a strong influence. India was sensitive to any U.K. or U.S. interference with regard to Pakistan. Whether the UN would be a suasive force was not sure. Even though this was no time for bullying Nehru, a stalemate should be avoided. If the U.S. agreed to this general line details could be worked out by the respective UN delegations.

41. MR. ACHESON said that while Mr. Scott was here he would like to have the appropriate officials in the Department meet with him on this matter. Regarding taking this question up in the Security Council and especially in the General Assembly, it should be raised "more in sorrow than in anger". Meanwhile, it would be most helpful to try to make progress on the Punjab development scheme which would help to remove the dispute from the political field.

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[4] For further documentation on U.S. interest in the Kashmir question, see vol. VI, Part 2, pp. 1699 ff.

42. Mr. Morrison made the general point with respect to Middle East affairs that both the U.S. and U.K. were open to criticism regarding failure to maintain mutual consultations. He asked that before the U.S. minds become too firm on a given problem that they consult with the U.K. With regard to the situation in Iran it was certainly capable of improvement with respect to consultation, and he was sending word to change the instructions to Iran to conform to the foregoing discussion.

Press Relations

43. It was agreed that the usual practice in bipartite talks would be observed, in that the press would merely be informed of the fact of the meeting and the persons present.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, Secretary's briefing book

United States Delegation Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States and United Kingdom Held at Washington, September 11, 1951, 10:30 a. m.

SECRET
U.S.–U.K. Min–2

Members

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)
Mr. Morrison (U.K.)

Also Present

U.S.	U.K.
Mr. Harriman	Sir Oliver Franks
Mr. Gifford	Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr Jessup	Lt. Gen. Sir K. MacLean
[Mr. Linder]	Mr. R. H. Scott
	Mr. Gaitskell
	Sir Leslie Rowan

Alignment of US–UK in Far East

a) Korea[1]

1. Mr. Acheson said the US side had been getting its ideas together regarding a course for UN action in Korea in case there is an armistice. The plan was to get on with political discussions keeping them confined to Korea and avoid discussing issues such as Formosa and China. The possibility of political agreement regarding Korea is not bright. We would not go back to where we were before hostilities began, and desire a united, free Korea. We recognize there is not much chance for agree-

[1] For further documentation on the Korean conflict and the question of an armistice, see volume VII.

ment on this point, but we would not "sanctify" a division of the country at the 38th parallel, which line had been drawn solely for purposes of the Japanese surrender. Our policy called for a united Korea.

2. MR. MORRISON said he agreed that discussions should be kept to Korea, keeping in mind, however, the possibility of a comprehensive approach to settlement of problems in the area. He said the UK also desired a unified, democratic regime. In the back of his mind, however, were thoughts regarding UK public opinion on China, and also the point that Korea might not be ready for democracy immediately and if a democratic state were created and left to its own devices, it might easily be upset by a Fifth Column. This was a danger to be kept in mind. Regarding the nature of a cease fire conference and any armistice talks, he felt these should not be conducted in such a manner as to make it appear that it was the UN versus the Communist powers which were debating the issue. We should emphasize that the UN is a world organization—everyone is in it—and are working their problems out among themselves.

3. MR. ACHESON then read from a position paper setting forth a proposed US course of action in case of no armistice. In addition to general consideration of the problem by the UN nations we believed we must accelerate military preparations. The free nations must get themselves in a state of readiness for general war. He did not wish to alarm anyone, but he believed there was a clearly increased likelihood of general hostilities. We have evidence of a considerable build-up in the Chinese air force, and at least two armored divisions have appeared in North Korea. The Western Allies should increase the tempo of their production and carry out their defense plans as quickly as possible. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed a paper [2] which includes a number of recommendations.

If the fighting falls off, the UN Commander in Chief should be directed to increase immediately the scale of military operations in order to retain the initiative in battle and prevent deterioration of morale.

Restrictions on General Ridgway's movements should be removed in order to give him tactical leeway to make advances into North Korea to the waist of the North Korean Peninsula.

Expedite the organization, training, and equipping of Japanese troops.

Develop and equip additional Republic of Korea military units, increasing their responsibility for the defense of Korea.

MR. ACHESON said forces of this type took a long time to develop. Two of the ROK divisions had turned out all right (the First and Capital Divisions), but there had been several disasters when ROK divisions had broken in battle allowing the enemy to come through and the UN Command had lost several months repairing the damage. The military policy now was not to place two ROK divisions side by side

[2] Memorandum dated July 13, 1951, volume VII.

and to keep them on the Eastern side of the Peninsula where there was less chance of Communist pressure. Time is the important factor since there were few effective Korean officers and non-commissioned officers, and it would take time to train them.

Remove restrictions against attacks in North Korea, especially against the Yalu River Dams and the power installations on the Korean bank.

MR. MORRISON asked why we had originally embargoed action against these objectives. MR. ACHESON explained that we thought such action might be provocative to the USSR. However, the Communists had now removed most of the equipment which generated power for North Korea so that the entire output is going into Manchuria. In addition, one of the Dams serves as a main highway into North Korea. With regard to air attacks on Rashin, these would be approved on an individual case basis, and the emphasis in this connection was to keep UN aircraft clear of the Soviet border.[3] MR. MORRISON said he was not familiar with Rashin and MR. ACHESON explained its location and proximity to Manchuria and Soviet territory. We had bombed it approximately three weeks ago, destroying the railroad marshalling yards and large quantities of war material. MR. MORRISON asked if there had been any Soviet reaction, and the Secretary replied that there had not been any evidence of it but that there may well have been concern.

A complete economic blockade of China by the UN nations was also recommended.

4. In case of any large-scale air attacks against UN troops and installations in Korea, General Ridgway was to carry out his standing instruction of informing Washington, which would in turn carry out consultation with the UK and other participating nations to the extent permitted by the situation, after which Ridgway might be authorized to conduct pursuit and retaliation against Communist air bases. MR. MORRISON recalled the UK had agreed this point in the past in a communication with the Secretary. MR. ACHESON said that as far as action in the UN is concerned we plan to give a history of the Kaesong discussions,[4] including full detail on the alleged violation of the neutral zone, emphasizing that any breakdown in talks was not the fault of the UN. We believe the UN should reaffirm its decision to carry on the struggle against aggression and that members should take diplomatic action to bring political pressure to bear. Additional economic measures should be considered looking toward a complete blockade of China and the US would seek to give effect to such a blockade either through the UN or bilaterally. The US would also seek to get increased military support and participation in the Korean operations.

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[3] In an addendum to these minutes, not printed, it was noted that the JCS standing directive did not require approval from Washington on individual cases. The British were informed of this by the Department of State following the second meeting.

[4] For documentation on the Kaesong armistice negotiations, see volume VII.

6. Mr. Morrison said he agreed on a lot of points and had some questions about others. It was desirable to give the UK background and approach to the problem. The UK was anxious not to become involved in a mainland war with China. This was partly because of the general UK attitude toward China and partly because they must look at the world as a whole with all its potential for trouble elsewhere. One difficulty was that there were so many places where the Soviets might make trouble. The Middle East with its bad governments and restless peasant classes could be exploited quite easily by persons wishing to cause trouble. It would be the adoption of a policy of desperation by these people. They had no labor movements comparable to those in the US and UK to support their point of view and the potential for trouble always existed. He remarked, "If I were Stalin, I would have a go at it." The UK didn't want to become involved in a war with China. He agreed that if UN forces were heavily bombed, we would have to strike back, but the UK didn't want to do things needlessly. As diplomats, it was our business to avoid World War III. Communist China need not necessarily be a slavish Communist satellite. Mr. Bevin had believed that Chinese history, character and sheer numbers gave some basis for the assumption that they would draw a line between themselves and the Soviets. He had also believed that the USSR purposely made it difficult for China to be admitted to the UN in order to force China to turn to the Soviets for understanding and assistance. The UK didn't want to do anything to drive China to further cement its defensive union with the USSR. Another point was that if the UN became more heavily engaged in the Far East, the Soviets would likely start trouble elsewhere. These, he felt, were the basic UK points of view.

7. Mr. Morrison was not clear on whether the JCS was an entirely American military group; when this point was made clear to him, he said that his comments might be subject to those which General MacLean might wish to make. As for Korea, he said the British were satisfied to depend on Ridgway's discretion regarding tactical moves. He felt that it was necessary for a field commander to have such discretion, and he well understood the point regarding troop morale because London had experienced a similar problem when undergoing the terrific German bombings and a job to do was vital in maintaining morale.

8. With regard to training Japanese forces, Mr. Morrison said that he had not heard of this before and the question was being raised sooner than he expected it might be. He wanted to get advice from his colleagues before he commented. There was some apprehension among certain people in the UK regarding German rearmament which he personally did not share because he felt to leave Germany out of the picture would result in the North Atlantic Treaty nations being

lined up on one side against the Soviet Union and its Satellites on the other. However, he felt the idea of arming Japanese would raise some excitement in Britain. As far as training South Korean troops went he felt this was perfectly all right. He remarked that the question of bombing the Yalu Dam was "apparently under control", but that General MacLean might wish to comment further. As far as a blockade by the UN was concerned, he was not sure it would be effective. He also felt it might cause China to rely even more heavily on the USSR. The Ridgway report,[5] he agreed, must make clear that it is not the UN's fault that cease fire negotiations have been terminated. The UN should reaffirm its decision to resist aggression.

9. General MacLean said that the British Chiefs' view was that they accepted the idea of UN tactical advances as far as the waist of Korea. They really didn't know enough about the situation and were satisfied to leave it up to Ridgway. They did feel, however, that the UN forces were in a good position at the present time and that if they went to the waist, it would add to their line of communication and internal security problems, at the same time shortening the Chinese lines which were vulnerable to air attack. Their consensus was that it was best for the UN to stay where it was. Mr. Acheson said that these same factors had been considered by the JCS and the general idea of maintaining our present position was considered sound. General MacLean interjected that the British forces held the view that pursuit beyond the waist was considered a problem requiring governmental decision.

10. Ambassador Franks asked if he might pose a question regarding Mr. Acheson's earlier statement that if fighting were resumed the general danger had markedly increased. He wondered what the background for this assumption was. If fighting was resumed, the Chinese would require additional men and equipment both on the ground and in the air. He supposed that it might be that the Chinese felt they could not withdraw. At the same time the USSR did not want to push the fighting further or give up larger amounts of material to the Chinese, but their commitment to the latter made them take a larger risk, and it is not clear where the fighting will stop.

11. Mr. Acheson said that is the underlying thought. In speculating on the situation it was possible to reach the conclusion that the Malik suggestion was based on an analysis by the Russians which foresaw that the fighting would proceed on a larger scale which might easily spread and endanger the Soviet position. The Chinese may desire to press on in an attempt to gain a victory. This posed for the Russians the problem of providing equipment and building a strong China or of attempting to conclude hostilities and waiting until the general

[5] For General Ridgway's report on the failure of the cease-fire negotiations at Kaesong, see volume VII.

situation was more favorable to the Soviets. For some reason this idea was not working out. The Kaesong protests were continuing and apparently were designed to continue until someone loses patience and feels there is no use in attempting to come to terms with the Communists. Ridgway was being very careful in this connection. However, we had reports which indicated that considerably more equipment was arriving for the Chinese Communists, including the armored divisions and large numbers of aircraft. A new attack on the UN forces might be very serious. If large-scale fighting does resume, the world situation is markedly worse. In this connection he doubted that there was much value in worrying about Chinese reactions to such things as additional restrictions placed on them by the UN. He felt that these could not irritate them a great deal as compared with the larger situation.

12. MR. ACHESON said that to go back to the Japanese troop point, he desired to make it plain that there was no intent to use Japanese forces in Korea. What we were proposing was to expand the Japanese police reserve. They could easily be made a military body by increasing their training and armament. The purpose was to increase the defenses of Japan. Our Defense Department had been disturbed last autumn when Japan was denuded by transferring all available United States troops and supplies to Korea. A situation had existed where it would have been easy to take Japan and if that ever happened the position of our forces in Korea would be untenable. It was difficult for the US to meet the security requirements of Japan and also to send troops to Europe under NATO commitments.

13. MR. MORRISON said this explanation improved the situation greatly from his point of view. He understood the problem in Japan. He thought it was agreed between us that we must do everything we could not to "go over the line." It was not inconceivable that the Soviets might be forced in their own thinking to "preventive war." On the question of additional troops for Korea he felt that he must state now that this would not be easy for the UK. They were having trouble in Malaya and elsewhere and unless there was partial mobilization or the possibility of obtaining troops from Australia was looked into he could not foresee any availability. He wanted to consider this question with his colleagues in London.

14. On the question of a blockade, MR. MORRISON wondered if this implied that UN naval units might actually stop Russian ships attempting to proceed to China.

15. MR. ACHESON said that we did not at present believe it was reasonable to have a naval inspection of vessels in the area but rather our thought was that UN member countries should agree to order ships under their registry not to go to China. MR. MORRISON said he appreci-

ated having our many points with regard to the Far Eastern situation and would report fully to his colleagues in London.

EAST-WEST TRADE [6]

16. MR. MORRISON introduced Mr. Gaitskell, Chancellor of the Exchequer, in order that Mr. Gaitskell might discuss a number of economic problems related to the agenda item on East-West trade.

17. MR. GAITSKELL said he had had discussions with a number of people in the US Government [7] and he thought it appropriate for him to describe the situation now existing in the UK within the context of the meetings between the Foreign Ministers. The UK imported two vital commodities from the USSR, timber and grain. Every year negotiations between the two countries reached a critical point when the British wondered whether they would get a trade agreement for the ensuing year. These commodities were vital to the economy of the UK yet, if the items which the Soviets could buy for sterling were severely limited there was always the possibility that they would not wish to accumulate additional sterling, and terminate the agreements. The British were now in debt under the current agreement for a considerable amount because restrictions had been placed on the export of rubber to the USSR, but that quantities of timber and grain had been imported at the very high prices now prevailing in the world market. This deficit was continuing to grow. He felt that he might just as well say plainly that the UK is now in the beginning of a very serious dollar crisis. On October 4 he would have to report to Parliament on the sterling-dollar situation. He would have to say that a deficit of nearly $500 million in the dollar account was projected for the years 1951–52; the over-all deficit including the sterling area would be approximately $1.2 billion. This was approximately the amount which the UK had gained as surplus in the previous year. By the end of fiscal year 1952 British reserves would be reduced to the equivalent of approximately $2 billion which was almost the same as the low point reached prior to the devaluation of the pound. The reasons for this situation were that there was more purchasing by sterling area countries from the dollar area. Defense production, and the high prices of raw materials were contributing factors. In 1950 the British Treasury thought it had solved the dollar deficit problem and were able to dominate the situation. This they now found was not so. The situation held a potential of very serious political consequences if the Government was unable to cope with it.

18. MR. GAITSKELL thought this was a European problem and not entirely one for the UK. Europe was now getting back to the pre-

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[6] For further documentation on U.S. policy with regard to East-West trade, see vol. I, pp. 993 ff.

[7] For documentation on Gaitskell's conversations with U.S. officials in Washington on September 6 and 7, see volume IV.

Marshall aid situation as a result of the new factor—world rearmament—which had been introduced into the total picture. With regard to East-West trade within the context of NATO he believed that other members would feel the same way as the UK. The USSR and satellite areas would have goods available which the US might not be able to supply and which some of the European countries would not have the dollars to buy even if available. Serious repercussions were apt to occur in the defense programs. However, the defense program was not the major cause of the situation but most people in Europe will think so. The pressure within the UK will be particularly noticeable since the balance of payments figures will be unfavorable yet exports will have been sacrificed to defense. This in fact has been British treasury policy up to now; the UK cannot continue to do it. With regard to military requirements as scheduled under the NATO he felt that there would be confusion and unpleasantness unless the economic realities of the European economic versus military situation were met squarely. There had never been in NATO a bringing together of these two. As things are going, Europe would have to adopt a war economy to go on. He felt it was highly desirable to discuss this problem among the Big Three before the question was taken to the full Council.

19. Mr. Morrison said that he felt he must explain the difference in approach of the UK as contrasted to the US. Exports and imports were vital to the livelihood of the UK. Now the UK had to live and carry out a rearmament program. The US was self-contained and only a small part of its production was related to overseas trade. It was much harder for the UK to say "no" to the Soviet Bloc on trading questions. As a matter of policy the UK also felt that "the Soviets may change their tune". The UK was principally interested in exchanging with the USSR not war materials but economic goods. They had found the Soviets very business-like to deal with and that they generally stuck with their bargains. It was not bad to have contact with them through this channel from a foreign policy point of view. The UK could not carry out a control policy to the point where it was not harming USSR but was really hurting the UK—i.e., the UK would be cutting off its nose to spite its face. It was good to make these general observations because he thought it made the UK position better understood.

20. Mr. Acheson asked Mr. Gaitskell if the UK could live with its present trading agreement and did not desire to go further. Mr. Gaitskell said that they could live with the present agreement; however, the Soviets can cut it off at any time if they can't spend their sterling and that if this happened it would cause a large additional dollar liability for the UK.

21. Mr. Morrison remarked that conditions placed by the US Congress on aid in relation to the East-West trade problem were extremely

annoying. He recognized that this did not reflect a State Department point of view and remarked that the Executive Branch could not control the Congress the way the Cabinet controlled the Parliament. He said that such conditions make the British people angry.

22. Mr. Acheson said that we disliked the procedure and that the President had stated his dislike to the Congress. One problem which we face is our inability to tell the Congress and the people what has been done in the field of controlling strategic exports to the Soviet area because this information is classified. Congress has the feeling that nothing has been done and actually we know that a great deal has been accomplished. The Kem Amendment could not be vetoed by the President because it was a rider on an important military appropriation. However, we feel the situation is somewhat improved—we feel that we have prevented even stronger legislation. In reply to a question by Mr. Gaitskell as to whether the Battle Bill was all right Mr. Linder said that we regarded it in a favorable light and hoped to get together on the remaining twenty items of the controls list. He said that if a good administrator was appointed and if the US and UK could reach an agreement regarding some further items the situation would not be too bad. He pointed out, however, that we would be faced with the problem the matter becoming alive from time to time because we would be required to make periodic reports to Congress. He hoped that we could make our primary strategic lists coincide and that this would be extremely helpful. Mr. Gaitskell said that he thought we could not avoid the fact that there would be continuing difficulties. For instance, he understood that public opinion in the US was very sensitive regarding the question of rubber which was one of the primary products which the UK had available for export and which the Soviets desired to purchase. Mr. Linder said that we desired to have further bilateral discussions on such questions; that we have given some education to the public and are hopeful that we can reach an agreed position. Mr. Gaitskell said he hoped we were not too optimistic regarding the twenty items. Mr. Morrison interjected that the UK had gone "a devil of a long way." Mr. Linder said it was highly desirable to get a few more items included.

23. Mr. Acheson inquired whether the proposed administrator is to be a full-time man or someone who has other responsibilities elsewhere in the defense production set-up. Mr. Linder said that the House and Senate bills differ on this point and the matter will have to be resolved in conference. Mr. Morrison inquired if the responsibility might rest in the State Department. Mr. Acheson replied that that would be the last place they would consider placing it. Mr. Gaitskell said he wanted to state that the UK appreciated very much the assistance which had been provided by the US and that he understood some of our present problems in regard to this matter of trading with the

communists. However, he felt that he must make it clear that the UK "was up against it."

24. MR. ACHESON said that he would like to return to Mr. Gaitskell's remark that defense expenditure was not the major cause of the present British imbalance and deficit situation. MR. GAITSKELL said that the UK had very low postwar reserves and that it could not afford balance of payments deficits even in sterling for very long. There had been a change in world prices—an increase which cost British more in imports, and upset the balance of payments. In order to hold the balance relatively equal the British have to sell more. The material which must go into defense items and the industries which must build defense material are the same ones as those which provide fifty percent of British exports. The burden of the defense program plus the world rearmament with the resultant increase in raw materials prices forced the UK to face a double burden. Rising prices in the US had caused higher import prices which directly affected the dollar situation and in addition prices were rising on the Continent and in the sterling area. The loss of revenue from Persian oil also was a factor. The UK's own part in the defense effort had had its effect but the UK was really more vulnerable to world changes resulting from the total rearmament effort. Repercussions of a defense program would not cause any particular political reaction if a deficit were confined to increased cost in the sterling area, but that if these costs were coupled with a dollar drain this is a real danger signal in the eyes of the public and opinion, particularly that supporting the left-wing portion of the labor party, would declare that the Nation was going bankrupt and that this was a vindication of their statement that the country could not carry out such a program. He was almost certain to face these charges on October 4 when he reported to the Parliament. The point now reached was what can Britain do? It must produce enough exports to bring the balance of payments situation into line since the deterioration could not be allowed to continue. Materials shortages limited expansion and the existing plant could not take defense orders at the same time it was meeting the need for export goods. Britain must slow down its expenditure dollars and earn currencies which were useful in place of dollars. If it were not for the deterioration in the terms of trade resulting from the price changes in the world picture he had no doubt Britain could do the program without chancing bankruptcy.

25. MR. HARRIMAN said that he had discussed this question the previous evening with Mr. Gaitskell and that while he felt that no early conclusions could be expected there certainly was a major problem which had to be discussed further while the Chancellor was in this country.

26. MR. ACHESON asked how the question should be brought up for discussion between the Governments. Mr. Gaitskell said he felt that at

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the beginning the question had to be taken out of the NATO program. It was necessary to have a frank discussion and make up our minds what we think the solution might be. He hoped that a meeting could be held before the end of the week with the Secretary's colleagues, including the Secretary of the Treasury. As far as staff work went he said that while the figures he would submit might be subject to official check by our government there was no other additional evidence necessary to begin the discussion and "as things are happening now it is a dangerous situation." The UK was going to reduce dollar expenditures by the sterling area. Additional stiff internal measures on consumption were already contemplated. However, he was convinced that the problem could not be solved without US cooperation and it was necessary to immediately get down "to where we are." He was not conscious of any treasury policy weakness and was convinced that the problem is outside British fiscal and budgetary control. MR. ACHESON said that he presumed that such a meeting should include the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Lovett, and Mr. Harriman, and that he would request that arrangements be made for an early meeting, possibly on Friday.

27. MR. HARRIMAN said that while he felt no decisions would be reached this week end it was very important to avoid another run on sterling. MR. GAITSKELL said that if he returned to the UK and had nothing to say after three weeks in this country there would be violent reaction. He must give information to the British people that we are cooperating with them in this situation. His staff would have a paper ready for discussion this week end. In answer to a question by Mr. Acheson, MR. GAITSKELL said that he definitely preferred bilateral discussions rather than a meeting including the French. The French were friendly but would not be of assistance in these discussions. The British contribution in terms of equipment for NATO under the present interim program might not be carried out unless this problem were met and some method for settling it brought forth. We must have a sharing exercise worked out on this program. That this question was bound to come out at the NATO meetings in Ottawa. The ECA agreed with him that we must have this exercise as an early item of business. In any discussion this week he would propose not to go over the whole sterling area problem but rather to confine our first attention to this immediate problem.

28. MR. ACHESON said that we would attempt to arrange a meeting for Friday, although he was committed to a very full schedule including a Cabinet meeting. He was leaving for Ottawa Saturday morning. However, he would talk to Mr. Harriman and see what could be done.

29. MR. GAITSKELL said he also thought it essential to have Mr. Wilson attend the meeting. MR. HARRIMAN said that his thought generally was that we must give attention to the procurement of end items

including the possibility of helping the program through dollar purchases on the Continent. He also thought a consideration of steel and raw materials would enter into the discussion; as well as UK deficit in EPU and the question of German occupation costs.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, Secretary's briefing book

United States Delegation Minutes of the First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States and France Held at Washington, September 11, 1951, 3: 30 p. m.

SECRET

U.S.–Fr. Min–1

MEMBERS

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)
M. Schuman (Fr)

ALSO PRESENT

U.S.	FRANCE
Mr. Harriman	M. Bonnet
Mr. Jessup	M. Alphand
Mr. Perkins	M. de Margerie
Mr. Bruce	

[Here follows a table of contents.]

Indochina [1]

1. M. SCHUMAN said that his Government was preparing a note on Indochina dealing with the present troop strength and casualties and containing a projection of plans and problems for 1952. Without going into details it was clear that it would be impossible for France to carry out the proposed effort in Indochina and to fulfill its obligations with respect to the defense of Europe. France planned to spend a billion francs a day in Indochina alone and faced many problems in obtaining a maximum effort there as it was engaged to do. As to the financial problem the Finance Ministers would be discussing it further. In brief, after July 1, 1952, the French would be unable to continue their effort at the present rate and would face a 150 billion franc deficit for the year. This deficit incidentally was included in the French estimate on the dollar gap. It was not suggested that the U.S. finance French policy directly but it was hoped that the U.S. could assist by arms and other troop supplies, especially in establishing the national armies of the Associated States. In this connection General de Lattre hoped to expand the present strength of 25 battalions to 50 battalions.

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[1] For documentation on U.S. interest in the question of Indochina, see vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 332 ff.

2. MR. ACHESON said that M. Mayer, French Finance Minister, had discussed this matter with General Marshall and had made a deep impression upon him. The need for a solution was generally recognized. There was general agreement on the principle as discussed during the talks with M. Pleven,[2] that France should continue to be primarily responsible for Indochina, that U.S. troops should not be used, and that first priority in military aid should go to Indochina. This difficult problem needed careful study, since funds directly available for Indochina under the present aid program were not sufficient. Both General Marshall and Mr. Foster of ECA were examining all possible ways to find other routes to reach the common goal. All that could be said now was that the importance of this problem was fully understood, that the question would be given urgent attention, and that the U.S. had the will—even if it were not sure as to the means—to assist in solving this problem. Perhaps General de Lattre would be able to make some helpful suggestions.

3. M. SCHUMAN said that Mr. Acheson's reply was cause for hope in the future. He recalled the first promise in May 1950 for aid to Indochina which has been effective and well used.[3] General de Lattre would develop more information on the long-term problem and relate it to the Singapore Conference. When he presented General de Lattre to Mr. Acheson personally on September 14 it might be possible to explore this problem further.

Germany

4. MR. ACHESON complimented the work of the Tripartite group discussing the Draft Instructions to the Allied High Commissioner and the Draft Agreement on General Relations with the Federal Republic (WFM T–5*a*, September 10, 1951 [4]), for although there remained important differences they had reached a broad area of agreement. He suggested that only those points of difference between the U.S. and France be discussed at this time since the document as a whole would be considered by the Tripartite meeting.

5. M. SCHUMAN joined in complimenting the group on its work and noted that there was no question of principle separating the two Governments. He was preoccupied with the need to give a large measure of satisfaction to the Federal Republic in order to help it resist opposition pressure. His only hesitation arose from the means in which the general objective could be obtained and agreed to consider various points at issue.

(*a*) With respect to security controls (pp. 5–6, WFM T–5*a*) M. SCHUMAN accepted the U.S. position providing agreement were

[2] For documentation on the Truman–Pleven talks, January 29–30, at Washington, see volume IV.

[3] Regarding this assurance, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1007 ff., and *ibid.*, vol. VI, pp. 812 ff.

[4] *Ante*, p. 1197.

reached on a European Defense Force and this plan became effective. MR. ACHESON replied that this was the premise on which the paper was based. If this community of effort were not realized the policy would have to be reexamined.

(*b*) On preservation of democracy (p. 9, WFM T–5*a*) and Article 7 of the Draft Agreement (p. 26, WFM T–5*a*) MR. ACHESON said that any agreement with the German Federal Republic was based on the premise that Germany had established a democratic regime and would maintain it. If this premise were violated all three powers would consult as to what they should do. He understood that the French Government desired to survey the activities of the Federal Republic in a more detailed fashion and to have the right to appeal to a tribunal if a specific infraction of democracy were discovered. He thought that this would involve the governments in too great a detail. M. SCHUMAN proposed that a unilateral declaration be made—possibly in the Preamble or by some other method—that if German democracy were overthrown the three powers would reconsider their own position. If this were done he would agree to the U.S. point of view. He wished to avoid the impression that all measures of the German Parliament would be surveyed or that there would be constant intervention. He would like to think the problem over until the next day but hoped to be able to reach an agreement on this basis. In a declaration, MR. ACHESON noted, the three Governments would wish to be tactful and to indicate the benefits that Germany and the free world would receive from such statement.

(*c*) As to logistical and financial support of Allied forces (p. 11, WFM T–5*a*) MR. ACHESON noted that each of the three Governments had different views. The problem arose from the fact that Germany was contributing approximately 6-½ billion DM during the coming year, while estimates indicated that 10 or perhaps 12 billion DM might be required. This amount was either close to or slightly above the level that Germany appeared able to bear. If in addition Germany contributed to its own armed defense then the load would be too great. It would be impossible to apply to Germany the formula existing in Austria, where the U.S. pays its own way while the U.K. and France do not. Congress would not agree to this policy. He did not see a solution to the problem but believed that it must be solved some way. M. SCHUMAN agreed that a solution could not be found today or tomorrow, and in any case it was a matter with which the Finance Ministers were primarily concerned. The difficulty lay in the fact that the Germans thought they were already paying too much, and when their own army was involved they would want to credit the sums assigned to them against their present payments. A sum must be determined for German contribution both to European defense and to support of Allied troops. He suggested that a working group of experts be established to determine an agreed sum both for German contribution to the European defense force and to the support of Allied troops. MR. ACHESON indicated his interest in this proposal.

(*d*) As to the proposed Article 5 of the Agreement on General Relations with the Federal Republic (p. 25, WFM T–5*a*) M. SCHUMAN raised the question of a guarantee to defend Berlin. He agreed in principle to guarantee the Federal Republic and had further agreed in New York, September 1950, that an attack upon Allied troops (including those in Berlin) would be considered an attack upon the North

Atlantic community. He doubted the wisdom of guaranteeing Berlin in an agreement with German Federal Republic. The Allies were in Berlin of their own right, while the Federal Republic did not have such a right. He thought it illogical and possibly dangerous to undertake a reciprocal agreement with the Federal Republic on this question. The Soviet Union which did not recognize the Federal Republic might react adversely. There was no difference among the three Governments as to Berlin, but he was reluctant to undertake such an engagement with the Federal Republic.

6. MR. ACHESON said he appreciated M. Schuman's point of view. He himself had doubts concerning the proposal, since the agreement might have to be placed before the Senate. There was no reciprocal element in this guarantee and it might impinge on certain provisions, especially Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. He had been thinking in the following direction: Perhaps the three Governments might make a special agreement or declaration reaffirming the New York declaration and stating that the change in status of Allied troops in Germany would have no effect on previous commitments. He was not in a position to lay this plan before the other two Governments in precise detail as yet. M. SCHUMAN indicated his approval of the proposal.

Italy [5]

7. MR. ACHESON said that he had received a proposal from the U.K. with respect to revision of the Italian Peace Treaty which he understood had also been handed to the French Government. The U.K. envisaged five steps:

(*a*) Agreement with Italy on terms of a note to request revision of the Italian Treaty.

(*b*) Tripartite Declaration indicating that the spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty should govern their relations with Italy.

(*c*) Note from Italian Government to include the following points: (1) in order to assure Italian self defense the military clauses of the treaty should be revised; (2) the general military clauses were no longer applicable; (3) the moral stigma of the Preamble should be removed; (4) the spirit of the U.N. Charter should govern it instead; and (5) Article 46 concerning military limitations should be revised since the Soviet Union had blocked U.N. action as provided by the treaty.

(*d*) After receipt of this note an interim reply followed by a period of possibly six to eight weeks, which would give time for Italy and Yugoslavia to settle their differences over Trieste and also for pressure to be exerted on other nations such as India, Ethiopia and Greece.

(*e*) Three powers reply that as far as bilateral relations with Italy were concerned they would no longer enforce the articles of the treaty mentioned above.

8. The U.K. proposal had the merit of avoiding notes to the Soviet Union and reference to NATO. In its general approach it accorded

[5] For further documentation on U.S. relations with Italy, including the proposal for revision of the Treaty of Peace, see volume IV.

with U.S. view that there should be no international treaty to revise the Italian treaty.

9. M. SCHUMAN indicated that as yet he had had no opportunity to study the note and his views were therefore preliminary. If this procedure involved notes to all the signatories, he questioned whether the Italian Government would wish to humiliate itself in that manner. Moreover, he had hoped to arrive at a declaration on this question, if not at Ottawa, at the NAC meeting in Rome. The British proposal seemed to be unnecessarily complicated and to dissipate the possible good effect upon Italian morale. Finally, if Trieste were tied into the revision, it was possible that the Italian Government might react against this and not act at all. At present, Italy and Yugoslavia were like a petrified dog and cat, each refusing to make a move.

10. MR. ACHESON replied that since a tripartite declaration would be issued as the second step, one of M. Schuman's objections would be overcome. Perhaps the agreement on the Italian note and the declaration could be executed quickly. He himself had queried the U.K. representatives as to whether or not they were making agreement on Trieste a condition to the treaty revision and was informed that this would not be the case, although it was hoped that the interval before the revision would assist in resolving the problem. M. SCHUMAN remarked that the three governments were dealing with an extremely sensitive people and that they should be very tactful. He promised to reflect on the matter further before the tripartite meeting.

Morocco [6]

11. Noting that the Resident-General in Morocco was directly under the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. SCHUMAN emphasized his direct interest and responsibility for Morocco. He had been concerned in early 1951 when he received a note from the U.S. to the effect that it would be difficult, or even impossible, to support France if the Moroccan question were raised before the U.N. He thought that it would be best to have a frank, friendly discussion before the Moroccan question became an issue of open debate. He would not, however, discuss the legal status of U.S. citizens in Morocco, since that question was presently before The Hague Tribunal and France would of course loyally adhere to any decision which was reached.

12. He was pleased to recognize and emphasize the important role that Marshall Plan aid had played in Morocco and to note that the relations between the Moroccans, the French and the Americans with respect to the military bases were very good.

13. He did not need to discuss in detail the content of the two memoranda of September 6 in which the French Government had set forth

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[6] For further documentation on the situation in Morocco and the U.S. position on the Moroccan question at the United Nations, see volume v.

its attitude with respect to communism and nationalism in Morocco and the political evolution of Morocco (WFM F–4/1, September 8, 1951 [7]). Instead he wished to describe present French policy which was opposite to the old colonial concept of the pre-1914 period. France would make a modern democratic state of Morocco. This was the purpose of the reforms of General Juin and of the new Resident-General, General Guillaume. The latter had received specific instructions to undertake additional reforms. France, however, could not impose these reforms but had to persuade the Sultan to accept them. Unfortunately the Sultan did not favor democracy, and since he was an absolute sovereign, he did not renounce his prerogatives easily. Moreover, the Berbers were also feudal and medieval in their point of view and were opposed to democracy. In addition, the European and Jewish colonies needed to be brought into a cohesive whole of Moroccan life. The Istiqlal, the anti-French opposition, was not interested in democracy and sought a representative assembly only in the hope of eliminating the French from Morocco. In undertaking necessary reorganization of the social structure, the reforms were directed to municipal improvement. They had evoked resistance but he hoped soon to get results.

14. In this policy France should not be isolated from the U.S. Neither the Sultan nor the Istiqlal should find a difference between the two countries. There was of course freedom for journalists to come to Morocco and freedom for Moroccans to travel abroad. Events of relative unimportance, such as a broadcast by Bourghiba from London, could be greatly exaggerated in Morocco. As to the communists in Morocco, they should not be confused with the nationalists. The two elements were entirely separate, but they could form a temporary alliance for their own purposes. Thus, the nationalists might try to use communist labor unions to create disorder.

15. As to the possibility that the Moroccan question might be placed before the U.N. by a member of the Arab League, M. Schuman asked the U.S. to discourage such action. Such a public discussion would not aid the situation in Morocco. Passions would be inflamed and it would be more difficult to make progress with the proposed reforms. At present there was no great difficulty in Morocco. General Guillaume was close to the Sultan and it was hoped that he would be able to influence him. If a debate did develop in the U.N., France and the U.S. should discuss their common attitude. At this point he had no specific ideas concerning exactly what should be done. France recognized its responsibility to lead Morocco forward toward independence in the French Union. This would be done in the same spirit as it had been done in Indochina. He appreciated the opportunity to explore this

[7] Not printed; it contained copies of the two French memoranda. (CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM British and French talks, memo)

problem which was of common strategic interest and in which the two countries had a common stake in an ordered, democratic regime.

16. MR. ACHESON said that the interests of France and the U.S. in Morocco were identical and that the two countries should work in close relationship. He appreciated the French assistance in making military facilities available. He would not want to hurt the position of France. He agreed that Morocco was not ready for independence and that it was the role of France to guide these people toward independence. In this effort he wished to be helpful. He also agreed that no useful purpose would be served by bringing the question before the U.N. and he would use such limited influence as he had to discourage such a step. He would study what had been said and would try to work out a common attitude if the question of Morocco came before the U.N. He observed that nationalist agitation merited careful consideration, as indeed the French were giving it, since such agitation was often used to direct attention away from local problems. He welcomed the offer of M. Schuman for further discussion of this question and thought perhaps this should be worked out.

Economic Situation

17. M. SCHUMAN said that as Foreign Minister he was naturally concerned with the general economic situation as it affected the North Atlantic Treaty effort. It was necessary to have an over-all view of the financial problem. Such a comprehensive survey had not yet been done, even though it was extremely important to make progress on the financial problem. He suggested that a high-level group be appointed to analyze the question and find a solution. The group might consist of four members: a U.S. chairman, a British and a French member, and a representative of the smaller countries. This study could not appropriately be made by the North Atlantic Council Deputies. These experts should of course have access to all data. He did not expect this action by Ottawa but hoped it could be done before the Rome meeting.

18. MR. ACHESON replied that this problem also preoccupied Mr. Gaitskell. It was hoped that a meeting could be arranged with French and British representatives, as well as representatives of other departments of the U.S. Government, to discuss this problem. It was generally agreed that such a meeting would be useful prior to the Ottawa session of the North Atlantic Council, and the afternoon of September 14 was considered a possible date.

Press

19. It was agreed that the press should be informed as to the participants of this meeting. It should be stated that the discussions were in preparation for the tripartite meeting tomorrow and included Indochina and Germany.

396.1-WA/9-1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] September 12, 1951.

Participants: M. Schuman, M. Alphand, M. Bonnet, Mr. Acheson, Ambassador Bruce, Mr. Perkins

The Secretary stated that he had asked for a small meeting because he had several questions he wanted to ask M. Schuman about the policies of the French Government. He referred to the draft Tripartite Declaration on European Integration which had been handed to Ambassador Bruce by M. Alphand [1] and to M. Schuman's letter of August 26 to him in which he had spoken of a real political community among the free states of Western Europe including West Germany.[2] He stated that he wondered, in view of these statements, whether or not the French Government had any specific plan in mind in connection with European political unity.

M. Schuman answered that he did have a plan. They felt that the Schuman Plan and the EDF Plan constituted the foundation of a structure, which, when complete, would make possible the erection of a roof over this foundation—the roof to be a real political set-up with wider powers than those contained in the two Plans and perhaps with membership which differed from that of either of the two Plans or the two Plans combined. He also stated that their Plan for action called for ratification of the Schuman Plan late this fall. It would

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[1] On September 10 Alphand had transmitted to Bruce a draft declaration on European integration which Schuman had asked be delivered to Secretary Acheson. Bruce's translation of the draft read as follows:

"The three Ministers of Foreign Affairs declare that the objective of the policy of their governments is the integration of a democratic Germany on a basis of equality into a continental European community within the framework of a constantly developing Atlantic community.

The three Ministers recognize that the initiatives taken by the French Government for the creation of a European community of coal and steel and of a European Defense Community constitute an essential contribution toward the progressive formation of a unified Europe. The establishment of these projects must be accelerated in every possible way, notably with a view to reinforcing the economy of Western Europe and to assure German participation in the common defense.

This participation will necessarily include the suppression of the present occupation statute and the establishment of a contractual regime between the three governments and the German Federal Republic.

The British Government, without fully participating in the continental community, hopes to establish a close association between this community and the United Kingdom.

The three Ministers reaffirm that this policy, which must be undertaken in common with the other free nations of Europe, has for its aim the establishment and the maintenance of a durable peace founded on justice and right. Their aim is to reinforce the security and the prosperity of Europe without altering in any manner the purely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." Memorandum by Bruce to Secretary Acheson, September 10 (740.5/9-1051).

[2] *Ante*, p. 1191.

take two actions by the Assembly—one in November, the second in December. They were also proposing to obtain from the Assembly at the same time as the first action on the Schuman Plan in November an endorsement of the principles of the EDF.

They further had in mind a declaration by the French Government on European political unity which might be made at about the time as the two November actions indicated above. Their thought was that such a declaration would help the passage of the other two actions in the Assembly.

M. Schuman was not specific as to exactly what the declaration would contain. He mentioned the possibility that the declaration would call for commencement of talks, perhaps in the Council of Europe or by other means not yet decided, to get on with political unity. He also referred to the result of the talks as a treaty.

He also indicated that the proposed tripartite declaration which M. Alphand had submitted was a preliminary step in connection with this action which they had in mind.

M. Schuman further said that within the last ten days both Prime Minister De Gasperi and Chancellor Adenauer had come to the French with similar suggestions and had indicated their agreement that European political unity was highly desirable and that initiative regarding it should be taken by the French.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, Secretary's briefing book

United States Delegation Minutes of the First Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Held at Washington, September 12, 1951, 10: 30 a. m.

SECRET

U.S.–Tri. Min–1

MEMBERS

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)
Mr. Morrison (U.K.)
M. Schuman (Fr.)

ALSO PRESENT

U.S.	U.K.	FRANCE
Mr. Jessup	Sir Oliver Franks	M. Bonnet
Admiral Wright	Sir Pierson Dixon	M. Alphand
Mr. Spofford		

[Here follows a table of contents.]

PRESS RELATIONS

1. MR. ACHESON noted that the impression had been received from the French press officer that the French delegation intended to brief

the press thoroughly on all events that occurred at the meetings. He wished to have a clear understanding about this so that completely frank and free discussion could exist at the meetings. MR. SCHUMAN said that it was not the intention of the French to brief the press. MR. MORRISON suggested that the three press officers get together at the close of each meeting and agree upon some minimum statement that could be made without embarrassment to the participants. MR. ACHESON and MR. SCHUMAN agreed to this procedure.

SURVEY OF PROGRESS IN POLICY OF CONTAINMENT OF SOVIET UNION AND ITS SATELLITES

2. MR. MORRISON said that he had suggested this topic merely to give the ministers an opportunity to survey the situation and the actions and policies which were intended to secure the peace of Europe and the world. The Western countries had sought to make clear to the Soviet Union that if it continued with its policy of aggression the West would resist. The West had succeeded at slowing down or perhaps stopping Soviet aggressive policies. This was true, particularly in Korea. There were, however, other points in the world in which danger still existed mainly the Middle East. The backward and difficult areas of the Middle East were strategically important to the southern perimeter of the Soviet Union.

3. MR. MORRISON suggested that there should be a joint study of this area where a gap exists in policies for effective containment of the Soviet Union. There might be a time when the containment policy is successful and forces of the free world approximate those of the Soviet Union and its satellites. When that point is reached it should be obvious that hostilities would be a danger to both sides; but another danger would arise from this situation, namely a period of tension which would exist both in the Communist world and in the free world caused by the fear that the other may precipitate the third world war. It was important that [no?] action should be taken which would inadvertently precipitate a third world war and, therefore, it was necessary to consider what policies might endanger peace. In this consideration it would be wise to keep in mind not only those acts which would likely precipitate a war but also that the free countries must not lose their nerve and should coolly calculate the policies necessary for Western security.

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5. MR. MORRISON said in summary the West must increase its military strength, its unity and means of consultation. The West must be ready for a real change of heart in the USSR but should make sure that such a change was made in good faith. MR. MORRISON reemphasized the need for constant consultation.[1]

6. MR. SCHUMAN said that he fully agreed with Mr. Morrison's statement and noted that the word "containment" contained no connotation of aggression but merely meant preventing one country from endangering the peace. All were happy that in Korea results had been obtained. These were mainly attributable to U.S. efforts. The French had at the same time been met with some success in Indochina also with containment in mind. If containment is the aim of Western policy then in Korea it must be made clear that the only aim is to secure the defense of the area and an armistice based on defense. The West must avoid giving the Soviets the idea that they were being encircled and that all their outlets cut off. This raised the question of how far the West should go to extend NATO and still remain faithful to the policy of defense. The West must measure its resources and not spread them too thinly in attempting to cover the geographic advantage of the Soviets. The West could not be equally strong in all points. In light of the astronomical expenditures being made for the defense of the West, Mr. Schuman wondered how far it was possible to go without seriously hurting Western economies. Defensive forces must be placed where they would do the most good, but the West should not give the impression to the Soviet Bloc, to other countries, or even to elements in the three countries that aggression was intended. It was for this reason that Western Germany had not been given an army which could unify all Germany by force. At the same time we must not show fear or disunity. France had always maintained that it was necessary to consult not only through diplomatic channels but through high level groups in order to agree upon what resources are available and how they might be used. Such consultation would also assist in the formulation of the global strategy of the West.

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[1] For documentation on the Soviet Union, see volume IV.

7. Mr. Acheson said that advances had been made in the policy of containment in Europe and indeed the Soviets had lost ground in Yugoslavia. If the West continued to build its strength without undermining its economies, it could succeed. The U.S. was in agreement that provocative actions should be avoided. The West must continually watch for ways in which the Soviets might try to slow down the progress of the free world or to divide the countries from each other. Looking to the Near East and Far East both problems were disturbing and Mr. Acheson agreed to a combined study on the Middle East and Far East. He mentioned the great troubles existing in Iran with the Arabs, with Egypt, with Pakistan and India. He believed that the Soviets would not be wise to resort to aggression in the Middle East since they had enough allies in the form of troubles without the risk of aggression. Those making a combined study of the Middle East would find complex problems. No extensive forces were available in those areas and Western economies were already strained to achieve present goals. The study should answer two major questions:

(*a*) What measures must the West take so that Western countries would not be identified as opponents of nationalism?

(*b*) What must be done to place in constructive channels those forces started by Western countries which were ripe for extreme nationalistic or communistic agitation. In the Far East almost the entire area was at war and these hostilities were created and kept alive by the Soviet Union.

Mr. Schuman had talked with Mr. Acheson with regard to Indochina and Mr. Morrison had talked about Malaya and the efforts being made in both of these areas by France and Great Britain.[2] The strain on both U.S. manpower and material resources caused by the Korean war might slow U.S. efforts to accomplish the MTDP. At present it seemed that the only way to solve the problems in the Far East was by military action, although if other solutions could be presented they would be most welcome.

Action:

All three ministers agreed to a combined study on the Middle East and Far East.

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[2] For a record of Schuman's discussion with Acheson on Indochina, see U.S.–Fr. Min–1, p. 1249; regarding Morrison's discussion with Acheson on Malaya, see U.S.–U.K. Min–2, Item 13, p. 1243.

Atlantic and Mediterranean Commands [3]

8. Admiral Wright, at the suggestion of Mr. Acheson, reported to the ministers on the progress of the Standing Group on this problem. Admiral Wright briefly mentioned the origin of this question at Brussels and noted that it was still pending before the NAT Deputies. On the recommendations of General Eisenhower a command of the south flank was established to take charge of the land campaign and to establish a line of communications. This had to be done in cooperation with all countries in the area. When General Eisenhower made his proposals, he recognized that the relationship of Greece and Turkey to the NAT had not been established. The Deputies had asked the Study Group to answer 14 questions to increase their understanding and to advise the Deputies how Greece and Turkey might be admitted to NATO. A detailed study was prepared by the Standing Group which was made more difficult since NAT countries had differing ideas on the admission of Greece and Turkey if admitted what their relation to the Organization should be. The Standing Group believed that a Unified Military Command in the Middle East must be established particularly to provide for the participation of Turkey. As a starting point, it was believed that Greece being more closely related to Europe should be under General Eisenhower's command rather than the Middle East Command. Turkey being primarily a Middle Eastern country should be a part of the Middle Eastern Command. The Standing Group was conscious of the fact some of the NAT countries would not wish to be connected with a command over territory beyond the North Atlantic Community, nor should such a command be concerned with matters not pertaining to the Middle Eastern area. Thus, the Middle Eastern Commander must be responsible to NATO on matters concerning Europe but must be responsible to another body concerning the territories. The report of the Standing Group also provided means by which the Middle East Command would be coordinated with General Eisenhower's command.

9. Mr. Schuman said that he saw the difficulty of bringing together military and political questions under this command. First it was necessary to have a new command since the forces would be largely

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[3] For further documentation on the question of Atlantic and Mediterranean Commands in NATO, see pp. 460 ff.

Turkish. In the second place, however, it would appear necessary for political questions to be handled by a political structure other than NATO and as yet unknown.

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CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, Secretary's briefing book

United States Delegation Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Held at Washington, September 12, 1951, 3:00 p.m.

SECRET

Tripartite Min–2

MEMBERS

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)
Mr. Morrison (U.K.)
M. Schuman (Fr.)

ALSO PRESENT

U.S.	U.K.	FRANCE
Mr. Jessup	Sir Oliver Franks	M. Bonnet
Admiral Wright	Sir Pierson Dixon	M. Alphand
Mr. Spofford		

[Here follows a table of contents.]

Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Middle East Commands

1. MR. ACHESON, noting that "many questions could be decided which could not be answered", turned to certain points raised by Mr. Schuman during the previous session. As to a political authority over a Middle East Command, it was hoped to obtain military cooperation without the political commitments and hence there would be no superior political body. This was a somewhat theoretical matter, however, for in practice the military committee would get its direction from the NATO governments, which would give informal if not public guidance.

2. MR. SCHUMAN wished to dispel a possible misunderstanding. He saw no advantage and in fact some real difficulty if the Middle East Command were included in NATO. While he would vote for the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, he wished to raise certain problems which would result from this action. He recognized that the

Standing Group had done its best to resolve the various problems. He would recommend to his Government, which was not yet aware of the plan, that it accept the Standing Group's proposals. However, he wished to state two reservations: (*a*) The Middle East Command should be autonomous and outside of NATO and should be an integrated command. In view of French traditional interest in the Middle East, especially in Syria and Lebanon, France should be accorded an appropriate place in the command and be given the position of Assistant Commander in Chief. (*b*) He recognized that there would be an Eastern Mediterranean Command headed by a British admiral to support the Middle East Command. In the Western Mediterranean, where France has special relations with Africa, and across which reserves must come to support the defense of Europe, France had the duty and right to request that a French admiral be in command. As to Mr. Acheson's comment on the political direction for Middle East Command, he read between the lines a possible solution. However, the situation was not yet entirely clear in view of the need for a unified policy in the Middle East.

3. As an additional question MR. SCHUMAN asked what the Standing Group planned to do with respect to the Straits, would they be under SHAPE, the Middle East Command or both? ADMIRAL WRIGHT replied that the Standing Group recognized the critical and strategic importance of the Straits and the fact that they were located near the dividing line between the southern flank of the European Command and the Middle East. In all probability defense of the area would involve Turkish ground troops and air and naval units from General Eisenhower's command. The various commanders concerned with the Straits would act under mutually agreed plans which had been approved by a NATO authority.

4. As to the views of the Standing Group with respect to the Western Mediterranean Command, ADMIRAL WRIGHT said that there were many factors involved. General Eisenhower recognized the special position of French naval forces in the Western Mediterranean and their responsibility for lines of communication between North Africa and southern Europe. Yet the Western Mediterranean was a confined naval area in which there would be a number of other combat operations. The French Commander would work with and be under General Eisenhower's Chief of Command for the southern area, Admiral Carney.

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5. MR. SCHUMAN replied that Admiral Wright's comments appeared to be somewhat different from those in the Standing Group's paper on the Mediterranean Command.[1] He understood that under SHAPE there would be several commands of which one of the most important would be for the Western Mediterranean. It appeared that this would be a geographic command rather than a merely functional one for the transport of troops.

6. ADMIRAL WRIGHT commented that the naval forces in the Mediterranean would have two tasks, to support SHAPE in Europe and to support the Middle East Command. In the Western Mediterranean the naval command structure would have to be of a nature to carry out functional tasks of transport across the Mediterranean, which was one of the most important lines of communication to Western Europe. The special interests of France in this area were recognized, but all the details have not yet been worked out.

7. MR. ACHESON said that he understood that a naval command was to be established in the Western Mediterranean under the command of a Supreme Commander, and that the French Government was interested in having a French admiral in this position.

8. MR. SCHUMAN was of the opinion that when his Government considered the entire problem, including the Middle East Command, it would be influenced by the command situation in the Western Mediterranean. The present explanation was not sufficiently clear to permit an immediately favorable decision. In making his own point of view precise, he repeated that he would ask his Government to accept the proposals of the Standing Group provided: (1) That it was clearly understood that the Middle East Command would be an integrated command and that an adequate position in the command would be given to France, including the position of an Assistant Commander in Chief. (2) That the Western Mediterranean Command would be so regulated as to reserve the command position to a French admiral and that his responsibilities would be similar to those of the U.K. admiral in the Eastern Mediterranean Command. Whether the French commander went directly to Eisenhower or through an intermediary such as Admiral Carney was not as important as some other elements of the problem. Moreover, in defining the area over which the French admiral would command he considered it to be between the coast of North Africa and France and between the coast of Spain and Sardinia. The command would not include the waters around Italy or the Adriatic. MR. SCHUMAN asked his colleagues to recognize that in reaching a governmental decision technical questions were not the exclusive considerations.

9. MR. ACHESON said that as to the first point it would be immediately taken under consideration and that while no answer could

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[1] Presumably Schuman is referring to SG 80/4, dated August 22, p. 575.

be given at the moment, the proposal appeared reasonable. As to the second point, while the Standing Group's paper dealt with two commands, one in the Middle East and one in Europe, Mr. Schuman appeared to propose a third area command. This obviously presented difficulties. Moreover, on appointments General Eisenhower would have to be consulted. ADMIRAL WRIGHT commented that the prime task in the Western Mediterranean was to support General Eisenhower. There would be many kinds of forces in the area, anti-submarine, carrier forces, convoys, et cetera. The military operations would be under the southern flank commander. The French navy would have important responsibilities but other units would be involved. It, therefore, appeared desirable to have a functional rather than an area commander. MR. ACHESON suggested that these questions needed further study, perhaps by the Standing Group representatives here at this meeting.

10. MR. MORRISON hoped that there would be no delay in reaching agreement on the proposals in the Standing Group. He was not entirely sure that the Western Mediterranean problem depended upon the Middle East Command. At the same time he recognized a relationship between the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic Command problems. It would be desirable if all of these problems could be cleared up during these talks.

11. In MR. SCHUMAN's opinion one could not disassociate the various phases of the problem. The commands in the Western Mediterranean and the Middle East were related, as well as in the Atlantic. These were all related to the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO, although at the same time they went beyond the Greek and Turkish question. He regretted the differences but they were due to the situation. MR. MORRISON suggested that further informal conversations at this meeting might bring progress and assist Mr. Schuman's communication to the French Government.

12. MR. SCHUMAN asked whether or not Turkey was in accord with the proposals on the Middle East Command. MR. MORRISON replied that on July 3 Turkey recognized that the defense of the Middle East was a key to the defense of Europe and that if Turkish security were assured it would assume its full responsibilities along with the U.S., U.K. and France in such a defense organization. On July 20 the Turkish Foreign Minister declared that if it joined the NATO it would enter into negotiations to play an effective role in the Middle East. At Strasbourg on August 2 the Foreign Minister stated that Turkey would make no difficulties in cooperation once admission to NATO was arranged.

13. MR. ACHESON noted that there was no thought of imposing a decision on Turkey but hoped that the three Ministers could reach an agreed position on which to negotiate with Turkey. While it ap-

peared that the Ministers had done as much as they could now, he hoped that the matter could be dealt with urgently.

14. MR. SCHUMAN said that he was not quite clear concerning the urgent need for a position with respect to the Middle East Command since negotiations with Turkey would not be taken until later. What should be decided first was the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO. On this the Ministers agreed. The constitution of the various commands, however, could be kept separate.

15. MR. MORRISON replied that the Middle East Command was relevant to admission to Greece and Turkey and would be a factor at Ottawa in persuading some of the more reluctant countries to agree to admit these two countries. He was glad that Mr. Schuman had said that the two questions should not be confused and that there appeared to be no difference of principle with respect to the Middle East Command. In his opinion the Western Mediterranean Command question was separate and though urgent was not as urgent as the others, and he hoped that the French could come to an agreement on the Middle East Command urgently.

16. MR. SCHUMAN replied that he did not see how the organization of the Middle East Command would affect potential opponents to the admission of Greece and Turkey, since it was well known that the Scandinavian countries, who had little interest in the Middle East, were the most reluctant. As to the command organizations, they should not be established piecemeal. Otherwise, there would be various commands in the Mediterranean and the situation would be unclear. An attempt should be made to settle the whole problem and if the Ministers were successful it would greatly facilitate his own position.

17. MR. ACHESON recognized the urgency of the problem, saying that plans must be moved ahead to discuss the command with the Turks or they would misunderstand. Moreover, since the situation in Egypt was getting no better, urgent security reasons dictated rapid action.

18. MR. MORRISON hoped that he had not been misunderstood earlier in the meeting for he did not wish to imply that the question of a Western Mediterranean Command was not urgent for the French. He recognized that it was. It was also urgent to reach agreement on the Middle East Command before Ottawa. He was working in the confident hope that the questions raised by Mr. Schuman could be satisfactorily answered.

19. MR. SCHUMAN repeated that his Government and Parliament must have a debate before passing the law to invite Greece and Turkey to join NATO. Under the pressure of debate it would be difficult to get agreement on the matter unless his questions were solved. He could not engage himself, his Government or Parliament beyond that. MR. MORRISON appreciated the problem faced by parliamentary dis-

cussion but hoped that the Ministers would be in a position to make the recommendation at Ottawa for the admission of these two countries. Ratification of their admission was a separate matter from Middle East and Western Mediterranean Commands. MR. SCHUMAN rejoined that in parliamentary debate the question of the Mediterranean Command would inevitably come up and the failure to solve it might risk the ratification vote on Greece and Turkey. MR. MORRISON hoped that Mr. Schuman would accept the Standing Group recommendations and the Ministers were trying to solve the problems he faces. MR. SCHUMAN promised to do his best and to take into account the statement of Mr. Morrison.

20. MR. MORRISON noted that there appeared to be no real difficulty as far as the French were concerned in the Middle East Command itself. He asked if the Ministers could agree on the timetable proposed by the Standing Group as follows:

(*a*) Agreement in Washington on the Middle East Command.
(*b*) Agreement at Ottawa to invite Greece and Turkey to join NATO subject to constitutional and procedural questions.
(*c*) Decision to advise Greece and Turkey of this action.
(*d*) Provision of full information to Turkey with respect to the Middle East Command through diplomatic channels so that Turkey might approach Egypt.

21. MR SCHUMAN replied that he could not give a definite answer as to the first step; however, he would try to obtain his Government's approval with the reservations stated above. As to the second and third points he saw no difficulty. The fourth point concerning Egypt, however, raised a new problem on which he could not yet take a position since he lacked instructions, noting that he had only been informed of this proposal on September 8. Such action possibly involved a new extension of defenses and he required more information.

22. MR. MORRISON regretted Mr. Schuman had not had earlier information. He noted that the best facilities for such a Middle East Command were found in Egypt. At the same time discussions in Cairo had been going on concerning radical revision of the 1936 Treaty which gave Britain use of these facilities. If the Command headquarters could be made interallied (U.S., U.K., France, Turkey and Egypt) and located in Egypt, it might solve the Egyptian problem. He remarked that the Egyptian Foreign Minister was somewhat impatient and he would like to make him happy.

23. MR. SCHUMAN recognized the great importance of the matter to the United Kingdom and he would ask urgently for further instructions.

Admission of Greece and Turkey

24. MR. ACHESON brought to the attention of the meeting the paper containing a draft agreement and protocol to be used in connection

with the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO. He noted that this paper, which proposed certain procedural steps, had been delivered to his French and British colleagues that morning and that it had not yet been fully studied.[2] It was agreed to discuss this matter the next day.

[2] The documents under reference here were distributed as WFM T–5/2*a* and T–5/3*a* and were subsequently combined into Tripartite D–4, September 13, p. 1301. There is no record of any further discussion of these documents by the Foreign Ministers at Washington.

396.1–WA/9–1351

United States Delegation Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Held at Washington, September 12, 1951, 9:30 a. m.

SECRET

Tripartite Min–3

MEMBERS

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)
Mr. Morrison (U.K.)
M. Schuman (Fr.)

ALSO PRESENT

U.S.	U.K.	FRANCE
Mr. Jessup	Sir Oliver Franks	M. Bonnet
Mr. McCloy	Sir Pierson Dixon	M. Francois-Poncet
	Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick	

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European Defense Force and Problem of German Participation

1. By way of preliminary, MR. ACHESON raised three procedural points with respect to the meetings. He noted the need for a communiqué and, after discussion with his colleagues, indicated that Mr. Bohlen, U.S., Mr. Ridsdale, U.K. and M. de Margerie, France, would prepare an appropriate draft. He also noted that M. Schuman had suggested a Tripartite Declaration and it was decided to ask Mr. MacArthur (U.S.), Mr. Rose (U.K.) and a French representative to consider this problem. Because of difficulties of scheduling on Friday, it was necessary to change the previous plans and tentatively set the meeting for discussion of economic questions at 9:30 a. m. While MR. MORRISON had no objection to a working group on a tripartite declaration, he had some doubts, primarily for domestic political reasons as to the wisdom of issuing such a declaration at this time. It might be

possible for such a declaration to be made part of the general communiqué.

2. Turning to the European Defense Force and Germany's contribution thereto, MR. ACHESON said there were two related problems: the way the Ministers should discuss this matter here, and their attitude at Ottawa. It would be unfortunate to debate this question extensively at Ottawa. Each of the three governments, however, might deal generally with an aspect of the question. Thus, M. Schuman might talk on the European defense force developments, while Mr. Morrison and he might deal with the Bonn talks on German military contribution and contractual relations. He thought that the three should indicate their general agreement but should not go into details at that time. This approach was tentatively accepted by the three Ministers.

3. M. SCHUMAN said he would not go into technicalities in discussing the interim report of the Paris Conference on the European army [1] but noted that not only France but Prime Minister de Gasperi of Italy and Dr. Hallstein, representing Chancellor Adenauer, likewise supported the project. He envisaged certain problems, of which the following were most important.

(*a*) In dealing with the question of how to make the transition from national armies to the European defense force, France agreed that all of its forces which would be available in Europe or North Africa to NATO should immediately be put into the European army. These forces would not, of course, include troops necessary for defense of overseas possessions. France made this considerable sacrifice in order to meet the German desire for equality. At the same time Germany would refrain from developing a national army and would put its troops, even during the transitional phase, into the European defense force. The first soldier recruited in Germany would be recruited for the European army.

(*b*) He was naturally preoccupied with the problem of when the first recruitment of these effectives could take place. In order to proceed as rapidly as possible, it was desirable to have a simplified mechanism. He did not require that all the political and supervisory institutions be fully functioning before the army could be made effective. The question needed further study to see if existing organizations, such as SHAPE and other command organizations, could not be used temporarily.

(*c*) As to the question of the size of national units, he noted that a year ago this matter had assumed great importance. Now with a sound structure envisaged, the size of units was less important, since with a sound super-structure there would be less concern over this problem. The French Government was willing to accept SHAPE's recommendations in this connection.

(*d*) In order that the European army should be free from the danger of being used for purely national designs, it was necessary that the

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[1] For extracts from the Interim Report of the European Army Conference, July 24, see p. 843.

army have an integrated command and staff and an autonomous administrative organization. This point of view was accepted with respect to the French units under NATO, as well as for other units.

(*e*) Finally certain additional military, legal and financial questions needed to be solved in order to put this project into effect.

4. For the information of his colleagues, M. SCHUMAN said that the French Government proposed to have a Parlimentary debate in November on the European defense force in order to get the necessary affirmative support even before the plan was finally completed.

5. MR. ACHESON said the U.S. policy could be stated briefly and simply. After studying the concept of the European Defense Force carefully, he was convinced that it was the best method to solve a number of major problems relating to the defense of Western Europe, such as the integration of Germany into Europe and the securing of German contribution to European defense. While there had been some question as to the practicability of the plan, General Eisenhower was convinced that it could work. M. Schuman's assurance that a way would be found to work out the technical problems with SHAPE was most helpful. The U.S. therefore gave vigorous enthusiastic and full support to the plan. There would be no turning back and no doubts. At the same time this attitude was consistent with the view that if after all possible effort had been made the project was not feasible, then it would be necessary to review the policy and see what else could be done. Such a step was not being considered now. The U.S. favored the French plan not only as a forward step in the development of the moral and material strength in Europe, but not least of all because it was advocated by M. Schuman himself. What had been said about not developing all the institutions envisaged by the interim report was very important for such action would take some time. By using existing institutions the decision could be worked out in a relatively definite period of time.

6. MR. MORRISON said that his Government was disposed to favor the European defense force plan. As was perhaps typically British, however, his Government disliked approving general principles until they had been spelled out in practical details and, therefore, he hoped that a number of arrangements could be worked out before the Rome meeting of NATO. To assist in this matter, he proposed to send high level military representatives to Paris and hoped that General Eisenhower would be adequately represented since his thinking in this matter was extremely important. There were additional questions, such as how to keep adequate three-power control over forces in Germany and he hoped to continue private discussions among the three powers to that end. He also hoped that his colleagues would accept the principle

that allocation of arms to NATO countries would continue to have priority over allocations to German forces. He thought at an appropriate time perhaps it might be well to give the Petersberg report on the Bonn discussions [2] to other NATO countries for if broad information were given out in the near future it would be easier later on. As M. Schuman would appreciate, the British Government had changed its position appreciably during the past year towards favoring the European defense force. With respect to the matter discussed earlier, that of Egypt and the Middle East Command, he hoped that France would do its best to follow sympathetically the British problems and point of view. The three governments need to be strong everywhere and such a development in the Middle East would aid the common cause.

7. M. SCHUMAN thanked Mr. Morrison for his sympathetic views with respect to the French effort to solve the European defense problem and Germany's contribution. He appreciated the sending of high level officers to the conference and noted that General Eisenhower would be well represented. There was some merit in making the Bonn report available, providing it was clearly indicated to be out of date. He hoped to be able to move towards the British point of view on Egypt.

8. MR. ACHESON agreed with his colleagues as to the importance of General Eisenhower's views and said that any plan envisaged must be workable in his eyes. As to release of the Bonn report, he expressed doubts as to releasing a document which might fix attention to problems which no longer existed and might therefore cause difficulties. He suggested that the three High Commissioners discuss this matter and report to the meeting tomorrow. If they and his colleagues desired to release it, he would not object.

9. M. SCHUMAN said he had possibly misunderstood the proposal, since he thought that the Bonn report in any case would not be released until Rome and then only as part of more general documentation. He did not think that it should be put before the Council at Ottawa.

10. As to Mr. Morrison's point on the priority of arms allocation to NATO countries, MR. ACHESON did not think it was a problem but he nevertheless wished to make clear that the present system of priorities would not change. Korea naturally received first priority; Indochina was next. Germany would not be put into a special position, although, of course, training equipment would be a problem to be worked out. Other areas would be treated as they were today.

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[2] Regarding the Technical Report on the discussions at Bonn concerning a German contribution to Western defense, see the letter from the High Commissioners to their Governments, June 8, p. 1044, and footnote 2 thereto.

396.1–WA/9–1351

United States Delegation Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Held at Washington, September 13, 1951, 10: 00 a. m.[1]

SECRET

Tripartite Min–4

MEMBERS

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)
Mr. Morrison (U.K.)
M. Schuman (Fr.)

ALSO PRESENT

U.S.	U.K.	FRANCE
Mr. Jessup	Sir Oliver Franks	M. Bonnet
Mr. McCloy	Sir Pierson Dixon	M. Francois-Poncet
	Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick	

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CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT FOR GERMANY

DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO THE ALLIED HIGH COMMISSION

MR. ACHESON said a paper had been prepared on this subject in which the differences between the three Ministers were set forth in brackets (WFM T–5*a*, September 10 [2]).

MR. MORRISON said the British originally had reservations on paragraph number four of the "Instructions" regarding the statement that "the basic assumption on which the Ministers have acted is that fulfillment of these conditions will promptly be achieved through the proposed EDF, etc.," but that they now felt they could agree providing the word "promptly" could be removed from the sentence. British public opinion was split regarding German rearmament with some elements favoring a German force in some form, others totally opposed to German rearmament, and a third group which felt that a European army was the best way of utilizing the Germans. He wished to make clear that Britain did not wish to delay a German contribution but he did not want to cause needless complications at home by suggesting that Britain was pushing German participation in EDF. MR. ACHESON said that although he was not too concerned regarding wording, he felt it was essential that the EDF be developed without delay. MR. SCHUMAN said that the question of wording was not too important to him and it was agreed that the word "promptly" would

[1] In the source text these minutes are mistakenly identified as "Minutes of the Third Meeting."

[2] *Ante*, p. 1197.

be deleted and the words "without delay" inserted before the phrase "through the proposed EDF."

SECURITY CONTROLS

MR. SCHUMAN said the French Government agreed with the suggested US–UK wording with the exception of paragraph (ii) of the text. It was necessary to define the prohibitions and limitations which were referred to in the Brussels agreement. The language of that agreement was frequently vague and it was necessary to set forth explicitly what types of heavy equipment Germany would not be allowed to make. The same was true for light weapons. Study by military experts from one of the Allied organizations was necessary. He submitted a substitute paragraph which the French believed should be inserted into the "Instructions" reading "The Brussels text should be defined as required as quickly as possible and in any event before the Rome conference through discussion at the governmental level." This was accepted by the US and UK. It was agreed that these experts should work in cooperation with the High Commissioners who are in touch with the German situation, but it was understood that the experts will have to carry the burden and merely consult with the High Commissioners. MR. MORRISON felt that there was advantage in an elastic situation which would allow consultation between the experts and the Allied governments. MR. ACHESON indicated that this was provided for in the first paragraph.

PRESERVATION OF DEMOCRACY

MR. SCHUMAN said he was willing to accept the US–UK proposals on this subject (paragraph 9 "Instructions"). MR. MORRISON said that he was concerned regarding the clear right of the Allies to intervene if a situation developed in Germany which they did not like. He wanted the Three Powers to be free to move in if any menace to the democratic regime developed, and was not sure that that right existed. He recalled what had happened to the Weimar Republic and said that although the right to intervene might be included in the present text he was not certain. MR. SCHUMAN said he thought the answer could be found in the annexed draft treaty ("Agreement on General Relations with the Federal Republic")—Article VII—where it is stated that if the security of the Allied armed forces is endangered the Allies can assert their authority. MR. ACHESON agreed that it was necessary to be in a position to meet quickly and vigorously any disruption of public or constitutional order. There would be included in the Preamble to the "Agreement" a statement that the contractual arrangement was premised on maintenance of constitutional order. MR. MORRISON said he was satisfied. MR. ACHESON added that we might keep in mind the principle that the high commissioners should make a declaration of political principles at the time the contractual rela-

tionship went into effect, making clear what the Allies meant—no return to totalitarian Government. Mr. Acheson raised a point regarding the inclusion of the words "grave threat" in this paragraph in referring to constitutional order, and wondered if it should not be confined to refer only to public order. Mr. Morrison said that historically it was not only the question of public order that caused the difficulties. Constitutional processes could lead to disruption of constitutional order. If someone was about to be appointed to a high office, who, in the opinion of the Allies, constituted such a threat the Allies might wish to intervene. He recalled that Hitler was appointed Chancellor by a German council. He believed, however, that the Allies should use discretion in exercising their powers in such a case. Mr. Schuman said he was inclined to agree with Morrison and felt the power to intervene in case of a "threat" to constitutional order should certainly be retained but used only if otherwise unavoidable and after warning to the Germans. Mr. Acheson indicated that the US was willing to accept the position of France and the UK with the proviso that there really must be a grave threat before it would be made operative. If Remer [*Reimann*?] picked up five or six additional Parliamentary seats this would hardly constitute a threat. Mr. Morrison said he did not disagree with the spirit of what Mr. Acheson had said and pointed out that the Three Powers must confer if they believed any such threat existed.

With regard to paragraph 3 of Article VII, of the draft "Agreement" Mr. Acheson said that, as written, this paragraph did not have any meaning. He suggested deleting a portion of the sentence, leaving it to read "This authority may also be employed to declare a state of emergency on the request of the Federal Republic." This was agreed.

ALLIED EMERGENCY POWERS

Mr. Morrison referred to the wording of the first sentence of the first paragraph under this heading and said that he did not like the idea of civilian authority being subordinate to the military as a matter of constitutional doctrine. As written, the text would require the Council of Ambassadors to receive the agreement of the appropriate Allied military authorities before they could exercise Allied powers in an emergency. He naturally presupposed an amicable understanding between the civilian and military authorities in reaching any such decision. Mr. Schuman said that he could not possibly expect the Chamber of Deputies to accept a treaty relationship with Germany under which the Government of France must obtain the approval of its own military before taking emergency action in Germany. It was agreed to delete the entire first sentence in this paragraph, dropping all references to the requirement of agreement by the military authorities.

LOGISTICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF THE ALLIED FORCES

MR. ACHESON said in relating this subject (paragraph 12, "Instructions") to the question of occupation costs and the problem of financing Germany's future contribution to the EDF, it was necessary to find a procedure which would enable the Allies to arrive at the necessary answers at an early date. If, as was estimated, Germany next year reached the limit of the resources it could devote to military purposes—approximately 12 billion Deutschmarks—in meeting the costs of the occupation forces, the problem remained of how Germany could finance its contribution to the EDF. British High Commissioner KIRKPATRICK said he thought the question was whether the Allies should commit themselves now to a formula which might allow the Germans to refuse. He felt this action should be left open for later consideration in order to avoid that possibility. MR. ACHESON said that we might have to have a group of experts study the problem but we must eventually face it. We might put it off for a while but it was not possible to avoid it in the long run. If all Germany's resources which could be utilized for a military effort were engaged in supporting merely the occupation forces and if they therefore were unable to support a contribution to the European Defense Forces then the Allied powers had gone through much lost motion in all the recent programs designed to enlist German participation in the defense of Europe and thereby build up the defensive capacity of that area. The US could not carry out the principle on which it was now operating in Austria—i.e. pay our own occupation costs—and obtain in addition, the tremendous sums required to carry out the total defense effort. This matter was one of great political importance in Germany because they would not move on other problems until they knew what the answer would be to this one. He thought it desirable to take certain portions of the present text and utilize them for giving such direction to the High Commissioners as was now possible. MR. MORRISON said that Britain was worried about the possibility that the Germans would squeeze the Allies to pay expenditures which they should be carrying for themselves. He said that this had occurred several times in German history and that he thought the Allies must be very careful to ensure that it did not happen again. He recently had conversations with both the German and Austrian Chancellors and had listened to their sad tales regarding operation costs. He had, however, told them flatly that they required defense; that Britain was paying for its own defense, that the defense which Germany and Austria now had happened to be the forces of the Allies and that they were obligated to pay for it. He proposed to continue to be "flat" with the Germans and said that when they produce forces for the EDF, and if they asked for an adjustment then, maybe the Allies should make such an adjustment. Britain was carrying a big burden and could not carry an additional one. The

Allies must be very careful that the Germans did not exploit them. MR. SCHUMAN said that the Germans were always harping on the theme of equality. It was a logical consequence then that they should carry an equal burden. The Germans should be treated the same as other NATO countries. He said that discussions which would occur shortly would establish a schedule of what would be expected from all countries in terms of a percentage of national income. Since the German and French national incomes were almost equal then the Germans should spend as much as the French, including the latter expenditures in Indo-China and elsewhere overseas. The second part of the problem was how this German contribution should be distributed. The French point of view was that the German contribution to the EDF should be no larger than that of the French and that the difference between this figure and the total French expenditure for military activities would then be available to the Germans to pay for occupation costs. He believed the British position was that the Germans should pay the occupation costs and that amount should then be subtracted from the total available and the balance utilized as the German contribution to EDF. He believed the US viewpoint was to pool the amount the Germans paid for occupation costs plus that which she gives to EDF and that this total would be determined by the limit of Germany's ability to pay. Presumably, the balance would have to be paid by the Allies. He proposed a compromise under which the German direct contribution to EDF should in no case be greater than that of France. Germany then could not exaggerate its position and the balance would be available for occupation costs. MR. MORRISON said he was very apprehensive about any formula tying the German contribution to that of a particular country. If a French Government came into power which cut expenditures in half then the Germans could cut their contributions to that level. Also, the proposal could act the other way if the French contribution were increased substantially, which might allow Germany to arm to a point beyond that desired by the Allies. The Germans should continue to meet the occupation costs and when a German contribution to EDF comes along then the Germans can argue about occupation costs. He doubted that the group could arrive at a formula now and thought that the High Commissioners must continue to discuss the matter with the Germans as we go along. He repeated his admonition that we must be careful. For these reasons he preferred the UK draft as stated in the last paragraph on page 12 wherein the requirement that Germany should make a total contribution to defense comparable in scale to that being made by other leading Western powers was stated in general terms. He said the possibility existed that the staffs of the Three Ministers could have another look at the UK proposal and submit a new draft, but that in

any case he did not desire to attempt to arrive at a definite formula during the course of these meetings.

MR. ACHESON suggested that the Ministers not try to reach a formula at this juncture. He thought that the problem should be transmitted to a working group and emphasized that this group should use certain elements of agreement which existed as a basis for its deliberation. These included agreement that the German contribution will be subject to a contractual arrangement and that the Germans must pay their full share based on the same criteria which is applied to other NATO countries. The question which remained was how that share would be apportioned between occupation costs and Germany's contribution to EDF. He agreed that the Allies must be firm with the Germans and that undoubtedly they would try to squirm on the problem. Although we are disinclined to face the problem right now, we must look forward to facing this problem in the near future since it was essential to get on with a German contribution to EDF. The question had to be faced in December or at least in the first part of the new year. It was agreed that representatives of the Three Governments should meet soon to prepare their recommendations, although no definite date was set. MR. SCHUMAN said he wished to reaffirm the principle of equal burden and that it was understood in the case of France the whole military burden included the French effort in Indo-China and elsewhere overseas. MR. ACHESON and MR. MORRISON indicated agreement.

SECURITY OF THE ALLIED FORCES

MR. MORRISON said that the UK had previously had some reservation on the question of court jurisdiction (paragraph 13, "Instructions"). The Allies might be sorry if they got mixed up in too many cases and there was considerable to be said for "coming clean" and getting out with regard to this function. On the other hand, he recognized that if German courts prosecuted and convicted British soldiers the UK public would resent it. He said he was willing to agree to the US-French proposal but trusted that the allies would be restrained in their execution of this function.

The question of when the Ministers should meet in Europe and invite the German Chanceller to join them (Paragraph 26, "Instructions") was presented by MR. ACHESON, who said that the problem was whether the Ministers were near enough to a final decision to decide now when this event should take place. MR. SCHUMAN said that he agreed that it probably was best not to fix a final date since all questions should be settled when this event occurred and it should be a solemn and forceful occasion. MR. MORRISON said that he did not want to delay this matter but felt that realistically it would not be accom-

plished in October. He said if the matter were rushed it would result in an untidy job and he did not want to feel that we must be ready by October because it was very important to do a good job. He also felt that such instructions to the High Commissioners might give them the feeling that they must work under pressure to reach solutions for the several problems remaining. It was agreed that it was too early to set a date but that it must be accomplished as soon as reasonably possible. In this connection, MR. ACHESON said that the Allies must keep in mind the principle of having Mr. Adenauer present when the agreement was concluded—and that the matter must not be let drag because this had a great deal to do with the defense of Europe.

AGREEMENT ON GENERAL RELATIONS WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

PREAMBLE

The British next withdrew their reservations on paragraph 6 draft "Agreement" which mentions the participation of Germany in the European Defense Community as one manifestation of that country's determination to establish with the other nations of Western Europe a free and peaceful community.

ARTICLE V

Security Guarantee for Federal Republic

MR. ACHESON said that with regard to the security guarantee proposed in the draft under Article V, the US would like to use a different approach and reaffirm the previous declaration by the Allies regarding action they would take in the event of an attack against the Federal Republic. He proposed that the Declaration of September 1950, be restated and a sentence added to the effect that the change in status of the Federal Republic does not alter or diminish the effect of that Declaration. MR. MORRISON said that while he was disposed to agree, the matter had numerous implications and that he would have to discuss it with his colleagues in London and confirm it by cable. MR. SCHUMAN said that he saw no difficulty with the US proposal but felt that rather than including it in this text he thought the Declaration should be linked with the statement to be made by the High Commissioners defining the Allied concept of democracy which was to be issued at the time the contractual relationship was announced. As it was he thought this statement would have no tactical value. MR. ACHESON agreed that he thought this a very useful idea and one that should be pursued. MR. MORRISON did not dissent.

Article VII*a* was removed by agreement. It was felt that the substance of this paragraph was covered in other ways.

396.1-WA/9-1351

United States Delegation Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Held at Washington, September 13, 1951, 3 p. m.

SECRET

Tripartite Min-5

MEMBERS

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)
Mr. Morrison (U.K.)
M. Schuman (Fr.)

ALSO PRESENT

U.S.	U.K.	FRANCE
Mr. McCloy	Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick	M. Francois-Poncet
Mr. Jessup	Sir Pierson Dixon	M. Bonnet
Mr. Perkins	Sir Oliver Franks	M. Alphand
	Mr. Allen	M. Seydoux

[Here follows a table of contents.]

1. MR. ACHESON wished to make clear his understanding of the previous day that the Bonn Report was not to be circulated but that an oral report only should be made.

2. MR. ACHESON also noted that a meeting of the three ministers with the Benelux ministers would take place on Sunday with regard to Germany.

PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

ALLIED UNDERTAKING TO STATION TROOPS IN GERMANY

3. MR. MCCLOY said that Chanceller Adenauer had presented the Commissioners with a draft security arrangement which included a security guarantee and made provision for the allies to station troops in Germany.[1] Such troops along with NATO forces should make an attack on Germany a heavy military risk. In addition, it was stipulated that sufficient forces should be stationed in Germany until the European Defense Force could take over. Until now the stationing of allied troops had been a right rather than an obligation. The High Commissioners could not answer this question without further instructions so that preliminary views from the Ministers would be most helpful to the High Commissioners.

4. MR. MORRISON said that he was not without sympathy for the Chancellor's request. He had talked with Schumacher and Adenauer, and the former had said if war came Germany must be defended and treated as an area of conflict in which the greatest damage would be inflicted. It was the U.K. view that the Soviets must be kept as far

[1] Transmitted in telegram 2026, August 31, p. 1520.

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East as possible and it was therefore in the interests of the West to maintain the defense of Germany. Germany, moreover, might provide a good training ground for allied troops. If, however, Adenauer was requesting the allies to effectively resist a Soviet attack, it would be hard to give an affirmative answer. It was impossible to give any firm answer at all without consultation at home, but the first step was to determine the nature of the Chancellor's request and whether it would be possible to live up to such commitments if granted.

5. MR. SCHUMAN said that the High Commissioners must note the ministers' views before making negotiations with Adenauer. His personal reaction was that the renewal of the 1950 declaration on the defense of Germany and Berlin was the maximum position to which the allies could go.[2] This declaration was not a contract, but if it were to become one, it would be in the form of a mutual defense pact and subject to legislation. Under NAT in the event of war each country acts in accordance with its own judgement. Under the Chancellor's suggestion the allies would be committed in the event of war regardless of their judgement. If the allies were to accept such an undertaking, moreover, they would be committed to take their troops out of Germany upon a German decision. The High Commissioners should say to Chancellor Adenauer that the Federal Republic had enough guarantees through the declaration on Germany and Berlin since it was necessary that the allies keep troops in Germany as long as they were in Berlin.

6. MR. ACHESON said that the U.S., like the British and French, could not make a firm decision. The matter was now under consideration by the President. It was probably impossible to commit troops by treaty on such a vague standard and for such an indefinite period. The High Commissioners might say after reaffirming the declaration that the three were committed to the policy of a democratic Germany, and that under NATO the West was proceeding with security arrangements. He agreed with Mr. Morrison in his sympathy for the German position. Means could be found, however, to give the Chancellor political support without creating treaty commitments. Close agreement of the three ministers might be enough for the High Commissioners at this time.

WAR CRIMINALS

7. SIR IVONE KIRKPATRICK said that the Commissioners would be attacked by Adenauer unless the present status regarding war criminals was changed. He felt that this problem was probably more political than juridical.

8. MR. SCHUMAN said that this was of primary interest to France. He recognized the fact that a number of war criminal cases in France

[2] Reference is presumably to the Draft Agreement on Berlin Security and the Communiqué on Germany discussed by the three Western Foreign Ministers at their meeting in New York, September 12–19, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1283 and 1296.

had not yet been judged by French courts. He would recommend a speedy liquidation of these pending cases. With regard to sentences imposed in the past, review of cases judged in Germany might well be represented by a German in an advisory capacity on the Pardon Commission. In France, however, it would be unconstitutional for a foreigner to sit on such cases.

9. MR. ACHESON said that there were two sets of problems—those cases in France and those in Germany—and he assumed that the present discussion only affected the latter. Both the questions of custody and clemency rights were involved. With regard to custody, it was possible to leave the prisoners in Germany under allied control, take them out of Germany under allied control, or turn the prisoners over to Germany. He felt that the latter solution would cause least trouble. Even though some prisoners might escape and some laxity would exist, the other alternatives would produce one kind of irritation or another. With regard to clemency, he agreed with Mr. Schuman that there would be an advantage in having a German representative on the Pardon Commissions.

10. MR. MORRISON did not believe that His Majesty's Government would change their mind in view of the great trouble in the past with regard to judging these cases and the probable strong reaction of the British public opinion if criminals were turned over to the Germans. He suggested that the criminals be left in allied hands and that the situation be reviewed in three years.

11. MR. SCHUMAN said that the experiment had been made in the French Zone of turning over several prisoners to the Germans. These prisoners were surrounded by an atmosphere of veneration, and he concluded that such an experience would be generalized if all prisoners were turned over to the Germans.

12. MR. ACHESON said that if Mr. Morrison would review the cases before this matter came up for decision in Germany and if Mr. Schuman would press his Government to speed up trials, it would be a great help to the High Commissioners. The Germans could very well argue that in Japan the occupying power maintained the right of clemency but had turned prisoners over to the Japanese.

BERLIN [3]

13. MR. FRANCOIS-PONCET stated that the situation became more and more tense, and that Soviet provocations recurred continually. In retaliation the allies seemed to have fewer weapons at their disposal than the Soviets. If the Soviets went to extreme lengths, it would be very difficult to again establish an air lift. There was a trade agreements treaty in preparation, however, which the Soviets greatly

[3] For further documentation on Berlin, see pp. 1828 ff.

desire.[4] It might be possible to refuse to sign this treaty unless Soviet provocations stopped. Even if provisions were made through this means for curtailing the present vexations the Soviets might invent new means of harassing West Berlin.

14. MR. SCHUMAN said that his own inclination was to avoid making the situation more difficult than it was. He recognized the difficulties borne by the West and Britain during the period of the air lift and hoped that a renewal of that operation could be avoided. Through the use of the treaty mentioned by Mr. Francois-Poncet it might be possible to make the Soviets understand that their best interests lay in stopping provocative actions. The Soviets must be made aware that it was up to them to make the decision.

15. MR. MORRISON said that it must be remembered that Soviet policy was to get the West out of Berlin. The policy of the West was to remain. The USSR and East Germany were breaking agreements regarding the free accession to Berlin and new signs of half measures by the three governments would not solve the problem but would accentuate it. Taking a stiff line would not make the Soviets more difficult. The West Germans and people in Berlin were of course looking for short solutions with which to meet their day-to-day troubles and consequently might employ a soft attitude hoping for a let-up by the Soviets. Reprisals were perhaps the best means of solving the problems. The Soviets might be informed that a tax on barges would be instituted unless matters were straightened out.

16. MR. ACHESON agreed with Mr. Morrison that a stiff line should be taken but believed that the forthcoming trade agreement was the main instrument in the hands of the West. The Soviets had been very firm in their desire for this. If the tax on barges would be a counter measure for any length of time it might be useful, but since East Berlin was about to complete a canal around the city this would not be enough. While it was necessary to be tough with the Soviets in Berlin it was also important to be liberal with the Germans there. This did not mean establishing a twelfth *Land*, but it would not be wise to treat those Germans badly who have stayed with the allies in the past.

17. MR. MORRISON suggested that the High Commissioners submit agreed recommendations to the Ministers within a week.

18. MR. SCHUMAN was in full agreement to rely again on the High Commissioners and emphasized that he was not in favor of a weak line. Reprisals, however, might be two-edged. For example, the West uses more barges on the river than the East Germans. He agreed that the trade agreement was the chief weapon at hand.

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[4] For further documentation on the negotiations for an interzonal trade agreement, see pp. 1828 ff.

Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States

19. This declaration concerning European unity was examined by the Ministers and approved after minor changes. It was agreed that the declaration would be published at the same time as the final communiqué on the talks.[5]

Declaration on Control of the Ruhr[6]

20. Mr. Schuman noted that this declaration should be published before the Bundestag debate in October and asked whether the difficulties the U.K. had found in it could be speedily settled.

21. Mr. Morrison said that matters with regard to Luxembourg were on the verge of settlement and that the problem would be solved within a few days.

Instructions to the High Commissioners

22. Mr. Acheson noted that the High Commissioners would have difficulties in negotiating the contractual arrangements with the Germans and asked whether it would be agreeable to allow them some freedom within the instructions given them.

23. Mr. Morrison agreed and Mr. Schuman said that the High Commissioners had seen the flexibility in the minds of the Ministers, but also the limits. He believed it would be useful to the High Commissioners if they agreed to keep their instructions secret from the Germans.

Revision of the Italian Peace Treaty[7]

24. Mr. Acheson noted the procedure submitted by the British and recorded U.S. agreement provided that it would be understood that while there would be a sincere effort to attain settlement of the Trieste issue and cooperation of other signatories of the treaty, the attainment of those objectives would not be a condition to the fulfillment of the rest of the procedure as outlined by the British.

25. Mr. Schuman said that he had several reservations to make with regard to this procedure. If the Italians made their request to the Western governments before the tripartite declaration is public it might weaken the value of the declaration. The Italians, moreover, might request more than could be granted. Otherwise he believed this procedure to be a good one. Mr. Schuman added that while it was

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[5] For the texts of the Declaration on European Unity and the final communiqué, see p. 1306.

[6] For documentation on the negotiation of the Declaration on Control of the Ruhr, signed at Paris on October 19, see pp. 1701 ff.

[7] For further documentation on the revision of the Italian Peace Treaty, see volume IV; for the text of the documents on the treaty considered here by the Foreign Ministers, see p. 1295.

necessary to liquidate the Trieste issue he believed it was unfortunate to tie Trieste to the declaration even in terms of chronology. He suggested that the Ministers might speak to Prime Minister de Gasperi in Ottawa with regard to Trieste, thus obtaining an indication of the Italian position on this whole matter.

26. Mr. Morrison said that the three governments should have an understanding with the Italians to the effect that the request should be in conformity with paragraph 4 of the Draft Tripartite Declaration on the Italian Peace Treaty.[8] He agreed that if the Italians requested more than was envisaged in this paragraph it would be embarrassing to the three governments and therefore the Ministers should meet with de Gasperi in Ottawa as Mr. Schuman had suggested.

27. Mr. Morrison approved the U.S. condition with regard to the procedure but noted that if the Italians, through clumsy handling of the problem, exaggerated the part played by the West there might be trouble with Yugoslavia. The Italians might also delay the settlement of the Trieste issue, which might also cause trouble with Yugoslavia.

28. Mr. Acheson pointed out that according to the U.K. procedure the first step after consultation with the Italians would be to publish the tripartite declaration which would set forth the limits of the request. This would obviate Mr. Schuman's fear of troubles on this score. There should also be an understanding with the Italians before and after the declaration is published in which the three governments would make clear the limits of the request. Some time would elapse after the publication of the declaration before the receipt of the Italian note. During this time it would be possible to attempt to secure the cooperation of the other signatories. During the same period the three governments could privately take up with the Italians the Trieste issue and utilize the six weeks or two months following the receipt of the note to work this matter out.

29. Mr. Schuman agreed with the procedures but cautioned against pressuring either the Italians or the Yugoslavs since this might have an unfavorable reaction.

30. Mr. Morrison said that any pressure should be discreetly applied. He suggested the deletion of the first clause of the first sentence in the draft tripartite declaration.

31. Mr. Acheson believed it would be helpful if the U.K. and French Embassies and officials of the State Department informed the Italian Embassy of the general nature of this procedure so that Mr. de Gasperi would be informed that the three Ministers would hold a discussion with him on this subject in Ottawa. The declaration could

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[8] Dated September 13, p. 1295.

be described in a general way and the procedure of the Italian note could be explained. Mr. Perkins would get in touch with the Italian Embassy and officials of the three governments would prepare the declaration so that it would be possible to show Mr. de Gasperi at Ottawa.

32. MR. MORRISON and MR. SCHUMAN agreed to this procedure.

AUSTRIA [9]

33. MR. ACHESON said the question here was whether the West governments would accept the Soviet version of the disagreed articles of the Austrian Peace Treaty [10] or whether the abbreviated form of the treaty submitted earlier that week to the British and French should be used.[11] The U.S. favored the latter approach. The U.S. was proposing that a meeting of the Deputies be called in which the West would offer the abbreviated treaty for study. The U.S. also proposed that if the USSR asked whether the three governments were abandoning the old text that the position should be kept open.

34. MR. SCHUMAN had not read the treaty but agreed to have the Western Deputies meet to decide upon using the abbreviated form with the Soviets.

35. MR. MORRISON noted with regard to timing that if the Italian Trieste issue were out of the way before the Austrian treaty were raised by the Deputies there might be a better opportunity to settle the Austrian question since the Soviets were claiming a connection existed between the two matters.

36. MR. ACHESON pointed out that this would be highly desirable but it would be difficult to postpone the Deputies meeting on Austria beyond November. The Ministers should review the progress on this matter in October. The other two ministers agreed.

37. MR. ACHESON asked the other Ministers to instruct their High Commissioners in Vienna to meet and consider occupation costs. He pointed out the new and critical situation with regard to occupation costs and increased need for France and the U.K. to pay for their share of these costs.[12]

38. MR. MORRISON said that the new price-wage agreement had caused expenditures in Austria to be more than ever. While he had no objections to the High Commissioners meeting to consider this problem, the U.K. Commissioners would have to take the line that the

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[9] For further documentation on U.S. relations with Austria, see volume IV.

[10] Regarding the disagreed articles of the draft treaty on Austria, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. IV, pp. 430 ff.

[11] For the text of the abbreviated draft treaty on Austria, see volume IV.

[12] For further documentation on the reduction of occupation costs in Austria, see *ibid.*

Austrians would have to pay more of the occupation costs to make up for the decrease in purchasing power of the schilling.

39. MR. SCHUMAN agreed to convey to the French High Commissioner the U.S. desire for such a meeting.

SPAIN [13]

40. MR. MORRISON said that the U.K. had strong feelings with regard to U.S. relations with Franco Spain. While the U.K. appreciated being informed of the arrangements being made by the U.S. these arrangements were highly regretted not only by the U.K. but also by France and the Scandinavians. It was the U.K. hope that the U.S. would not move any further than was necessary from the U.S. point of view. Under no circumstances, however, should the question arise bringing Spain into NATO since such a question might even cause a break-up in the Organization. While appreciating the pressures of Congress and the U.S. public opinion, it was unfortunate that the U.S. had laid itself open to propaganda and world criticisms of its intentions.

41. MR. ACHESON said that he could assure Mr. Morrison that the U.S. was fully aware of French and U.K. public opinion and noted that there was no difference between military authorities of the three governments with regard to the military importance of Spain. The U.S. was only attempting to make arrangements for anchorage rights, landing rights, and over flight rights. No attempt was being made to bring Spain into NATO. It would be very hard to explain to the U.S. public that it was impossible to make military arrangements with Franco when much more is being attempted with Tito. If the recent trip of Admiral Sherman to the Mediterranean [14] had been prevented some of the criticisms directed toward the State Department would be directed instead toward the U.K. and France. The U.K. and France could be assured that the U.S. was moving very cautiously in this field.

42. MR. SCHUMAN thanked Mr. Acheson for this statement which he believed would help appease French public opinion. What would cause most trouble in France would be a Spanish national army equipped by the U.S. on the Pyrenees. Such a situation would make it appear that the U.S. sought to base the defense of the West on the Pyrenees, which Mr. Schuman knew was contrary to intentions of all the three powers. Equipping of the Spanish army by the U.S., moreover, would compete with French requirements.

43. MR. ACHESON assured the Ministers that the U.S. would keep Britain and France informed on this matter.

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[13] For further documentation on U.S. relations with Spain, see volume IV.

[14] For a report on Admiral Sherman's visit to Spain and the Mediterranean, see *ibid.*

CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, Secretary's briefing book

United States Delegation Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Held at Washington, September 14, 1951, 9: 30 a. m.

SECRET

Tripartite Min–6

MEMBERS

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)
Mr. Morrison (U.K.)
M. Schuman (Fr.)

ALSO PRESENT

U.S.	U.K.	FRANCE
Mr. Harriman	Mr. Gaitskell	M. Mayer
Mr. Lovett	Sir Oliver Franks	M. Alphand
Mr. Foster	Sir Edwin Plowden	

[Here follows a table of contents.]

COMMUNIQUÉ AND DECLARATION

1. MR. ACHESON suggested, and it was agreed, that the Communiqué on the Tripartite Meeting should be embargoed for release at 3: 00 p. m. today.[1] Considering the revised draft of the communiqué, the following changes were agreed. On page 1, paragraph 1 the concluding date of the talks was changed to September 14. On page 2, paragraph 1 M. SCHUMAN suggested a revised wording for the last sentence. Instead of "forming part of the joint defense forces under the North American Treaty Organization" it should read "integrated within the framework of the forces placed at the disposal of the North American Treaty Organization". He proposed this revision since the original draft implied that Germany would be participating in NATO. His suggestion was accepted subject to minor revisions in the English text. On page 3, the last paragraph, the third line from the end was deleted and after the phrase "new and resolute effort" the phrase was inserted "in the meetings of the Austrian Deputies". On page 4, paragraph 1 the phrase "of possible revision of the treaty and this question" was deleted, and the word "which" inserted. This change was based on M. Schuman's point that the Ministers did not propose formally to revise the Italian treaty. On page 4, the last paragraph, the first sentence was revised to read "the three Ministers on behalf of their Governments and peoples restate their fidelity to the purpose contained in the UN Charter that international differences should be settled by peaceful means and not by force or threatened

[1] For the text of the communiqué, see p. 1306.

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force". This revision was based on Mr. Morrison's feeling that the original draft was too narrow in its meaning.

2. It was also agreed to release at that time the Three Power Declaration on the goals of European union and German participation therein.[2]

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

3. MR. GAITSKELL said that a discussion of the economic problems facing the three countries appeared desirable prior to Ottawa [3] since the question would certainly come up there. The UK was faced with a contrast between the economic realities in Britain and in Europe, and the military requirements of the Medium Term Defense Plan, to say nothing of subsequent plans which have been proposed by General Eisenhower.[4] The UK was especially dependent upon foreign trade and balance of payments. These were matters of greater importance now than before the war since British reserves had diminished. The rise in the price of imports had caused a burden roughly equal to that embodied in the extra burden of defense. They were aware of the problem when they undertook the defense program; but the recent deterioration in prices was bringing about a substantial deficit in the balance of payments. This deficit might reach 400 million pounds sterling this year. It was conceivable that this deficit might be financed by drawing on the sterling block or possibly from EPU, but this could not be done at this time. Moreover, there was a gap as between the dollar and sterling areas. In the fiscal year 1951–52, there would be a dollar deficit of over 1 billion dollars. He would not go into the various steps which the UK was considering in order to meet this situation, but he did wish to point out how this situation affected the defense program. Of the approximately 2 billion pounds involved in the 4.7 billion program, about 1.3 billion had already been placed. These orders naturally fell primarily to the engineering and steel industries. But the products of these same industries were necessary for the expansion of trade essential to improving the balance of payments. The British would soon be faced with the problem of whether exports or defense programs would have priority. They had not reached that point yet, but they were faced with the probability under present circumstances that anything beyond the 4.7 billion program would become impossible. In addition to the two gaps—UK imbalance in sterling trade and the dollar deficit—there was a third gap between the existing defense programs and the Medium Term and other pro-

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[2] See Tripartite D–5, p. 1306.

[3] For documentation on the NATO Council meeting at Ottawa, September 15–20, see pp. 1309 ff.

[4] For documentation on the Medium-Term Defense Plan, see pp. 1 ff.

grams. This third gap was a major cause of concern. The 4.7 billion program was not enough to provide equipment for the interim forces for NATO and forces elsewhere in the world. This deficiency was approximately 1.5 to 2 billion pounds. A further gap existed between this and the Medium Term Program. General Eisenhower's latest plans would mean an even greater gap. He did not see how the UK could do any more than it was doing, and it was doubtful that it could even carry out the 4.7 program on schedule. He was submitting problem to the meeting, but he did not have a solution.

4. M. MAYER said that a parallel existed between the British situation and that of France with respect to ability to obtain foreign exchange. In the plans as presently set up or under contemplation, there was a certain amount of excessive optimism concerning the economic capacities of Britain and France. France was now working on a 45 hour work week, and in certain industries even 48 to 52 hours. France had not completed its reconstruction from the war, especially in the fields of housing and public works. Moreover, the assistance it had obtained to modernize its industrial plant under ECA was to be terminated. One of the bottlenecks was power. Another was the steel industry which needs coke and was importing it even from the US. As a result of its inability to obtain fuel, it was operating at only 85% capacity while the German industry was working at 100% capacity. As to balance of payments, France needs raw materials from the dollar area and is having difficulty in its export trade. Because of the defense program, there are fewer products available for internal consumption and this makes it difficult to fight inflation. He anticipated that the dollar gap for 1952 would be between 500 and 600 million dollars.

5. In addition to these problems the war in Indo-China was causing a severe strain on France, not only financially but in trained cadres. France would have, therefore, to determine the maximum limit to which it could go in trying to equip its armed forces and subdivide its aid between its forces in Indo-China and Europe. If it did not do this, it may face such dangerous inflation as to undermine its basic economic stability. He noted that the economic and financial body of NATO had studied this problem and would report at Ottawa. France would propose to NATO that a new global review of the capacities of the various NATO countries would be undertaken. Such a review would set up a goal which could be reached and which the people could understand without destroying the basic economy of the member countries. This global review would also seek the best way to integrate the effort of the US and other NATO countries, especially with respect to the placing of orders in industries in Europe for armaments needed by US and other troops in Europe. This last problem had not

been studied sufficiently and new ideas might emerge, especially as to how and where to place these orders and how best to use the European industrial and steel industries. He, therefore, hoped that persons appointed would be especially qualified to examine this problem and would be capable of broad political judgments as well. They would make the analysis and submit their ideas to NATO for an overall review and division of responsibilities.

6. MR. ACHESON said that the US Government was giving very careful attention to this problem which both Mr. Gaitskell and M. Mayer had discussed during the past few days.[5] The US attitude is that because the Governments face difficulties there should be no slackening of the effort to defend Western Europe. Ways must be found to proceed with the military program and to solve the difficulties facing the various countries. It would be obviously unwise to bring about the destruction of the economic stability of various member countries in order to provide defense since that would be self-defeating. The proposal for a high-level study was being called "Operation Wisemen" in the US Government.[6] He thought that there should be discussions in order to reach agreement on the resolutions to be submitted to NATO. Perhaps the three Deputies and the Financial and Economic Board could begin immediately on this problem. Mr. Acheson indicated that he might ask Mr. Harriman to assist in this matter.

7. MR. GAITSKELL approved this general procedure and thought that the delegations could get together informally at Ottawa to discuss this further. He noted that both technical and political decisions were necessary and at times the people with technical information and political judgment were not the same.

8. MR. FOSTER agreed with Mr. Acheson's general statement. He noted briefly the three gaps: balance of payments, internal, and the difference between economic production and military requirements. The last seems somewhat like the immovable object and the irresistible force. He thought that the situation was roughly comparable to that faced in 1948 and agreed that high-level discussion was needed to consider the problem.

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[5] For documentation on Gaitskell's discussions with various American officials in Washington on September 6 and 7, see volume IV.

[6] For documentation on the work of the Temporary Council Committee (TCC) of NATO, sometimes referred to as the "Wisemen," see pp. 1 ff.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, Secretary's briefing book

United States Delegation Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Held at Washington, September 14, 1951, 4 p. m.

SECRET

Tripartite Min–7

MEMBERS

Mr. Acheson (U.S.)
Mr. Morrison (U.K.)
M. Schuman (Fr.)

ALSO PRESENT

U.S.	U.K.	FRANCE
Mr. Jessup	Sir Oliver Franks	M. Baeyens
Mr. Merchant	Sir Pierson Dixon	M. Alphand

[Here follows a table of contents.]

MIDDLE EAST COMMAND

1. MR. MORRISON opened the meeting by reading a statement on the Middle East Command. He said that in the course of the "first" Tripartite meeting the question of the Standing Group proposals for a Middle East Command had been left open for further consideration (U.S.–Tri. Min–1, September 12, 1951 [1]). He recalled that M. Schuman had said he could accept the Standing Group proposals on two conditions. (See Tripartite Minutes–2, September 12, 1951, Paragraph 2.[2]) The British could now agree to the first French condition. It had always been the British view that the NE Command would be a fully integrated Allied command. It would, of course, be for the Supreme Commander himself to designate the precise post. With regard to the second condition relating to a French naval command in the western Mediterranean, he felt this was a technical matter which the Foreign Ministers should not attempt to solve, but which should be passed to the Standing Group, who were, he understood, almost in agreement. In Ottawa the Defense Ministers should be in a position to agree at the ministerial level. MR. MORRISON said he viewed the French proposal with sympathy and agreed to it in principle. He was confident technical details could be resolved during the next day or two. If the US could also accept the French position, he hoped that M. Schuman could now accept the SG proposals. If this were possible, he believed the Ministers should turn their attention to the following immediate steps: (1) agree at Ottawa that Turkey and Greece should be invited

[1] *Ante*, p. 1257.
[2] *Ante*, p. 1262.

to join NATO, (2) the Turkish Government should be approached immediately thereafter regarding the proposals on the ME Command, and (3) when Turkish agreement has been received, an approach should be made to the King of Egypt in order to determine how best to approach the Egyptian Government. As he had previously explained (see Paragraphs 10 and 11, U.S.–U.K. Minutes–1, September 10, 1951 [3]) it was essential for the Allies to retain the Egyptian base for the new Allied command. This must be done quickly or we might be in a position where the Egyptians would refuse. Following this there would be approaches to other Middle Eastern and Commonwealth countries. What to say to Israel would also have to be considered. The purpose of the British proposals was to reach a stage where the three governments could announce the establishment of a Middle East Command as quickly as possible. Owing to political necessities, he felt UK could not go ahead with vital NATO matters such as the announcement of the Atlantic Command until the Middle East Command could also be announced. He believed it was essential to talk the problem over before the Ottawa meeting, and he hoped M. Schuman was able to indicate at least tentative agreement.

2. M. Schuman thanked Mr. Morrison for his declaration of understanding for the French position. He said that he had sent messages in the previous two days to Paris indicating the urgency of this matter. He had received a preliminary reply and thought he would be able to give a final answer at Ottawa on Monday, which he hoped would be favorable. The French Minister of Defense was in transit to Ottawa and had been out of reach for consultation. With regard to the question of approaching Egypt, M. Schuman had telephoned Paris and hoped to give a final answer soon, which he hoped would be favorable. He mentioned that in the plan to approach Middle Eastern countries, consideration be given to the position of Syria and The Lebanon.

3. Mr. Morrison said he did not know if the agenda item proposing membership for Greece and Turkey was due to come up Monday morning or afternoon. He indicated that if the French could indicate their answer before then, it would be of great value. M. Schuman suggested the timing of the agenda could be discussed with Chairman Van Zeeland. Mr. Morrison said he had authority from his Government to agree to the admission of Greece and Turkey, but he wanted approval of the Standing Group proposals for the Middle East Command before the vote on the admission question, if at all possible. He was not proposing to make the foregoing public, but as M. Schuman could understand "the road would then be clear". With regard to M. Schuman's point on Syria and the Lebanon, he desired to say "Yes" in principle, but the matter was one of timing and there undoubtedly

[3] *Ante*, p. 1228.

would be consultation between the representatives of the three governments participating in the Middle East Command. M. SCHUMAN said that we must also see on what contractual basis the structure would rest, but that that was a problem for the future. MR. ACHESON said that the Standing Group would have a proposal establishing a basis on which the Command could be implemented. The United States was in agreement with the proposals of the Standing Group and had been informed that with regard to the question of a French naval command, the Standing Group had already made a proposal to the French which the United States hoped would be satisfactory. He understood the appropriate military authorities had already relayed his latest proposal to Paris. MR. ACHESON then said that he believed he ought to raise one point to prevent the possibility of any future argument. As he understood the UK position, it, in effect, established a condition on which a favorable British vote to admit Greece and Turkey rested. This was understandable. However, he hoped it did not mean that the election to membership would be conditional. MR. MORRISON replied the less said regarding conditions the better. M. SCHUMAN indicated that he understood the steps to be taken.

FAR EAST

4. M. SCHUMAN said that he believed the Ministers would be interested in information from Mr. Acheson regarding Korea, the military situation in general, and any forecast which could be made regarding the possibility of an armistice. MR. ACHESON set forth the military situation as based on current reports from the JCS and proceeded to explain what steps the United States proposed to take in case an armistice was agreed in Korea. He next outlined the steps which we propose to take if no armistice was established. This entire discussion followed closely the exposition reported in Paragraphs 1–15 of the minutes of the second US–UK meeting on September 10, 1951.[4] M. SCHUMAN thanked Mr. Acheson and indicated there was no need for discussion. He said he assumed that any questions arising in the future would be discussed in the Consultative Committee of the United Nations. MR. MORRISON said that he would report to his colleagues and see how they reacted to the US proposals. He reiterated his doubt regarding the effectiveness of a blockade or "embargo" and pointed out that Hong Kong must trade with the mainland to live. He said he believed Communist China was not a servile satellite of the USSR and that he did not desire to take any steps which would drive her toward the Soviets.

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[4] *Ante*, p. 1238.

INDOCHINA

5. M. SCHUMAN said that he desired to report briefly on the situation in Indochina. The military situation was much improved after many setbacks last year. General de Lattre had reestablished the position from a political and psychological point of view. The latter was particularly important from the standpoint of the Indochinese. France was taking steps to implement its agreement with the Associated States and was assisting in the development of the armies of the States. Mobilization had been decided upon and would occur after October 1. The main responsibility of the force of the Associated States would be the defense of the interior. The French Army would be responsible for the area in the north. The situation in the northern area worried them. They did not know what the nature of Chinese intervention would be. If an armistice was reached in Korea, this would increase the danger, because Chinese "volunteers" would be freed for action against Indochina. If this occurred it would create a new situation affecting the interests of all three powers in the area. The three countries should keep in close contact and should carry out consultations similar to those held at the Singapore Conference. The French Government strongly believed such consultations should be continued and before a crisis arrived. He said that, finally, he would like to ask for the conclusions of the US and UK regarding the Singapore Conference. He did not expect an immediate answer. He said the Conference had made recommendations of a military nature which France had accepted, but he did not know if the US and UK had.

6. MR. MORRISON expressed appreciation for M. Schuman's outline and said he was glad to hear that the military situation was improved. He desired to express on behalf of his people their admiration for the French effort in Indochina and particularly for the achievements of General de Lattre. He had noted M. Schuman's wish for further tripartite military talks and would consult his government. The conclusions of the Singapore Conference were under consideration at the present time by the British Chiefs as were some of the other points raised by M. Schuman. He desired to say he was wholeheartedly behind the general approach but could not be more specific at this juncture.

7. MR. ACHESON said that the United States regarded as of vital importance the operations in Indochina. It was of great importance that the area be held. While the Ministers were in Ottawa, United States Government representatives, including the Secretary of Defense, would be working with de Lattre and considering problems of the type mentioned by M. Schuman. The Department of Defense had been discussing a number of problems with French military representatives in Washington and had raised some technical questions, the

answers to which were now being sought in Paris. The economic problems of Indochina would also be discussed while General de Lattre was in this country. M. Schuman said he wanted to thank his colleagues for their consideration and understanding of the Indochina problem and for their kind words regarding General de Lattre. He very much appreciated their recognition of Indochina as a part of the common cause.

8. MR. MORRISON, in closing, said that he desired to state his sincere appreciation for the excellent manner in which Secretary Acheson had conducted the conference, and was profuse in his praise of the Secretary's tact and ability. He said that this was the first "high-powered" conference he had attended and he was impressed with the value of such conferences. He hoped that they could be held oftener, since he believed it was valuable to exchange ideas. He had been surprised and pleased by the high percentage of agreement which had been reached during this meeting. He said the success of the conference owes a big debt to Secretary Acheson and that he felt that it could be truly said this was the Secretary's second big triumph in as many weeks. M. SCHUMAN said that he had had the pleasure of dealing with Mr. Acheson for over three years and that he heartily seconded Mr. Morrison's words of praise. MR. ACHESON thanked the Ministers for their compliments and said he would pass on their words of commendation to his organization. He was sure he could speak for M. Schuman in saying that they had found Mr. Morrison a worthy successor to his predecessor, Mr. Bevin, who had been such a fine man.

C. DOCUMENTS AND COMMUNIQUÉ, SEPTEMBER 13–14, 1951

CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents

Paper Prepared by the United States Delegation [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 13, 1951.

Tripartite D–1

ITALIAN PEACE TREATY

The United States Government, while maintaining the views expressed heretofore with reference to the Italian Peace Treaty, is prepared to associate itself with the following procedure and timing as suggested by the British Government for the *de facto* revision of the Treaty on a bilateral basis on the understanding that while there will be a sincere effort to attain the objectives of paragraphs 5(*a*) and 5(*b*), the attainment of those objectives is not a condition to the accomplishment of paragraphs 6 and 7:

[1] This paper was prepared for the use of the U.S. Delegation and apparently circulated to the other delegations for discussion at the fifth meeting on September 13; see Tripartite Min–5, p. 1279.

1. Agree with the Italian Government the terms of a note from Italy to all signatories (US proposed draft attached as Annex I) This note would:

(*a*) Draw attention to the fact that under present circumstances the *military clauses* prevent Italy from ensuring her own defense, and ask for assistance in ending this state of affairs.

(*b*) Draw attention to fact that the *general political clau* (15–18) are no longer applicable.

(*c*) Request a statement from the signatories that the moral stigma applied to Italy in the *Preamble* no longer affects their relations with Italy.

(*d*) Request, that in general, relations be based on the spirit of the *United Nations Charter* rather than on that of the Peace Treaty.

(*e*) Point out, that Article 46 of the Treaty envisaged revision of the military clauses by means of agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers or, after Italy became a member of the United Nations; by agreement between the Security Council and Italy, but that through the unjustifiable attitude of the USSR neither of these means of revision is open to Italy.

2. Issue a tripartite declaration. (US proposed draft attached as Annex II)

3. Delivery of Italian note as soon as they wish.

4. Interim and fully sympathetic acknowledgment, but no further commitment beyond the terms of the declaration.

5. Interval of about six weeks to two months during which

(*a*) a very strong effort should be made to persuade the Italians and Yugoslavs to settle the Trieste issue, and

(*b*) there should be diplomatic activity to ensure the cooperation of other signatories—with particular reference to India, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia and Greece.

6. Formal notes from each signatory to the Italian Government (US proposed draft attached Annex III) stating in essence:

(*a*) That so far as their bilateral relations are concerned, and without prejudice to the rights of third parties, they agree not to enforce certain specified articles.

(*b*) That the moral stigma inherent in the Preamble no longer affects their bilateral relations.

7. Italian acknowledgment, constituting with 6 above bilateral exchanges of notes.

[Annex I]

SECRET

DRAFT ITALIAN NOTE TO THE SIGNATORIES OF THE ITALIAN PEACE TREATY

SIR: I have the honor to refer to declarations made by the Italian Government and to statements made by officials of other governments

regarding the anomaly created by the existence of the Italian Peace Treaty and the position which Italy occupies today. The Peace Treaty signed with Japan on September 8, 1951, and the present proposals for contractual arrangements for the Western German Republic strongly emphasize this anomaly.

It was contemplated by the Peace Treaty that Italy would be admitted to membership in the United Nations. The basic assumption was that membership in the United Nations by the Allies and Italy and universal adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter would assure the security of Italy and of other nations. Although limitations were placed upon Italy's military forces, it was not the intent of the Treaty to deny Italy the right of self-defense. It was believed that the forces and other defensive facilities permitted Italy under the conditions of peace and security, which the world was to enjoy, would be sufficient to protect the integrity of Italy.

As represented by all of these matters, the assumptions on the basis of which the Italian Peace Treaty was negotiated, was signed, and was ratified have not been fulfilled. Even though the preamble of the Treaty contemplated admission of Italy as a full member of the United Nations, Italy's application for membership, although receiving on three occasions the support of the majority of member states voting in the General Assembly, has not been approved, due to vetoes in the Security Council on the four occasions when it was considered.

Rather than the peaceful world for which all peoples hoped at the time the Treaty was negotiated, the free nations are faced with military aggression launched in Korea and with threats of further Communist aggression in various parts of the world. Under these conditions the forces and defensive facilities permitted Italy under the Peace Treaty are not sufficient to protect the integrity of Italy. In addition, the Free Nations of the West which are cooperating in the development of a North Atlantic Community have been required to create a collective defense system to deter aggression and insure their security. This collective self-defense arrangement is fully consistent with the United Nations Charter. Italy is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization but the provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty do not permit Italy at the present time to discharge in full its obligations of membership.

Italy is now a democratic state, supporting the efforts of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security and participating in concert with other nations in a number of international organizations working to establish peaceful and improved conditions of life for the peoples of the world. In these circumstances the spirit and certain restrictive provisions of the Peace Treaty designed to ensure the

establishment of democracy in Italy and to protect the rights of those who assisted the Allies no longer appear to be appropriate. Italy does not intend to devote its resources to build large armies for aggressive purposes, but to develop forces sufficient to defend its frontier and to contribute more fully to the growth and development of collective security.

Italy, therefore, requests the Government of the United States and other signatories of the Peace Treaty to whom similar notes have been addressed to recognize that the spirit of the Peace Treaty no longer accords with the situation prevailing today nor with Italy's status as an active member of the democratic and freedom-loving family of nations. Italy specifically requests recognition that the spirit reflected by the Preamble no longer exists, that Articles 15–18 of the political clauses are no longer necessary and that the military clauses, Articles 46–70, with the relevant annexes, are no longer consistent with Italy's position among nations. With reference to Articles 15 and 17, the Italian Government wishes to point out that not only is it the settled policy of the Italian Government to support the principles stated therein, but also that the Italian Constitution assures to all Italians the safeguards provided for in those Articles. In addition, Italy fully supports the provisions on human rights and fundamental freedoms contained in the United Nations Charter. As for Article 16, the spirit of present-day Italian democracy has rendered it obsolete. Accordingly, the Italian Government proposes that each of the Allied and Associated Powers enter into new understandings with Italy which will be in accord with Italy's present position. In particular, the Italian Government proposes that each of the Allied and Associated Powers waive Italy's obligations to it under Articles 15–18 and Articles 46–70 with the relevant annexes of the Italian Peace Treaty.

The Italian Government would appreciate confirmation from the Government of the United States and from other signatories of their concurrence in these proposals.

Annex II

SECRET

DRAFT TRIPARTITE DECLARATION ON THE ITALIAN PEACE TREATY

1. At the request of the Government of Italy, the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States have considered for some time how best to resolve, in the interests of the harmonious development of cooperation between the free nations, the problem presented by the Peace Treaty with Italy.

2. In accordance with the desire of the Italian people, Italy, which fully cooperated with the Allies during the latter part of the last war as a cobelligerent, has established democratic institutions. In the spirit of the United Nations Charter Italy has invariably extended to the peace-loving and democratic governments that cooperation indispensable to the solidarity of the free world.

3. Nevertheless, although Italy has on three occasions received the support of the majority of member states voting in the General Assembly, it is still prevented by an unjustifiable veto from obtaining membership into the United Nations and is still subject under the Peace Treaty to certain restrictions and disabilities particularly affecting its capacity for self-defense. These restrictions no longer accord with the situation prevailing today nor with Italy's status as an active member of the democratic and freedom-loving family of nations.

4. Each of the three governments therefore declares hereby its readiness to consider sympathetically a request from the Italian Government to remove, so far as concerns its individual relations with Italy, those permanent restrictions and discriminations now in existence which are either wholly overtaken by events or have no justification in present circumstances.

5. Each of the three governments hereby declares its intention to continue its efforts to secure Italy's membership in the United Nations.

6. The three governments trust that this declaration will meet with the wide approval of the other signatories of the Peace Treaty and that they will likewise be prepared to take similar action.

Annex III

SECRET

Draft Reply to the Proposed Italian Note on Italian Peace Treaty

Sir: I have the honor to refer to your Excellency's Note No. _____ of _____ regarding the anomaly created by the existence of the Italian Peace Treaty and the position which Italy occupies today. The Government of the United States can attest to the fact that the Peace Treaty contemplated that Italy would be admitted to the United Nations and that membership in the United Nations by the Allies and Italy and universal adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter would assure the security of Italy and of other nations. It has always been the position of the United States that the limitations placed upon Italy's military forces by the Treaty were not intended to deny Italy the right of self-defense, since the forces permitted Italy would, under conditions of peace and security, be sufficient to protect the integrity of Italy.

The United States recognizes that in these matters, the assumptions on the basis of which the Treaty of Peace was negotiated, was signed, and was ratified, have not been fulfilled. Although strongly supported by the United States and other democratic nations, Italy's application for membership in the United Nations has not been approved due to successive vetoes cast by the Soviet Union in the Security Council of the United Nations. The United States also recognizes that under present conditions, in which free nations are faced with military aggression launched in Korea and with the threats of further Communist aggression in various parts of the world, the forces permitted under the Peace Treaty are no longer sufficient to protect the integrity of democratic Italy. In addition, Italy is recognized as a democratic nation having fully provided the rights and freedom specified in certain of the political clauses.

The United States recognizes, therefore, that the spirit of the Peace Treaty no longer accords with the situation prevailing today, nor with Italy's status as an active member of the democratic and freedom-loving family of nations. The United States and Italy have previously taken measures to restore normal financial and economic relations between our two countries. These measures have included a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation signed at Rome on February 2, 1948 and Memorandums of Understanding dealing with certain financial and economic matters arising under Articles 73(2), 76, 78, and 79 and Annex XV of the Italian Peace Treaty. These measures did not affect, however, Italy's obligations to the United States under the political and military clauses of the Treaty. Accordingly, and in view of the circumstances set forth in your Excellency's Note No. _____ of _____, the United States hereby relieves Italy of all obligations to the United States under Articles 15–18 and Articles 46–70 of the Italian Peace Treaty, including Annexes XII and XIII in so far as they relate to these Articles and affirms that the spirit reflected in the Preamble no longer affects the friendly relations between the two countries.

Editorial Note

Tripartite D–2, September 13, not printed, consisted of a cover sheet and the text of the abbreviated Austrian peace treaty. For the text of the abbreviated treaty, see volume IV.

For the text of Tripartite D–3, September 14, see WFM T–5*a*, page 1197, and footnotes thereto.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents

United States Proposed Draft Procedure for Accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 13, 1951.

Tripartite D–4

At the Ottawa meeting of the North Atlantic Council the United States will propose that Greece and Turkey be invited to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. The United States will at that time be prepared to advance reasons why it believes that membership of these countries is the most practicable and desirable means of associating them with the North Atlantic Treaty defense system. The North Atlantic Treaty countries are already familiar with many of the considerations which make it desirable to associate Greece and Turkey more intimately with the western Defense System and the Council of Deputies have in fact passed these along to the Council in the form of a Working Group report. There has, however, been little or no consultation on the precise steps which would actually be required to effect the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty.

When the North Atlantic Treaty itself was in the process of ratification, some of the signatories advised their respective legislatures that if, pursuant to Article 10, the Parties decided to invite any other European state to accede to the Treaty they would, before agreeing to such an invitation, seek the consent of their respective legislatures. The United States Government so advised the United States Senate. The Department of State understands that some of the other Parties who did not so advise their legislatures may now consider it preferable to obtain the consent of the legislative branch in advance of final action to invite new members. There is, therefore, a need on the part of most of the North Atlantic Treaty countries to obtain the consent of their respective legislatures before a definitive invitation can be issued to Greece and Turkey to accede. On the other hand, if it is agreed that these two countries should be invited, the action of the Council in inviting them should obviously reflect as clearly as possible the intent of the parties that Greece and Turkey should be enabled to become full members as soon as the requisite constitutional procedures have been complied with.

The Parties to the Treaty defined in Article 6 the territory be covered for purposes of Article 5 which relates to their obligations in the event of an armed attack on one or more of them. Should Turkey, pursuant to Article 10 of the Treaty, be invited to accede thereto, a

[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet, not printed. Copies of this paper were delivered to Schuman and Morrison on September 12, and it was discussed briefly at the second meeting of the Ministers on that day; see Tripartite Min–2, p. 1262; for further documentation on the question of Greek and Turkish accession to NATO, see pp. 460 ff.

question would arise as to the obligations of the Parties in the event of an event of an attack upon that portion of Turkey which lies outside of Europe. An attack upon this portion of Turkey would be as likely to lead to serious consequences as an attack upon the European area of Turkey, and yet it would be outside the area presently defined by Article 6. Furthermore, so long as this area is not within the area specifically covered by the Treaty, an aggressor would be in some doubt as to the consequences of an act of aggression directed against the area and, to that extent, the intent of the Treaty to deter aggression would be vitiated. Finally, if the Parties desire Turkey to assume the obligations towards them of Article 5, it is clearly necessary that they on their part recognize that the entire area of Turkey is covered for the purposes of this Article. An amendment of Article 6 is therefore required and this in turn must, in the case of most North Atlantic Treaty countries, be placed before their respective legislatures for ratification.

From the foregoing paragraphs, it will be apparent that the participation of parliaments will be required (1) to permit a definitive invitation to Greece and Turkey and (2) to amend the Treaty to cover the territory of Turkey in the event it wishes to accept the invitation. It would obviously be desirable to obtain legislative approval on these two separate matters by a single reference to the parliaments. Similarly, the procedure devised should be such as to make the amendment to Article 6 effective only at the time when the Government of Turkey, by depositing its instrument of accession pursuant to Article 10, becomes a Party to the Treaty.

The Government of the United States believes that, in the event the Council decides that the Parties should invite Greece and Turkey to accede, the necessary formalities can best be complied with by adoption by the Council of a Resolution which would recommend to the Governments that Greece and Turkey should be invited to accede and that effective upon the accession of Turkey, Article 6 of the Treaty would be appropriately amended. It further believes that these purposes could best be accomplished by bringing into force a Protocol annexed to the Resolution which would be signed by duly accredited plenipotentiaries as soon as possible following the adoption by the Council of the Resolution. It would for its part submit the Protocol for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification.

It may be noted that the proposed amendment to Article VI, in addition to including the territory of Turkey, would accomplish the two additional purposes of including the Islands of the Mediterranean (notably Cyprus)[2] which belong to the Parties and were not hitherto specifically included in the Treaty area and deleting the adjective "occupation" in anticipation of the time when the forces of the Parties in Germany will no longer be occupation forces. This change is neces-

[2] Subsequent extension of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization did not include Cyprus.

sary to assure the substantial retention of Germany in the area to be covered by the Treaty.

STEPS TO ACCOMPLISH THE ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY TO NATO

(1) Adoption at Ottawa Council Meeting of the draft resolution to which proposed Protocol is annexed.

(2) Signature of the Protocol. If it is possible for the Foreign Ministers to procure full powers from their governments after the adoption of the resolution, the Protocol could be signed before the conclusion of the Ottawa Meeting. Another alternative would be to have the Council recommend that the Deputies be empowered to sign the Protocol at the earliest possible date. Still a third possibility would be to have the ambassadors, when duly authorized, sign it in Washington.

(3) Greece–Turkey to be advised of decision at Ottawa by Chairman of Atlantic Council and requested to indicate whether or not they wish to accede.

(4) Notification by all Parties to US of their definitive agreement to invite Greece and Turkey, and notification by US to all Parties when notifications of all of them have been received.

(5) Note sent by US to Greece and Turkey inviting them to deposit their instruments of accession.

(6) Deposit of instruments of accession by Greece and Turkey, at which time they become Parties, and upon deposit by Turkey the Article VI revision becomes effective.

Annex I

United States Draft Resolution on the Accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty

SECRET [WASHINGTON, September 13, 1951?]

The Council

Having considered the proposal put forward for the accession of the Kingdom of Greece and the Turkish Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty,

Satisfied that the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty will be served and the security of the North Atlantic area enhanced by the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty,

Having examined the question of amendments which might be desirable in the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty,

Recommends to the Governments which are parties to the Treaty,

That, pursuant to Article 10 of the Treaty, the Parties agree to invite the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to accede to

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the North Atlantic Treaty, and so notify the Government of the United States of America, the depository under the Treaty of instruments of accession,

That, pursuant to Article 10, Greece and Turkey shall become Parties to the Treaty upon date of the deposit of their respective instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America,

That, effective upon the deposit with the Government of the United States of America by the Government of the Turkish Republic of its instrument of accession, the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty agree to the modification of Article 6 of the Treaty so that it will then read as follows:

> "For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory, forces, vessels, or air craft of any of the Parties in Europe, North America, the Algerian Departments of France, Turkey, or in the Mediterranean, or North Atlantic Ocean north of the Tropic of Cancer."

Agrees

That these purposes would be achieved and the requirements of Article 10 of the Treaty would be met by bringing into force a Protocol as annexed hereto.

Recommends

That the Parties to the Treaty notify the Government of the United States of America that they are prepared to enter into such a Protocol and that the Protocol be prepared, in English and French texts, for signature at _____ as soon as possible.

Annex II

United States Draft Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty

SECRET [WASHINGTON, September 13, 1951?]

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949,

Being satisfied that the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty will be served and the security of the North Atlantic area enhanced by the accession of the Kingdom of Greece and the Turkish Republic to that Treaty,

Agree as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and the Gov-

ernment of the Turkish Republic an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, as modified by Article 2 of the present Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of Greece and the Turkish Republic shall each become a Party on the date when each deposits its respective instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 2

In the event that the Turkish Republic becomes a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6 of the Treaty shall, effective on the date of the deposit by the Government of the Turkish Republic of its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America, be modified to read as follows:

"For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory, forces, vessels, or air craft of any of the Parties in Europe, North America, the Algerian Departments of France, Turkey, or in the Mediterranean, or North Atlantic Ocean north of the Tropic of Cancer."

ARTICLE 3

Upon its entry into force the present Protocol shall be subject to the provisions of Articles 12 and 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty to the same extent as though the Protocol were an integral part of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 4

The present Protocol shall enter into force when all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have communicated to or deposited with the Government of the United States of America their respective notifications or instruments of approval. The Government of the United States of America shall notify all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each such notification or instrument of approval and the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

ARTICLE 5

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol.

DONE at _____ the _____ day of _____, 19____

FOR [etc.]

CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, WFM tripartite documents

Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States [1]

Tripartite D–5 WASHINGTON, September 14, 1951.

The three Foreign Ministers declare that their Governments aim at the inclusion of a democratic Germany, on a basis of equality, in a Continental European Community, which itself will form a part of a constantly developing Atlantic Community.

The three Ministers recognize that the initiative taken by the French Government concerning the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community and a European defense community is a major step towards European unity. They welcome the Schuman Plan as a means of strengthening the economy of Western Europe and look forward to its early realization. They also welcome the Paris Plan as a very important contribution to the effective Defense of Europe, including Germany.

The participation of Germany in the common defense should naturally be attended by the replacement of the present Occupation Statute by a new relationship between the three Governments and the German Federal Republic.

The Government of the United Kingdom desires to establish the closest possible association with the European continental community at all stages in its development.

The three Ministers reaffirm that this policy, which will be undertaken in concert with the other free nations, is directed to the establishment and the maintenance of a durable peace founded on justice and law. Their aim is to reinforce the security and the prosperity of Europe without changing in any way the purely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They reaffirm their determination that in no circumstances shall the above arrangements be made use of in furtherance of any aggressive action.

[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet, not printed. This declaration, frequently referred to as the Declaration on European Unity, was approved by the Ministers at their fifth meeting on September 13. For a record of that meeting, see Tripartite Min–5, p. 1279. The text of the declaration was released to the press on September 14.

CFM files, lot M–88, box 158, communiqué and declaration

Communiqué Issued by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France [1]

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1951.

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have held meetings in Washington from September 10

[1] Approved by the Foreign Ministers at their sixth meeting and released to the press at 3 p. m., September 14.

through September 14. The three Foreign Ministers have met frequently in the last few years primarily because of the special and explicit responsibilities of their Governments in regard to Germany and Austria. The meetings equally offer a convenient opportunity for the three Ministers to exchange views on world developments and informally to review problems of mutual concern to their three countries.

The Foreign Ministers have noted with satisfaction the results already achieved by their three countries, together with other free nations of the world, in order to insure their common security and to safeguard the peace. They again recorded the fundamental unity of the policies of their three governments in regard to the many and acute problems facing them today.

The Foreign Ministers have reviewed the relationship of their countries to the German Federal Republic, and have agreed on instructions to the Allied High Commission for negotiation of mutually acceptable agreements with the Federal Government, the effect of which will be to transform that relationship completely.[2]

As a result of the agreement reached by the three Foreign Ministers in Brussels last December, the High Commission has already explored with the Federal Government the way to establish relations between the three Powers and the Federal Republic on as broad a contractual basis as possible, in the light of German participation in Western Defense. The Foreign Ministers have now instructed the High Commission to proceed to negotiations with the Federal Government, which will, it is hoped, culminate in early agreements between the four Governments to enter into effect together with the agreement for German participation in Western Defense through the proposed European Defense Community, whose forces would form part of the joint defense forces under the North Atlantic Supreme Command.

The Foreign Ministers have agreed on certain general principles to guide the High Commission in its negotiations with the Federal Government. As stated in the Tripartite Declaration issued today[3] the guiding principle of their policy continues to be the integration of the Federal Republic on a basis of equality within a European community itself included in a developing Atlantic Community. Such integration would thus be inconsistent with the retention in future of an occupation status or of the power to interfere in the Federal Republic's domestic affairs.

The Ministers believe that the agreements now to be reached with the Federal Government should provide the basis for its relationship to their countries until a peace settlement with a unified Germany becomes possible. The division of Germany, however, presents the conclusion of such a settlement at this time. This division and the security

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[2] For the text of the instruction, see WFM T–5*a*, p. 1197, and footnotes thereto.
[3] Tripartite D–5, *supra*.

problem confronting the Federal Republic obliges the Allies to retain, in the common interest, certain special rights but only in relation to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of the security of those forces, as well as to questions affecting Berlin and Germany as a whole, including the eventual peace settlement and the peaceful reunification of Germany.

The High Commission will proceed to negotiations with the Federal Government as rapidly as possible. The Ministers hope to be able to consider at an early meeting final drafts both of the agreements to be reached by the three Powers and the Federal Republic and of the agreement for the establishment of a European Defense Community including Germany.

The three Foreign Ministers were unanimous in stating that in the view of their Governments there is no justification for any further delay in the conclusion of a treaty for the re-establishment of a free and independent Austria. This has been the constant aim since the conclusion of hostilities. They will not desist in their efforts to bring the Soviet Government to the same view and to that end they have decided to make a new and resolute effort in the meetings of the Austrian Treaty Deputies to fulfill the long over-due pledge to the Austrian people.

The Italian Government has pointed out the contradiction between some provisions of the Italian peace treaty and the present Italian position in the family of free nations. The Ministers studied sympathetically this question which will be the subject of further conversations between the Governments.

Note was taken of the necessity further to examine in collaboration with the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the most effective use of their combined resources taking full account of the social and economic as well as of the military needs of their peoples.

While recognizing the gravity of the world situation, especially in the face of the continued defiance of the United Nations by the forces of aggression in Korea, the Ministers nevertheless found solid grounds for confidence in the growing strength and unity of the free world.

The three Ministers on behalf of their Governments and peoples restate their fidelity to the principle contained in the United Nations Charter that international differences must be resolved by peaceful processes and not by force or threat of force. They therefore express the hope that the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris will afford a real opportunity for contacts and exchanges of views which the three Foreign Ministers are, for their part, prepared fully to use.

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF BELGIUM, FRANCE, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES, AT OTTAWA, SEPTEMBER 16, 1951 [1]

740.5/9–1651

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

SECRET [OTTAWA,] September 16, 1951.

Subject: Tripartite Meeting with Benelux

Present: Mr. Acheson, Mr. Morrison, M. Schuman
Mr. Perkins, Mr. Barclay, M. Seydoux
Mr. Van Zeeland, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium
Dr. Stikker, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Netherlands
Mr. Dupong, Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Luxembourg

Mr. Acheson opened the discussion by pointing out that an attempt had been made to establish closer contact with the Benelux and to this end discussions had been held with representatives of the Benelux countries before and during the recent discussions in Washington.[2] If these conversations had been reported to the Ministers, there was little to add. He indicated that if Germany became a partner in the European Defense Force, they were entitled to a new status. This was, of course, subject to inherent limitations due to the fact that a peace treaty could not now be established. However, the suggested arrangements went as far as possible in the circumstances in giving Germany a free hand. There were still problems to be solved, such as the status of the forces of the Occupying Powers under the new arrangements and what contractual obligations there should be as to the defense burden to be borne by the Federal Republic. This probably should be based on an equality of burden in relation to what other countries participating in Western defense were doing.

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[1] The Ministers were in Ottawa for the seventh session of the North Atlantic Council; for documentation on this meeting, see pp. 616 ff.

[2] For a report on the first meeting with the Benelux representatives on September 11, see memorandum of conversation, p. 1214; the second meeting took place at 3:30 on September 14 at which time Byroade, Seydoux, and Allen explained the decisions that had been reached on Germany and gave the Benelux representatives copies of the declaration on Germany, the Foreign Ministers communiqué, and the paper on general principles regarding the contractual relations with the Federal Republic. A report on the second meeting, not printed, is in file 396.1–WA/9–1451.

In response to an inquiry for comments Mr. Stikker stated that he felt that the procedure used in Washington in keeping Benelux informed was excellent and thought that the general direction of the conversations was absolutely right. He said, however, there were some questions that he wished to raise. The first of these was that he recognized the difficulty of establishing a contractual relationship on the defense cost to be borne by Germany. The second was that he wondered about the question of equality of status. Did this mean equality of status with the three Occupying Powers? If so, what consideration was given to the fact that Germany did not have outside responsibilities as did these three Powers? He indicated that the Netherlands did not object to participation of Germany in NATO but hoped that equality did not mean that Germany would be in on the Standing Group.

Mr. Van Zeeland indicated that he agreed with the procedure and proposal which they had heard about. He was not worried about the unsolved problems—feeling that these were technical and soluble. He felt that on Germany's share of the burden the principle to be followed was that it should be broadly equal to that of others. He felt that the military participation could be taken care of through the EDF. The budget would then cover the cost of the army and such other costs for defense as it could. The question of the division of the German budget between its own army and the support of other forces in Germany was a technical question and not too disturbingly difficult. He felt it was important that the Western Powers should not take untenable positions with Germany, and the Germans must not feel that they were suppressed. He questioned the desirability of establishing a Council of Ambassadors, feeling that this might contribute to a feeling of suppression by the Germans and wondered if the three Ambassadors in Germany would not in fact constitute a Council without being so named.

Mr. Stikker asked if the question of NATO membership would be discussed.

Mr. Acheson replied that no doubt this question would arise, but that it should not come up now.

Mr. Morrison agreed that the question of NATO membership should be deferred and felt there were certain questions which had not yet been dealt with which need action. He pointed out the obligation of the Germans to pay for their own defense and said that they would have a case for claiming relief of occupation costs when they were paying for their own forces. He further indicated that he felt that the relationship of the Occupying Forces needed adjustment under the proposed set-up and that they should be certain that they were exercising economy in their expenses to justify continued contribution of the Germans to these expenses.

Mr. Acheson pointed out that once the agreements were signed the occupation forces became defense forces. Therefore, the German contribution was to defense, not to occupation.

Mr. Morrison raised the question of what would happen if the Germans did not contribute their full share to total defense.

Mr. Acheson said that the situation was most difficult since the Germans really were entering into two contracts—one with the Occupying Powers and one with the EDF. The relationship between these two obligations had to be worked out.

M. Schuman indicated that he felt strongly that the Germans must contribute adequately, and that this problem was now under discussion.

Mr. Acheson agreed, but indicated that the amount which the Germans should contribute should not be excessive or we would repeat the experience after the first World War.

Mr. Stikker said that he had been impressed by the development of the EDF. However, their mention as members has been, perhaps, premature. He asked how the work of the EDF would proceed and particularly what England meant by saying that it hoped to be associated with it.

Mr. Morrison replied that England did not intend to contribute troops.

In response to Mr. Stikker's inquiry as to where he could get more detailed information, M. Schuman referred him to M. Alphand.

Mr. Stikker indicated that they have difficulty with the EDF formula, but might be able to follow some other formula, and, therefore, were particularly interested as to how the British proposed to proceed.

In response to Mr. Van Zeeland's inquiry as to what the next procedure should be, Mr. Schuman indicated that first of all there should be a treaty of the five most interested Powers and that after that there should be general approval of the twelve Members of NATO.

MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE, AT PARIS AND ROME, NOVEMBER 1951

Editorial Note

On October 25, 1951, Secretary Acheson departed by ship for Europe where he and his advisers participated in the meetings of the Sixth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations at Paris beginning on November 6. During his stay in Paris, November 2–23, the Secretary of State met on a number of occasions with Foreign Secretary Eden and Foreign Minister Schuman on questions of mutual concern. Since their meetings had to be scheduled around the sessions of the General Assembly, the three Foreign Ministers decided at the conclusion of each meeting when they would meet next. According to the records of the Department of State, Secretary Acheson initiated the meetings with a call on Schuman on November 2. This was followed by bilateral talks with Eden on November 4, 5, 6, and 7 which were largely devoted to the topic of Iran. The three Foreign Ministers met on November 6 and 9 and discussed problems related to the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Because of the press of General Assembly meetings, only one further meeting, that of November 14 between Acheson and Eden, was held until November 20, when Acheson discussed Austria with Schuman and Foreign Minister Gruber. On the 21st Acheson, Eden, and Schuman resumed their meetings, and on the following day they met with Chancellor Adenauer to inform him of the decisions that they had taken with respect to Germany. On November 23 the three Foreign Ministers and their advisers traveled to Rome for the eighth session of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council. While in Rome the three Ministers continued their discusssions on Germany and Austria and briefed the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands on the decisions that had been taken on Germany. At the same time Acheson and Eden also held three conversations dealing respectively with Egypt, Korea, and the European Defense Community. Secretary Acheson departed from Naples on the SS *Independence* on December 4, arriving in New York on December 12.

The Department of State drafted two series of position papers in preparation for the meetings of the Foreign Ministers. The first, designated PAR D. dealt only with problems concerning Germany

and numbered nine papers in all. The second, designated NOV D, was prepared for the expected talks between Acheson and Eden and consisted of papers on the Far East, Germany, the British financial situation, and other European questions. Sets of both series of papers are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 96–98. In addition to the records in the Department of State two of the main participants, Acheson and Eden, have also written their recollections of the meetings: Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pages 511 and 578–587, describes the talks on Iran, Germany, and the subjects before the General Assembly; while Eden, *Full Circle*, pages 10–13, 17–19, and 217–225, describes the discussion of issues before the General Assembly, Korea, and Iran.

The Foreign Ministers and their principal advisers for the meetings were:

United States: Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense
Frank Pace Jr., Secretary of the Army
John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury
General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
David K. E. Bruce, Ambassador to France
Walter S. Gifford, Ambassador to the United Kingdom
John G. McCloy, High Commissioner for Germany
W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to President Truman and Chairman of the Temporary Council Committee
George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Harold F. Linder, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Colonel Henry A. Byroade, Director of the Bureau of German Affairs
G. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs
Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

United Kingdom: Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
R. A. Butler, Chancellor of the Exchequer
Lord de L'Isle and Dudley, Secretary of State for Air
Sir Ivone A. Kirkpatrick, High Commissioner for Germany
Sir Oliver C. Harvey, Ambassador to France

Sir Pierson J. Dixon, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Selwyn Lloyd, Minister of State
Frank G. Roberts, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for German Affairs
Sir Reginald J. Bowker, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Cecil C. Parrott, Head of the United Nations Political Department
Charles A. E. Shuckburgh, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

France: Robert Schuman, Minister for Foreign Affairs
René Mayer, Minister of Finance
Maurice Schumann, Deputy Foreign Minister
Henri Bonnet, Ambassador to the United States
André François-Poncet, High Commissioner for Germany
René Massigli, Ambassador to the United Kingdom
Alexandre Parodi, Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry
Jean Chauvel, Permanent Representative at the United Nations Security Council
Hervé Alphand, Deputy Representative at the NATO Council and President of the European Army Conference
Vincent Broustra, President of the Interministerial Commission charged with preparation for the General Assembly
Jacques Bourbon-Busset, Director of the Cabinet Ministry

With respect to Germany the three Foreign Ministers approved a draft of a general agreement on relations between the Federal Republic and the three Western Powers to replace the Occupation Statute for Germany and a draft security guarantee. On November 22 the texts of these agreements were communicated to Chancellor Adenauer who approved them. The Ministers also reached agreement on the terms for a German financial contribution to Western defense and on the terms for German security controls to replace the Prohibited and Limited Industries Agreement. For documentation on the Foreign Ministers discussions on contractual relations including the texts of the draft agreement on general relations and the security guarantee, see PAR M–1, PAR M–2, telegrams 3086, and Actel 20, November 22–26, and the communiqué dated November 22, pages 1597, 1604, 1605, 1609. For documentation on their discussion of a German financial contribution, see PAR M–2, PAR M–3, and PAR D–9*a*, November 26–27, pages 1676, 1681, 1685. For documentation on their discussion of German security controls, see PAR M–1, PAR M–3, and PAR M–4, Novem-

ber 23–28, pages 1715, 1721, 1726; for Secretary Acheson's report to President Truman on this subject, dated November 30, see page 1730.

In their discussions on Austria the three Foreign Ministers agreed to call a meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies to see whether the Soviet Union would accept the text of the draft Austrian Treaty as it stood at the end of 1950. If, at such a meeting, the Soviet Deputy refused to accept the draft, then further discussions would take place between the three Western governments concerning the introduction of the United States "Abbreviated Treaty" which Secretary Acheson had pressed his colleagues to accept but which both Eden and Schuman were reluctant to introduce at that time. For documentation on the Ministers discussion of the Austrian Treaty, see telegrams 3030, November 20; Secto 68, November 22; and Secto 101, November 28, in volume IV. For a report on Secretary Acheson's conversation with Gruber on November 20, see telegram 3013, November 20, *ibid.*

In their initial meetings the three Foreign Ministers discussed questions that were germane to the meetings of the United Nations General Assembly including disarmament, Chinese representation at the United Nations, and the status of Morocco. With regard to the first topic, the Ministers drafted a resolution and agreed on the strategy of its introduction to the General Assembly; with regard to the latter topics, they discussed how each should be handled during the session. For documentation on the question of disarmament, see volume I, pages 443 ff. Regarding Chinese representation and United States interest in the inclusion of the Moroccan question on the agenda of the General Assembly, see volume II, pages 209 ff. and 135 ff.

In his bilateral talks Secretary Acheson discussed Iran and Korea with Eden and the French financial situation with Schuman and other French officials. Acheson was especially interested in obtaining British agreement to the resolution of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) dispute with the Iranian Government. Prime Minister Mossadegh was in Washington at the time, and the communications between Washington and Paris show the efforts of the Secretary of State to persuade the British to modify their stand on Iran, continue negotiations with Mossadegh for a settlement of the dispute, and prevent Iran from falling into the hands of the Communists (see volume V). At the same time Secretary Acheson wanted to keep the British fully informed on the armistice talks in Korea. For records of his conversations with Eden on the subject of Korea on November 28 and 29, see volume VII.

The talks with French officials took place periodically from the time of Acheson's arrival in Paris until his departure from Rome. The Secretary of State did not participate in all of them, but a general agreement was reached to accord France $650 million in financial

aid by July 1, 1952. For documentation on these talks, see telegrams Actel 2, November 2; 2827, November 13; 2967, November 17; Toeca 1503, November 22; and Secto 111, November 29, volume IV.

From time to time during their meetings the Foreign Ministers also discussed the European Defense Community and arrangements for the Eighth NATO Council Session. Regarding these discussions, see pages 755 ff. and 693 ff.

Index for Parts 1 and 2 Appears at End of Part 2.